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Indian Frontier Policy, an Historical Sketch-General Sir John Miller Adye · History of Minnesota and Tales of the Frontier, Part 1

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  Speaker 1: Indian Frontier Policy and Historical Sketch by General Sir John
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  Speaker 1: Adai GCB RA Read for LibriVox.org by David Barnes Preface
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  Speaker 1: The subject of our policy on the northwest frontier of
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  Speaker 1: India is one of great importance as affecting the general
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  Speaker 1: welfare of our Eastern Empire and especially interesting at the
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  Speaker 1: present time when military operations on a considerable scale are
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  Speaker 1: being conducted against a combination of the independent tribes along
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  Speaker 1: the frontier. It must be understood that the present condition
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  Speaker 1: of affairs is no mere sudden outbreak on the part
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  Speaker 1: of our turbulent neighbours. Its causes lie far deeper, and
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  Speaker 1: are the consequences of events in bygone years. In the
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  Speaker 1: following pages I have attempted to give a short historical
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  Speaker 1: summary of its varying phases, in the hope that I
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  Speaker 1: may thus assist the public in some degree to understand
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  Speaker 1: its general bearings, and to form a correct opinion of
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  Speaker 1: the policy which should be pursued in the future. John Adai,
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  Speaker 1: General Chapter 1 EVENTS PRIOR TO AND INCLUDING THE FIRST
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  Speaker 1: AFGHAN WAR OF 1839-41 COVERING PROPOSED INVASION OF INDIA BY
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  Speaker 1: NAPOLEON I, MISSION OF BURNS TO KABUL, ITS FAILURE, FIRST
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  Speaker 1: AFGHAN WAR 1839-41, ITS VICISSITUDES AND COLLAPSE. In considering the
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  Speaker 1: important and somewhat intricate subject of policy on the north-western
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  Speaker 1: frontier of our Indian Empire, it will be desirable in
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  Speaker 1: the first place to give a concise history of the
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  Speaker 1: events which have guided our action, and which for many
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  Speaker 1: years past have exercised a predominating influence in that part
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  Speaker 1: of our eastern dominion. Speaking generally, it may, I think,
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  Speaker 1: be said that the main features of our policy on
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  Speaker 1: the north-western frontier are have been determined by the gradual
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  Speaker 1: advance of Russia southwards, and partly also by the turbulent
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  Speaker 1: character of the people of Afghanistan and of the independent
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  Speaker 1: tribes who inhabit the great region of mountains which lie
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  Speaker 1: between Russia and ourselves. These two circumstances, the first having
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  Speaker 1: been the most powerful, have led us into great wars
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  Speaker 1: and frontier expeditions, which as a rule have been costly,
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  Speaker 1: and in some cases unjust, and their consequences have not
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  Speaker 1: tended to strengthen our position, either on the frontier or
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  Speaker 1: in India itself. It will be well, therefore, to give
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  Speaker 1: an outline of the Russian conquests in Central Asia to
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  Speaker 1: the north of Afghanistan, and also of our dealings with
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  Speaker 1: the rulers of Kabul in bygone years, and we shall
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  Speaker 1: then be better able to judge of our present position
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  Speaker 1: and to determine the principles which should guide our northwestern
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  Speaker 1: frontier policy. One of the first threats of invasion of India,
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  Speaker 1: early in the century, was planned at Tilsit, and is
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  Speaker 1: thus described by Kay in History of the War in Afghanistan.
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  Speaker 1: Whilst the followers of Alexander and Napoleon were abandoning themselves
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  Speaker 1: to convivial pleasures, those monarchs were spending quiet evenings together
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  Speaker 1: discussing their future plans and projecting joint schemes of conquest.
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  Speaker 1: It was then that they meditated the invasion of Hindustan
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  Speaker 1: by a confederate army uniting on the plains of Persia,
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  Speaker 1: and no secret was made of the intention of the
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  Speaker 1: two great European potentates to commence in the following spring
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  Speaker 1: a hostile demonstration contre les possessions de la Compagnie des Indes. Unquote.
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  Speaker 1: The peril, however, was averted by a treaty at Tehran
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  Speaker 1: in March 1809 in which the Shah of Persia covenanted
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  Speaker 1: not to permit any European force whatever to pass through
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  Speaker 1: Persia towards India, or towards the ports of that country.
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  Speaker 1: And so the visionary danger passed away. The old southern
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  Speaker 1: boundary of Russia in Central Asia, extended from the north
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  Speaker 1: of the Caspian by Orenburg and Osk, across to the
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  Speaker 1: old Mongolian city of Semipalatinsk, and was guarded by a
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  Speaker 1: cordon of forts and Cossack outposts. It was about two
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  Speaker 1: thousand miles in length, and, quote, aborted on the great
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  Speaker 1: Kyrgyz steppe, and to a certain extent controlled the tribes
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  Speaker 1: pasturing in the vicinity, but by no means established the
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  Speaker 1: hold of Russia on that pathless and for the most
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  Speaker 1: part lifeless waste, unquote. Quarterly Review, October 1865. During all
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  Speaker 1: the earlier years of the century, while we were establishing
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  Speaker 1: our power in India, constant intrigues and wars occurred in Persia,
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  Speaker 1: Afghanistan and Central Asia, and rumours were occasionally heard of
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  Speaker 1: threats against ourselves, which formed the subject of diplomatic treatment
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  Speaker 1: from time to time, but in reality the scene was
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  Speaker 1: so distant that our interests were not seriously affected. and
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  Speaker 1: it was not until 1836 that they began to exercise
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  Speaker 1: a powerful influence as regards our policy on the northwest frontier.
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  Speaker 1: In that year, Lord Auckland was Governor-General, and Captain Alexander
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  Speaker 1: Burns was sent on a commercial mission up the Indus
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  Speaker 1: and through the Khyber Pass to Kabul, where he was
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  Speaker 1: received in a friendly manner by the Emir Dost Muhammad.
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  Speaker 1: It must be borne in mind that neither Sindh nor
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  Speaker 1: the Punjab was then under our rule, so that our
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  Speaker 1: frontiers were still far distant from Afghanistan. It was supposed
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  Speaker 1: at the time that Russia was advancing southward towards India
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  Speaker 1: in league with Persia, and the mission of Burns was
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  Speaker 1: in reality political, its object being to induce the Emir
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  Speaker 1: to enter into a friendly alliance. Dost Muhammad was quite
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  Speaker 1: willing to meet our views, and offered to give up
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  Speaker 1: altogether any connection with the two powers named. It, however,
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  Speaker 1: soon became apparent that our interests were by no means identical.
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  Speaker 1: His great object, as we found, being to recover the
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  Speaker 1: Peshawar district, which had been taken a few years previously
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  Speaker 1: by Runjit Singh, while we, on the other hand, courted
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  Speaker 1: his friendship chiefly in order that his country might prove
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  Speaker 1: a barrier against the advance of Russia and Persia. These
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  Speaker 1: respective views were evidently divergent and the issues doubtful, when
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  Speaker 1: suddenly a Russian envoy, Vicovich, also on a so-called commercial mission,
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  Speaker 1: arrived at Kabul, offering the emir money and assistance against
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  Speaker 1: the Sikhs. This altered the aspect of affairs. Burns wrote
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  Speaker 1: to the Governor-General that the Russians were evidently trying to
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  Speaker 1: outbid us. Still some hope remained. until definite instructions arrived
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  Speaker 1: from Lord Auckland, declining to mediate with or to act
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  Speaker 1: against Ranjit Singh, the ruler of Punjab. The Amir felt
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  Speaker 1: that we made great demands on him, but gave him
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  Speaker 1: nothing in return. It then became evident that the mission
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  Speaker 1: of Burns was a failure, and in April 1838 he
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  Speaker 1: returned to India. It was our first direct effort to
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  Speaker 1: provide against a distant and unsubstantial danger, and it failed,
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  Speaker 1: but unfortunately we did not take the lesson to heart.
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  Speaker 1: In the meantime, the Shah of Persia, instigated by Russia,
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  Speaker 1: besieged Herat, and after months of fruitless effort, and in
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  Speaker 1: consequence of our sending troops to the Persian Gulf, the
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  Speaker 1: Shah at length withdrew his army. It was not only
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  Speaker 1: the hostile efforts of the Shah on Herat in 1838
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  Speaker 1: that which were a cause of anxiety to the Indian government.
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  Speaker 1: But as Kay writes in War in Afghanistan, quote, far
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  Speaker 1: out in the distance, beyond the mountains of the Hindu Kush,
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  Speaker 1: there was the shadow of a great northern army, tremendous
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  Speaker 1: in its indistinctness, sweeping across the wilds and deserts of
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  Speaker 1: Central Asia towards the frontiers of Hindustan, unquote. That great
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  Speaker 1: northern army, as we now know, but did not know then,
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  Speaker 1: was the column of Perovsky, which had left Orenburg for
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  Speaker 1: the attempted conquest of Kiva, but which subsequently perished from
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  Speaker 1: the hardships and pestilence in the snowy wastes of the
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  Speaker 1: Barsuk Desert, north of the Aral. In view of all
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  Speaker 1: the circumstances, of the supposed designs of Russia and Persia,
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  Speaker 1: and of the hostility and incessant intrigues in Afghanistan, the
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  Speaker 1: Government of India were sorely perplexed, and opinions amongst the
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  Speaker 1: authorities differed widely as to the policy to be pursued.
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  Speaker 1: Lord Auckland, however, at length decided on the assemblage of
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  Speaker 1: a British force for service across the Indus. In his
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  Speaker 1: manifesto issued in December 1838, he first alluded to the
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  Speaker 1: Burns mission and the causes of its failure. He then
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  Speaker 1: referred to the claims of Shah Suja, a former ruler
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  Speaker 1: of Afghanistan who had been living for some years in exile.
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  Speaker 1: within our territories, and said we had determined, in cooperation
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  Speaker 1: with the Sikhs, to restore him to power as Emir
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  Speaker 1: of Kabul. It was arranged that Shah Suja should enter
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  Speaker 1: Afghanistan with his own troops, such as they were, supported
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  Speaker 1: by a British army, marching through Sindh and Balochistan. The
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  Speaker 1: Governor-General expressed a hope that tranquillity would thus be established
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  Speaker 1: on the frontier, and a barrier formed against external aggression,
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  Speaker 1: and he ended by proclaiming that when the object was accomplished,
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  Speaker 1: the British army would be withdrawn. This was indeed a
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  Speaker 1: momentous decision. The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Fane, had
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  Speaker 1: already given an adverse opinion, saying that, quote, every advance
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  Speaker 1: you make beyond the Sudledge, in my opinion, adds to
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  Speaker 1: your military weakness, unquote. On the decision becoming known in England,
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  Speaker 1: many high authorities and the public generally disapproved of the expedition.
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  Speaker 1: The Duke of Wellington said that, quote, our difficulties would
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  Speaker 1: commence where our military successes ended, unquote, and that, quote,
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  Speaker 1: the consequences of crossing the Indus once to settle a
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  Speaker 1: government in Afghanistan will be a perennial march into that country, unquote.
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  Speaker 1: The Marquess of Wellesley spoke of, quote, the folly of
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  Speaker 1: occupying a land of rocks, sands, deserts and snow, unquote.
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  Speaker 1: Sir Charles Metcalfe from the first protested and said, quote,
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  Speaker 1: Depend upon it. The surest way to bring Russia down
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  Speaker 1: upon ourselves is for us to cross the Indus and
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  Speaker 1: meddle with the countries beyond it. Mr Elphinstone wrote, If
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  Speaker 1: you send 27,000 men of the Bolam to Kandahar and
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  Speaker 1: can feed them, I have no doubt you can take
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  Speaker 1: Kandahar and Kabul and set up Suja. But as for
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  Speaker 1: maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong and remote country,
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  Speaker 1: among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it
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  Speaker 1: seems to me to be hopeless. If you succeed, you will,
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  Speaker 1: I fear, weaken the position against Russia. The Afghans are neutral,
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  Speaker 1: and would have received your aid against invaders with gratitude.
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  Speaker 1: They will now be disaffected, and glad to join any
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  Speaker 1: invader to drive you out. Mr. Tucker, of the Court
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  Speaker 1: of Directors, wrote to the Duke of Wellington,' We have
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  Speaker 1: contracted an alliance with Shah Suja, although he does not
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  Speaker 1: possess a rood of ground in Afghanistan, nor a rupee
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  Speaker 1: which he did not derive from our bounty as a
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  Speaker 1: Kwondam pensioner.' He added that, quote, Even if we succeed,
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  Speaker 1: we must maintain him in the government by a large
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  Speaker 1: military force, 800 miles from our frontier and our resources.
