Latest / KAJ Business & Money LIVE / Global Politics for Leaders 59: Iran, Venezuela & Greenland with Irina Tsukerman
Transcript
- 0:19Speaker 1: Welcome to this episode of the World.
- 0:20Speaker 2: According to Irena Sugarman, our very special series on global
- 0:24Speaker 2: politics on the Cage, a masterclass Live. Irena Sugarman is
- 0:29Speaker 2: a US based national security and human rights lawyer as
- 0:33Speaker 2: well as a renowned geopolitical analyst. Her writings and commentary
- 0:37Speaker 2: have appeared in diverse US and international media and have
- 0:41Speaker 2: been translated to over a dozen languages. Every fortnight in
- 0:45Speaker 2: the world, according to Irena Sugarman, we traverse the geopolitical
- 0:49Speaker 2: landscape and telvin to pressing international issues and gain insight
- 0:53Speaker 2: from Irene as expert perspective. Welcome to the show once again, Irena.
- 1:00Speaker 3: Thank you great to be here as usual.
- 1:03Speaker 1: Welcome, Welcome.
- 1:04Speaker 2: This is the first episode of the new year, though
- 1:07Speaker 2: this is our fifty ninth episode together Arena on the world.
- 1:11Speaker 2: According to Irena Sugarman, so let's look at the world
- 1:15Speaker 2: a bit in a fresh manner. Though the start has
- 1:19Speaker 2: been you know, has been very surprising. We had been
- 1:23Speaker 2: anticipating something, but then Venezuela happened and now looks like
- 1:27Speaker 2: almost on the words of Iran, how do you see
- 1:30Speaker 2: this opening to the new year in terms of you know, politics,
- 1:35Speaker 2: a world politics geopolitics.
- 1:39Speaker 3: Well, Iran should come as no suppressed to anyone who's
- 1:42Speaker 3: been watching this runacre probab come. Donald Trump essentially rescued
- 1:50Speaker 3: it from collapse in June when Witkof engaged in negotiations
- 1:56Speaker 3: with Iran, and then Trump actually stopped Israel from finishing
- 2:01Speaker 3: off Harmony and other leaders of the regime. Only six
- 2:08Speaker 3: months later, we're seeing that the situation has once again
- 2:14Speaker 3: come to a head with the economic collapse after closure
- 2:19Speaker 3: over a major bank in the Ran, bringing even former
- 2:23Speaker 3: staunch supporters of the Islamic Revolution the bizarre vendors to
- 2:28Speaker 3: the streets, and the protests spread like wildfire across over
- 2:34Speaker 3: one hundred Tian cities inside the country and eventually even
- 2:38Speaker 3: made their way into the streets of Tehran in mass numbers.
- 2:44Speaker 3: People of all backgrounds, including religious Muslims who have not
- 2:49Speaker 3: been particularly involved in political affairs, have taken to the
- 2:53Speaker 3: streets and calling for the end to the regime. Completely
- 2:58Speaker 3: fed up due to the economic apps, Many have described
- 3:02Speaker 3: the situation as a death spiral for the Iranian regime,
- 3:07Speaker 3: but whatever the case may be, it's not a clean
- 3:09Speaker 3: or dramatic death spiral, but rather a slow and painful
- 3:15Speaker 3: process of the regime institutions slowly collapsing under the weight
- 3:19Speaker 3: of the economic instability. It is definitely in a phase
- 3:26Speaker 3: where its problems are comparling much faster than the authorities
- 3:32Speaker 3: can manage them, and what looks like survival on the
- 3:35Speaker 3: surface is increasingly dependent on repression, fear, and information control
- 3:40Speaker 3: rather than any sense of real governance. The regime finally
- 3:46Speaker 3: transitioned into this information blackout phase when it turned off
- 3:51Speaker 3: the Internet and even started jamming. Starling, for which activists
- 3:56Speaker 3: were dependent for communications with the outside world, end with
- 4:00Speaker 3: each other, and a known number of protesters has been killed. Apparently,
- 4:06Speaker 3: the shootings have been indiscriminate, with the many young people
- 4:10Speaker 3: also been killed or wounded. The numbers of the death
- 4:17Speaker 3: range wildly depending on who you listen to, but at
- 4:21Speaker 3: least two outlets have said that the losses could be
- 4:26Speaker 3: as high as twelve to twenty thousand dollars twenty thousand
- 4:30Speaker 3: people in just two days in just the last couple
- 4:34Speaker 3: of days. Still I resumed. Even in this condition can
- 4:40Speaker 3: endure for years. People are afraid to go out into
- 4:44Speaker 3: the street. After Iran brought in a foreign milicious his
- 4:48Speaker 3: bullary Iraqi militias and others, both in Tehran and also
- 4:52Speaker 3: into peripheral sitkies and essentially inundated the forces on the streets.
- 4:59Speaker 3: The military is also taking part in some of the
- 5:02Speaker 3: institutional support, but it has become very brittle, and the
- 5:07Speaker 3: shocks hit harder and recovery takes longer each time, so
- 5:11Speaker 3: we are really seeing these waves of destabilization. It runs
- 5:15Speaker 3: already been weakened by the military attacks last year. Now
- 5:21Speaker 3: it's barely holding on for your life. When a state
- 5:25Speaker 3: has to repeat aly shut down the internet, deploy this
- 5:29Speaker 3: level of security forces and arrest and kill large numbers
- 5:33Speaker 3: of people just to restore acquire the symbol is clear.
- 5:37Speaker 3: Normal authority has obviously failed, and their ability to functional
- 5:42Speaker 3: relies more unpreventing coordination than on solving problems. Ie Tolajamane
- 5:48Speaker 3: has attempted to steal the situation by offering the seven
- 5:54Speaker 3: extra dollars a month to the population, which seems like
- 5:58Speaker 3: nothing to us, but given the level of inflation in Iran,
- 6:04Speaker 3: it's a significant amount of money. The problem is the
- 6:10Speaker 3: collapse of the bank has essentially multiplied the prices to
- 6:17Speaker 3: such an extent that most people can't afford even basic
- 6:21Speaker 3: food items at this point, it's no longer but ideology
- 6:24Speaker 3: on a sort of democratic response to oppression. This is
- 6:29Speaker 3: about basic survival. They're seeing this pattern with each wave
- 6:37Speaker 3: of this process becoming more and more powerfum It appears
- 6:42Speaker 3: in systems that are completely hollowed out from the inside
- 6:45Speaker 3: and are not prepared for a new sort of reform.
- 6:48Speaker 3: And at this point no one is even calling for reform.
- 6:52Speaker 3: I think even those people who were who who believed
- 6:55Speaker 3: any sort of changes could make things better, now understand
- 6:58Speaker 3: that it's impossible. With each cycle of these protects, the
- 7:03Speaker 3: economy grows weaker, the public becomes angry, the institutions are
- 7:07Speaker 3: even less trusted. Even if the protests shrinked inmporarily as
- 7:11Speaker 3: they appear to be raning at the moment, the resentment
- 7:15Speaker 3: has been accumulating beneath the surface, and over time this
- 7:19Speaker 3: dynamic is eroding loyalty even within the system itself, not
- 7:24Speaker 3: just among civilians. On an institutional level. Even ERGC and
- 7:28Speaker 3: other regime supporters and loyalless are feeling that level of pressure.
