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03 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Book three, Chapter one. Since therefore virtue is conversant with passions and actions,
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and praise and blame accompany things of a voluntary nature, but pardon and
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sometimes pity such as are involuntary, it is perhaps necessary that those who speculate
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concerning virtue should define the voluntary and involuntary. This will also be useful to
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legislators in conferring rewards and inflicting punishments. But those actions appear to be involuntary,
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which are done by force or through ignorance, And the violent is that
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the principle of which is external, being of such a nature that it contributes
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nothing to the advantage of him who acts, or of him who suffers,
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As if, for instance, the wind or man, who are the masters
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of some one, should bring him to a certain place. With respect to
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such things, however, as are performed through the fear of greater evils,
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or for the sake of something beautiful in conduct, as if a tyrant who
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is the lord of parents and children should command one to do a certain base
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action, and on these conditions, that if he did it, his parents
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and children should be saved, but if he did not, they should die.
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With respect to such things as these, it is dubious whether they are
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voluntary or involuntary. Something of the like kind also happens in losses at sea,
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when in a tempest the goods of the ship are thrown overboard. For
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simply considered, no one throws them into the sea willingly, but every one
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who is endued with intellect does so for his own safety and that of the
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rest of the crew. Such like actions therefore are mixed. But they are
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more similar to voluntary actions, for they are than eligible when they are performed.
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But the end of the action is according to opportunity. A thing therefore
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must be said to be done voluntarily or involuntarily, then when it is done,
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But he threw his goods into the sea voluntarily, for the principle of
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moving the organic parts in such like actions is in the man himself. But
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those things of which the principle is in himself, he has the power to
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reform or not. Such things, therefore are voluntary simply considered. However,
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they are perhaps involuntary, for no one would choose any one of these on
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its own account. But in such like actions men are sometimes praised when they
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endure something disgraceful or painful, for the sake of great and beautiful circumstances,
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and if they do otherwise, they are blamed. For to endure the most
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disgraceful things with a view to nothing beautiful or moderate is the part of a
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bad man. To other things, however, no praise is given, but
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pardon is granted to them. When a man does what he ought not to
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do in consequence of being compelled by such things as pass human nature and which
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no one can endure. And perhaps there are some things which we ought never
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to do by any compulsion, but we ought to suffer the most dreadful evils
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and die rather than do them, for those circumstances appear to be ridiculous,
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which compelled the Elkmaeon of Euripides to kill his mother. It is, however,
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sometimes difficult to judge what is to be chosen in preference to something else,
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and whether this is to be endured instead of that. And it is
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still more difficult to persevere in our decisions, since, for the most part,
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things which are expected are attended with molestation, in things which we are
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compelled to do are base. Hence, both praise and blame are given to
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those that act from compulsion and to those who do. Not what kind of
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things therefore are to be called violent? Shall we say that they are then
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simply to be called so when the cause is in things external, and the
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agent contributes nothing to the action, but they things which are of themselves involuntary
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indeed, but are now eligible, and are eligible instead of certain other things,
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and the principle of which is in the agent. These are, of
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themselves indeed involuntary, but now and instead of certain other things, are voluntary.
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They are, however, more similar to voluntary actions, for actions are
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conversant with particulars than these are voluntarily performed. It is not, however,
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easy to show what things are to be chosen in preference to others, for
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there are many differences in particulars. But if it should be said that things
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delectable and beautiful are violent, for they compel us to act, being external.
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If this should be said, all things will thus be violent. For
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all men do everything for the sake of these, and those indeed who act
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from violence and unwillingly act painfully. But those who are influenced by the delectable
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act with pleasure. It is therefore ridiculous for man to accuse external things and
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not himself when he is easily captivated by things of this kind, and to
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consider himself as the cause of beautiful actions, but delectable things as the causes
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of his base actions. Hence, the violent appears to be that the principle
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of which is external, and to which the thing compelled contributes nothing. Everything,
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however, which is done from ignorance, is not voluntary, but that
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is involuntary which is attended with pain and repentance. For he who does anything
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from ignorance and is not at all indignant with the action, does not indeed
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perform it willingly, because he acts from ignorance. Nor yet again, does
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he perform it unwillingly in consequence of feeling no pain from the action of those
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therefore, who act from ignorance. He who repents of what he has done
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appears to have acted unwillingly. But he who does not repent, since he
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is a different character from the other, may be said to have acted not
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willingly. For since he is a different character, it is better that he
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should have a proper name. To act from ignorance likewise appears to be a
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different thing from acting ignorantly. For he who is intoxicated or enraged does not
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appear to act from ignorance, but from some one of the above mentioned circumstances,
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yet not knowingly, but ignorantly. Every depraved man therefore is ignorant what
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ought to be done and from what actions he should abstain, And from error
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of this kind may become unjust and in short bad. But an action ought
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to be called involuntary, not if he who does it is ignorant of what
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is advantageous. For ignorance in the deliberate choice of a thing is not the
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cause of involuntary conduct, but of depravity. Nor is the ignorance of universal
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the cause of it, for men are blamed on this account. But it
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arises from the ignorance of particulars in which and about which every action is conversant.
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For in these there is pity and pardon. Since he who is ignorant
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of any one of these acts involuntarily. Perhaps, however, it will not
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be amiss to define what and how many the particular circumstances are which render an
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action involuntary. They are, therefore the circumstance of the principal agent, the
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circumstance of the instrumental agent, the circumstance of the end and the circumstances of
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the action itself. No one, therefore will be ignorant of all these unless
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he is insane. But it is evident that neither will he who acts be
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ignorant of them, or how can he be ignorant of himself. A man,
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however, may be ignorant of what he does, as is the case
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with those who say that they have spoken unawares, or that they did not
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know what they said was our kane, as Eschylus with respect to the mysteries,
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or as when some one throws a catapulta not knowing what he throws.
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A person also may fancy, like Meropi, that a son is an enemy,
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and that a spear which has a sharp point is blunt like a ball,
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or that a stone is uponmus. A man, likewise, striking another
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with a view to his safety, may kill him, and wishing to show
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the mode of exercise and wrestling, he may strike him whom he wished to
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instruct. As there is ignorance. Therefore, in all these particulars in which
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there is action, he who is ignorant of some one of them appears to
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have acted involuntarily, And especially in those things which are of principal importance.
