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015 - Chapter 7 Part 2 - Advance To The Chosin Reservoir · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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  Speaker 1: Chapter seven, Part two of US Marine Operations in Korea
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  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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  Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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  Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Advanced to the Chosen
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  Speaker 1: Reservoir supplies truck to Hagaroo. Provisions for the advance of
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  Speaker 1: RCT five east of the Chosen Reservoir were included in
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  Speaker 1: Division Operation Order twenty twosh fifty, issued at zero eight
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  Speaker 1: hundred on seventeen November. As a preliminary RCT seven was
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  Speaker 1: given a two fold mission, one to protect the division
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  Speaker 1: left flank between Hagaroo and Yudam Knee with a minimum
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  Speaker 1: of a battalion, and two to relieve elements of RCT
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  Speaker 1: five and protect the MSR and zone from positions in
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  Speaker 1: the vicinity of Hagaroo, Codo Ree and Chinhung Knee. RCT
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  Speaker 1: five assign these missions one to pass a minimum of
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  Speaker 1: a battalion through RCT seven at Hagaroo, two to move
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  Speaker 1: up to the east side of the Chosen Reservoir and
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  Speaker 1: seize Sinhung Ni about seven miles northeast of Hagaroo, and
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  Speaker 1: three on order to seize the road junction at Kilmo Knee,
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  Speaker 1: some twenty miles north of Hagaroo. Division Reconnaissance Company was
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  Speaker 1: to screen the left flank of the MSR in the
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  Speaker 1: vicinity of Majan Doong and the eleventh Marines to maintain
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  Speaker 1: its fourth battalion in that area prepared for employment in
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  Speaker 1: the north. On Order Operation Order twenty two, DASH fifty
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  Speaker 1: directed the Supply Regulating Detachment one to establish a truckhead
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  Speaker 1: at Hagarou after taking over and consolidating the dumps of
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  Speaker 1: RCT seven, two to control traffic between coto Re and
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  Speaker 1: chinhung Ni, and three to support RCTs five and seven
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  Speaker 1: with priority to RCT five. The following supply levels were
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  Speaker 1: fixed Classes one and three, five days, Class five, one
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  Speaker 1: unit of fire Class two and four as required for
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  Speaker 1: all troops operating to the north and west of coto Rie.
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  Speaker 1: Although the advanced westward to Huksure remained the mission of
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  Speaker 1: RCT IE, the shortage of rail and motor transport slowed
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  Speaker 1: the movement from Janson to Chigyon. The last elements had
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  Speaker 1: not arrived on the eighteenth when KOR asked and received
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  Speaker 1: the consent of Division to the employment of the twenty
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  Speaker 1: six Rock Regiment for the attack on Huksuri, with the
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  Speaker 1: understanding that the objective would be turned over to RCT
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  Speaker 1: one at a later date. On the morning of the nineteenth,
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  Speaker 1: the Rock Unit left Chigyon to execute its mission. Two
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  Speaker 1: days later, rct I was relieved of this responsibility when
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  Speaker 1: Kor verbally notified Division that Huksui had been placed within
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  Speaker 1: the modified boundary of the third Infantry Division. This was
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  Speaker 1: confirmed the next day by ten Corps O I seventeen,
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  Speaker 1: which all so directed the division to establish blocking positions
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  Speaker 1: at Udam Knee. Up to this time, General Smith had
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  Speaker 1: not been able to make much progress towards Udam Knee
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  Speaker 1: without dispersing his units to an extent, which he regarded
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  Speaker 1: as imprudent. But with the availability of rct IE to
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  Speaker 1: occupy positions on the MSR behind the other two infantry regiments,
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  Speaker 1: he could now push ahead. As an added factor, the
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  Speaker 1: first Marine Division had just acquired a new unit early
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  Speaker 1: in November. Admiral Joy had inquired if General Smith could
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  Speaker 1: use the forty first Independent Commando Royal Marines, the British
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  Speaker 1: unit of fourteen officers in two hundred and twenty one enlisted
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  Speaker 1: men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, and attached
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  Speaker 1: to kamnav Fee in Japan, had requested service with the U. S. Marines.
