Latest / Tech IPO Conversations with Fexingo: Public Software Companies and Capital Markets / How Post-IPO Companies Use Dual-Class Share Structures
Transcript
- Lucas: So Palantir announced another buyback this week — $1.2 billion authorization on top of the $800 million they repurchased last quarter. But what’s interesting to me isn’t just the dollar figure. It’s that Palantir, like a handful of other high-profile post ipo tech companies, operates under a dual-class share structure. And that changes the signal of a buyback entirely. Luna: Because the founders still hold super-voting shares, right? So when Palantir buys back stock, it’s not really about sending a confidence signal to the market in the traditional sense — they already control the vote. Lucas: Exactly. A dual-class structure separates economic ownership from voting control. Typically, Class A shares get one vote per share — those trade on the exchange. Class B shares get ten votes or more, and they’re held by founders and insiders. So when Palantir buys back Class A shares, it’s reducing the float and potentially increasing earnings per share for public holders, but it doesn’t shift control. The voting power stays concentrated. Luna: And that’s the tension we’ve seen since Snap went public in 2017 with zero-vote shares for the public. It really opened the floodgates for companies to say, we want founder control, no ifs or buts. Lucas: Right. Snap’s IPO was a watershed moment — they were the first major U.S. company to issue shares with literally no voting rights. Before that, dual-class usually meant 10-to-1 or 20-to-1, not zero. And the market accepted it. Even a lot of institutional investors who publicly oppose dual-class still bought Snap because they had to — it was the hot social media IPO at the time. Luna: And since then, we’ve seen companies like Roblox, Coinbase, and even the recent AI IPOs adopt some version of a multi-class structure. But what’s the trend now? Are we seeing a pushback? Lucas: A slow one. The Council of Institutional Investors has been lobbying for years. Some indexes, like the S&P 500, now exclude companies with multiple share classes from certain indices — but they made an exception for existing members like Meta and Berkshire Hathaway. So there’s this bifurcation: the market doesn’t love it, but it also won’t punish it severely enough to make companies change. Luna: And we should name Meta because they’ve been one of the most vocal defenders. Mark Zuckerberg controls roughly 58% of the voting power through a dual-class structure that was built into the Facebook IPO in 2012. That’s held steady even as the company pivoted to the metaverse and now AI. Lucas: And what’s interesting is that the structure doesn’t just protect founders from activist investors — it also lets them make long-term bets without worrying about quarterly earnings pressure. For better or worse, Zuckerberg could spend billions on Reality Labs without a shareholder revolt because he controls the vote. That’s the governance trade-off. Luna: But critics would say it also insulates management from accountability. Look at the WeWork debacle — Adam Neumann had super-voting shares, and the board could barely check his decisions until the IPO implosion forced change. Lucas: WeWork is a textbook cautionary tale. But there’s something else happening now that’s shifting the debate: time-based sunsets. A few recent IPOs have voluntarily adopted clauses that automatically convert super-voting shares to one-vote shares after a set period, typically 5 to 10 years. Luna: That’s a pretty big deal. It gives founders a runway to execute their vision but eventually aligns voting power with economic ownership. Who’s done that? Lucas: Lemonade did it in 2020 — their dual-class structure sunsets after ten years. So did Instacart in its IPO last year, though they set a shorter five-year sunset. And even some of the AI companies that went public in 2024 and 2025 included sunset provisions, partly because underwriters pushed for them. Luna: And how do investors react? I remember seeing data that IPOs with sunset clauses tend to have slightly better aftermarket performance, maybe because they signal founder confidence in eventually ceding control. Lucas: Yeah, there’s some academic evidence for that — a study from the Journal of Financial Economics found that dual-class companies with sunset provisions trade at a 5 to 8 percent premium to those without. The market seems to price in the governance risk. And that’s actually the conversation we’re having today — how post ipo companies use dual-class structures not just to entrench power, but to signal strategic intent. Luna: If that insight was useful — and I think it’s one of those things that reframes how you read a buyback announcement or an IPO prospectus — the way these conversations stay ad-free is listener support. A quick coffee at buymeacoffee.com/fexingo helps keep the podcast independent and subscriber-free. Lucas: Exactly. No pressure — just if you find value in the specific numbers and governance angles we dig into, that’s the link. buymeacoffee.com/fexingo. And now, back to the sunset clause question: we’re seeing more companies voluntarily adopt them, but several high-profile