Latest / Kublai Khan and the Mongol Rule of China — Fexingo History / Khubilai's Paper Money and the Inflation Crisis of Yuan China
Transcript
- Lucas: So we've talked a lot about Kublai's grand projects — his canal, his port at Quanzhou, his astronomical observatory. But there's one thing that underpinned all of it, something that Marco Polo couldn't stop gawking at when he reached Dadu: paper money. Luna: Right — I mean, Europeans were still using gold coins and barter. Did the Mongols invent paper money? Lucas: Not exactly. The Song dynasty had been using paper promissory notes — jiaozi and huizi — since the eleventh century. But they were essentially commercial bills of exchange, backed by reserves of copper coins. What the Mongols did under Kublai was something far more radical: they made paper the only legal tender, and they backed it with the full coercive power of the state. Lucas: In 1260, the year Kublai was proclaimed Great Khan, his government issued the first nationwide paper currency, called zhongtong chao. It was decreed that all taxes and all transactions — private or public — had to be conducted in chao. Anyone accepting payment in silver or copper was subject to confiscation of their goods. Luna: So they just outlawed metal currency? That's a bold move. Lucas: It was. And it worked, for a while. The chao was convertible into silver at a fixed rate — at least in theory — and the Yuan government maintained a reserve of precious metals. But the real genius was that the state demanded chao for tax payments, creating an artificial demand. Merchants on the Silk Road had no choice but to accept it if they wanted to buy Chinese goods. Marco Polo wrote that Kublai 'has more treasure than anyone in the world' — he was talking about paper. Luna: But didn't that lead to inflation? I feel like I've heard this story before: print too much money, and the value drops. Lucas: Exactly. And that's the pivot. The system only worked as long as the government restrained its printing. But Kublai had a lot of expenses: the construction of Dadu, the Grand Canal, the failed invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, the disastrous campaigns in Vietnam and Java, the endless wars in the steppe against Kaidu. Each time, the solution was to print more chao. Lucas: The man in charge of finance for much of this period was a Persian-born minister named Ahmad Fanakati. He was ruthless — he raised taxes, monopolized iron and salt, and expanded the paper money supply. The Chinese Confucian officials hated him, called him a 'Central Asian fox'. But he was also effective: under his watch, the Yuan exchequer funded Kublai's wars and public works. Luna: So Ahmad was the fall guy? Or was he actually corrupt? Lucas: Both, probably. The Yuan Shi records that he embezzled funds, took bribes, and appointed his cronies to high positions. But the real problem wasn't corruption — it was structural. The chao was not backed by a growing economy; it was backed by the treasury's silver reserves, which were finite. When Kublai spent beyond his means, the reserves shrank, and confidence in the paper plummeted. Lucas: By the 1280s, prices in Dadu had risen sharply. A bolt of silk that cost one chao in 1260 might cost ten by 1290. The government tried to fix the problem by issuing new denominations — 'silver notes' and 'gold notes' — but these were just more paper. They even decreed that old chao could be exchanged for new at a loss, which was essentially a hidden tax on everyone who held savings. Luna: So the people who trusted the system got burned. Lucas: Yes. And here's a fascinating detail: the Yuan actually tried to control inflation by banning the use of bronze coins outright. In 1280, they prohibited the circulation of copper cash, on pain of death. But people hoarded coins anyway. Archaeologists have found caches of Song and Yuan coins buried in the foundations of houses — ordinary people hiding their real wealth from the state. Lucas: After Kublai's death in 1294, the inflation only worsened. His successors, Temür, Khaishan, Ayurbarwada — they all kept printing. By the 1350s, the chao was virtually worthless. The Yuan Shi records that at one point, the government printed sixty million ding in a single year — a ding being a string of a thousand coins' worth of paper. That's a staggering amount. Luna: Wait — sixty million? How much was that in real terms? Lucas: Hard to calculate exactly, but by the 1350s, prices had risen a thousandfold or more from the 1260s. A picul of rice — about sixty kilograms — cost over a thousand chao. In Kublai's early reign, it might have cost ten. The economy was essentially in hyperinflation. And that was one of the main reasons the Yuan dynasty collapsed: the state couldn't pay its armies, so soldiers deserted, and rebel leaders like Zhu Yuanzhang — the future Ming emperor — offered rice in exchange for service, not paper. Luna: So the Mongols' greatest innovation became their greatest weakness. Lucas: Exactly. It's a cautionary tale that echoes down the centuries. The Yuan was the first government in history to attempt a full fiat currency — paper not backed by any commodity, just by state decree. And it worked brilliantly for thirty years. But when the state overreached, the whole system disintegrated. Lucas: And that brings me to something I want to mention. A couple of dollars a month is genuinely what keeps these episodes going — buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo, if you've gotten something out of them. We're ad-free, and listener support makes that possible. Luna: Yeah, I think we tend to take for granted that a show like this can exist without commercial breaks. It's a nice model. Lucas: It really is. And speaking of models — the Yuan's monetary experiment didn't vanish. When the Ming took over, they issued their own paper currency, the Da Ming baochao. But they learned from the Mongol mistakes: they kept the supply limited, and they didn't force everyone to use it. Within a century, silver from the New World flooded in, and China became a silver-based economy. Paper money disappeared from China for almost four hundred years. Luna: Until the modern era. So the ghost of Kublai's chao haunted Chinese monetary policy for centuries. Lucas: It did. And in a roundabout way, the story of paper money — from the Song jiaozi to the Yuan chao to the Ming baochao — is the story of the state's growing power over the economy. Kublai pushed that power further than anyone before him, and he paid the price. But the idea never died. It just waited for better central banks.