Latest / The Team House / Kinetic Diplomacy w/ Alex Hollings | EYES ON | Ep. 21
Transcript
- 0:00Hello, everyone, Welcome to another episode of Eyes On. I'm Andy Milburn,
- 0:05and so we don't make this a kind of stunted introduction, which I
- 0:10already have. Jason Unfortunate is with us today. We have our esteemed present
- 0:15to manage a boss guru, Detacos and the man that actually everyone has tuned
- 0:24in to see, the famous Alex Hollings. And Alex, we already have
- 0:32been talking about this topic and spoiling it, but I'm going to turn over
- 0:37to you to talk about kinetic diplomacy. Awesome. Well, kinnecting diplomacy is
- 0:43probably a term that's been used by others, but as far as I know,
- 0:47I was the first one to start using it a lot back in twenty
- 0:49seventeen. But the idea being that it's sort of the other side of the
- 0:54coin of grayzone operations or hybrid warfare, where so hybrid warfare or grayzone operations
- 1:00are military actions that sort of fall short of an impetus to war, right.
- 1:03The whole idea being that now that we have such a high bar for
- 1:08open conflict with nuclear powers, especially, we can do a lot of stuff
- 1:12prior to that which is something bad actor nations like Russia and China have taken
- 1:18a lot of advantage of connecting. Diplomacy is sort of the other side of
- 1:21that coin. It's using conventional military power to send a message, but without
- 1:26the intention of escalating to open war, often even with a de escalating message
- 1:33or at least intentionally designed to provide an off ramp away from open conflict,
- 1:38but while still sending a very clear message, often multiple messages to different audiences.
- 1:42You've got a domestic message you're sending to your audience, and then you've
- 1:46got sort of an international message, especially one that you're sending to your adversarial
- 1:52audience. And that's really what we saw play out between Israel and Iran in
- 1:56these past few weeks. Yeah, I was going to say that, you
- 1:59know, you, when you think about it, kinetic diplomacy. I mean,
- 2:04we we already we don't call it that, but we we already integrate
- 2:09kinetic diplomacy into all of our military plans, and we called them flexible deterrent
- 2:15options. You know, essentially that is it, you know, non escalatory
- 2:21strikes to send a message. But yeah, please go go ahead and talk
- 2:25talk about the attack that Iran launched on Israel on the thirteenth right of this
- 2:32month, and then and then and then the counter attack, but mostly what
- 2:38it means and why it was conducted. And so after a bit of tit
- 2:45for tat actions between Israel and Iran. And it's important to understand that,
- 2:49you know, Iran has been conducting offensive operations in this theater for many,
- 2:53many years, just usually behind the guise of plausible deniability, using their you
- 3:00know, their tertiary actors, you know, through the IRGC and the CUDS
- 3:05force. But this was notable because Iran actually launched this offensive against Israeli targets
- 3:12from inside Iranian borders, and they used a variety of munitions, ranging from
- 3:16pretty inexpensive drones that might run fifty grand apiece up through really high end weapon
- 3:22systems that cost multiple millions of dollars au pomp and you know, the idea
- 3:27genuinely was to send a message. It was meant to be that we can
- 3:32send and this is a bit of conjecture here, but it was meant to
- 3:36be that we can send a variety of munitions, some very high end,
- 3:38some very low end. We have the volume to potentially overwhelm some of your
- 3:44air defense capabilities, and we have some systems that can penetrate your integrated air
- 3:47defenses. Unfortunately for Iran, the United States and coalition forces in that area
- 3:55in the region really wiped the floor with this offensive. The intent that Iran
- 4:01had was never to significantly strategically reduce the amount of combat power is feel had
- 4:08in theater, because that would prompt an escalatory response. The intent was to
- 4:14send a message that we can strike targets in your territory. The fact that
- 4:18it failed, the fact that ninety nine percent of these munitions were intercepted in
- 4:24route, really sort of took some of the fang out of that message.
- 4:29But it is important to remember that at the end of the day, the
- 4:30goal here was not war. The goal was to tell Israel and any other
- 4:35politically aligned nations in theater that we're willing to use force in our military technology.
- 4:42You know, we're resolute in our defensive posture. But also to send
- 4:46a message to that domestic audience who Aron has been radicalizing by saying, you
- 4:50know, the West is the bad guy. Israel in the United States or
- 4:54this evil partnership, we need to act and they need to satiate the calls
- 4:59for action by again launching this offensive and then we saw with Israel's response,
- 5:04which you know, there was a lot of concern about how will Israel respond
- 5:10because Iran's response was yeah, Alex, before yeah, before we talked about
- 5:15this, you brought up a number of really good points there, and I
- 5:17know that that that will you know, we'll get we're going on the Israeli
- 5:24counterattack. But I want I want to to ask you a couple of things
- 5:27that have come up in subsequent discussions. So you know, we talk about
- 5:30the breakdown of the the mix right the attack and and unusually, when I
- 5:39say unusually, but compared to for instance, Russian attacks in Ukraine, there
- 5:46was an unusually high number of cruise missiles and more bilistic missiles in in that
- 5:55In that mix, typically you throw in the majority of drones right to kind
- 5:59of overwhelm and distract and blah blah blah, and you throw in a few
- 6:02nuggets. But in this case it was like a fifty to fifty mix and
- 6:10a high density of more expensive, more capable systems thrown in with the drones
- 6:14which were shot had one thirty one one thirty six is although there were a
- 6:18few of those supposedly used for the first time jet powered variants. So it's
- 6:25kind of an R and D effort here absolutely throughout some some figures for you
- 6:30either to say, hey, that's bullshit, or but really for kind of
- 6:34interpretation. So you have, you know, one hundred and seventy or so
- 6:41drones, right these by the way, these figures could be off, but
- 6:46probably not by a magnitude of the lot because they align with IDF estimates,
- 6:54UK simates. I'm not sure I've seen one from the US, but also
- 6:59you know, knowledgeable bloggers, and but one hundred and seventy drones, thirty
- 7:03cruise missiles, one hundred and twenty ballistic missiles, and so the interesting aspect
- 7:10of this too, and this is my question. You have the drones and
- 7:15the cruise missiles, all right, and they're launched. The drones are going
- 7:18to take five to six hours, and there's this there's this like Tetris.
- 7:24What was that eighties game that we all used to play in the pub,
- 7:27not you guys, you too, little bit Tetris? You know pac Man?
- 7:30Right, it was like pac Man. They were going to launch and
- 7:32the drones and cruise missiles came across Iraq and Jordan. A number of them
- 7:38intercepted by by fighter intercepts US and reportedly Jordan and a patriot battery in Iraq
- 7:48who was involved. But while that was happening at some point one hundred and
- 7:55twenty ballistic missiles is you know, different trajectory, different uh and but not
- 8:01synchronized, you know, not synchronized with the other attack. Very you know
- 8:07why that happened. I would argue that that was a mistake. I mean
- 8:11again, without being able to peer directly into a round strategic planning, we're
- 8:16all speculating here. We're allowed to the idea behind launching a multifaceted attack like
- 8:22this, where you're gonna use ballistic missiles, you're gonna use cruise missiles,
- 8:26and you're gonna use a mix of lower end two mid to higher end drones.