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  Speaker 1: Smith replied that he would be glad to have these
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  Speaker 1: fine troops, highly trained in reconnaissance. They could operate with
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  Speaker 1: the Division Reconnaissance Company and protecting the flank of the
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  Speaker 1: marine advance. The British Marines arrived at Hungnam on the
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  Speaker 1: twentieth and reported to the first Marine Division Division. Operation
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  Speaker 1: Order twenty three DASH fifty, issued at zero eight hundred
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  Speaker 1: on the twenty third, directed the commandos to locate and
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  Speaker 1: destroy enemy forces on the left flank, ranging as far
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  Speaker 1: as thirteen miles west of Coto Rie. It was hoped
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  Speaker 1: that the British unit and the Division Reconnaissance Company might
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  Speaker 1: flesh out c CF troops beyond the reach of routine
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  Speaker 1: infantry patrols. Other tasks assigned to elements of the division,
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  Speaker 1: whereas follows RCT seven to seize Judomnie and maintain one
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  Speaker 1: battalion in that position. RCT five to seize Kyomo Lee
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  Speaker 1: twenty miles north of Hagarou and be prepared to seize
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  Speaker 1: Tokso Lee ten miles northwest of Kiyomo Lee and two
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  Speaker 1: on d fifteen miles northeast of Kyomo Lee. On Order
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  Speaker 1: rct IE to relieve elements of RCT seven in the
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  Speaker 1: vicinity of Hagaroo and Koto Rie and protected the Vision
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  Speaker 1: MSR from positions in the vicinity of Hagaroo, Coodore and
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  Speaker 1: chinhung Ni. First Tank Battalion less detachments to protect the
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  Speaker 1: MSR from positions in the vicinity of Majandong and soyang Ni.
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  Speaker 1: First Engineer Battalion to support Division operations with priority to
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  Speaker 1: the maintenance of the MSR and construction of the airfield
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  Speaker 1: at Hagarou. Operation Order twenty three DISH fifty also provided
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  Speaker 1: that the Supply Regulating Station Detachment continue operation of the
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  Speaker 1: truckhead at Hagaroo and stock supplies at the following levels
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  Speaker 1: classes one in three eight days, Classes two and four
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  Speaker 1: as required, and Class five one in one third UF
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  Speaker 1: for all troops operating to the north and west of
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  Speaker 1: chinhung Ni. The trucking facilities of the Division had been
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  Speaker 1: strained to the limit ever since the Wan San landing.
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  Speaker 1: Shortly afterwards, the bulk of the seventh Motor Transport Battalion
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  Speaker 1: was taken under the Operational control of ten Corps, and
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  Speaker 1: it became necessary to attach the first Motor Transport Battalion
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  Speaker 1: to RCT seven. On nineteen November, however, the first MT
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  Speaker 1: less detachments had passed to the control of the first
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  Speaker 1: Supply regulating Detachment at Hagarou. There the truckers not only
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  Speaker 1: built up the stockpile of supplies but rendered the best
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  Speaker 1: support that units of the division had known so far
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  Speaker 1: along the MSR. Confidence in UN command General MacArthur did
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  Speaker 1: not appear to be shaken by usak G two reports
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  Speaker 1: during the third week of November, which called attention to
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  Speaker 1: a formidable CCF build up on both sides of the Yalu.
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  Speaker 1: On the contrary, a UN order of the twentieth giving
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  Speaker 1: directions for the conduct of troops at the border, indicated
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  Speaker 1: that an occupation rather than a fight, was expected. Elements
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  Speaker 1: of minimum size only will be advanced to the immediate
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  Speaker 1: vicinity of the geographical boundary of Korea. No troops or
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  Speaker 1: vehicles will go beyond the boundary between Korea and Manchuria
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  Speaker 1: or between Korea and the U. S. S R. Nor
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  Speaker 1: will fire be exchanged with or air strikes be requested
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  Speaker 1: on forces north of the northern boundary of Korea. Rigid
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  Speaker 1: control of troop movements and vicinity of northern boundary will
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  Speaker 1: be exercised. Damage destruction or disruption of service of power
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  Speaker 1: plants will be avoided. No personnel, military or civilian will
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  Speaker 1: be permitted to enter or leave Korea via the Manchurian
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  Speaker 1: or U S s R. Border. Commanders will ensure that
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  Speaker 1: the sanctity of the international border is meticulously preserved. The
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  Speaker 1: italicized sentence emphasizes an assumption which had made converts in
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  Speaker 1: High State Department as well as defense circles in Washington.