- 7:34Speaker 3: And what makes this face especially dangerous is that decline
- 7:39Speaker 3: is uneven. Some parts of the state still work, especially
- 7:43Speaker 3: the security of organs and propaganda systems, while others are
- 7:46Speaker 3: barelah functioning at all. The ministries are struggling with budget gaps,
- 7:51Speaker 3: with delayed salaries, and a level of corruption that has
- 7:56Speaker 3: become normalized. Local officials are more focused than avoiding blame
- 8:00Speaker 3: and getting in trouble than solving problems. And we are
- 8:03Speaker 3: seeing institutional paralysis and ordinary people are experiencing This is
- 8:10Speaker 3: a constant sense of instability. The prices, the sudden pricing,
- 8:16Speaker 3: changing prices was the last too. I think the the
- 8:20Speaker 3: insurance was no longer able to sustain. The situation has
- 8:25Speaker 3: become unbearable, and this is what has led to this
- 8:29Speaker 3: massive protests. And you know what's different from what we've
- 8:34Speaker 3: seen before is the is the that the fact that
- 8:38Speaker 3: even pro using functionaries are now out demonstrating and also
- 8:43Speaker 3: the share scope of these protests across the entire country
- 8:47Speaker 3: has unified. Even groups that are generally opposed to one another.
- 8:52Speaker 3: Still out question against early celebrations of our over transition
- 8:57Speaker 3: to a better system, because as as it is, even
- 9:01Speaker 3: with all these conditions in place, there's no unified leadership.
- 9:05Speaker 3: Despite calls for monarchy in some circles and for democracy
- 9:09Speaker 3: and federalism in others. These protests are also very uneven,
- 9:16Speaker 3: and so far there has not been any sort of
- 9:18Speaker 3: outside support that would have pressured the system from the inside.
- 9:23Speaker 3: We also haven't seen either the military order to see
- 9:27Speaker 3: throwing against the regime, so the advantage of the military
- 9:33Speaker 3: units and the access to advanced weapons is still on
- 9:37Speaker 3: the side of the regime, which is why these protests
- 9:40Speaker 3: in particular are probably not the very end of the
- 9:46Speaker 3: Islamic Republic, but they are likely the beginning of the end.
- 9:49Speaker 3: This level of traumal is unsustainable in the long run,
- 9:53Speaker 3: and they share economic collapse may end up eroding institutions
- 9:58Speaker 3: to the point that that even that most of the population,
- 10:04Speaker 3: which by the way, is not in the private sector
- 10:07Speaker 3: but dependent on the government bureaucracies, even even those people
- 10:11Speaker 3: will not be able to afford basic courts of living,
- 10:14Speaker 3: and they will find it being easier to turn away
- 10:18Speaker 3: from the regime and hope for some sort of other transition.
- 10:22Speaker 3: So what have we seeing externally? The United States has
- 10:26Speaker 3: signaled repeatedly their support for the protesters, and they're willing
- 10:30Speaker 3: to provide willingness to provide assistance. Trump threatened with assorted
- 10:37Speaker 3: unspecified measures to assist the protesters and has made repositioning
- 10:44Speaker 3: of jets and ships towards the Middle East first to
- 10:48Speaker 3: protect US, Basis and Israel from attacks after the regime
- 10:52Speaker 3: with the officials have repeatedly openly threatened to attack them
- 10:57Speaker 3: to militias, but also a general deterrence measure.
- 11:02Speaker 2: UH.
- 11:02Speaker 3: There's been a few hours of tension today when the
- 11:07Speaker 3: when Iran closed the air space and flights were canceled
- 11:11Speaker 3: over Israel and in the visin Gym where with a
- 11:15Speaker 3: lot of rumors about potential strikes Israel too. Despite having
- 11:21Speaker 3: a sort of pre protest arrangement whether run not to
- 11:27Speaker 3: attack each other directly that was secured to Russian mediation,
- 11:32Speaker 3: was prepared for potential that Iran would try to cause
- 11:36Speaker 3: a major diversion by attacking Israel. So far that has
- 11:40Speaker 3: not happened. There's been a lot of noise and explosions
- 11:44Speaker 3: over Iraq. There's been armed Courgish groups from Irun that
- 11:49Speaker 3: have tried to cross into Iraq. Talking another international leader,
- 11:56Speaker 3: voices have tried to convince the US not to attack
- 12:00Speaker 3: you run or to minimize attacks to minor surgical strikes.
- 12:06Speaker 3: Sagariba was one of those countries that was asking US
- 12:10Speaker 3: to limit it's any intervention to surgical strikes and particular
- 12:15Speaker 3: military facilities. But so far nothing has happened at all,
- 12:19Speaker 3: and UH even re opened its airspace just recently. And
- 12:25Speaker 3: so far there is Israel too is holding away and
- 12:30Speaker 3: they basically indicated that until US signals that it is
- 12:34Speaker 3: okay to move militarily, Israel is not going to get
- 12:38Speaker 3: involved directly.
- 12:41Speaker 2: Absolutely absolutely Iren. So where do we stand on this?
- 12:45Speaker 2: Means suddenly US have gotten very interested in in some
- 12:50Speaker 2: sort of rights of protesters and all all that Steff
- 12:55Speaker 2: help is coming your way, and you know about the
- 12:58Speaker 2: hangings and the all those talks were happening. So not
- 13:01Speaker 2: to do all that is love for democracy increasing from
- 13:06Speaker 2: the US side? Or is it something else that is
- 13:11Speaker 2: it politics or is it US policy that.
- 13:14Speaker 1: Is opening up?
- 13:15Speaker 2: How should we understand what's the role of Israel here
- 13:18Speaker 2: on this because time and then looks like the Israeli
- 13:22Speaker 2: is coming into the picture. Iran seems to be accusing
- 13:25Speaker 2: Israel for all these things.
- 13:27Speaker 3: Well, this situation actually started before the breakout of the protests,
- 13:34Speaker 3: with Ntiniaco's visit to the United States has repeated the world,
- 13:39Speaker 3: the US that Iran is rearming rapidly and also restarting
- 13:45Speaker 3: its nuclear program, and that Israel is prepared for preemptive
- 13:51Speaker 3: attacks in the event that Iran's rearmaments restores its military
- 13:57Speaker 3: strength and puts it in a position to cause the
- 14:00Speaker 3: security damage to Israel. And I think this, you know,
- 14:05Speaker 3: these warnings caused Trump to reassess his approach and to
- 14:10Speaker 3: start escalating rhetoric to essentially ensure that Iran start does
- 14:16Speaker 3: not start making aggressive moves in the region, especially against
- 14:21Speaker 3: Israel and US basis. And you know, the protests were
- 14:27Speaker 3: a parallel situation that occurred at the same time as
- 14:32Speaker 3: this security and glow was being managed. It's not that
- 14:36Speaker 3: US has previously completely ignored the protesters. The US has
- 14:41Speaker 3: the Trump administration has made supportive statements in the past,
- 14:45Speaker 3: but now the security and the humanitarian and have converged
- 14:49Speaker 3: and have become part of the same narrative. And also
- 14:54Speaker 3: the sheer numbers of the protests and the scope have
- 14:58Speaker 3: become so significant, especially again with the mind that Trump
- 15:03Speaker 3: essentially prolonged the lifeline for the regime after saving Harmony
- 15:08Speaker 3: and others from Israel strikes, that now you know, with
- 15:13Speaker 3: this boiling pressure coming to a boiling port, part, even
- 15:18Speaker 3: Washington starts to realize that this could be an opportunity
- 15:21Speaker 3: for the US to speed up the end of this
- 15:26Speaker 3: process and to excessis control over the transition before it
- 15:30Speaker 3: becomes chaotic and gets out of hands, uh and turns
- 15:34Speaker 3: and turns into something disastrous. I think I think this
- 15:39Speaker 3: rhetoric is part of this management attempt to escalate through
- 15:44Speaker 3: the torrents rhetoric that would cause the protests to back
- 15:47Speaker 3: off if they feel that the US is backing them
- 15:51Speaker 3: and uh, if the Iranian regime officials feel pressure from
- 15:56Speaker 3: the US not to continue escalating the attacks on the protesters.
