Latest / ACLED Audio / REPORT: Extraction under fire: How mining reshapes conflict in the central Sahel
Transcript
- 0:06SPEAKER_00: Extraction under fire how mining reshapes conflict in the central Sahel.
- 0:12SPEAKER_00: Key Takeaways Mining adjacent violence in the central Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is concentrated around major mining sites and several broader mining belts.
- 0:27SPEAKER_00: The overwhelming predominance of gold in the region shapes both the geography and the severity of mining adjacent conflict.
- 0:35SPEAKER_00: Violence is largely concentrated within the broader mining ecosystems rather than at the extraction sites themselves.
- 0:43SPEAKER_00: Some mining areas feature complex multi-actor environments, but the predominant conflict dynamic remains competition between militants and pro-government forces.
- 0:55SPEAKER_00: Jamat Nusrat al-Islam al-Muslimin, J.
- 0:59SPEAKER_00: Nim, is the dominant armed actor implicated in mining adjacent conflict.
- 1:05SPEAKER_00: Sustained armed contestation transforms mining areas into persistent conflict environments.
- 1:12SPEAKER_00: Executive Summary.
- 1:15SPEAKER_00: Mining-related conflict in the central Sahel, particularly around gold mining sites, follows identifiable spatial and temporal patterns.
- 1:25SPEAKER_00: Rather than occurring mainly at extraction sites, violence is concentrated in the surrounding areas that support mining activity, including transport routes, nearby settlements, artisanal mining sites, and commercial hubs.
- 1:42SPEAKER_00: Nearly ninety percent of mining adjacent conflict events recorded by ACLED occur outside mining concessions, with most occurring within approximately 10 kilometers of concession boundaries.
- 1:56SPEAKER_00: This finding illustrates that violence linked to mining areas often extends beyond extraction sites themselves, and that conflict environments for mining areas are more than just extraction sites.
- 2:10SPEAKER_00: They increasingly serve as spaces where economic activity, security provision, governance, and armed contestation intersect.
- 2:20SPEAKER_00: As militant groups expand into new territories, violence often spreads beyond the mines, affecting roots, communities, and economic activities linked to extraction.
- 2:32SPEAKER_00: What may begin as attacks on mining personnel, infrastructure, or transport can develop into broader competition over movement, territorial control, local authority, and access to resources.
- 2:46SPEAKER_00: Violent incidents involving militant groups, state forces, self-defense militias, and local communities contribute to multi-directional and escalating patterns of violence.
- 2:58SPEAKER_00: These dynamics are neither random nor purely opportunistic.
- 3:03SPEAKER_00: Militant groups are increasingly exploiting mining economies to finance their activities and to wage economic warfare against the states they are combating.
- 3:14SPEAKER_00: Since 2023, governments have been tightening their oversight and control over mineral resources through mining code reforms and nationalization, while mining companies have been navigating a rapidly evolving multi-risk environment.
- 3:30SPEAKER_00: As these competing interests converge around mining areas, local communities are increasingly becoming the focus of competition between armed groups, governments, and mining companies, who all seek to secure influence, legitimacy, labor, and access among the populations that sustain local mining economies.
- 3:53SPEAKER_00: At the same time, a sustained push by militant groups to surrounding states in coastal West Africa presents similar emerging risks in the near future.
- 4:04SPEAKER_00: Mining and the wider conflict ecosystem are increasingly overlapping.
- 4:09SPEAKER_00: Mining-related violence in the central Sahel has evolved alongside the broader expansion of jihadist militancy over the past decade, driven by the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam al-Muslimin, J Nim, and Islamic State Sahel Province, ISSP, as well as the fragmentation of state authority and the proliferation of state-backed militias, self-defense groups, and mercenary outfits.
- 4:40SPEAKER_00: With ACLED recording incidents linked to mining operations as early as 2015, mining adjacent conflict accounts for about 5% of all recorded political violence events in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger since 2015.
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: During this time period, it has become an increasingly important feature across the region.
