Latest / Why We Do What We Do / The TSA in the USA pt. 1

Transcript

The TSA in the USA pt. 1 · Why We Do What We Do

0:00
Hey, folks, So we've got a thing that we want to talk about
0:04
real quick. The goal of this show has always been movement towards knowledge.
0:09
I think you know, I joined in later for the show, and I
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think that that pursuit has been pretty consistent since the beginning of the show.
0:15
Our aim is always to uncover information about a topic if we can dispel some
0:20
myths, which we always really like to do, and we've covered a great
0:23
many of topics over the past several years. One thing that we have always
0:26
aimed to do is cover a topic with candor and competence. And in some
0:29
cases, there are some topics that are simply too big for us to do
0:33
any sort of real justice, and if anything, we are pretty aware of
0:36
our limits. Yeah, I think so. And really, what we're talking
0:39
about here is what's been going on between Israel and Palestine, and there is
0:44
a topic that is is much better covered by experts in this area. The
0:48
conflict between these two nations is one that has bubbled for several decades and is
0:53
embroiled with highly emotional and spiritual factors along with many many injustices, and as
1:00
a show, we feel like it would be a disservice to even attempt to
1:03
try and cover this in a way it deserves and focus on the people and
1:07
not on the politics, right, And so with recent actions, they've crossed
1:11
into an uncrossable threshold and we simply cannot stand and be silent for that.
1:18
And you know, there's a lot of things going on. The genocide of
1:21
the Palaestinian people is something that as a world community, we simply cannot allow
1:25
to continue. And so standing on the side of silence would be unfair and
1:30
would be in support of the oppressors. So we want to be really clear
1:34
about kind of the message on this. Too often we see government decisions that
1:38
pit innocent lives against each other and outside interference encouraging that conflict. The US
1:42
is directly involved in the actions taken against the Palestinian people in Gaza and the
1:47
West Bank and what's going on in that conflict, and we stand with the
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Palastinian people their humanitarian right to live and their freedom from an oppressive state.
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And we stand with our Jewish community and our friends who are unfairly maligned to
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the actions from the Israeli government and the military. And so I think it's
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really important to know that we stand with the people, not Hamas, not
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Israel, but the people who are directly in conflict, in our friends,
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who are unfortunately being maligned as a result of this. Very important that we're
2:15
not trying to say that we are behind one nation or another. We are
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behind the people, the individuals in this particularly the innocent lives who are at
2:24
stakehore threatened, and who have been lost. And so for the foreseeable future,
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each show will begin with a support resource that we can use to move
2:32
forward toward understanding this conflict better and identifying committed actions that we can take,
2:38
even at a distance, that can help those in need. And we do
2:40
not want to take up more space than is necessary, especially when there are
2:44
those that are more informed than we are. However, will be sure to
2:47
link and elevate those resources going forward to the extent that we feel that we
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can. Right so, for the next few episodes, we are going to
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intro each show with some resource, whether it's a documentary or it's a website,
3:00
whether it's a nonprofit, and maybe even a little bit of information about
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what might be going on, and maybe a little bit of history about what's
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going on too, so at least you have some more information than you might
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have the day before. This is a new topic for me in particular.
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Yeah, I have been admittedly ignorant to the conflict, knowing that it was
3:21
pretty complicated and not knowing where to start. And that's an unfortunate thing because
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it has led to this. And so hopefully we can do better by learning
3:30
more and providing support for the people that are really in need, and hopefully
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call for a ceasefire and end this conflict. Yes, and again, I
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just want to make sure that we'll restate really quickly for people who maybe heard
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the words Palestine and the words Israel and felt we were supporting one side or
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the other. We have long advocated a position of non violence on this show.
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That's the position we take. I think when lives are when lives are
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lost, when damage is done, that's something we see as an atrocity.
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And so we're not calling out any one group for their actions here. I
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just want to say stop killing people. Like right, that's where I fall
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on things, and that my heart goes out to the families of people who
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have lost loved ones and to the people who are still lost and our refugees
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and that sort of thing. So we're not trying to talk politics on this.
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We just want to make sure it's clear that we've said something that we
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understand. Like it feels disrespectful to try and begin a show and just pretend
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like there's not an enormous amount of atrocity going on in the world, and
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so we just felt like we had to say something before we kick this off,
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right, So thank you for going on this journey with us, Thank
4:38
you for listening to us. If you decide not to listen as a result
4:42
of this, I understand, but I think it's something that does fit within
4:46
our values and within the value of the show, and just between Abraham and
4:49
myself, just the value of both of us as people. And so we
4:54
appreciate you listening and continue to listen and continue to work with us through this
4:57
and learn with us and hopefully fight this. And you know, the show
5:00
goes on, So please enjoy the show you're listening to Why We Do what
5:08
We Do? Welcome to Why We Do what We Do. I am your
5:19
late, tired and miserable host Abraham and I am your continuously groped host Shane.
5:26
Oh No. We're a psychology podcast. We talk about the things that
5:30
people do, sometimes that they do well, and sometimes that they do very
5:32
poorly. Maybe a little bit more on the ladder today, and all,
5:35
you know, all the psychology things, we look at it from a skeptical
5:39
scientific lens and we try and spew it back at you for your listening enjoyment.
5:43
Yes, and so here we are talking about this thing that has impacted
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every American who likes to travel via plane, but maybe not so much trains
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or automobiles. Fair enough, fair enough, you know, Before we even
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dive into this, I would like to acknowledge that if you're joining us for
5:59
the time, welcome, We're glad to have you here. If you've been
6:01
around, welcome back, Glad to see you again. And just so you
6:05
know, today, if you're just waking up and you're like, I don't
6:09
know what day it is, I don't know what the date is, it
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is, in fact the day that this publishes, November eighth, and November
6:14
eighth does in fact have some holidays. Today is roast Dinner Day, so
6:18
you can roast your dinner. I guess this sounds great. Today's also cook
6:23
something bold and pungent day, which sounds horrible. I guess maybe like for
6:29
people who are cooking like cabbage stew, today's the day for you. The
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word pungent is what really throws that one off. Yeah, Happy National Cappuccino
6:36
Day. This is a good one. I like that. It's also a
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bet and Aid Puns Thursday, which I really like that, so I am
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big fan of puns. I yeah, absolutely. It is World Radiography Day,
6:48
so thank your X ray technician who is a radiographer. I love that.