- 16:01Speaker 3: But that Trump was ever fully committed to attacking run
- 16:10Speaker 3: only over protesters is very much doubtful. This is not
- 16:15Speaker 3: any reason he's ever done anything politically or not with Venezuela,
- 16:19Speaker 3: not previously with the Run and elsewhere. I think the
- 16:23Speaker 3: reason he's using this rhetoric, first of all, it's getting
- 16:28Speaker 3: him a lot of support domestically, and second, it does
- 16:31Speaker 3: put pressure on the regime to just to show that
- 16:34Speaker 3: US is watching, and that alone could be sufficient to
- 16:39Speaker 3: kind of calm the situation down and allow us to
- 16:42Speaker 3: calibrate and plan and manage it accordingly. I do think
- 16:48Speaker 3: that at some point Trump's patients will run out, because
- 16:52Speaker 3: I don't think the regime has moved away from its
- 16:56Speaker 3: rearmament tactics. But I just think the trap is using
- 17:03Speaker 3: democracy and human rights as a rhetorical device and literally
- 17:07Speaker 3: weaponizing this concept without any necessarily direct intention to put
- 17:12Speaker 3: US forces on the ground in Iran in anything other
- 17:16Speaker 3: than intelligence and logistical capacity. That said, it's it's very
- 17:22Speaker 3: clear that the region has been deeply penetrated by Israelis
- 17:26Speaker 3: who've probably been sharing a lot of that with their
- 17:30Speaker 3: US counterparts, and US and the US government problem has
- 17:34Speaker 3: a pretty good handle on what's going on. Even under
- 17:37Speaker 3: current circumstances with complete darkness and blackouts and so forth,
- 17:42Speaker 3: there are probably human information sources flowing even with all
- 17:47Speaker 3: these complications, And I do think that the US probably
- 17:52Speaker 3: does not believe that this current wave of protest is
- 17:55Speaker 3: the final one. But I do think that they're also
- 17:58Speaker 3: hoping that the Iranians will eventually take it upon themselves
- 18:02Speaker 3: to result their own internal situation, and that political support
- 18:06Speaker 3: from US will prove sufficient to motivate them and to
- 18:11Speaker 3: create this demoralizing pressure on the Iranian officials. Still, we
- 18:20Speaker 3: can never underestimate the element of unpredictability in trum politics.
- 18:28Speaker 3: He could, as a matter of surprise, use symbolics strikes
- 18:32Speaker 3: to send a stronger message to the regime, especially after
- 18:36Speaker 3: the officials threatened to assassinate him once again. And that's
- 18:43Speaker 3: clearly causing the stress world of internal domestic tumal and
- 18:47Speaker 3: into an external security threat. And the fact that all
- 18:52Speaker 3: these sources, all these jets and ships are being taken
- 18:55Speaker 3: out of various other regions and moved to the Middle
- 18:58Speaker 3: East can be at more than just messaging. It's at
- 19:02Speaker 3: the very least about defensive preparation for potential escalations and
- 19:08Speaker 3: possibly readiness to launch an offensive attack should it become necessary.
- 19:14Speaker 2: Absolutely, I was reading at a couple of places and
- 19:18Speaker 2: some thoughts were there, perhaps that you know, the US
- 19:22Speaker 2: is looking at moving away from so much of you know,
- 19:26Speaker 2: their business with a Middle List in that sense, military
- 19:30Speaker 2: sort of engagement in that and for that Iran is
- 19:34Speaker 2: a it could be a problem in terms of a
- 19:37Speaker 2: strong Iran and that is where they would look at,
- 19:40Speaker 2: you know, some sort of a situation where Iran is
- 19:42Speaker 2: much more on their side, much more stabilized, and their
- 19:47Speaker 2: engagement in Middle List is reduced after that. How do
- 19:50Speaker 2: you look at this sort of a speculation, reasoning, or understanding.
- 19:57Speaker 3: I just think that if the YES felt that the
- 20:00Speaker 3: was real serious leadership in Iran that could take over smoother,
- 20:04Speaker 3: they would probably even support a full democratic position. But
- 20:08Speaker 3: I don't think Trump actually feels that way currently, and
- 20:12Speaker 3: he would prefer a weekend uncontrollable Iran, which is why
- 20:16Speaker 3: he is. Either contends to manage the situation and ensure
- 20:20Speaker 3: that Iran stay stays within certain limits, but without you know,
- 20:25Speaker 3: intervening decisively, or he would prefer to cut a deal
- 20:29Speaker 3: with some more pragmatic faction without within the regime that
- 20:34Speaker 3: would reduce its external interference and cooperate with the United States,
- 20:41Speaker 3: even if it meant that internal repressive measures stayed in place.
- 20:46Speaker 3: For now, he has been cautiously exploring leadership leadership options,
- 20:51Speaker 3: but so far nothing has been identified that would probably
- 20:56Speaker 3: fit the criteria for complete US backing and support for
- 21:01Speaker 3: any particular opposition faction. Simultaneously, there's also been an ongoing
- 21:11Speaker 3: political dialogue with the Run through One and other channels.
- 21:15Speaker 3: This Iran had signaled its willingness to negotiate the nuclear
- 21:20Speaker 3: deal and so forth probably believing that it could buy
- 21:24Speaker 3: some time, and also understanding that it's the nuclear program
- 21:29Speaker 3: that remains the top priority for this administration. Regardless, however,
- 21:35Speaker 3: I think Trump is not the only one who would
- 21:38Speaker 3: prefer to see a weekend but stable Iran, even if
- 21:43Speaker 3: it means that democracy and human rights out the windows side.
- 21:48Speaker 3: The Arabbean has repeatedly expressed concern about becoming a front
- 21:54Speaker 3: line in any potential destabilization track, and other growth states
- 22:02Speaker 3: too are also concerned about the impact on the trade,
- 22:06Speaker 3: on their relationships in the region, and on their own stability.
- 22:10Speaker 3: After all, Iranian factions have also penetrated other growth states
- 22:16Speaker 3: in the region. There's lots of unknowns. It's very clear
- 22:19Speaker 3: that the TRAP administration would not be involved in the
- 22:22Speaker 3: Ministries of State building process or regional stabilization processing. For
- 22:27Speaker 3: that reason, many countries would prefer to keep things as
- 22:31Speaker 3: they are as long as they don't get worse, rather
- 22:34Speaker 3: than up for an open ended process with where several
- 22:41Speaker 3: different scenarios could play out in unpreductable ways.
- 22:47Speaker 2: Absolutely absolutely will keep watch on what's happening down there.
- 22:51Speaker 2: Lots of things are happening. Let's move on to Venezuela
- 22:55Speaker 2: and understand truans policy there.
- 22:59Speaker 1: It's was it was it only about Maduro?
- 23:02Speaker 3: You know?
- 23:02Speaker 2: Or what is it was it only also only about
- 23:06Speaker 2: oil or also about oil?
- 23:08Speaker 1: Where do we go from there?
- 23:10Speaker 2: That that place is you know, after they run, that
- 23:13Speaker 2: has gone into the back background. But we want to
- 23:16Speaker 2: understand how did the person understand what's happening there?