- 8:30The idea really is over to saturate the integrated air defenses of the defending
- 8:37nation. What a lot of people may not realize is that air defense is
- 8:41never a sure thing. Anytime that you're trying to defend against targets in the
- 8:45air, it's a bit of a gamble, even if they're subsonic cruise missiles
- 8:48that you know, everybody's afraid of. Hypersonic weapons. Cruise missiles at low
- 8:52speeds can be just as if not more, dangerous when launched in a coordinated
- 8:58and well timed attack. So the reason you would launch a mix like this
- 9:03is a to overwhelm those defenses. Get your defensive systems that are looking for
- 9:07high altitude threats like ballistic missiles are busy. Your defenses that are focused on
- 9:13low altitude threats like drones and some cruise missiles are busy. The idea is
- 9:18to reach a saturation point where even if you have one hundred percent intercept rate,
- 9:22which is all but impossible, they're still going to end up with weapons
- 9:26that get through because you've saturated those defenses and you've confused them. So by
- 9:31not coordinating the attack, you sort of eliminated the possibility for that to happen.
- 9:37And I think my theory on that would be that Orian thought that some
- 9:41of their higher end weapons that this was really their first operational use. They
- 9:46assume those were going to walk through, and because of that, they were
- 9:50creating opportunity to blunt this attack on Israel's part, with the assumption being that
- 9:56we're going to launch you know, three hundred or one hundred thirty or whatever
- 10:00it might be. We're gonna launch hundreds of munitions. The majority of them
- 10:05may not get through or may not find their targets are high end ones which
- 10:09we have carefully chosen the targets for will get through. They will create some
- 10:15kind of a strategic impact that's going to force Israel to think twice about messing
- 10:20with us in the future. But again with the ultimate goal of not escalating
- 10:24the conflict, but sending a real message, sending a message we can we
- 10:28can penetrate your aspace at any time, exactly to a global audience. You
- 10:33know, the Iranian regime. Even the Iranian regime realize that they are on
- 10:37thin ice with their own domestic audience. But yeah, we can do this.
- 10:41I was gonna plment to that. Look, you know, yeah,
- 10:46you know that whole thing about overwhelming and deliberately not overwhelming is fascinating. Of
- 10:54course, Isruel has a great advantage in this sense that it's a small area,
- 10:58but I mean that it's well of it by free tier air defense in
- 11:01a way that you could never do with Ukraine. You know, Arrow,
- 11:05David Sling and an iron dome hardware requirements alone. It was possible. Yeah,
- 11:13and so penetrating is if they really wanted to overwhelm them, they would
- 11:20have had his balla way in. That's the key component here, you know,
- 11:24I mean they that that would have that really would have had Israel facing
- 11:28a serious threat and massive delus Those weapons came from Iran. It provided a
- 11:35amount of intercept whereas you're one hundred percent right, if this had been if
- 11:39the intention had been to escalate to open war, we would have seen the
- 11:43tax coming from multiple directions from proxy forces aligned with Iran as well as from
- 11:48Iran. And the fact that we didn't see that really sort of points to
- 11:52motive. So so there's a it's a very I mean, there's so much
- 11:58interesting stuff here that you don't I mean, you don't have to be a
- 12:01ballistic missile nerd or a droney. It's just just interested in warfare. And
- 12:07so for a start, the Arrow three, which is the latest version of
- 12:13Israeli right, the you know, long range ballistic missile interceptor equivalent to our
- 12:18SM three. I think in US navals SM three reportedly there were exo atmospheric
- 12:26interceptions, right, which would have been the s M three or the Arrow
- 12:31three, I think I believe for the first time in combat if it is
- 12:35the SM three US Navy. So you see, so we're kind of I
- 12:39mean, it was a testing occasion for both sides, right, I mean
- 12:43it was. It might have been a nose show for most people watching,
- 12:46but there are a lot of missile heads really really enthralled by this, and
- 12:52they're probably still having wet rooms. Hey guys, it's Jack. I just
- 12:56wanted to talk to you today about a way that you can help support the
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- 13:48Teamhouse and for the people involved in the AGIS program too. You know,
- 13:52AGS is an incredible it's probably the best air defense capability this planet has ever
- 13:58seen. But it gets a lot less conversation than Patriot and you know,
- 14:01some of these other platforms that have seen use in Ukraine. But it was
- 14:05really it was an opportunity for AGES to shine that you know, I think
- 14:09nerds like me really appreciated. But if you aren't a nerd like me,
- 14:13it probably, like you said, it seems like a bit of a non
- 14:16event, you know, well yeah, I mean it sadly it's a non
- 14:22event because of technology and Western democraty liberal democracy's military success in missile interception,
- 14:30it would be anything. But you know, it's easy for us to laugh
- 14:33about this massive attack, but it relied it relied on I mean just to
- 14:39give you I mean, you know this, Alex, but just to you
- 14:41know, give you an example. So so you take the drones alone,
- 14:45one hundred and seventy launched, the US only intercepted eighty, right, okay,
- 14:50yes, Shahas. But even with that warning and everything, the US
- 14:54intercepted only eighty using mostly attack aircra off. The Brits and the French intercepted
- 15:03and unknown number they the Jordanians say dozens, so you know, let's say
- 15:09two or three dozen, but that doesn't that's not one hundred percent interception rate.
- 15:16And interestingly too, when you do the math on the ballistic missiles,
- 15:22the interception rate doesn't work out either, which means that a large number may
- 15:28well have crashed, yes, you know, in en route that failure.
- 15:33You know. So the Iranian there was a sense perhaps the testing here too
- 15:37which shouldn't which isn't shocking. I think that because the reason these ballistic missiles
- 15:41and some of the higher end cruise missiles were used was meant to be a
- 15:46demonstration of Iranian technological capability. They wanted to say, look, we've worked
- 15:52out the literal rocket science to place these weapons on target at long range.