- 5:04SPEAKER_00: Geographically, violence has mostly concentrated around mining sites in Burkina Faso.
- 5:11SPEAKER_00: Mining-related violence there accounted for 75% of all recorded incidents from January 2015 to June 2026 in the central Sahel, compared to 15% in Mali and 10% in Niger.
- 5:29SPEAKER_00: Among the violence were several early and high-profile incidents in Burkina Faso, including the kidnapping of a Romanian security guard at the Tombao Manganese mine in April 2015, and sustained attacks on convoys and personnel associated with the Inata Gold Mine from 2017 until 2021.
- 5:52SPEAKER_00: See the timeline in the report for details.
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: These incidents point to the important overlap between extractive activities and evolving militant dynamics.
- 6:04SPEAKER_00: However, since 2024, the distribution of mining adjacent violence has also become increasingly regional.
- 6:13SPEAKER_00: By 2025, Burkina Faso's share had fallen to 54%, while Mali and Niger accounted for 29% and 18% of recorded incidents respectively.
- 6:26SPEAKER_00: This shift does not reflect a decline in mining-related violence in Burkina Faso, but rather points to the growing spread of mining-related conflict across the central Sahel.
- 6:39SPEAKER_00: Over time, violence has also become more widespread, complex, and increasingly lethal.
- 6:46SPEAKER_00: Mining areas have emerged not only as sites of economic activity and violence, but also as spaces where armed groups, state forces, and local actors vie for influence, seek to govern and control populations, regulate access to resources, and impose competing forms of social and political order.
- 7:10SPEAKER_00: While jihadist violence accounts for the largest share of recorded incidents around mining areas, these environments are also affected by other types of violence and disorder, including communal clashes, protests, riots, and mob violence.
- 7:27SPEAKER_00: The gold rush across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger risks creating new sources of financing, recruitment, and territorial influence for armed groups.
- 7:38SPEAKER_00: Mining areas attract armed groups for reasons that go well beyond access to mineral resources as a source of financing.
- 7:47SPEAKER_00: Artisanal mining areas, in particular, concentrate economic activity, mobile populations, transport links, equipment, and commercial supply chains that can support militant operations.
- 8:00SPEAKER_00: Control over mining areas, therefore, provides opportunities not only to generate revenue through taxation or protection payments, but also to recruit fighters, gather intelligence, regulate access to livelihoods, and assert influence.
- 8:17SPEAKER_00: In some areas, JNIM has transformed artisanal mining sites into semi-permanent bases where fighters can alternate between civilian and combatant roles, blend in among miners, store weapons and equipment, and sustain operations with a lower risk of detection.
- 8:35SPEAKER_00: Mining activities can also provide access to materials with operational value, including commercial explosives, detonators, chemicals, fuel, and motorcycle spare parts.
- 8:48SPEAKER_00: Mining areas, therefore, represent multifunctional spaces that can support governance, logistics, and military operations.
- 8:57SPEAKER_00: Mining reshapes conflict, but conflict also reshapes mining.
- 9:02SPEAKER_00: The spatial distribution of conflict events challenges common assumptions about mining-related violence.
- 9:09SPEAKER_00: While attacks on mines often receive the most attention, violence rarely concentrates solely on extraction sites.
- 9:18SPEAKER_00: Instead, it clusters in areas surrounding the sites that sustain mining activity, including transport routes, nearby settlements, artisanal mining sites, and markets linked to mining.
- 9:32SPEAKER_00: At both industrial and other key mining sites, including semi-mechanized and artisanal mining areas, most conflict events occur beyond the immediate vicinity of the mines.
- 9:45SPEAKER_00: See the graph in the report for details.
- 9:48SPEAKER_00: Only 10% of violent incidents associated with industrial mining sites and 21% of incidents associated with key mining sites take place within 3 kilometers of a site.
- 10:03SPEAKER_00: The vast majority take place in surrounding areas, demonstrating that violence linked to mining often extends well beyond extraction sites.