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  Speaker 1: The above were strong and weighty opinions and arguments against
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  Speaker 1: the rash and distant enterprise on which the government of
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  Speaker 1: India were about to embark, but there is more to
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  Speaker 1: be said. Independently of the result in Afghanistan itself, it
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  Speaker 1: must be borne in mind that the proposed line of
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  Speaker 1: march of the army necessarily led through Sindh and Balochistan,
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  Speaker 1: countries which, whatever their former position may have been, were
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  Speaker 1: then independent both of the emir and of ourselves. The
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  Speaker 1: force from Bengal, consisting of about 9,500 men of all arms,
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  Speaker 1: with 38,000 camp followers, accompanied by Shah Suja's levee, left
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  Speaker 1: Ferozepur in December, and crossing the Indus arrived at Dadur,
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  Speaker 1: the entrance to the Bolan Pass, in March 1839. Difficulties
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  Speaker 1: with the emirs of Sindh at once arose, chiefly as
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  Speaker 1: to our passage through their territories, but their remonstrances were disregarded,
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  Speaker 1: and they were informed that, quote, the day they connected
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  Speaker 1: themselves with any other power than England would be the
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  Speaker 1: last of their independence, if not of their rule. K's
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  Speaker 1: War in Afghanistan The army then advanced through the Bolam
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  Speaker 1: and reached Quetta on March 26th, but here again obstacles
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  Speaker 1: similar in character to those just described occurred. and Sir
• 14:44
  Speaker 1: Alexander Burns visited the ruler of Balochistan, the Khan of Kelat,
• 14:48
  Speaker 1: demanding assistance, especially as to supplies of food. The prince,
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  Speaker 1: with prophetic truth, pointed out that though we might restore
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  Speaker 1: Shah Suja, we would not carry the Afghans with us,
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  Speaker 1: and would fail in the end. He alluded to the
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  Speaker 1: devastation which our march had already caused in the country,
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  Speaker 1: but having been granted a subsidy, unwillingly consented to afford
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  Speaker 1: us assistance, and the army, leaving possible enemies in its rear,
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  Speaker 1: passed on, and reached Kandahar without opposition in April. At
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  Speaker 1: the end of June it recommenced its march northwards, and Ghuzni,
• 15:28
  Speaker 1: having been stormed and captured, our troops, without further fighting,
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  Speaker 1: arrived at Kabul on April 6th. Dost Muhammad, deserted for
• 15:38
  Speaker 1: the time by his people, fled northward over the Hindu Kush,
• 15:43
  Speaker 1: finding a temporary refuge in Bokhara, and Shah Suja reigned
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  Speaker 1: in his stead. So far the great expedition had apparently
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  Speaker 1: accomplished its object, and the success of the tripartite treaty
• 15:57
  Speaker 1: between ourselves, the Sikhs, and the new Amir had been
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  Speaker 1: successfully carried out, almost entirely, however, by ourselves as the
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  Speaker 1: predominant partner. The time, therefore, would seem to have arrived when,
• 16:12
  Speaker 1: in fulfilment of Lord Auckland's proclamation, the British army should
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  Speaker 1: be withdrawn from Afghanistan. For the moment this appeared to
• 16:21
  Speaker 1: be the case, but in reality it was not so,
• 16:25
  Speaker 1: and our position soon became dangerous, then critical, and at
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  Speaker 1: last desperate. In the first place the long line of
• 16:33
  Speaker 1: communication was liable at any time to be interrupted, as
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  Speaker 1: already mentioned, Then again, the arrival of Shah Suja had
• 16:42
  Speaker 1: excited no enthusiasm, and the very fact that we were
• 16:46
  Speaker 1: foreigners in language, religion and race rendered our presence hateful
• 16:51
  Speaker 1: to his subjects. In short, the new emir was and
• 16:56
  Speaker 1: continued to be a mere puppet, supported in authority by
• 17:00
  Speaker 1: British bayonets. These conditions were apparent from the first day
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  Speaker 1: of his arrival. and grew in intensity until the end.
• 17:11
  Speaker 1: Shah Suja himself soon discovered that his authority over his
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  Speaker 1: people was almost nominal. And although he chafed at our
• 17:19
  Speaker 1: continued presence in the country, he also felt that the
• 17:23
  Speaker 1: day of our departure would be the last of his reign,
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  Speaker 1: and that our withdrawal was under the circumstances impossible. But
• 17:32
  Speaker 1: the situation was equally complicated from our own point of view. If,
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  Speaker 1: as originally promised, the British troops were withdrawn, the failure
• 17:41
  Speaker 1: of the expedition would at once become apparent by the
• 17:44
  Speaker 1: anarchy which would ensue. On the other hand, to retain
• 17:48
  Speaker 1: an army in the far distant mountains of Afghanistan would
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: not only be a breach of faith, but, while entailing
• 17:56
  Speaker 1: enormous expense, would deprive India of soldiers who might be
• 18:00
  Speaker 1: required elsewhere. After lengthy consideration, it was decided to reduce
• 18:06
  Speaker 1: the total of our force in the country while retaining
• 18:09
  Speaker 1: a hold for the present on Kabul, Ghuzni and Kandahar,
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: together with the passes of the Khyber and Bolam. In short,
• 18:19
  Speaker 1: the British army was weakly scattered about in a region
• 18:22
  Speaker 1: of mountains, amongst a hostile people, and with its long
• 18:26
  Speaker 1: lines of communication insufficiently guarded. Both in a military and
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: a political point of view, the position was a false
• 18:35
  Speaker 1: and dangerous one. General Sir John Keane, who was about
• 18:40
  Speaker 1: to return to India, writing at the time, said, quote,
• 18:45
  Speaker 1: Mark my words, it will not be long before there
• 18:48
  Speaker 1: is here some signal catastrophe, unquote. During the summer of 1840,
• 18:56
  Speaker 1: there were troubles both in the Khyber and Bolan passes,
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: In the former, the tribes, incensed at not receiving sufficient subsidies,
• 19:05
  Speaker 1: attacked the outposts and plundered our stores, while in Balochistan
• 19:10
  Speaker 1: matters were so serious that a British force was sent
• 19:14
  Speaker 1: and captured Kelat, the Khan being killed, and part of
• 19:18
  Speaker 1: his territory handed over to Shah Suja. Footnote. In The
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: Life of Sir Robert Sandman, recently published, It is stated
• 19:27
  Speaker 1: that the alleged treachery of Meerab Khan, which cost him
• 19:31
  Speaker 1: his life, was on subsequent inquiry not confirmed. Rumours from
• 19:38
  Speaker 1: Central Asia also added to our anxieties. Although the failure
• 19:44
  Speaker 1: of the Russian attempt on Kiva became known some months later,
• 19:48
  Speaker 1: it excited apprehension at Sir Alexander Burns, during the winter
• 19:42
  Speaker 1: of 1839, expressed opinions which were curiously inconsistent with each other. Quote,
• 20:04
  Speaker 1: I maintain that man to be an enemy to his
• 20:07
  Speaker 1: country who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of
• 20:10
  Speaker 1: the Indus, while at the same moment he advocated the
• 20:15
  Speaker 1: advance of our troops over the Hindu Kush into Balkh,
• 20:19
  Speaker 1: so as to be ready to meet the Russians in
• 20:21
  Speaker 1: the following May. Sir William MacNaughton, the chief political officer
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: in Kabul, went still further, and in April 1840 not
• 20:31
  Speaker 1: only urged a march on Bokhara, but also contemplated sending
• 20:36
  Speaker 1: a mission to Korkand in order, as he said, to
• 20:40
  Speaker 1: frustrate the knavish tricks of the Russians in that quarter.
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: Our position, however, at that time was sufficiently precarious without
• 20:52
  Speaker 1: adding to our anxieties by distant expeditions in Central Asia,
• 20:57
  Speaker 1: even had the Russians established themselves in the principalities, which
• 21:01
  Speaker 1: at that time was not the case. Not only was
• 21:04
  Speaker 1: Afghanistan itself seething with treachery and intrigues from one end
• 21:09
  Speaker 1: to the other, but the Sikhs in the Punjab, our
• 21:12
  Speaker 1: nominal allies, had, since the death of Ranjit Singh, become
• 21:17
  Speaker 1: disloyal and out of hand. Balochistan was in tumult. The
• 21:22
  Speaker 1: tribes in the Khyber, ever ready for mischief, incessantly threatened
• 21:27
  Speaker 1: our communications. so that we were certainly in no condition
• 21:31
  Speaker 1: to enter upon further dangerous expeditions against distant imaginary foes.
• 21:39
  Speaker 1: Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Commander-in-Chief, strongly objected to any advance. Quote,
• 21:46
  Speaker 1: In truth we are much weaker now than in 1838. Unquote.
• 21:53
  Speaker 1: During the latter months of 1840 and in 1841, matters
• 21:58
  Speaker 1: became steadily worse, and all Afghanistan seemed ripe for revolt.
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: We are in a stew here, wrote Sir William McNaughton
• 22:08
  Speaker 1: in September. It is reported that the whole country on
• 22:12
  Speaker 1: this side of the Oxus is up in favour of
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: Dost Muhammad, who is certainly advancing in great strength. Again,
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: in a letter to Lord Auckland, he said, that affairs
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: in this quarter have the worst possible appearance, and he
• 22:30
  Speaker 1: quoted the opinion of Sir Willoughby Cotton that, unless the
• 22:34
  Speaker 1: Bengal troops are instantly strengthened, we cannot hold the country.
• 22:41
  Speaker 1: At this critical period, however, Dost Muhammad was heavily defeated
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: at Bamiyan, on the Hindu Kush, voluntarily surrendering shortly afterwards.
• 22:52
  Speaker 1: and for the moment prospects looked brighter, but the clouds
• 22:56
  Speaker 1: soon gathered again, and the end was at hand. The
• 23:01
  Speaker 1: Governor-General of India had throughout the whole war wisely and
• 23:05
  Speaker 1: steadfastly resisted the proposed further operations in Central Asia, and
• 23:11
  Speaker 1: the Court of Directors in London wrote as follows, quote,
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: We pronounce our decided opinion that for many years to
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: come the restored monarchy will have need of a British
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: force in order to maintain peace in its own territory
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: and prevent aggression from without. And they go on. We
• 23:31
  Speaker 1: again desire you seriously to consider which of the two
• 23:35
  Speaker 1: alternatives is a speedy retreat from Afghanistan or a considerable
• 23:40
  Speaker 1: increase of the military force in that country, you may
• 23:43
  Speaker 1: feel it your duty to adopt. We are convinced that
• 23:47
  Speaker 1: you have no middle course to pursue with safety and
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: with honour. The Government of India, hesitating to the last,
• 23:57
  Speaker 1: failed in adopting either of the alternatives. In November 1841,
• 24:04
  Speaker 1: Sir Alexander Burns was treacherously murdered by a mob in Kabul,
• 24:10
  Speaker 1: which was followed by an insurrection and the defeat of
• 24:13
  Speaker 1: our troops. General Elphinstone, who was in command, writing to
• 24:18
  Speaker 1: Sir W. McNaughton on November 24th, said that, quote, from
• 24:23
  Speaker 1: the want of provisions and forage, the reduced state of
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: our troops, the large number of wounded and sick, the
• 24:31
  Speaker 1: difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated cantonment we occupy,
• 24:37
  Speaker 1: the near approach of winter, our communications cut off, no
• 24:42
  Speaker 1: prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms against us,
• 24:46
  Speaker 1: I am of opinion that it is not feasible any
• 24:49
  Speaker 1: longer to maintain our position in this country, and that
• 24:53
  Speaker 1: you ought to avail yourself of the offer to negotiate
• 24:56
  Speaker 1: that has been made to you. This was conclusive. Our envoy,
• 25:04
  Speaker 1: early in December, met the Afghan chiefs and agreed that
• 25:08
  Speaker 1: we should immediately evacuate the country and that Dost Mohammed,
• 25:12
  Speaker 1: who was in exile in India, should return. On December 23rd,
• 25:18
  Speaker 1: Sir William MacNaughton was treacherously murdered at a conference with
• 25:22
  Speaker 1: the Afghan Sirdars within sight of the British cantonment. And
• 25:28
  Speaker 1: then came the end. The British force at Kabul, leaving
• 25:32
  Speaker 1: its guns, stores and treasure behind, commenced its retreat on
• 25:37
  Speaker 1: January 6th, 1842, but incessantly attacked during its march and
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: almost annihilated in the Kord Kabul Pass, it ceased to
• 25:49
  Speaker 1: exist as an organised body. General Elphinstone and other officers,
• 25:55
  Speaker 1: invited to a conference by Akbar Khan, were forcibly detained
• 25:59
  Speaker 1: as hostages, and on January 13th a solitary Englishman, Dr Brydon,
• 26:06
  Speaker 1: arrived at Jalalabad, being, with the exception of a few prisoners,
• 26:11
  Speaker 1: the sole remaining representative of the force. I have given
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: this short sketch of the First Afghan War because, disastrous
• 26:21
  Speaker 1: as it was, the causes of our failure were due throughout.
• 26:26
  Speaker 1: far more to rash and mistaken policy than to any
• 26:30
  Speaker 1: shortcomings of the British troops engaged. Kaye, in his history,
• 26:35
  Speaker 1: gives a clear summary of its original object and unfortunate results.
• 26:41
  Speaker 1: The expedition across the Indus was undertaken with the object
• 26:45
  Speaker 1: of creating in Afghanistan a barrier against the encroachment from
• 26:49
  Speaker 1: the West. The advance of the British army was designed
• 26:54
  Speaker 1: to check the aggression of Persia on the Afghan frontier
• 26:58
  Speaker 1: and to baffle Russian intrigues by the substitution of a
• 27:02
  Speaker 1: friendly for an unfriendly power in the countries beyond the Indus.
• 27:07
  Speaker 1: After an enormous waste of blood and treasure, we left
• 27:12
  Speaker 1: every town and village in Afghanistan bristling with our enemies.