- 15:58You know, a ballistic missile really is in many ways in orbital rocket,
- 16:02right, which is the reason why we've seen these exo atmospheric intercepts. So
- 16:07the ability to propel a weapon like this and then to actually guide it to
- 16:11a target is a pretty significant capability. The same way coordinating cruise missile strikes
- 16:15at low altitude to hide behind the horizon of the Earth is a pretty significant
- 16:21modern military capability. And the whole goal here was to show off those sophisticated
- 16:26military capabilities. Of course, it didn't pan out quite like that, but
- 16:32I agree with what you were saying earlier that you know, there's a there
- 16:34was good reason behind this mix, and that good reason was that Iran did
- 16:40assume there was going to be a high intercept rate, but they also assumed
- 16:42that their higher end, most capable weapons were going to get through. And
- 16:47it looks like they also planned for a certain failure rate, which would point
- 16:52to a decent testing apparatus if they were aware of their failure rate. You
- 16:56know, Yeah, that's a great point I had in the code to me,
- 17:00and all those systems that kind of you know, the drones and the
- 17:04cruise missiles arguably would be used in a real war from you know, from
- 17:10closer at hand, from from Lebanon where there was less flight time, and
- 17:15combined with the the just a thing about ballistic missiles, so they you know,
- 17:19I remember, I mean we started off with learning about the Shahab three,
- 17:23which I believe was North Korean, right, and it was what Iran
- 17:27had, but it had a you know, it's not very accurated, like
- 17:30a CEP of two clicks. And then all these other names start emerging,
- 17:36right, you know, and most recently that the Kaiber what's it, the
- 17:40Kaiba Chikhan, which supposedly was launched this time. Someone explained to me that
- 17:45every time the Uranians do a minor change on the Shahab, you know,
- 17:49improved the guidance system, improved the range. Solid fuel is the latest thing,
- 17:56solid fuel for the Kaiban, it gets a new name. But it
- 17:59was all bill on this basic North Korean design, and they're testing it.
- 18:03You know, they need to test it absolutely, and they're and they're testing
- 18:07it, uh, you know with active use at times, you know what
- 18:11I mean, like as we saw in this engagement, you know what I
- 18:14mean. That's one thing that Iran benefits a great deal from their proxies for
- 18:18is that well, Iran might not necessarily launch offensive actions, you know,
- 18:22under their own banner, all that often they are able to collect data from
- 18:26the offensive strikes launched by proxy forces all throughout the region. All the time,
- 18:30not just take those function but also on the response to them, you
- 18:36know, which I think is why Iran likely thought that they had identified some
- 18:40holes they could poke in the Israeli defense. Uh, that didn't end up
- 18:44being holes quite the way they've thought. Yeah. But interestingly, if let's
- 18:52say, I mean the two the two air bases that would hit never Team
- 18:56and I think the other one was called Ronan, that both and and the
- 19:00other places that were hit were up in the Golan Heights, and which,
- 19:03by the way, when you look at the number of hits, they're definitely
- 19:08more. It means that even with all those systems that by the time it
- 19:11got to Israeli airspace that advertised into separate of ninety nine percent wasn't quite great,
- 19:18right, it was lower than that without being overwhelmed. So that that
- 19:23should be a warning to the Israelis as it is, you know, the
- 19:27Ranians did them a favor by kind of like yeah, but anyway, so
- 19:32they so they they got missiles in by the way they they they were using
- 19:37you know, we talked about ballistic missiles. The cruise missiles were an upgraded
- 19:41version are spicy, especially by our It's like the Bavar. It's a first
- 19:48scene in twenty twenty three exactly, you know, and that's probably why they'd
- 19:52used far fewer. But anyway, so they hit these two bases and they
- 19:56go on, well, these two air bases are in the UH. They'
- 20:03around in the desert and UH and and so the point is that there isn't
- 20:07civilian infrastructure. There's there's not a lot of opportunity for things to go badly
- 20:12wrong. Now there so happens a Bedouin kid was hurt. But but that
- 20:17kind of shows how sparsely populated this this area was. So it says,
- 20:22though, okay, we're going to go towards two of your defensive positions.
- 20:27It's going to make good optics. One of them, by the way,
- 20:30isn't that far from Demona, you're nuclear you know, research center. So
- 20:37there was all kind of a guided message in this too, right, very
- 20:41deliberate selection of targets. Same thing with the Golan disputed area, but sparsely
- 20:47populated, already evacuated by the Israelis, as the Iranians knew, nail on
- 20:52the head, you know. And this is and this speaks exactly to what
- 20:55kinetic diplomacy is it's the idea that you're going to take military you want to
- 21:00demonstrate your strength. Basically, most of all, you want to save face.
- 21:04That is the baseline requirement for kinetic diplomacy is to save face, especially
- 21:10with your domestic audience. But sometimes you know you're escalating a bit beyond that.
- 21:14You want to make a statement, but you have to make sure that
- 21:18that statement that you make doesn't come at such a high cost that domestically,
- 21:22but a big part of kinetic diplomacy is recognizing that your adversary has domestic political
- 21:30needs. Right, So, if En had launched a strike that made a
- 21:36significant impact on Israeli civilian infrastructure, or there was a massive loss of life,
- 21:41either civilian or military, or if Bran had managed to compromise, you
- 21:45know, a great deal of Israeli combat capacity in the region, there would
- 21:51be a political outcry and a leadership outcry from within Israel to retaliate with a
- 21:56larger offensive strike. So exactly as you're saying, these targets were chosen very
- 22:03specifically meant to send a message, but while still creating that off ramp,
- 22:07while still creating opportunity for this not to continue to escalate, toward open war,
- 22:11while Iran still gets to try to send the message to the international audience
- 22:15they want to send, while Iran creates opportunity for Israel to manage the expectations
- 22:22of the Israeli audience without escalating to open war. You know, it's a
- 22:26it's a multiple, and arguably it was a win win. You know,
- 22:30Iran looked good to global and domestic audience. At the same time, the
- 22:37attack strengthened Israel's hand diplomatically. You know, it was an expensive tack,
- 22:48but but there were deliberate decisions made according to the rules not to escalate to
- 22:53the war. And I think, you know, I hate to sound like
- 22:56in that I am one. You know, you think back to the book
- 22:59that was required reading for us as officers in the Marines, Guns of August,
- 23:04right, you know, the how how the beginning of the First World
- 23:07War, Well, how the First World War started, and there was a
- 23:11six week period. Whether it didn't matter what the leaders said or or did.
- 23:15The mechanisms of war were rolling, right, you know, they the
- 23:21mobilization process was such, you know, with trains telegrams that once you started
- 23:26it on both sides, it was hard to stop. And you know,
- 23:30there's a there's a supposedly the Kaiser said to Mulky at some point, hey,
- 23:37listen, we you know, we need to de escalate, and and
- 23:41Malki said, hey, sir, it's already too late. Yeah, we're
- 23:45going to war, you know. And this was weeks before it actually started.
