Latest / Supreme Cases from 1803-2018 / 25 - Supreme Cases from 1803-2018 by United States Supreme Court
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Section twenty five of a collection of Supreme Court opinions
- 0:04Speaker 1: by the United States Supreme Court. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:08Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:11Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording
- 0:17Speaker 1: by Colin McMahon Roe v. Wade, four ten U S.
- 0:22Speaker 1: One thirteen, Decided January Twoond, nineteen seventy three, Part one.
- 0:28Speaker 1: Please note this is a reading of the opinion of
- 0:31Speaker 1: the Court only. This reading does not include the syllabus
- 0:34Speaker 1: or any concurring or dissenting opinions. For ease of listening,
- 0:38Speaker 1: this reading omids legal citations found within the text of
- 0:42Speaker 1: the Court's opinion. Mister Justice Blackman delivered the opinion of
- 0:48Speaker 1: the Court. This Texas Federal peel and its Georgia companion
- 0:53Speaker 1: Do v. Bolton post present constitutional challenges to state criminal
- 0:58Speaker 1: abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical
- 1:02Speaker 1: of those that have been in effect in many states
- 1:05Speaker 1: for approximately a century. The Georgia's statutes, in contrast, have
- 1:09Speaker 1: a modern caste and are a legislative product that, to
- 1:13Speaker 1: an extent at least obviously reflects the influences of recent
- 1:17Speaker 1: attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of
- 1:22Speaker 1: new thinking about an old issue. We forthwith acknowledge our
- 1:26Speaker 1: awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy,
- 1:30Speaker 1: of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of
- 1:34Speaker 1: the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires
- 1:39Speaker 1: one's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges
- 1:44Speaker 1: of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life
- 1:48Speaker 1: and family and their values, and the moral standards one
- 1:52Speaker 1: establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
- 1:56Speaker 1: and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. In addition,
- 2:00Speaker 1: population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate
- 2:05Speaker 1: and not to simplify the problem. Our task, of course,
- 2:09Speaker 1: is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of
- 2:13Speaker 1: emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this,
- 2:17Speaker 1: and because we do, we have inquired into, and in
- 2:20Speaker 1: this opinion place some emphasis upon medical and medical legal history,
- 2:25Speaker 1: and what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward the
- 2:29Speaker 1: abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too,
- 2:33Speaker 1: mister Justice Holmes's admonition and is now vindicated dissent in
- 2:37Speaker 1: Lockner View, New York quote, the Constitution is made for
- 2:41Speaker 1: people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our
- 2:45Speaker 1: finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking,
- 2:49Speaker 1: ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
- 2:53Speaker 1: statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
- 2:58Speaker 1: End of the Texas statutes that concern us. Here are
- 3:01Speaker 1: articles eleven ninety one through eleven ninety four and eleven
- 3:05Speaker 1: ninety six of the state's Penal Code. Footnote Article eleven
- 3:10Speaker 1: ninety one. Abortion. If any person shall designedly administer to
- 3:15Speaker 1: a pregnant woman, or knowingly procure to be administered with
- 3:19Speaker 1: her consent, any drug or medicine, or shall use towards
- 3:23Speaker 1: her any violence or means, whatever, externally or internally applied,
- 3:27Speaker 1: and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in
- 3:30Speaker 1: the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years.
- 3:35Speaker 1: If it be done without her consent, the punishment shall
- 3:38Speaker 1: be doubled. By abortion is meant that the life of
- 3:41Speaker 1: the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb,
- 3:44Speaker 1: or that a premature birth thereof be caused. Article eleven
- 3:48Speaker 1: ninety two. Furnishing the means. Whoever furnishes the means for
- 3:53Speaker 1: procuring an abortion, knowing the purpose intended, is guilty as
- 3:57Speaker 1: an accomplice. Article eleven ninety three attempt at abortion. If
- 4:02Speaker 1: the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the
- 4:05Speaker 1: offender is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion,
- 4:09Speaker 1: provided it be shown that such means were calculated to
- 4:12Speaker 1: produce that result, and shall be fined not less than
- 4:15Speaker 1: one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars. Article eleven
- 4:20Speaker 1: ninety four. Murder in producing abortion. If the death of
- 4:24Speaker 1: the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced, or
- 4:27Speaker 1: by an attempt to affect the same, it is murder.
- 4:30Speaker 1: Article eleven ninety six. Nothing in this chapter applies to
- 4:34Speaker 1: an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the
- 4:38Speaker 1: purpose of saving the life of the mother. The four
- 4:41Speaker 1: going articles, together with Article eleven ninety five, compose Chapter
- 4:45Speaker 1: nine of Title fifteen of the Penal Code. Article eleven
- 4:49Speaker 1: ninety five, not attacked here reads Article eleven ninety five
- 4:54Speaker 1: Destroying unborn child. Whoever shall, during parturition of the mother,
- 4:59Speaker 1: destroy the vitality or life in a child in a
- 5:02Speaker 1: state of being born and before actual birth, which child
- 5:06Speaker 1: would otherwise have been born alive, shall be confined in
- 5:09Speaker 1: the penitentiary for life or for not less than five
- 5:12Speaker 1: years end of footnote. These make it a crime to
- 5:17Speaker 1: quote procure an abortion end of quote as therein defined,
- 5:21Speaker 1: or to attempt one, except with respect to quote an
- 5:25Speaker 1: abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose
- 5:29Speaker 1: of saving the life of the mother end of quote.
- 5:31Speaker 1: Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the states.
- 5:36Speaker 1: Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in eighteen fifty four.
- 5:40Speaker 1: This was soon modified into language that has remained substantially
- 5:45Speaker 1: unchanged to the present time. The final article in each
- 5:48Speaker 1: of these compilations provided the same exception as does the
- 5:51Speaker 1: present article eleven ninety six for an abortion by quote
- 5:56Speaker 1: medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of
- 5:58Speaker 1: the mother end of quote footnote. Long ago, a suggestion
- 6:03Speaker 1: was made that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague because
- 6:07Speaker 1: of definitional deficiencies. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disposed
- 6:12Speaker 1: of that suggestion, peremptorily saying only quote it is also
- 6:16Speaker 1: insisted in the motion and arrest of judgment that the
- 6:20Speaker 1: statute is unconstitutional and void in that it does not
- 6:23Speaker 1: sufficiently define or describe the offense of abortion. We do
- 6:27Speaker 1: not concur in respect to this question. End of quote.