names like Meta and Palantir have no sunset. So the question is, will regulation force the issue? Luna: The SEC has been circling the topic for years. Chair Gensler mentioned dual-class structures in a speech last year, saying the commission might consider requiring mandatory sunsets for new IPOs. But nothing concrete yet. Lucas: And the political landscape makes it tricky. Some lawmakers see dual-class as a protection for founder-led innovation in the face of short-term activism. Others view it as a fundamental violation of shareholder democracy. The Nasdaq actually tried to impose a mandate in 2018 — they proposed a rule requiring mandatory sunsets for new listings — but the SEC rejected it after heavy lobbying. Luna: So we’re in this messy middle where the market is self-regulating through investor preferences, but some companies resist. And the data shows that while dual-class is common among tech IPOs — about 20 percent of IPOs in 2025 had dual-class structures — the share of those with sunset clauses is rising. Lucas: Let’s tie it back to Palantir. They have a dual-class structure where Class B shares carry 10 votes each, held by co-founders Peter Thiel and Alex Karp, plus a few insiders. When they announced the buyback, the stock popped about 3 percent that day. But if you look at the buyback’s impact, it’s primarily financial — it uses cash to reduce share count, which boosts earnings per share. It doesn’t change who controls the company. Luna: And for a company like Palantir, which is heavily tied to government contracts and has a very specific corporate culture, that control might actually be a selling point. Investors who buy Palantir know they’re buying into the Karp-Thiel vision, not a democratic board. Lucas: That’s exactly the argument proponents make. You buy a dual-class stock knowing the founder is in charge. If you don’t like it, buy a different stock. The issue is when a dual-class company is the only pure-play in a hot sector — like Snap in social media or Coinbase in crypto. Then investors have no choice. Luna: And that’s where the governance debate gets heated. Because if you’re a pension fund that needs exposure to the AI theme, you might have to buy Palantir or a similar dual-class stock. You can’t just opt out. Lucas: Right. And that’s why the shareholder rights movement is focusing on two things: mandatory sunsets and greater disclosure. The SEC could require companies to disclose more detail about how dual-class shares affect voting outcomes, especially on things like executive compensation or acquisitions. Some companies already do that voluntarily, but it’s not standard. Luna: Let me ask you a practical question: if I’m a retail investor looking at a recent IPO that has dual-class shares, what should I look for in the prospectus? Lucas: Three things. One: the ratio. Is it 10-to-1, 20-to-1, or zero-vote? Zero-vote is the most extreme — you have no say at all. Two: is there a sunset clause? If yes, after how many years? A five-year sunset is better than ten. Three: what triggers a conversion? Some companies have clauses that convert super-voting shares if the founder leaves or sells a certain percentage. That’s a good thing — it aligns control with active involvement. Luna: And do you expect more IPOs to adopt sunsets, or will the trend reverse? Lucas: I think we’ll see a split. The big-name companies with powerful founders — the ones who can command a premium regardless of governance — will resist sunsets. But smaller or less-established IPOs will use them as a signaling tool to attract institutional investors who demand governance. The market is effectively sorting itself into two tiers. Luna: And that sorting has implications for liquidity, too. Because some institutional funds have mandates that prohibit holding dual-class shares without sunsets. So if a company wants to be in those funds, it has to offer a sunset. Lucas: Exactly. And that’s the quiet pressure. It’s not regulation — it’s the asset management industry voting with its dollars. BlackRock and Vanguard have both said they prefer one-share-one-vote and will engage with companies on sunset provisions. They can’t force it, but they can influence it through proxy votes and dialogue. Luna: So circling back to the Palantir buyback: given their dual-class structure, do you interpret it as a positive signal for the stock, or just a financial engineering move? Lucas: I think it’s primarily financial engineering. The real signal would be if the company announced a change to its governance — like adopting a sunset clause. That would tell investors the founders are willing to share control as the company matures. A buyback alone, with voting power locked up, is just a cash allocation decision. It’s not a governance signal. Luna: And that’s the key takeaway for investors: don’t conflate buybacks with governance confidence in a dual-class company. The two are separate. Lucas: Exactly. And as more companies go public in the next wave — especially AI startups with visionary founders — the dual-class debate will only intensify. The question is whether the market’s self-correction will be fast enough to address the concerns, or if regulators will step in. Either way, it’s a conversation worth watching.