• 27:17
  Speaker 1: Before the British army crossed the Indus, the English name
• 27:21
  Speaker 1: had been honoured in Afghanistan. Some dim traditions of the
• 27:25
  Speaker 1: splendour of Mr Elphinstone's mission had been all that the
• 27:29
  Speaker 1: Afghans associated with their thoughts of the English nation, but
• 27:33
  Speaker 1: in their place we left galling memories of the progress
• 27:38
  Speaker 1: of a desolating army. The history of the war from
• 27:43
  Speaker 1: the first to last deserves careful consideration, and if the
• 27:48
  Speaker 1: lessons taught by it are taken to heart, they will
• 27:52
  Speaker 1: materially assist in determining the principles which should guide our
• 27:56
  Speaker 1: policy on the northwest frontier of India. Indian Frontier Policy,
• 28:03
  Speaker 1: an historical sketch by General Sir John Adai, GCB RA
• 28:10
  Speaker 1: Chapter 2. Events prior and leading up to the Second
• 28:14
  Speaker 1: Afghan War covering the conquest of Kiva, Bacara and Kokand
• 28:19
  Speaker 1: by Russia, British conquests of Sindh and the Punjab, our
• 28:24
  Speaker 1: policy with the frontier tribes, the Treaty of 1857 with
• 28:28
  Speaker 1: Dost Muhammad, Shir Ali succeeds as Amir, 1868, the War
• 28:35
  Speaker 1: of 1878, Abdul Rahman becomes Amir, withdrawal of British army
• 28:40
  Speaker 1: from Afghanistan, 1881. For a few years subsequent to the war,
• 28:46
  Speaker 1: our foreign policy happily remained free from complications, and it
• 28:51
  Speaker 1: will be desirable now to refer shortly to the progress
• 28:54
  Speaker 1: of Russia in Central Asia, and of her conquests of
• 28:57
  Speaker 1: the decaying principalities of Kiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Previous to 1847,
• 29:04
  Speaker 1: the old boundary line of Russia, south of Orenburg, abutted
• 29:10
  Speaker 1: on the Great Kyrgyz step, a zone, as the late
• 29:13
  Speaker 1: Sir H. Rawlinson told us, of almost uninhabited desert, stretching 2,000
• 29:18
  Speaker 1: miles from west to east, and nearly 1,000 from north
• 29:22
  Speaker 1: to south, which had hitherto acted as a buffer between
• 29:26
  Speaker 1: Russia and the Mohammedan principalities below the Aral. Footnote, Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1878. Quote,
• 29:33
  Speaker 1: It was in 1847, contemporaneously worldwide, our final conquest of
• 29:41
  Speaker 1: the Punjab, that the curtain rose on the aggressive Russian
• 29:45
  Speaker 1: drama in Central Asia, which is not yet played out.
• 29:49
  Speaker 1: Russia had enjoyed the nominal dependency of the Kyrgyz Cossacks
• 29:53
  Speaker 1: of the Little Horde, who inhabited the western division of
• 29:56
  Speaker 1: the Great Steppe since 1730. but, except in the immediate
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: vicinity of the Orenburg line, she had little real control
• 30:04
  Speaker 1: over the tribes. In 1847-48, however, she erected three important
• 30:10
  Speaker 1: fortresses in the very heart of the steppe. These important works,
• 30:15
  Speaker 1: the only permanent constructions which had hitherto been attempted south
• 30:19
  Speaker 1: of the line, enabled Russia for the first time to
• 30:22
  Speaker 1: dominate the western portion of the steppe and to command
• 30:26
  Speaker 1: the great routes of communication with Central Asia. But the
• 30:29
  Speaker 1: steppe forts were after all a mere means to an end.
• 30:33
  Speaker 1: They formed the connecting link between the old frontiers of
• 30:36
  Speaker 1: the Empire and the long-coveted line of the Jackserties, and
• 30:40
  Speaker 1: simultaneously with their erection arose Fort Aralsk, near the embouchure
• 30:45
  Speaker 1: of the river. Unquote. Footnote. Extract from Quarterly Review, October 1865.
• 30:55
  Speaker 1: The Russians, having thus crossed the great desert tract and
• 30:58
  Speaker 1: established themselves on the Jaxertes, Sirdaria, from that time came
• 31:03
  Speaker 1: permanently into contact with the three carnates of Central Asia,
• 31:08
  Speaker 1: and their progress since that date has been comparatively easy
• 31:11
  Speaker 1: and rapid. The principalities had no military organisation which would
• 31:16
  Speaker 1: enable them to withstand a great power. Their troops and
• 31:20
  Speaker 1: those of Russia were frequently in conflict of late years.
• 31:24
  Speaker 1: but the battles were in a military sense trivial, and
• 31:27
  Speaker 1: the broad result is that Russia has been for some
• 31:30
  Speaker 1: years predominant throughout the whole region, and her frontiers are
• 31:34
  Speaker 1: now continuous with the northern provinces of both Afghanistan and Persia.
• 31:40
  Speaker 1: It is this latter point which is the important one,
• 31:43
  Speaker 1: so far as we're concerned, but before entering into its
• 31:46
  Speaker 1: details it will be well to consider the nature of
• 31:49
  Speaker 1: the great country over which Russia now rules. Until within
• 31:53
  Speaker 1: the last few years our information as to its general
• 31:57
  Speaker 1: character was very limited, but the accounts of numerous recent
• 32:01
  Speaker 1: travellers all concur in describing it as consisting for the
• 32:04
  Speaker 1: most part of sterile deserts, deficient in food, forage, fuel
• 32:09
  Speaker 1: and water. There are a certain number of decayed ancient
• 32:14
  Speaker 1: cities here and there, and there are occasional oases of
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: limited fertility, but the general conditions are as just described.
• 32:23
  Speaker 1: With the exception of the one railway from the Caspian
• 32:26
  Speaker 1: to Samarkand, the means of transport are chiefly pack animals.
• 32:31
  Speaker 1: Speaking roughly, the dominions of Russia in Central Asia, south
• 32:35
  Speaker 1: of Orenburg, may be taken as almost equal in geographical
• 32:39
  Speaker 1: extent to those of our Indian Empire, but there is
• 32:43
  Speaker 1: this striking difference between the two, that whilst the population
• 32:46
  Speaker 1: of India is computed at 250 millions, that of Central Asia,
• 32:51
  Speaker 1: even at the highest computation, is only reckoned at four
• 32:55
  Speaker 1: or five millions, of whom nearly half are nomadic, that is,
• 32:59
  Speaker 1: they wander about not from choice but in search of
• 33:02
  Speaker 1: food and pasturage. The extreme scantiness of the population is
• 33:07
  Speaker 1: of itself a rough measure of the general desolation. The
• 33:11
  Speaker 1: military position of Russia in Central Asia, therefore, is that
• 33:15
  Speaker 1: of a great but distant power, which during the last
• 33:18
  Speaker 1: fifty years has overrun and taken possession of of extended
• 33:22
  Speaker 1: territories belonging to fanatical Mohammedan tribes. The people themselves are,
• 33:28
  Speaker 1: many of them, warlike and hostile, but they are badly armed,
• 33:32
  Speaker 1: have no discipline, training or leaders, and are not therefore
• 33:36
  Speaker 1: in a position to withstand the advance of regular troops. Consequently,
• 33:41
  Speaker 1: Russia is unable to hold the country with a comparatively
• 33:44
  Speaker 1: small force of scattered detachments. which are, however, supplied with arms,
• 33:50
  Speaker 1: munitions and stores under great difficulties from far distant centres,
• 33:55
  Speaker 1: and her troops are practically incapable of concentration. Indeed, the
• 33:59
  Speaker 1: farther they go, the weaker they become, the very magnitude
• 34:03
  Speaker 1: of the area being an additional cause of weakness. This
• 34:07
  Speaker 1: is a condition somewhat precarious in itself, and would certainly
• 34:11
  Speaker 1: not appear to be an alarming one as a basis
• 34:13
  Speaker 1: of attack against our empire, even were India close at hand.
• 34:19
  Speaker 1: While Russia, however, was completing the subjugation of the principalities
• 34:23
  Speaker 1: and advancing her frontiers until they became conterminous with the
• 34:27
  Speaker 1: northern provinces of Afghanistan and Persia, the government of India,
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: by the great wars of 1843 and 1849, having annexed
• 34:36
  Speaker 1: Sindh and Punjab, advanced our frontiers in a similar manner,
• 34:41
  Speaker 1: so that the people both of Balochistan and Afghanistan hitherto
• 34:45
  Speaker 1: far remote from our dominions, now became our neighbours. In
• 34:50
  Speaker 1: The Life of Sir Robert Sandeman, recently published, a very
• 34:54
  Speaker 1: interesting account is given, not only of the nature of
• 34:57
  Speaker 1: the country along the border, but of the policy pursued
• 35:00
  Speaker 1: for many years with the independent tribes. It says, quote,
• 35:05
  Speaker 1: By the conquest of Sindh in 1843 and the annexation
• 35:09
  Speaker 1: of the Punjab in 1849, the northwest frontier of India
• 35:13
  Speaker 1: was advanced across the River Indus to the foot of
• 35:16
  Speaker 1: the Rocky Mountains, which separate the plains of the Indus
• 35:19
  Speaker 1: Valley from the higher plateaus of Afghanistan and Calat. These
• 35:24
  Speaker 1: mountain ranges formed a vast irregular belt of independent or
• 35:29
  Speaker 1: semi-independent territory, extending from Kashmir southward to the sea near Karachi,
• 35:35
  Speaker 1: a total length of about 1,200 miles, unquote. The belt
• 35:40
  Speaker 1: of territory above described was, quote, The policy pursued for
• 35:44
  Speaker 1: many years is thus described, quote, The disasters of the
• 36:04
  Speaker 1: First Afghan War and the tragical episode of Kalat were
• 36:08
  Speaker 1: fresh in men's recollections and created a strong feeling against
• 36:13
  Speaker 1: political interference with tribes beyond our border. Accordingly, from the
• 36:18
  Speaker 1: very first, the system of border defence maintained by the
• 36:22
  Speaker 1: Punjab government was not purely military, but partly military, partly
• 36:27
  Speaker 1: political and conciliatory. While the passes were carefully watched, Every
• 36:32
  Speaker 1: means was taken for the promotion of friendly intercourse. Roads
• 36:37
  Speaker 1: were made, steamers started on the Indus, and inundation canals
• 36:42
  Speaker 1: developed along the border. So long as they were friendly,
• 36:46
  Speaker 1: the tribesmen had free access to our territory, could hold land,
• 36:50
  Speaker 1: enlist in our army, and make free use of our markets.
• 36:54
  Speaker 1: As a result, the deadly hatred formerly prevailing between the
• 36:58
  Speaker 1: Sikhs and the hill tribes soon disappeared. Raids became exceptional.
• 37:03
  Speaker 1: Cultivation increased. The bazaars of our frontier stations teamed with Afghans,
• 37:09
  Speaker 1: with trains of laden camels, who at the close of
• 37:12
  Speaker 1: the season returned laden with our goods. Disputes were voluntarily
• 37:17
  Speaker 1: referred by independent tribesmen for the arbitration of British officers. Such,
• 37:22
  Speaker 1: it is stated in the life of Sir Robert Sandeman,
• 37:25
  Speaker 1: were the results of Lawrence's frontier policy. and no words
• 37:29
  Speaker 1: are required to emphasise these excellent arrangements, which remained in
• 37:33
  Speaker 1: force for many years. Before leaving this part of the subject,
• 37:38
  Speaker 1: it may be as well to anticipate a little, and
• 37:41
  Speaker 1: to allude to the successful part taken by Sir Robert
• 37:44
  Speaker 1: Sandman in 1876 on his appointment as our agent to
• 37:48
  Speaker 1: the Khan of Calad. It is important in the first
• 37:51
  Speaker 1: place to mention that whilst in Afghanistan the tribes all
• 37:55
  Speaker 1: along the frontier were for the most part independent of
• 37:58
  Speaker 1: the Emir of Kabul and were ruled by their own
• 38:01
  Speaker 1: jirgas or councils, in Balochistan the mode of government was
• 38:05
  Speaker 1: so far different that the chiefs, whilst acknowledging the Khan
• 38:09
  Speaker 1: as their hereditary ruler, were entitled not only to govern
• 38:13
  Speaker 1: their own tribes, but to take part in the general
• 38:16
  Speaker 1: administration of the country as the constitutional advisers of the
• 38:20
  Speaker 1: paramount chief. the dangers arising from the vicinity of three
• 38:26
  Speaker 1: powerful kingdoms, Persia, Afghanistan and Sindh, had no doubt led
• 38:31
  Speaker 1: them to perceive the necessity of cooperation, which was established
• 38:35
  Speaker 1: about the middle of the 18th century. Although the constitution,
• 38:39
  Speaker 1: as above described, secured to the confederated tribes nearly a
• 38:43
  Speaker 1: century of prosperity and peaceful government, it so happened that
• 38:47
  Speaker 1: for some years before 1876, owing to the weakness of
• 38:52
  Speaker 1: the then ruler, and partly to turbulence of the chiefs,
• 38:56
  Speaker 1: the government of the country fell into disorder, and the
• 38:59
  Speaker 1: commerce through the Bolan Pass altogether ceased. From 1872 to 1876,
• 39:07
  Speaker 1: Lord Northbrook was Viceroy of India, and one of his
• 39:10
  Speaker 1: last acts before leaving was the appointment of Colonel Sandman
• 39:14
  Speaker 1: as our envoy, with a view to mediate between the
• 39:17
  Speaker 1: Khan and his subordinates, and which proved successful. The principal
• 39:22
  Speaker 1: terms which were finally accepted by the Khan and his
• 39:25
  Speaker 1: tribal chiefs were that their foreign policy was to be
• 39:28
  Speaker 1: under our guidance. and we were also to be the
• 39:32
  Speaker 1: referee in case of internal disputes, that the commerce of
• 39:36
  Speaker 1: the Bolan was to be opened and protected, the annual
• 39:39
  Speaker 1: subsidy hitherto granted to the Khan of five thousand pounds
• 39:43
  Speaker 1: being doubled to cover the that a British agent with
• 39:49
  Speaker 1: a suitable contingent should be established at Quetta. It is
• 39:53
  Speaker 1: important to observe that the negotiations were conducted throughout in
• 39:57
  Speaker 1: a spirit of cooperation, and that their beneficial results remain
• 40:01
  Speaker 1: in force to the present day. The policy pursued for
• 40:05
  Speaker 1: many years on the Afghan frontier, although regulated by the
• 40:09
  Speaker 1: same general principles as in Qalat, was not altogether so
• 40:13
  Speaker 1: rapidly accomplished or so entirely successful. The circumstances were in
• 40:18
  Speaker 1: some degree different and less simple. In the first place,
• 40:22
  Speaker 1: the frontier was 800 miles long and was inhabited by
• 40:26
  Speaker 1: Afghan tribes who were more predatory and intractable than the Baluchis.