- 23:21Speaker 3: Well, we saw there is another case where nobody knew
- 23:25Speaker 3: exactly why Trump was doing it. Trump certainly articulated several
- 23:30Speaker 3: ex justifications, including narco trafficking, oil related, economic and oil
- 23:38Speaker 3: more general and related concerns, sentanel and of course UH
- 23:44Speaker 3: the terrorism and foreign actors violating the Manue doctrine. But
- 23:53Speaker 3: his rhetoric has shifted several times, and it's very and
- 23:57Speaker 3: it's unclear whether any of those UH reasons are really
- 24:02Speaker 3: the reason for why he did what he did. After all,
- 24:06Speaker 3: a very effective US operation ultimately ended up taking just
- 24:11Speaker 3: two people, Madua and his wife, who are being put
- 24:14Speaker 3: on trial. And there's a potential that this legal process
- 24:18Speaker 3: could end in any number of ways, which could include
- 24:21Speaker 3: potential prisoner exchange or diplomatic diplomatic arrangement where by Maduro
- 24:29Speaker 3: is exiled to some friendly third country. Meanwhile, the remnants
- 24:35Speaker 3: of the regime remain in place, and just today Truck
- 24:38Speaker 3: had a phone call with the Vice President, who is
- 24:41Speaker 3: pretty anti American and also blamed designers for this operation somehow.
- 24:48Speaker 3: Even though Venezuela is quite far from Israel and is
- 24:51Speaker 3: far from its top security priority, even if it's considered
- 24:55Speaker 3: a hostile actor that has enabled many of more or
- 25:00Speaker 3: immediately adversarial forces. Still, you know, for is Israel, taking
- 25:05Speaker 3: out Madula would not be anything remotely close to its
- 25:09Speaker 3: number one interest. At the moment, we are seeing that
- 25:14Speaker 3: there are concerns about the election process, about the transition process,
- 25:18Speaker 3: about whether Venezuela will actually end up being turned into
- 25:26Speaker 3: a democracy, and whether the revision will ultimately be taken out.
- 25:30Speaker 3: Secretary of State Ruder claimed the de Vice President, who
- 25:35Speaker 3: has become the interim president is not a legitimate leader
- 25:39Speaker 3: and that election process will be settled at some point.
- 25:43Speaker 3: There is also concern about US commitments until the transition
- 25:47Speaker 3: process is complete. US is committed to controlling the situation
- 25:51Speaker 3: and stabilizing it. What does that mean, will it keep
- 25:55Speaker 3: troops in the ground, and for how long Trump is
- 26:00Speaker 3: actively presuming some sort of a normalization in terms of
- 26:04Speaker 3: industry trends with oil trying che Run is apparently geting
- 26:09Speaker 3: a license for oil extraction, still rebuilding the oil interest
- 26:13Speaker 3: rutal itself is a huge financial commitment and the lengthy
- 26:17Speaker 3: process which can potentially even out as this administration. There
- 26:23Speaker 3: are rumors that the real reasons cover absolutely nothing in
- 26:28Speaker 3: common to do with what Trump announced, that they are
- 26:31Speaker 3: more about his the Trump organization's private arrangements regarding goal
- 26:37Speaker 3: the extraction and other national resources in Venezuela, and also
- 26:41Speaker 3: about gaining you know, some level of support and control
- 26:47Speaker 3: and stability over Venezuela, preventing it from spreading an anti
- 26:55Speaker 3: American activity across Latin America, but also without necessarily causing
- 27:02Speaker 3: massive breakdown, additional refugee crisis and such destabilizing the whole
- 27:07Speaker 3: region through uh, you know, uncontrolled processes. There is a
- 27:14Speaker 3: positive sign the Trump is finally willing to meet with
- 27:17Speaker 3: Mariam my Childo, the Nobel Price Laurent laureate who who
- 27:23Speaker 3: earned acclaim for unifying the previously polarized Venezuelan opposition, and
- 27:30Speaker 3: many view her as a potential and legitimate and very
- 27:35Speaker 3: credible candidate for political office, for political leadership in Venezuela.
- 27:40Speaker 3: Trump had that various points bax in his support for her.
- 27:46Speaker 3: At one point he was reseentful of her winning the
- 27:49Speaker 3: Nobel price he thought would be rightfully his. But he
- 27:52Speaker 3: is willing to meet with her, so perhaps he will
- 27:56Speaker 3: change his position, and perhaps he will become more involved
- 27:59Speaker 3: in their political processes and not just geopolitical level levels
- 28:06Speaker 3: of power in minne Isuela.
- 28:11Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely, we will have to watch out also on that.
- 28:15Speaker 2: It looks like there is much more that we will
- 28:18Speaker 2: hear on that side because the court case. How does
- 28:21Speaker 2: this court case look like for Madro, because again it
- 28:24Speaker 2: will take many years.
- 28:26Speaker 1: We have seen that in the past.
- 28:27Speaker 2: Even in Nadiaga's case also, so I want to understand
- 28:32Speaker 2: from that point on view.
- 28:34Speaker 3: If I am for the audience, I would say this
- 28:38Speaker 3: legal process is as much a political process as it
- 28:41Speaker 3: is a purely legal court case. Because we saw that
- 28:45Speaker 3: on day one of court proceedings, the US dropped its
- 28:49Speaker 3: biggest you know, concern that that is the charges that
- 28:54Speaker 3: Maduro was basically a drug dealer and and admitted it's
- 28:59Speaker 3: had no evidence. So one of the major legal basis
- 29:03Speaker 3: for taking Madua out of the country was essentially dropped
- 29:07Speaker 3: by the US itself, which means that everything else is
- 29:11Speaker 3: basically lesser and negotiable. It's very likely that US will
- 29:16Speaker 3: want some sort of a deal with Madua, perhaps information
- 29:20Speaker 3: on additional assets, perhaps information of abroad cartels, some forms
- 29:27Speaker 3: of cooperation, and perhaps all of this is just to
- 29:31Speaker 3: boost the torrents against foreign actors in the Western Hemisphere,
- 29:36Speaker 3: and it's far less about Madua himself and his faith.
- 29:41Speaker 2: Absolutely, let's move on from this to Greenland. What's happening
- 29:46Speaker 2: with the Greenland issue and what will happen to NATO
- 29:51Speaker 2: if at all things move in a difficult position.
- 29:55Speaker 3: Well, the situation is clearly not being resolved anytime soon.
- 30:00Speaker 3: Today's four talks between Danish Greenland and leaders and Trump failed.
- 30:08Speaker 3: They did not come to any agreement. In fact, the
- 30:14Speaker 3: leader of Greenland, the Prime Minister, said that he was
- 30:18Speaker 3: choosing Denmark over the US, and Donald Trump essentially threatened
- 30:23Speaker 3: him and basically said that he views Greenland siding with
- 30:28Speaker 3: Denmark as Greenland siding with Russia and China. I think
- 30:32Speaker 3: the level of Russian and Chinese intervention with Greenland is
- 30:37Speaker 3: grossly exaggerated for dramatic effect by Trump. What is also
- 30:43Speaker 3: worth underscoring is that US and Denmark have a joint
- 30:47Speaker 3: agreement since nineteen fifty one to provide defense and security
- 30:51Speaker 3: for green Lang, which is why the North Base is
- 30:56Speaker 3: stationed there, and a US at any point can bring
- 30:58Speaker 3: in any number of soldiers, any number of ships to
- 31:02Speaker 3: support nitual and security against the new Russian and Chinese threats,
- 31:06Speaker 3: which is not to say but whether those threats are
- 31:09Speaker 3: not real. But the fact that Putin actually threatened to
- 31:13Speaker 3: take Greenland if he as doesn't shows that this is
- 31:16Speaker 3: much more about politics than any series geopolitical concerns. The
- 31:21Speaker 3: resources that Trump had previously cited as the reason for
- 31:25Speaker 3: his interest in purchasing Greenland are very difficult to abstract.