6:53
It's also National Harvey Wallbanger Day, which is arguably the best name for
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a drink. But I don't drink so does but it sounds fun. There
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you go. And related to that, it's shot Day, so I say,
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drink responsibly and safely and maybe make it a virgin shot of some sort.
7:10
Soy milk's good for that. Yeah. When I used to work at
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Starbucks, I would just put, like, I get a shot glass of
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soy milk and put like a spritz of the dulce, the cemondulce in that
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the soy milk, and that was pretty tasty. It just tasted like a
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cemon toast crunch. There you go. No, I'm sorry. Waffle crisp
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from when we were kids. Oh, yeah, which is really good.
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And it's also World Pianist Day. Pianist okay, pianists. Pianists almost heard,
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Yeah, I know, I realized at the end. I realized,
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so I realized why I said it several times. Pianist pianist. We need
7:46
to speak slowly, pianist. Moving on, it is Eating Healthy Day that
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corresponds to shots or I mean not to shots. But shots are bots.
7:57
Yeah, shots are notts. It's also World Planning Day, which sounds nice,
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all right. It is the Great British game week for game hunters,
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I suppose is what that's about. Yeah, I love that. And it's
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also Stem Steam Day, which is all about STEM studies, which I really
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enjoy. Yeah, And National Dunce Day. I guess honor those Dunce's Yeah,
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yeah, or the hats at least, I mean maybe that's what I
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guess. I guess depends on what color the hat is. White might be
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a problem. This is what I'm saying, is fair. Yeah, I
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agree, that's a good point. And there's a lot of like it's like
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National Adam and Ashley and Leon and Kyle Day, So like, I guess
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if you have that name, good for you? Sure, and we may
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have mentioned a few of these other ones, like it's World Vegan Month,
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Lung Cancer Awareness Month, National Children's Month. I think I maybe mentioned these
8:46
last week when we started the month, So yeah, maybe we've covered those.
8:50
That sounds good. I like that those are holidays. There are holidays
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that happened. Yeah, hey, and if you happen to be traveling on
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one of those holidays, you might have some delays, might be long,
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you might have to plan ahead, which wasn't always the case though, Nope,
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it was not. Thanks early two thousands for making it difficult for everybody.
9:09
We are talking about the tsa ooh yeah, or the's suh, that's
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uh, which our patrons are. They already knew that when we said that,
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that's right, we let them know ahead of time that we're talking about
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so and so this came to mind for me recently because of personal experience,
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and you know, it got me thinking, this is this is an institution
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we all love to hate kinda. There's actually been some polls about that.
9:33
We'll get to. But I was going through security recently and I just completely
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forgot that I had a bottle of body wash soap in there, and it
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was of course over the limit there, But I was thinking about it.
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It's clear that it's soap. It's clear that they know that it's soap.
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Right. Also, I have the TSA pre check we'll talk about in a
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little bit, but that means that with the TSA PreCheck, they have already
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done an extensive background check on me. Okay. Sure. So it got
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me wondering, like, all right, you've already cleared before coming to the
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airport. You like had tabs on me that I gave you and said like,
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here, know all the things about me TSA and CIA and whoever else,
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so that I can go through security at the airport faster because you don't
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have to worry about me as much because you are already like checking up on
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me constantly, okay, And so what do they think they're accomplishing by throwing
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away my soap? It's not practical. And so I was like, is
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it meant to be psychological? The illusion of safety? Good album? By
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the way, yes, a recommend strong recommend strong recommend the theater of security
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is meant to create? Like, is it meant to create the experience of
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safety and security not necessarily actually be safety and security, but maybe it is,
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but I think in the case of my soap, not is meant to
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maybe create that experience. Is it meant to scare that would be rule breakers
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and evildoers away? And why do they do Why does the TSA do the
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horrible things that they do? So that's sort of what got me thinking about
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this topic for today, right, so we are going to ask what is
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the TSA, what is the point of the comically over the top and seemingly
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nonsensical policies, and how do other countries manage their security. I have personally
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flown through Canada and let me tell you, very very little security checks.
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It's great, interesting, interesting, interesting. Okay, I want to hear
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more about that when we get to talking about some other countries, because I
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sort of did what I could in my digging, and some sometimes it wasn't
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always clear. But anyway, let's get to a little background on understanding the
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TSA and the context in which we find ourselves and for the people who are
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not part of the United States, what that even means. So broad picture
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stuff. Nearly a billion people in the US flew on an airplane in twenty
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nineteen. Wow, Okay, in twenty twenty two, almost nine hundred million
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people flew on a plane nearly recovering from that pre pandemic high of twenty nineteen,
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which was at the time was sort of a record. I mean,
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nine hundred million is kind of spitting distance from a billion. Now it is
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one hundred million, And if we're talking about dollars, that's still a lot
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more than I have. Yes, so that's a big gap. But you
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think comparatively speaking, nine hundred million to a billion is a relatively smallish jump,
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depending on your situation, I guess. Yeah. But a thing to
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know about how many people were on planes in twenty nineteen and twenty twenty two,
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and all of them were in the Atlanta Airport. Apparently at that place,
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everyone all of everyone, all at the same time. That place is
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so crowded. But similarly, planes carried up to forty two billion pounds of
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freight every year in the US during the pre pandemic levels and again in the
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recovery from that, So they're carrying not only a lot of people, but
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a lot of cargo. Yeah, and really we're at the point now that
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with transportation and shipping, these are not luxuries anymore. These are critically important
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aspects of our global economy, accounting for as much as five percent of our
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total GDP and almost eleven million jobs. So shipping is like if that went
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away, things would just collapse. It would be a major disruption if for
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some reason that was prevented from occurring. I mean, they have temporarily halted
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shipping, but it's never for more than like a very brief window of time.