• 40:31
  Speaker 1: They were not only independent of each other, but for
• 40:34
  Speaker 1: the most part acknowledged no allegiance to the Amir of Kabul.
• 40:39
  Speaker 1: Border disputes, therefore, had to be settled with individual chiefs,
• 40:43
  Speaker 1: and no opportunity was offered for our mediation in internal
• 40:47
  Speaker 1: feuds or for joint agreement on external policy, as was
• 40:51
  Speaker 1: so successfully accomplished by Sandeman in Balochistan. There was no
• 40:56
  Speaker 1: general federation with which we could enter into negotiation. As
• 41:00
  Speaker 1: a consequence, we were compelled to maintain a large force
• 41:04
  Speaker 1: and fortified posts along the frontier, and many punitive expeditions
• 41:09
  Speaker 1: became necessary from time to time, against lawless, offending tribes. Still,
• 41:15
  Speaker 1: on the whole, and considering the difficulties of the situation,
• 41:18
  Speaker 1: the policy of conciliation, subsidies, and of non-interference with their
• 41:23
  Speaker 1: internal affairs gradually succeeded. Raids, once chronic, became exceptional, and
• 41:29
  Speaker 1: were dealt with rather as matters of frontier policy than
• 41:32
  Speaker 1: of war. Footnote. See Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1878, page 30.
• 41:40
  Speaker 1: and Balochistan, number 3, 1878. It must also be remembered,
• 41:46
  Speaker 1: as an additional complication, that in annexing the Punjab, although
• 41:50
  Speaker 1: it is essentially the country of the Sikhs, who are Hindus,
• 41:54
  Speaker 1: the inhabitants of the Transindus districts are for the most
• 41:57
  Speaker 1: part what are termed Punjabi Muslims, that is, Afghans, in race,
• 42:02
  Speaker 1: religion and language. From what has been said as to
• 42:06
  Speaker 1: our dealings with the border tribes, it will be evident
• 42:09
  Speaker 1: that while our difficulties were continuous and often serious, still
• 42:13
  Speaker 1: they were chiefly local, and that the defence of the
• 42:16
  Speaker 1: empire on that frontier against foreign aggression depended in a
• 42:21
  Speaker 1: great measure on our relations with the ruler of Afghanistan itself.
• 42:25
  Speaker 1: When Dost Mohammad, after the Great War, returned in 1843
• 42:30
  Speaker 1: to his former position as emir of that distracted country,
• 42:34
  Speaker 1: It was hardly to be expected that, although acquiescing in
• 42:37
  Speaker 1: his reinstatement, we should be regarded by him in a
• 42:41
  Speaker 1: friendly light. Still, some years passed away without any important
• 42:45
  Speaker 1: change in our relative positions, one way or the other.
• 42:50
  Speaker 1: In 1855, Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General, and a treaty was
• 42:55
  Speaker 1: made with Dost Mohammed, by which both parties agreed to
• 42:59
  Speaker 1: respect each other's territories. In January 1857, a still more
• 43:04
  Speaker 1: important one followed. We were then once more at war
• 43:07
  Speaker 1: with Persia, and at a meeting between Sir John Lawrence
• 43:10
  Speaker 1: and the Emir, an agreement was entered into that Dost Muhammad,
• 43:14
  Speaker 1: acting in cooperation with us, should receive £ 10, 000 a month
• 43:19
  Speaker 1: for military purposes to continue during the war, that English
• 43:23
  Speaker 1: officers should reside in his country temporarily to keep the
• 43:27
  Speaker 1: Indian government informed, but not to interfere with the administration,
• 43:32
  Speaker 1: and that when peace ensued they should be withdrawn, and
• 43:35
  Speaker 1: a native agent alone remain as our representative. Footnote. In
• 43:40
  Speaker 1: view of the strong objection to the presence of English
• 43:43
  Speaker 1: officers in Afghanistan, Sir John Lawrence intimated to the Viceroy
• 43:47
  Speaker 1: of India that he had given an assurance to Dost
• 43:50
  Speaker 1: Muhammad that it should not be enforced unless imperatively necessary.
• 43:54
  Speaker 1: End footnote. It is important to note that this friendly
• 43:59
  Speaker 1: treaty was made at Peshawar, just before the Great Mutiny,
• 44:03
  Speaker 1: and that the Emir, though urged by his people to
• 44:06
  Speaker 1: attack us in our hour of danger, remained faithful and
• 44:09
  Speaker 1: would not allow them to cross the border. Dost Muhammad
• 44:14
  Speaker 1: died in June 1863, and for some years after his death,
• 44:19
  Speaker 1: family feuds and intestine wars occurred as to his successor.
• 44:24
  Speaker 1: during which we carefully abstained from interference, and were prepared
• 44:28
  Speaker 1: to acknowledge the de facto ruler. Ultimately, in 1868, his son,
• 44:33
  Speaker 1: Shir Ali, established his authority in Afghanistan, and was acknowledged accordingly.
• 44:39
  Speaker 1: Lord Lawrence was then the Viceroy, and in a dispatch
• 44:42
  Speaker 1: to the Secretary of State, expressed his views as regards
• 44:46
  Speaker 1: the advances of Russia. After pointing out that they were
• 44:49
  Speaker 1: now paramount in Central Asia, He suggested a mutual agreement
• 44:54
  Speaker 1: as to our respective spheres and relations with the tribes
• 44:57
  Speaker 1: and nations with whom we were now both in contact,
• 45:01
  Speaker 1: and he went on to welcome the civilising effect of
• 45:03
  Speaker 1: Russian government over the wild tribes of the steppes, and
• 45:07
  Speaker 1: pointed out that if Russia were assured of our loyal
• 45:10
  Speaker 1: feeling in these matters, she would have no jealousy in
• 45:13
  Speaker 1: regard of our alliance with the Afghans. The Secretary of State,
• 45:19
  Speaker 1: Sir Stafford Northcote, replied, quote, that the conquests which Russia
• 45:24
  Speaker 1: had made, and apparently is still making, in Central Asia,
• 45:27
  Speaker 1: appear to be the natural result of the circumstances in
• 45:30
  Speaker 1: which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground
• 45:34
  Speaker 1: whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the
• 45:39
  Speaker 1: part of this country. It is a great misfortune that
• 45:43
  Speaker 1: such sensible, conciliatory views did not continue to guide our
• 45:47
  Speaker 1: policy in the event's which a few years later led
• 45:50
  Speaker 1: us into the Second Great War in Afghanistan. Shir Ali
• 45:55
  Speaker 1: did not inherit the great qualities of his father, and
• 45:59
  Speaker 1: was also somewhat discontented that we had not abetted his
• 46:02
  Speaker 1: cause during the internal troubles in Afghanistan. However, in 1869
• 46:08
  Speaker 1: he met Lord Mayo at Ambala, and after careful discussion
• 46:12
  Speaker 1: it was agreed that we should abstain from sending British
• 46:15
  Speaker 1: officers across the frontier. and from interfering in Afghan affairs,
• 46:20
  Speaker 1: that our desire was that a strong, friendly and independent
• 46:24
  Speaker 1: government should be established in that country. It was further
• 46:27
  Speaker 1: decided to give Shir Ali considerable pecuniary assistance and presence
• 46:33
  Speaker 1: of arms from time to time. The Emir, while gratified
• 46:37
  Speaker 1: at these results, wished us also to give a dynastic
• 46:40
  Speaker 1: pledge as to his lineal descendants, which, however, was not
• 46:45
  Speaker 1: acceded to. In 1873, Lord Northbrook was Viceroy of India,
• 46:50
  Speaker 1: and a further conference took place at Simla with the
• 46:53
  Speaker 1: Emir's Prime Minister, chiefly as to the northern Afghan frontier
• 46:58
  Speaker 1: in Badakhstan and Wakhan, which were at the time somewhat
• 47:01
  Speaker 1: uncertain and a matter of dispute with Russia. This somewhat
• 47:06
  Speaker 1: delicate question was, however, settled in a friendly manner by
• 47:10
  Speaker 1: Lord Granville, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Prince
• 47:14
  Speaker 1: Gorchakov's final dispatch to him on the subject was as follows. Footnote,
• 47:19
  Speaker 1: Central Asia, 1873, circa 699. Quote, The divergence which existed
• 47:26
  Speaker 1: in our views was with regard to the frontiers assigned
• 47:29
  Speaker 1: to the dominion of Shir Ali. The English government includes
• 47:33
  Speaker 1: within them Badakhstan and Wakhan, which according to our views
• 47:37
  Speaker 1: enjoyed a certain independence. considering the difficulty experienced in establishing
• 47:42
  Speaker 1: the facts in all their details in these distant parts,
• 47:46
  Speaker 1: considering the greater facilities which the British Government possesses for
• 47:50
  Speaker 1: collecting precise detail, and above all considering our wish not
• 47:54
  Speaker 1: to give to this question of detail greater importance than
• 47:58
  Speaker 1: is due to it, we do not refuse to accept
• 48:01
  Speaker 1: the boundary line laid down by England. We are the
• 48:04
  Speaker 1: more inclined to this act of courtesy, as the English
• 48:07
  Speaker 1: government engages to use all its influence with Shir Ali
• 48:11
  Speaker 1: in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude,
• 48:15
  Speaker 1: as well as to insist on his giving up all
• 48:17
  Speaker 1: measures of aggression or further conquest. This influence is indisputable.
• 48:23
  Speaker 1: It is based not only on the material and moral
• 48:26
  Speaker 1: ascendancy of England, but also on the subsidies for which
• 48:29
  Speaker 1: Shir Ali is indebted to her. Such being the case,
• 48:32
  Speaker 1: we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: maintenance of peace. Prince Gorchakov admitted more than once that
• 48:43
  Speaker 1: the Emperor of Russia looked upon Afghanistan as completely outside
• 48:47
  Speaker 1: the sphere of Russian influence, and within that of ours,
• 48:51
  Speaker 1: at the same time claiming similar independence for Russia in
• 48:55
  Speaker 1: Central Asia. During the next few years, subsequent to the
• 49:00
  Speaker 1: similar conference, Shir Ali, though he had received considerable assistance
• 49:05
  Speaker 1: from us, both in money and arms, was not altogether satisfied,
• 49:09
  Speaker 1: and one or two incidents occurred during that period which
• 49:12
  Speaker 1: gave him umbrage. Lord Northbrook, the viceroy in 1875, was
• 49:17
  Speaker 1: not unaware of the somewhat cold and capricious spirit of
• 49:20
  Speaker 1: the Emir, but in writing to London he pointed out
• 49:24
  Speaker 1: that Shir Ali's situation was difficult, not only from the
• 49:27
  Speaker 1: risk of revolution at home, but also of attack from abroad,
• 49:32
  Speaker 1: and that on the whole he was to be relied on.
• 49:35
  Speaker 1: A change, however, was coming over the scene. and our
• 49:39
  Speaker 1: policy reverted from conciliation to compulsion. It was a critical
• 49:44
  Speaker 1: period in the history of frontier policy and demands careful consideration.
• 49:50
  Speaker 1: It must not be forgotten that, although amongst those best
• 49:54
  Speaker 1: qualified to judge, the majority had long been opposed to
• 49:58
  Speaker 1: advance and conquest in territories beyond our northwest frontier and
• 50:03
  Speaker 1: entertained but little fear of Russian aggressive power, still there
• 50:07
  Speaker 1: were others who, men of long experience who had filled
• 50:10
  Speaker 1: higher positions in India, who held different views, and it
• 50:15
  Speaker 1: is probable that not only successive British governments, but the
• 50:18
  Speaker 1: public generally, who have no time for carefully weighing the
• 50:22
  Speaker 1: diverse aspects of the subject, were influenced sometimes one way,
• 50:26
  Speaker 1: sometimes another. In the many difficulties connected with our worldwide empire,
• 50:32
  Speaker 1: this must always be more or less the case. For instance,
• 50:35
  Speaker 1: the late Sir H. Rawlinson a few years before the
• 50:39
  Speaker 1: Second Afghan War, took a very alarmist view of the
• 50:43
  Speaker 1: progress of Russia, not only in Central Asia, but also
• 50:46
  Speaker 1: in Asia Minor. He considered that her advance from Orenburg
• 50:50
  Speaker 1: was only part of one great scheme of invasion, and
• 50:54
  Speaker 1: he averred that the conquest of the Caucasus had given
• 50:57
  Speaker 1: her such a strong position that there was no military
• 51:00
  Speaker 1: or physical obstacle to the continuous march of Russia from
• 51:04
  Speaker 1: the Arexes to the Indus. Footnote. Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1878.