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But those appear to be of principal importance in which there is action, and
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that for the sake of which action is undertaken. Since the involuntary therefore is
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denominated from an ignorance of this kind, it is besides this necessary that the
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action should be painful and attended with repentance. But as the involuntary is that
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which is done from violence and through ignorance, the voluntary will appear to be
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that of which which the principle is in the agent who knows the particulars in
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which the action consists. For perhaps it is not well said that actions which
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are produced through anger or desire are involuntary. For in the first place,
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indeed, if this were admitted, no other animal would act voluntarily, nor
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would children. And in the next place, whether are any of the actions
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which we perform through the influence of desire or anger done by us voluntarily?
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Or shall we say that worthy actions are performed by us voluntarily, but base
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actions involuntarily? Or would not this be ridiculous, since there is one cause
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of both of these. Perhaps, too, it is absurd to call those
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things involuntary, after which it is requisite to aspire but it is necessary to
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be angry with certain things and to desire others, such as health and discipline.
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It appears, however, that things involuntary are painful, but that those
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which are the objects of desire are delectable. Again, what difference is there
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between the errors which are caused by reason or by anger with respect to their
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being involuntary? For both are to be avoided. The irrational passions also do
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not appear to be less human. But the actions of man proceed both from
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anger and desire. It would be absurd, therefore, to consider these as
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involuntary. Chapter two. Having therefore defined the voluntary and involuntary, it follows
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that we should discuss pre election or deliberate choice. For deliberate choice appears to
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be most aligned to virtue, and by this, as a rule, a
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judgment may be formed of manners more than by actions. Deliberate choice therefore appears
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indeed to be a voluntary thing. Yet it is not the same with what
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is voluntary. But the voluntary is more extended. For of the voluntary children
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and other animals partake, but they do not partake of deliberate Schafthoe. And
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we say, indeed, the things which we do suddenly are done voluntarily,
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but not according to deliberate choice. But those who call it desire or anger,
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or will or a certain opinion do not appear to speak rightly. For
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deliberate choice is not common to us and irrational animals, but desire and anger
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are. And the incontinent man indeed acts from the influence of desire, but
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not from deliberate choice. On the contrary, the continent man acts from deliberate
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choice, and not from the impulse of desire. And desire indeed is contrary
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to deliberate choice, But desire is not contrary to desire. Desire, likewise,
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is conversant both with that which is delectable and that which is painful.
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But deliberate choice is neither conversant with the painful nor the delectable. Much less
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is deliberate choice anger. For in the smallest degree do things which are affected
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through anger appear to be affected by deliberate choice. Nor yet is it will.
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The will appears to be near to it, For deliberate choice, indeed
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is not among the number of things impossible. And if any one should say
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that he deliberately chooses impossibilities, he would appear to be stupid. The will,
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however, is directed to things which are impossible, as for instance,
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to immortality. And the will indeed is also conversant with things which can,
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by no means be accomplished by him who wills, as that a certain player
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or person engaged in athletic contests may be victorious. No one, however,
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deliberately chooses things of this kind, but only such as he things can be
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affected through himself. Farther still, the will indeed is more directed to the
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end, but deliberate choice to things pertaining to the end. Thus we wish
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to be well, but we deliberately choose those things through which we become well.
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And we wish indeed to be happy. And we say that this is
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our wish. But it is not fit to say that we deliberately choose to
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be happy. For in short, deliberate choice appears to be conversant with the
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things that are in our power. Neither therefore, will deliberate choice be opinion.
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For opinion indeed appears to be conversant with all things, and no less
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with things eternal and impossible than with things in our power. Opinion likewise is
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divided into the false and the true, and not into good and evil,
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But deliberate choice is rather divided into the latter than into the former. In
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shorts. Therefore, perhaps no one will say that deliberate choice is either the
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same with opinion in general or with some particular opinion. For by deliberately choosing
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good or evil, we become affected with a certain quality. But this does
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not happen to us through forming an opinion. And we deliberately choose, indeed
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to obtain or avoid or to do something of the like kind. But we
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form an opinion of what it is, or to what it is advantageous,
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or in what manner, and we do not very much appine to obtain or
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avoid it. And deliberate choice indeed is praised because it pertains to that of
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which it is necessary to partake more abundantly or with rectitude. But opinion is
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praised for its truth. We likewise deliberately choose those things which we especially know
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to be good, but we form an opinion of things which are not very
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much known to us. And the same persons do not appear to deliberately choose
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and opine the most excellent things. But some indeed opine that which is better,
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but from vice choose those things which ought not to be the objects of
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choice. It is, however, of no consequence whether opinion precedes or follows
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deliberate choice, for our attention is not directed to this, but to the
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consideration whether deliberate choice is the same with a certain opinion. What, then,
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or what kind of a thing is the de liberate choice? Since it
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is no one of the above mentioned particulars, It appears therefore to be a
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voluntary thing. Not everything, however, which is voluntary, is the object
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of deliberate choice, but that which has been the subject of previous deliberation.
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For deliberate choice is accompanied with reason and the discourse of energy of reason,
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and this the name appears to signify the object of deliberate choice, being that
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which is eligible in preference to other things. Chapter three. But whether do
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men consult about all things? And is everything a subject of consultation? Or
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about certain things? Is there no consultation? Perhaps, however, that must
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be called a subject of consultation, not about which some stupid or insane person
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consults, but which is an object of consultation to a man endued with intellect.
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Concerning eternal things, However, no one consults such as concerning the world
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world, or the diagonal and side of a square, because they are incommensurable.
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Nor does anyone consult about things which are in motion, but which are
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always passing into existence after the same manner, whether from necessity or naturally,
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or from some other cause, such as conversions and risings. Nor does anyone
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consult about things which subsist differently at different times, such as about drought and
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rain, nor about fortuitous events such as the discovery of a treasure. And
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yet about all human concerns, for no Lacedaemonian consults. How the polity of
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the Scythians may be governed in the best manner, since none of these things
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can be affected by us. But we consult about things which can be performed
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by us. And these are the rest of things which we have not mentioned.
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For nature, necessity, and fortune appear to be causes. And besides
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these, intellect and everything which energizes through man. The individuals, however,
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of the human species, consult about things which may be performed by them.
