Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Four Corners: 2025 Annual Family Law Case Update
Transcript
- 0:03Welcome to the 2025 Four Corners family law case
- 0:09update. I am Ryan Wedeking, co -chair of the
- 0:12Beverly Hills Bar Association's family law section.
- 0:16I will first note that our family law section
- 0:18is sponsored by White Suckerman. White Suckerman
- 0:21provides a wide variety of resources to complete
- 0:24almost any project, large or small. They also
- 0:27provide traditional accounting and tax practice
- 0:30services. We invite you to contact them to discuss
- 0:33your specific accounting needs and learn how
- 0:36they can be of service to you. Learn more at
- 0:40WZWLH .com. We are also sponsored by SoberLink.
- 0:46As many of you know, SoberLink provides objective
- 0:49real -time data that can be used to reduce disputes
- 0:51over alcohol consumption, leading to less conflict
- 0:55in custody cases. To help ensure smoother negotiations
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- 1:07client's best interests with an unprecedented
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- 1:13facial recognition, tamper resistance, real -time
- 1:17results, and customized testing. SoberLink's
- 1:21discrete system has been the leader in remote
- 1:23alcohol monitoring since 2011. Learn more at
- 1:27soberlink .com. I will also note that we have
- 1:31an upcoming networking event tomorrow night at
- 1:35above 60 Beverly Hills. That is a rooftop lounge
- 1:40and bar, very, very glam. And that is a cross.
- 1:45practice group networking event with the entertainment
- 1:48law section and the estate planning section,
- 1:51which are two practice groups that you would
- 1:55all be well served to network with. So this is
- 1:59something that we're trying to do. We're trying
- 2:00to increase kind of. cross -practice group pollination
- 2:04this year. So we will see you all there tomorrow
- 2:07night at 6 p .m. Again, that's at above 60 in
- 2:10Beverly Hills. Lastly, I will note that we have
- 2:13an upcoming CLE on March 11th that is on bifurcation
- 2:19issues, bifurcating issues of trial, and that
- 2:21is with Erin Gray and Judge Luna. And with that,
- 2:26I will let Judge Silverman. uh take it away with
- 2:31introduction for tonight's speakers okay well
- 2:40hi everybody another year and here we are again
- 2:43with our four corners program um i'm so glad
- 2:47to see all of you and i know i get i get emails
- 2:50every year you can't really see us judge and
- 2:52i know that i can't really see you but i can
- 2:54imagine and i know you're out there and I get
- 2:59to see some of you at my new gig at Signature
- 3:01Resolutions. Hopefully, I'll get to see more
- 3:03of you. But we're really glad to be here this
- 3:08year again. And I'm so delighted. For those of
- 3:12you who don't know me, I'm Judge Harvey Silverman.
- 3:14I retired last year after 20 years on the family
- 3:18law bench, eight years downtown, 12 in Pasadena.
- 3:23And I am so pleased tonight that I got our panel
- 3:28from last year all to come back. They're just
- 3:31so impressive to me how intelligently they read
- 3:35and analyze these cases that I'm just so delighted
- 3:40to have them. And as promised by the title of
- 3:44our program, they come from all parts of Los
- 3:47Angeles County. I work downtown in Pasadena,
- 3:51sort of centralized Los Angeles County and as
- 3:55we had last year, holding up our Eastern flank
- 3:58out in Pomona. We have Judge Janine Iriarte.
- 4:03We're so glad to have her back. And we have many
- 4:05thanks to her, all of us should, because we have
- 4:08the wonderful PowerPoint that she's mostly responsible
- 4:11for. So thank you, Judge Iriarte. Glad to have
- 4:14you with us. Then holding up our southern border
- 4:18down there in Compton is Judge Maria Puente -Poros.
- 4:22And I have to tell you a true story. This is
- 4:24an absolutely true story. I was so anxious to
- 4:27get Judge Puente -Poros on the panel last year
- 4:29that I tracked her down on her vacation and phoned
- 4:33her. She's like, what are you calling me for
- 4:36on my vacation? And I'm like, I want you to do
- 4:38this panel. And she graciously said she did.
- 4:40And we're so glad to have her back again. And
- 4:43then finally, my oldest friend on this panel
- 4:46has been with me since the first years of it,
- 4:49Judge Amir Aronoff, our San Fernando Valley guy.
- 4:54And last year, I think, he appeared as Commissioner
- 4:57Aronoff. But this year, he's now Judge Aronoff,
- 5:01and we're awfully proud of him. I, of course,
- 5:03took the same route, Commissioner and then Judge,
- 5:06and so I'm so especially proud of Judge Aronoff.
- 5:09Okay, so we've got a lot of cases. We're gonna
- 5:12do our best to finish in the 730 time slot. We'll
- 5:16do our best. If you have any questions, please
- 5:20put them in the Q &A and they'll tell us. And
- 5:24hopefully we'll get to it. We always try our
- 5:26best, but there's a lot of material to cover.
- 5:29Okay, so if we can have the PowerPoint up, I'm
- 5:32gonna turn the first case over to Judge Iriardy
- 5:35and Pomona. and say, ready, set, let's go. All
- 5:45right, our first case is in Ray Marriage of Patel.
- 5:48Now I do have some facts up here, but this deals
- 5:50with legal separation, but I wanna give you more
- 5:53background information regarding this case. Husband
- 5:56and wife were married in 2002. They had two children
- 6:00that were born in Georgia. Atlanta, Georgia.
- 6:03They moved to California from 2019 to 2023. In
- 6:08July 2023, the parties moved to Atlanta, Georgia.
- 6:12They lived in a condo that the husband owned
- 6:14in Atlanta, Georgia. The children were enrolled
- 6:17in school in Georgia, and the parties were looking
- 6:20for a home in Georgia. In December, the wife
- 6:24took the children to go visit the grandparents
- 6:26in California, and they planned to return back
- 6:29to Georgia in January of 2024. The husband joined
- 6:33them on that trip to California, and then husband
- 6:36and wife returned on January 8th to Georgia,
- 6:39but they didn't bring the children. Husband says,
- 6:43hey, wife kidnapped my children. Her and her
- 6:45family kidnapped them. And the wife said, no,
- 6:47that's not true. What happened is husband actually
- 6:51changed the plans. We were supposed to stay in
- 6:53California. Some important timelines in this
- 6:56case. January 4th, 2024, husband files for dissolution
- 7:01in Georgia with a request for custody of the
- 7:05children. January 11th, a temporary restraining
- 7:08order was granted against husband by wife based
- 7:13upon the for domestic violence where she had
- 7:17requested custody and that was done in Orange
- 7:19County. February 1st, wife files for legal separation,
- 7:25requesting custody. So husband files a motion
- 7:28to dismiss that legal separation petition and
- 7:32says, I'm not agreeing to this. And he says,
- 7:35based upon Family Code Section 2345, that the
- 7:39court may not render a judgment of legal separation
- 7:43without the consent of both parties. The trial
- 7:47court's ruling was that the trial court granted
- 7:50the motion to dismiss without prejudice to wife
- 7:54filing her petition for dissolution, quote, at
- 7:57the appropriate time. So the wife appeals, and
- 8:02her appeal argued that family code section 2345
- 8:05does not expressly authorize the court to grant
- 8:09a dismissal. So what does the court of appeal
- 8:12say? Next slide. The Court of Appeal affirmed
- 8:18the trial court and they said Family Code Section
- 8:212345, a court may not render a judgment of legal
- 8:25separation without the consent of both parties.
- 8:29So essentially, by creating a condition to rendering
- 8:32a judgment of legal separation, that being the
- 8:35consent of both parties, Family Code Section
- 8:392345, impliedly authorizes dismissal if that
- 8:44condition has not or cannot be met. And then
- 8:48the trial court, excuse me, the court of appeal
- 8:50went further on to state that the trial court
- 8:53has inherent power to dismiss an action shown
- 8:57to be sham, fictitious, or without merit in order
- 9:01to prevent abuse of the judicial process. The
- 9:05court of appeal in this case indicated on the
- 9:08record that indicated that the record did not
- 9:11reveal whether the wife had opposed the dismissal
- 9:14because she intended to amend her petition to
- 9:17seek a dissolution once she met the residency
- 9:20requirements pursuant to family code section
- 9:232321 subdivision A. The wife made a motion to
- 9:28continue at some point and the reasons were to
- 9:31get caught up to speed and clear the jurisdictional
- 9:33issue. But the Court of Appeal again noted the
- 9:36request to continue does not mention anywhere
- 9:39whether the wife needed to meet the residency
- 9:42requirements and that's why she needed a continuance.
- 9:45The Court of Appeal also stated whether upon
- 9:48a complete record we would have reached the same
- 9:51conclusion is a question we need not address.
- 9:55And I think in this case, the practice tip here
- 9:59is for appellate purposes, You really have to
- 10:02be ready to state the proper code sections you're
- 10:04objecting to. And don't count when you're going
- 10:07into court. Don't count on the court granting
- 10:09your continuance. You still need to be ready
- 10:12and prepared with the arguments and code sections,
- 10:15because this may have ended up differently had
- 10:17the parties been ready. But I understand when
- 10:20you come in with a situation like this, where
- 10:22you have UCCJEA issues, you have really does
- 10:27the court have jurisdiction here? And you want
- 10:29to write a thorough points and authority, but
- 10:32you still have to be ready because that court
- 10:34may not grant your motion to continue. And anytime
- 10:37you're on the record, it may not turn out the
- 10:40way you think it's going to turn out. So you
- 10:41always have to think, what do I need for an appellate
- 10:43record? And I tell you, for the way that I practice
- 10:47as a judge, it doesn't matter what case I have.
- 10:50Whether it's a pro -per, whether it's a lawyer
- 10:53case, Every time I make my findings on my case,
- 10:56I look at that case as though it's going to be
- 10:58an appeal case. So I try and make a very thorough
- 11:00record on every single case just in the event
- 11:03it does go up on appeal. And I think if we have
- 11:06that type of mindset every time we enter court,
- 11:09we're gonna be better practitioners and or judges.
