Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Ivanti Connect Secure: a zero-day chain that your integrity checker cannot see
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Wednesday, the fourteenth of October.
- 0:07Ivanti Connect Secure: a zero-day chain that your integrity checker cannot see.
- 0:14A V P N gateway is meant to be the locked front door of an organisation.
- 0:20This week Volexity, a US threat intelligence firm, described how one attacker walked through that door on ful
- 0:28ly patched Ivanti Connect Secure appliances, left no malware behind, and slipped past the vendor's own integri
- 0:35ty checker. Ivanti released a fix on 13 October for part of the chain.
- 0:41By Volexity's account, the final step is still unpatched.
- 0:45Next.
- 0:49Think of a receptionist who checks your pass for the public lobby, then obeys a note in your hand saying "ac
- 0:56tually, take me to the server room".
- 0:59That is the first flaw. A request to a public login page could name a different, private script in a header,
- 1:06and the access check never looked at the header.
- 1:08Volexity says the second flaw abused a race.
- 1:12The upload handler saved a file before checking it was valid, and deleted it if not.
- 1:18So the attacker ran their script in the gap.
- 1:21Those two flaws are tracked as C V E twenty twenty-six, one zero four nine three five.
- 1:29The third step turned a foothold into full control.
- 1:33Ivanti says a fix will come in a future release.
- 1:36Volexity found no web shell and no backdoor.
- 1:39Each command simply re-ran the whole chain, with the payload held in memory only.
- 1:45The attacker then used the appliance's directory service account to look up local administrator passwords and
- 1:52disk recovery keys. They captured credentials passing through the box, and edited logs on the way out.
- 1:59Volexity dates the first exploitation to 3 October.
- 2:03That's ten days before a patch existed.
- 2:06And also.
- 2:10Very little. Volexity says Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool does not detect this activity, because the change
- 2:18s sit in memory and the configuration is put back afterwards.
- 2:21So what does show up? Bursts of requests to the login page carrying an unusual routing header that doesn't m
- 2:28atch the U R L. Hidden directories and renamed packet-capture processes on the appliance.
- 2:35And directory queries for administrator passwords and recovery keys, coming from the V P N's own service acco
- 2:41unt.
- 2:4812 of them were used by ransomware groups.
- 2:50And finally.
- 2:55The deeper problem is architectural.
- 2:58An internet-facing appliance that terminates every remote session, holds a privileged directory account and c
- 3:05annot be independently inspected is a very large bet on one vendor's code.
- 3:09A tool that vouches for its own integrity, on a device the attacker already controls, is marking its own home
- 3:17work.
- 3:21Patch now, then assume nothing.
- 3:24If you ran an affected version since early October, commission memory and network forensics rather than relyi
- 3:31ng on the checker.
- 3:37Cut that account's privileges to the minimum.
- 3:40It should not be able to read administrator passwords or recovery keys.
- 3:44And log from outside the device, so an attacker can't edit the evidence.
- 3:49Opinion, not advice: a board that still treats the remote access gateway as a plumbing detail is carrying a
- 3:57risk it hasn't priced.
- 4:00The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:04Thanks for listening.