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And indeed, in those sciences which are accurate and sufficient to themselves, there
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is no consultation, as for instance, there is no consultation about letters for
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there is no contention how we should write, but such things as are affected
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by us, yet not always after the same manner. About these we consult
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as about things pertaining to medicine and the art of procuring money, and about
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the art of the pilot, more than about the gymnastic art, because the
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former is much less accurate than the latter. In a similar manner, also
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we consult about the rest. But we consult more in the arts than in
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the sciences, for we dissent more about them. Consultation, however, takes
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place in things which have a frequency of subsistence, but of which the event
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is in manifest, and in things in which there is the indefinite. In
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things also which are of great importance, we employ counselors, distrusting our own
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judgment as not sufficient. We consult, however, not about ends, but
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about things pertaining to ends. For neither does a physician consult whether he shall
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heal a sick, nor a rhetorician whether he shall persuade, nor the politician
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whether he shall establish equitable legislation. Nor does any one of the remaining characters
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consult about the end. But proposing a certain end, they consider how and
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by what means it may be obtained. If also it appears that this end
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is to be obtained through many media, they consider through which of them it
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may be obtained in the easiest and best manner. But if through one medium,
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they consider how it may be accomplished through this and through what likewise this
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may be obtained, until they arrive at the first cause, which is discovered
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in the last place. For he who consults appears to investigate and analyze in
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the above mentioned manner, as if if he were investigating and analyzing a diagram.
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It appears, however, that not every investigation is a consultation. For
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mathematical inquiries are not consultations. But every consultation is an investigation. And that
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which is last in analysis is first in generation. And if indeed, in
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consulting we meet with an impossibility, we desist from consultation, as if there
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should be occasion for money, and this cannot be procured. But if that
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about which we consult appears to be possible, then we endeavor to obtain it.
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Those things, however, are possible, which may be accomplished through ourselves.
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For things which are accomplished through our friends are in a certain respect affected
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through ourselves, since the principle is in us. But at one time instruments
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are explored, and at another time the use of them, and in a
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similar manner in other things, at one time indeed, that being investigated,
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through which the end may be obtained, and at another time the manner man.
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Therefore, as we have said, appears to be the principle of actions.
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But consultation is about things which may be performed by man, and actions
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are for the sake of other things. Hence, the end will not be
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the object of consultation, but things which pertain two ends. Neither therefore will
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particulars be the objects of consultation, as whether this thing is bred or as
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well baked, or is made as it ought to be. For these things
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pertain to sense. But if a man always consults, there will be a
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procession to infinity. The object of consultation, however, and the pre eligible
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or object of deliberate choice, are the same, except that the object of
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pre election or deliberate choice is something which is now definite. For the pre
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eligible is that which is preferred from consultation. For everyone ceases to investigate how
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he shall act when he has reduced the principle to himself and to that part
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of himself which ranks as the leader, since this part is that which he
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deliberately chooses. But this also is evident from the ancient polities which Homer has
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imitated, for the kings of these polities announced to the people what they had
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deliberately chosen to do. Since, however, that which is pre eligible is
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an object of consultation appetible of things which are in our power. Pre election
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also, or deliberate choice will be an appetite of or tendency two things in
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our power, accompanied with consultation for forming a judgment. In consequence of having
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consulted, we desire conformably to consultation. We have therefore adumbrated what pre election
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is and what the things are with which it is conversant, and have shown
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that it belongs to things which have reference to ends. Chapter four. That
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will, however, pertains to the end we have shown. But this end
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to some persons appears to be the good, and to others apparent good.
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But it happens to those who say that the object of the will is the
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good, that what he wills who does not choose rightly is not an object
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of will, For if it were an object of will, it would also
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be good. It may, however, happen to be bad. And it
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happens to those who say that the object of the will is apparent good,
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that the object of the will has not a natural subsistence, but is what
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appears to anyone to be eligible. A different thing, however, appears to
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be eligible to a different person, And if it should so happen, contraries
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appear to be eligible. If therefore, these things are not approved, we
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must say that simply and in reality, the good is indeed the object of
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the will, but that apparent good is the object of the will to everyone.
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To the worthy man, therefore, real good is the object of the
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will, but to the bad man casual good. Just as in bodies,
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to such as are well disposed, those things are salubrious, which are in
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reality so, but other things to such as are diseased. And the light
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takes place in things that are bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and
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each of the rest. For the worthy man judges of everything rightly, and
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in everything the truth presents itself to his view. For according to every habit,
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there are things beautiful and delectable which are peculiar to that habit. And
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perhaps the worthy man very much excels others in this, that he sees the
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truth in everything, being as it were, the rule and measure of things.
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But with the multitude, deception is present on account of pleasure, For
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pleasure, though not good, appears to be so. The multitude therefore choose
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the delectable as good, but fly from pain as an evil. Chapter.
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Since the end therefore is the object of the will. But things pertaining to
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the end are the objects of consultation and deliberate choice. The actions which are
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conversant with these will be actions of deliberate choice and voluntary. But with these
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the energies of the virtues are conversant. Virtue therefore also is in our power,
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and in a similar manner vice, For in those things in which to
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act is in our power, not to act is also in our power.
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And in those things in which we have the power not to act, we
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have likewise the power to act. Hence, if to act worthily is in
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our power, not to act basely will likewise be in our power. And
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if we have the power of not acting worthily, we have also the power
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of acting basely. But if to act, and in a similar manner not
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to act worthily and basely are in our power, and this is to be
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good or bad. It will be in our power to be worthy or depraved
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characters. And to say, with a certain tragic poet that quote no one
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is willingly depraved nor unwillingly blessed close quote seems to be partly false and partly
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true. For no one is unwillingly blessed. But depravity is voluntary. Or
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unless this is admitted, what we have just now asserted must be controverted.
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And it must not be said that man is the principle and generator of actions
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in the same manner as he is of children. But if these things are
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admitted, and we cannot refer them to any other principles than those which are
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in our power, it follows that those things are in our power and are
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voluntary, of which also the principles are in our power. The truth of
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this appears to be tested did both privately by individuals and publicly by legislators themselves,
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for they castigate and punish those who act depravely if they do not act
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from compulsion or from ignorance, of which they were not the causes, but
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They honor those who act well in order that they may excite these and impede
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those. No one, however, exhorts others to the performance of such actions
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as are neither in our power nor a voluntary because no advantage can be derived
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from persuading us not to be hot, or be in pain, or be
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hungry, or anything else of the like kind. For notwithstanding the persuasion,
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we shall no less suffer these things. For legislators also punish a man for
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his ignorance if he appears to be the cause of his ignorance. Thus,
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double punishments are ordained for those that are intoxicated, for the principle is in
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themselves, because they have the power of not becoming intoxicated, and this i
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e. Intoxication is the cause of their ignorance. They likewise punish those who
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are ignorant of anything which is legally established, which ought to be known,
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and which it is not difficult to know. And in a similar manner in
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other things which men appear to be ignorant of from negligence, and of which
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it is in their power not to be ignorant. For it is in our
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power to pay attention to what ought to be known. Perhaps, However,
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it may be said that a man is a person of such a character that
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he cannot pay attention. But such persons are themselves the causes of their characteristic
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qualities in consequence of living negligently. The causes, likewise, of men being
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unjust or intemperate, are in themselves in consequence of the former acting wickedly,
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and of the latter spending their time in drinking and things of the like kind.