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  Speaker 1: The Chinese, according to this conjecture, were concerned chiefly with
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  Speaker 1: defending their Manchurian frontier and guarding the power complexes along
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  Speaker 1: the Yalu. As evidence, it was pointed out that early
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  Speaker 1: in November the Sinwiju radio described the CCF troops crossing
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  Speaker 1: the river as a voluntary corps for the protection of
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  Speaker 1: the hydro electric plants along the Yalu serving Mukden, Darren
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  Speaker 1: and Port Arthur. Proceeding from this premise, it was a
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  Speaker 1: logical conclusion that if no provocation were given these forces,
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  Speaker 1: a large scale fight might be avoided. General MacArthur, after
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  Speaker 1: receiving a qualified permission to bomb the Yalu bridges had
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  Speaker 1: enjoined U and airmen not to violate territory or airspace
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  Speaker 1: on the other side of the river. This meant that
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  Speaker 1: the bomber crews must take much greater risks, since their
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  Speaker 1: restricted access of approach and flight pass were known to
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  Speaker 1: enemy anti aircraft gunners in advance. Moreover, CCF jet fighters
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  Speaker 1: could attack and retire to the sanctuary of Manchuria when
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  Speaker 1: hard pressed. Despite these handicaps, air Force and Navy bombers
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  Speaker 1: knocked out four of the twelve international bridges and damaged
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  Speaker 1: most of the others. These efforts doubtless imposed delays, but
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  Speaker 1: troops and supplies continued to cross throughout November. After arrival
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  Speaker 1: in North Korea, they seemed to vanish into that void
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  Speaker 1: of mystery which had swallowed up Chinese Communist troops ever
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  Speaker 1: since they broke off contact. Students of history may have
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  Speaker 1: recalled at this time that one of the most significant
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  Speaker 1: engagements of modern history was known as the Battle of
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  Speaker 1: the Yalu. From a tactical viewpoint, to be sure, the
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  Speaker 1: clash of thirty April nineteen oh four was not a
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  Speaker 1: great affair. The Japanese army, after disembarking at Kamalpo Incheon
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  Speaker 1: and marching up the Korean Peninsula, numbered five times the
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  Speaker 1: Russian force which opposed the crossing of the Yalu at Uiji,
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  Speaker 1: just south of Sinuiju. A Japanese victory was doubtless to
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  Speaker 1: be expected, Yet a new page of history had opened.
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  Speaker 1: For the first time in modern chronicles. The Asiatic army
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  Speaker 1: had successfully challenged the European army with the weapons and
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  Speaker 1: tactics of the machine age. Now nearly half a century later,
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  Speaker 1: history was repeating itself as another Asiatic army crossed the
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  Speaker 1: Yalu with unknown capabilities and intentions. If the Chinese Communists
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  Speaker 1: were merely sending a force to guard the hydro electric
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  Speaker 1: complexes in frontier, hopes of peace by Christmas might be realized.