- 11:15Next. Okay, good evening. And I also want to
- 11:21echo the gratitude to Judge Iriarte because she
- 11:24is the architect of the beautiful slideshow that
- 11:27you're seeing. So we're onto you versus Pozniak
- 11:33Rice. And this is where the village gets involved,
- 11:36right? So this is a civil harassment restraining
- 11:40order. Petitioner is seeking a restraining order
- 11:43against their former partner's parent. And the
- 11:46issue here turns on the issue of what is sufficient
- 11:50due diligence for attempting to serve. And I
- 11:53thought it was interesting because, as you can
- 11:57see, the declaration by the individual who was
- 11:59attempting to serve, Mr. Berdychevsky, he talks
- 12:03about what they try to do and how many times
- 12:05they try to do it. The takeaway here is that
- 12:08you have to be finite with the due diligence.
- 12:11You have to be specific as to what you were doing.
- 12:14And sadly, for the petitioner here, who was successful
- 12:18in getting a, in essence, a default restraining
- 12:21order, they were granted a five -year protective
- 12:23order, the respondent files a motion to set aside.
- 12:28The court finds that the motion to set aside
- 12:31premise on 473 was not something that the vehicle
- 12:36that they could use because there was no judgment
- 12:38entered so the court denied it and Respondent
- 12:42posniac rice Appropriately files their appeal
- 12:45so that being said the substance of the declaration
- 12:50for the process server talked about that they
- 12:53tried to ascertain addresses and and They use
- 12:59the email address from another court hearing,
- 13:01from another jurisdiction. They use that address.
- 13:04They use the address from pleadings in this case.
- 13:07But no actual effort of them going out to try
- 13:10and serve the respondent. So the appeal is filed.
- 13:15And the Court of Appeals spends quite a bit of
- 13:17time trying to analogize and qualify the distinction
- 13:23between due diligence and the meeting of the
- 13:28statute. In fact, they state with specificity.
- 13:31This case involves what showing is sufficient
- 13:36under the new statute, because as we know, the
- 13:39statute was amended 527 .6 subsection M2 to include
- 13:44alternate service. And the court found that here,
- 13:49Mr. Berdichevsky just talked about efforts that
- 13:52they did to ascertain their address, but not
- 13:55actual efforts to go out and properly serve the
- 13:59respondent. So be aware that it's a diligent
- 14:05effort to find not and to try and procure the
- 14:10individual, locate the individual, not just the
- 14:13efforts to gained the address. There was a case
- 14:16that the court talked about, the court of appeals
- 14:18talked about, where an argument was made to serve
- 14:21by social media platform and the court rightly
- 14:26points out that no e -service by media platform,
- 14:29although the times are there, that's not within
- 14:32the statute. So be mindful that you have to have
- 14:36to be giving the specifics. In fact, The reasonable
- 14:42diligence requirement in civil cases under CCP
- 14:45415 .50 is used to illustrate evidence required
- 14:51to obtain an order for personal service by publication.
- 14:55So they thoroughly vetted both options. And the
- 14:59declaration was deficient. There was no probative
- 15:01facts based on personal knowledge and demonstrating
- 15:04a thorough investigation to learn. the respondent's
- 15:08whereabouts. In fact, Mr. Burtychewski provided
- 15:11no information about his professional background
- 15:14and IDed himself only as a, quote, service provider,
- 15:18end quote. No information about is he an experienced
- 15:22investigator or is he an experienced private
- 15:25investigator, a registered process server, what
- 15:28was his relative experience. So because neither
- 15:32party could explain what I'm sorry, neither Mr.
- 15:37Brzevski nor petitioner you are playing too few
- 15:40could explain what efforts true efforts were
- 15:44made to locate the address for the respondent.
- 15:47The court found that the declaration was insufficient.
- 15:50Next slide. Next slide. My apologies. I forgot
- 15:56to. have our folks supporting us to move the
- 16:00slide forward, and so there is the statutory
- 16:03information for you. Thank you. One last one.
- 16:15I would add on that last case, while it seems
- 16:19very niche -y that it's just about civil harassment
- 16:22restraining orders, 527 .6 M2 is pretty much
- 16:27the exact same language for alternative service
- 16:30in a DV application. And so that case tracks
- 16:34specifically with what a court could do and should
- 16:37consider for alternative service of DV application.
- 16:40So I think that case should not be looked at
- 16:42as just the civil harassment context. But let's
- 16:46turn to Rinker. If you could just load up all
- 16:49of it, that would be helpful. So Rinker, that's
- 16:54great. Previously called Robert Winker versus
- 16:58Cindy Winker. It was just recently republished.
- 17:01It is now referred to as RR2 versus CR. So I'll
- 17:06refer to it as that case since they've anonymized
- 17:10the parties. This case is a common set of circumstances
- 17:16where mental health and issues regarding a party's
- 17:21mental health bleeds into the domestic violence
- 17:25context you know we see a lot of cases in terms
- 17:29of people claiming domestic violence or alleging
- 17:33domestic violence when the other party is having
- 17:36a mental health crisis or attempting or threatening
- 17:42to attempt suicide as a form of domestic violence
- 17:46and this one is very much focused on an individual
- 17:51who is in crisis but had a history of mental
- 17:55health crisis and engaged in problematic and
- 18:00more transparently admitted conduct that would
- 18:05rise to the level of domestic violence, namely
- 18:08stalking and harassing and conduct, but for a
- 18:12mental health component would clearly be considered
- 18:15domestic violence. What this court really focused
- 18:19on is the trial court's determination that imputing
- 18:26a level of intent in the conduct was how to gauge
- 18:32whether it was domestic violence or not. Specifically,
- 18:36the trial court said and essentially dismissed
- 18:40stalking allegations, harassing allegations as
- 18:44uh not domestic violence because there was no
- 18:48uh evidence that it was an intentional attempt
- 18:51to threaten or otherwise intimidate the party
- 18:54clearly not a requirement under the domestic
- 18:57violence prevention act and the court of appeals
- 19:00did clarify that that element does not exist
- 19:03but we often hear in evidence and evidentiary
- 19:07hearings on domestic violence a lot of focus
- 19:10on motive, or were you really afraid, all these
- 19:13attempts to impute some sort of expectation of
- 19:21additional elements to domestic violence. And
- 19:23I think that this case highlights that courts
- 19:28should not take that invitation to articulate
- 19:31domestic violence with some other expectation
- 19:34of evidentiary support. So I think that's really
- 19:37important about this case. But I also wonder
- 19:40how the trial court found domestic violence and
- 19:45not made that asterisk for the intent and said,
- 19:51well, even though I see domestic violence, I'm
- 19:54exercising my discretion to not issue a restraining
- 19:57order because a restraining order would not meet
- 20:01the policy. Considerations for domestic violence
- 20:05given its mental health component and for instance
- 20:08it would not it would not help to prevent further
- 20:12domestic violence and That the issue of keeping
- 20:15the parties apart in order to deal with the underlying
- 20:18issues of domestic violence Would not be met
- 20:20by issuing a restraining order now if the court
- 20:23had exercised its discretion after finding domestic
- 20:27violence, I wonder whether the Court of Appeals
- 20:30would have overturned it but in this case the
- 20:34court of appeals really structured its analysis
- 20:37on the court added an element intent and that
- 20:41wasn't proper and for that reason it's reversed
- 20:44and but for that intent the court found domestic
- 20:48violence so rather than just send it back for
- 20:50the court to exercise its discretion uh we're
- 20:55going to just issue the restraining order so
- 20:57i i think and i think there's another element
- 20:59and it was kind of a side issue is this is the
- 21:03second appeal by involving this judicial officer
- 21:08with the same exact issue. And they brought that
- 21:13up specifically that this is the second case
- 21:16that they're overturning based on this intent
- 21:20element. So I think that they really are sending
- 21:23a message, not just generally, but likely to
- 21:27the judicial officer which happens you know we
- 21:30we we get our comments right next slide ah okay
- 21:38the whole slide please so this is a domestic
- 21:42violence case but it's really important evidentiary
- 21:46case really important The wife and husband are
- 21:49married a short time, and they have a four -year
- 21:51-old daughter, who it appears is monolingual
- 21:54Spanish -speaking or has limited English. The
- 21:57mother has two children from a previous marriage,
- 22:00including a 13 -year -old daughter. The 13 -year
- 22:03-old daughter accuses the husband of touching
- 22:06her breasts and inserting his fingers into her.
- 22:09And criminal charges are initiated against father,
- 22:12and the mother seeks a domestic violence restraining
- 22:15order, which would include custodial orders.
- 22:18The 13 year old did not testify at the DV hearing.
- 22:22There was no evidence as to why, but wife's declaration
- 22:26states that the child told her of the alleged
- 22:29abuse and that she was present when the child
- 22:33was interviewed by the police wherein she made
- 22:36the same allegations. The minor also told police
- 22:41and mother that the husband threatened to deport
- 22:44her and to falsely accuse her of stealing if
- 22:47she ever told anybody. So the husband's attorney
- 22:50objected to the admission of the statements by
- 22:53the minor contained in the mother's declaration
- 22:55as, of course, hearsay statements. And the objection
- 22:59was overruled. The trial court relied on a state
- 23:03of mind exception to the hearsay rules and found
- 23:07that wife to be a credible witness. Then the
- 23:10court took judicial notice of the pending criminal
- 23:14case against father and the CPO in effect. And
- 23:19it relied on Family Code Section 63 -06, which
- 23:22mandates that the court do a search prior to
- 23:24DV trial for felony convictions and other matters.