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For energies in everything render them those who employ them similar to such energies.
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This, however, is evident from those who exercise themselves in any contest
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or action, for they persevere in energizing to be ignorant. Therefore, that
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in everything from energizing about the thing habits are produced is the province of a
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very insensate man. Again, it is absurd to suppose that he who acts
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unjustly is unwilling to be unjust, or that he who acts intemperately is unwilling
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to be intemperate. But if any one does those things from which he will
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be unjust, not ignorantly, he will be unjust willingly. Nevertheless, though
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he should wish, he will not cease to be unjust. And become just.
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For neither does he who is diseased become well by wishing to be so,
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even though it should happen that he is voluntarily diseased by living intemperately and
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disobeying his physicians. Prior therefore, to his living intemperately, it was in
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his parer not to be diseased. But after having abandoned himself to intemperance,
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it was no longer possible, as neither is it possible for him who has
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thrown a stone to resume it. At the same time, it was in
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his power to emit from his hand and hurl a stone, for he contained
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the principle of action in himself. Thus, also to the unjust and intemperate
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man, it was possible from the beginning not to be unjust and intemperate,
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on which account they are voluntarily so. But when they are become such characters,
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it is no longer possible for them not to be so. Not only,
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however, the vices of the soul are voluntary, but in some persons
29:38
also the vices of the body, which likewise we reprehended. For no one
29:44
reprehends those who are naturally deformed, but we blame those who are so through
29:48
the want of exercise and from negligence. The like also takes place in imbecility
29:56
and mutilation. For no one would reproach a man who is blind from need
30:00
or disease, or a blow, but would rather pity him. But every
30:03
one would reprove him who is blind from drinking wine, to excess, or
30:08
from any other species of intemperance. Of the vices therefore pertaining to the body,
30:15
those indeed that are in our power are blamed, but those which are
30:18
not are not reprehended. But if this be the case in other things,
30:22
also the vices which are reprehended will be in our power. If, however,
30:27
some one should say that all men aspire after a parent could, but
30:32
that we have no authority over the fantasy, and that such as every one
30:36
is such, also does the end appear to him to be. If indeed
30:41
every one is to himself in a certain respect the cause of habit, he
30:45
will also be in a certain respect the cause to himself of the fantasy,
30:49
i e. Of the conception which he forms of a thing in his imagination.
30:55
But if no one is the cause to himself of bad conduct, but
30:59
he acts evinly from an ignorance of the end, fancying that by so acting
31:03
he shall obtain the greatest good. And if the desire of the end is
31:07
not spontaneous, but it is requisite that everyone should be borne endued, as
31:12
it were, with sight, by which he may judge rightly and may choose
31:17
real good. And if also he is naturally of a good disposition, in
31:22
whom this is well implanted by nature. For that which is greatest and most
31:26
beautiful, and which can neither be obtained nor learned from another person, but
31:30
which such as a man is naturally such he possesses, and to be naturally
31:36
inclined to this well and beautifully will be a perfect and true natural goodness of
31:41
disposition. If these things are true, why will virtue more than vice be
31:45
voluntary? For the end appears and is similarly posited both to the good and
31:52
the bad man, either by nature or in some other way. But referring
31:56
other things to this, they act in any manner whatever. Whether therefore the
32:02
end, whatever it may be, is not apparent to every one from nature,
32:07
but there is also something with him who acts, or whether the end
32:10
is natural, Yet, because a worthy man performs other things voluntarily, and
32:15
therefore virtue is voluntary. Vice also will be no less voluntary, For in
32:22
a bad as well as in a good man, there is similarly a power
32:24
of acting from himself in what he does, though the intention of the end
32:30
is not in our power. If therefore, as we have said, the
32:34
virtues are voluntary, for we ourselves, in a certain respect are the concuses
32:38
of habits, and in consequence of being disposed in a certain way, we
32:44
propose to ourselves a certain end. If this be the case, the vices
32:49
also will be voluntary. For a similar reason. We have therefore spoken in
32:53
common concerning the virtues, have adumbraided the genus of them, and have shown
33:00
own that they are media and habits. We have likewise unfolded what the things
33:05
are from which they are produced, and have shown that they are caused by
33:08
energies, and are the principles of energies similar to those by which they are
33:14
generated. That they are likewise in our power and our voluntary things. And
33:20
this in such a way as right reason shall ordain. Actions. However,
33:24
and habits are not similarly voluntary. For of actions we are the lords from
33:30
the beginning to the end. Since we have a knowledge of particulars, but
33:35
of habits we are only lords of the principle. The accession, however,
33:38
of particulars is not known, as it is in diseases, but because it
33:44
is in our power thus to use or not to use particulars. On this
33:47
account, our habits are voluntary. Resuming therefore the discussion of each of the
33:52
virtues, let us show what they are, what the quality of the things
33:57
is with which they are conversant, and how they subsist. But at the
34:01
same time it will be manifest how many there are. And in the first
34:06
place, let us consider fortitude Chapter six. That fortitude therefore is indeed a
34:15
medium which is conversant with fear and audacity has been already observed by us.
34:22
But we evidently fear things of a terrible nature, and these are in short
34:27
evils. Hence, also fear is defined to be the expectation of evil.
34:32
We fear therefore all things that are evil, such as infamy, poverty,
34:37
disease, the want of friends, and death. The brave man, however,
34:43
does not appear to be conversant with all evils, for it is necessary
34:46
and beautiful to be afraid of some things, and not to be afraid of
34:50
them is base, as, for instance, not to be afraid of infamy.
34:54
For he who is afraid of this is a worthy and modest man.