- 10:13SPEAKER_00: Several factors help explain this pattern.
- 10:17SPEAKER_00: Industrial mining operations often cover large concession areas and rely on networks that extend far beyond extraction sites.
- 10:25SPEAKER_00: Core mining facilities, including base camps and processing plants, are often heavily secured and can be difficult to reach, particularly in open terrain.
- 10:36SPEAKER_00: The roads, settlements, fuel supplies, and commercial networks that support extraction are far easier to access and disrupt.
- 10:46SPEAKER_00: Armed groups can monitor movement, target convoys, impose restrictions, and pressure local communities.
- 10:54SPEAKER_00: Violence, therefore, tends to target the mining supply chain rather than extraction sites.
- 11:00SPEAKER_00: Mining sites are linked to supply routes, nearby settlements, and markets that sustain mining operations, but also influence where violence occurs.
- 11:11SPEAKER_00: In turn, armed groups use violence to disrupt transport networks, alter patterns of access and control, and affect the movement of people and goods.
- 11:22SPEAKER_00: Therefore, mining reshapes conflict, and conflict also reshapes mining.
- 11:28SPEAKER_00: The result is a dynamic relationship in which violence extends across the broader mining environment rather than remaining confined to individual extraction sites.
- 11:39SPEAKER_00: This pattern reflects how mining and militancy have evolved together in the central Sahel.
- 11:45SPEAKER_00: As militant groups expand into new areas, they rarely focus on mines alone.
- 11:51SPEAKER_00: Instead, they interact with the miners, traders, transport routes, and surrounding communities that sustain mining activity and depend on it for their livelihoods.
- 12:02SPEAKER_00: Regional hotspots of mining adjacent violence.
- 12:06SPEAKER_00: Mining adjacent violence is concentrated around several regional hotspots in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, although its spatial distribution varies by country.
- 12:18SPEAKER_00: Refer to the table in the report for details.
- 12:22SPEAKER_00: In Burkina Faso, it is more widespread and dispersed across multiple mining sites and transport routes, including Inata and Bungu mines, as well as the N3 Corridor, whereas in Mali and Niger, it clusters along several defined mining belts.
- 12:42SPEAKER_00: Burkina Faso, the Inatta and Bungu gold mines, and the N3 Corridor.
- 12:49SPEAKER_00: The evolution of violence around the Inata and Bungu gold mines illustrates how militants target not only the mining sites but their surroundings.
- 12:59SPEAKER_00: Early incidents around Inata focused on the mine and the routes supporting transport to it, including attacks on convoys, mining infrastructure, and security forces.
- 13:11SPEAKER_00: The October 2018 attack on the Inata Gold Mine and Gendarmerie Post prompted the first French military intervention in Burkina Faso, illustrating the growing importance of mining areas and concerns that militant groups could benefit from access to gold production and related economic activities.
- 13:32SPEAKER_00: Over time, though, Inata became embedded within wider conflict dynamics.
- 13:37SPEAKER_00: By 2021, militants had overrun the Gendarmerie detachment responsible for securing the area, while in subsequent years, ACLED records repeated airstrikes and military operations targeting militant positions around the mine.
- 13:54SPEAKER_00: Violence in Inata evolved from attacks on mining activities into a broader struggle over territory.
- 14:01SPEAKER_00: As of June 2026, however, J Nim exercises de facto control over Inata and its surrounding areas.
- 14:10SPEAKER_00: Bungu illustrates a different trajectory.
- 14:13SPEAKER_00: The November 2019 attack on a military-escorted convoy carrying mine employees exposed weaknesses in the security arrangements for industrial mining operations, particularly in areas under militant influence.
- 14:30SPEAKER_00: The Bungu Mine incident prompted a reassessment of local security measures and helped inform the creation of Burkina Faso's Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, VDP, in January 2020, absorbing existing self-defense structures, including the Kogulweogo and Dozo groups, which for years had provided protection and security services in rural communities and at mining sites.