• 51:10
  Speaker 1: He described it as the unerring certainty of a law
• 51:15
  Speaker 1: of nature, but throughout he ignores distances, blots out the mountains,
• 51:20
  Speaker 1: deserts and arid plains of Persia and Afghanistan, and takes
• 51:24
  Speaker 1: no account of the warlike races who would bar the path.
• 51:28
  Speaker 1: It requires a very large map to embrace all the
• 51:32
  Speaker 1: details of this widespread strategy. Some account has already been
• 51:37
  Speaker 1: given of the weakness, in a military point of view,
• 51:40
  Speaker 1: of Russia in Central Asia, and of the distance of
• 51:43
  Speaker 1: her scattered troops from the main resources of the Empire. But,
• 51:47
  Speaker 1: in addition, it must be remembered that the mountains of
• 51:50
  Speaker 1: Afghanistan also form a natural and enduring barrier against a
• 51:55
  Speaker 1: further advance. The great Hindu Kush range, running all along
• 52:00
  Speaker 1: the northern part of that country, forms indeed the real
• 52:03
  Speaker 1: scientific frontier between the two empires. The few passes over
• 52:08
  Speaker 1: its snowy crests, ranging from 12,000 to 18,000 feet high,
• 52:13
  Speaker 1: and only open for a few months in the year.
• 52:17
  Speaker 1: Another supposed line of advance for a Russian army, namely
• 52:21
  Speaker 1: by the Pamirs, has of late years been brought forward.
• 52:25
  Speaker 1: but its main features are more discouraging than those of
• 52:28
  Speaker 1: any other. This elevated region consists of a mass of bare,
• 52:32
  Speaker 1: snow-capped mountains, attaining elevations of over 25,000 feet, intersected by
• 52:39
  Speaker 1: plateau almost as devoid of vegetation as the mountains themselves.
• 52:44
  Speaker 1: The lakes are about 12,000 feet above sea level. The
• 52:48
  Speaker 1: population is scanty and consists chiefly of nomads in search
• 52:52
  Speaker 1: of food and pasture during the short summer. so that
• 52:56
  Speaker 1: although the Russians might, if unopposed, possibly move in small
• 53:00
  Speaker 1: isolated detachments carrying their own food and munitions over the Pamirs,
• 53:05
  Speaker 1: it would only be to lose themselves in the gorges
• 53:08
  Speaker 1: of the Himalayas. The conditions above mentioned are for the
• 53:13
  Speaker 1: most part permanent. Russia may not, and probably has not,
• 53:17
  Speaker 1: any intention of trying to invade and conquer India, but
• 53:21
  Speaker 1: she has not the power, which is a far more
• 53:23
  Speaker 1: important consideration. to return to the position of affairs previous
• 53:29
  Speaker 1: to the Second Afghan War. Footnote, see Afghanistan, 1878, published
• 53:35
  Speaker 1: by the Secretary of State for India, pages 128 and following.
• 53:40
  Speaker 1: Early in 1875, Lord Northbrook, the Governor-General, received a dispatch
• 53:46
  Speaker 1: from the government at home, pointing out that the information
• 53:49
  Speaker 1: received from Afghanistan, not only in respect to internal intrigues,
• 53:53
  Speaker 1: but also as regards the influence of foreign powers, was
• 53:56
  Speaker 1: scanty and not always trustworthy. He was therefore instructed to
• 54:02
  Speaker 1: procure the assent of the Amir to the establishment of
• 54:05
  Speaker 1: a British agency at Herat and also at Kandahar. The
• 54:09
  Speaker 1: Viceroy of India and his council, having consulted various experienced
• 54:14
  Speaker 1: officers on the subject, replied in June that in their
• 54:17
  Speaker 1: opinion the present time and circumstances were unsuitable for taking
• 54:22
  Speaker 1: the initiative. They pointed out that the Serdars and many
• 54:26
  Speaker 1: of the people of Afghanistan would strongly object, and that
• 54:29
  Speaker 1: in the Emir's somewhat insecure position he could not afford
• 54:33
  Speaker 1: to disregard their feelings in the matter. They advised patience
• 54:37
  Speaker 1: and conciliation. In November 1875 a second dispatch was received
• 54:43
  Speaker 1: from England, reiterating the necessity of more complete information as
• 54:47
  Speaker 1: to Afghanistan, especially in view of recent Russian advances in
• 54:52
  Speaker 1: Central Asia. and the Viceroy was directed to send a
• 54:55
  Speaker 1: mission to Kabul without delay, to confer with the Emir
• 54:58
  Speaker 1: on Central Asia, and requesting that British officers should be
• 55:02
  Speaker 1: placed on the frontier to watch the course of events.
• 55:06
  Speaker 1: The Government of India, in January 1876, again urged the
• 55:11
  Speaker 1: undesirability of forcing the hands of the Emir, and pointed
• 55:16
  Speaker 1: out that his objections to English officers were not from
• 55:19
  Speaker 1: a feeling of disloyalty, and that to force his hands
• 55:22
  Speaker 1: was not desirable. They did not apprehend any desire of
• 55:26
  Speaker 1: interference on the part of Russia, and they concluded by
• 55:29
  Speaker 1: alluding to the careful conciliatory policy carried out by Lords Canning,
• 55:34
  Speaker 1: Lawrence and Mayo, as giving the best promise of peace
• 55:37
  Speaker 1: and satisfactory results in Afghanistan. Consequently, they deprecated the proposed
• 55:43
  Speaker 1: action by the Home Government, enforcing British officers upon Shir Ali.
• 55:49
  Speaker 1: In April 1876, Lord Northbrook quitted India and was succeeded
• 55:54
  Speaker 1: by Lord Lytton, and a further reply from Lord Salisbury,
• 55:58
  Speaker 1: the Secretary of State for India, was received by the Viceroy.
• 56:02
  Speaker 1: It reiterated that the government at home considered our trans-frontier
• 56:06
  Speaker 1: relations unsatisfactory, that permanent British agencies should be established in Afghanistan,
• 56:13
  Speaker 1: and that we were willing to afford the Emir material
• 56:16
  Speaker 1: support against unprovoked aggression, our object being to maintain a
• 56:20
  Speaker 1: strong and friendly power in that country. The dispatch went
• 56:24
  Speaker 1: on to say that should the Emir decline to meet
• 56:27
  Speaker 1: our request, he should be informed that he was isolating
• 56:30
  Speaker 1: himself from us at his peril. The next step was
• 56:34
  Speaker 1: taken in May, when the Emir was invited to receive
• 56:37
  Speaker 1: a special mission, which he politely declined. In October, our
• 56:42
  Speaker 1: native agent at Kabul came to Simla and had an
• 56:45
  Speaker 1: interview with Lord Lytton, who reiterated the demands of the
• 56:49
  Speaker 1: British government, pointing out that in the event of a refusal,
• 56:53
  Speaker 1: there was nothing to prevent our joining Russia in wiping
• 56:56
  Speaker 1: Afghanistan out of the map altogether, of which Shir Ali
• 57:00
  Speaker 1: was duly informed. In January 1877, a final effort was
• 57:06
  Speaker 1: made to come to terms, and Sir Lewis Pelly and
• 57:10
  Speaker 1: the Afghan Prime Minister, Noor Mohammed, had a conference at Peshawar,
• 57:15
  Speaker 1: The first, and indeed the only point discussed, was the
• 57:18
  Speaker 1: demand that British representatives should reside in Afghanistan, which was
• 57:23
  Speaker 1: a sine qua non. Nur Muhammad pathetically pleaded that Lords Lawrence,
• 57:28
  Speaker 1: Mayo and Northbrook, successive viceroys, had all in turn promised
• 57:33
  Speaker 1: that this should not be insisted on, and he ended
• 57:36
  Speaker 1: by saying that Shir Ali would rather perish than submit.
• 57:40
  Speaker 1: It was evident that further discussion was useless, and the
• 57:43
  Speaker 1: conference was closed. nor Muhammad, who was ill, dying shortly afterwards.
• 57:49
  Speaker 1: In March 1887, our native agent at Kabul was withdrawn,
• 57:54
  Speaker 1: and direct communication with Shir Ali ceased. I have given
• 58:00
  Speaker 1: above resume of the correspondence in 1875-77, and of the
• 58:06
  Speaker 1: abortive efforts to induce the Emir to comply with our demands,
• 58:10
  Speaker 1: because it is evident that if he continued to resist...
• 58:13
  Speaker 1: Compulsion must almost inevitably ensue. At about the same time, Quetta,
• 58:19
  Speaker 1: in the Bolam, was occupied by a considerable British force,
• 58:23
  Speaker 1: which was naturally regarded as a threat on Afghanistan. A
• 58:27
  Speaker 1: concentration of troops also took place in the northern Punjab,
• 58:32
  Speaker 1: and preparations were made for the construction of bridges over
• 58:35
  Speaker 1: the Indus. All these were indications of coming war. It
• 58:40
  Speaker 1: must also be noted that our relations with Russia in
• 58:42
  Speaker 1: Europe were much strained at the time, so that probably
• 58:46
  Speaker 1: the preparations in India were in some degree due to
• 58:49
  Speaker 1: the apprehension of war in other parts of the world.
• 58:54
  Speaker 1: In the summer of 1878, a Russian envoy arrived at Kabul,
• 58:59
  Speaker 1: which under the circumstances is hardly to be wondered at.
• 59:02
  Speaker 1: Some months, however, elapsed, and it was not until November
• 59:06
  Speaker 1: 1878 that war was declared. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, in
• 59:11
  Speaker 1: his proclamation stated, quote, that for ten years we had
• 59:16
  Speaker 1: been friendly to Shir Ali, had assisted him with money
• 59:19
  Speaker 1: and arms, and had secured for him formal recognition of
• 59:22
  Speaker 1: his northern frontier by Russia, unquote. It went on to
• 59:26
  Speaker 1: state that in return he had requited us with active ill-will,
• 59:31
  Speaker 1: had closed the passes and allowed British traders to be plundered,
• 59:35
  Speaker 1: and had endeavoured to stir up religious hatred against us.
• 59:39
  Speaker 1: It then pointed out that whilst refusing a British mission,
• 59:43
  Speaker 1: he had received one from Russia, and ended by saying
• 59:46
  Speaker 1: that we had no quarrel with the Afghans but only
• 59:49
  Speaker 1: with Shir Ali himself. From official correspondence published subsequently— Footnote,
• 59:56
  Speaker 1: Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, 1881, No. 2, Chapter 2811. It appeared
• 1:00:03
  Speaker 1: that in entering Afghanistan our chief object at the outset
• 1:00:07
  Speaker 1: was to establish what was called a strategical triangle, by
• 1:00:11
  Speaker 1: the occupation of Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad, and it was
• 1:00:15
  Speaker 1: stated that by holding this position, entrenched behind a rampart
• 1:00:19
  Speaker 1: of mountains, we should have the power of debouching on
• 1:00:22
  Speaker 1: the plains of the Oxus against Russia and and Central Asia.
• 1:00:27
  Speaker 1: It is difficult, said Lord Lytton, to imagine a more commanding,
• 1:00:31
  Speaker 1: strategical position. The events of war, however, soon put an
• 1:00:36
  Speaker 1: end to this somewhat fanciful strategy. In November 1878, the
• 1:00:42
  Speaker 1: British forces entered the country by three main routes, the Khyber,
• 1:00:46
  Speaker 1: the Khorram, and the Bolam, and hard fighting had once
• 1:00:50
  Speaker 1: ensued on the two northern ones. The results were immediate,
• 1:00:55
  Speaker 1: Shir Ali fled northwards and died soon after. His son,
• 1:00:59
  Speaker 1: Yaqub Khan, assumed temporarily the position of Amir, but in
• 1:01:03
  Speaker 1: the convulsed state of the country he possessed little real
• 1:01:07
  Speaker 1: power or authority. In May 1879 he met the British
• 1:01:12
  Speaker 1: authorities at Gondomuk, and after considerable consideration signed a treaty,
• 1:01:18
  Speaker 1: the chief points of which were as follows. The foreign
• 1:01:21
  Speaker 1: affairs of Afghanistan were to be under our guidance. and
• 1:01:24
  Speaker 1: we undertook to support the Emir against foreign aggression. British
• 1:01:29
  Speaker 1: agents were to reside in the country. The Quorum, Pishin
• 1:01:33
  Speaker 1: and Sibi valleys were assigned to the British government, and finally,
• 1:01:37
  Speaker 1: Yacoub Khan was to receive an annual subsidy of £ 60, 000.