- 23:29Some of you may not know this, when we judges
- 23:31have a domestic violence restraining order, we've
- 23:33got to do a search. And we do. The trial court
- 23:37issued the restraining order, including mother
- 23:40finding that the husband disturbed her state
- 23:43of mind. It also severely limited father's visitation
- 23:47with the child. The marriage the four -year -old
- 23:50until such time as she learned to speak English
- 23:52where monitors can in fact understand and listen
- 23:55to the child and make sure and prevent any type
- 23:57of inappropriate contact between the child and
- 24:00the father and the father appealed and He says
- 24:03that the child statements appearing in mother's
- 24:06declarations are hearsay Any question that they
- 24:10were? The state of mind exception clearly did
- 24:14not apply to mother based on the daughter's statements
- 24:16unless the statements were being made and admitted
- 24:19for the truth. But in a major shift, the Court
- 24:23of Appeals ruled that the child dependency hearsay
- 24:27exception applied. Now many of us know that the
- 24:31rules in dependency court regarding children's
- 24:35statements are different than in family court
- 24:37based upon caseload that dates back almost 30
- 24:40years. In certain circumstances, out -of -court
- 24:44statements by children where sexual abuse is
- 24:47alleged are admissible under this exception.
- 24:51The reason being that children may be afraid
- 24:54to publicly accuse a parent, they might be frightened
- 24:58of the setting in a courtroom, or intimidated
- 25:02by adverse counsel or cross -examination. So
- 25:06the Court of Appeals stated that the Here's an
- 25:10exception applied in this instance, citing a
- 25:14California Supreme Court case which affirmed
- 25:17the exception based upon similar reasoning. The
- 25:20court went on to state that the same realities,
- 25:23as we've talked about in dependency court with
- 25:26sexual abuse allegations, the same realities
- 25:30exist for children in DV cases in family court,
- 25:34and the same reasons exist to protect them. And
- 25:37so the law is now, in DVPA cases, involving the
- 25:42sexual abuse of a minor, otherwise reliable out
- 25:45-of -court statements made by that minor should
- 25:48not be categorically excluded simply because
- 25:52the statements do not fit into the traditional
- 25:56yet narrow categories of hearsay exceptions.
- 26:01So interesting to me was in response to the husband's
- 26:04objections about extending dependency rules into
- 26:07DVPA hearings, the court went out of its way
- 26:11to state that without limiting language by the
- 26:14legislature of other case law rules from dependency
- 26:19court could be extended to other types of cases.
- 26:25Hear that. Without any limiting language from
- 26:27the legislature, we may be able to extend special
- 26:31rules from dependency court into family law.
- 26:36So in matters like Sanchez rulings, There's case
- 26:43law in dependency court which limits Sanchez
- 26:46rulings. Might that rule be extended to custodial
- 26:50cases in family court? Well, we shall see. I
- 26:53know I tried for years to get a case like that
- 26:55in front of me to test these rules. I never got
- 26:58such a case, but after reading the dependency
- 27:00court rules on Sanchez, I was very interested
- 27:06in seeing it. Now we have a case where they've
- 27:08clearly said A lot of these dependency court
- 27:12rules really belong in family court as well.
- 27:17Just so you know, if you're trying to admit a
- 27:18child's statements pursuant to this hearsay exception,
- 27:21there are three requirements. First, the time,
- 27:25content, and circumstances of the statement must
- 27:28provide sufficient indicia of reliability. Second,
- 27:32the minor must either be available for cross
- 27:35-examination or there must be some evidence which
- 27:39corroborates the statements made by the child,
- 27:42and third, the opposing party must have had adequate
- 27:45notice that the statements would be introduced.
- 27:49As for the other things, the use of the criminal
- 27:51allegations as part of the pleadings, remember
- 27:54that You can only use things that deal with convictions
- 27:58and not just allegations. And of course we all
- 28:01should know that a professional monitor must
- 28:03be able to speak the language of the party being
- 28:05supervised and of the child or the monitor must
- 28:08provide a neutral interpreter over 18 years of
- 28:12age. Next slide. Can I say something on that
- 28:17last one? I actually did a case more recently
- 28:20where I actually used this exception. And in
- 28:23my ruling, I actually took those due process
- 28:25requirements and I noted the age of the child,
- 28:28who the incident was initially reported to. I
- 28:31noted whether there was an addition of reliability
- 28:34in that reporting. Who specifically was it reported
- 28:38to? And I listed all the individuals. I think
- 28:40there were like four individuals that it was
- 28:41reported to. And then I noted that the child
- 28:44was actually at court in the hallway and prepared
- 28:47to testify. And then I asked the restraint party,
- 28:50do you have any witnesses that you want to call?
- 28:53They declined. And then I also noted that the
- 28:56relationship between the mother and father did
- 28:59not suggest that there was a motive on behalf
- 29:02of mom to fabricate and influence a child in
- 29:05any matter. So what I did in my ruling was I
- 29:08noted all those due process requirements. And
- 29:11I also showed that there was an addition of reliability
- 29:14in the statement that was being admitted. And
- 29:18that's really what you want to do. If you want
- 29:19to use that exception, you kind of want to set
- 29:22those things in the record. But on the flip side,
- 29:25if you want to keep the statement out, obviously,
- 29:27you want to focus on attacking and breaking down
- 29:30those exact same areas. Oh, this is me, XK versus
- 29:39X. Okay, all right. So this is a case where wife
- 29:44was a Chinese immigrant. And I'm gonna give you
- 29:45a little bit more background information. Her
- 29:48and her husband had one child. In 2023, wife
- 29:52filed for a domestic violence restraining order.
- 29:55Her temporary restraining order was denied. Wife
- 29:58claimed abuse dating back to 2016. There was
- 30:02a written apology in 2016 where the husband said,
- 30:05I'm really sorry for not treating you right,
- 30:07for lying to you, for yelling at you, things
- 30:10like that. In 2017, wife said, when I was eight
- 30:14months pregnant, he grabbed me by my ankles,
- 30:18lifted me off the ground and put me on the sidewalk.
- 30:20She basically indicated she was raped after she
- 30:24had the baby several times by him. In 2018, she
- 30:29was strangled in China with both of his hands.
- 30:32In 2019, she was punched in the shoulder and
- 30:35showed photographs of the bruising. And in 2019,
- 30:39the social media posts that you see up here,
- 30:42you think about suicide and I think about murder.
- 30:44He went on to say, it's so wrong. We are general
- 30:48good people and deserve to be genuinely happy.
- 30:51She claimed to be emotionally and financially
- 30:53abused and placed under significant, significant
- 30:56coercive control. I mean, it's to the point where
- 30:59she couldn't really even go to work unless the
- 31:02child was at school. That was the only time she
- 31:04was allowed. She claimed that she didn't even
- 31:06have a SIM card in her phone here in the States.
- 31:10And so she had no cell phone access. She claimed
- 31:13he was a harsh father and wouldn't play girl
- 31:16games with his daughter. Now, why? actually completed
- 31:21her PhD studies here in California. Now, the
- 31:25trial court in this case said that the vast majority
- 31:28of the discussions today has been around custody
- 31:32and visitation issues, and that is foundation
- 31:35of the dispute between the parties, and custody
- 31:38and visitation doesn't fall within the DVPA,
- 31:40therefore denied. Next slide. The court of appeals
- 31:44said, absent a lack of credibility finding, The
- 31:48trial court's explanation that the alleged abuse
- 31:52occurred in the context of disputes over dissolution
- 31:55and co -parenting and visitation was not a proper
- 31:59reason to deny. In other words, it was legal
- 32:02error to find that. And they also stated that
- 32:05abuse occurring in different countries must be
- 32:08considered under the totality of the circumstances.
- 32:13The wife asked, based upon this reversal, that
- 32:16the matter be remanded with the direction of
- 32:18the trial court to issue the restraining order.
- 32:21And the court of appeals said no. The trial court
- 32:24is best situated to exercise discretion in this
- 32:26case to grant or deny the DVRO. And this kind
- 32:30of goes to what Amir was saying earlier. What
- 32:34would happen if the proper finding had been made?
- 32:37But anyways. the trial court is best to evaluate
- 32:41credibility of the parties and weighing of the
- 32:44evidence. And in this case, all over this decision,
- 32:47the court of appeal talked about credibility,
- 32:49credibility, credibility. Because I think the
- 32:52court of appeal could read between the lines
- 32:54in this case. I mean, the initial TRO was denied.
- 32:57And I think that they could see that there were
- 33:00a host of grounds of this woman. brought forward.
- 33:03And I think there were credibility issues in
- 33:05this case. And I think the practice point for
- 33:09us is when you have a case like this where there's
- 33:12all kinds of very serious allegations and the
- 33:16court makes a finding like this, like, oh, this
- 33:18is just custody and visitation. You need to step
- 33:21back if you just won that DVRO. Because you know
- 33:25it's wrong. You know that it's going to go up
- 33:27on appeal, and it will be reversed. We know that.
- 33:32So what do you do in a situation like that? And
- 33:35I've always said, time and time again, you need
- 33:37to be prepared, even in renewal cases, with the
- 33:40law in your case file. So that if a court does
- 33:44this, because remember, the courts are busy.
- 33:46We have a lot of restraining orders, a lot of
- 33:49matters. But take a step back and say, Your Honor,
- 33:52can you please make a credibility call in this
- 33:54case? And then if it's not on credibility, I
- 33:57would have the court actually look at the law
- 33:59and give them the case. And say, for appellate
- 34:02purposes, Your Honor. And when you say, for appellate
- 34:05purposes, that's going to go ding, ding, ding
- 34:08in the judge's head. I need to make a better
- 34:10record so I don't get reversed. Because I can
- 34:13tell you, there's no judge that wants to get
- 34:14reversed. So help the court along. Ask for the
- 34:17break and give them the case law. Next slide.
- 34:28Following along the domestic violence, the issue
- 34:31of coercion and control. This case is relating
- 34:35to a woman who was 26 years old when she met
- 34:39this individual. He was 42. And so, of course,
- 34:43there's an age difference. And he was a human
- 34:45trafficker. And he took her from Honduras and
- 34:48then into Mexico. And in Mexico, she tried to
- 34:52escape. And he threatened that if she ever left,
- 34:53he'd kill her, right? So she's not there of her
- 34:56own volition. When the case comes to be, they
- 34:59have three daughters. They have a six -year -old,
- 35:03a five -year -old, and a four -year -old. So
- 35:05I want you to keep that in mind as we talk a
- 35:07little bit about the facts. the cycle of violence
- 35:13that included the alcohol abuse by the perpetrator,
- 35:18the isolation. In fact, when he brought her to
- 35:21California, he put her in the middle of nowhere
- 35:23and the quote, the middle of nowhere is in quotes
- 35:26within the state, the court's opinion. And she's
- 35:30in his trailer and it's just her and the kid.