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  Speaker 1: But if the invaders were secretly massing for an all
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  Speaker 1: out counteroffensive, a great new war might soon be flaming
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  Speaker 1: up from the ashes of the old. Little fault can
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  Speaker 1: be found with current G two estimates of CCF numbers,
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  Speaker 1: which hold up surprisingly well even when viewed with the
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  Speaker 1: wisdom of hindsight. Quite as much depended on interpretations of
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  Speaker 1: CCF intentions by the UN Command, and there can be
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  Speaker 1: no doubt that an end of the war atmosphere prevailed
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  Speaker 1: on the eve of the Eighth Army offensive on twenty
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  Speaker 1: four November. Thanksgiving Day, which fell on the twenty third,
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  Speaker 1: was celebrated both in Korea and the United States in
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  Speaker 1: a spirit of rejoicing over a victorious piece which seemed
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  Speaker 1: almost within grass. It was a tribute to American bounty
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  Speaker 1: as well as organizational genius that the troops in Korea
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  Speaker 1: were served at dinner, which would have done credit to
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  Speaker 1: a first rate state side restaurant. The menu, as proposed
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  Speaker 1: by ten Corps to component units, included shrimp, cocktail, stuffed olives,
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  Speaker 1: roast young tom turkey with cranberry sauce, candied sweet potatoes,
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  Speaker 1: fruit salad, fruit cake, mince pie, and coffee. As an
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  Speaker 1: item of good news for this Thanksgiving, it was learned
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  Speaker 1: the day before that the seventeenth Regiment of the seventh
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  Speaker 1: Infantry Division had reached the Yalu at Heisingen. Not a
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  Speaker 1: single Chinese soldier had been encountered by troops who had
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  Speaker 1: troubles enough with sub zero temperatures and mountain roads. Since
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  Speaker 1: the first week of November, In fact, there had been
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  Speaker 1: no clashes of any importance with the invaders from Red China.
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  Speaker 1: On the twenty fourth, as usual, the front was quiet
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  Speaker 1: everywhere except for minor patrol contacts. Yet this was the
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  Speaker 1: d day of the Great Eighth Army Offensive, and the
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  Speaker 1: stirring communique of the Commander in Chief was read to
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  Speaker 1: all troops in Korea. It was a message in the
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  Speaker 1: bold spirit of incheon, and no one could doubt the
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  Speaker 1: confidence of the UN command after hearing these words. The
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  Speaker 1: United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea against the
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  Speaker 1: new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort.
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  Speaker 1: The isolating component of the pincer are air forces of
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  Speaker 1: all types, have, for the past three weeks, in a
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  Speaker 1: sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy
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  Speaker 1: lines of support from the north, so that further reinforcement
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  Speaker 1: therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited.
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  Speaker 1: The eastern sector of the pincer, with noteworthy and effective
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  Speaker 1: naval support, has now reached commanding andaling position, cutting into
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  Speaker 1: the northern reaches of the enemy's geographical potential. This morning,
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  Speaker 1: the western sector of the pincer moves forward in general
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  Speaker 1: assault in an effort to complete the compression and close
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  Speaker 1: the vice. If successful, this should, for all practical purposes
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  Speaker 1: and the war restore peace and unity to Korea, enable
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  Speaker 1: the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit
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  Speaker 1: the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of
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  Speaker 1: full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which
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  Speaker 1: we fight. Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army,
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  Speaker 1: Commander in chief eighth Army Troops, found it something of
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  Speaker 1: an anti climax after this message to jump off without
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  Speaker 1: meeting any large scale opposition. General MacArthur, who flew to
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  Speaker 1: the front for the occasion, watched from his plane as
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  Speaker 1: the UN columns moved out unmolested, as if conducting a
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  Speaker 1: motor march. The Army offensive began as scheduled at ten
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  Speaker 1: hundred hours on twenty four November, said the Yusak Report.
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  Speaker 1: Since for some time there had been little contact with
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  Speaker 1: enemy forces, the advance of Yusak elements was in the
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  Speaker 1: nature of a meeting engagement, with little or no resistance
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  Speaker 1: in the initial stage across the eighth Army front. As
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  Speaker 1: a whole advances were made from four thousand to sixteen
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  Speaker 1: thousand yards Marine concentration on MSR. On this same day,
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Childs presented ten Corps Operation Plan eight Draft
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  Speaker 1: three at Tokyo. It was approved at UNC headquarters with
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  Speaker 1: only one modification, the shifting of the proposed boundary between
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  Speaker 1: ten Corps and Eighth Army farther to the south in
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  Speaker 1: the zone of the first Marine Division. This plan was
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  Speaker 1: the basis of ten Corps Operation Orders seven issued on
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  Speaker 1: the twenty fifth. It provided for a reorientation of the
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  Speaker 1: ten Corps attack to provide more assistance for Eighth Army.