35:00
But he who is not afraid of it is impudent. He is, however,
35:04
metaphorically called by some a brave man, for he has something similar to
35:08
the brave man, since the brave man also is fearless. But perhaps it
35:14
is not proper to fear poverty or disease, or in short, such things
35:19
as neither proceed from vice nor from ourselves. Yet neither is he who is
35:23
fearless with respect to these, a brave man. We denominate him, however,
35:28
brave from similitude. For some men who, in the dangers of war
35:31
are timid, are liberal and possess a proper confidence in the loss of money.
35:37
Neither therefore is he timid who dreads insolent conduct towards his children and wife,
35:43
or envy, or anything of the like kind. Nor is he a
35:46
brave man if he is confident when he is about to be whipped with what
35:52
kind of dreadful things? Therefore is the brave man conversant? Shall we say,
35:55
with such as are the greatest? For no one endure dreadful things better.
36:00
But death is the most dreadful of things, for it is the end
36:05
of life, and nothing farther appears to remain for him who is dead,
36:07
either good or bad. But neither does the brave man appear to be conversant
36:14
with every kind of death, as for instance, death in the sea or
36:19
from disease. With What kinds of death, therefore is he conversant? Shall
36:23
we not say, with those that are most beautiful? But these are the
36:28
deaths which happen in war, For such a death is attended with the greatest
36:31
and most beautiful danger. And the truth of this is confirmed by the honors
36:37
which cities and monarchs confer on those who conduct themselves bravely in war. He
36:43
therefore may properly be called a brave man who is intrepid with respect to a
36:47
beautiful death, and such things as are the causes of death when they are
36:51
near. But things of this kind are especially such as happen in war.
36:55
Nevertheless, in the sea and in diseases, the brave man is intrepid,
37:00
yet not in the same manner as sailors are. For brave men, when
37:06
they despair of their safety, indignantly bear death of this kind but sailors have
37:12
good hope of escaping from their experience. At the same time, brave men
37:16
act with fortitude in those things in which strength of mind is requisite, or
37:22
it is beautiful to die. But neither of these exists in such like destructions.
37:25
As we have mentioned chapter seven. The same thing, however, is
37:31
not terrible to all men. But we say that there is also something which
37:36
is above man. This therefore is indeed terrible to everyone endued with intellect.
37:42
But the terrible things which do not exceed the endurance of human nature differ in
37:46
magnitude and in the more and the less, and the light takes place in
37:52
things pertaining to confidence. The brave man, however, is unterrified as a
37:57
man. He will therefore indeed dread things of this kind, yet in such
38:01
a manner as is proper, and as reason prescribes, for the sake of
38:06
the beautiful in conduct, for this is the end of virtue. But it
38:10
is possible to be terrified at these in a greater and less degree. And
38:15
it is also possible to dread things which are not dreadful, as if they
38:19
were so. Of the errors. However, in the endurance of things terrible,
38:23
one consists in dreading what it is not proper to dread, another in
38:29
dreading not as is proper, but another in not dreading when it is proper,
38:34
or something of this kind, and in a similar manner, in what
38:37
pertains to confidence. He therefore, who endures and fears things which it is
38:43
requisite to endure in fear, and for the sake of that for which it
38:45
is requisite, and in such a way as and when it is requisite,
38:51
and in a similar manner, He who thus confides is a brave man.
38:54
For the brave man suffers and acts according to the importance of the thing,
38:59
and conformably to reason. But the end of every energy is the end,
39:04
according to habit i e. The beautiful in conduct, And to the brave
39:08
man, fortitude is beautiful. The end also is a thing of this kind,
39:14
for everything is defined by the end for the sake of the beautiful in
39:17
conduct. Therefore, the brave man endures and performs all that pertains to fortitude.
39:23
Of the characters, however, which exceed he indeed, who exceeds in
39:28
fearlessness is anonymous. But it has been before observed by us that many things
39:34
are anonymous. He, however, who fears nothing neither earthquakes nor inundations,
39:39
as it is said of the celtae, will be an insane person, or
39:44
one who has no sense of pain. But he who exceeds in confidence respecting
39:47
things of a terrible nature will be audacious. The audacious man also appears to
39:52
be arrogant and a pretender to fortitude. Such therefore, as the brave man
39:58
is with respect to things of it terrible nature, such does the audacious man
40:01
wish to appear, And hence in those things in which he is able,
40:07
he imitates him. On this account, also, many audacious persons have timidity
40:12
united with audacity, for in consequence of their audacity, when danger is not
40:16
imminent, they do not endure things of a dreadful nature when they occur.
40:22
But he who exceedes in fearing is timid, for he fears what he ought
40:25
not, and in such a manner as he ought not to fear. And
40:30
all such things are consequent to him. But he is deficient in confiding,
40:35
as he exceeds. However in pains he is more apparent. The timid man
40:39
therefore is hopeless, for he fears all things, but the brave man is
40:45
the contrary. For confidence is the province of the man who hopes for the
40:49
best. The timid, the audacious and the brave man, therefore are conversant
40:53
with the same things, but they are differently affected towards them. For the
40:59
timid and the audacious man exceed and are deficient, but the brave man is
41:04
disposed towards things dreadful in the middle way, and in such a manner as
41:08
is proper. And audacious men, indeed are precipitate and wish to encounter dangers
41:15
before they arrive, but when they arrive they are deficient in fortitude. Brave
41:20
men, however, are ardent in encountering danger, and before it arrives they
41:23
are quiet. As we have said, Therefore, fortitude is a medium conversant
41:29
with those things of a dreadful nature, and such as pertain to confidence,
41:34
which we have mentioned, and it chooses and endures them because it is beautiful.
41:37
To do so, or not to do so, is base. But
41:42
to die in order to avoid poverty or on account of love or something painful,
41:47
is not the province of a brave but rather of a timid man,
41:52
For it is effeminate to fly from things laborious, and such do not endure
41:57
death. Because it is beautiful to endure it, but in order to fly
42:00
from evil. Fortitude therefore is a certain thing of this kind. Chapter eight.