- 6:31Speaker 1: The same court recently has held again that the state's
- 6:34Speaker 1: abortion statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court
- 6:39Speaker 1: held that, quote, the State of Texas has a compelling
- 6:42Speaker 1: interest to protect fetal life end of quote, that Article
- 6:46Speaker 1: eleven ninety one quote is designed to protect fetal life.
- 6:50Speaker 1: End of quote, That the Texas homicide statutes, particularly Article
- 6:55Speaker 1: twelve oh five of the Penal Code, are intended to
- 6:58Speaker 1: protect a person quote in existence by actual birth end
- 7:02Speaker 1: of quote, and thereby implicitly recognize other human life that
- 7:06Speaker 1: is not quote in existence by actual birth. End of quote.
- 7:10Speaker 1: That the definition of human life is for the legislature
- 7:14Speaker 1: and not the courts. That Article eleven ninety six quote
- 7:18Speaker 1: is more definite than the District of Columbia statute upheld
- 7:21Speaker 1: in United States versus Village end of quote, and that
- 7:25Speaker 1: the Texas statute quote is not vague and indefinite or overbroad.
- 7:30Speaker 1: End of quote. A physician's abortion conviction was affirmed in Thompson.
- 7:35Speaker 1: The court observed that any issue as to the burden
- 7:38Speaker 1: of proof under the exemption of Article eleven ninety six
- 7:41Speaker 1: quote is not before us. End of quote, end of
- 7:44Speaker 1: footnote two. Jane Roe footnote. The name is a pseudonym.
- 7:50Speaker 1: End of footnote. A single woman who was residing in
- 7:53Speaker 1: Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March nineteen
- 7:57Speaker 1: seventy against the District Attorney of the county. She sought
- 8:01Speaker 1: a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion Statutes were
- 8:05Speaker 1: unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant
- 8:10Speaker 1: from enforcing the statutes. Rowe alleged that she was unmarried
- 8:14Speaker 1: and pregnant, that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by
- 8:17Speaker 1: an abortion quote performed by a competent licensed physician under
- 8:22Speaker 1: safe clinical conditions end of quote, that she was unable
- 8:26Speaker 1: to get a legal abortion in Texas because her life
- 8:29Speaker 1: did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of
- 8:32Speaker 1: her pregnancy, and that she could not afford to travel
- 8:35Speaker 1: to another jurisdiction in order to secure illegal abortion under
- 8:39Speaker 1: safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague,
- 8:44Speaker 1: and that they abridged her right of personal privacy protected
- 8:48Speaker 1: by the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth Amendments. By
- 8:52Speaker 1: an amendment to her complaint, Roe purported to sue quote
- 8:56Speaker 1: on behalf of herself and all other women end of quote.
- 9:00Speaker 1: Similarly situated, James Hubert Halford, a licensed physician, sought and
- 9:05Speaker 1: was granted leave to intervene in rose action. In his complaint,
- 9:09Speaker 1: he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations
- 9:13Speaker 1: of the Texas Abortion Statutes, and that two such prosecutions
- 9:17Speaker 1: were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who
- 9:21Speaker 1: came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for
- 9:25Speaker 1: many cases, he, as a physician, was unable to determine
- 9:29Speaker 1: whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by
- 9:33Speaker 1: Article eleven ninety six. He alleged that, as a consequence,
- 9:37Speaker 1: the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the
- 9:41Speaker 1: fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his
- 9:44Speaker 1: patient's rights to privacy in the doctor patient relationship and
- 9:48Speaker 1: his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were
- 9:52Speaker 1: guaranteed by the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments
- 9:58Speaker 1: John and Mary Dow. These names are pseudonyms. End of footnote.
- 10:03Speaker 1: A married couple filed a companion complaint to that of Roe.
- 10:07Speaker 1: They also named the district attorney as defendant, claimed like
- 10:12Speaker 1: constitutional deprivations and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The does
- 10:18Speaker 1: alleged that they were a childless couple, that missus Dow
- 10:21Speaker 1: was suffering from a quote neurochemical end of quote disorder
- 10:26Speaker 1: that her physician had quote advised her to avoid pregnancy
- 10:30Speaker 1: until such time as her condition was materially improved end
- 10:34Speaker 1: of quote, although a pregnancy at the present time would
- 10:37Speaker 1: not present quote a serious risk end of quote to
- 10:40Speaker 1: her life, that pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued
- 10:45Speaker 1: use of birth control pills, and that if she should
- 10:48Speaker 1: become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by
- 10:51Speaker 1: an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe
- 10:55Speaker 1: clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the day
- 11:00Speaker 1: purported to sue quote on behalf of themselves and all
- 11:03Speaker 1: couples similarly situated end of quote. The two actions were
- 11:08Speaker 1: consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three Judge
- 11:11Speaker 1: District Court. The suits thus presented the situations of the
- 11:16Speaker 1: pregnant single woman, the childless couple with the wife not pregnant,
- 11:20Speaker 1: and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack
- 11:24Speaker 1: on the Texas Criminal abortion Statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits,
- 11:29Speaker 1: motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The
- 11:33Speaker 1: court held that Roe and members of her class and
- 11:36Speaker 1: doctor Halford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies,
- 11:41Speaker 1: but that the does had failed to allege facts sufficient
- 11:44Speaker 1: to state a present controversy and did not have standing.
- 11:48Speaker 1: It concluded that with respect to the requests for a
- 11:51Speaker 1: declaratory judgment, abstention was not warranted on the merits. The
- 11:56Speaker 1: district Court held that the quote fundamental right of single
- 12:00Speaker 1: women and married persons to choose whether to have children
- 12:03Speaker 1: is protected by the Ninth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment
- 12:07Speaker 1: end of and that the Texas Criminal Abortion Statutes were
- 12:11Speaker 1: void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague
- 12:16Speaker 1: and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiff's Ninth Amendment rights.
- 12:22Speaker 1: The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect
- 12:25Speaker 1: to the request for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the
- 12:29Speaker 1: Doe's complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the
- 12:33Speaker 1: application for injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe, and
- 12:37Speaker 1: the intervener Halford, pursuant to twenty eight USC. Section twelve
- 12:42Speaker 1: fifty three, have appealed to this Court from that part
- 12:46Speaker 1: of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant
- 12:50Speaker 1: district attorney has purported to cross appeal pursuant to the
- 12:53Speaker 1: same statute from the Court's grant of declaratory relief to
- 12:58Speaker 1: Row and Halford. Sides also have taken protective appeals to
- 13:02Speaker 1: the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- 13:06Speaker 1: That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision.