- 35:31She can't go to work. She can't go run errands.
- 35:35And he is 100 % the provider. So she's definitely
- 35:38at his and is back on call and of course beholden
- 35:44to anything that he decides. She gets pregnant
- 35:49And within two months of the child's birth, she's
- 35:53pregnant again, but she had gotten on birth control.
- 35:55So at one point she says, she mentions about
- 35:58the birth control and he says, well, yeah, I
- 36:00swapped the birth control pills for vitamins,
- 36:02right? Because he wanted her quote to have as
- 36:04many babies as they could so that no man would
- 36:07ever want her. So again, this continued cycle
- 36:10of violence, both situational, physical, emotional,
- 36:13mental, and in the existence of this quote relationship,
- 36:18there's beatings, there's rapes. In fact, one
- 36:22of the rapes happened with the two children in
- 36:24the bed, at least as reflected in her declaration.
- 36:29So at one point, she hides her smart watch so
- 36:34that she can, because he comes in and he's attempting
- 36:37to... assault her. She hides her watch so that
- 36:40she can call for help. So the next day she calls
- 36:42911. Police come, they arrest him. So she goes
- 36:45with the children to Texas, to her aunt's house.
- 36:48He gets out of custody. He doesn't know where
- 36:51she is, of course, because she's not disclosing
- 36:53it, but he gets access to her Facebook and starts
- 36:55to change the password and starts reading her
- 36:58messages and realizes where she is. So identifies
- 37:01her home address. He goes to the home address
- 37:03and somehow entices the six -year -old to come
- 37:05out. Now mind you, she had secured a restraining
- 37:08order and he wasn't supposed and there was that
- 37:10criminal protective order right that emergency
- 37:12protective order and he wasn't supposed to be
- 37:14reaching out to her but he does and he continues
- 37:16to show up at her address in Texas. He coaxes
- 37:20the six -year -old to come out and then of course
- 37:22she feels at least in her testimony that she
- 37:25had no other option but to allow him to see the
- 37:27kids. So she allows him to see the kids and then
- 37:30he takes off with them. He takes them to California
- 37:32without telling her then he takes them to Mexico
- 37:34and for seven months she's trying to get her
- 37:38children back. She follows her restraining order
- 37:40and the temporary order. grants her protective
- 37:44status, protected status, but not the children.
- 37:46And the basis for the denial on that was that
- 37:49there was no imminent risk of harm to the children.
- 37:53So they go to a hearing and she testifies to
- 37:58all of these atrocities that she's undergone.
- 38:00And there was testimony that he'd actually hit
- 38:04the children, not sexual abuse, but physically
- 38:06abused the children and the court. denies. The
- 38:11court allows them to reopen the testimony. There's
- 38:15a great deal about all the machinations with
- 38:18the declaration and what I have and what I don't
- 38:20have, at least from the judicial perspective.
- 38:23And then the court at the end denies the protective
- 38:26status to the children but finds that there's
- 38:29a basis to grant it as to mom. So mom appeals.
- 38:32And the court says specifically, right, there's
- 38:36good cause and you have to look, as Judge Ariarte
- 38:39just mentioned in the prior case, at the totality
- 38:41of the circumstances. So if you think about this
- 38:44adult person that can't protect themselves and
- 38:46you have a six, a five, and a four -year -old
- 38:48who are the... in the presence of this environment,
- 38:52they are witnessing it and they can't protect
- 38:55themselves. So the court then of course reverses
- 38:58and says, right, upon a showing of good cause,
- 39:01witnessing a parent's abuse, but they themselves
- 39:03are also abused. So watching these things during
- 39:06one of the, during a rape, one of the children
- 39:09wakes up and is crying and is saying, leave my
- 39:11mommy alone, right? So the court then reverses
- 39:16and remains with instructions. to include the
- 39:18children as protected parties. Thank you. Next
- 39:23slide, please. All right. We can put the whole
- 39:33slide up. This is actually an interesting DV
- 39:37procedurally case, because it deals with the
- 39:43issuance or lack of issuance of the TRO. And
- 39:47this is an appeal of ATR road determination.
- 39:51And what's interesting about it is you wonder
- 39:55why the stakes are so high to engage in a litigation
- 40:02over the issuance of a temporary restraining
- 40:05order when there's subsequently a hearing to
- 40:08decide whether there will be a restraining order
- 40:11at all. So for someone to go to the lengths of
- 40:16appealing that is interesting. But actually,
- 40:19it ends up being a very helpful case to give
- 40:25some insights into judicial obligations as it
- 40:29relates to the decision to issue or not issue
- 40:33a TRO. And in this particular case, wife comes
- 40:38in and there's a high asset case. where they
- 40:42had signed a marital settlement agreement and
- 40:45she proceeds to indicate that conflict between
- 40:49her and the husband continues to escalate in
- 40:52part because of the marital settlement agreement.
- 40:55There was harassment, coercive control, arguing
- 41:00over the MSA and following the MSA and engaging
- 41:06in essentially quid pro quo kind of discussions
- 41:10as you better do this, otherwise you're not going
- 41:12to get the remaining $5 million of our settlement
- 41:16agreement and so forth. And she brings this TRO
- 41:20and the court that was reviewing it, and keep
- 41:24in mind that some of us are reviewing between
- 41:26five to 10 TRO applications every day. So we
- 41:32rely very much on these check boxes that exists
- 41:35on these TROs. This judge also, uh, issued a
- 41:40text, you know, check the boxes and indicated
- 41:43that they believed that there wasn't sufficient
- 41:47evidence of abuse. And the other checkbox there
- 41:51isn't sufficient, uh, detail as to the abuse.
- 41:55And that's where, and then also issued another
- 41:58one saying other, this is custody and visitation
- 42:02issues and conflict over an MSC. An MSA so the
- 42:07the interesting part is the Court of Appeals
- 42:10in this what looks to be like the first case
- 42:14relating to the issuance or the decision to not
- 42:18issue a TRO really focuses on what those text
- 42:22box means and and essentially assesses that Those
- 42:28text boxes were what the court determined, but
- 42:31that was not true because they were clearly enough
- 42:35evidence of abuse and sufficient detail. So for
- 42:39that reason, it should be reversed. But it also
- 42:43gave us for the first time language that a court
- 42:47could use, even if it finds a facial showing
- 42:52of abuse, to decide not to issue a TRO. And they
- 42:56gave us verbatim what we are able to say in exercising
- 43:01that discretion. It's specifically indicating
- 43:03that under the totality of circumstances, the
- 43:07court finds that the party has not demonstrated
- 43:10the need for a TRO to prevent abuse pending a
- 43:15noticed hearing. And the Court of Appeals specifically
- 43:20indicates that that would have been perfectly
- 43:23fine. And the court even and often judicial officers
- 43:28complain that the Court of Appeals doesn't understand,
- 43:31especially in the DV context, the inner workings
- 43:34and the realities and logistics of DV litigation.
- 43:38But actually this Court of Appeals acknowledged
- 43:40that there's a lot of reasons why you would deny
- 43:43a DV TRO, that there's the context of using it
- 43:47for tactical purposes and why sometimes because
- 43:52it's an ex parte application. and where it is
- 43:55in the process of a case, that it may be more
- 43:59thoughtful and prudent to wait for the hearing.
- 44:02So had the trial court said that, there would
- 44:05have been no issues. And thankfully, this judge
- 44:09didn't do that so that we can get specific instruction
- 44:14from the court of appeals that we can do that,
- 44:16that we can deny it. And I think that this often
- 44:19comes up in the context of, for instance, long
- 44:23-standing litigation, very heavily litigated,
- 44:26and all of a sudden an ex parte application for
- 44:29domestic violence restraining order comes, and
- 44:32this feeling that the court is compelled not
- 44:35just to issue a temporary restraining order without
- 44:38notice, but also issue custody and visitation
- 44:41orders, etc. And I think that this case highlights
- 44:45that a court is allowed and should consider the
- 44:50context of the application, and even if otherwise
- 44:54it would have, in a different context, issued
- 44:56the restraining order, in this particular context
- 44:59it can decline and wait for the noticed hearing.
- 45:02I think that's really powerful to understand
- 45:06the level of discretion a court should engage
- 45:09in, even on what would otherwise be garden variety
- 45:13TRO applications. And so, you know, we hate to
- 45:17see that certain certain applications come only
- 45:21to find ex parte applications thereafter or a
- 45:26responsive TRO application also ex parte without
- 45:31notice. I think the idea might be that in the
- 45:35context of a heavily litigated proceeding, giving
- 45:39notice even though you're not required to, in
- 45:42the context of a DV application goes to that
- 45:45totality of the circumstances for a court to
- 45:47consider, as opposed to don't give notice, even
- 45:50though you know the other side has been litigating
- 45:53and has counsel, but for you not giving them
- 45:59an opportunity to respond, the court only gets
- 46:02one side. This is an invitation to really think
- 46:07about context and give the court some leeway
- 46:10to gauge the context of a DV application. So
- 46:13I think there's a really good case from a judicial
- 46:16standpoint and also a warning to practitioners
- 46:19to really think about not just the application
- 46:23as that one ex parte no notice application to
- 46:28get some sort of advantage because it may not
- 46:32necessarily end up that way because this case
- 46:35tells us to consider the totality of the circumstances
- 46:39even at the initial application. Next slide.
- 46:48Okay, heart versus heart. So this case, just
- 46:52a little bit of history, the DISA was followed
- 46:54in 2017 and Very quickly thereafter, the competing
- 46:59restraining orders are filed, one by Ashley,
- 47:01one by Stephen. It took several days of testimony
- 47:04and the hearings conclude in February of 2018.
- 47:08Stephen's is denied and Ashley's is granted.
- 47:10And then, of course, thereafter, they come to
- 47:12a stipulation in July of 2019, and Ashley stipulates
- 47:16to dismiss her protective order with prejudice.