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  Speaker 1: HR was to be zero eight hundred on the twenty seventh,
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  Speaker 1: and the principal units of ten Corps were assigned these tasks.
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  Speaker 1: First Marine Division to seize Mupyong Knee in advance to
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  Speaker 1: the Yalu. Seventh Infantry Division one to attack from east
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  Speaker 1: side of Chosen Reservoir and advance to Yalu in zone
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  Speaker 1: two to secure Pungksan area, coordinating with one rock Core
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  Speaker 1: one rock cores to advance from Hopsu and chung Jin areas,
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  Speaker 1: destroying enemy in zone to north boundary of Korea. Third
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  Speaker 1: Infantry Division one to gain and maintain contact with the
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  Speaker 1: right flank of Eighth Army in Zone two to protect
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  Speaker 1: the left flank of ten Cores three to support the
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  Speaker 1: first Marine Division on ten Core Order four to protect
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  Speaker 1: harbor and airfield at Wantson five to destroy enemy guerrillas
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  Speaker 1: in Zone A Core Warning order issued on the evening
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  Speaker 1: of the twenty fourth, was supplemented by a briefing session
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  Speaker 1: at Corps headquarters at ten hundred the next morning. General
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  Speaker 1: Smith learned that his division was to be the northern
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  Speaker 1: arm of the pincers in the massive compression envelopment, while
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  Speaker 1: the seventh Infantry Division took over the previous marine mission
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  Speaker 1: of advancing east of the chosen reservoir to the Yalu.
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  Speaker 1: The new marine boundary cut across Korea to the north
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  Speaker 1: of eighth Army. From Yudam Knee, the marine route of
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  Speaker 1: advance led to mupyong Ni, fifty five miles to the west.
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  Speaker 1: This objective was about halfway between Hutchan in the south
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  Speaker 1: and Kangi in the north. From the latter, which was
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  Speaker 1: believed to be the assembly area of the NKPA remnants,
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  Speaker 1: a good road led about forty miles north to manpo
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  Speaker 1: Jin on the Yalu. In accordance with Corps Operation Order seven,
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  Speaker 1: the rear boundary of the First Marine Division had been
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  Speaker 1: moved north to a line just south of Hagaroo. The
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  Speaker 1: Third Infantry Division had the responsibility for the area south
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  Speaker 1: of Hagaroo, but this unit had so many other commitments
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  Speaker 1: that it could assign few troops to the task. General
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  Speaker 1: Smith was granted permission therefore to retain garrisons at koto
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  Speaker 1: Ree and Chinhung Knee. This left the Third Infantry Division
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  Speaker 1: responsible for the protection of the MSR from Sudong southward
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  Speaker 1: to Hamhung. Corps Operation Order seven, in short, provided for
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  Speaker 1: a wide envelopment to be spearheaded by the First Marine
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  Speaker 1: Division on twenty seven November. The other arm of the pincers,
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  Speaker 1: of course, was to be the Eighth Army, but on
• 17:40
  Speaker 1: the evening of the twenty fifth came the disturbing news