- 13:10Speaker 1: Here we postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on
- 13:14Speaker 1: the merits. It might have been preferable if the defendant,
- 13:17Speaker 1: pursuant to our rule twenty have presented to us a
- 13:21Speaker 1: petition for certiori before judgment in the Court of Appeals
- 13:25Speaker 1: with respect to the granting of the plaintiff's prayer for
- 13:27Speaker 1: declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Danovan and Gun v.
- 13:32Speaker 1: University Committee are to the effect that Section twelve fifty
- 13:36Speaker 1: three does not authorize an appeal to this Court from
- 13:39Speaker 1: the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless,
- 13:45Speaker 1: that those decisions do not foreclose our review of both
- 13:48Speaker 1: the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a case of
- 13:51Speaker 1: this kind when it is properly here as this one
- 13:55Speaker 1: is on appeal under twelve fifty three from specific denial
- 13:59Speaker 1: of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects
- 14:03Speaker 1: are necessarily identical. It would be destructive of time and
- 14:07Speaker 1: energy for all concerned were we to rule otherwise. Four.
- 14:11Speaker 1: We are next confronted with issues of judiciability, standing and abstention.
- 14:17Speaker 1: Have Roe and the does established that quote personal stake
- 14:21Speaker 1: in the outcome of the controversy end of quote That
- 14:24Speaker 1: ensures that quote the dispute sought to be adjudicated will
- 14:28Speaker 1: be presented in an adversary context and in a form
- 14:32Speaker 1: historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution end of quote.
- 14:37Speaker 1: And what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges
- 14:40Speaker 1: against doctor Halford in State Court have upon the propriety
- 14:44Speaker 1: of the federal courts granting relief to him as a
- 14:46Speaker 1: plaintiff intervener A Jane Rowe. Despite the use of the pseudonym,
- 14:52Speaker 1: no suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious person
- 14:56Speaker 1: for purposes of her case, we accept as true and
- 14:59Speaker 1: is a state established her existence, her pregnant state as
- 15:03Speaker 1: of the inception of her suit in March nineteen seventy
- 15:06Speaker 1: and as late as May twenty first of that year,
- 15:09Speaker 1: when she filed an elias affidavit with the District Court,
- 15:12Speaker 1: and her inability to obtain a legal abortion in Texas.
- 15:17Speaker 1: Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing
- 15:19Speaker 1: and thereafter until as late as May, there can be
- 15:22Speaker 1: little dispute that it then presented a case or controversy,
- 15:26Speaker 1: and that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as
- 15:30Speaker 1: a pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws,
- 15:34Speaker 1: had standing to challenge those statutes. Indeed, we do not
- 15:38Speaker 1: read the appell's brief as really asserting anything to the
- 15:41Speaker 1: contrary that quote, logical nexus between the status asserted and
- 15:46Speaker 1: the claims sought to be adjudicated end of quote, and
- 15:49Speaker 1: the necessary degree of contentiousness are both present. The appelle notes, however,
- 15:55Speaker 1: that the record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant
- 15:58Speaker 1: at the time of the District court hearing on May
- 16:01Speaker 1: twenty second, nineteen seventy, or on the following June seventeenth,
- 16:05Speaker 1: when the court's opinion and judgment were filed, and he
- 16:08Speaker 1: suggests that Roe's case must now be moot because she
- 16:12Speaker 1: and all other members of her class are no longer
- 16:15Speaker 1: subject to any nineteen seventy pregnancy. The usual rule in
- 16:19Speaker 1: federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at
- 16:23Speaker 1: stages of a pellet or serchiorari review, and not simply
- 16:27Speaker 1: at the date the action is initiated. But when, as here,
- 16:31Speaker 1: pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal
- 16:35Speaker 1: two hundred and sixty six day human gestation period is
- 16:39Speaker 1: so short that the pregnancy will come to term before
- 16:42Speaker 1: the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes
- 16:46Speaker 1: a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond
- 16:51Speaker 1: the trial stage, and appellet review will be effectively denied.
- 16:55Speaker 1: Our law should not be that rigid pregnancy often comes
- 16:58Speaker 1: more than once to the same way, and in the
- 17:01Speaker 1: general population, if man is to survive, it will always
- 17:04Speaker 1: be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a
- 17:08Speaker 1: conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be quote capable of
- 17:13Speaker 1: repetition yet evading review end of quote. We therefore agree
- 17:18Speaker 1: with the District Court that Jane Rowe had standing to
- 17:21Speaker 1: undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and
- 17:26Speaker 1: that the termination of her nineteen seventy pregnancy has not
- 17:29Speaker 1: rendered her case moot. B Doctor Halford, The doctor's position
- 17:35Speaker 1: is different. He entered rose litigation as a plaintiff intervener,
- 17:39Speaker 1: alleging in his complaint that he quote in the past,
- 17:42Speaker 1: has been arrested for violating the Texas abortion laws, and
- 17:46Speaker 1: at the present time stands charged by indictment with violating
- 17:50Speaker 1: said laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas,
- 17:54Speaker 1: to Wit. One, the State of Texas versus James H. Halford,
- 17:59Speaker 1: number CIX six nine five three zero seven one H
- 18:03Speaker 1: and two the State of Texas versus James H. Halford
- 18:06Speaker 1: n C. Six nine two five two four H. In
- 18:10Speaker 1: both cases, the defendant is charged with abortion. End. In
- 18:15Speaker 1: his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like
- 18:18Speaker 1: representations as to the abortion charges pending in the state court.
- 18:23Speaker 1: These representations were also repeated in the affidavit he executed
- 18:27Speaker 1: and filed in support of his motion for summary judgment.
- 18:30Speaker 1: Doctor Halford is therefore in the position of seeking in
- 18:34Speaker 1: a federal court declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to
- 18:38Speaker 1: the same statutes under which he stands charged in criminal
- 18:41Speaker 1: prosecutions simultaneously pending in state court. Although he stated that
- 18:46Speaker 1: he has been arrested in the past for violating the
- 18:48Speaker 1: state's abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial
- 18:53Speaker 1: and immediate threat to any federally protected right that cannot
- 18:56Speaker 1: be asserted in his defense against the state prosecution. Neither
- 19:01Speaker 1: is there any allegation of harassment or bad faith prosecution.