• 1:01:41
  Speaker 1: So far, it would appear as if the campaign had
• 1:01:47
  Speaker 1: at once realised the main objects of British policy, but
• 1:01:51
  Speaker 1: tragic events rapidly followed. Active hostilities were resumed, and the
• 1:01:56
  Speaker 1: Treaty of Gondomuk became mere waste paper. As a result
• 1:02:01
  Speaker 1: of the treaty, Sir Louis Cavagnari, footnote, Afghanistan, 1881, number 1,
• 1:02:08
  Speaker 1: was appointed our envoy, and accompanied by a few officers
• 1:02:12
  Speaker 1: and a small escort, arrived at Kabul in July, being
• 1:02:16
  Speaker 1: received in a friendly manner by the emir. although influences
• 1:02:20
  Speaker 1: adverse to his presence in the capital soon became apparent. Suddenly,
• 1:02:25
  Speaker 1: on September 3rd, the British residency was attacked by several
• 1:02:29
  Speaker 1: Afghan regiments, and after a desperate resistance, Cavagnari and the
• 1:02:34
  Speaker 1: whole of his officers and escort perished. This deplorable event,
• 1:02:40
  Speaker 1: of course, upset all previous arrangements, and led to an
• 1:02:44
  Speaker 1: immediate resumption of hostilities, Our troops at once advanced and
• 1:02:48
  Speaker 1: captured Kabul, Yaqub Khan voluntarily abdicating and becoming an exile
• 1:02:53
  Speaker 1: in India. Ghuzni also was occupied shortly afterwards by our
• 1:02:58
  Speaker 1: advance from Kandahar. The government in India, in a dispatch
• 1:03:03
  Speaker 1: in January 1880, pointed out that, in view of the
• 1:03:07
  Speaker 1: complete change in the political situation, it was necessary in
• 1:03:11
  Speaker 1: the first place fully to establish our military position in
• 1:03:15
  Speaker 1: the country. They acknowledged that the hopes entertained of establishing
• 1:03:19
  Speaker 1: a strong, friendly and independent kingdom on our frontier had collapsed,
• 1:03:24
  Speaker 1: and that Afghanistan had fallen to pieces at the first blow,
• 1:03:29
  Speaker 1: its provinces being now disconnected and masterless. In view of
• 1:03:33
  Speaker 1: these unexpected results, they went on to recommend the permanent
• 1:03:37
  Speaker 1: separation of the provinces under separate rulers, and having regard
• 1:03:42
  Speaker 1: to the special difficulties connected with Herat, advocated its being
• 1:03:46
  Speaker 1: handed over to Persia. This was indeed a policy of despair.
• 1:03:54
  Speaker 1: Lord Hartington, who had become Secretary of State for India,
• 1:03:58
  Speaker 1: writing in May 1880, summed up the situation as follows,
• 1:04:03
  Speaker 1: It appears that as the result of two successful campaigns,
• 1:04:07
  Speaker 1: of the employment of an enormous force, and of the
• 1:04:10
  Speaker 1: expenditure of large sums of money, Long and careful consideration
• 1:04:14
  Speaker 1: was naturally given to the solution of the difficulty in
• 1:04:16
  Speaker 1: which this country found itself, owing to the untoward circumstances
• 1:04:20
  Speaker 1: just related. Two important decisions were, however, ultimately arrived at. Footnote, Afghanistan, 1881,
• 1:04:49
  Speaker 1: number 1. 1. That authority in Afghanistan and the unity
• 1:04:55
  Speaker 1: of its provinces should as far as possible be restored
• 1:04:58
  Speaker 1: by the appointment of a new emir, and Abdul Rahman,
• 1:05:02
  Speaker 1: a nephew of Shir Ali, who had been for 12
• 1:05:05
  Speaker 1: years in exile in Bukhara, was invited to Kabul and
• 1:05:09
  Speaker 1: was supported by us in assuming the title. The chief
• 1:05:12
  Speaker 1: conditions were that his foreign policy was to be under
• 1:05:15
  Speaker 1: our guidance, that no English officers were to reside as
• 1:05:19
  Speaker 1: our representatives in Afghanistan, and that he was to receive
• 1:05:23
  Speaker 1: a subsidy. 2. That the British troops should be withdrawn
• 1:05:28
  Speaker 1: as soon as the pacification of the country would permit.
• 1:05:31
  Speaker 1: This decision was recommended not only by the Viceroy, the
• 1:05:35
  Speaker 1: Marquess of Ripon, but by the higher officers who had
• 1:05:38
  Speaker 1: held command during the war. Sir Donald Stewart who was
• 1:05:42
  Speaker 1: in chief command, and Sir Frederick Roberts, both concurred in
• 1:05:46
  Speaker 1: our withdrawal from the country. The Khyber Pass was to
• 1:05:50
  Speaker 1: be held by subsidised tribes, and the Khurram Valley to
• 1:05:53
  Speaker 1: be altogether abandoned, the independence of the tribes being in
• 1:05:57
  Speaker 1: each case recognised. Sir John Watson, who was in command
• 1:06:02
  Speaker 1: in that valley, pointed out that as a route from
• 1:06:04
  Speaker 1: India into Afghanistan it was practically useless. As a further
• 1:06:08
  Speaker 1: argument in favour of withdrawal, it may be well to
• 1:06:12
  Speaker 1: allude to the fact that the men of our native
• 1:06:14
  Speaker 1: regiments were sick of serving in Afghanistan far away from
• 1:06:18
  Speaker 1: their homes, and that it would be impolitic to keep
• 1:06:21
  Speaker 1: them there. Some differences of opinion existed as to whether
• 1:06:26
  Speaker 1: we should relinquish possession of Kandahar, but as it was
• 1:06:29
  Speaker 1: 400 miles from the Indus in a foreign country, and
• 1:06:33
  Speaker 1: as our remaining there would not only be hateful to
• 1:06:36
  Speaker 1: the Afghans, but in a military sense would be dangerous
• 1:06:39
  Speaker 1: and costly, its final abandonment was decided on, the Valley
• 1:06:44
  Speaker 1: of Pishin between Kandahar and Quetta being alone retained by
• 1:06:48
  Speaker 1: the British government. So ended the Great War of 1878-80.
• 1:06:54
  Speaker 1: At its close we had over 70,000 men in Afghanistan,
• 1:06:59
  Speaker 1: or on the border in reserve, and even then we
• 1:07:02
  Speaker 1: really only held the territory within range of our guns.
• 1:07:06
  Speaker 1: The whole country had been disintegrated and was in anarchy,
• 1:07:10
  Speaker 1: whilst the total cost of the war exceeded twenty million sterling,
• 1:07:14
  Speaker 1: being about the same amount as had been expended in
• 1:07:17
  Speaker 1: the former Great War of 1839-41. The military operations in
• 1:07:23
  Speaker 1: themselves had been conducted throughout with great skill in a
• 1:07:26
  Speaker 1: most difficult country, and the troops, both British and native,
• 1:07:31
  Speaker 1: had proved themselves admirable soldiers. but as regards the policy
• 1:07:35
  Speaker 1: which led us into war, it appears to have been
• 1:07:38
  Speaker 1: as unjust in principle as it was unfortunate in result.
• 1:07:42
  Speaker 1: The facts, however, speak for themselves. Indian Frontier Policy An
• 1:07:51
  Speaker 1: Historical Sketch By General Sir John Adai, GCB, RA Chapter
• 1:07:58
  Speaker 1: 3 Frontier Policy Since the Second Afghan War including the
• 1:08:03
  Speaker 1: expedition to Chitral, covering further advance of Russia, Merv occupied,
• 1:08:10
  Speaker 1: Sir West Ridgeway's frontier commission of 1885, the Durand Agreement
• 1:08:15
  Speaker 1: with Abdul Rahman, the Chitral expedition of 1895 and its results,
• 1:08:21
  Speaker 1: a sudden outbreak of frontier tribes 1897. The reaction after
• 1:08:28
  Speaker 1: the war naturally inclined the authorities in both countries to
• 1:08:32
  Speaker 1: leave frontier policy alone, at all events for the time.
• 1:08:37
  Speaker 1: Our professed object for years had been to make Afghanistan strong,
• 1:08:41
  Speaker 1: friendly and independent. The first had certainly not been accomplished,
• 1:08:47
  Speaker 1: and the other two were doubtful. Still, by patience, conciliation
• 1:08:51
  Speaker 1: and subsidies, we might hope in the course of time
• 1:08:55
  Speaker 1: that the wounds we had inflicted would gradually be healed,
• 1:08:59
  Speaker 1: and a more stable condition. ensue. For a short period
• 1:09:03
  Speaker 1: it was so, but then the old bugbear of Russian
• 1:09:06
  Speaker 1: advance over the dreary wastes of Central Asia again supervened,
• 1:09:11
  Speaker 1: and exercised its malign influence on our policy. In 1881
• 1:09:16
  Speaker 1: and the following years, Russia, whilst completing her conquests and
• 1:09:22
  Speaker 1: improving her communications in the southwestern part of Central Asia,
• 1:09:27
  Speaker 1: became involved in somewhat prolonged hostilities with the Teke Turkomans,
• 1:09:32
  Speaker 1: ending in their subjugation and in the occupation of the long,
• 1:09:36
  Speaker 1: desolate strip of country extending eastwards from the Caspian, which
• 1:09:40
  Speaker 1: had hitherto been independent. A railway was gradually constructed from
• 1:09:46
  Speaker 1: the vicinity of Krasnovodsk on the Caspian towards Samarkand. Merv,
• 1:09:51
  Speaker 1: formerly a city of importance, but of late a mere
• 1:09:54
  Speaker 1: village in the desert, was also occupied. These acquisitions of Russia,
• 1:09:59
  Speaker 1: accomplished in districts far removed from India, would not appear
• 1:10:03
  Speaker 1: to involve any special consideration on our part, but as
• 1:10:07
  Speaker 1: the southern frontiers of Russia were thus became conterminous for
• 1:10:11
  Speaker 1: a long distance with northern Persia, and also with some
• 1:10:14
  Speaker 1: districts of Afghanistan, their new position was regarded as possibly
• 1:10:19
  Speaker 1: involving designs against our Indian Empire, and remonstrances were made
• 1:10:23
  Speaker 1: by us, more especially as regards the occupation of Merv.
• 1:10:33
  Speaker 1: In a strategical point of view, the question would not
• 1:10:35
  Speaker 1: appear to be of much importance, and would probably have dropped,
• 1:10:40
  Speaker 1: but in early 1885 the Russians attacked and drove the
• 1:10:44
  Speaker 1: Afghan troops out of Penje, a small, hitherto almost unknown
• 1:10:48
  Speaker 1: village in the desert. It was a high-handed measure, and
• 1:10:53
  Speaker 1: the relations between the two governments, British and Russian, which
• 1:10:56
  Speaker 1: were already rather strained, became critical, and war at one
• 1:11:00
  Speaker 1: moment appeared to be almost inevitable. It is not necessary,
• 1:11:05
  Speaker 1: nor would it be desirable, now to recapitulate the details
• 1:11:09
  Speaker 1: of this serious crisis, because, happily, owing to the prudence
• 1:11:13
  Speaker 1: exercised by both governments, the danger gradually passed away, a
• 1:11:18
  Speaker 1: joint commission being agreed on to meet on the frontier
• 1:11:21
  Speaker 1: and to report as to its delimitation. It may, however,
• 1:11:25
  Speaker 1: be as well to mention that it seems rather doubtful
• 1:11:28
  Speaker 1: whether Penje at the time absolutely belonged to Afghanistan, Frontiers
• 1:11:34
  Speaker 1: in the east are proverbially uncertain and shifting, and in
• 1:11:37
  Speaker 1: our own official maps, not very long before the occurrences
• 1:11:41
  Speaker 1: in question, it was marked as outside the Afghan border.
• 1:11:45
  Speaker 1: Colonel Stewart, reporting in 1884 on the northern frontier of
• 1:11:50
  Speaker 1: Afghanistan and alluding to Penjay, said that it was inhabited
• 1:11:54
  Speaker 1: by Turkomans, and he thus described the position, quote, Unquote.
• 1:12:22
  Speaker 1: The appointment of a joint commission of Russian and British
• 1:12:26
  Speaker 1: officers to delimit the northern frontiers of Afghanistan proved of
• 1:12:30
  Speaker 1: great value, not only in gaining information regarding districts hitherto
• 1:12:34
  Speaker 1: but little known, but also because its conjoint work tended
• 1:12:38
  Speaker 1: to engender feelings of respect and goodwill between the two
• 1:12:42
  Speaker 1: nations concerned. Its labours commenced in the autumn of 1885,
• 1:12:48
  Speaker 1: and the report of Sir West Ridgeway, the British commissioner,
• 1:12:52
  Speaker 1: is full of interest and encouragement. In an article in
• 1:12:56
  Speaker 1: the 19th century of October 1887 on the completion of
• 1:13:00
  Speaker 1: his work, he gives some details of the country and
• 1:13:04
  Speaker 1: also of the position of Russia in Central Asia, which
• 1:13:07
  Speaker 1: are worth quoting. As to the Afghan border, he says,
• 1:13:12
  Speaker 1: The three or four hundred miles of country through which
• 1:13:14
  Speaker 1: the new northwestern frontier of Afghanistan runs is a sandy, treeless,
• 1:13:20
  Speaker 1: waterless desert. except where it is traversed from south to
• 1:13:24
  Speaker 1: north by the hairy rood, the murgab and the oxus.
• 1:13:28
  Speaker 1: The only cultivable land is on the banks of these rivers,
• 1:13:32
  Speaker 1: but in springtime, after the winter snows have melted, the
• 1:13:35
  Speaker 1: intervening plains afford good grazing for sheep. But perhaps the
• 1:13:41
  Speaker 1: most important part of his article is his view of
• 1:13:44
  Speaker 1: the position of Russia in Central Asia. If any Russian general...
• 1:13:49
  Speaker 1: were so reckless as to attempt the invasion of India,
• 1:13:53
  Speaker 1: and relying on the single line of lightly constructed rails
• 1:13:57
  Speaker 1: which connects the Caspian with the Oxus, and which are
• 1:14:00
  Speaker 1: liable in summer to be blocked by the moving sands
• 1:14:03
  Speaker 1: of the desert, and in winter by the falling snows
• 1:14:06
  Speaker 1: of heaven, if, relying on this frail and precarious base,
• 1:14:10
  Speaker 1: he were to move an army through the barren plains
• 1:14:13
  Speaker 1: bordering the Oxus, and leaving in his rear the various
• 1:14:16
  Speaker 1: hostile and excited races of Central Asia, he were to
• 1:14:20
  Speaker 1: cross the difficult passes of the Hindu Kush, and entangle
• 1:14:24
  Speaker 1: his army into barren mountain homes of the fanatical and
• 1:14:28
  Speaker 1: treacherous Afghan, then indeed our fortunate generals may well congratulate
• 1:14:33
  Speaker 1: themselves that the Lord has delivered the enemy into their hand. Whilst, however,
• 1:14:42
  Speaker 1: his conclusions as to the military weakness of Russia in
• 1:14:45
  Speaker 1: that part of the world are clear and decisive enough,
• 1:14:48
  Speaker 1: he at the same time does full justice to the
• 1:14:51
  Speaker 1: good work which she is carrying out in that vast area.