- 14:58SPEAKER_00: In the years that followed, violence increasingly concentrated along roads leading to the mine and in surrounding communities.
- 15:07SPEAKER_00: Repeated IED attacks, ambushes, attacks on military and volunteer fighter positions, and military operations around Bungu show how mining-related insecurity extended well beyond the mine itself.
- 15:21SPEAKER_00: The Inatta and Bongu gold mines' operational status and significance.
- 15:27SPEAKER_00: The cases of the Inatta and Bogu mines in Burkina Faso show how incidents in areas linked to mining have increasingly shaped military interventions, local security structures, and broader conflict dynamics.
- 15:43SPEAKER_00: Attacks and disruptions along the N3 corridor have affected both the Toparco and Esikane mines, illustrating how violence along key transport routes can disrupt mining activity far beyond individual sites.
- 15:59SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
- 16:02SPEAKER_00: Instead of targeting the mines themselves, J Nim repeatedly focused on the N3 road section between Pisilla, Tuguri, Toparko, and Yalgo.
- 16:13SPEAKER_00: The villages of Nare, Gorbalay, and Owanobian became key choke points where militants destroyed bridges with explosives, planted IEDs, established checkpoints, and attacked civilian transport, military, and logistics convoys.
- 16:32SPEAKER_00: By repeatedly disrupting a small number of key crossing points, Jain was able to constrain movement along the principal supply route serving northern Burkina Faso's mining sector, while simultaneously hampering military mobility and consolidating its influence over the surrounding area.
- 16:52SPEAKER_00: The June 2021 massacre in Solhan demonstrated a different aspect of the same pattern.
- 17:00SPEAKER_00: About 160 people were killed as a result of local conflict surrounding the artisanal mining economy, including efforts by J.
- 17:09SPEAKER_00: Nim to assert control over the area and the presence of volunteer fighters protecting the mining community.
- 17:17SPEAKER_00: Therefore, it illustrates how violence can affect mining communities rather than the extraction sites themselves.
- 17:26SPEAKER_00: Niger, the Samira, Komabangu, Mbanga, and Tamu Mining Belt.
- 17:32SPEAKER_00: In western Niger, violence has increasingly affected a larger mining belt encompassing the Samira, Komabangu, Mbanga, and Tamu sites, illustrating how insecurity has spread across established mining areas.
- 17:48SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
- 17:52SPEAKER_00: Around late 2017 and early 2018, when militants expanded to Western Niger's mining belt, the first recorded IED attack in the Tarodi area took place at the artisanal mining site of Tombola.
- 18:08SPEAKER_00: The attack was significant because its modus operandi pointed to the diffusion of jihadist violence into an area where such tactics had not previously been recorded.
- 18:19SPEAKER_00: Mali, from the extreme north to the Guinea and Ivory Coast borders.
- 18:24SPEAKER_00: Northern Mali provides the clearest example of the evolution of mining-related violence.
- 18:31SPEAKER_00: In the extreme north, the artisanal mining belt comprising sites in Talhandak, Tinzawaten, Iguzar, and Tasiq is located in areas controlled by Jain Nim and the Azawad Liberation Front.
- 18:46SPEAKER_00: While these sites have not been subjected to the same levels of sustained violence observed elsewhere in Mali, they have intermittently been subjected to drone strikes and incursions by the Malian military and Russian partner forces.
- 19:02SPEAKER_00: In the Gurma region, around Intahka, Tinaikaren, and Enabao, competition over mining areas has become intertwined with wider contests over territory, mobility, and local authority involving jihadist groups, rebel factions, pro-government militias, state forces, and Russian partner forces.
- 19:25SPEAKER_00: Further south, J.
- 19:27SPEAKER_00: Nim's expansion into Mali's mining zones along the borders with Guinea and Ivory Coast has brought growing pressure on mining operations and activities that sustain them.