- 19:04Speaker 1: In order to escape the rule articulated in the cases
- 19:07Speaker 1: cited in the next paragraph of this opinion that absent
- 19:11Speaker 1: harassment and bad faith, a defendant and appending state criminal
- 19:15Speaker 1: case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under
- 19:19Speaker 1: which the state is prosecuting him. Doctor Halford seeks to
- 19:23Speaker 1: distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his
- 19:26Speaker 1: status as a quote potential future defendant end of quote,
- 19:31Speaker 1: and to assert only the latter for standing purposes here
- 19:35Speaker 1: we see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in
- 19:38Speaker 1: Samuels v. Mackell compels the conclusion that the District Court
- 19:43Speaker 1: aired when it granted declaratory relief to doctor Halford instead
- 19:47Speaker 1: of refraining from so doing. The Court, of course, was
- 19:50Speaker 1: correct in refusing to grant injunctive relief to the doctor.
- 19:54Speaker 1: The reasons supportive of that action, however, are those expressed
- 19:58Speaker 1: in Samuels v. Mackell, Zupra, and in Younger v. Harris,
- 20:02Speaker 1: Boyle v. Landry, Perez Viledesma and Burne v. Carlais. See
- 20:07Speaker 1: also Dombrowski v. Fister. We note in passing that Younger
- 20:12Speaker 1: and its companion cases were decided after the three judge
- 20:15Speaker 1: District Court decision. In this case, Doctor Halford's complaint in
- 20:19Speaker 1: intervention therefore is to be dismissed. Footnote. We need not
- 20:24Speaker 1: consider what different results, if any, would follow, if doctor
- 20:28Speaker 1: Halford's intervention were on behalf of a class. His complaint
- 20:32Speaker 1: in intervention does not purport to assert a class suit
- 20:35Speaker 1: and makes no reference to any class, apart from an
- 20:38Speaker 1: allegation that he quote and others similarly situated end of
- 20:42Speaker 1: quote must necessarily guess at the meaning of Article eleven
- 20:46Speaker 1: ninety six. His application for leaf to intervene goes somewhat further,
- 20:51Speaker 1: for it asserts that plaintiff Row does not adequately protect
- 20:54Speaker 1: the interest of the doctor quote and the class of
- 20:58Speaker 1: people who are physicians and the class of people who
- 21:01Speaker 1: are patients. End The leave application, however, is not the complaint.
- 21:06Speaker 1: Despite the District Court's statement to the contrary, we fail
- 21:09Speaker 1: to perceive the essentials of a class suit in the
- 21:12Speaker 1: Halford complaint end of footnote. He is remitted to his
- 21:16Speaker 1: defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse
- 21:20Speaker 1: the judgment of the District Court in so far as
- 21:22Speaker 1: it granted doctor Halford relief and failed to dismiss his
- 21:26Speaker 1: complaint in intervention see the Does. In view of our
- 21:30Speaker 1: ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the issue
- 21:33Speaker 1: of the DOES standing in their case has little significance.
- 21:37Speaker 1: The claims they assert are essentially the same as those
- 21:40Speaker 1: of Roe, and they attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we
- 21:44Speaker 1: briefly note the Doe's posture. Their pleadings present them as
- 21:48Speaker 1: a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, who
- 21:52Speaker 1: have no desire to have children at this time because
- 21:55Speaker 1: of their having received medical advice that Missus Dowe should
- 21:58Speaker 1: avoid pregnancy, and for quote other highly personal reasons end
- 22:02Speaker 1: of quote. But they quote fear they may face the
- 22:06Speaker 1: prospect of becoming parents end of quote, and if pregnancy ensues,
- 22:10Speaker 1: they quote would want to terminate end of quote it
- 22:14Speaker 1: by an abortion. They assert, an inability to obtain an
- 22:17Speaker 1: abortion legally in Texas, and consequently the prospect of obtaining
- 22:21Speaker 1: an illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to
- 22:25Speaker 1: some place where the procedure could be obtained legally and competently.
- 22:29Speaker 1: We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have,
- 22:33Speaker 1: as their asserted immediate and present injury only an alleged
- 22:36Speaker 1: quote detrimental effect upon their marital happiness end of quote,
- 22:41Speaker 1: because they are forced to quote the choice of refraining
- 22:44Speaker 1: from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary Doe's health
- 22:48Speaker 1: through a possible pregnancy end of quote. Their claim is
- 22:52Speaker 1: that sometime in the future, Missus Doe might become pregnant
- 22:56Speaker 1: because of possible failure of contraceptive measures, and at that
- 23:00Speaker 1: time in the future, she might want an abortion that
- 23:03Speaker 1: might then be illegal under the Texas Statutes. The very
- 23:07Speaker 1: phrasing of The doe's position reveals its speculative character. Their
- 23:11Speaker 1: alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy,
- 23:17Speaker 1: possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health.
- 23:23Speaker 1: Any One or more of these several possibilities may not
- 23:26Speaker 1: take place, and all may not combine in the doe's estimation.
- 23:30Speaker 1: These possibilities might have some real or imagined impact upon
- 23:34Speaker 1: their marital happiness. But we are not prepared to say
- 23:38Speaker 1: that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is
- 23:41Speaker 1: sufficient to present an actual case or controversy. The doe's
- 23:46Speaker 1: claim falls far short of those resolved otherwise in the
- 23:49Speaker 1: cases that the Dos urge upon US, namely, Investment Company
- 23:53Speaker 1: Institute Vcamp, Data Processing Service v Camp and Eperson v. Arkansas.
- 24:00Speaker 1: They also true acts be rache. The Does therefore are
- 24:04Speaker 1: not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their complaint was properly
- 24:08Speaker 1: dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal five.