• 1:14:55
  Speaker 1: He says, quote, Hitherto Russia's advance in Central Asia has
• 1:15:00
  Speaker 1: been the triumph of civilization. Wherever she has planted her flag,
• 1:15:05
  Speaker 1: slavery has ceased to exist. This was keenly brought home
• 1:15:09
  Speaker 1: to us in the course of our travels. For hundreds
• 1:15:12
  Speaker 1: of miles before we reached Herat, we found the country
• 1:15:15
  Speaker 1: desolated and depopulated by Turkoman raids. While even in the
• 1:15:19
  Speaker 1: Herat valley, we continually came across the fathers and brothers
• 1:15:23
  Speaker 1: of men who'd been carried off from their peaceful fields
• 1:15:27
  Speaker 1: by man-stealing Turkomans, and sold into slavery many hundred miles away.
• 1:15:33
  Speaker 1: All this has ceased since the Russian occupation of Merv,
• 1:15:37
  Speaker 1: the cruel slave trade has been stamped out, unquote. Lord Salisbury,
• 1:15:43
  Speaker 1: speaking in 1887 at the conclusion of the frontier delimitation,
• 1:15:48
  Speaker 1: happily described the situation as follows, quote, I value the
• 1:15:53
  Speaker 1: settlement for this reason, not that I attach much importance
• 1:15:57
  Speaker 1: to the square miles of desert land with which we
• 1:16:00
  Speaker 1: have been dealing, and which probably after ten generations of
• 1:16:03
  Speaker 1: mankind will not yield the slightest value to any human being,
• 1:16:08
  Speaker 1: but the settlement indicates on both sides that spirit which
• 1:16:12
  Speaker 1: in the two governments is consistent with continued peace. There
• 1:16:16
  Speaker 1: is abundant room for both governments if they would only
• 1:16:19
  Speaker 1: think so. What a pity that some statesmen could not
• 1:16:24
  Speaker 1: have persuaded England to that effect fifty years before. During
• 1:16:30
  Speaker 1: the next few years no events of special importance occurred
• 1:16:34
  Speaker 1: to affect our general frontier policy in India so far
• 1:16:38
  Speaker 1: as Russia and Afghanistan proper are concerned. The ample information
• 1:16:43
  Speaker 1: we now possess of the relative power and position of
• 1:16:45
  Speaker 1: each country and the experience gained in bygone wars enable
• 1:16:50
  Speaker 1: us to form a correct judgment of the great strength
• 1:16:53
  Speaker 1: of our empire in the East and it is to
• 1:16:56
  Speaker 1: be hoped that in the future our we shall hear
• 1:16:58
  Speaker 1: less of those alarmist views which have so frequently led
• 1:17:01
  Speaker 1: us into erroneous policy and untoward expeditions. Russia and England
• 1:17:07
  Speaker 1: are now happily on friendly terms, and Abdulrahman, the Emir
• 1:17:11
  Speaker 1: of Kabul, although his position is difficult in the midst
• 1:17:15
  Speaker 1: of a turbulent people, has proved himself a loyal neighbour.
• 1:17:20
  Speaker 1: But another cloud has appeared on the horizon, and our
• 1:17:23
  Speaker 1: troubles with the intervening frontier tribes are now apparently worse
• 1:17:27
  Speaker 1: than ever. FROM ACCOUNTS ALREADY GIVEN OF THOSE WHO DWELL
• 1:17:31
  Speaker 1: ALONG THE BORDER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT ALTHOUGH OUR DIFFERENCES
• 1:17:34
  Speaker 1: WITH THEM DURING PAST YEARS HAVE BEEN FREQUENT AND OFTEN SERIOUS,
• 1:17:38
  Speaker 1: THEY HAVE BEEN MORE OR LESS OF A LOCAL CHARACTER. TROUBLESOME,
• 1:17:42
  Speaker 1: AS OUR NEIGHBOURS HAVE PROVED, STILL THEY HAVE NO POWER
• 1:17:45
  Speaker 1: OF INFLICTING SERIOUS INJURY OR OF ENDANGERING OUR RULE. UNDER
• 1:17:50
  Speaker 1: THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE BEST POLICY, WHILE FIRMLY REPRESSING THEIR PREDATORY INTERESTS,
• 1:17:56
  Speaker 1: IS TO LEAVE THEM ALONE, In the absence of full
• 1:18:00
  Speaker 1: official information as to the origin of recent difficulties which
• 1:18:04
  Speaker 1: have culminated in the present frontier war, it is only
• 1:18:08
  Speaker 1: possible to speak in general terms. It may be mentioned,
• 1:18:12
  Speaker 1: in the first place, that, owing to the uncertain line
• 1:18:15
  Speaker 1: of demarcation between the territories of the Emir of Kabul
• 1:18:18
  Speaker 1: and those of his independent tribal neighbours, constant feuds and
• 1:18:23
  Speaker 1: local hostilities occurred from time to time in the mountains.
• 1:18:27
  Speaker 1: and with a view of defining their respective spheres, the
• 1:18:30
  Speaker 1: Government of India, in 1893, sent a mission to Kabul
• 1:18:34
  Speaker 1: for the purpose. This in itself would appear to have
• 1:18:37
  Speaker 1: been a reasonable step, and the Durand Agreement, which ensued,
• 1:18:42
  Speaker 1: but which has not been published, would, it was hoped,
• 1:18:46
  Speaker 1: tend to a cessation of conflicts between the Emir's subjects
• 1:18:50
  Speaker 1: and their neighbours. But there is a further aspect of
• 1:18:53
  Speaker 1: the question. So far as is known, not only were
• 1:18:56
  Speaker 1: the respective borders laid down, but it is understood that
• 1:19:00
  Speaker 1: in many cases the intervening tribes are now assumed to
• 1:19:04
  Speaker 1: be what is termed within the sphere of British influence.
• 1:19:09
  Speaker 1: In maps recently published, presumably with some authority, vast mountainous
• 1:19:14
  Speaker 1: districts are now included in this somewhat mysterious phrase. For instance,
• 1:19:19
  Speaker 1: the Coram Valley, the Samarna Range, the countries of the
• 1:19:23
  Speaker 1: Aphraides and the Momans, the districts of Chitral, Bajor, Deir, Swat,
• 1:19:29
  Speaker 1: Bonaire and others are all included within it. and in
• 1:19:32
  Speaker 1: many instances fortified positions occupied by British troops are to
• 1:19:37
  Speaker 1: be found either within or along their borders. Surely this
• 1:19:42
  Speaker 1: opens out a wide question, and it would be interesting
• 1:19:45
  Speaker 1: to know whether, in the discussions at Kabul, the chiefs
• 1:19:49
  Speaker 1: of the intervening tribes were present, and whether they acquiesced,
• 1:19:53
  Speaker 1: not only in the new boundaries, but also in being
• 1:19:55
  Speaker 1: included as within our sphere of influence. It is evident
• 1:20:00
  Speaker 1: it should have been a tripartite and not a dual agreement.
• 1:20:04
  Speaker 1: It is perfectly well known, and has been proved by
• 1:20:07
  Speaker 1: long experience, that these frontier tribes value their independence and
• 1:20:11
  Speaker 1: liberties beyond everything else, and will not submit peacefully to interference.
• 1:20:17
  Speaker 1: And if they were not consulted in the arrangements just described,
• 1:20:20
  Speaker 1: we may begin to trace the origin of the present crisis. Although,
• 1:20:25
  Speaker 1: as I have explained, we are unable, from want of
• 1:20:28
  Speaker 1: official information, to deal fully with the larger topic of
• 1:20:32
  Speaker 1: recent border policy, we have at all events ample details
• 1:20:36
  Speaker 1: as regards the Chitral question in the parliamentary papers published. Footnote.
• 1:20:42
  Speaker 1: North-West Frontier, Chitral, 1895. It appears that, so long ago
• 1:20:48
  Speaker 1: as 1876, the ruler of Chitral voluntarily tendered his allegiance
• 1:20:53
  Speaker 1: to the Maharaja of Kashmir and endeavoured, but without success,
• 1:20:58
  Speaker 1: to persuade the neighbouring chiefs of Swat, Bajor and Deer
• 1:21:01
  Speaker 1: to follow his example. Now Chitral and Kashmir are not
• 1:21:06
  Speaker 1: only far apart, but are separated by lofty mountain ranges,
• 1:21:10
  Speaker 1: inhabited by other tribes, so that this sudden offer of
• 1:21:14
  Speaker 1: vassalage appears rather inexplicable It transpired, however, a few years afterwards,
• 1:21:20
  Speaker 1: that his real motive in seeking the friendship of Kashmir
• 1:21:23
  Speaker 1: was due to his fear of aggression by the Emir
• 1:21:26
  Speaker 1: of Kabul. The government of India at the time encouraged
• 1:21:34
  Speaker 1: this somewhat sentimental friendship, and in order to obtain influence
• 1:21:38
  Speaker 1: over the intervening tribes, established a fort at Gilgit, in
• 1:21:42
  Speaker 1: an almost inaccessible position, not far from the snowy crests
• 1:21:46
  Speaker 1: of the Hindu Kush. The position, however, proved to be
• 1:21:50
  Speaker 1: costly and also dangerous from unfriendly neighbours, and as after
• 1:21:55
  Speaker 1: three years' experience no special object was attained, it was
• 1:21:59
  Speaker 1: withdrawn in 1881. In 1889 the old fears of possible
• 1:22:05
  Speaker 1: Russian aggression again revived, and Gilgit was reoccupied with a
• 1:22:10
  Speaker 1: strong detachment of Kashmir troops, accompanied by several English officers,
• 1:22:15
  Speaker 1: The government of India pointed out that the development of
• 1:22:19
  Speaker 1: Russian military resources in Asia rendered it necessary to watch
• 1:22:23
  Speaker 1: the passes over the mountains in order to prevent what
• 1:22:26
  Speaker 1: was called a coup de main from the north. In short,
• 1:22:30
  Speaker 1: they dreaded the march of a Russian army over the
• 1:22:32
  Speaker 1: Pamirs and the Hindu Kush, a region where nature has
• 1:22:36
  Speaker 1: constructed for us perhaps one of the most formidable frontiers
• 1:22:39
  Speaker 1: in the world. Friendship with the ruler of Chitral was
• 1:22:44
  Speaker 1: also cultivated. He was given an annual subsidy and a
• 1:22:48
  Speaker 1: present of 500 sniders, being visited also by English officers.
• 1:22:53
  Speaker 1: It was even contemplated at the time to construct a
• 1:22:56
  Speaker 1: direct road from his capital to our frontier near Peshawar.
• 1:23:01
  Speaker 1: But as he was suspicious, and as his neighbours in Swat,
• 1:23:04
  Speaker 1: Bajor and others would probably have objected, the suggestion was
• 1:23:08
  Speaker 1: happily postponed. In October 1892, the ruler of Chitral died
• 1:23:16
  Speaker 1: and after the usual family contests and intrigues, Nizam al-Mulk,
• 1:23:20
  Speaker 1: his son, established his authority in the country. In January 1893,
• 1:23:27
  Speaker 1: Dr Robertson arrived at Chitral as our representative, accompanied by
• 1:23:31
  Speaker 1: two officers and fifty Sikhs. Although he was received in
• 1:23:36
  Speaker 1: a friendly manner by the new ruler, his account of
• 1:23:39
  Speaker 1: the state of affairs in April was discouraging and ominous.
• 1:23:43
  Speaker 1: He wrote, quote, A few weeks later, he gave a
• 1:23:57
  Speaker 1: more cheerful account, and although he described the people as fickle,
• 1:24:01
  Speaker 1: he considered that Englishmen were safe. It became evident, however,
• 1:24:05
  Speaker 1: that the Nizam al-Mulk was weak and unpopular, and Dr
• 1:24:09
  Speaker 1: Robertson described the country as, quote, in a distracted state
• 1:24:14
  Speaker 1: and torn by factions. The reports of our agent, in short,
• 1:24:19
  Speaker 1: would seem to prove that he was in a false
• 1:24:21
  Speaker 1: and dangerous position, with a small escort, far away in
• 1:24:25
  Speaker 1: the mountains, about 200 miles from our frontier. In January 1895,
• 1:24:31
  Speaker 1: the Nizam was murdered by his brother, and the whole
• 1:24:36
  Speaker 1: country at once again fell into anarchy. Dr Robertson, who
• 1:24:40
  Speaker 1: had been temporarily absent but had returned in February, was
• 1:24:44
  Speaker 1: besieged in a fort with his escort, which, however, had
• 1:24:48
  Speaker 1: been increased to about 290 men. The crisis had come
• 1:24:52
  Speaker 1: at last, and there was no time to spare. A
• 1:24:56
  Speaker 1: strong force under Sir Robert Lowe was assembled at Peshawar
• 1:25:00
  Speaker 1: and crossed the frontier on April 1st. It must be
• 1:25:04
  Speaker 1: pointed out that, In proceeding to Chitral, the British troops
• 1:25:08
  Speaker 1: had necessarily to pass through a difficult mountainous country, inhabited
• 1:25:12
  Speaker 1: by independent tribes, and the government of India issued a
• 1:25:16
  Speaker 1: proclamation in which they pointed out that their sole object, quote,
• 1:25:20
  Speaker 1: is to put an end to the present and to
• 1:25:23
  Speaker 1: prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and that
• 1:25:27
  Speaker 1: as soon as this object has been attained, the force
• 1:25:30
  Speaker 1: would be withdrawn, unquote. The proclamation went on to say
• 1:25:34
  Speaker 1: that the government, quote, have no intention of permanently occupying
• 1:25:39
  Speaker 1: any territory through which Murakhan's misconduct may now force them
• 1:25:42
  Speaker 1: to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes, unquote.