- 23:48But now you have these these rules and these off ramps that that we
- 23:56should all be grateful for. Right they take the place of the constraints of
- 23:59the Cold War and view through a political lens. As you pointed out,
- 24:03from Iran's perspective, we talked about Iranians, Israel's hand being strengthened diplomatically,
- 24:10and eyes being averted from the debacle in Gaza. All right, did I
- 24:15say about what's happening in Gaza? But from Mauranian perspective, you know it
- 24:22it showed off new technology, penetrated Israeli ed offense, hit key targets,
- 24:26no civilians. It was a great demonstration to the world. It showed and
- 24:30worth all the resources. You know. No, and you raise another great
- 24:37point. There is the idea here that this this idea of kinetic diplomacy,
- 24:41the idea that you can use military actions this way as a fairly recent development,
- 24:47in large part because of the ways that we can communicate with one another
- 24:49now and how we can sort of stave off those mechanisms of war to the
- 24:56last possible minute with the way societ is sort of built now, though I
- 25:00do have concerns about the way that we as a media tend to cover these
- 25:07events almost like wishful thinking, like this World War three, It's finally here,
- 25:11you know, and we create narrative opportunity for things to escalate through our
- 25:18discourse. But that's where as you know, we all we all get our
- 25:22news according to our inclinations and personalities, so the you know, the crisis
- 25:29ISS will always look for those sites that say we're at World War three.
- 25:33You know what I liked about this was all the good was the moderate stuff,
- 25:37you know, the explanations on social media and in the media. But
- 25:41maybe that's because I need to just be focusing less on the negative. And
- 25:45if I look for the people doing a good job, I'll probably speaking,
- 25:52you know. So now we're going to transition to discussion of the Uranian counter
- 25:57attech. By the way, you know, I've talked. Oh, I
- 26:02can't believe I messed this up. So I caused a furor about a month
- 26:07ago when I talked about Baruck Goldstein, who opened far in the Cave of
- 26:11the Patriarchs in nineteen ninety three, I think, killing twenty nine Palestinians,
- 26:18wounding worshipers, wounding another hundred before he was beaten to death. All right,
- 26:23got all the facts out there, Okay, Anyway, why is he
- 26:27coming up in this discussion? Because again, Ben Gavier, who is I've
- 26:33got to get this right. Jov Gallan is the Defense minister. Ben Gavert
- 26:37as the National Security Minister, Minister of security. He had a picture of
- 26:45Baruke Goldstein on his wall. Ben Gavier is the guy who, right after
- 26:51the attack said hey, is that all you got? You know? And
- 26:56and the Iranians picked that up as an example of arrogance and even even reportedly
- 27:04Netanyahu slapped Benavia's wrist for that, you know. But but it was like,
- 27:14dude, you don't you don't understand the rules of the game. But
- 27:15it was like within this cabinet, there was one guy, let's go,
- 27:18let's go, you know, it's like stut up. And then and then
- 27:23Ben Gavier, he's had seventy eight traffic sacked citations the last seventy twenty three
- 27:30years, including a number of accidents. Then he ramped an Israeli civilian's car
- 27:36in his armored cart, put a put people in hospital, to include his
- 27:42own daughter. I didn't know us. Yeah, he r yeah, he
- 27:48was, he was ran apparently ran a red light. And he does this
- 27:52not you know, seventy eight citations. He's the Lauren to himself. But
- 27:59that took him out of the pure fortunately. You know, it was almost
- 28:02as though Massad had stuck something, had stuck something. Well, I'm not
- 28:07suggesting that for a moment. Well, he also, like he also tweeted
- 28:11after the Israeli counter strike on Isafan that it was a weak counter strike.
- 28:17Yeah, that's right. Yeah, cut these out from under this kinetic diplomacy
- 28:22time. There's always a free radical. Yeah, absolutely. Can we get
- 28:26into that Israeli counter strike just because it kind of was surprising, you know,
- 28:33it seemed like Israel completely defeated everyone's, at least Iran's air defenses and
- 28:41stuff like that. It does seem as though they were very effective. Now,
- 28:45I've read a couple of different competing claims about exactly what munitions were used
- 28:49and which platforms launched them. But you could argue that Israel's response was much
- 28:56more kinetic diplomacy than it was military action, in that there was a lot
- 29:02of concern about how Israel was going to respond when I posted my video about
- 29:07the Iranian attack, saying this was never going to cause World War III,
- 29:10because that wasn't the outcome either side we're pursuing. You know, the response
- 29:15in the comments was repeatedly, yeah, but Israel's going to escalate, and
- 29:19that's what's going to create the opportunity for a runaway escalation. And you know,
- 29:25and my response at the time was, well, this is what we
- 29:26need to be looking for. We need to be looking to see how Israel
- 29:30response and whether or not it's a measured response or an escalatory one. And
- 29:34there was obviously a great deal of political pressure on Israel to minimize this retaliatory
- 29:41strike. But it's also important for us to acknowledge that that political pressure also
- 29:47creates the need within Israel to respond, because the last thing they want to
- 29:52do is be seen as though they are just doing whatever they're told by the
- 29:56United States or by the current administration. You know, this is a running
- 30:00narrative. You see from bad actors all the time that the US is either
- 30:03a slave state to Israel or vice versa. You want to make sure that
- 30:07you don't, you know, enable those narratives. So Israel had to respond.
- 30:12The United States was clear that if it was an escalatory response, you
- 30:17know, you couldn't count on American support in an offensive, though likely you
- 30:21could in the defensive measures that would follow. And I think Israel, really,
- 30:26I think it was a pretty crafty response because it created tons of opportunity
- 30:32for narrative play within Israel and Iran and in the geopolitical environment. And that
- 30:38being that within Israel, you can say that these weapons which were launched from
- 30:41aircraft a few hundred miles out without penetrating Iranian airspace, the weapons made it
- 30:47through by and large through Iranian defenses, found targets that were not necessarily a
- 30:53huge strategic impact on around Because again this is important, we need to make
- 30:57sure that we don't compromise Iran's military capabilities in theater, or they'll have to
- 31:03respond. You want to send a message that isn't one that's too much of
- 31:07a stomach butt, you know, too much of a shot to the gut.
- 31:10So Israel demonstrated its ability to fly right through Iranian air defenses, which
- 31:15within Israel is a powerful domestic message and in the UNI, can I stup
- 31:19you that for a moment? Yeah, I mean yeah, But arguably that
- 31:25was not too big an obstacle since they have F thirty five some and glide
- 31:29bombs, right, And I'm wondering if that was a discussion beforehand with the
- 31:33US, you know, I definitely think so. I think that I think
- 31:38that what we saw was a carefully concocted plan, and the plan was,
- 31:45again, it was emphasizing that kinetic diplomacy side rather than offensive operations. You
- 31:52know, you raise a great point, Andy that I don't think everybody necessarily
- 31:55will appreciate, and that's that for all of the money that Iran does invest
- 31:59into defense and does not have anything that can really stand up to the F
- 32:04thirty five, the broad capability suite that it's got. I'm not even just
- 32:07talking about F thirty five's delivering ordinance, just an electronic warfare capacity alone.