42:07
Other kinds of fortitude also are denominated according to four modes, and in
42:14
the first place indeed political fortitude, since this most resembles fortitude truly so called,
42:20
for citizens appear to endure dangers on account of the punishments and disgrace inflicted
42:25
by the laws, and also on account of the honors they confer. Hence,
42:30
the most brave men appear to be found among those with whom the timid
42:34
are disgraced and the brave are honored. Homer likewise introduces such persons as,
42:40
for instance, Diomede and Hector quote shall proud Polydamus before the gate proclaim his
42:49
counsels are obeyed too late, which timely followed, But the former night what
42:53
numbers had been saved by Hector's flight close quote? And Diomede quote, but
43:02
ah, what grief should haughty Hector boast I have fled inglorious to the guarded
43:07
coast close quote. This species of fortitude, however, is especially similar to
43:14
the before mentioned because it is produced from virtue. For it is generated through
43:19
shame and a desire of the beautiful in conduct, for it is through a
43:22
desire of honor and a flight from disgrace, which is dishonorable. Those also
43:29
may be ranked among brave men who are compelled to be brave by their rulers.
43:34
But they are inferior to the former, i e. The politically brave,
43:37
because their conduct is not produced through shame but through fear, and is
43:43
not the consequence of flying from what is base, but from what is painful,
43:46
For they are compelled by their masters. Thus Hector quote on rushed bold,
43:54
Hector gloomy, as the knight forbids to plunder, animates the fight points
44:00
to the fleet. For by the gods who flies, who dares but linger
44:06
by this hand he dies no weeping sister. His cold eye shall close,
44:12
no friendly hand, his funeral pile compose who stops to plunder at this signal
44:17
hour, the birds shall tear him, and the dog's devour close quote.
44:24
And the generals scourge the soldiers if they desert their ranks. The same thing
44:30
also is done by those who dispose their troops before Foss's and adopt other methods
44:35
of the like kind. For all these employ force It is necessary, however,
44:39
not to be brave from necessity, but because it is beautiful to be
44:44
so. But experience, but particulars appears to be a certain fortitude. Whence
44:50
also Socrates thought that fortitude was a science. And indeed there are other such
44:54
persons in other things. But soldiers are such Inmarli like a fair for it
45:00
seems that there are many vain terrors in war, of which soldiers are especially
45:05
aware. Soldiers therefore appear to be brave because other persons do not understand the
45:10
nature of these alarms. In the next place, they are especially able from
45:15
their experience to attack their enemies without receiving any injury themselves. They also know
45:21
how to guard against and strike their enemies in consequence of being able to use
45:25
their arms and having armor of such a kind as is most excellent for the
45:30
purpose of attacking without being injured by their adversaries. They fight therefore, like
45:37
armed with unarmed men, and like athletes with those that are unskilled in athletic
45:43
exercises. For in such like contests, not the most brave are the most
45:47
adapted to fight, but those who are most strong, and those whose bodies
45:52
are in the most excellent condition. But soldiers become timid when the danger is
45:57
excessive and they are deficient in numbers and warlike apparatus. For the merely skillful
46:04
are the first that fly, But those who act bravely according to political circumstances,
46:08
die, remaining at their post, as it happened at the Hermaeus,
46:13
since to citizens, flight is base and death is more eligible than such a
46:17
preservation. But the soldiers in this battle at Hermaus encountered the danger at first
46:24
as thinking themselves superior to their enemies, But when they saw the full extent
46:30
of the danger, they fled, dreading death more than disgrace. The brave
46:34
man, however, is not a person of this description. Anger also is
46:38
referred to fortitude, for men likewise appear to be brave on account of anger,
46:45
just as wild beasts rush on those that moon them, because brave men
46:47
also are irascable. Whence, Homer says, quote strength be to anger added,
46:58
and his ardor and his wrath he roused, and pungent fury from his
47:06
nostrils flowed, and his blood boiled close quote. For everything of this kind
47:16
appears to signify the energy and impulse of anger. Brave men therefore act on
47:22
account of the beautiful in conduct, but anger cooperates with them, and savage
47:29
animals act through the influence of pain, for they act because they are wounded
47:34
or terrified, since if they are in a wood or in a marsh,
47:37
they do not attack anyone. Hence, those persons are not brave or are
47:42
impelled to danger by pain and anger, for seeing nothing that is dreadful.
47:46
Since thus, asses also would be brave when they are hungry, for they
47:51
cannot, even by blows, be driven from their pasture. Adulterers, likewise,
47:57
perform many audacious deeds through their lustful desire. Those therefore are not brave
48:02
or impelled to danger through pain or anger. The fortitude, however, appears
48:07
to be most natural, which subsists on account of anger, and which assumes
48:13
deliberate choice, and that for the sake of which a thing is done or
48:16
the final cause. Men also, when they are angry, are pained,
48:21
but are delighted when they take vengeance on the authors of their anger. Those,
48:25
however, who act under the influence of these causes are indeed pugnacious,
48:30
but not brave, for they do not act with a view to the beautiful
48:35
in conduct, nor from the dictates of reason, but from the influence of
48:39
passion, but may possess something similar to fortitude. Nor yet, are those
48:45
who are full of good hope brave, For in consequence of having frequently conquered
48:51
and conquered many, they are confident in dangers. But they are similar to
48:57
brave men, because both these characters are confident. Brave men, however,
49:01
are indeed confident for the reasons we have already assigned, but these because they
49:07
fancy they are superior to others, and that they shall suffer no evil from
49:10
their opponents. Those also, that are intoxicated, act after this manner,
49:16
for they become full of good hope. But when they are frustrated of their
49:21
expectations, they fly from danger. It is, however, the province of
49:25
a brave man to endure things which are and appear to be dreadful to men,
49:30
because it is beautiful to do so, and base not to endure them.
49:35
Hence, also it appears to be the part of a more brave man
49:38
to be fearless and without perturbation in sudden terrors, rather than in such as
49:44
whereforeeseen for this rather proceeds from habit and in a less degree from preparation for
49:50
things indeed, which whereforeeseen, may be chosen from deliberation and reason. But
49:55
in things which suddenly happen, a man can only conduct an self fearlessly from
50:00
the habit of fortitude. Those persons likewise appear to be brave who are ignorant
50:07
of danger, and they are not fair remote from those who are full of
50:09
good hope. They are, however, inferior to them, because they have
50:15
no preconceived opinion of vanquishing the evil, but the former have. Hence,
50:20
the fortitude of those who are full of good hope continues for a certain time,
50:24
but the fortitude of those who are ignorant of danger ceases as soon as
50:29
the deception is apparent, as was the case with the Archives when they met
50:34
with the Lacedaemonians and thought them to be Sisionians. And thus we have shown
50:39
what kind of men the brave are and those who appear to be brave.