- 31:29Speaker 3: They will take ten to fifteen years, far beyond this
- 31:33Speaker 3: administration sten here. It's also very obvious that logistically it
- 31:42Speaker 3: doesn't make sense to try to secure Greenland through means
- 31:48Speaker 3: other than during cooperation without the EU members. For the
- 31:53Speaker 3: US to get to Greenland, it would have to send
- 31:56Speaker 3: ships around Canada and quite a journey. Indeed, there are
- 32:02Speaker 3: serious concerns about strategic Arctic passageways. There is an ongoing
- 32:09Speaker 3: battle between Russian Chinese forces on the one side and
- 32:13Speaker 3: western including American icebreakers on the other side, over natural resources,
- 32:21Speaker 3: over strategic routes, and so forth. None of that is
- 32:25Speaker 3: getting results anytime soon, and nothing will change logistically. Even
- 32:29Speaker 3: if you US were to become the owner of Greenland.
- 32:33Speaker 3: None of it would bring any additional logistical benefit in
- 32:36Speaker 3: terms of US influence in that area. Reasonable questions could
- 32:42Speaker 3: be asked about why US is so concerned about a
- 32:46Speaker 3: very small area quite far away when Russia is much
- 32:50Speaker 3: closer to Alaska than it is to Greenland. And then
- 32:52Speaker 3: both Russian and Chinese incursions into US territory, both near
- 32:57Speaker 3: Alaska and in the Pacific near Hawaii, have in the
- 33:00Speaker 3: past cost series concern to the intelligence community, with very
- 33:06Speaker 3: little done by either the Biden or the Trump administrations.
- 33:10Speaker 3: Those are all reasonable questions, I think for Trump, Greenland
- 33:13Speaker 3: has become a status issue, an issue of being seen
- 33:19Speaker 3: as the primary force who can enforce his will in
- 33:24Speaker 3: other states. It's more about competing for influence than it
- 33:28Speaker 3: is about any series security concerns. Europe responded by sending
- 33:34Speaker 3: additional troops from four different countries to Greenland, which makes
- 33:38Speaker 3: it much more difficult for US to try to acquire
- 33:42Speaker 3: Greenland by force. UH, you know it's It's very questionable
- 33:49Speaker 3: the videas would want to engage in a and an
- 33:52Speaker 3: armed confrontation with its allies, especially if it needs them
- 33:55Speaker 3: for other forms of cooperation, and President McCrone as well
- 34:00Speaker 3: as other European leaders have threatened the US with political
- 34:04Speaker 3: and economic consequences in the event session effort is made.
- 34:08Speaker 3: Many people don't believe Trump seriously means an invasion. They
- 34:12Speaker 3: think it's just a rhetoric in part too as a
- 34:18Speaker 3: show of strength, and some I think that he's going
- 34:22Speaker 3: along with Russian propaganda to break up to break up NATO. Indeed,
- 34:30Speaker 3: Russian China benefit the most from this public political dispute
- 34:35Speaker 3: between allies. It may be the Russia has been encouraging
- 34:40Speaker 3: Trump to engage in counterproductive arguments. To that effect, they
- 34:48Speaker 3: are seeing that it's much to do about nothing about
- 34:54Speaker 3: at the end of the day, and yet it's taking
- 34:58Speaker 3: up attention space, it's causing much among different countries, is
- 35:02Speaker 3: forcing Europe to races US role. It cousts Denmark to
- 35:08Speaker 3: demarcate US as a security threat for the first time.
- 35:11Speaker 3: None of it is actually positive for US image of
- 35:14Speaker 3: its interest.
- 35:16Speaker 1: Absolutely, absolutely lots happening.
- 35:19Speaker 2: Don I think more more, a lot of sounds coming
- 35:22Speaker 2: from that part of the world we are yet to see,
- 35:25Speaker 2: you know, understand what is what is the final What
- 35:28Speaker 2: do you think is Trump's motto only rhetoric? If they
- 35:32Speaker 2: wanted to have more engagement in in Greenland, that would
- 35:36Speaker 2: have also been done in a peaceful manner that that
- 35:39Speaker 2: Ald arrangement allows for that.
- 35:42Speaker 3: I think, I think there are many ways of resolving
- 35:45Speaker 3: this issue. Threatening user force is completely unhelpful and it's
- 35:51Speaker 3: only likely to harden the European position against the US.
- 35:54Speaker 3: US is basical positioning itself on the same side with
- 35:58Speaker 3: Russia in China, listening as it claims to want to
- 36:02Speaker 3: counter Russian and Chinese influence and competition for strategic routes.
- 36:08Speaker 3: All of that could be resolved very quietly, very quickly.
- 36:11Speaker 3: It's very clearly just an issue of Trump's ego and
- 36:15Speaker 3: desire to be seen as the strong leader. He believes
- 36:20Speaker 3: that any sort of compromise or break him down at
- 36:23Speaker 3: this point would be seen as a sign of weakness.
- 36:26Speaker 3: But in some ways he painted himself into the corner,
- 36:28Speaker 3: into a position where he cannot afford to compromise by
- 36:32Speaker 3: engaging in bringsmanship over the over something relatively unimportant so.
- 36:38Speaker 2: Early on, absolutely from that part of the world, that's
- 36:42Speaker 2: come to my part of the world. And let's look
- 36:45Speaker 2: at India through your eyes the actions, because how do
- 36:49Speaker 2: you see India's position now with you know, with the
- 36:53Speaker 2: trade traf with with with India, Russia, India, China becoming
- 36:57Speaker 2: much more engaged here and Israel's you know, Somalian and recognition.
- 37:03Speaker 2: It has shaped Shukota region and leads to a new
- 37:06Speaker 2: dimension to the Red Sea security. From that point of view,
- 37:10Speaker 2: let's start what does it mean for India and then
- 37:13Speaker 2: we got to the other issues here.
- 37:16Speaker 3: Yeah, well, the situation here is quite complicated. For Israel's
- 37:21Speaker 3: recognition of some Mareland is not as symbolic gesture. It's
- 37:25Speaker 3: very much as strategic move which shapes which he shapes
- 37:28Speaker 3: how power is projected around the Red Sea in the
- 37:32Speaker 3: corner of Africa. By recognizing this breakaway small republic, Israel
- 37:38Speaker 3: is signaling that it's willing to bribe as traditional diplomatic
- 37:42Speaker 3: constraints in order to secure maritime and intelligence advantages. It's
- 37:46Speaker 3: building a military base in some Malla land, and in
- 37:51Speaker 3: part it's a response measure to the increasing increasingly aggressive
- 37:57Speaker 3: political measures by Turkey and the Arab Gulf States in
- 38:02Speaker 3: some ways also cooperating with the run to isolate and
- 38:05Speaker 3: freeze out Israel politically from the region. And I think
- 38:09Speaker 3: Israel's response as well, if you're going to try to
- 38:11Speaker 3: block me in the Middle East, I'm going to cause
- 38:15Speaker 3: you a problem for your interest in the Red Sea,
- 38:18Speaker 3: which is strategically important, and I think that's exactly what's happening.