- 19:38SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
- 19:41SPEAKER_00: Fuel and transport blockades and attacks on mining camps, equipment, personnel, and military protection arrangements show how violence increasingly targets not only extraction sites, but also the wider economic activities that support them.
- 19:59SPEAKER_00: These developments suggest that mining has become part of a broader strategy of economic warfare aimed at disrupting transport and trade, paralyzing the economy, and undermining state authority.
- 20:13SPEAKER_00: These examples represent the main clusters of mining-related conflict identified through spatial analysis.
- 20:20SPEAKER_00: Together, they explain how the region's major concentrations of violence emerged and evolved while illustrating different manifestations of the same broader pattern across the central Sahel.
- 20:34SPEAKER_00: What often began as attacks on mining personnel, infrastructure, or transport evolved into broader competition over movement, governance, economic activity, and territorial control.
- 20:48SPEAKER_00: Gold dominates mining adjacent violence, and sustained armed contestation shapes its trajectory.
- 20:55SPEAKER_00: While our spatial analysis shows that violence concentrates around mining areas rather than at the extraction sites themselves, these patterns also evolve over time.
- 21:07SPEAKER_00: With this, the scale and severity of violence are driven by two key factors, the overwhelming predominance of gold extraction in the region, and the sustained armed contestation involving militant groups, state forces, militias, and local communities, resulting in increasingly multidirectional and lethal patterns of violence.
- 21:32SPEAKER_00: Gold dominates mining adjacent conflict.
- 21:35SPEAKER_00: Violent events related to gold dominate the ACLED dataset, see the graph in the report for details.
- 21:43SPEAKER_00: According to ACLED data, gold sites account for 90% of all recorded events and have the highest lethality, averaging about three people killed per event.
- 21:55SPEAKER_00: The predominance of gold also reflects the composition of the mining sector itself.
- 22:01SPEAKER_00: Out of the 44 identified mining sites included in the analysis, Analysis, 39% produce gold, making it by far the most widespread mineral in the central Sahel.
- 22:16SPEAKER_00: The dominance of gold in the conflict data, therefore, reflects both its geographic spread and the concentration of armed actors operating around gold-producing areas.
- 22:29SPEAKER_00: The overlap of industrial, semi-mechanized, and artisanal gold mining produces diverse mining environments with shared networks of transport routes, settlements, traders, and security actors, all of which are exposed to violence.
- 22:46SPEAKER_00: Several key examples illustrate this pattern.
- 22:50SPEAKER_00: Inata, Bungu, and Solhan are all linked to gold mining and together account for some of the deadliest incidents in Burkina Faso.
- 23:00SPEAKER_00: Among other minerals, manganese mining has the second largest number of mining adjacent conflict events, but it still only accounts for 5%.
- 23:10SPEAKER_00: Manganese mining-adjacent violence is driven by a small number of strategically important locations, most notably Tambao in northeastern Burkina Faso and Tassiga in northern Mali.
- 23:25SPEAKER_00: Both sites are in areas that have experienced persistent militant activity and military operations targeting ISSP.
- 23:34SPEAKER_00: The Tassiga site has been managed by various pro-government militias and ISSP, but reportedly came under Wagner Group control in April 2024, according to a Malian security expert who spoke to ACLED.
- 23:51SPEAKER_00: Unlike gold, whose prominence reflects its overwhelming share of identified mining sites in the region, manganese-related violence remains concentrated around very few sites that have gained importance at the local level.
- 24:06SPEAKER_00: This suggests that, while gold dominates mining-related violence in aggregate, other minerals can generate distinct conflict patterns when located in contested territories.
- 24:18SPEAKER_00: JNIM is the dominant armed group operating near mine sites.
- 24:23SPEAKER_00: The armed actor landscape further illustrates the complexity of mining-related violence.
- 24:29SPEAKER_00: The persistent presence of JNIM and its predecessor groups in mining areas from 2015 to June 2026 makes it the most consistently active non-state armed group in the ACLED dataset.