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If for some reason that was disrupted for like a week, I think
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we would be in like full blown chaos. Yeah, it's a nightmare when
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stuff gets delayed like shipping. Like I mean, when we had the shipping
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barges that were getting delayed for a little bit, all the shortages that came
13:30
out of that, and that was only a very brief period of time,
13:33
part of what contributed to inflation. In fact, not that this is an
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episode on that, but yeah, one day we're going to start an economics
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podcast and we're gonna know nothing about it, so we'll invite some people,
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have to ask them. So, while perhaps because airplanes are such a vital
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dimension of our daily activities and success of our economy, they are particularly dangerous
13:50
as a target from bad actors, they are also obviously highly prone to disastrous
13:56
consequences should they fail or are sabotaged. Yes, So, therefore, cutting
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edge, state of the art security technologies are necessary to maintain the safety integrity
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of our flying and general transportation economy. Enter the Transportation Security Administration or TSA.
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Yes, so the name implies all forms of transportation, and they are
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actually involved in all forms of transportation, But their primary role and what they
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are known for is their air traffic security or whatever it is that they do.
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Okay, we're going to go into the history of this, but prior
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to September eleventh, two thousand and one, in the United States, going
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to the airport, going through security boarding a plane, it was a simple
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process of walking through a metal detector. They didn't even ask to see your
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ticket, they didn't ask to see your ID. None of that was even
14:48
needed. Family members or friends that could simply walk through security with you and
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wait at your gate with you until your flight, or if you were arriving,
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they might walk through security and wait for you to arrive so that they
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could walk out with you. I vaguely remember this in my lifetime, like
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I was still fairly like I hadn't traveled very much at that point. So
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like my recollection is probably from early nineties at most, when I would have
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maybe done something like this. But it's actually kind of funny. If you
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watch TV shows that took place prior to two thousand and one, you'll see
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this all the time. Why are the people just standing at someone's gate when
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a plane arrives, How it was waving it them? Well, like waving
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goodbye to them. They're waving yeah, exactly right. They're like out a
15:26
window, or they're having some interaction at the gate of the plane when one
15:30
person's clearly not going to be boarding the plane. And like how that even
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possible? Well, it's because you didn't have to have a ticket to get
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to the gate at a terminal in an airport back then. You could just
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walk right over there. Right. Also, we should probably do an episode
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one day on the number of hijackings that happened, like when aircraft started becoming
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like a regular thing, Planes were hijacked literally all the time, Like it
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happened so much in the sixties and seventies. If people don't realize that,
15:56
like the dB Cooper story is like one of many many hijacking stories. It
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happened a lot then Actually it would have fit nicely into this episode, and
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I didn't even think about that when I was putting together the notes. So
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you're right, that would be a fun sort of like follow up on this
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is the because it's funny like this hijacking obviously was very critically massively consequential and
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not something to be laughed at or joked about in any way. But before
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that, there were tons of hijackings that happened still, so yeah, yeah,
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So according to Brendan Kroner, who I guess does some research on this,
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talked about kind of the number of hijackings in American air space. Between
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nineteen sixty one and the end of nineteen seventy two, there were one hundred
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and fifty nine hijackings in American airspace, which averaged about one per week.
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So it happened a lot. Wow, to kind of unpack that a little
16:48
bit, just the sixties were a wild time. There's a lot going on
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there. They were absolutely so the security measures that were previously handled by airports
16:56
and all these spaces, they were usually handled by contractors whoever would cost the
17:02
airport at the least amount of money. Which is kind of how that private
17:03
sector works. Absolutely and typically consisted of metal detectors, the ones that you
17:07
would walk through it, like if you're walking into like Disney. Yeah,
17:11
in an attempt to stop people from bringing obvious weapons onto the plane, where
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the stakes are catastrophically high in the event of an attack or sabotage on a
17:17
plane. So not all weapons, though, knives less than four inches were
17:21
alliable on planes, and even if you had one, they'd hand it right
17:23
back to you. So they'd be like, oh, that's a knife,
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and then just give it back to you. Yeah, they're like, well
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it's less than four inches. Enjoy your flight, and yeah, there you
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go, exactly. Okay, But we were talking about September eleventh, and
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for those of you who are somehow not aware of this, on that fateful
17:37
date, nineteen, hijackers boarded flights in Portland, Maine, at Boston's Logan
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International Airport, at Liberty International Airport in Newark, New Jersey, and at
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Dulles International Airport in the Washington, DC area, and they executed a very
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It was a highly complex, intricate plan that they'd made to attack and hijack
18:00
these planes by taking over or attempting to take over, as was the case
18:03
with one of them, the plane's cockpits, and then fly those planes directly
18:08
into two of the tallest buildings in the United States in one of the most
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densely populated cities in the United States the twin towers and ended up killing two
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nine and ninety six people and cost hundreds of millions of dollars in damages done.