- 24:13Speaker 1: The principal thrust of the appellant's attack on the Texas
- 24:16Speaker 1: Statutes is that they improperly invade a right said to
- 24:20Speaker 1: be possessed by the pregnant woman to choose to terminate
- 24:23Speaker 1: her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept
- 24:27Speaker 1: of personal liberty embodied in the fourteenth Amendments due Process Clause,
- 24:33Speaker 1: or in personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to
- 24:37Speaker 1: be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras,
- 24:40Speaker 1: or among those rights reserved to the people by the
- 24:43Speaker 1: Ninth Amendment. Before addressing this claim, we feel desirable briefly
- 24:48Speaker 1: to survey, in several aspects the history of abortion, for
- 24:52Speaker 1: such insight as that history may afford us, and then
- 24:55Speaker 1: to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal
- 24:59Speaker 1: abortion laws. Six. It perhaps is not generally appreciated that
- 25:04Speaker 1: the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority
- 25:08Speaker 1: of states today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws
- 25:13Speaker 1: generally prescribing abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy,
- 25:17Speaker 1: except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life, are
- 25:21Speaker 1: not of ancient or even of common law origin. Instead,
- 25:25Speaker 1: they derived from statutory changes effected for the most part
- 25:29Speaker 1: in the latter half of the nineteenth century on ancient attitudes.
- 25:34Speaker 1: These are not capable of precise determination. We are told
- 25:38Speaker 1: that at the time of the Persian Empire, abortifacians were known,
- 25:42Speaker 1: and that criminal abortions were severely punished. We are also told, however,
- 25:47Speaker 1: that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as
- 25:50Speaker 1: in the Roman era, and that it was resorted to
- 25:53Speaker 1: without scruple end of quote. The Ephigian Serranos, often described
- 25:58Speaker 1: as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have
- 26:02Speaker 1: been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free abortion practices. He
- 26:07Speaker 1: found it necessary to think first of the life of
- 26:09Speaker 1: the mother, and he resorted to abortion when upon this
- 26:12Speaker 1: standard he felt the procedure advisable. Greek and Roman law
- 26:16Speaker 1: afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted
- 26:21Speaker 1: in some places, it seems to have been based on
- 26:24Speaker 1: a concept of a violation of the father's right to
- 26:26Speaker 1: his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion. Two the
- 26:31Speaker 1: Hippocratic Oath, What then, of the famous oath that has
- 26:35Speaker 1: stood so long as the ethical guide of the medical profession,
- 26:38Speaker 1: and that bears the name of the great Greek four
- 26:41Speaker 1: sixty to three seventy seven BC, who has been described
- 26:44Speaker 1: as the father of medicine. The quote wisest and the
- 26:47Speaker 1: greatest practitioner of his art end of quote, and the
- 26:51Speaker 1: quote most important and most complete medical personality of antiquity
- 26:55Speaker 1: end of quote, who dominated the medical schools of his time,
- 26:59Speaker 1: and to tip the sum of the medical knowledge of
- 27:02Speaker 1: the past. The oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation,
- 27:07Speaker 1: but in any translation the content is clear. Quote I
- 27:11Speaker 1: will give no deadly medicine to anyone, if asked, nor
- 27:14Speaker 1: suggest any such council. And in like manner, I will
- 27:17Speaker 1: not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion
- 27:20Speaker 1: end of quote. Or quote I will neither give a
- 27:24Speaker 1: deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will
- 27:26Speaker 1: I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will
- 27:30Speaker 1: not give to a woman an abortive remedy end of quote.
- 27:33Speaker 1: Although the oath is not mentioned in any of the
- 27:35Speaker 1: principal briefs in this case or in Dovie Bolton, it
- 27:39Speaker 1: represents the apex of the development of strict ethical concepts
- 27:43Speaker 1: in medicine, and its influence enjures to this day. Why
- 27:46Speaker 1: did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade abortion practice in
- 27:50Speaker 1: his time and that of Rome. The late doctor Edelstein
- 27:54Speaker 1: provides us with a theory. The oath was not uncontested.
- 27:58Speaker 1: Even in Hippocrates' day. Only the Pythagorean school of philosophers
- 28:02Speaker 1: frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers,
- 28:06Speaker 1: on the other hand, commended abortion at least prior to viability.
- 28:10Speaker 1: For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma.
- 28:13Speaker 1: For them, the embryo was animant from the moment of conception.
- 28:17Speaker 1: An abortion meant destruction of a living being. The abortion
- 28:21Speaker 1: clause of the oath therefore, quote echoes Pythagorean doctrines end
- 28:25Speaker 1: of quote, and quote in no other stratum of Greek
- 28:29Speaker 1: opinion were such views held or proposed in the same
- 28:32Speaker 1: spirit of uncompromising austerity end of quote. Doctor Edelstein then
- 28:37Speaker 1: concludes that the oath originated in a group representing only
- 28:40Speaker 1: a small segment of Greek opinion, and that it certainly
- 28:43Speaker 1: was not accepted by all ancient physicians. He points out
- 28:47Speaker 1: that medical writings down to galen a d. One thirty
- 28:50Speaker 1: to two hundred quote give evidence of the violation of
- 28:54Speaker 1: almost every one of its injunctions end of quote. But
- 28:57Speaker 1: with the end of antiquity, a decided change took place
- 29:00Speaker 1: resistance against suicide and against abortion became common. The oath
- 29:05Speaker 1: came to be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity were
- 29:09Speaker 1: in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The oath quote became
- 29:13Speaker 1: the nucleus of all medical ethics. End of quote. End
- 29:17Speaker 1: quote was applauded as the embodiment of truth. End of quote. Thus,
- 29:22Speaker 1: suggests doctor Edelstein, it is quote a Pythagorean manifesto and
- 29:27Speaker 1: not the expression of an absolute standard of medical conduct.
- 29:30Speaker 1: End of quote. This, it seems to us, is a
- 29:33Speaker 1: satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity.
- 29:38Speaker 1: It enables us to understand and historical context a long
- 29:42Speaker 1: accepted and revered statement of medical ethics. Three the common law.
- 29:48Speaker 1: It is undisputed that at common law abortion performed before
- 29:52Speaker 1: quote quickening end of quote. The first recognizable movement of
- 29:56Speaker 1: the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the sixteenth to
- 30:00Speaker 1: the eighteenth week of pregnancy, was not an indictable offense.
- 30:04Speaker 1: The absence of a common law crime for pre quickening
- 30:07Speaker 1: abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological,
- 30:14Speaker 1: and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins.
- 30:18Speaker 1: These disciplines variously approached the question in terms of the
- 30:21Speaker 1: point at which the embryo or fetus became formed or
- 30:25Speaker 1: recognizably human, or in terms of one age person came
- 30:29Speaker 1: into being that is, infused with a soul or animated.