- 32:13F thirty fives can enable a lot of other types of offensive operations. But
- 32:20so, you know, I like it a lot of this to being in
- 32:22a bar, you know, I'm a big rugby guy. There's always a
- 32:24big drink up after the rugby game, and depending on who you're playing with,
- 32:30there may or may not be a fight in that bar, right,
- 32:32And when you're walking around in that bar, and there's the short guy who
- 32:36picks a fight with everyone this right when he when he shoves you, Yes,
- 32:45you could take him outside and beat the crap out of this guy,
- 32:47but you have nothing to gain from that, right. But you also don't
- 32:52want to shrink away from that, you know, that conflict. You don't
- 32:54want to look as though you're soft and then let the next guy come and
- 32:59shove you too. So you need to make a bit of a show of
- 33:01puffing out your chest. You need to demonstrate your resolute strength and defense in
- 33:07a way that gets him to back down, but still gives him the opportunity
- 33:12to not be embarrassed, because if he's embarrassed, you're gonna fight, you
- 33:15know. And that's and that's what we saw here. We saw, you
- 33:17know, Iran was that short guy who came up and puffed his chest out
- 33:21and shoved Israel, and Israel could have taken ran out back and beaten a
- 33:27living crap out of him. But doing that would have created nothing but more
- 33:30problems. So instead we saw a puffed out chest response. Even even the
- 33:37counter attack was controversial, you know, the famously Biden said, look,
- 33:40take the win. But but nehahu As, as you pointed out, his
- 33:46political survival depends on support from the extreme right, and that is why you
- 33:51have nutters like Ben Givia in his cabinet. Aaron Nose, he's a nutter.
- 33:55Unfortunately, he's involved for internal external security, which is a fairly big
- 34:00portfolio to put in the hands of another. But Ben Givier is useful for
- 34:07us to kind of explain the mentality of the people that Netmia who has to
- 34:14please. You know, we talk about we talk about this is going to
- 34:17be controversial, We talk about Islam, Islamic fundamentalists. We need to talk
- 34:22to about Christian and Jewish fundamentalist extremists because they exist right radical not my take,
- 34:34but people with radicalized beliefs have more in common with one another than they
- 34:37do that they understand each other. That's you know, that's the weird thing
- 34:44about this Ben Givier. You know, his background is he's from Iraq.
- 34:50That has what I'm saying is he he does understand this mentality and has brought
- 34:55into it, and it's a very Middle East and approach, not as we
- 35:00in the United States would want, you know, the views of the Western
- 35:05liberal democracy, and we like to think that when we give F thirty fives
- 35:08and bombs like that, they're going to be used in accordance with those sort
- 35:15of values and views. Well, this raises a question that I was asked
- 35:19last week whether or not when the United States sells up thirty fives to partner
- 35:23nations, if the F thirty fives have like a secret code that the US
- 35:28can type in it to activate the work, you know, like what do
- 35:32you use is on this car with the breath? Was Isa? Yeah,
- 35:36yeah, are you you know, you put in your country code and you
- 35:38get certain capabilities, you know, and so as far as and you know,
- 35:44I've spoken to a few F thirty five pilots about this, that isn't
- 35:46true though. There are very clear ways to sort of turn off a nation's
- 35:51ability to operate the F thirty fives in the long term, you know,
- 35:53basically withhold sustainment. But the problem with doing that, you know, Israel.
- 36:00That's a good example of this is that if the United States really didn't
- 36:02want Israel to use its up thirty five's the implications of sort of preventing them
- 36:08from using them extend way further than US relations. We're talking about a trillion
- 36:14dollar program, right, you were going to customers talking about FMA. I
- 36:19mean, we're talking about the whole ethos behind fmf FMS. It's yeah,
- 36:25there is some very deep seated policy. It's it's a complicated, messy situation
- 36:31to consider, you know. But but his how, you know, this
- 36:38his how I would think that the Israelis are looking at this and how they're
- 36:45selling it, how Netnyahu can sell it, certainly to his right wing,
- 36:49the right wing, more right wing components of his cabinet. Those targets in
- 36:54Iran again weren't selected at random, you know, the tance right, I
- 37:01mean the Natanz province, which is also home of course too. You know,
- 37:07you think the Iranian weaponization nuclear I've got the cap say that uranium enrichment,
- 37:19possible weaponization. Yeah, yeah, it's where the centrifugias are and all
- 37:22that. It's the so yeah, they didn't they didn't plank near where the
- 37:32you know, the actual site is, but they did reportedly hit an Adya
- 37:38system on an air base, which is yeah, and I'm i'm this is
- 37:43coming from the Israelis and it's not you know, it's not official sign.
- 37:46But reportedly they took out it was an S three hundred system, which was
- 37:52subsequently removed by the Iranians, which would explain why it's a little damage was
- 37:55shown, but it but again a message, Hey, what was that air
- 38:00system doing there in you know, obviously it was part of the coverage for
- 38:05IADS to protect the nuclear sign and the point was we could take any one
- 38:09of these systems. Now, we can take them all out at any time.
- 38:13A one hundred is a higher end system too. I mean, it's
- 38:15obviously not the highest end Russian air defense system, but it is a higher
- 38:20end expensive platform. So that sends again. I think people, you know,
- 38:25obviously not you, but I think a lot of folks don't appreciate how
- 38:30complex air defense is and what a difficult undertaking it is, and how expensive
- 38:37these platforms that we use for air defense really can be. And the S
- 38:40three hundred is a great and you know, the S three hundred in many
- 38:43ways is sort of the Russian equivalent to Patriot. Though the S four hundred
- 38:46uses the same nebo m you know, radar array, but it has better
- 38:51anti ballistic capabilities. But these are you know, Russia's top tier air defense
- 38:55systems. The S three hundred and S four hundred have something like a seven
- 39:00percent component overlap. So Iran demonstrating that they could walk right through the S
- 39:05three hundred without any trouble is a big message. It's a big message to
- 39:10Iran and to the international comput and to Russia. Yes, who is you
- 39:15know, undoubtedly pondering. I mean, Russia's already agreed to upgrade a number
- 39:21of the Iranian systems that it can and most US systems remember where originally US.
- 39:29So Russia can't do that, but it can really help Iran with its
- 39:35anti air defense system and that is one of Israel's biggest fears. Yeah,
- 39:43and because again I think that we do have a bad habit in the West.
- 39:46We tend to either think of Russian air defense systems as impenetrable or junk,
- 39:52and they are neither. Nowhere defense system is impenetrable, and Russian air
- 39:58defense capabilities are a pretty capable. I would argue that Patriot is more capable
- 40:04at this point, but only in the right circumstances. The fact of the
- 40:07matter is the S three hundred and the S four hundred are top tier air
- 40:12defense systems. They're not nothing's gonna stop everything, but they don't have the
- 40:16counter stealth capabilities that Russian guys online might like to claim it. But they
- 40:21certainly are capable. And look look what they've done for Ukraine. I mean
- 40:24three hundred. I mean originally the first seven eight months of the Wall,
- 40:30it was all S three hundreds, absolutely, you know, And I think
- 40:34that this speaks to a problem that Russia is having where because Russia has focused
- 40:38so much on foreign weapons sales and up talking all of their military capabilities.