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That's why this was so immensely consequential when this happened on September eleventh,
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two thousand and one in the United States, right, I feel like we
18:33
could talk about nine to eleven. This is just kind of like that event
18:37
in particular kind of set the motion for what we're going into next. So
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I think it's important to know that that was kind of a turning point for
18:42
airport security. Right So, in response, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation
18:48
Security Act, which created the TSA, a government run agency to tremendously beef
18:52
up airport security. Unfortunately, what has happened as a result of that is
18:56
security measures in other places maybe started lacking. And that's why you are suddenly
19:02
going to get ads because we could not stop them from getting through all right,
19:12
we've patched up our holes in security, at least for now. We'll
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see they might find other ways through anyway. As part of the new Transportation
19:19
Security Administration the TSA, the creation of this required several things that to be
19:25
modified about the system. One was they required more armed air marshals that were
19:30
on flights. Ten percent of all luggage that came through was screened with X
19:34
rays. And also that they reinforced the cockpit doors of aircrafts of airplanes,
19:40
and they also generally continued to escalate those security measures pretty much ever since they
19:45
first put those ones into place, right, and so, then in December
19:49
two thousand and one, a British terrorist named Richard Reid attempted to blow up
19:53
a plane using explosives that he packed into his shoes. Moisture damaged the explosive
19:57
trigger, and he was subdued in the detained without causing any damage, thankfully,
20:02
and the plane was forced land Early From then on though, passengers were
20:06
asked to voluntarily remove their shoes as part of security. Yes, so walking
20:11
through the timeline here just in case that wasn't clear. So that was two
20:12
thousand and one. In two thousand and three, they started arming pilots with
20:17
guns. Just a thing that happened. Then, in two thousand and six,
20:19
British security foiled a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives. The terrorists had
20:25
packed explosives into plastic soda bottles and so they airport. Then in response,
20:30
the airport security banned all liquids. Then a month later they instead walked that
20:36
back a little bit and allowed liquids that were under three point four ounces and
20:40
those were acceptable on planes. And they also officially required shoe removal for all
20:44
passengers. Up to that point, it had been like voluntary or and it
20:48
was in some places but not others. But at this point there was just
20:51
nope, everyone takes their shoes off, right, And they started using security
20:55
dogs to sniff four explosives in addition to that, which I mean, let's
20:59
be let's be real. The dogs are the real heroes in any story,
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right, truly. Now, In two thousand and nine, a terror smuggled
21:07
explosives onto a plane in his boxer briefs. Similar to the shoebomber. Moisture
21:11
from sweat prevented the explosion from taking place, although he still set his own
21:15
pants on fire and he was burned in the process. So it's a question
21:18
of like what came first the liar of the pants on fire? Was he
21:22
lying or was the pants on fire? You know that whole thing. But
21:25
airports began using full body scans in response, I have gotten so many full
21:29
body scans. Yes, tons, I am mostly X ray at this point.
21:34
It's a superpower. Yeah. In twenty eleven, the TSA began a
21:41
pre screening procedure called TSA pre Check, in which passengers can voluntarily pay to
21:47
subject themselves to a lengthy and in depth background check in exchange for faster,
21:52
less invasive security screening at all participating airports. Basically, you give them your
21:56
address, you set for an interview. You pay this every like so many
22:00
years or whatever, and in response, there's like a separate line for TSA
22:04
pre check, and whenever you get a boarding pass, your boarding pass will
22:07
say TSA pre check. Assuming you use your TSA pre check number two,
22:11
get that boarding pass, and then they will allow you to go through a
22:14
line that has slightly less ran mostly the shorter line. That's really what you're
22:21
paying for. Yeah, you're getting through quicker, which is nice, I
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guess. So I think It's important to note that this is specific to the
22:26
United States. Yes, and all of the security that we just talked about,
22:30
all of these annual updates, all of these things that we are discussing
22:34
here costs the United States somewhere upwards of eight billion dollars a year. Yeah,
22:40
so let me let me say that again. Eight billion dollars a year
22:44
are put into making people take off their shoes before they get on planes and
22:48
various other things that we'll discuss. But yeah, that is if you're people
22:52
who often want to cut back on programs in the country and they're going after
22:56
programs that are directly helping people or programs there are actually a lot of government
23:00
programs with the government spends money because it's an investment to save money or even
23:04
make money down the road. This is not one of those things. This
23:08
is the thing where money just goes into a black hole and we never see
23:11
anything from it again. Right, It's just how this current system works.
23:15
I think it's probably important to unpacked too, like and we and we're going
23:18
to get into some of all the stuff, but I think it's really important
23:22
to look at the reaction to twenty eleven nine to eleven I should say,
23:27
like what this is doing that, Like, you know, there hasn't been
23:30
a major terrorist attack since that happened that you know as far as like as
23:34
far as that that level or that caliber in the United States. But you
23:38
know, it's one of those things where you kind of go through it and
23:41
you're like, do we need this anymore? And that's I think a question
23:44
that we're maybe going to unpack a little bit too well, and also did
23:47
we need it ever? Because I think that segues beautifully into the question of
23:51
Okay, we now know the timeline, we know sort of what events led
23:55
to the current processes that people in the United States are experiencing. We understand
23:59
how how that sort of chain of events rolled out. The question then,
24:03
is is it working? Is this current system that we have actually functioning the
24:07
way that we want it to? And you just pointed out one thing that
24:08
people point to, and we'll get to a little bit later, is like,
24:11
well, we haven't had any major terrorist attacks, so maybe it's working.
24:15
Sure. So so the question of is it working is difficult to answer
24:18
because that depends on what metric you select and all that. But there weren't
24:22
a lot of plane based terrorst attacks before nine to eleven or since. So
24:26
we could cite the lack of incidence as a proof that the security is working.
24:30
But how would we know because the baseline wasn't very high to begin with.