• 1:25:49
  Speaker 1: The military operations were conducted with great skill and rapidity,
• 1:25:53
  Speaker 1: and Dr Robertson's small garrison, which at one time had
• 1:25:57
  Speaker 1: been hard-pressed, was saved. A small force under Colonel Kelly
• 1:26:01
  Speaker 1: was which had left Gilgit, having by a daring and
• 1:26:04
  Speaker 1: successful march arrived just before the main body from Peshawar.
• 1:26:09
  Speaker 1: The short campaign having thus accomplished its object, the gradual
• 1:26:13
  Speaker 1: withdrawal of the British troops in accordance with the proclamation
• 1:26:17
  Speaker 1: would seem to have been a natural sequence. In the weak,
• 1:26:21
  Speaker 1: distracted state of the country, and in the assumed necessity
• 1:26:25
  Speaker 1: of not losing our influence in those distant regions— The
• 1:26:28
  Speaker 1: Government of India, however, considered that a road from our
• 1:26:32
  Speaker 1: frontier to Chitral should be made, and certain positions retained
• 1:26:36
  Speaker 1: in order to guard it. This vital question having been
• 1:26:40
  Speaker 1: carefully considered at home, the Secretary of State for India,
• 1:26:44
  Speaker 1: on June 13, 1895, telegraphed to the Viceroy that Her
• 1:26:48
  Speaker 1: Majesty's Government regretted they were unable to concur in the proposal.
• 1:26:53
  Speaker 1: He went on to say that, quote, no military force
• 1:26:57
  Speaker 1: or European agent shall be kept at Chitral, that Chitral
• 1:27:01
  Speaker 1: should not be fortified, and that no road should be
• 1:27:04
  Speaker 1: made between Peshawar and Chitral, unquote. He added that all
• 1:27:08
  Speaker 1: positions beyond our frontier should be evacuated as speedily as
• 1:27:13
  Speaker 1: circumstances allowed. It so happened that within a few days
• 1:27:18
  Speaker 1: of this important decision, a change of government occurred at home.
• 1:27:22
  Speaker 1: and the question was reconsidered, and on August 9th fresh
• 1:27:27
  Speaker 1: instructions were telegraphed to India, by which it was ordered
• 1:27:30
  Speaker 1: that British troops should be stationed at the Malakund Pass
• 1:27:34
  Speaker 1: leading into Swat, and that other posts up to and
• 1:27:37
  Speaker 1: including Chitral should also be held, and a road made
• 1:27:41
  Speaker 1: through the country. In short, the previous decision was entirely reversed.
• 1:27:48
  Speaker 1: Before going further, it may be as well to point
• 1:27:50
  Speaker 1: out that this is no mere question between one political
• 1:27:53
  Speaker 1: party and another. It goes far beyond that, and we
• 1:27:57
  Speaker 1: may feel assured that in considering the subject, both governments
• 1:28:01
  Speaker 1: were actuated by a desire to do what was considered
• 1:28:04
  Speaker 1: best in the interests of the Indian Empire. Still, it is,
• 1:28:09
  Speaker 1: I think, impossible not to regard the ultimate decision as
• 1:28:12
  Speaker 1: very unfortunate, and as likely to lead to serious consequences.
• 1:28:18
  Speaker 1: In a mere military point of view, it was a
• 1:28:20
  Speaker 1: repetition of the policy pursued of recent years of establishing
• 1:28:24
  Speaker 1: isolated military posts in countries belonging to others or in
• 1:28:28
  Speaker 1: their vicinity, inevitably tending to aggravate the tribes, and which
• 1:28:33
  Speaker 1: in time of trouble, instead of increasing our strength, are
• 1:28:37
  Speaker 1: and have been the cause of anxiety to ourselves. Therefore,
• 1:28:42
  Speaker 1: not only as a matter of policy, but in a
• 1:28:44
  Speaker 1: purely military sense, the arrangement was dangerous. I would further
• 1:28:49
  Speaker 1: observe that many officers, both civil and military, men of
• 1:28:53
  Speaker 1: the highest character and long experience in the Punjab and
• 1:28:57
  Speaker 1: its borders, did not hesitate to express their opinions at
• 1:29:00
  Speaker 1: the time, that retribution would speedily follow, and their anticipations
• 1:29:05
  Speaker 1: appear now to have been verified. Suddenly, not many weeks ago,
• 1:29:10
  Speaker 1: the people of Swat, who were said to be friendly,
• 1:29:13
  Speaker 1: violently attacked our position on the Malakund, losing, it is said,
• 1:29:17
  Speaker 1: three thousand men in the attempt, and also nearly captured
• 1:29:21
  Speaker 1: a fortified post a few miles distant at Chakdara. Not
• 1:29:25
  Speaker 1: only that, but this unexpected outbreak was followed by hostilities
• 1:29:29
  Speaker 1: on the part of the tribes in Bajor, and by
• 1:29:32
  Speaker 1: the Momans north of Peshawar, and also by the Afredis, who,
• 1:29:37
  Speaker 1: subsidised by Oz, had for years guarded the celebrated Khyber.
• 1:29:42
  Speaker 1: Again the tribes of the Samana range, and others to
• 1:29:45
  Speaker 1: the west of Kohat, rose in arms. and a very
• 1:29:49
  Speaker 1: large force of British troops had to be pushed forward
• 1:29:52
  Speaker 1: in all haste to quell this great combined attack on
• 1:29:55
  Speaker 1: the part of our neighbours. General Sir Neville Chamberlain, perhaps
• 1:29:59
  Speaker 1: the greatest living authority on frontier questions, has written quite recently,
• 1:30:04
  Speaker 1: pointing out that never previously had there been a semblance
• 1:30:08
  Speaker 1: of unity of action amongst the different tribesmen. Footnote, Saturday Review,
• 1:30:14
  Speaker 1: 30th October 1897. There surely must have been some very
• 1:30:20
  Speaker 1: strong feeling of resentment and injustice which brought so many
• 1:30:24
  Speaker 1: tribesmen for the first time to combine in opposition to
• 1:30:27
  Speaker 1: what they evidently considered an invasion of their country. As
• 1:30:31
  Speaker 1: regards the Afredis, who are spoken of as treacherous and faithless,
• 1:30:36
  Speaker 1: it must be borne in mind that in 1881 we
• 1:30:39
  Speaker 1: specially recognised their independence. Footnote, Afghanistan, number 1, 1881, page 57.
• 1:30:47
  Speaker 1: and have ever since subsidised them for the special purpose
• 1:30:51
  Speaker 1: of guarding the commerce through the Khyber, a duty which
• 1:30:54
  Speaker 1: they have faithfully carried out until the present summer. Lord Lytton,
• 1:30:59
  Speaker 1: who was Viceroy when the arrangement was proposed at the
• 1:31:02
  Speaker 1: end of the war, wrote in 1880, footnote, ibid, page 62, quote,
• 1:31:08
  Speaker 1: I sincerely hope that the Government of India will not
• 1:31:11
  Speaker 1: be easily persuaded to keep troops permanently stationed in the Khyber,
• 1:31:16
  Speaker 1: I feel little doubt that such a course would tend
• 1:31:19
  Speaker 1: rather to cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies
• 1:31:23
  Speaker 1: of troops would be a constant provocation to attack. Large
• 1:31:27
  Speaker 1: bodies would die like flies. I believe that the past
• 1:31:31
  Speaker 1: tribes themselves, if properly managed, will prove the best guardians
• 1:31:35
  Speaker 1: of the past and be able, as well as willing,
• 1:31:38
  Speaker 1: to keep it open for us if we make it
• 1:31:40
  Speaker 1: worth their while to do so. Many of these very
• 1:31:45
  Speaker 1: men and those of other tribes on the frontier, have
• 1:31:48
  Speaker 1: for years enlisted in our ranks and have proved to
• 1:31:51
  Speaker 1: be good soldiers. I repeat that some strong cause must
• 1:31:56
  Speaker 1: have influenced them suddenly to break out into war. Until
• 1:32:01
  Speaker 1: the present military operations have been brought to a close,
• 1:32:05
  Speaker 1: and until full official information has been given of the
• 1:32:08
  Speaker 1: circumstances which have led to them, it is not possible
• 1:32:12
  Speaker 1: to pronounce a final judgment. Still, it seems to me
• 1:32:15
  Speaker 1: that we have strong grounds for believing that the border
• 1:32:19
  Speaker 1: policy of late years has in many instances been too
• 1:32:22
  Speaker 1: aggressive and regardless of the rights of the tribes, and
• 1:32:26
  Speaker 1: that the course finally pursued of the retention of fortified
• 1:32:30
  Speaker 1: posts through Swat and Bajor to Chitral has been the
• 1:32:34
  Speaker 1: ultimate cause which has excited the people against us and
• 1:32:38
  Speaker 1: produced so great and costly a border war. It must
• 1:32:42
  Speaker 1: also not be forgotten that even now we are merely
• 1:32:45
  Speaker 1: on the fringe, as it were, of the question, and
• 1:32:48
  Speaker 1: that if we persist in forcing ourselves forward, we shall
• 1:32:52
  Speaker 1: have many a costly campaign to undertake, far away, in distant,
• 1:32:56
  Speaker 1: little-known regions, more difficult and more inaccessible even than those
• 1:33:01
  Speaker 1: in which we now find ourselves. On the whole, it
• 1:33:05
  Speaker 1: appears to me that we should as far as possible
• 1:33:08
  Speaker 1: withdraw our isolated posts, so many of which are either
• 1:33:12
  Speaker 1: within the tribal region or along its borders. It is
• 1:33:16
  Speaker 1: sometimes argued that any withdrawal on our part would have
• 1:33:19
  Speaker 1: a demoralising effect on the tribes, who would ascribe our
• 1:33:23
  Speaker 1: retirement to inability to maintain our positions. The best reply
• 1:33:28
  Speaker 1: will perhaps be to quote the words of Lord Hartington.
• 1:33:36
  Speaker 1: when under similar circumstances it was decided in 1881 to
• 1:33:40
  Speaker 1: retire from Kandahar. He said, footnote, Afghanistan, number 1, 1881,
• 1:33:47
  Speaker 1: page 92, quote, the moral effect of a scrupulous adherence
• 1:33:52
  Speaker 1: to declarations which have been made, and a striking and
• 1:33:56
  Speaker 1: convincing proof given to the people and princes of India...
• 1:34:00
  Speaker 1: that the British government have no desire for further annexation
• 1:34:03
  Speaker 1: of territory, could not fail to produce a most salutary
• 1:34:07
  Speaker 1: effect in removing the apprehensions and strengthening the attachment of
• 1:34:12
  Speaker 1: our native allies throughout India and on our frontiers. These
• 1:34:18
  Speaker 1: remarks may now be brought to a close. My object
• 1:34:21
  Speaker 1: throughout has been to give an historical summary of the
• 1:34:25
  Speaker 1: various wars and expeditions in which we have been engaged
• 1:34:28
  Speaker 1: during the present century on the north-west frontier of India,
• 1:34:33
  Speaker 1: and of the causes which have led to them. My
• 1:34:35
  Speaker 1: observations are founded on parliamentary official papers and on other
• 1:34:40
  Speaker 1: works of authority, and I hope they may prove useful
• 1:34:43
  Speaker 1: to the public, who have not, as a rule, time
• 1:34:46
  Speaker 1: to study the intricate details of this difficult subject. I
• 1:34:51
  Speaker 1: have endeavoured to prove that the tribes on the frontier
• 1:34:53
  Speaker 1: are and the people of Afghanistan have no real power
• 1:34:57
  Speaker 1: of injuring our position in India, and turbulent as they
• 1:35:00
  Speaker 1: may be, a policy of patience, conciliation, and subsidies is
• 1:35:05
  Speaker 1: far more likely to attain our object than incessant costly
• 1:35:09
  Speaker 1: expeditions into their mountains. Our influence over them is already great,
• 1:35:15
  Speaker 1: and is increasing year by year. By carefully maintaining the
• 1:35:18
  Speaker 1: principles I have sketched out, We shall gradually obtain their friendship,
• 1:35:23
  Speaker 1: and also their support, should other dangers ever threaten our dominions.
• 1:35:28
  Speaker 1: We are the rulers of a great empire in the East,
• 1:35:31
  Speaker 1: with its heavy duties and responsibilities, and in devoting ourselves
• 1:35:36
  Speaker 1: to the welfare of the millions under our sway, and
• 1:35:39
  Speaker 1: in developing the resources of the country, we shall do
• 1:35:42
  Speaker 1: far more for the happiness of the people and the
• 1:35:44
  Speaker 1: security of the empire than by squandering our finances and
• 1:35:49
  Speaker 1: in constant expeditions beyond its borders.