Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / ScreenConnect abused to reach dozens of firms through their IT providers
Transcript
- 0:03Good evening, and welcome to Decrypted.
- 0:05I'm Belinder. It's Thursday, the twelfth of November, twenty twenty-six, and this is the evening edition.
- 0:11screen-connect abused to reach dozens of firms through their I T providers.
- 0:17Since this morning's bulletin, a different problem has surfaced in the tools I T firms use to run other people's
- 0:24computers. On Wednesday evening, the security firm Huntress reported an active campaign against managed service
- 0:31providers, the outsourced I T firms many UK businesses rely on.
- 0:35The attackers are abusing screen-connect, a remote monitoring and management, or R M M, tool, the kind I T providers
- 0:42use to run clients' machines.
- 0:44Huntress counts 6 compromised providers and at least 286 endpoints across 47 organisations.
- 0:52It says the figures are still rising.
- 0:55So, how does this actually work?
- 0:57Think of a provider as a caretaker holding keys to every client's building, with screen-connect as the key cabinet.
- 1:04The attackers didn't pick the lock.
- 1:06Huntress says this looks like abuse of legitimate functionality, not a software flaw.
- 1:11ConnectWise, which makes screen-connect, said it has no evidence of a compromise of its own infrastructure or
- 1:17a vulnerability in the product.
- 1:19What the attackers did was use screen-connect's Run Command feature to push rogue screen-connect clients onto
- 1:25managed devices. Those clients give them access outside the provider's own environment, so the real provider can
- 1:31no longer see or cut it off.
- 1:33ConnectWise's initial assessment points to five third-party extensions: Labtech Plus, R M M Plus, R M M+ and
- 1:41two Password Link variants.
- 1:43They expose an interface that can run remote commands, guarded by a passphrase the partner sets.
- 1:49ConnectWise disabled them across about 400 partner environments.
- 1:53On-premises customers must do it themselves.
- 1:56And having an extension installed doesn't mean you were breached.
- 1:59How the attackers got in isn't confirmed.
- 2:02Huntress's telemetry points to stolen credentials or hijacked operator sessions.
- 2:07What would a defender actually see?
- 2:09A new screen-connect client on a machine where nobody installed one.
- 2:13Huntress named two rogue client I Ds, 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091.
- 2:27Sequential tags in the attacker's installers suggest earlier victims, so Huntress advises checking Run Command
- 2:33history even if no alert fired.
- 2:35The worse possibility is unconfirmed.
- 2:38ConnectWise has reports of technician workstations being compromised during interactive sessions with infected
- 2:44devices. That would turn one client's problem into the provider's, and then every other client's.
- 2:50Disabling the extensions is containment only.
- 2:53It doesn't remove malware or access already established.
- 2:56So, what's the Secure by Design lesson here?
- 2:59A tool that can run commands on every client machine shouldn't let third-party code reach that power behind a
- 3:06single shared passphrase. Secure by Design would have extensions off by default, narrowly scoped, approved per
- 3:12action and logged where the customer can see it.
- 3:15The console itself would sit behind multi-factor authentication, M F A, a second check on top of the password.
- 3:22The cost is friction for technicians, which is why it must be built in.
- 3:26For a UK director, the useful step is a conversation, not a patch.
- 3:30Ask your provider which extensions its remote tool runs.
- 3:34Ask whether console logins need M F A.
- 3:36And ask whether it can show you what was run on your machines this month.
- 3:40As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 3:45That was Decrypted, with me, Belinder.
- 3:47The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:51Thanks for listening. Stay patched, and stay sceptical.