- 47:20So things are moving along. And then July of
- 47:232023, Ashley has to file another restraining
- 47:25order. And of course, the court, I don't mean
- 47:28of course, obviously, I mean thereafter, the
- 47:31court grants that September of 2023, she gets
- 47:34a nine month protective order granted in her
- 47:37favor. Within the statutory time period, she
- 47:41files her request to renew it and the court conducts
- 47:44the hearing and she's asking for a five -year
- 47:46renewal. The court does the hearing and says
- 47:50that they're not inclined to grant it for a five
- 47:52-year period, but they're inclined to grant it
- 47:54for nine months. Just a repeat of what the...
- 47:57DB 130 that was previously granted in September
- 48:00of 2023. And the Court of Appeal says, yes, the
- 48:03court has judicial discretion, right? There's
- 48:06discretion of the court. However, this is pursuant
- 48:09to Family Code 6345A. This is a minimum term
- 48:12period. So if you find that there is a basis,
- 48:15the judicial discretion is out the door and you
- 48:18have to grant it for the renewal period, which
- 48:20was five years. five years, more, or permanent.
- 48:24So those are the three options. So be mindful
- 48:26when you are filing for your renewals. Quote
- 48:30the statute. And this is not in any way, shape,
- 48:34or form other than to say, help the court, just
- 48:38like you would provide your memorandum points
- 48:41and authorities. Sometimes these particular renewals
- 48:45are so few and far between, right? So just...
- 48:49Couple blurbs in your declaration or your prayer
- 48:52for relief we're showing two family codes 345
- 48:54a the courts three options are just anything
- 48:58to kind of highlight it because Sometimes we
- 49:01are navigating family law Dense issues with custody
- 49:04and support and this is a one -off from everything
- 49:08else that we're doing So help us help you to
- 49:11get the movement that you need us to get you
- 49:14to if of course your client prevails based on
- 49:16the evidence so that And then I want to double
- 49:19back with what Judge Aronoff said. Professional
- 49:23courtesy and the professional responsibility,
- 49:27I think, though you can go in with no notice,
- 49:32should you is one of the questions you should
- 49:35consider so that we can get contextual pictures
- 49:38of the entirety of the case, especially in these
- 49:39very highly litigant cases. Thank you. Next slide.
- 49:49Okay, whole slide. Marriage of J .G. and K .G.
- 49:54Family Code Section 3044. Ever heard of it? I
- 49:57think we all have lots, lots of appeals court
- 50:00cases on this. And this is another case, really
- 50:04it's instructive to the judicial officer. So
- 50:07why am I an attorney? What do I have to listen
- 50:09to that for? All right, well, I think as Judge
- 50:11Iriardi and I don't know if I've spoken about,
- 50:15well, because if you're getting a ruling that's
- 50:17in your favor, You want to make sure that all
- 50:21these things are covered so that it's iron clad
- 50:24and you don't get a reversal. And that's what
- 50:27happened in this case. As most of you know and
- 50:29understand, Family Code Section 3044 creates
- 50:32a rebuttable presumption stating that after there's
- 50:35a judicial finding that a party is a perpetrator
- 50:38of domestic violence, with or without a restraining
- 50:41order being issued. It's presumed that it's against
- 50:45the best interests of the children related to
- 50:48the case to award the perpetrator joint or sole
- 50:51custody of the child or children. The courts
- 50:55have been pretty clear that you cannot get around
- 50:583044 unless there is a finding by a judicial
- 51:01officer on the record that the presumption has
- 51:04been rebutted. so that the court may find it
- 51:07is in the best interest of the related children
- 51:10to award the perpetrator's soul or joint custody.
- 51:13So at the initial trial stage in this case, the
- 51:16court found that there was domestic violence
- 51:19and had been perpetrated by father against the
- 51:21mother. However, the parents made an agreement
- 51:24to share custody of their child and the judge,
- 51:28without making any inquiries or findings as to
- 51:313044 being rebutted, signed off on the joint
- 51:34custodial judgment. A few years ago, a few years
- 51:38go by and um The mother files a motion. I guess
- 51:42things didn't go so well. She files a motion
- 51:44to modify those custody orders and give her sole
- 51:47custody of the child. Now there's a new judge
- 51:50who's now on the case and this judge was clearly
- 51:53aware that 3044 was in play, but the only evidence
- 51:57taken was father's verbal assertion that he had
- 52:00completed an anger management class. Father's
- 52:03attorney did not bother to produce a certificate
- 52:06of completion or any other corroborative evidence
- 52:09of completion of the class. The case got sent
- 52:15down to the court mediator. Now, El Dorado County
- 52:19where this has happened is what we call a recommending
- 52:21county and the court mediator recommended to
- 52:24the court that the current shared custodial schedule
- 52:27be retained despite the mediator's admission
- 52:30that there was no evidence presented to the mediator
- 52:33as to things father had done to rebut that 3044
- 52:37presumption. Father argued that after two years
- 52:40of joint custody, it was unnecessary for him
- 52:44to show completion of his anger management program
- 52:47or any other program he might have taken. Despite
- 52:51the lack of evidence, the court found that 3044
- 52:54had been rebutted. The court also noted that
- 52:57the joint custody order had been pursuant to
- 53:00an agreement of the parties. Finally, the court
- 53:03stated it was troubled. Not by the lack of evidence
- 53:07as to rebuttal. It was troubled by mother wanting
- 53:11to go back on an agreement she had previously
- 53:13made. So, as most of you hopefully know, neither
- 53:17the initial judge nor the second judge fulfilled
- 53:20the court's mandatory duty in finding the 30
- 53:23-44 presumption had been rebutted. While the
- 53:26first judge was free to adopt the party's joint
- 53:29custody agreement, the judge had to first take
- 53:33evidence and make findings that the 3044 presumption
- 53:36had been rebutted. The second judge seemed to
- 53:40understand that 3044 was still in play, but merely
- 53:44stated that it had been rebutted without identifying
- 53:47when or how the presumption was rebutted or address
- 53:51any of the factors outlined as possible reasons
- 53:54for rebuttal or state any of it on the record
- 53:58or in writing, which is mandated by the statute.
- 54:02So, what else does this case remind us of? Parties
- 54:06cannot merely agree to waive or somehow get around
- 54:103044. Prior to adopting such an agreement, the
- 54:13court has to make findings that 3044 has been
- 54:16rebutted and state what evidence they used to
- 54:19make those findings. The best interests of children
- 54:22trumps any agreements by parents. at least in
- 54:26this setting of 3044. The health and well -being
- 54:29of the child has the greater state interest than
- 54:32any agreement by the parents. Next slide. DT
- 54:40versus Superior Court. Next slide. Okay, so the
- 54:44trial court in this case granted a five -year
- 54:46DVRO and continued temporary co -parenting orders.
- 54:50This case was actually filed in 2019. And in
- 54:532024, CT requested to relocate to Denmark and
- 54:58the court maintained orders and then set it for
- 55:00a future final custody determination. And at
- 55:05a hearing in August of 24, the San Francisco
- 55:08Superior Court found that neither the child CT
- 55:12nor KW resided in California, but noted that
- 55:15the court retained jurisdiction over the ongoing
- 55:18custody case. So CT challenged this decision,
- 55:21arguing that the court lost jurisdiction under
- 55:24UCC -JEA. And specifically, what CT was arguing
- 55:29was Family Code Section 3422, which states that
- 55:32a court in this state has exclusive continuing
- 55:35jurisdiction over the determination until either
- 55:38of the following occurs. And one of the occurrences
- 55:41is in subdivision two, which states that a court
- 55:45of this state or another state when they determine
- 55:49that the child, the child's parents, or any person
- 55:52acting as a parent do not presently reside in
- 55:55the state, then the court loses jurisdiction.
- 55:58So it went up on a writ, and the court found
- 56:02the trial court retained jurisdiction to resolve
- 56:05the original co -parenting and visitation issue,
- 56:09which was filed in 2019, despite the party's
- 56:13relocation. jurisdiction attaches to the commencement
- 56:17of the proceeding and is not lost due to the
- 56:21subsequent relocations. So really, what happened
- 56:25in this case is family code section 3422 is normally
- 56:30addressed in the context of a modification hearing
- 56:33after final custody and visitation determinations
- 56:37have been made. The scenario we have here was
- 56:40a filing in 2019 that remained open with no final
- 56:44orders or judgment. And so the court said, while
- 56:48the case is proceeding and pending, and the court
- 56:52has not resolved it with the judgment, essentially,
- 56:55the court still has jurisdiction. And the court
- 56:58of appeals said, you know, that makes a lot of
- 57:00sense. Because if you think about it, a contrary
- 57:03interpretation would lead to form shopping. It
- 57:06would lead to the parents deciding where the
- 57:09jurisdiction would be held because if they didn't
- 57:11like the judge's rulings, they could just move.