- 30:34Speaker 1: A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these
- 30:37Speaker 1: events occurred at some point between conception and live birth. Footnote.
- 30:42Speaker 1: Early philosophers believed that the embryo or fetus did not
- 30:46Speaker 1: become formed and begin to live until at least forty
- 30:49Speaker 1: days after conception for a male and eighty to ninety
- 30:52Speaker 1: days for a female. Aristotle's thinking derived from his three
- 30:57Speaker 1: stage theory of life vegetable animal ration. The vegetable stage
- 31:01Speaker 1: was reached a conception, the animal at quote, animation end
- 31:05Speaker 1: of quote, and the rational soon after live birth. This theory,
- 31:10Speaker 1: together with the forty to eighty day view, came to
- 31:13Speaker 1: be accepted by early Christian thinkers. The theological debate was
- 31:17Speaker 1: reflected in the writings of Saint Augustine, who made a
- 31:20Speaker 1: distinction between embryo intimatus not yet endowed with a soul,
- 31:26Speaker 1: and embryo animatis. He may have drawn upon Exodus, chapter
- 31:30Speaker 1: twenty one, verse twenty two. At one point, however, he
- 31:34Speaker 1: expressed the view that human powers cannot determine the point
- 31:37Speaker 1: during fetal development at which the critical change occurs. Galen,
- 31:42Speaker 1: in three treatises related to embryology, accepted the thinking of
- 31:46Speaker 1: Aristotle and his followers. Later, Augustine on abortion was incorporated
- 31:51Speaker 1: by Gracian into the Decretum, published about eleven forty. This
- 31:56Speaker 1: decretal and the decreatles that followed were recognized as the
- 31:59Speaker 1: defaire definitive body of canon law until the New Code
- 32:03Speaker 1: of nineteen seventeen. End of footnote this was quote mediate animation,
- 32:08Speaker 1: end of quote. Although Christian theology and the Canon law
- 32:12Speaker 1: came to fix the point of animation at forty days
- 32:14Speaker 1: for a male and eighty days for a female, a
- 32:17Speaker 1: view that persisted until the nineteenth century, there was otherwise
- 32:21Speaker 1: little agreement about the precise time of formation or animation.
- 32:25Speaker 1: There was agreement, however, that prior to this point the
- 32:28Speaker 1: fetus was to be regarded as part of the mother,
- 32:31Speaker 1: and its destruction therefore was not homicide. Due to continued
- 32:35Speaker 1: uncertainty about the precise time when animation occurred, to the
- 32:39Speaker 1: lack of any empirical basis for the forty to eighty
- 32:42Speaker 1: day view, and perhaps to Aquinas's definition of movement as
- 32:46Speaker 1: one of the two first principles of life. Bracton focused
- 32:49Speaker 1: upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening
- 32:54Speaker 1: was echoed by later common law scholars and found its
- 32:57Speaker 1: way into the received common law in this country. Whether
- 33:01Speaker 1: abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common
- 33:03Speaker 1: law or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. Bracton,
- 33:07Speaker 1: writing early in the thirteenth century, thought it homicide. Footnote.
- 33:12Speaker 1: Bracton took the position that abortion by blow or poison
- 33:16Speaker 1: was homicide quote if the fetus be already formed and animated,
- 33:20Speaker 1: and particularly if it be animated end of quote, or
- 33:24Speaker 1: as a later translation puts it, quote if the fetus
- 33:27Speaker 1: is already formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened
- 33:31Speaker 1: end of quote, end of footnote. But the later and
- 33:34Speaker 1: predominant view, following the great common law scholars, has been
- 33:38Speaker 1: that it was at most a lesser offense. In a
- 33:41Speaker 1: frequently cited passage, Coke took the position that abortion of
- 33:45Speaker 1: a woman quote quick with child end of quote is
- 33:50Speaker 1: quote a great misprisian and no murder. End of quote.
- 33:54Speaker 1: Blackstone followed saying that while abortion after quickening had once
- 33:58Speaker 1: been considered manslaughter though not murder, quote, modern law end
- 34:03Speaker 1: of took a less severe view. A recent review of
- 34:06Speaker 1: the common law precedence argues, however, that those precedents contradict Coke,
- 34:12Speaker 1: and that even post quickening, abortion was never established as
- 34:15Speaker 1: a common law crime. Footnote means the phoenix of abortional
- 34:20Speaker 1: freedom is a Pronumberle or Knight amendment right about to
- 34:23Speaker 1: arise from the nineteenth century legislative ashes of a fourteenth
- 34:27Speaker 1: century common law liberty. The author examines the two principal
- 34:31Speaker 1: precedents cited marginally by Coke, both contrary to his dictum,
- 34:35Speaker 1: and traces the treatment of these and other cases by
- 34:38Speaker 1: earlier commentators. He concludes that Coke, who himself participated as
- 34:43Speaker 1: an advocate in an abortion case in sixteen oh one,
- 34:47Speaker 1: may have intentionally misstated the law. The author even suggests
- 34:51Speaker 1: a reason Coke's strong feelings against abortion coupled with his
- 34:55Speaker 1: determination to assert common law secular jurisdiction to ass penalties
- 35:00Speaker 1: for an offense that traditionally had been an exclusively ecclesiastical
- 35:05Speaker 1: or canon law crime. See also later who notes that
- 35:09Speaker 1: some scholars doubt that the common law ever was applied
- 35:12Speaker 1: to abortion, that the English ecclesiastical courts seem to have
- 35:16Speaker 1: lost interest in the problem after fifteen twenty seven, and
- 35:19Speaker 1: that the preamble to the English legislation of eighteen oh three,
- 35:23Speaker 1: referred to in the text, states that quote no adequate
- 35:27Speaker 1: means have been hitherto provided for the prevention and punishment
- 35:30Speaker 1: of such offenses. End of quote, end of footnote. This
- 35:34Speaker 1: is of some importance because while most American courts ruled
- 35:38Speaker 1: in holding or dictum, that abortion of an unquickened fetus
- 35:42Speaker 1: was not criminal under their received common law, others followed
- 35:46Speaker 1: Coke in stating that abortion of a quick fetus was
- 35:49Speaker 1: a quote misprisian end of quote, a term they translated
- 35:53Speaker 1: to mean misdemeanor. That their reliance on Coke in this
- 35:57Speaker 1: aspect of the law was uncritical, and apparently in all
- 36:00Speaker 1: the reported cases dictum, due probably to the paucity of
- 36:04Speaker 1: common law prosecutions for post quickening abortion. Makes it now
- 36:08Speaker 1: appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a
- 36:12Speaker 1: common law crime, even with respect to the destruction of
- 36:15Speaker 1: a quick fetus. Four. The English statutory law England's first
- 36:20Speaker 1: criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, came in eighteen o three.