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  Speaker 1: that its right wing, the Two Rock Corps, had been
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  Speaker 1: hurled back by a surprise CCF counterstroke. This reverse took
• 17:51
  Speaker 1: place in the vicinity of Tukchan, about seventy air miles
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  Speaker 1: southwest of Yudam Knee. Yusak intelligence reports, as it proved,
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  Speaker 1: were not far off the mark and estimating enemy strength
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  Speaker 1: on the eighth Army front at one hundred forty nine
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  Speaker 1: thou seven hundred forty one troops at this time. During
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  Speaker 1: the past few days, however, estimates of probable enemy courses
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  Speaker 1: of action had been so reassuring as to justify the
• 18:16
  Speaker 1: confidence of sink fe'st communique on D Day. Even the
• 18:20
  Speaker 1: setback of the twenty fifth was not regarded as alarming,
• 18:24
  Speaker 1: with the possible exception of the relatively vague situation on
• 18:27
  Speaker 1: the east flank, said the next day's G two report,
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  Speaker 1: the enemy reaction to the USAC attack has been one
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  Speaker 1: of active defense with local counter attacks and strength. The
• 18:38
  Speaker 1: enemy's probable course of action was believed to be an
• 18:41
  Speaker 1: active defense in depth along present lines, employing strong local
• 18:45
  Speaker 1: counter attacks in conjunction with continued guerrilla activities with bypassed units,
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  Speaker 1: limited air activity, and further reinforcement by CCF or USSR
• 18:55
  Speaker 1: forces on the ten core front. The reorientation of the
• 18:59
  Speaker 1: attack to the way US gave General Smith a long
• 19:01
  Speaker 1: sought opportunity to collect his dispersed units and achieve a
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: relative degree of concentration. The release of RCT one from
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  Speaker 1: its Hucksure mission made it possible to bring that infantry
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: regiment up behind the other two. This move, in turn
• 19:16
  Speaker 1: enabled RCT five to advance east of the Chosen Reservoir
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  Speaker 1: and RCT seven to push on to Udem Knee. Progress
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  Speaker 1: might have been more rapid for all units if adequate
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  Speaker 1: transportation had been available for RCT one in the Chigyong area.
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  Speaker 1: Only by using vehicles of the eleventh Marines was it
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  Speaker 1: possible to move one to one to Chinhung Knee, where
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  Speaker 1: it relieved the third Battalion of the fifth Marines on
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  Speaker 1: twenty three November. During the next two days, the second
• 19:43
  Speaker 1: Battalion in RCT one headquarters relieved two five at Codo Ree.
• 19:48
  Speaker 1: After the return of the vehicles, three to one less
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  Speaker 1: company g left behind for lack of trucks was lifted
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  Speaker 1: to Hagaroo on the twenty sixth to relieve the second
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  Speaker 1: Battalion seventh Marines. All three battalions of RCT five were
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: operating east of the Chosen Reservoir by twenty four November,
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  Speaker 1: until supply levels were built up at Hagarou. However, General
• 20:11
  Speaker 1: Smith kept a careful check on the advance in this quarter.
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  Speaker 1: The farthest penetration took place on the twenty fifth, when
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  Speaker 1: a platoon sized patrol of three five, reinforced by two tanks,
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  Speaker 1: drove nearly to the northern end of the reservoir. Scattered
• 20:26
  Speaker 1: enemy groups were flushed out and an abandoned seventy five
• 20:29
  Speaker 1: millimeter gun destroyed after a pursuit, resulting in five Chinese
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: killed and one captured. This was one of the few
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  Speaker 1: encounters in an area combed by patrols from all three battalions,