- 57:13So the court of appeals said, yes, you still
- 57:16have jurisdiction. In a footnote, the court did
- 57:19say that CT would be free to file a motion under
- 57:23family code section 3427 for inconvenient form,
- 57:28but states were not going to make a comment as
- 57:29to how we would rule on that. Next slide. Okay,
- 57:36Mary Dubarque and GK. So this is a due process
- 57:40and an appellate issue case. The Court of Appeal
- 57:44indicates in its opinion that there are two things
- 57:48that you should be focusing on. An appellate
- 57:50affirmatively has to show an error. by referring
- 57:54to an adequate appellate record. Here, there
- 57:56was no appellate record. And the second general
- 57:59rule is that the appellate court cannot consider
- 58:02a claim of error that could have been, but was
- 58:04not raised in the trial court. Here, dad failed
- 58:07to raise the issue that he was asking the court
- 58:11to consider. He had custody of the minor child
- 58:14by virtue of an MSA mother. He then moves away
- 58:17from the county where... everything was adjudicated,
- 58:20he moves away. And then mother files a request
- 58:22for joint custody. So of course, notice on the
- 58:26custody issue being at issue. And the court rules
- 58:29that mother will have custody of the minor child
- 58:32and father appeals saying that it was a move
- 58:35away. But remember, he's the one that moved away,
- 58:38not mom. And so the court, in essence, based
- 58:40on the fact that he was found to be manipulative
- 58:43and certainly not credible. The court found that
- 58:48mother's request for physical custody put him
- 58:52on notice on that being the issue because, of
- 58:54course, he then lost custody. It was a three
- 58:57-day evidentiary hearing. So be mindful, right,
- 59:02that father's claim based on His position that
- 59:08he didn't know mom wanted her to come back to
- 59:11the county where all of this originated was disingenuous
- 59:14So you take again the totality of the circumstances
- 59:17the witness their testimony what they put in
- 59:20their paperwork and also most importantly What
- 59:22record is or isn't created? So be mindful with
- 59:25your settled statements if you don't have a court
- 59:27reporter If you can afford a court reporter get
- 59:30a court reporter if you can secure a court reporter
- 59:32provided by the court Do what you need to do,
- 59:35but it's really important that you understand
- 59:37we're doing less with more. So you're going to
- 59:38have to be very creative on how to make your
- 59:41record. Next slide. Nope. I just want to point
- 59:47out that the court affirmed the trial. The court
- 59:49of appeal affirmed the trial court and the minor
- 59:51was allowed to remain with the mother as granted
- 59:55by the trial court. Sorry about that. No, no
- 59:58worries. So, uh, Balindraan is a case where we
- 1:00:04can all say whether you're on the bench or you're
- 1:00:10a practitioner really highlights, I think, one
- 1:00:13of the most difficult set of circumstances to
- 1:00:16navigate, which is grandparent visitation when
- 1:00:19one of the parents is deceased. And what Ball
- 1:00:24and Draw does is it highlights that difficulty,
- 1:00:28that tension that exists in these types of cases.
- 1:00:32uh the well -meaning desires to try to find a
- 1:00:36solution for children in a really unfortunate
- 1:00:41set of circumstances and then the constitutional
- 1:00:45uh issues that are implicated by those desires
- 1:00:51to find some sort of harmony and Ball and drawn
- 1:00:53like a lot of these grandparent visitation cases
- 1:00:56really focuses on the constitutional rights of
- 1:01:01parents and how the court needs to really delicately
- 1:01:04balance the issues of fitness the issues of detriment
- 1:01:08to children and all of the factors to consider
- 1:01:13before issuing a grandparent visitation order
- 1:01:17over the objection of a parent because the courts
- 1:01:21time and time again have highlighted the importance
- 1:01:25of giving the special weight to a fit parent's
- 1:01:30decision especially in the context of parents
- 1:01:33who are willing to give at least they say so
- 1:01:37and they show it demonstrated to some extent
- 1:01:40uh, unstructured visitation or access to children
- 1:01:44by the grandparents and their desire to not be
- 1:01:48bound by an order. So Bondron is really not unique
- 1:01:52in its assessment of the, of the factors to consider
- 1:01:57under Troxel and 3102. What, what I think it
- 1:02:01highlights again is even the court of appeal
- 1:02:04time and time again, and it's decision talks
- 1:02:07about this difficult tension of uh or the invitation
- 1:02:13especially by grandparents that the court uh
- 1:02:17essentially assess its values of what would be
- 1:02:21appropriate given the circumstances over a parent's
- 1:02:25value system and we have to defer again and again
- 1:02:29to what otherwise in all the reasoning that a
- 1:02:32fit parent might have to uh deny visitation or
- 1:02:37structured in the way that they want uh without
- 1:02:40falling prey to frankly the emotions that are
- 1:02:43so involved in these cases and that uh attempt
- 1:02:47that often some of us uh on the bench try to
- 1:02:50do is find some sort of commonality and perhaps
- 1:02:53the solution and uh sometimes the solution is
- 1:02:57we can't wait into it and sort of ball and drawn
- 1:03:00just says thank you for your attempt just stay
- 1:03:06out of it, which is not a very satisfactory kind
- 1:03:09of solution when you're dealing with a dead parent,
- 1:03:14grandparents that are the only connection to
- 1:03:16that dead parent and another parent who is not
- 1:03:20necessarily the most reliable, you know, but
- 1:03:23still fit. So another one of these cases chalking
- 1:03:26up the grandparent visitation Conundrum, it's
- 1:03:30really is a conundrum and there are cases previously
- 1:03:32that just talked about it Very aptly as one of
- 1:03:35the most difficult judicial determinations to
- 1:03:37make and I think this case highlights that again
- 1:03:40Next slide, please Okay, in ray marriage Alan
- 1:03:47freeman freeman not to be confused with other
- 1:03:49important family law appeals cases with the same
- 1:03:53name of freeman and so I guess if you're Name
- 1:03:58is Freeman and getting divorced don't appeal
- 1:04:00anymore. We have enough Freeman cases, but this
- 1:04:03is a typical fact pattern couples marry 20 years
- 1:04:06or so no minor children. There's a request for
- 1:04:09spousal support and Determination of the community
- 1:04:12interest in a separate property home So, you
- 1:04:16know 14 months ago during my last days on the
- 1:04:19bench and even now my capacity as a private judge
- 1:04:21when hearing spousal support cases the pleadings
- 1:04:25often appear to put the marital standard of living
- 1:04:29front and center. And I understand that it's
- 1:04:32one of the 4320 factors for which the court must
- 1:04:34make findings. However, if you really take a
- 1:04:37look at the caseload, which I went back and did
- 1:04:39over the last 20 years or so, it appears to me
- 1:04:43that marital standard of living has lost a lot
- 1:04:47of its determinative power. I mean, it's still
- 1:04:50there as a factor and perhaps in some cases a
- 1:04:53major one. However, this case The Freeman case
- 1:04:57here certainly focuses more on ability to pay,
- 1:05:01health, the age, and I think significantly employability,
- 1:05:08not simply based on a vocational evaluation,
- 1:05:12but seen in light of the health, the age, and
- 1:05:15all the other 40 through 20 factors. Also, the
- 1:05:18court makes a point of asserting its right to
- 1:05:22make basically whatever spousals of order they
- 1:05:25wish after properly evaluating all the 4320 factors.
- 1:05:30In other words, there's no formula. Importantly,
- 1:05:33it is the court that determines which of the
- 1:05:36factors take priority. You can argue the various
- 1:05:40factors. but it's the court that prioritizes.
- 1:05:43So I think that a mere reliance on the marital
- 1:05:46standard of living is a questionable tactic.
- 1:05:50Again, to support your case, yes, but reliance
- 1:05:53on it, I'd be careful. Importantly, we all know
- 1:05:58that Dissa Master X spouse may be used in calculating
- 1:06:01a temporary spousal support order, but can it
- 1:06:04be used to calculate a permanent order? That
- 1:06:08is where analysis of the 4320 factors must be
- 1:06:11determinative. For years, I would make it clear,
- 1:06:15as clear as possible, that I was segregating
- 1:06:18any disamaster calculation used to temporary
- 1:06:21support when doing my permanent support calculation.
- 1:06:24However, we would often still use the program
- 1:06:27to calculate important things like net spendable
- 1:06:30income, various tax ramifications. Well, that
- 1:06:34is what happened in this case. as ex -spouse
- 1:06:36was used simply to supply the court with certain
- 1:06:39financial factors which the appellant believed
- 1:06:42was an improper use of the program. The Court
- 1:06:45of Appeal importantly said it was not, not improper.
- 1:06:50The judge properly covered the... and covered
- 1:06:53the court by including detailed findings on all
- 1:06:57the 40 -20 factors and detailing the findings
- 1:07:00on each factor. And the Court of Appeals made
- 1:07:02it clear that this was sufficient to answer any
- 1:07:06questions regarding whether the court improperly
- 1:07:09used the ex -spas temporary order. I used to
- 1:07:13have the 40 -20 factors on the bench with me.
- 1:07:16And in every case, I simply went down the list.
- 1:07:19Judges and lawyers, if you want these kind of
- 1:07:21rulings to withstand scrutiny, make sure the
- 1:07:24bench officer makes findings on each factor.
- 1:07:27That will bulletproof the ruling, even if the
- 1:07:30ex -bast program is used to calculate financials
- 1:07:32or net spendable, or even as in this case, the
- 1:07:35temporary order is referenced in the ruling.
- 1:07:38Additionally, the family residence was a separate
- 1:07:42property residence which had accumulated a significant
- 1:07:44community interest over the 20 years of the marriage.
- 1:07:47As you all know, we use more Marsden to calculate
- 1:07:50such a community interest and we need a valuation
- 1:07:53of the property to correctly calculate that interest.
- 1:07:56In this case, the value of the property was significantly
- 1:08:01higher on the date of separation than it was
- 1:08:04a few years later at the time of trial. The court
- 1:08:06validated what I believe we all know. Generally,
- 1:08:09property is valued at the time of trial. If the
- 1:08:12litigants on an alternative valuation date, they
- 1:08:15needed to file a motion prior to the trial. Next
- 1:08:18slide. If the name Ennsberg sounds familiar,
- 1:08:30Morgan Ennsberg, it's because he's a major league
- 1:08:32baseball player, third baseman, and he played
- 1:08:34for the Houston Astros along with another team.
- 1:08:38So this case deals with four retirement accounts.
- 1:08:41Next. So in 2018, there was a stipulation dividing
- 1:08:46half of the community property interest in his
- 1:08:50Houston's Astros 401k. Wife received her half
- 1:08:53and the balance was husband's separate property.
- 1:08:562019, there was a status only judgment. Next.
- 1:09:012019 again, another division of a pension. Next.
- 1:09:07In May 22, there was a trial on reserve financial
- 1:09:11disputes. Next, the trial court ruled that, again,
- 1:09:14now this is the third pension that the court
- 1:09:17has equally divided, but the court at this hearing
- 1:09:20found that there was a breach of fiduciary duty
- 1:09:23to the amount of $3 .6 million. and awarded 1
- 1:09:27.8 to the wife, 230 ,000 in attorney's fees,
- 1:09:31100 ,000 for breach of fiduciary duty, and 130
- 1:09:35,000 for evasive interrogation interrogatory
- 1:09:40answers. So the wife was awarded over $2 million.