- 36:26Speaker 1: It made abortion of a quick fetus section one a
- 36:28Speaker 1: capital crime, but in section two it provided lesser penalties
- 36:33Speaker 1: for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved
- 36:37Speaker 1: the quickening distinction. This contrast was continued in the General
- 36:41Speaker 1: Revision of eighteen twenty eight. It disappeared, however, together with
- 36:45Speaker 1: the death penalty in eighteen thirty seven, and did not
- 36:48Speaker 1: reappear in the Offenses against the Person Act of eighteen
- 36:51Speaker 1: sixty one that formed the core of English anti abortion
- 36:54Speaker 1: law until the liberalizing reforms of nineteen sixty seven. In
- 36:58Speaker 1: nineteen twenty nine, the Inna Life Preservation Act came into being.
- 37:03Speaker 1: Its emphasis upon the destruction of quote the life of
- 37:06Speaker 1: a child capable of being born alive end of quote,
- 37:10Speaker 1: it made a wilful act performed with the necessary intent
- 37:13Speaker 1: a felony. It contained a proviso that one was not
- 37:16Speaker 1: to be found guilty of the offense quote unless it
- 37:19Speaker 1: is proved that the act which caused the death of
- 37:22Speaker 1: the child was not done in good faith for the
- 37:24Speaker 1: purpose only of preserving the life of the mother end
- 37:27Speaker 1: of quote. A seemingly notable development in the English law
- 37:31Speaker 1: was the case of Rex v. Born. This case apparently
- 37:34Speaker 1: answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary
- 37:38Speaker 1: to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was accepted
- 37:42Speaker 1: from the criminal penalties of the eighteen sixty one Act.
- 37:45Speaker 1: In his instructions to the jury, Judge McNaughton referred to
- 37:49Speaker 1: the nineteen twenty nine Act and observed that that Act
- 37:52Speaker 1: related to quote the case where a child is killed
- 37:55Speaker 1: by a wilful act at the time when it is
- 37:58Speaker 1: being delivered in the ordinary course of nature, end of quote.
- 38:02Speaker 1: He concluded that the eighteen sixty one acts use of
- 38:05Speaker 1: the word quote unlawfully end of quote imported the same
- 38:09Speaker 1: meaning expressed by the specific proviso in the nineteen twenty
- 38:12Speaker 1: nine Act, even though there was no mention of preserving
- 38:16Speaker 1: the mother's life in the eighteen sixty one Act. He
- 38:19Speaker 1: then construed the phrase quote preserving the life of the
- 38:22Speaker 1: mother end of quote broadly, that is, quote in a
- 38:25Speaker 1: reasonable sense end of quote, to include a serious and
- 38:29Speaker 1: permanent threat to the mother's health, and instructed the jury
- 38:32Speaker 1: to acquit doctor Bourne if it found he had acted
- 38:35Speaker 1: in a good faith belief that the abortion was necessary
- 38:38Speaker 1: for this purpose, the jury did a quit. Recently, Parliament
- 38:42Speaker 1: enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act
- 38:46Speaker 1: of nineteen sixty seven. The Act permits a licensed physician
- 38:50Speaker 1: to perform an abortion where two other licensed physicians agree
- 38:54Speaker 1: a quote that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve
- 38:58Speaker 1: risk to the life of the pregnant or of injury
- 39:01Speaker 1: to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman
- 39:04Speaker 1: or any existing children of her family, greater than if
- 39:07Speaker 1: the pregnancy were terminated end of quote, or b quote
- 39:12Speaker 1: that there is a substantial risk that if the child
- 39:14Speaker 1: were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental
- 39:17Speaker 1: abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped end of quote. The
- 39:22Speaker 1: Act also provides that in making this determination quote, account
- 39:26Speaker 1: may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably
- 39:29Speaker 1: foreseeable environment end of quote. It also permits a physician,
- 39:34Speaker 1: without the concurrence of others, to terminate a pregnancy where
- 39:38Speaker 1: he is of the good faith opinion that the abortion
- 39:41Speaker 1: quote is immediately necessary to save the life or to
- 39:45Speaker 1: prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health
- 39:48Speaker 1: of the pregnant woman end of quote. Five The American
- 39:52Speaker 1: law in this country, the law and effect in all
- 39:55Speaker 1: but a few states until the mid nineteenth century was
- 39:58Speaker 1: the pre existing in dead English common law. Connecticut the
- 40:02Speaker 1: first state to enact abortion legislation, adopted in eighteen twenty
- 40:06Speaker 1: one that part of Lord Ellenborough's Act that related to
- 40:10Speaker 1: a woman quote quick with child end of quote. The
- 40:13Speaker 1: death penalty was not imposed abortion before quickening was made
- 40:17Speaker 1: a crime in that state only in eighteen sixty. In
- 40:20Speaker 1: eighteen twenty eight, New York enacted legislation that, in two respects,
- 40:25Speaker 1: was to serve as a model for early anti abortion statutes. First,
- 40:30Speaker 1: while barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as
- 40:33Speaker 1: a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor,
- 40:37Speaker 1: but the latter second degree manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a
- 40:41Speaker 1: concept of therapeutic abortion by providing that an abortion was
- 40:45Speaker 1: excused if it quote shall have been necessary to preserve
- 40:49Speaker 1: the life of such mother, or shall it be advised
- 40:52Speaker 1: by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose end
- 40:55Speaker 1: of quote. By eighteen forty, when Texas had received the
- 40:58Speaker 1: common law, only the eight American states had statutes dealing
- 41:02Speaker 1: with abortion. It was not until after the War between
- 41:05Speaker 1: the states that legislation began generally to replace the common law.