• 20:41
  Speaker 1: and no signs of large scale enemy activity were reported
• 20:44
  Speaker 1: by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplet, co of three five
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  Speaker 1: after a helicopter reconnaissance. Meanwhile, RCT seven began its move
• 20:54
  Speaker 1: to Udem Knee. This objective had first been mentioned as
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  Speaker 1: early as eleven November and ten Corps Operation Order six,
• 21:02
  Speaker 1: but until URCT one could be brought up to the MSR,
• 21:06
  Speaker 1: the division commander limited the advance to the vicinity of
• 21:09
  Speaker 1: Taktong Pass. There an estimated one hundred fifty to two
• 21:13
  Speaker 1: hundred enemy resisted with machine gun fire, but were scattered
• 21:16
  Speaker 1: with the aid of air strikes and artillery support. On
• 21:20
  Speaker 1: the twenty third, in accordance with Division Operation Order twenty
• 21:23
  Speaker 1: three DASH fifty, the first Battalion led the advance of
• 21:27
  Speaker 1: RCT seven. During the next two days, Lieutenant Colonel Davis's
• 21:32
  Speaker 1: reinforced battalion methodically cleared booby trapped but undefended roadblocks and
• 21:36
  Speaker 1: scattered small groups of enemy along the route. The men
• 21:40
  Speaker 1: of one seven belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the twenty fourth
• 21:44
  Speaker 1: with a full hot turkey dinner, their last full meal
• 21:47
  Speaker 1: for seventeen days, and seized battered Um Knee the next
• 21:51
  Speaker 1: day against negligible resistance. The third Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: three eleven minus followed. Marine operations east of the Chosen
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: Reservoir came to an end at twelve hundred on the
• 22:04
  Speaker 1: twenty fifth with the relief of RCT five by the
• 22:07
  Speaker 1: first Battalion, thirty second Infantry, seventh Infantry Division. Core orders
• 22:12
  Speaker 1: called for this unit to remain under operational control of
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: the first Marine Division until the assumption of command in
• 22:18
  Speaker 1: the area by the co thirty first Infantry. All elements
• 22:22
  Speaker 1: of URCT five were to be relieved by the following
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: noon for the mission of advancing to Udam Knee and
• 22:28
  Speaker 1: then passing through RCT seven to lead the attack toward
• 22:31
  Speaker 1: Mupyong Knee. This was in accordance with Division Operation Order
• 22:35
  Speaker 1: twenty four DASH fifty issued at zero eight hundred on
• 22:38
  Speaker 1: the twenty six to implement the provisions of Corps Operation
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: Order seven. The jump off was to be at zero
• 22:45
  Speaker 1: eight hundred on twenty seven November, with the first objective
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: the road junction at Yeongnam Dong twenty seven miles west
• 22:52
  Speaker 1: of Yutam Knee in preparation for further advance on order
• 22:56
  Speaker 1: to the high ground about one mile south of koge
• 22:59
  Speaker 1: Goal and thirty five miles west of udam Nie. Other
• 23:03
  Speaker 1: provisions of Operation Order twenty four DASH fifty were as follows.
• 23:08
  Speaker 1: RCT seven to seize and secure Udam Knee without delay
• 23:12
  Speaker 1: and when passed through RCT five to protect the Division
• 23:16
  Speaker 1: MSR from sinhung Ni seven miles west of Hagarou to Udamnee.
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: RCT five to pass through RCT seven west of Udamnee
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: by zero eight hundred twenty seven November, advanced to the
• 23:30
  Speaker 1: west and seize first objective, prepared for further advance. RCT
• 23:35
  Speaker 1: I in Division reserve to occupy positions in the vicinity
• 23:40
  Speaker 1: of Chinhungni, Codo Re and Hagaroo for the protection of
• 23:43
  Speaker 1: the MSR eleventh Marines less detachments to provide general support
• 23:49
  Speaker 1: from positions in the vicinity of Udam Ni. Forty first
• 23:53
  Speaker 1: Commando reinforced to move to Udam Knee prepared for operations
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: to the southwest to protective VS left Flank Reconnaissance Company
• 24:03
  Speaker 1: to move to Udam Knee and reconnoiter to the north
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: in coordination with operations of RCT seven. General Smith, flying
• 24:11
  Speaker 1: by helicopter from hung Nam to Udam Knee on the
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: morning of the twenty sixth, could survey the MSR below
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: him and reflect with satisfaction that it was now easier
• 24:20