24:33
I mean, we had a lot of hijackings, but that was also
24:36
domestic. Yeah, like d B. Cooper was, I believe from what
24:40
I understand in American or at least what they know of them, right,
24:42
you know, And I keep going back to DBI Cooper because that is just
24:45
such a fun story and it's also low key. We know that yeah,
24:47
as a Norse god, that's yeah, as Norse god, that's why he's
24:49
gone. But possibly we can look at how many seeming tears plots have been
24:55
foiled around you know, because of this or around this, and that's kind
24:57
of one metric to look gat. And you might say, like, well,
25:00
they're not going to say how many they've foiled, but I kind of
25:03
I don't know, Like why would they want to hide that. You'd think
25:07
they specifically want to flaunt both the terrorists and the American public. Look at
25:11
how good of a job we're doing. We have foiled this one and this
25:15
one and this one, the one reason they might not want to is if
25:18
people would be then be scared of flying. But if they are preventing those
25:22
things from happening, then I feel like they're showing that they're secure. But
25:26
I could be wrong. I don't know. I could see also like that
25:29
being like tout is a challenge because I think the United States is like historically
25:33
known for being kind of like, uh, you know, oh, yeah,
25:34
we're big and bad, and then nine to eleven happened, they went,
25:37
oh, maybe not so much. Yeah, So I think maybe touting
25:40
it would be like, yeah, see what we can do, look at
25:41
us, look at us, and then they're just waiting. They're just kind
25:44
of tempting somebody to I could see that being a reason too. They probably
25:47
err on the side of like not sharing information, over sharing any but anyway,
25:49
point being like, they're at least in some cases, we're going to
25:52
find out about what the terrorist plots that were foiled. Maybe not all of
25:56
them, but definitely the you know, a hand flailed the very least if
25:59
not all of them. So let's at least talk about the ones that we
26:03
do know about. So there have been two to three additional attempts to attack
26:07
airports or airplanes, depending on how you choose to count them, since that
26:11
September eleventh, two thousand and one attack. Okay, and we will sort
26:15
of go through a few of these. One in which there was a plot
26:17
to bomb the airport at some airport and that was discovered and interrupted before the
26:22
date of the planned attack, and it was not discovered by the TSA.
26:25
It was discovered by other intelligence agencies in the United States. But it was
26:29
one that maybe was going to happen, was foiled or prevented from happening because
26:33
we had other security then went out and found them. There was another in
26:36
which a passenger was subdued while trying to detonate a bomb on a plane,
26:38
like Okay, that's an example, but he was already on the plane,
26:41
which means that it wasn't TSA issue. As a matter of fact, he
26:45
wasn't caught by TSA at all. And there was another one there was a
26:48
plot to attack both a synagogue and a military aircraft. That is not a
26:53
TSA issue. The synagogue is definitely not a TSA issue, and the military
26:56
aircraft actually handles their own security. And again that was caught before that would
27:02
have taken place anyway. So at least those instances that we definitely know about
27:06
were ones where there were planned attacks that were prevented from happening, none of
27:11
them by the TSA, right, And I think it's also important to point
27:14
out too that these are specific to what might be related to aircraft and all
27:18
that stuff. This is not to say that there aren't other terrorist attacks that
27:22
have been foiled or disrupted in other spaces doing other things. Totally, that's
27:27
not necessarily under the purview of the TSA. The TSA is supposed to be,
27:32
what I understand of it, a preventative measure, not a law enforcement
27:37
kind of investigatory type of intelligence agency like you see with FBI, CIA and
27:41
stuff like that. Absolutely, it's a filter. It's a screen. That's
27:44
mostly what it does. If you meet some of the TSA people, then
27:47
you know what I'm talking about. I'm just joking. Like everybody I've dealt
27:51
with, it's been perfectly fine. Yeah, But these measures to increase security
27:53
largely occurred as a reaction to failures of security to catch would be terrorists whose
27:59
plans were only due to some other breakdown in their terrorist plans. The plan,
28:02
of course, is to prevent these acts from reaching the plane. That
28:07
is the thing that they have to make sure does not happen, which they
28:11
showed that in one case it got to the plane. Yes, and really
28:14
to that point, security is performing splendidly, but not by the TSA.
28:18
Big data and analytics do almost all of the heavy lifting on actual security,
28:23
well before any passenger even arrives at the airport. They catch and foil terrorist
28:29
attacks so often that one CEO actually said as often as once a week,
28:34
like that's how often they're catching these and it's well in advance of the would
28:38
be terrorist even getting to the airport. According to the CEO of a big
28:42
data security firm, Pallenteer, I think is how you say that? Yeah,
28:45
Palenteer, which I believe if I'm not mistaken, or I think it's
28:49
Plantier, Oh Plantier, Yeah, Plantier. It's a lord of the rings
28:53
reference. It's a seeing eye crystal So what a great name for a data
28:59
security firm, Like, yeah, yeah, it's way better than Big Brother.
29:03
It's the same thing but with magic. You know. The Plantier is
29:06
what saw him on the white had and his that was the crystal ball that
29:10
you weren't supposed to look at Oh wow, you remember that better than I
29:12
do. I just think it's a really cool word. So now most security
29:18
to catch potential terrorist plots isn't happening at the airport anymore. And if someone
29:22
was trying to do this and made it that far, it would probably go
29:26
undetected. Like at that point in time, they would have made it through
29:29
so many screens that one more screen probably wouldn't have been an issue or hassle.
29:33
Yeah, basically, yeah, it's a point we'll get to too.
29:36
Is you might imagine that one way that TSA would evaluate the effectiveness of their
29:40
procedures would be to do like a secret shopper type test, right, the
29:44
try and sneak guns, knives and explosives through security. And that's exactly what
29:48
they did. Went ahead and they sent people through, didn't tell the TSA
29:52
agents. These people had guns, knives, or bombs strapped to them,
29:55
and the Department of Homeland Security sent agents through security and an attempt to identify
30:00
if and where vulnerable abilities and their security may exist. The results seventy to
30:04
eighty percent of contraband weapons made it through security, Seventy to eighty percent of
30:12
guns, knives, and bombs that were just on their person. Wow,
30:18
those aren't good data. Yeah, but actually that represents a modest victory for
30:22
them, as this was up from the missing ninety five percent of weapons conducted
30:26
during a similar test in twenty thirteen, So they got better. I guess.
30:33
One example is during the test in twenty thirteen, a man with a
30:37
fake bomb strapped to his back successfully cleared security as part of the test.