50:45
Chapter nine. Since, however, fortitude is conversant with confidence and fear,
50:52
Yet it is not similarly conversant with both, but in a greater degree with
50:58
things of a terrible nature. For he who is without perturbation in these and
51:02
who conducts himself in them as he ought, is more brave than he who
51:07
does so in things pertaining to confidence. Brave men, therefore, as we
51:12
have before observed, are called brave from enduring things of a painful nature.
51:17
Hence, also fortitude is unaccompanied with pain, and is justly praised, for
51:23
it is more difficult to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. Nevertheless,
51:29
the end according to fortitude may appear to be pleasant, but to be obscured
51:35
and obliterated by surrounding circumstances, just as it happens in gymnastic contests. For
51:40
to pugilists, indeed, the end for the sake of which they contend is
51:45
pleasing viz. A crown and honors, But to be beat, since this
51:51
pertains to the flesh, is painful, as is likewise every labor. Because,
51:55
however, the circumstances which produce pain are many, and that for the
52:00
sake of which they content is small, it appears to possess nothing delectable.
52:05
If therefore a thing of this kind also pertains to fortitude, Death, indeed,
52:10
and wounds will be painful to a brave man, and to one who
52:14
is unwilling to endure them. The brave man, however, endures them because
52:19
it is beautiful so to do, or because it is base not to endure
52:22
them. And by how much the more he possesses every virtue and is more
52:29
happy, by so much, the more will he be pained by death.
52:31
Where such a man most eminently deserves to live, and he is knowingly deprived
52:37
by death of the greatest goods, but this is painful. He is,
52:42
however, no less brave, and perhaps he is more brave because he chooses
52:46
that conduct in battle which is beautiful, in preference to these goods to energize.
52:52
Therefore, delectably does not pertain to all the virtues, except so far
52:57
as they come into contact with the end. But perhaps nothing prevents not only
53:01
those from being most excellent soldiers who are most brave, but also those who
53:07
are less brave and possess no other good For these are prepared for danger and
53:13
to lose their life for a small gain. And thus much concerning fortitude,
53:16
and it is not difficult from what has been said to adumbrate what it is
53:22
Chapter ten. In the next place, let us speak concerning temperance. For
53:29
these i e. Fortitude and temperance appear to be the virtues of the irrational
53:35
parts. The temperance, therefore, is a medium conversant with pleasures. Has
53:39
been already observed by us, for it is conversant in a less degree,
53:44
and not similarly with pains, but about pleasures, and pains in temperance also
53:50
is employed. What the pleasures, therefore are with which temperance is conversant,
53:55
we must now explain. Let pleasures, however, be to divided into those
54:00
pertaining to the soul and those pertaining to the body. Thus, for instance,
54:05
the pleasures pertaining to the soul are ambition and the love of learning,
54:09
For each of these is delighted with that which is the object of its desire,
54:15
the body not being at all affected, but rather the rational part.
54:19
And those who are conversant with such like pleasures are neither denominated temperate nor intemperate.
54:25
Thus too with respect to such other pleasures as are not corporeal, For
54:30
we call those who are lovers of fables and narrations, and who consume the
54:35
day in such casual circumstances as present themselves triflers, but not intemperate. Nor
54:42
do we call those intemperate or pained by the loss of riches or friends.
54:45
Temperance, however, will be conversant with corporeal pleasures. Yet neither will it
54:51
be conversant with all such pleasures. For those persons are not called either temperate
54:55
or intemperate who are delighted with objects of sight, such as colors and figures
55:00
and pictures, though it would seem that there is also a proper manner of
55:05
being delighted with these, and that it is possible to be pleased with them
55:09
according to excess and defect. Thus two in things pertaining to the hearing,
55:15
For no one calls those intemperate who are excessively delighted with melodies or players,
55:21
nor are those temperate who are delighted with them in a proper manner. Nor
55:24
are those denominated temperate or intemperate who are delighted with odors, except from accident.
55:30
For we do not call those persons intemperate who are delighted with the smell
55:36
of apples or roses, or odoriferous fumigations. But we rather denominate those persons
55:43
so or are delighted with the smell of ointments and food. For intemperate persons
55:47
are pleased with these because through these the recollection of the objects of their desires
55:53
is produced. Others also may be seen, who, when they are hungry,
55:58
are delighted with the smell of f But to be delighted with things of
56:01
this kind is the province of an intemperate man, For to such a one
56:06
these things are objects of desire. Nor do other animals receive pleasure from these
56:10
senses except by accidents. For neither are dogs delighted with the smell, but
56:15
with the eating of hairs, the smell producing the sense i e. Causing
56:22
them to perceive food present. Nor is the lion delighted with the voice of
56:25
the ox, but with eating him. But he perceives through the voice of
56:30
the ox that he is near, and is seen to be delighted with this
56:34
perception. In link manner, neither is the lion delighted with seeing or finding
56:38
a stag or a wild goat, but he is pleased on seeing that from
56:43
which he shall obtain food. Temperance and intemperance therefore are conversant with pleasures of
56:50
this kind, of which also irrational animals partake. Hence, these pleasures appear
56:54
to be servile and savage, and they are the pleasures pertaining to the touch
57:00
in the taste. Temperance and intemperance, however, appear to use the taste,
57:05
but in a small degree or not at all. For the judgment of
57:08
sapers is the province of the taste, which those persons employ who make trial
57:14
of wines and season food. The intemperate, however, are not very much
57:19
delighted with these sapers, but with the enjoyment of the food, the whole
57:23
of which is affected through the touch in meats and drinks, and in what
57:28
are called venereal concerns. Hence, a certain person named Philoxenus, the son
57:34
of Erics, who was most voracious kneading, wished that he had a neck
57:38
longer than that of a crane, as being one who was delighted with the
57:43
touch. The touch, therefore, with which intemperance is conversant, is the
57:46
most common of all the senses, and will appear to be justly disgraceful,
57:52
because it exists in us, not so far as we are men, but
57:54
so far as we are animals. To be delighted. Therefore with and especially
58:00
enamored of such pleasures is beastly for the most liberal of the pleasures which are
58:06
perceived through the touch are not to be numerated with these, such, for
58:09
instance, as the pleasures in gymnastic exercises produce through friction and heat, since
58:15
the touch of the intemperate man does not pertain to the whole body, but
58:20
to certain parts of it. Chapter eleven. Of desires, However, some
58:27
appear to be common, but others peculiar and advantageous. Thus, for instance,
58:31
the desire of food is indeed natural for everyone when in want desires either
58:37
dry or moist nutriment, and sometimes both. And as Homer says, both
58:43
the young man and he is in the vigor of his age, desire the
58:46
joys of love. But everyone does not desire this or that food, nor
58:52
the same food. Hence this desire appears to be properly ours, and it
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possesses also something natural for different things. Things are pleasing to different persons,
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and the same thing is more agreeable to some persons than to others. Few
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therefore err in natural desires, and they err in these in one way,
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viz. In excess, for to eat or drink what casually presents itself till
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an excessive fullness is produced is to surpass in multitude what is conformable to nature,
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since natural desire is the replenishing of indigence. Hence such persons are called
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gluttons, as replenishing the indigence of nature beyond what is becoming. And those
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who are very servile become men of this description. But in those pleasures which
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are peculiar or proper, many persons err, and in many ways, for
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they are denominated lovers of things of this kind, either from being delighted with
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things which are not proper, or being pleased with them more than is proper,
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as is the case with the multitude, or not in such a way
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as is proper, or not in that respect in which it is proper.