- 24:42SPEAKER_00: During this time, JNIM was involved in 42% of all recorded mining adjacent conflict events.
- 24:50SPEAKER_00: The combined military forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger were involved in a similar share, 42%, while ISSP was involved in 27% of events.
- 25:04SPEAKER_00: These figures show that mining-related violence is primarily shaped by the interactions between jihadist groups and state security forces, see heat map below.
- 25:15SPEAKER_00: Other actors appear more intermittently but remain important, including the VDP and unidentified armed groups.
- 25:23SPEAKER_00: What matters most is not the presence of any single armed group, but the repeated interactions between them.
- 25:31SPEAKER_00: While the predominant conflict dynamics consist of binary contests between militant groups and pro-government forces, some mining areas exhibit more complex multi-actor environments.
- 25:44SPEAKER_00: Around Inata, militant attacks, military operations, and repeated airstrikes have become part of an escalating cycle of violence.
- 25:55SPEAKER_00: In northern Mali, mining areas like Intah have been contested by jihadist groups, rebel factions, pro-government militias, state forces, and Russian partner forces.
- 26:08SPEAKER_00: These actors have competed not only for territory, but also for access to key mining areas, transport routes, and economic activity.
- 26:18SPEAKER_00: Armed confrontations between J Nim, military forces, and the VDP around Bungu have blurred the distinction between civilians and combatants, which has drawn communities into the conflict and exposed them to violence from multiple sides.
- 26:35SPEAKER_00: These interactions have transformed mining areas into spaces of sustained competition, rather than isolated locations affected by violence.
- 26:45SPEAKER_00: Implications of regional shifts and mining adjacent conflict clusters.
- 26:50SPEAKER_00: Mining adjacent conflict has entered a new phase as armed groups adapt their strategies around the mining economy.
- 26:58SPEAKER_00: Governments assert greater control over mineral resources.
- 27:02SPEAKER_00: Mining companies navigate a more challenging operating environment, and competition now extends beyond mining sites to the communities that sustain mining activities.
- 27:13SPEAKER_00: These factors continue to reshape the relationship between mining and conflict with implications that extend beyond the central Sahel to neighboring regions in coastal West Africa.
- 27:25SPEAKER_00: Key factors shaping the future trajectory of mining in the Sahel.
- 27:30SPEAKER_00: Violent Islamist threat.
- 27:33SPEAKER_00: JNIM and ISSP remain the dominant armed groups and represent the main security threats to mining activities, although they interact with the sector in different ways.
- 27:45SPEAKER_00: JNIM operates across several larger mining belts, where it targets mining operations, taxes local mining economies, and uses its influence over mining areas to support territorial expansion and local governance.
- 28:01SPEAKER_00: In western and southern Mali, its expansion into the Kaye and Sicasso regions has increased pressure on industrial and semi-mechanized operations, including through attacks on mining camps and the kidnapping of Chinese miners and other foreign personnel.
- 28:19SPEAKER_00: These attacks also reflect a broader strategy of economic warfare aimed at disrupting economic activity and depriving the state of important revenue.
- 28:30SPEAKER_00: ISSP remains concentrated in the Seno and Udalan provinces of northeastern Burkina Faso, where it exploits mining areas around In Salatene, Falaguntu, Esakane, Guluguntu, and Alcoma through direct resource extraction, taxation, and extortion.
- 28:51SPEAKER_00: The growing use of drones by these militant groups represents an emerging threat to industrial mining operations, especially base camps, processing plants, aircraft, fuel storage, and security positions.
- 29:06SPEAKER_00: States asserting control over mineral resources.
- 29:10SPEAKER_00: Governments in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are deepening state involvement in the mining sector through revised mining legislation, contract reviews, and the nationalization of extractive assets.
- 29:24SPEAKER_00: Burkina Faso's acquisition of Bungu, Taparco, and Vagnion mines illustrates this shift, while Mali's revised mining code reflects a broader effort to strengthen state oversight and increase government revenues from mineral resources.