30:42
So, okay, here's my thoughts on this. I have been through enough
30:45
scans. I have been groped multiple times for having nothing in like, like
30:53
nothing to be grouped for, and so so it's it's mind blowing that somebody
30:59
could have a bomb's wrapped their back. I mean, here's here's the thing,
31:00
though, I will say this in ten years, Well, I don't
31:04
know when the seventy to eighty percent data came from, but at least there's
31:07
a drop that's progress in the right direction. So good for them. I
31:12
guess it's if it's a shaving procedure, but I don't know that I would
31:15
want this to be the shaping procedure that i'd want to be, you know,
31:18
part of Yeah, you went from missing ninety five percent of weapons to
31:22
missing eighty percent of weapons. That's progress, I mean, hopefully in a
31:26
short amount of time. I mean, yeah it was. I think that
31:27
was like maybe twenty eighteen, twenty nineteen. I forget the year, but
31:30
it took five years to drop fifteen percent. That's that's three percent per year.
31:34
That's all by that estimate. If we're looking at three percent per year,
31:38
I mean we're talking decades before we get to zero or at least anywhere
31:42
near it. But thank god they got my soap, you know, really,
31:45
you know it really please they caught that one. Good job. Yeah,
31:51
serious danger from that one. Oh man. I mean, if you
31:53
couldn't tell, we're a little bit fired up about this this thing because I'm
31:57
soupy about my soap. They're like, do you want to like go back
32:02
through security and you can check your baggage, and said, I'm like,
32:05
no, throw it away, it's fine, but like also I'm pre check
32:09
and also it's soap. Yeah, test it, rub the bomb pad on
32:14
it, like let's see, let's see what comes out of that. Oh
32:15
that didn't you don't want to do that, Okay, whatever, all right,
32:19
I'm going to cool the temperature. I'm gonna go out have a smoke
32:22
break, just you know, proverbial smoke break, proverbial smoke break. Here
32:29
are the ads. What a great smoke break that was. So we've been
32:40
talking about the illusion of success that the TSA has had, and I think
32:45
it's important to kind of dive into the failed attempts. They've spent so much
32:49
money on build strategies that we're gonna start unpacking that. First, they spent
32:52
thirty million dollars on explosive detective machines that failed to detect explosives. So thirty
32:59
million dollar dollars on the thing that didn't work. You had one job.
33:02
It's the equivalent of the test that the scientologists do, Like you spend all
33:07
this money on a thing that doesn't do the thing that you want it to
33:08
do. Yeah, that's a lot. I would I would gladly accept that
33:12
thirty million dollars and give them a magic dowsing rod to use. I would
33:15
put it to such better use. Right. They spent two hundred million dollars,
33:21
No, sorry, not spend. They spend two hundred million dollars every
33:24
year on quote unquote behavioral measures that include looking for suspicious behavior, which and
33:31
this is true has never caught anyone attempting terrorist activity and is based on pretty
33:38
shoddy pseudoscience. Now, they have flagged some people. Fourteen percent of the
33:45
people who were flagged, fourteen percent of the people who were flagged were then
33:49
referred to law enforcement, meaning eighty six percent were not. Of those,
33:52
only zero point six percent of that fourteen percent were arrested, and of those
34:00
zero were deemed as terrorist related in any way. Yes, so I'd like
34:05
to rediterate. So for a zero percent outcome, we're spending two hundred million
34:09
dollars a year. Yeah, and we're being told that we can't pay for
34:13
student loans, so you know, boo. Anyway, let's keep going,
34:17
Like, if you're not infuriated, let's go, let's do more. We
34:21
got more. They spend with a d as a dog two hundred and forty
34:27
million dollars per year on scanning equipment that can't detect soft devices anyway, and
34:31
they're only in larger airports, so they can still be avoided by terrorists by
34:36
simply going to small regional airports, right, and soft devices means things like
34:40
liquids and gels that they might store in the person. It might It also
34:44
could mean things that are plastic pipe. Bombs that are made of PVC pipe,
34:46
for example, would be something that would not be detected by this,
34:50
even if they were to try and bring it on and even if and it
34:53
kind of doesn't matter because if they were afraid of that, they just go
34:57
to an airport that doesn't have one, that's slightly smaller than the few airport
35:00
that do. Right, So in case it isn't clear, once cleared through
35:05
security in airport, as long as you don't leave the airport, you are
35:07
clear for security for all airports for the rest of however long you stay in
35:12
the airports all LAH the terminal with Tom Hanks. So if you clear a
35:17
checkpoint at one airpoint, you will have to clear another no matter how many
35:22
airports you go through until you leave an airport and try to return. So
35:25
once you are in, you are in your through. And again this means
35:30
that like you can go to those the smaller airports where that don't have as
35:34
much security. You did say airpoint at one time, I just want to
35:36
throw that was kind of fun. But the airpoints, Yeah, I like
35:39
that airpoint. So yeah, any only around seventy percent of the airports in
35:44
the United States have full security measures, so there's about thirty percent that that
35:47
someone could go to if they were trying to evade certain security devices, although
35:52
again, they probably wouldn't make it there because they probably get caught long in
35:54
advance because of all the analytics and data that are being run to prevent things
35:59
like that from happening. Yeah, exactly right now, just to kind of
36:02
rack it up, we are at what four hundred and forty million dollars per
36:07
year on this stuff that doesn't work? Four hundred and seventy four and seventy
36:09
sorry, four hundred and seventy okay, four hundred and seventy million dollars per
36:13
year of stuff that doesn't work so far, so if you're all doing the
36:15
math now. They also spend one billion dollars per year on air marshals who
36:21
have largely only detained people for petty crimes and again have never and I want
36:25
to repeat that, never stopped the terrorist zero yep. So you know,
36:32
we talk about this thing a lot of times. We've talked about prevention and
36:36
that sort of thing, and the Commons saying that that people like and I
36:39
agree with. I think this is really good that an ounce of prevention is
36:43
worth a pound of cure, meaning that what you pay for in prevention,
36:46
you will save like tenfold or fivefold often, but five or tenfold in return
36:52
on investment from not having to react to the problem that was caused by not
36:58
preventing that problem in the first place. In this instance, we're kind of
37:00
the opposite. We're one thousand pounds of prevention for maybe an ounce of cure.
