Latest / Aurangzeb: The Emperor Who Expanded and Broke the Mughal Empire — Fexingo History / Aurangzeb's Kandahar Campaigns: The Frontier War
Transcript
- Lucas: So, Luna, we've talked a lot about Aurangzeb's wars in the Deccan, but there's one set of campaigns that often gets overlooked — his two attempts to take back Kandahar from the Safavids. These were early in his career, when he was still a prince, and they both failed spectacularly. Lucas: Kandahar was a critical trading hub on the route between India and Persia, a fortress city that changed hands several times. The Mughals had lost it to the Safavids in the 1620s under Jahangir, and Shah Jahan tried twice to get it back — in 1638, he actually succeeded through diplomacy, but the governor defected back to Persia. By the time Aurangzeb became viceroy of the Deccan, the emperor wanted a decisive military reconquest. Luna: So Aurangzeb was the one leading the charge? Lucas: Exactly. In 1649, Shah Jahan ordered a massive expedition. Aurangzeb was given command of the main army, along with some of the empire's top generals, like Sadullah Khan — who was the grand vizier — and the prince Dara Shikoh's son, Sulaiman Shikoh, was also involved, though he was more a figurehead. The plan was to besiege Kandahar and starve out the Persian garrison. Lucas: But almost immediately, things went wrong. The logistics were a nightmare — moving thousands of men, horses, and siege equipment across the barren mountains of eastern Afghanistan. And the Persians had reinforced the fortress heavily. The Safavid governor, Ghulam Ali Khan, proved a tough defender. Luna: What kind of defenses did they face? Lucas: Kandahar was a triple-walled fortress, with a deep moat and bastions designed to withstand cannon fire. The Mughals brought heavy siege guns — but dragging them through the passes was brutal. They set up batteries, bombarded the walls, and even tried mining — digging tunnels under the fortifications and setting off gunpowder. But the Persians were skilled at counter-mining. After about three months, with winter approaching and supplies running low, Aurangzeb had to lift the siege. Luna: That must have been a blow to his reputation. Lucas: It was, but Aurangzeb learned from it. He spent the next few years studying siegecraft, improving his logistics — stockpiling supplies in advance, building road networks. So when Shah Jahan ordered a second campaign in 1653, Aurangzeb was better prepared. This time, he had even more artillery, and he tried a different approach: instead of just bombarding the walls, he built a series of fortified positions around the city — essentially a siege of blockade, cutting off supplies. Lucas: But the Persian commander, now the legendary general Rustam Khan, was equally astute. He led sorties, disrupted the Mughal supply lines, and even managed to get reinforcements from the Safavid shah Abbas II. The siege dragged on for nearly six months. In the end, Aurangzeb had to retreat again — his army was decimated by disease, desertion, and the harsh winter. Luna: So the Mughals never recaptured Kandahar? Lucas: Not under Aurangzeb. The Safavids held it until 1709, when the Hotaki Afghans rose up. But the consequences were far-reaching. These failures convinced Aurangzeb that direct conquest in the northwest was too costly, which partly explains his obsession with the Deccan. But it also weakened Mughal prestige on the frontier, and left a power vacuum that eventually invited Nadir Shah's invasion in 1739. Luna: Interesting how one failure can redirect an entire empire's strategy. Lucas: Absolutely. And there's a personal angle too: Aurangzeb's rivalry with Dara Shikoh — Dara was the favorite son, and these military setbacks made Aurangzeb seem less capable compared to Dara's more diplomatic successes in the Deccan. It fueled their later conflict. Lucas: Let's talk about the technological side for a moment. The Mughals used massive cannons — some called 'Kali Top' — but they were too heavy to move quickly. The Persians, on the other hand, had lighter field artillery and were experts in mountain warfare. Aurangzeb later adopted more mobile siege trains in the Deccan, inspired by these lessons. Luna: So the Kandahar campaign was a learning experience. Lucas: It really was. And it's a reminder that even the most successful emperor had his share of defeats. But he didn't repeat the same mistakes — his later sieges of Bijapur and Golconda were much more methodical. Lucas: Now, one thing that often goes unmentioned is how local Afghan tribes played both sides. The Mughals tried to win over the Pashtun clans with subsidies, but the Persians were just as generous. This shifting loyalty was a headache for both empires. Luna: So it wasn't just a Mughal-Persian war — it was also a proxy war over Afghan allegiances. Lucas: Exactly. And that pattern would repeat for centuries. If you've been coming with us through these conversations about South Asia, you'll see echoes of it even today. Lucas: Speaking of which — a couple of dollars a month is genuinely what keeps these going. If you've gotten something out of them, buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo. It makes a real difference — helps us keep digging into stories like these. Luna: Yeah, we really appreciate it. Lucas: So back to Kandahar — what do you think, Luna, about the idea that Aurangzeb's early failures made him more relentless later? Luna: I think it shows he could adapt, even if it took time. Lucas: Right. And that adaptation came at a huge cost — but the Mughal Empire was still powerful enough to absorb those losses. By the end of his reign, the Deccan wars had drained the treasury, but the Kandahar lesson stuck with him: avoid overextending in hostile terrain. But in the end, the empire overextended anyway, just in a different direction. Lucas: Perhaps that's the real legacy of these forgotten campaigns — they foreshadowed the limits of Mughal power, even as Aurangzeb pushed those limits to their breaking point.