- 41:10Speaker 1: Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening,
- 41:15Speaker 1: but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts
- 41:19Speaker 1: equally with completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception
- 41:24Speaker 1: for an abortion thought by one or more physicians to
- 41:26Speaker 1: be necessary to save the mother's life, that provision soon disappeared,
- 41:31Speaker 1: and the typical law required that the procedure actually be
- 41:34Speaker 1: necessary for that purpose. Gradually, in the middle and late
- 41:38Speaker 1: nineteenth century, the quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory law
- 41:42Speaker 1: of most states, and the degree of the offense and
- 41:45Speaker 1: the penalties were increased. By the end of the nineteen fifties,
- 41:48Speaker 1: a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion, however, and
- 41:53Speaker 1: whenever performed unless done to save or preserve the life
- 41:57Speaker 1: of the mother. The exceptions Alabama and the District of
- 42:00Speaker 1: Columbia permitted abortion to preserve the mother's health. Three states
- 42:05Speaker 1: permitted abortions that were not quote unlawfully end of quote performed,
- 42:10Speaker 1: or that were not quote without lawful justification end of quote,
- 42:14Speaker 1: leaving interpretation of those standards to the courts. In the
- 42:18Speaker 1: past several years. However, a trend toward liberalization of abortion
- 42:22Speaker 1: statutes has resulted in adoption by about one third of
- 42:25Speaker 1: the states of less stringent laws, most of them pattered
- 42:29Speaker 1: against the ALI model Penal Code Section two thirty point
- 42:33Speaker 1: three set forth as Appendix bee to the opinion in DOVEE.
- 42:37Speaker 1: Bolton footnote. Fourteen states have adopted some form of the
- 42:41Speaker 1: Ali's statute. Mister Justice Clark described some of these states
- 42:46Speaker 1: as having quote led the way end of quote. By
- 42:49Speaker 1: the end of nineteen seventy four, other states had repealed
- 42:52Speaker 1: criminal penalties for abortions performed in early pregnancy by a
- 42:56Speaker 1: licensed physician, subject to stated procedural and health require The
- 43:01Speaker 1: precise status of criminal abortion laws in some states is
- 43:04Speaker 1: made unclear by recent decisions in state and federal courts
- 43:08Speaker 1: striking down existing state laws in whole or in part.
- 43:11Speaker 1: End a footnote. It is thus apparent that at common law,
- 43:16Speaker 1: at the time of the adoption of our Constitution and
- 43:19Speaker 1: throughout the major portion of the nineteenth century, abortion was
- 43:23Speaker 1: viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently
- 43:27Speaker 1: in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a
- 43:31Speaker 1: substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does
- 43:34Speaker 1: in most states today, at least with respect to the
- 43:38Speaker 1: early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation.
- 43:42Speaker 1: The opportunity to make this choice was present in this
- 43:45Speaker 1: country well into the nineteenth century. Even later, the law
- 43:49Speaker 1: continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion
- 43:53Speaker 1: procured in early pregnancy. Six The position of the American
- 43:57Speaker 1: Medical Association anti abortion mood prevalent in this country in
- 44:02Speaker 1: the late nineteenth century was shared by the medical profession. Indeed,
- 44:07Speaker 1: the attitude of the profession may have played a significant
- 44:10Speaker 1: role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion legislation during
- 44:14Speaker 1: that period. An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was appointed
- 44:18Speaker 1: in May eighteen fifty seven. It presented its report to
- 44:22Speaker 1: the twelfth Annual Meeting. That report observed that the committee
- 44:26Speaker 1: had been appointed to investigate criminal abortion quote with a
- 44:30Speaker 1: view to its general suppression. End of quote. It deplored
- 44:34Speaker 1: abortion and its frequency, and it listed three causes of
- 44:38Speaker 1: quote this general demoralization. The first of these causes is
- 44:43Speaker 1: a widespread popular ignorance of the true character of the crime,
- 44:47Speaker 1: a belief even among mothers themselves, that the fetus is
- 44:50Speaker 1: not alive till after the period of quickening. The second
- 44:54Speaker 1: of the agents alluded to is the fact that the
- 44:57Speaker 1: profession themselves are frequently supposed cares fetal life. The third
- 45:02Speaker 1: reason of the frightful extent of this crime is found
- 45:05Speaker 1: in the grave defects of our laws, both common and statute,
- 45:09Speaker 1: as regards the independent and actual existence of the child
- 45:12Speaker 1: before birth as a living being. These errors, which are
- 45:16Speaker 1: sufficient in most instances to prevent conviction, are based and
- 45:20Speaker 1: only based upon mistaken and exploded medical dogmas with strange inconsistency.
- 45:27Speaker 1: The law fully acknowledges the fetus in utero and its
- 45:30Speaker 1: inherent rights for civil purposes, while personally and as criminally affected,
- 45:35Speaker 1: it fails to recognize it and to its life as
- 45:39Speaker 1: yet denies all protection. End of quote. The Committee then
- 45:43Speaker 1: offered and the Association adopted, resolutions protesting quote against such
- 45:48Speaker 1: unwarrantable destruction of human life end of quote, calling upon
- 45:52Speaker 1: state legislatures to revise their abortion laws, and requesting the
- 45:57Speaker 1: cooperation of state medical societies quote impressing the subject end
- 46:01Speaker 1: of quote. In eighteen seventy one, a long and vivid
- 46:05Speaker 1: report was submitted by the Committee on Criminal Abortion It
- 46:09Speaker 1: ended with the observation, quote, we had to deal with
- 46:12Speaker 1: human life in a matter of less importance, we could
- 46:15Speaker 1: entertain no compromise. An honest judge on the bench would
- 46:19Speaker 1: call things by their proper names. We could do no less.
- 46:22Speaker 1: End of quote. It proffered resolutions adopted by the Association, recommending,
- 46:28Speaker 1: among other things, that it quote be unlawful and unprofessional
- 46:32Speaker 1: for any physician to induce abortion or premature labor without
- 46:36Speaker 1: the concurrent opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician,
- 46:41Speaker 1: and then always with a view to the safety of
- 46:43Speaker 1: the child, if that be possible. End of quote, and
- 46:47Speaker 1: calling quote the attention of the clergy of all denominations
- 46:50Speaker 1: to the perverted views of morality entertained by a large
- 46:54Speaker 1: class of females I and men also on this important question.
- 46:59Speaker 1: End of quote. End of section twenty five. Recording by
- 47:03Speaker 1: Colleen McMahon