  Speaker 1: to count the marine outfits south of Chinnung Nie than
• 24:23
  Speaker 1: those to the north. These included the first Tank Battalion
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: with the exception of the provisional Platoon at Hagaroo and
• 24:30
  Speaker 1: the second Platoon of Company D at Chinhung Knee. Transportation
• 24:34
  Speaker 1: had not yet been provided for the forty first Commando,
• 24:37
  Speaker 1: but the new unit was scheduled to move up in
• 24:39
  Speaker 1: convoy on the twenty eighth with Headquarters Battalion when the
• 24:43
  Speaker 1: Division CP displaced from hung Nam to Hagaroo. By that time,
• 24:47
  Speaker 1: only service units and a few platoons of tanks and
• 24:50
  Speaker 1: engineers would be left in the rear area. At Hagarou,
• 24:54
  Speaker 1: the C forty seven airstrip was taking shape as the
• 24:57
  Speaker 1: dozers hacked away at the frozen earth night and day,
• 25:00
  Speaker 1: working under floodlights in the darkness. Company C and E
• 25:04
  Speaker 1: of the first Medical Battalion had set up clearing stations
• 25:07
  Speaker 1: and built up dumps of medical supplies. Troop units at
• 25:11
  Speaker 1: Haggaroo and Udam Knee had two days supplies of rations
• 25:14
  Speaker 1: and fuel, but only a unit of fire was stockpiled
• 25:18
  Speaker 1: at Hagaroo in addition to the half unit carried by
• 25:21
  Speaker 1: the troops. Marine motor columns were winding along the narrow,
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: twisting mountain road from Hagaroo to Udam Knee in preparation
• 25:29
  Speaker 1: for the attack. In the morning. Upon arrival at Lieutenant
• 25:32
  Speaker 1: Colonel Davis's one seven CP, General Smith learned to his
• 25:36
  Speaker 1: discomfort that the hovering ability of a rotary wing aircraft
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: as curtailed at high altitudes. The helicopter dropped like a
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: stone the last ten feet, but fortunately no injury resulted
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: to passenger, pilot or machine. On the twenty sixth, intelligence
• 25:53
  Speaker 1: arrived at hamhung for the seventh Marines, reporting capture of
• 25:56
  Speaker 1: three soldiers from the sixtieth CCF Division. They asserted that
• 26:01
  Speaker 1: the fifty eighth, fifty ninth, and sixtieth divisions of the
• 26:04
  Speaker 1: twentieth CCF Army had reached the Udamnie area on the twentieth.
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: According to these enlisted men, Chinese strategy and vision to
• 26:13
  Speaker 1: move south and southeast from Udamnie to cut the MSR
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: after two marine regiments passed TENCORP had received similar reports
• 26:22
  Speaker 1: of Chinese movements southeast from Udamnie, as well as air
• 26:25
  Speaker 1: reports of enemy activity north and northeast of the chosen reservoir.
• 26:30
  Speaker 1: Six Chinese divisions had now been identified in northeast Korea,
• 26:34
  Speaker 1: but both Corps and division intelligence estimates of probable enemy
• 26:37
  Speaker 1: action continued to be optimistic. Although Chinese attacks on the
• 26:42
  Speaker 1: division's MSR or along the Houchan Husui hem hung Acxis
• 26:46
  Speaker 1: were not ruled out, g two officers seemed to consider
• 26:49
  Speaker 1: a continued westward would draw more likely. Division planning went
• 26:54
  Speaker 1: ahead on the assumption of Commander and staff that the
• 26:57
  Speaker 1: enemy would be met in strength in the mountainous coste
• 27:00
  Speaker 1: west of Yudam Knee. This was the basis for the
• 27:03
  Speaker 1: decision to pass the relatively fresh fifth Marines through the
• 27:07
  Speaker 1: seventh for the attack westward. It was a cold, clear
• 27:11
  Speaker 1: Sunday afternoon when General Smith returned to Hungnam from his helicopter.
• 27:16
  Speaker 1: He could see for several miles on either side, and
• 27:19
  Speaker 1: no signs of enemy activity were discerned in the snow
• 27:22
  Speaker 1: clad hills. After his arrival at the Division CP, however,
• 27:27
  Speaker 1: the Marine general was informed that the situation had gone
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: from bad to worse. In West Korea. The two Rock
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: Corps on the right flank had disintegrated on the twenty
• 27:36
  Speaker 1: sixth under a second day's heavy blows, thus exposing the
• 27:40
  Speaker 1: second Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade to flank attack. In short,
• 27:46
  Speaker 1: the Eighth Army offensive had been brought to a standstill
• 27:49
  Speaker 1: before the Marines could jump off in the morning, as
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: the other arm of the United Nations envelopment. End of
• 27:56
  Speaker 1: Chapter seven, Part two, read by Aaron Bennett S