Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / An abandoned app's updater could have run code on millions of machines
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Monday, the twenty-sixth of October, twenty twenty-six.
- 0:08This is the morning edition.
- 0:11An abandoned app's updater could have run code on millions of machines.
- 0:19A dead streaming app has just handed the industry a tidy lesson in how software updates go wrong.
- 0:26Researchers at Eye Security found that Time4Popcorn, an abandoned fork of the Popcorn Time BitTorrent client,
- 0:35still had an updater running on a great many machines.
- 0:38It kept calling home to domains nobody owned any more.
- 0:41Whoever registered those domains could have pushed code to all of them.
- 0:45Eye registered one, and then did the decent thing.
- 0:49So, how did the updater end up trusting a stranger?
- 0:55The flaw is tracked as C V E twenty twenty-six, three zero six one two, the public reference number for this
- 1:02vulnerability. On Windows and macOS, the updater runs in the background with full privileges: system on Windo
- 1:10ws, root on macOS. Eye's write-up says it connects to update servers over an insecure channel, so anyone able
- 1:18to manipulate that traffic can offer their own update.
- 1:21BleepingComputer, reporting the research, adds that the updater accepted executables without checking their d
- 1:28igital signatures. On Android, the user is prompted to install an attacker's package.
- 1:34Picture a night porter told to let in anyone who says "delivery", without checking the uniform.
- 1:40The only thing the updater checked was the address, and the address had lapsed.
- 1:45Buying it was all it took to become the trusted sender.
- 1:50So what did Eye do once it held the keys?
- 1:53It registered one of the abandoned domains.
- 1:56According to the abstract of its Hack.
- 1:59lu talk, it saw millions of unique hardware I Ds connect over several months.
- 2:04BleepingComputer reports the connections included corporate, government and military networks, a detail we ha
- 2:11ven't been able to confirm elsewhere.
- 2:12Rather than leave the door open, Eye used the updater itself to deliver code that switched it off.
- 2:19Eye's write-up says most of the infrastructure is now sinkholed by the Shadowserver Foundation, a non-profit.
- 2:26Android is the exception. The updater can't be disabled remotely, so those users must remove the app.
- 2:34Everyone should uninstall it, because the software is abandoned and unfixable.
- 2:38What would a defender actually see?
- 2:41Very little. An update arriving through a trusted process, running as system, looks like routine maintenance
- 2:49. Detection here is mostly inventory.
- 2:52Eye publishes the commands to find and stop the Windows "Update service" and the macOS P T.
- 3:00updd launch daemon, and sweeping for those is quick.
- 3:04Nothing in the reporting is UK-specific, and that's the point.
- 3:08The updater didn't care where its host sat.
- 3:11Any UK organisation with staff who install their own software on work machines had the same exposure as every
- 3:18one else. So what's the Secure by Design lesson?
- 3:22Three decisions would have prevented this, and none is expensive.
- 3:26Sign every update, and verify the signature on the device.
- 3:30Then control of a domain isn't control of the machine.
- 3:34Use encrypted connections to fetch updates, because plain H T T P invites tampering in transit.
- 3:41And plan for the end of life.
- 3:43Ship a kill switch, or retire the update service when you retire the product.
- 3:48For a buyer, the cost is a question rather than a purchase.
- 3:53What is running on our estate that nobody owns?
- 3:56Software with no vendor behind it can't be patched, but it can be found and removed.
- 4:03As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 4:06That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:12Thanks for listening.