- 1:09:44Next. Now, fast forward in the case. The judgment
- 1:09:47is entered in this matter. And then, go ahead,
- 1:09:50next. And then the wife thereafter, several months
- 1:09:53later, files a request for order to enforce the
- 1:09:56awarded $2 million by four quadros, making her
- 1:10:00the sole beneficiary of all of the retirement
- 1:10:03accounts. So there's now a fourth retirement
- 1:10:05plan from the Tampa Bay Rays that he had acquired
- 1:10:09after separation. The trial court's ruling did
- 1:10:13grant signing the four quadros giving wife 100
- 1:10:16% of the benefits, which really didn't even secure
- 1:10:18for her all the money that she had lost and was
- 1:10:21deprived of. The Court of Appeal held that the
- 1:10:24quadros related to marital property rights and
- 1:10:27complied with ERISA. The quadros are a proper
- 1:10:31vehicle to enforce damages for the breach of
- 1:10:34fiduciary duty. Next. In looking what the court
- 1:10:39did in this case, let's first look at husband's
- 1:10:41arguments. He argued, number one, the quadros
- 1:10:44didn't relate to marital property rights, two,
- 1:10:48it contravened ERISA, and three, the quadros
- 1:10:52were invalid because of certain code sections,
- 1:10:54but also the trial court divided marital property
- 1:10:57after the final disposition of the judgment.
- 1:11:00Next. Next. Okay, so ERISA generally prohibits
- 1:11:06assignment or garnishment of retirement plan
- 1:11:09benefits. However, next. Next. The exception
- 1:11:13would be for a quadro, which protects the rights
- 1:11:15of non -employees. Next. To qualify as a quadro,
- 1:11:20the order must relate to the provisions of child
- 1:11:23support, alimony payments, or marital property
- 1:11:26rights. And the question in this case was, does
- 1:11:31enforcing the breach of fiduciary duty reimbursement
- 1:11:34of lost community property create a marital property
- 1:11:38right, which can be enforced through a quadro
- 1:11:41aimed at separate property retirement accounts?
- 1:11:44And the answer is yes in this case. So if we
- 1:11:47go back next, if we go back to the husband's
- 1:11:54arguments, the court said, no, we're saying this
- 1:11:58is property, marital property rights. So no,
- 1:12:01you don't get that. The second argument was it
- 1:12:04contravene a risk of purpose of protecting the
- 1:12:07retirement count. Now, in this case, there's
- 1:12:10an interesting argument about the Marshall case,
- 1:12:13which the court had denied where a wife did not
- 1:12:17get some money out of a stipulated judgment to
- 1:12:20pay a tax liability. And the wife tried to use
- 1:12:23the quadro to get that. And the court of appeals
- 1:12:26said, no, you can't do that. So the husband was
- 1:12:30trying to say, hey, look, that applies. And basically
- 1:12:33the court of appeal in this case distinguished
- 1:12:35Marshall and stated the husband's duty in the
- 1:12:38Marshall case to hold the wife harmless regarding
- 1:12:41that stipulation was because the husband assumed
- 1:12:45to do it. And the underlying liability was not
- 1:12:48the wife's rather it was owed to a third party.
- 1:12:51And so in this case that we have here, the court
- 1:12:55of appeal said the obligation of husband was
- 1:12:58a breach. And again, they keep going back. It's
- 1:13:00a breach of fiduciary duty reimbursement, which
- 1:13:03is a marital property right owed to wife as a
- 1:13:05portion of her community interest. Going to the
- 1:13:09third argument, there were these two sections,
- 1:13:122610 and 704, where the court said, look, ERISA
- 1:13:17preempts that. But I want to look more at where
- 1:13:19the trial court divided the marital property
- 1:13:22after disposition. I thought this was interesting.
- 1:13:24The court of appeal said the trial court did
- 1:13:27not modify the existing judgment by issuing the
- 1:13:30quadros. The quadros merely allowed wife to enforce
- 1:13:33the existing judgment regarding her marital property
- 1:13:36rights against the retirement accounts. There
- 1:13:39was no second division of property or modification
- 1:13:42of the judgment. So as to that third argument,
- 1:13:45the court of appeal says no. And we all know
- 1:13:48where this goes from here. Three strikes and
- 1:13:50you're out. Next. Okay, marriage is strong. Another
- 1:13:58issue on enforcement of judgments. This is an
- 1:14:01arrears issue or an arrears case where we're
- 1:14:04talking about reach and where can you reach to
- 1:14:06get your collections. So Mr. Strong was in debt
- 1:14:10to wife to the tune of $2 million. That was what
- 1:14:13he was in arrears for both child and spouse to
- 1:14:15support. And he admitted he had no other assets
- 1:14:18to make good on this debt other than the copyright
- 1:14:22to these Michael Jackson works that were titled
- 1:14:25The Collected Works of Jackson Strong Alliance.
- 1:14:28And so he's arguing, look, we know, court, that
- 1:14:31you can reach a patent, but you can't take my
- 1:14:35copyrights because wife had followed an RFO seeking
- 1:14:38a receiver to monetize. this copyright privilege
- 1:14:44or right that husband has and his argument husband's
- 1:14:47argument again is yes you can do that but not
- 1:14:50for you can do it for a patent but not for a
- 1:14:53copyright and the court of appeal and the trial
- 1:14:55court affirmed that the the court of appeal affirmed
- 1:14:59the trial court when the trial court found that
- 1:15:01pursuant to ccp section 695 .010 a2 provides
- 1:15:08that absent any exception quote all property
- 1:15:11of the judgment debtor is subject to enforcement
- 1:15:14of a money judgment end quote so husband could
- 1:15:17not carve out this copyright there was no statutes
- 1:15:21in fact there's no statutes on the copyright
- 1:15:24it just mentions the intellectual property so
- 1:15:27mr strong was of course unsuccessful wife's claim
- 1:15:33and rfo was affirmed And so therefore, again,
- 1:15:37be mindful of the statute. And if there's nothing
- 1:15:40that prevents it, right, then that's the theory
- 1:15:44that you hang your hat on, as Mrs. Strong did
- 1:15:47here and was successful in collecting her $2
- 1:15:50million. Thank you. Next. All right. On Nelson,
- 1:15:59it's a case where an individual really believed
- 1:16:02their legal argument. And unfortunately, the
- 1:16:05Court of Appeals found it to be without merit
- 1:16:09whatsoever. This individual was a very high net
- 1:16:13worth individual, was ordered to direct his trust
- 1:16:17to provide security for a significant $20 ,000
- 1:16:22a month spousal support obligation to a spouse
- 1:16:26that was much younger than him. And he argued
- 1:16:28to the Court of Appeals and the trial court that
- 1:16:31Making me set up a trust to secure the spousal
- 1:16:36support when I'm dead is the equivalent of violating
- 1:16:41the statute that says spousal support is not
- 1:16:43payable once I'm dead. Very novel workaround
- 1:16:48kind of argument and the Court of Appeals pretty
- 1:16:51much says not only are those statutes appropriate,
- 1:16:54you're reading it wrong. The security is established
- 1:16:58during your life. Had it been established after
- 1:17:01your death Perhaps you'd have weight but the
- 1:17:04court has the ability to order you to provide
- 1:17:08the security after it made detailed findings
- 1:17:10during your life That will be payable to the
- 1:17:14other person upon your death. That's not the
- 1:17:17same as ordering you to pay when you're dead
- 1:17:19so interesting kind of uh trying to turn statutes
- 1:17:24and trying to find this harmony where there wasn't
- 1:17:27a lesson in you know you could shoot your shot
- 1:17:29right shot shoot it shot it shot it all the way
- 1:17:33up to the court of appeals and the court of appeals
- 1:17:34said no and said go ahead and pay uh all costs
- 1:17:38or uh to for the appeal and likely he probably
- 1:17:42paid for all the attorney's fees to get to the
- 1:17:45court of appeal, I suspect, given his net worth
- 1:17:47and the disparity in access between the parties,
- 1:17:50which led to the security. So we never know what
- 1:17:53the next chapter is, but you shoot your shot,
- 1:17:56but probably had devastating consequences on
- 1:17:59the back end. Next. Okay. An unmarried couple
- 1:18:07have a child together. Father's a member of the
- 1:18:10Chumash Indian tribe. and both parents worked
- 1:18:13at the Chumash Casino Resort. Following the breakup
- 1:18:17of their relationship, mother files a request
- 1:18:19for child support and attorney fees. As a Chumash
- 1:18:22descendant, father received $5 ,000 a month from
- 1:18:26the Chumash tribe's general welfare program.
- 1:18:31The question brought to the court was whether
- 1:18:33this $5 ,000 monthly payment from the general
- 1:18:37welfare program was to be included as money available
- 1:18:41for support, as well as included in the calculation
- 1:18:44of a contributive share of attorney fees. His
- 1:18:48attorney, who was also the tribe's legal and
- 1:18:51governmental affairs officer, claimed without
- 1:18:53any corroboration that the general welfare payments
- 1:18:57to tribal descendants was in the form of just
- 1:19:00that. a welfare payment and therefore not subject
- 1:19:03to federal taxation nor to inclusion as income
- 1:19:07available for support. Now, as most of us know,
- 1:19:11There are governmental benefits that are included
- 1:19:15in income available for support, such as social
- 1:19:18security, pensions, unemployment benefits, workers'
- 1:19:22comp benefits. And indeed, many tribal benefits
- 1:19:26have already been litigated in this area, such
- 1:19:29as reasonable value for rent -free housing on
- 1:19:31a reservation and things such as that. And they've
- 1:19:35already been decided that they are indeed income
- 1:19:39available for support. But what about the tribe
- 1:19:46providing, as in this case, what the title suggests
- 1:19:49is a welfare payment? Well, Family Code Section
- 1:19:524058 precludes a court from determining child
- 1:19:56support by including as income payments a party
- 1:20:01who receives from any public assistance program,
- 1:20:05eligibility for which is based on need. That
- 1:20:09is why when calculating child support, we do
- 1:20:11include SSI payments or general welfare payments
- 1:20:16that provide a minimum level of income for the
- 1:20:20indigent and other categorical assistance programs
- 1:20:23for the poor. Most, if not all, of these programs
- 1:20:28must meet the federal and state poverty levels
- 1:20:31to qualify for the benefits. So, are we to look
- 1:20:36at this tribal so -called welfare program as
- 1:20:39a measure to assist? the indigent and therefore
- 1:20:42exclude the payments from the support calculation?