1:00:02
The intemperate, however, exceed in all things, for they are delighted with
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some things with which it is not proper to be delighted, since there odious,
1:00:12
and if it is requisite to be delighted with some of such things,
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they are delighted with them more than is proper, and after the manner of
1:00:20
the multitude. That excess therefore in pleasures is intemperate, and that it is
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blameable is evident. In pains. However, a man is not said to
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be temperate by enduring them as in fortitude, nor intemperate by not enduring them.
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But he indeed is intemperate who is pained more than is requisite, because
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he does not partake of pleasures, so that the pleasure gives him pain in
1:00:44
consequence of being desired by him above measure. And he is said to be
1:00:49
a temperate man who is not pained by the absence of pleasure and by abstaining
1:00:53
from it. The intemperate man therefore desires all pleasant things, or those which
1:00:59
are most eminently pleasant, and is led by desire so as to choose what
1:01:02
is most pleasant in preference to other things. Hence, also he is pained
1:01:07
both when he is frustrated of pleasure and when he desires it, for desire
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is accompanied with pain. Though it seems to be absurd that a man should
1:01:16
be pained on account of pleasure. Those however, who are deficient in pleasures
1:01:22
and are delighted with them less than is proper, are not very frequent,
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For an insensibility of this kind is not human, since other animals also distinguish
1:01:31
food and are delighted with some kinds of it and not with others. But
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he to whom nothing is delectable, and with whom one thing does not differ
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from another, is very remote from human nature. Such a one also is
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without a name, because he does not very frequently exist. The temperate man,
1:01:51
however, with respect to these things, subsists in a middle condition.
1:01:55
For neither is he delighted with those things with which the intent imporant man is
1:02:00
especially delighted, but he is rather indignant with them. Nor, in short,
1:02:05
does he rejoice in things in which he ought not. Nor is he
1:02:07
very much delighted with anything of this kind, nor is he pained if it
1:02:13
is absent, Nor does he desire it except moderately, nor more than is
1:02:17
proper, nor at a time when he ought not, nor in short,
1:02:22
anything of this kind. But such things, as being delectable, contribute to
1:02:28
health or to a good habit of body, These he desires moderately, and
1:02:32
in such a way as is proper. He also desires other delectable things which
1:02:37
are not an impediment to these, or which are not adverse to the beautiful
1:02:42
in conduct or above his income. For he who is thus affected loves such
1:02:46
pleasures beyond their dessert. The temperate man, however, is not a person
1:02:52
of this description, but is one who acts conformably to right reason Chapter twelve.
1:03:00
In temperance, however, appears to be more similar to the voluntary than
1:03:04
timidity, for the former subsists on account of pleasure, but the latter on
1:03:08
account of pain, of which the one indeed is eligible, but the other
1:03:14
is to be avoided. And pain indeed astounds and disturbs the nature of its
1:03:19
possessor. But pleasure produces nothing of this kind. It is therefore more voluntary,
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and on this account also it is more disgraceful, for it is more
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easy to be accustomed to these things, since there are many such in life,
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and the being accustomed to them is unattended with danger. But the contrary
1:03:37
takes place in things of a dreadful nature. Timidity, likewise, may appear
1:03:43
not to be similarly voluntary with particulars, for timidity indeed is without pain,
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but particular so astound men through pain that they throw away their arms and act
1:03:53
in other things indecorously, and on this account they appear to be violent.
1:04:00
The contrary, however, takes place with the intemperate man, For particulars with
1:04:04
him are voluntary, since he desires them, and his appetite is directed to
1:04:10
them. But the whole of an intemperate life is less voluntary, for no
1:04:15
one desires to be intemperate. We transfer also the name of intemperates to puerile
1:04:19
errors, for they possess a certain similitude. But which of these is denominated
1:04:25
from the other is of no consequence to the present discussion. It is,
1:04:29
however, evident that the latter is denominated from the former. Nor does the
1:04:33
transition appear to be badly made. For that which desires what is base is
1:04:39
to be punished, and which has an abundant increase. But desires in a
1:04:44
child are especially a thing of this kind. Where children live according to desire,
1:04:47
and in these the appetite of the delectable especially flourishes. If therefore this
1:04:54
appetite is not obedient and subject to the governor reason, it increases abundance.
1:05:00
For the appetite of the delectable is insatiable, and in the stupid man is
1:05:04
every way diffused. And the energy of desire increases that which is allied to
1:05:10
it, so that if the desires are great and vehement, they expel the
1:05:14
reasoning power. Hence it is necessary that they should be moderate and few,
1:05:18
and in no respect adverse to reason. But we call a thing of this
1:05:23
kind obedient and reformed by correction. For as it is necessary that a child
1:05:29
should live conformably to the mandate of his preceptor, thus also it is requisite
1:05:34
that the part of the soul which energizes according to desire should live conformably to
1:05:40
reason. Hence it is necessary that this part of the soul in the temperate
1:05:44
man should accord with reason, for the end proposed by both i e.
1:05:48
By a reason and desire in the temperate man is the beautiful in conduct.
1:05:54
And the temperate man desires those things which it is proper to desire, and
1:05:58
as and when it is proper. But reason likewise thus ordains unless much concerning
1:06:04
temperance end of Book three