- 38:23Speaker 3: The Red Sea is one of the world's most sensitive
- 38:25Speaker 3: shipping corridors and disruptions that are quickly ripple into global trade,
- 38:30Speaker 3: energy prices, and food security. And the actor with the
- 38:33Speaker 3: influence in that area against leverage far beyond the immediate region,
- 38:39Speaker 3: and Israel's move inserts it directly into a space that's
- 38:43Speaker 3: been traditional contested by the Golf States, by Turkey, Iran
- 38:47Speaker 3: and global powers. So this recognition is what is giving
- 38:51Speaker 3: some hollyland international visibility. It's been very much autonomous and
- 38:56Speaker 3: basically independent for the past thirty years in all but
- 38:59Speaker 3: the name and official status. But Somalia has taken this
- 39:06Speaker 3: aggressive approach. Even colum Fasa, you're a bit to attack
- 39:10Speaker 3: some other land and essentially cutting off relations with UE,
- 39:15Speaker 3: which is another backer of some other land moving closer
- 39:19Speaker 3: and closer towards recognizing some other lands independence as well,
- 39:24Speaker 3: simply because of this geopolitical element now coming into play
- 39:28Speaker 3: with the Israel actively asserting interest despite the fact that
- 39:31Speaker 3: it's also had relations and dialogue with the SMaL land
- 39:36Speaker 3: far for many years, long before the current developments. It's
- 39:41Speaker 3: only now that all hell is breaking loose because now
- 39:44Speaker 3: there is a clear military dimension to this whole uh development,
- 39:51Speaker 3: even without widespread recognition a single powerful backer. Authors are
- 39:56Speaker 3: bargain in dynamics, and the message is here is the job.
- 40:00Speaker 3: It matters more than formal legitimacy, and that logic is
- 40:04Speaker 3: starting to resonate in the world where authority is increasingly fragmented.
- 40:10Speaker 3: From a security perspective, the Red Sea is also shifting
- 40:14Speaker 3: from being a transit route to a contested strategic theater privacy.
- 40:20Speaker 3: The smaller pirates have reappeared recently with the assistance of
- 40:24Speaker 3: the Hooties, and they've attacked Indian ships even as far
- 40:27Speaker 3: as the Indian Ocean militia. Attacks, drovene strikes and naval
- 40:33Speaker 3: brinkmanships have turndered into a zone of persistent risk and
- 40:38Speaker 3: is almost interest lies in protecting shipping, gathering intelligence, and
- 40:43Speaker 3: preventing hostile actors from establishing foot calls near critical routes.
- 40:47Speaker 3: And those actors are not only the Pirates but also
- 40:50Speaker 3: the Hoochies. They're also all Shabab, which gets penetrated some
- 40:55Speaker 3: other quite significantly, and they're even various terrorist groups that
- 41:03Speaker 3: traversing Egypt and the entire coast. This recognition then opens
- 41:09Speaker 3: doors to formal cooperation that goes beyond quiet security ties,
- 41:14Speaker 3: and that includes sports, surveillance and logistical access. Why is
- 41:18Speaker 3: Egypt so angry about the situation Because some otherland concluded
- 41:22Speaker 3: a major agreement with Ethiopia for portaxes and Ethiopia is
- 41:26Speaker 3: a strategic adversary of Egypt over water resources such as
- 41:31Speaker 3: the brand. Ethiopia then a major destabilizing factor for Egypt,
- 41:37Speaker 3: and over other issues related to border security as well.
- 41:42Speaker 3: So this all is alarming. Regional players consideratecy as their
- 41:47Speaker 3: own backyard, the same way Trump is expressed outrage Overmadua
- 41:52Speaker 3: and Venezuela and a foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere.
- 41:57Speaker 3: It also complicates existing alliances because Israel's presence intersects with
- 42:01Speaker 3: grow fumbitions and African politics. The corner of Africa is
- 42:05Speaker 3: becoming less and less peripheral and more central to Middle
- 42:09Speaker 3: Eastern security planning, and that raises the stakes for everyone
- 42:13Speaker 3: involved and for some other land itself. Recognition also changes
- 42:17Speaker 3: internal and external dynamics. It strengthens claims of sovereignty and
- 42:22Speaker 3: boost leadership legitimacy, but also raises expectations that may be
- 42:26Speaker 3: hard to meet. Externally, it attracts attention from actors who
- 42:31Speaker 3: previously ignore that, including rivals who are now seeking to
- 42:35Speaker 3: undermind it. Increased attention can bring investment and security cooperation,
- 42:40Speaker 3: but it can also bring pressure, espionage, and distabilization attempts
- 42:44Speaker 3: and basing all of the above happening some morelans. Relative
- 42:50Speaker 3: stability compared to its ceragics makes it attractive but also vulnerable.
- 42:54Speaker 3: Becoming a node in great power competition is a double
- 42:58Speaker 3: hed sword. Some other lands instance recognizes pai Wan, which
- 43:02Speaker 3: makes it a target for China. Local institutions could struggle
- 43:06Speaker 3: to manage the influx of interest, and stability may end
- 43:10Speaker 3: up being tested when too many actors pulled in different directions.
- 43:14Speaker 3: Uh and there is also a few of presidents. As
- 43:18Speaker 3: much as immediate security concerns, we have seen that this
- 43:21Speaker 3: development has led the roughly to Saudi Arabia, attacking Yui
- 43:25Speaker 3: for the first time without any UH, without any warning,
- 43:29Speaker 3: and also driving Yui entirely out of Yemen and essentially yeah,
- 43:36Speaker 3: putting an end to the Southern trans Transitional Council, which
- 43:41Speaker 3: is a you know, an independence movement originating in South Yemen,
- 43:49Speaker 3: which has become a primary counter terrorism UH group fraction
- 43:57Speaker 3: in in operating in the area. It's essentially abducted its
- 44:00Speaker 3: delegation and tried to kill its leader, President Al Zubeiji,
- 44:05Speaker 3: who fled via the very same Samaliland to ue recognition
- 44:11Speaker 3: of a break of a territory is challenging longstanding norms
- 44:14Speaker 3: about borders and sovereignty. There are concerns about internal divisions
- 44:19Speaker 3: or other separatist movements and the rup of effect, and
- 44:23Speaker 3: at the same time also there is the pragmatism of
- 44:28Speaker 3: engaging with whoever controls ki terrain that creates a split
- 44:32Speaker 3: between public condemnation and private recalculation. Regional diplomacy in general
- 44:38Speaker 3: is becoming more transactional and less rule bound, and the
- 44:43Speaker 3: Red Sea Region's politics increasingly resembling those of other contested
- 44:49Speaker 3: corridors where power matters much more than international law or paperwork.
- 44:55Speaker 3: But for India, this shift too has direct consequence. A
- 45:00Speaker 3: so in direct consequence because India is heavily dependent on
- 45:03Speaker 3: red sea shipping for trade, for energy imports and also
- 45:07Speaker 3: for access to European markets, any change in security architecture
- 45:11Speaker 3: along this route affects its economic and strategic planning, and
- 45:17Speaker 3: Israel's deeper presence could contribute to stability through intelligence and deterrence,
- 45:22Speaker 3: which benefits all shipping nations. On the other hand, it
- 45:25Speaker 3: could also intensive for competition and provoke counter moves by
- 45:29Speaker 3: rival actors, increasing volatility. India you will have to assess,
- 45:34Speaker 3: but the new alignments reduce or raise risks. New security
- 45:39Speaker 3: notes can either anchor order or become dangerous flashpoints, and
- 45:44Speaker 3: this ambiguity is something that the INCA will have to
- 45:48Speaker 3: carefully navigate along these tensions. Also, its strategic challenge is
- 45:54Speaker 3: that it benefits from stability in the area, but also
- 45:57Speaker 3: has limited control over how that stability is produced. New
- 46:02Speaker 3: actors entering the space can help secure shipping lanes, but
- 46:06Speaker 3: they can also trigger reactions from rivals who feel encircled
- 46:10Speaker 3: or excluded. Now, India diplomatically traditionally prefers quiet engagement and
- 46:16Speaker 3: multilateral frame warks, but the Red Sea is moving towards
- 46:19Speaker 3: a much more fragmented and power driven order, and that
- 46:23Speaker 3: forces New Deli to rethink assumptions about neutrality and distance.