37:06
Like, right, so much prevention, so little problem it's preventing.
37:09
There's so little in the way of outcome measures that show that the prevention is
37:15
actually working. And I think that's a thing that's really kind of frustrating with
37:17
the amount of money and time and effort and all the stuff that goes into
37:22
this particular thing where they're not doing the thing that they're saying they're doing.
37:27
That's not to say that removing it now, like I mean, you never
37:30
know if you removed it all now, who knows what could happen. And
37:32
that's kind of a scary thing too that we can talk about. But it's
37:36
a weird space to be in. Yeah, So the TSA is conducted pat
37:39
downs and other embarrassing and inappropriate searches of elderly people, people with physical and
37:44
kind of disabilities, and even children. These people are considered a potential threat.
37:47
Maybe in some places, sure, maybe they're weaponized, but it hasn't
37:52
really happened here. When I joked at the beginning of this episode, and
37:54
I said that I've been groped every single time I have been padded down,
37:58
I've been padded down in and in but around my genitals every single time I've
38:04
had to have in a in front of multiple people standing in line, had
38:08
to have my genitals paded down. Yeah. So, yes, this population
38:14
could be used to smuggle weapons, like we mentioned, in some places,
38:16
that is absolutely the case, and they could be used to smuggle weapons forcefully,
38:21
unknowingly, or even willingly. But to date, there is no evidence,
38:23
zero evidence that this has ever taken place. And in the meantime,
38:28
people are being violated in the name of security. So this hasn't happened here.
38:31
Yeah, like this has happened in other places, like there are examples
38:35
of that happening in other places, but it has not happened here. There's
38:37
no evidence of to support that. Now, we started alluded to this,
38:42
but let's consider who may be trying to commit terrorist acts. Right, there's
38:46
kind of a spectrum you might imagine from like the very amateur end of sort
38:51
of disgruntled, not thought through, impulsive, I'm just going to go do
38:53
this thing all the way to like professional level. They actually work in an
38:58
organization that does this type of thing. So you have the white spectrum.
39:01
People who are kind of on the amateur side of that spectrum. They're going
39:06
to be deterred well before they attempt anything at the airport, and are also
39:08
likely to be caught by the most basic security measures because they're amateurs, like
39:13
they're they're again, they're impulsive, possibly have some mental health issues going on.
39:17
They're not going to be doing a lot of strategic things. Is an
39:21
example of this. In March twenty twenty three, a man boarding a plane
39:23
in Lehigh Valley National Airport in Pennsylvania was arrested when explosives were found in his
39:29
check luggage during routine screening. This was in fancy screening, wasn't an in
39:32
person pat down, it wasn't intense, it was just a very basic routine
39:37
screening. Amateur right. US Army veteran Kevin Brown was detained at the Orlando
39:42
Airport in two thousand and eight when they found materials to make a pipe bomb
39:45
in his checked luggage, which he claimed he was bringing to show his friends
39:49
how to make a pipe bomb. That makes it better, right, sure?
39:55
Like okay, also not a good idea, But due to the fact
40:00
that in his luggage these were unassembled and in his checked luggage, which means
40:05
that he did not have access to them, he really posed no threat to
40:08
the plane at all. Now you can make the case he shouldn't have been
40:12
bringing pipe bombs on the plane or materials. I agree. Sure, it
40:15
doesn't mean that he shouldn't have been stopped. He should have been just that.
40:19
When it comes to the TSA being a preventative measure for threats to the
40:22
plane, he was not actually a threat to the plane. He was boarding
40:25
also amateur like this he was, even if he was like the basic routine
40:30
things caught it. And again these instances are exceedingly rare, like this is
40:36
two that I found that was looking for some also just mail it. I'm
40:39
just kidding, do not mail pipe bomb materials, like don't do that.
40:43
Oh my god, we are going to be flagged, like you're not going
40:50
to be able to fly pre check anymore because of this, because of this
40:52
episode. Yeah, our listens went way up on this one when the TSA
40:58
got a hold of it as a check video. Hi yeah hii folks,
41:02
nice to see you. Now. The professionals are going to find ways,
41:06
the ones that are like really skilled, they're going to find ways and know
41:08
how to get around any in person security. When they are caught, it
41:12
is before they even make it to the airport. Like we mentioned before,
41:15
So remember the plot to sneak liquid explosives onto a plane in Britain that was
41:19
stopped, That was orchestrated by al Qaeda, and the people involved were arrested
41:23
two weeks before the flight was even supposed to take place. They were caught
41:27
by preventive intelligence measures before there was ever a ban on liquids. And as
41:31
far as we know, this policy has never prevented liquid explosives from and making
41:36
it onto a plane. Furthermore, it just doesn't make any sense. And
41:38
to that point, we're going to borrow a little clip that we're going to
41:42
comment on the quality from from a little show some people may know called SNL.
41:46
Hey I remember that show. The important thing about today is that the
41:51
TSA is loosening our restrictions on liquids and gels. Now you can bring three
41:55
ounces of liquids or gels as long as they are inside of super baggy.
42:00
Why why what? Why did it change? That's a good question. Good
42:07
because the FBI did test and founds that three ounces of liquids can't blow up
42:10
an airplane, but four ounces of liquid cams Still we're still not sure on
42:20
that. But what is important here is that three ounces can, So we're
42:24
safe as long as we stick with the three Well, what's to stop two
42:29
people from each having three ounces and then meeting on the plane to combine them?
42:42
Chris, you want to take this one? No, that was the
42:44
gist of it. It was the like they could just combine them, honestly,
42:46
And you can do that too, because you can bring to separate containers
42:51
that are both in a three point four ounces right onto a plane. You
42:54
can bring one hundred of them if you want to and combine them into one
42:59
one container. Like that's the policy is three point four ounces. So what
43:01
is the actual point? Yeah, it's nothing. Yeah, it doesn't make
43:06
any sense. If the policy were cumultive bounces, I could understand that,
43:08
but it's not, so it doesn't make any sense. Like I think you
43:12
alway pointed out, like the difference between three point four and three point five
43:15
ounces is the difference between something that can and cannot blow up an airplane?