- 1:20:45I think the answer came pretty easily once the
- 1:20:49court reviewed Father's income from his tribal
- 1:20:52job working at the casino. His base salary was
- 1:20:56$114 ,000 a year. And the court found therefore
- 1:21:00that the Tribal Welfare Program, despite its
- 1:21:04name, was not a program designed to provide minimal
- 1:21:08assistance to the indigent. per month, $60 ,000
- 1:21:12a year, was properly included in the trial court's
- 1:21:15calculation as and for support, and the attorney
- 1:21:18-free order was proper due to the court's consideration
- 1:21:21of this additional income. Next slide. Marriage
- 1:21:27of Ade and Farameh. In this case, it's looking
- 1:21:30at the I -864 Affidavit for Support, which is
- 1:21:34an affidavit that a person needs to sign with
- 1:21:36the U .S. government if they want to sponsor
- 1:21:40a family member to get their green card. And
- 1:21:42doing so, they have to basically promise to provide
- 1:21:46sufficient income and assets to support the immigrant.
- 1:21:49And basically, the primary goal is to assure
- 1:21:52that immigrants do have enough money to support
- 1:21:54themselves and really not live off of the government.
- 1:21:58And the obligation generally lasts until the
- 1:22:00immigrant naturalizes or earns 40 qualifying
- 1:22:03work hours, which is about 10 years. So in this
- 1:22:07case, husband and sponsored wife, and wife files
- 1:22:10an RFO for spousal support based on the I -864
- 1:22:14affidavit. And this is a case of first impression
- 1:22:17for the court of appeal. So wife argument was
- 1:22:20that the federal poverty guideline in 2024 was
- 1:22:2415 ,060 per year. And 125 % of that is $1 ,569
- 1:22:31in spousal support per month. And wife said husband
- 1:22:35had to pay that until she became a US citizen.
- 1:22:38Well, husband in this case argued, hey, look.
- 1:22:41Wife earned $57 ,900 in 2023, more than the 125
- 1:22:46% federal poverty guideline, and argued wife's
- 1:22:50income should be considered. Well, the trial
- 1:22:52court actually ordered the $1 ,569 and ordered
- 1:22:57that it would be paid until the wife reached
- 1:23:00her 40 quarters, which would have been approximately
- 1:23:0210 years under this program. So what happened
- 1:23:07was the trial court was reversed and the court
- 1:23:10of appeals said, look, you need to go ahead and
- 1:23:13consider that income. And they basically interpreted
- 1:23:16the I -864 quote, had to provide any support
- 1:23:21necessary to satisfy the minimal requirement,
- 1:23:24which necessarily requires consideration of the
- 1:23:27white's income. And it makes sense, right? Next.
- 1:23:36All right. Kuvabina, I'm sure that most of the
- 1:23:41lawyers listening have faced a litigant like
- 1:23:44the appellant in this case. And most, if not
- 1:23:47all, of the judges listening have faced a litigant
- 1:23:50like this. This is an appeal from an order finding
- 1:23:54that mother in this case was a vexatious litigant.
- 1:23:58Thereafter, she needed to file a request for
- 1:24:01the supervising judge at the court overseeing
- 1:24:04the case to review any moving papers and approve
- 1:24:07the matter to go forward before the trial court
- 1:24:10could proceed with the matter. CCP Section 391
- 1:24:14at SEC is the code section governing the vexatious
- 1:24:16litigant findings. In this case, in the five
- 1:24:22years prior to the action, Mother, who was an
- 1:24:27attorney representing herself, had commenced
- 1:24:31prosecuted or maintained 11 appeals and writs,
- 1:24:37nine of which had been finally determined adversely
- 1:24:40to her with the other two still to be ruled upon.
- 1:24:44So the vexatious litigant statutes are designed
- 1:24:47to protect opposing parties harassed by meritless
- 1:24:50lawsuits and to conserve court time and resources
- 1:24:54so as to protect other litigants who are waiting
- 1:24:57in line for their legal cases to proceed. To
- 1:25:01qualify, a self -represented person has to have
- 1:25:04filed at least five qualifying pieces of litigation
- 1:25:09within the past seven years that were decided
- 1:25:12adversely to them. Remember, in this case, she
- 1:25:16filed 11 writs and appeals in just five years,
- 1:25:19so she qualified. And just to prove how vexatious
- 1:25:24she had become, most of the rulings found in
- 1:25:27the appeal opinion were things that were already
- 1:25:31legally clear. There was no question for the
- 1:25:33Court of Appeals. So first, she claimed that
- 1:25:37appeals don't count towards the total number
- 1:25:40of actions she brought forth. Well, there's a
- 1:25:43ton of case law making it clear that appeals
- 1:25:46and writs do count. Then she argued that her
- 1:25:50appeals don't count because she was defending
- 1:25:52herself against actions brought by father. her
- 1:25:56appeals and writs were not deemed to be in defense
- 1:25:59of herself just because she was appealing rulings
- 1:26:03that went against her. So that argument was blown
- 1:26:06off. Then she argued the four writs she filed
- 1:26:10attempting to disqualify various judges were
- 1:26:14not final adjudications and therefore not part
- 1:26:18of the number of litigations charged to her.
- 1:26:21and they were not final because the litigation
- 1:26:26kept going. Well, the court said no, the issue
- 1:26:29of whether the particular judge was biased against
- 1:26:32you was final. Then she argued that because she
- 1:26:35had been denied an attorney fee order and was
- 1:26:39forced, forced to represent herself, she should
- 1:26:43not be charged for her actions because she didn't
- 1:26:45know what she was doing. They didn't buy it since
- 1:26:49If you choose to represent yourself, you are
- 1:26:51held to the same standards. And finally, she
- 1:26:54argued that because the court maintains jurisdiction
- 1:26:57in custody and support cases, that her appeals
- 1:27:00on those matters were not final adjudications.
- 1:27:04Now, the court feels said as to the particular
- 1:27:07orders appealed, they were final orders and she
- 1:27:11met the standard and she was a vexatious litigant.
- 1:27:14So, Just be thankful that you do not run across
- 1:27:18such a litigant and know that these rules should
- 1:27:22be in your arsenal should you have to defend
- 1:27:24yourself. Next slide. All right. For our final
- 1:27:29case, we have Goldman, which I think is a good
- 1:27:32backstop to the cases relating to enforcement
- 1:27:37authority and how far enforcement authority goes.
- 1:27:39And this talks specifically about the issue of
- 1:27:42defenses to the enforcement of a judgment when
- 1:27:47a party delays and does not actively pursue enforcement
- 1:27:50until years and years later. And opposed to the
- 1:27:55last case I presented on relating to a frankly
- 1:27:59unreasonable interpretation of two statutes,
- 1:28:03this case really turns on two reasonable interpretations
- 1:28:06of the same statute. so much so that the Court
- 1:28:09of Appeals had to look into the legislative intent
- 1:28:12to understand whether the legislature even considered
- 1:28:16equitable defenses when it comes to pursuing
- 1:28:20enforcement of judgments in the family law context.
- 1:28:24And they came to the conclusion that other than
- 1:28:27some categories of enforcement actions, specifically
- 1:28:32on the issue of support, where the equitable
- 1:28:37defenses are not available in the context of
- 1:28:40money judgments and property judgments, there
- 1:28:42is the ability to assert equitable defenses.
- 1:28:46And the question was whether the equitable defense
- 1:28:50of latches applied in a case where wife waited
- 1:28:53for over a decade to pursue. her claims under
- 1:28:58a judgment to enforce the division of certain
- 1:29:01assets and to, in this case also, seek the filing
- 1:29:05of joint tax returns and exchange of refunds.
- 1:29:09So she sat on her hands for a while. And while
- 1:29:14the court did say, yes, this latches issue does
- 1:29:18apply in this context, it highlighted what needs
- 1:29:22to be proven in order to establish a defense
- 1:29:27of latches, namely the failure to assert a right
- 1:29:30for some appreciable period of time so as to
- 1:29:35amount to unreasonable delay, and the result
- 1:29:39needs to be prejudicing to the adverse party,
- 1:29:43or the party needs to demonstrate that the other
- 1:29:46party who sat on their hands acquiesced to not
- 1:29:49seeking the enforcement of that judgment. And
- 1:29:54in this case, uh, the court noted that the trial
- 1:29:58court, while properly finding that latches did
- 1:30:01apply, did essentially engaged in some bootstrapping
- 1:30:05between those elements and found the delay equaled
- 1:30:08the prejudice. And, um, and, and the court of
- 1:30:11appeals took issue with the factual findings
- 1:30:14more so and related back to, uh, for further
- 1:30:19litigation. But I think the most important part
- 1:30:21of this case is understanding that these defenses
- 1:30:25do exist and these and it's a it's a good counterpoint
- 1:30:29to what we heard about uh collecting against
- 1:30:33copyrights and the ERISA not being a defense
- 1:30:39to using quadro for enforcement we've seen in
- 1:30:42previous years, enforcement, wide ranging enforcement
- 1:30:46of support orders. So this seems to be a really
- 1:30:49interesting and the court of appeals even calls
- 1:30:53it a novel legal question as to what defenses
- 1:30:56exist in this context. Definitely a worthwhile
- 1:30:59read. All right. Thank you all. We've run out
- 1:31:03of time. If the bar will throw questions to us,
- 1:31:06we'll do our best to answer them. Thank you all
- 1:31:08for being with us. It was our pleasure and be
- 1:31:12well. Take care.