- 46:28Speaker 3: It cannot afford to be passive if competition intensifies new
- 46:32Speaker 3: roads that carry a very large share of its trades.
- 46:35Speaker 3: At the same time, if it aligns worldly with any
- 46:39Speaker 3: single actor, it could alienate everybody else. So India is
- 46:43Speaker 3: going to have to use diplomatic acumen imbalancing acts, which
- 46:49Speaker 3: will only become harder as security arrangements become mobile, lateral
- 46:54Speaker 3: and less institutional. And the comfort zone for India is
- 46:58Speaker 3: now being tested, if not routed. Another concern is president
- 47:03Speaker 3: because the recognition of Smaland challenges that yet that borders
- 47:06Speaker 3: are fixed an I yea that India strong the values
- 47:10Speaker 3: because of its own territorial sensitivities. It may not oppose
- 47:16Speaker 3: engagement with samal Inland, but formal recognition by others may
- 47:20Speaker 3: complicate its own diplomatic position. Now, once again, I would
- 47:24Speaker 3: like to underscore that Samalanland has essentially been nearly independent
- 47:29Speaker 3: for the past thirty years. The way the country was
- 47:33Speaker 3: created was a result of genocide when Samali tribes have
- 47:38Speaker 3: essentially accused other Muslim African tribes in the same border
- 47:45Speaker 3: area of being Jewish, which was not to their Muslim
- 47:49Speaker 3: and essentially tried to wipe them out. So Smalan end
- 47:56Speaker 3: has become an island of So why go for these
- 48:03Speaker 3: remaining tribes after unattempted, after attempted massacres by their own brethren,
- 48:11Speaker 3: existing in the same country, speaking the same languages, They've
- 48:16Speaker 3: very much left alone and pursued an independent foreign policy
- 48:20Speaker 3: and none of it has bothered India or anyone else
- 48:22Speaker 3: successfully China until this issue. So while the jury it
- 48:29Speaker 3: has been, you know, still part of a small and
- 48:32Speaker 3: the facto it has been living an independent life for
- 48:36Speaker 3: approximately thirty years, and that's something to take into consideration
- 48:40Speaker 3: when weighing this delicate balance between respecting the right to
- 48:46Speaker 3: self determination and territorial integrity. Here there is also the
- 48:50Speaker 3: fact that Somalia, quite frankly, is extremely unstable. As I said,
- 48:56Speaker 3: Al Sabab has penetrated all over US of government backing
- 48:59Speaker 3: for Islamist states such as Cutter and Toki has also
- 49:04Speaker 3: contributed to a particular pasture that makes it a risk
- 49:08Speaker 3: factor for various actress. So it may not be such
- 49:11Speaker 3: a bad thing that some malevent is attempting to become
- 49:16Speaker 3: fully independent. Even for India, this is not the same
- 49:20Speaker 3: as its own territorial disputes, because essentially some other event
- 49:25Speaker 3: could be an ally and advance its own interest in
- 49:28Speaker 3: the region.
- 49:31Speaker 2: Absolutely absolutely, and that brings me to the last topic
- 49:35Speaker 2: of the day is about India giving much more consideration
- 49:39Speaker 2: to Chinese corporations. How far truth is this? Is there
- 49:44Speaker 2: in this and how do you see this? And if
- 49:47Speaker 2: at all, if it is coming to be true, what
- 49:50Speaker 2: are the disks involved here?
- 49:52Speaker 3: Now? The consideration of you know, bringing in these potentially
- 49:58Speaker 3: Chinese corporations actually reflects much more economic pressure rather than
- 50:03Speaker 3: strategic comfort the Chinese firms. They are still deeply embedded
- 50:09Speaker 3: in global supply chains. Completely excluding them raises costs for
- 50:13Speaker 3: Indian consumers and industries. Now, India has been growing quite
- 50:17Speaker 3: rapidly and its ambitions require capital, technology, and manufacturing and
- 50:21Speaker 3: scale that domestic firms cannot always provide quickly. Relaxing restrictions
- 50:26Speaker 3: can appear pragmatic in the short term, especially given the inflation,
- 50:32Speaker 3: employment issues, and expert competitivectiveness that are at stake. However,
- 50:37Speaker 3: this economic logic does not exist and should not be
- 50:40Speaker 3: examined in a vacuum. Chinese corporate sector is closely intertwined
- 50:45Speaker 3: with state objectives, making commercial engagement inseparable from geopolitical risk,
- 50:51Speaker 3: which looks like the business at least to India, often
- 50:54Speaker 3: carries strategic implications, and that duel and nature is the
- 50:57Speaker 3: core dilemma that is now facing India. The benefits may
- 51:02Speaker 3: very well be immediate and visible and a huge boost
- 51:05Speaker 3: given its current needs, especially in the midst of dispute
- 51:09Speaker 3: with Trump over terrorists and other factors, but the risks
- 51:12Speaker 3: are long term and harder to measure. So one major
- 51:16Speaker 3: risk is dependency creep. When Chinese companies intersectors such as electronics,
- 51:22Speaker 3: telecommunications or telecom components, batteries or logistics, they often become
- 51:28Speaker 3: difficult to replace over time. Domestic alternatives would struggle to
- 51:33Speaker 3: compete with scale pricing and integrated supply chains, and this
- 51:37Speaker 3: creates a structural lines that can be exploited during political disputes.
- 51:42Speaker 3: And you know the given the deep level of distrust
- 51:46Speaker 3: between India and China and their continuing revalry in China
- 51:51Speaker 3: support for Pakistan and for bangladiation for assorted actors that
- 51:57Speaker 3: are adversarial to India's interest. It's only amount of time
- 52:00Speaker 3: before these disputes surface once again, and India has experienced
- 52:05Speaker 3: this vulnerability prior in trade disruptions and bord attentions. Allowing
- 52:10Speaker 3: deeper corporate penetration can very well recreate these risks under
- 52:14Speaker 3: a different label, and once this dependency forms, reversing it
- 52:19Speaker 3: is expensive and politically painful. Shortain gains can lock in
- 52:23Speaker 3: long term exposure and this is a classic trap for
- 52:27Speaker 3: rapidly growing economies and China has exploited it with other
- 52:31Speaker 3: countries in the region. Another very obvious factor is national
- 52:35Speaker 3: security concerns. Chinese firms are often subject to laws requiring
- 52:40Speaker 3: cooperation with the government, including sharing data or complying with
- 52:44Speaker 3: intelligence requests in sensitive sectors. This creates risks that are
- 52:49Speaker 3: not easily mitigated by regulation alone. Data flaws, infrastructure access,
- 52:54Speaker 3: and technology transfer can all become channels for influence or espionags. Now,
- 53:00Speaker 3: India is already part of the Brick Bricks Framework, which
- 53:04Speaker 3: is supposed to facilitate technology transfers and economic cooperation with China,
- 53:10Speaker 3: but the difference is that it's multi rat multilateral UH,
- 53:17Speaker 3: which is the format India usually finds comfortable, it's under control,
- 53:23Speaker 3: and it's limited in school. Allowing Chinese corporations to enter
- 53:30Speaker 3: India's markets is a completely different story than cooperating on
- 53:35Speaker 3: some limited specific projects and the political I mean, first
- 53:40Speaker 3: of all, if the undermined Lutun industrial self reliance, even
- 53:44Speaker 3: if prices dropped temporarily, it would open the door to
- 53:49Speaker 3: Chinese competition, crowding out local players before they mature, and
- 53:53Speaker 3: the political backlash from job losses and factory closures can
- 53:57Speaker 3: be severe. Economically, liberallyation without protection mechanisms could hollow out
- 54:04Speaker 3: key sectors. Given that China is not it's not competing fairly,
- 54:11Speaker 3: it's very very predatory competitor, and it's known for these
- 54:16Speaker 3: process extremely aggressive and unethical practices. Once industrial capacity is lost,
- 54:22Speaker 3: rebuilding it could take years, and so the government has
- 54:26Speaker 3: to consider not only consumer prices but industrial ecosystems. Finally,
- 54:33Speaker 3: it's worth noting that there is also a diplomatic signaling effect.
