Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Stolen GitHub tokens turned thousands of build pipelines into secret thieves
Transcript
- 0:03Good morning, and welcome to Decrypted.
- 0:05I'm Belinder. It's Sunday, the fifteenth of November, twenty twenty-six, and this is the morning edition.
- 0:12Stolen GitHub tokens turned thousands of build pipelines into secret thieves.
- 0:18Over the past few days, attackers have used stolen GitHub access tokens to slip a secret-stealing script into
- 0:25the automated build pipelines of thousands of software projects.
- 0:29Then they wiped away the evidence.
- 0:31Two security firms, ox Security and Aikido, are reporting separately.
- 0:36They call the campaign wfx-loot.
- 0:39At least 1,806 repositories ran the payload and sent their secrets out.
- 0:45The attackers did not break GitHub.
- 0:47They held keys that belonged to someone else.
- 0:49So how did it actually work?
- 0:52Think of a post room that also holds the master keys.
- 0:55A C I and C D pipeline, the automated pipeline that builds and ships code, needs exactly that: cloud passwords,
- 1:03publishing tokens and service keys, all within reach of anyone who can edit its instructions.
- 1:08ox counts 4,837 hijacked accounts.
- 1:13For each repository an account could write to, the attacker first opened a pull request titled "docs: dependency
- 1:19audit notes". That was a quiet test of whether the token had write access.
- 1:24Then came a commit disguised as routine maintenance.
- 1:27It added about 1,500 lines of shell script to a workflow, or hooked into N P M, JavaScript's public library of
- 1:35add-on packages, so it ran on install.
- 1:38The next build executed it.
- 1:40Within minutes the commit was reverted and the run logs deleted.
- 1:44What did it take, and what would you see?
- 1:47Aikido says the script harvested workflow secrets, cloud credentials, registry publishing tokens and AI service
- 1:54keys. It then tried to swap that access for live A W S, Azure and Google Cloud sessions.
- 2:00To stay in, it rewrote an A W S trust policy to admit any principal, and added Azure credentials named wfx-ci,
- 2:08which survive token rotation.
- 2:10Data went to raw I P addresses and, from 12 November, partly through Telegram bots, per ox.
- 2:17So blocking addresses is not enough.
- 2:20For defenders, the tell is an absence.
- 2:23ox says the most reliable trace is a missing workflow run number, because the logs are gone.
- 2:28Search your organisation for that pull request title, for branches called wfx-docs, and for commits titled "ci:
- 2:36restore" or "ci: cleanup" since 10 November.
- 2:40If a malicious commit landed in a repository with Actions enabled, ox advises treating every secret that workflow
- 2:47could reach as stolen, even if no run is visible.
- 2:50What's the Secure by Design lesson here?
- 2:53The pipeline was trusted with too much, for too long.
- 2:57Bot accounts bypassed branch protection.
- 3:00In one project, ox says, two commits went in through its bot that way, and a contributor caught them about 20
- 3:06minutes later. Aikido adds that the script forged "success" status checks, so required checks alone are not a
- 3:13safeguard. The fixes are dull and cheap.
- 3:16Short-lived tokens. Narrow workflow permissions.
- 3:20Bots held to the same review rules as people.
- 3:23Secrets released only to the jobs that need them.
- 3:25That costs far less than rotating every credential you own.
- 3:30So ask your engineering lead three questions.
- 3:33Do we use GitHub Actions? Can any token or bot change our main branch without review?
- 3:39And if a build were hijacked today, which secrets would it be holding?
- 3:43As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 3:47That was Decrypted, with me, Belinder.
- 3:51The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:55Thanks for listening. Stay patched, and stay sceptical.