43:19
No? Right? And also like, as far as we can tell,
43:22
has this prevented anybody from bringing in any exploit liquid based explosives onto an airplane?
43:28
No? No, I mean they even sell turkey sandwiches inside the airport.
43:31
So, like the liquids are everywhere, and again like it's how do
43:37
you aggregate it? What counts as a liquid? Like if it's frozen,
43:40
it's technically fine, right, Like I've had water bottles where I had just
43:44
stuck him in the freezer the night before, and they're like, eh,
43:45
it's not liquid. So you come on right, like so ridiculous. Do
43:51
you hear what you're saying? Right? That's the thing is, like when
43:53
you lay it all out, it just does not It doesn't line up.
43:58
And I don't know, maybe there's some ration now somewhere. I don't know
44:00
where that is though I have yet to find it. Yeah, well,
44:02
okay, we actually have so much more to talk about this. What's more
44:07
that we planned than we're currently at, so I think it actually makes the
44:12
most sense to split this into it two parter and we will see you back
44:15
here next time for a thrilling conclusion. We're going to talk more about how
44:19
the TSA may be working when we talk about it with respect to the psychological
44:22
aspect of it. We're to talk about some like what is the future like
44:27
where is the direction going? We're talk about how other countries handle this,
44:30
and some sort of interesting tidbits that we always like to throw in and pepper
44:32
in here. But I think that's what we have to say today. We
44:36
do like to share our recommendations, so let's go ahead and we'll talk about
44:39
those. But first we have to give credit where credit is due for the
44:43
people who have joined us on Patreon are special elite group of members which you
44:46
anybody is welcome to join. We would like as many of you to join
44:51
us as you as would be like that. Yeah, it's not an exclusive
44:52
club, Come be with us anyway. The group currently includes a list of
44:57
special elite people that is Mike m Meghan, Laila, Mike T, Justin,
45:00
Kim, Joshua, Brad, Stephanie, Olivia, Brian and Ashley,
45:05
Thank you all. You guys are amazing. Yeah, y'all rule. We
45:07
are such big fans of you. In addition, thank you Shane for recording
45:12
with me today on this late night rare recording and made my co host and
45:15
all the things you do. Justin does our audio engineering and production, and
45:20
Emma Wilson as our social media coordinator, and of course we would do nothing
45:23
without our listeners. Thank you all for being with us today. We appreciate
45:27
you. If you'd like to support us non financially, I mean, you
45:29
can support us on Patreon, but you can also support us non financially by
45:31
leaving us alreating and review, subscribing, telling friends, doing all that sort
45:36
of thing. Let's get to some fun recommendations. Let's do it recommendations,
45:47
all right. So I am recommending an agency which I think does some really
45:52
cool work, and I am joining their team to do a little bit of
45:55
supervision. And that is an organization called Empowered, a Center for Sexuality,
46:00
and they are based out of the Midwest here in the United States. So
46:05
the goal of this organization is to provide comprehensive, socially valid sexuality education and
46:10
therapy and support and behavior interventions for individuals with and without disabilities, and so
46:16
they can work on a lot of different kind of problem areas that might come
46:21
up for folks or just some general education. They do a certification process to
46:25
become a Certified Behavioral Sexologist CBS, which is a new certification program. Oh
46:30
so that's what CBS stands for. Yeah, that's that whole company. They
46:35
offer some really great continuing ed opportunities for folks that want to do that kind
46:38
of work in that space. And they also are connected with our friends over
46:44
at Behavior Bitches and Study Notes ABA doing some work with them too. So
46:47
like they're kind of in a lot of places doing some really cool work,
46:51
and I'm really excited to collaborate with them on some things, even if it
46:53
is minimally that's great. Yeah, are you sure it's legal for you to
46:57
do a job like that when you live in Florida? And all I'm gonna
47:00
say is my governor who's not my governor, complains about gender affirming care while
47:06
wearing lifts in his cowboy boots. So you know the guy, I don't
47:09
think he really knows what he's talking about. I think sex education has been
47:14
criminalized in Florida. So yes, but but I gotta say it is my
47:19
favorite watching all the conspiracy theories about whether or not Rhonda Santis wears actual lifts
47:23
in his boots, which he does, by the way. No, it's
47:25
it's it's it's been a it's been a joy to watch. I agree,
47:29
it's my favorite. It's so fun. So yours is wholesome and nice,
47:31
empowered a center for sexuality. That's great. Yes, mine is a silly
47:36
movie. Because I do that. I am recommending a reason Amazon Prime original
47:39
movie, and this is called Totally Killer. I don't want to give too
47:44
much away, but I'm just gonna say this is a sort of comedy horror
47:46
movie in then that sort of vein. So I think if you are in
47:51
in the world of enjoying horror and you like your horror with a bit of
47:54
comedy in it, I strong recommend for me. I thought this movie was
47:59
a lot of fun. You can do a lot worse than Totally Killer on
48:01
Amazon Prime. Yeah, it looks like it's fun. Yeah, it's good.
48:06
I think that's all that I have. Is there anything that you have
48:07
or anything that I forgot that you we should add before we wrap up today.
48:12
No, I think that We've got a lot more to cover on this
48:15
and we've got some interesting things coming up, but yeah, I think that
48:17
covers it for this one. Perfect all right. We will see you next
48:20
time for part two talking about the TSA, and I think that's it.
48:23
So this is Abraham and this is a Shane. We're up. It's yup.
48:28
You've been listening to Why We Do What We Do. You can learn
48:30
more about this and other episodes by going to WWDWWD podcast dot com. Thanks
48:37
for listening, and we hope you have an awesome day.