- 40:45The SU fifty seven is a pretty easy example of this. The SU fifty
- 40:49seven is hands down the least capable fifth generation fighter on the planet. However,
- 40:54had Russia brought this platform to market as the most capable fourth generation fighter,
- 41:00it would be seen as a very competent platform. But because Russia is
- 41:05always sort of trying to OutKick their coverage in terms of claims, and they're
- 41:07dishonest about their testing regime and the capabilities that these platforms have, we tend
- 41:14to overcompensate in one direction or the other, and you're one hundred percent right.
- 41:17Russian air defense capabilities may not be these impenetrable bubbles that they're presented as
- 41:22online sometimes. But the last thing that Israel wants is for Iran's integrated air
- 41:28defense capabilities to continue to improve. And the more improved they are, the
- 41:34higher end Israel's attacks would have to be or responses would have to be.
- 41:37And the higher end something is the more an implicit risk. You know,
- 41:42if you if is Reel lost in F thirty five over Iran and this response,
- 41:47that would have been a much bigger deal than is Reel launching submissiles that's
- 41:52where were Yeah, that would have been huge. You know, you have
- 41:55me thinking, you know, so unfortunately we've only got this one episode,
- 42:04so we have to bring you back. But you know, the the nuclear
- 42:07threat from Iran and and I'm not a nuclear expert, so this is all
- 42:15from research and reading talking to people. The worst case scenario is that Iran,
- 42:22and there are indicators suges Iran might be in this position, can break
- 42:27out within six months and producing you know, adequate amount of enriched uranium,
- 42:32Well, six months doesn't mean they can launch a missal. They still have
- 42:36to weaponize it, but it nevertheless having weapons grade uranium sufficient quantity for four
- 42:43or five weapons within six months, which is so it's frightening prospect. It's
- 42:47terrifying for Israel that regards as an existential threat, and it heightens tensions within
- 42:54the Israeli national security community between two schools of thought on how to deal with
- 43:00this. I see two schools because there is no longer a diplomatic school of
- 43:04thought. So the two schools have thought are, hey, let's do more
- 43:07of the same, just continuously disrupting their efforts. You'll notice that, you
- 43:14know, Iranian nuclear scientists tend to have a very short lifespan. That's,
- 43:20you know, no surprise. There are Mossad operation involving again indigenous you know,
- 43:27Iranian Jews, who can blend in very very except for one attack that
- 43:35was an automated gun. The other attacks were very not low tech which you
- 43:39know, but very skillfully carried out, you know, signs of a sophisticated
- 43:45intelligence organization. The Massat has learned a lot from their mistakes. They've had
- 43:50some horrendous mistakes and at least to include that one recently in UAE where they
- 43:54had a bunch of agents rolled up with foreign passports and yeah, anyway,
- 44:00so they don't always do things smoothly, but in Iran it's been particularly useful.
- 44:06So anyway, back to non tech, low tech, they just I'm
- 44:08just recounting this because I think it's interesting story, Like sticky bombs that they
- 44:14attached to cars from motorcycles and heavy traffic, you know, I mean perfect
- 44:19almost the perfect way in a in a congested place like Tehran to take someone
- 44:24out and then disappear absolutely okay, and then stuck's net. You know.
- 44:29The cyber efforts there are the Israeli Special Forces Unit mclan. Mclan specifically is
- 44:40focused on Iranian mission, inserting guys there and taking things out with you know,
- 44:46with with long range precisions, I mean, with precisions strike weapons from
- 44:51inside Iran. So there's all this kind of gray zone stuff. And then
- 44:57there is the lobby that's no, we need to we need to fucking do
- 45:00what we did to the Syrians in whenever it was two thousand and people iraqis
- 45:07in nineteen eighty one, and that is destroyed that react to Yeah, the
- 45:12only way they can do that. I think that's weapons. We see a
- 45:15lot of this mentality is not all that dissimilar. Obviously the politics, the
- 45:21overarching politics are, but the mentality within military planners and leaders seems to be
- 45:27not too dissimilar from the United States and the Cold War in the sixties,
- 45:30especially the fifties and sixties, where we saw World War three as an inevitability
- 45:36so rather than later in the Cold War, and today where American foreign policy
- 45:40is predicated largely on deterrence, which is sort of that one mentality you speak
- 45:46to, this idea that we'll keep doing what we're doing, we will deter
- 45:50this conflict, which some people, especially hardliners, tend to see as kicking
- 45:54the can down the road. They go, all you're doing is making this
- 45:58a problem we have to deal with than five years or ten years, or
- 46:00that my kids have to deal with. But you know, the bright side
- 46:06to that kicking the can down the road deterrent model is that you can outlast
- 46:09your adversary. The United States did this, you know, with the Soviet
- 46:13Union. I honestly think that in a lot of ways, that is China's
- 46:16current plan towards the United States is they don't they're not being Yeah, they're
- 46:22not escalating toward open war. They're playing the long game where they are betting
- 46:25on themselves to outlast American efforts to sort of be their political and cultural counterweight,
- 46:31you know. And so the deterrent strategy is a long game with no
- 46:37necessarily positive outcome, which is I would argue that that long game is easier
- 46:45for autocrats who aren't going to change power. All of the power of their
- 46:49state is isolated within them, so they don't need to worry about political support.
- 46:52But within a democracy, that deterrent game is not as popular because you
- 46:59may have, you know, in an office in a few years with a
- 47:01completely different strategy. That is a really good point. I hadn't thought about
- 47:06that. So the head of Mossad was removed by Netanyahoo, I want to
- 47:10say back in it's about six years ago, right, and reportedly, of
- 47:17course not in the paper, but reportedly it was over this difference of opinion.
- 47:22And it plays exactly what what you'll see. You've got a long standing
- 47:27head of Mossad who's been there through couple of administrations at least, and then
- 47:30you've got a political leader who's also long standing, but he wants to get
- 47:35a quick, big bang you know, hey, especially if he is just
- 47:39being humiliated in one of the biggest ah well in the in the most humiliating
- 47:45and uh egregious, highest casualty attack in Israel and its history. You go
- 47:57to much for that. And I think that this, especially when it comes
- 48:00to figures like Netan Yahuu, there's that other element we need to con You
- 48:04always need to consider the leader saving face as a part of that domestic communication
- 48:08piece of the puzzle, you know, around being a good example. They
- 48:13obviously need to have a message to their domestic audience, especially their hardline or
- 48:17audience. But when we talk about that, sometimes we lose sight of what
- 48:21you're talking about right now, is that it's not just about the government saving
- 48:24face. It is often about this specific figurehead. You know. We do
- 48:30talk about this in regard to Russia, where we go any opportunity to end
- 48:35the conflict with Ukraine has to end with something Kutin can color as a victory,
- 48:40you know, otherwise this will be the Cuban missile crisis of his administration.