- 54:36Speaker 3: Easy restrictions on Chinese firms can be interpreted by using
- 54:40Speaker 3: as weakness or willingness to compartmentalize disputes. This could reduce
- 54:44Speaker 3: immediate tension and improve relations, but can also reduce leverage
- 54:48Speaker 3: in future negotiations. India's from this on thecononic boundaries has
- 54:53Speaker 3: been one of its few non military pressure tools. The
- 54:56Speaker 3: eluting that stands without reciprocal concessions would likely imvolvant assertive
- 55:01Speaker 3: behavior by China Elsewhere. Strategic ambiguity can be useful, but
- 55:06Speaker 3: it can also invite testing. How China interprets India's movest
- 55:10Speaker 3: matters as much as it's as India's own intent and
- 55:13Speaker 3: perception shapes behavior in geopolitics, and of course, there is
- 55:18Speaker 3: the idea of regulatory capture and asymmetry. Large Chinese corporations
- 55:23Speaker 3: are experienced at navigating foreign regulatory environments. They often arrive
- 55:28Speaker 3: with some legal, financial, and political vacking. Indian regulatory institutions,
- 55:33Speaker 3: while improving, can be overwhelmed by the scale and sophistication
- 55:38Speaker 3: of these companies over time. That can lead to uneven enforcement, lobbying, pressure,
- 55:43Speaker 3: and quiet the illusion of safeguards Domestic firms can enjoy
- 55:49Speaker 3: very rare actually enjoy the same capacity to shape rules
- 55:53Speaker 3: or absorb compliance costs, and this imbalance would destroyed markets
- 55:57Speaker 3: in various ways. It would create resent among local businesses
- 56:01Speaker 3: that would feel that the playing field is tilted in
- 56:04Speaker 3: China's favor, and once regulatory credibility begins, restoring it can
- 56:09Speaker 3: be difficult. Another court for Contron is supply chain security.
- 56:15Speaker 3: Chinese companies often integrate vertically and they control multiple stages
- 56:19Speaker 3: of production and logistics. That can also reduce costs, but
- 56:23Speaker 3: it can also considerate risk. Disruptions that are caused by
- 56:27Speaker 3: political tensions, sanctions or expert controls can cascade rapidly through
- 56:32Speaker 3: the economy. India's experience during global supply shacts has already
- 56:36Speaker 3: highlighted how fragile dependence can be. Allowing deep integration without
- 56:42Speaker 3: diversification strategies would increase exposure and risk, and resilient resilience
- 56:48Speaker 3: would require redundancy, not just efficiency. So global prices today
- 56:54Speaker 3: could just would like to not justify vulnerability tomorrow. Finally
- 57:00Speaker 3: worth noting technological dimensions she needs. Firms often bring proprietary software,
- 57:06Speaker 3: management systems and operational standards over time. They These things
- 57:10Speaker 3: all shape how interre sectors function. These can crowd out
- 57:15Speaker 3: domestic innovation and lock industries into foreign ecosystems. Switching away
- 57:20Speaker 3: laterly becomes both closely and disruptive. This sort of dependence
- 57:25Speaker 3: is harder to detect. Than physical dependence, but it's just
- 57:28Speaker 3: as consequential. It affects skills, development, research priorities, and even
- 57:33Speaker 3: hugere competitiveness. And India's ambition to become a tack leader
- 57:38Speaker 3: depends on controlling its own innovation pathways. And of course,
- 57:41Speaker 3: public perception and political legitimacy matter just as much as
- 57:46Speaker 3: all these pragmatic considerations. In case relationship with China is
- 57:50Speaker 3: emotionally charged due to past border disputes and national security concerns,
- 57:55Speaker 3: Allowing she needs firms greater leeway can be frame domestical
- 57:59Speaker 3: as compromise, but also as weakness regardless of economic Quessionnel
- 58:04Speaker 3: opposition parties and media would likely amplify fears of selling
- 58:09Speaker 3: out national interests. This can turn economic policy into a
- 58:13Speaker 3: political minefield. Governments have to manage not only economic health comes,
- 58:18Speaker 3: but narratives. Losing public trust can derail reforms, even if
- 58:22Speaker 3: they are technical sound, And of course India HOSTO also
- 58:26Speaker 3: consider how this step would align with partners. Many of
- 58:32Speaker 3: India's key partners are actively reducing exposure to Chinese supply chains.
- 58:37Speaker 3: Moving in the opposite direction would complicate coordination and trust partners,
- 58:42Speaker 3: especially in the Indo Pacific security strategy with question India's
- 58:47Speaker 3: reliability in shared security and technological frameworks. That doesn't mean
- 58:53Speaker 3: India has to mirror what everyone else doing the TAT,
- 58:57Speaker 3: but the version has its cout. Strategic aton requires credibility
- 59:02Speaker 3: just as much as independence. Mixed signals can begin India's
- 59:06Speaker 3: bargaining position. So one way to overcome this obstacle is
- 59:10Speaker 3: through selective engagement with very strict conditions and yet can
- 59:14Speaker 3: allouging is participation in low risk sectors while maintaining from
- 59:19Speaker 3: various insensitive industries. Strong screening, data, localization, and ownership limits
- 59:26Speaker 3: can reduce risk, but these measures require consistent enforcement and
- 59:32Speaker 3: political will. Partial openness without discipline would invite exploitation, and
- 59:37Speaker 3: the effectiveness of this approach would very much depend on
- 59:41Speaker 3: institutional strength and not just good intentions. Finally, it's worth
- 59:46Speaker 3: noting that the risk is not engagement itself, but unmanaged engagement.
- 59:50Speaker 3: And yes, economic size gives it leverage, but only if
- 59:53Speaker 3: it uses that leverage in a deliberate manner. Allowing short
- 59:58Speaker 3: term pressures to dictate long strategy would be costly. Over
- 1:00:02Speaker 3: the cost in Chinese corporate pressens ultimately cannot be treated
- 1:00:07Speaker 3: as neutral market activity. It should be assessed through the
- 1:00:11Speaker 3: lens of power, resilience and savaggy. So there's a lot
- 1:00:16Speaker 3: to think about before making this decision, that's for sure.
- 1:00:20Speaker 2: Absolutely absolutely with this, it's a w up on this
- 1:00:23Speaker 2: very special edition of the world. According to our sugarman
- 1:00:27Speaker 2: on the kJ masterclass line, thank you so much indeed
- 1:00:31Speaker 2: for joining us.
- 1:00:32Speaker 3: Thank you