- 29:41SPEAKER_00: These reforms are unfolding amid persistent insecurity, creating an increasingly complex operating environment in which mining companies face pressure from both armed groups and more assertive governments.
- 29:55SPEAKER_00: Militant expansion beyond the Sahel.
- 29:59SPEAKER_00: Mining adjacent conflict is unlikely to remain confined to the central Sahel.
- 30:05SPEAKER_00: J Nim's expansion toward the borders with Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Ghana raises the risk that patterns already observed in the central Sahel will spread farther south to coastal West Africa.
- 30:19SPEAKER_00: The entrenched presence of Jinim and ISSP in northwestern and north-central Nigeria will likely push these groups to engage with local mining economies, creating new opportunities to exploit, tax, and extort artisanal mining activities in these regions.
- 30:39SPEAKER_00: Implications for assessing mining-related risk.
- 30:43SPEAKER_00: Industrial and semi-mechanized mining operations are likely to remain attractive targets as part of the broader economic warfare tactics employed by militants.
- 30:54SPEAKER_00: Attacks on these operations can disrupt a vital sector of national economies and undermine state authority as well as confidence among foreign investors and mining companies.
- 31:06SPEAKER_00: The spatial findings have direct implications for how mining-related risk is assessed.
- 31:13SPEAKER_00: Because most violence takes place outside extraction sites, assessments limited to concession boundaries will miss much of the surrounding threat environment.
- 31:24SPEAKER_00: Risk assessments, therefore, need to cover the wider geographic areas in which mines operate, including surrounding communities, artisanal sites, access routes, supply chains, and nearby locations exposed to armed violence.
- 31:42SPEAKER_00: These findings further point to the limitations of securing mining sites alone.
- 31:48SPEAKER_00: Strengthened security may make core facilities harder to attack, but it cannot protect the broader geographic areas that support mining activity.
- 31:59SPEAKER_00: Heavier security deployments can also redirect attacks toward workers, less protected infrastructure, convoys, and nearby communities.
- 32:10SPEAKER_00: The growing use of drones adds an additional challenge by allowing armed groups to threaten well-protected facilities from a distance, and may require costly investments in surveillance and counter-drone protection.
- 32:25SPEAKER_00: The main challenge for mining companies is, therefore, not limited to managing security, but to navigating and operating in a rapidly changing environment where armed conflict, state policy, and acceptance among local communities increasingly shape operational risk.
- 32:43SPEAKER_00: These pressures are likely to raise costs due to higher security requirements, convoy protection, insurance, logistical disruption, and investment in counter-drone systems.
- 32:55SPEAKER_00: Companies will depend more on community support through local employment, procurement, and visible investment in surrounding areas.
- 33:04SPEAKER_00: This factor may prove just as important as traditional security measures because communities ultimately influence the extent to which mining operations are tolerated despite their social and environmental impacts.
- 33:18SPEAKER_00: As mining-related conflict extends beyond competition over mineral resources to competition over the communities that sustain local mining economies, armed groups seek to tax, recruit, influence, and govern local populations, while governments and mining companies likewise depend on community cooperation to maintain security, employment, and access.
- 33:44SPEAKER_00: Communities, therefore, will likely remain central to future conflict dynamics as competition revolves around the populations, livelihoods, and local economies that sustain mining activities.
- 33:58SPEAKER_00: Mining areas are now more than just sites of resource extraction.
- 34:03SPEAKER_00: They increasingly serve as indicators of broader conflict dynamics, showing how governments assert control over mineral resources and how localized violence can spread and disrupt vital economic activities.
- 34:18SPEAKER_00: The evolution of mining adjacent violence will, therefore, remain important for assessing the future trajectory of conflict across the central Sahel and coastal West Africa.
- 34:30SPEAKER_00: This report was written by Heni Nsabia, ACLED senior analyst for West Africa, and is part of a collaboration with the International Land Coalition, which examines the intersections between conflict and natural resource exploitation and other forms of land use.