- 48:44After this, he will be, you know, a figurehead until he's
- 48:46gone, but his perceived strength and capability will be gone, you know,
- 48:52And that's something you have to worry about in autocratic states, but very much
- 48:55in democracies where we're always campaigning for our next election, you know, and
- 49:01because of that, you know, it's sort of like the corporate model of
- 49:04you need quarter over quarter wins in order to be popular enough to win the
- 49:09next election. Whereas you're dealing with you know, bad actor states that don't
- 49:15have any of those concerns. You know, they're just playing that long.
- 49:19But you know, nevertheless, it's so a positive I know, I mean,
- 49:23I'm not by no means going to provide any defense of the Iranian regime,
- 49:30but I'm saying, at least at least there's a rational calculus, right,
- 49:35you know, yeah, based on self interest, of course, but
- 49:39it's irrational calculus. It's not which is what we're concerned about, for instance
- 49:44with Putin. Yes, but anyway, no, I'm not downplaying the Iranian
- 49:50threat for Iranian regime by any means, because I would say, not chicken
- 49:54little, I am glasshowful, But I think we need to look be a
- 49:59little bit concerned about such a well telegraphed event, not deliberately, not synchronized,
- 50:06deliberately, not intended to go off the population centers, deliberately not combined
- 50:12with local proxy attack. And yet, and yet a number of missiles got
- 50:17through way more, way more than the one percent that was advertised, and
- 50:22the US only destroyed ady the drones. You know, we if they if
- 50:29there was indeed, as it looks like, up to a fifty percent failure
- 50:32rate, then then you know, luck was a big fire in this too.
- 50:37Yes, now the Uranians knew that they probably had that that was going
- 50:43to happen, as you said, So maybe that's not quite the case,
- 50:46but the point is still that even when everyone's making every effort not to escalate,
- 50:52not to hurt people, missiles get through. And and so you multiply
- 50:59that by tens of thousands or whatever, I mean, all thousands, which
- 51:04is not an exaggeration. When you throw in his balla rockets, everything projectiles
- 51:09and you have an overwhelmed iron dome system, then the results, you know,
- 51:16it's a harbinger. And I think anyone who laughs at it is missing
- 51:22some of the serious undertones here. I agree, And to be honest,
- 51:25I even think because so I've written in the past about our misconceptions about the
- 51:30air defense enterprise and how especially those of us who live in a very safe
- 51:36environment and we've never you know, those of us who have never been in,
- 51:39you know, a forward environment where you may have threats coming in from
- 51:43above. You we don't recognize how much of a sure thing air defense is
- 51:50not, you know, amen to that we tend to talk about. You
- 51:54know, So if a kinsel gets through anywhere and you trane, we go
- 52:00patriot failed. You know, that's not how air defense works. If anything,
- 52:05every successful intercept, in my opinion, is something that you pump your
- 52:07fist for, and the intercepts that don't happen, the weapons that get through
- 52:14are the ones that I expect and anticipate, because air defense as a whole
- 52:17is you know, you're not just trying to hit a bullet with a bullet.
- 52:21You're trying to hit a maneuvering bullet with a maneuvering bullet. Will both
- 52:24of the bullets fly faster than bullets, you know, and in these circumstances,
- 52:30especially if Iran had coordinated this strike, where you have threats coming in
- 52:34from above and from breaching the horizon with the cruise missiles and from drones,
- 52:39which create a great deal of clutter for these radar arrays to try to distribute
- 52:45through. The way air defense works is pretty simply. You blip you know,
- 52:49that item as that's coming towards you here, and then you blip it
- 52:52again a little further and you calculate its trajectory, You determine what its forward
- 52:55trajectory will be from there, and you launch an interceptor to or along that
- 53:00course. So let's say you can do that to thirty targets simultaneously, and
- 53:05there are one hundred targets coming through. The concern isn't just whether or not
- 53:09you're going to be able to take out thirty percent of the targets coming through.
- 53:14You run into confusion and problems with that where you might use multiple interceptors
- 53:20on the same target, you might end up hitting nothing. You know,
- 53:22this is an old rugby and football axiom for me, But if you try
- 53:27to hit two guys, you'll miss both. You know, you create the
- 53:30confusion on the battlefield that allows for a much more successful attack. And to
- 53:36your point, which I hadn't thought of before, the fact that Iran didn't
- 53:39coordinate the timing of these strikes almost looks like they were trying to create the
- 53:45opportunity for a high intercept rate and even to lull you into a bit of
- 53:50a full sense of security, you know. Yeah. And my point is
- 53:53even then, the rate was not high enough. Yes, exactly, my
- 53:58point. It's not high enough because if those missiles that got through had been
- 54:04aimed at Tel Aviv, yes, we it would have been a different story.
- 54:07We know why they weren't. Blah blah blah, but one day they
- 54:10might, right. And you know what, when people ask why South Korea
- 54:15or the United States don't take more of an aggressive stance on North Korea,
- 54:20this is part of the reason is that people don't realize that North Korea's you
- 54:24know, artillery mountain right near the border with soul in range. Maybe a
- 54:30very old school, old fashioned approach to warfare. It doesn't change the amount
- 54:35of damage they could reach, they could reap if given the opportunity and pushed
- 54:39into that position. You don't need an F thirty five basically to you know,
- 54:45lay an immense amount of destruction upon your adversary, especially in close quarters
- 54:51like this. But you know, just speak to that air defense thing.
- 54:53If you were to launch a strike just like a ran launched from that same
- 54:57range against the United States, we wouldn't stop up much of it. Yeah,
- 55:01but you know when I talk about Israel having an advantage of their defense,
- 55:06that it's a small country. That's a serious disadvantage when it comes to
- 55:09air defense being penetrated because your critical infrastructure. And I would put critical infrastructure
- 55:17into three components here, one is and very specific, one is their nuclear
- 55:23researchzation. The other is a massive chemical plant and hypha, and the third
- 55:30is simply The third is simply you name it, highly built up population centers.
- 55:37That is critical infrastructure in Israel because human life, the life of their
- 55:43civilians. You know, of course civilian life is important Western democracy, but
- 55:47in Israel it is you know, it's part of that survival that it's all
- 55:52meshed into their national identity. So you are going after their critical infrastructure sadly
- 56:00by by hitting that. You know these and you just you know, I've
- 56:04commented on the show before, I've been going to Israel since nineteen eighty one
- 56:07and I've watched it grow up up. I mean, you Tel Aviv is
- 56:12skyscraper land now and you've seen a lot of these towns. Beshiva, any
- 56:17Israeli town now is full of these massive tower blocks that were built to accommodate,
- 56:23you know, Russia, the various surges of immigration, and they are
- 56:29incredibly vulnerable. Yes, you know, and again we have to think about
- 56:34what happens when you strike a target like that too, because let's say,
- 56:37and this brings me to the other element of kinetic diplomacy, which is that
- 56:40inherent risk. There's always the risk of escalation when you start sparring with an
- 56:45adversary state. Even if you're trying to launch a limited strike, even if
- 56:50you're making very calculated choices about the targets that you're going to send these things
- 56:54after, there's always the risk that you miscalculated and something's going to go wrong
- 57:00if one of these weapons, if one of these ballistic missiles had struck an
- 57:04apartment building like that, you know, and killed let's say a thousand people,
- 57:08Israel would have to respond with a larger escalation of offensive force within Israel,
- 57:15and Yahu wouldn't be able to survive the political upheaval, especially from the
- 57:20most radical in his cabinet and in his you know, sort of voting populace.
- 57:27If he just let that pass, he you know, his political career
- 57:30would be over, and Israel's defensive posture would be degraded, right, so
- 57:36from his perspective, he would have no choice but to go and take lives,
- 57:40maybe more likely in Iran. And because we didn't see that, we
- 57:45dodged a bullet, you know. But whenever, you know, I want
- 57:50to be clear when I talk about kinetic diplomacy because it sounds almost cheeky,
- 57:53you know, like I'm like, it's just tit for tat political measures.
- 57:57Lives are lost, These are bloody actions. But the idea is to keep
- 58:00them, you know, sort of within that threshold where they could they stay
- 58:06you know, in very in a very real way, they stay gray zone
- 58:08operations, you know, their offensive military operations that are meant to fall short
- 58:13of that threshold for open war. And uh, you know, we're really
- 58:16kind of pushing the balance of what we would consider that. But in a
- 58:20real way, it is that as long as you don't hit one of those
- 58:24skyscrapers, as long as you don't hit one of those apartment buildings, as
- 58:28long as you don't hit a nuclear enrichment facility, as long as you don't
- 58:30hit a target that is so strategically valuable or politically valuable that you force you
- 58:37know, an escalatory dolation. You know. Yeah, I was just saying,
- 58:45and we're fortunate that it didn't go that way. You know. Amen
- 58:47to everything you said about air offense. You know, just hard to understate.
- 58:52It's it's important in one warfare at every level. And like to say,
- 59:00yeah, going, oh, you know, whenever we talk about this
- 59:04air defense challenge, the first thing people say is lasers, and the lasers
- 59:08aren't going to solve the problem for us. Uh. You know, lasers
- 59:13are a very effective means of defending against mortars and rockets, uh, things
- 59:17like that, But lasers aren't going to save us from ballistic missiles or even
- 59:21cruise missiles for a long time. If ever, lasers are not going to
- 59:24save us from hypersonic weapons either. Uh. You know, there is short
- 59:29there is short range at offense nail lasers like a modern sea whizz. And
- 59:34I think what people don't understand. I mean some people have been but for
- 59:37as you pointed out, ballistic missile interception. You know, there's you can't
- 59:43intercept a ballistic missile at any point on its trajectory. It has to be
- 59:45at certain points. You know. Normally I'm going to be criticized for getting
- 59:51this wrong. But you know, normally, like you know, after entering
- 59:55exo atmosphere at the zen if of its a it's trajectory, and then again
- 1:00:00when it's re entering atmosphere, I think, but I will be corrected.
- 1:00:06But anyway, the point is just only a limited number. And you can't
- 1:00:09use a laser. And you do use a laser, he doesn't give you
- 1:00:14any advantage over it. Yeah, yeah, range air defense against multi you
- 1:00:20know, drone swarms, Yes, lasers, but they yeah, they're not
- 1:00:23a And to speak to what you were saying before about those, if it
- 1:00:27were coordinated, if it were coordinated and coming in waves, you run into
- 1:00:31a real problem fast because the the problems you run into with air defense are
- 1:00:37depth of magazine, you know, and the cost exchange ratio becomes a real
- 1:00:40concern along conflict. But depth of magazine is a concern today because if you
- 1:00:45use up all your interceptors, it doesn't matter how good your air defense is.
- 1:00:49Everything's getting through, you know. And so the fact that we didn't
- 1:00:52see multiple waves, the fact that they weren't coordinated at one time, you
- 1:00:57know, these were all opportunities around put in there for that for that off
- 1:01:01ramp. But again, I don't want to. I'm not portraying Iran in
- 1:01:05a positive light here, Like you said, this was self serving. Iran
- 1:01:10does not want to get into an open war. They might lose any more
- 1:01:15than anybody else does. They are bad actors, but they're not stupid.
- 1:01:19They're not the very frighteningly rational at times. So yeah, big proponent of
- 1:01:24everything that we have talked about having been sadly unfortunate coincidence, but maybe not
- 1:01:32in the first Ukrainian city to be hit by Iranian drones when it was hit
- 1:01:37by drones in October of twenty two, and then sadly in Israel the first
- 1:01:42team Israel was hit by Iranian drones. Actually and actually, looking back,
- 1:01:50I was in Isfahan first time it was hit by Iraqis in the War of
- 1:01:52the Cities in ah Gosh, October of eighty seven, No. Six.
- 1:02:00I'm a magnet, Alex say. So what Amy saying is if we ever
- 1:02:05meet in person, I should be concerned in a Yeah, Alex, where
- 1:02:12can everybody finds you? Sandbox News Airpower on Sandbox News is YouTube Channel'm gonna
- 1:02:16put all the links in the description, so check them out there. Anything
- 1:02:20else you can find all my written work on sandboxnews dot com that's Sandbox with
- 1:02:24two x's, and you can find my you know me talking to the camera
- 1:02:29on YouTube at the Sandbox channel and on my TikTok if you're still using that
- 1:02:32app for as long as it exists. I've got a pretty big following on
- 1:02:36there. So I'm sticking around at Alex Sells fifty two and uh Andy,
- 1:02:40of course your book When the Tempest Gathers U Award winning book. Congratulations again,
- 1:02:50it's incredible. It's a really good book. I haven't read it yet.
- 1:02:52I'm gonna have to fix this, oh Alex. Yeah, and then
- 1:02:57do an episode on it. You got it. Love to get that audience,
- 1:03:00yeah, like and subscribe if you're listening to us on audio rate and
- 1:03:06review at five stars. That really helps the channel out as well. Patreon
- 1:03:09dot com slash the Teamhouse YouTube is crushing our soul. Uh So we're trying
- 1:03:15to get support wherever we can and uh yeah, thanks guys. Yeah everyone,
- 1:03:22Alex super having you again, and we're gonna and hopefully you'll come back
- 1:03:25us always. It's always really enjoyable. Yeah, that's part of my day.
- 1:03:30I'd love to come back all right. Everyone, see you in a
- 1:03:35few days.