Latest / The Line Podcast / On The Line: Is NATO doomed, and Canada with it?
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_00: Hello, ladies and gentlemen of On The Line.
- 0:02SPEAKER_00: I'm your host,
- 0:02SPEAKER_00: Jen Gerson,
- 0:03SPEAKER_00: and today I have Jean-Francois Adolf Belanger,
- 0:07SPEAKER_00: recently married, assistant professor and defense analyst.
- 0:10SPEAKER_00: He is an assistant professor of military operations at
- 0:13SPEAKER_00: the Royal Danish Defense College, normally stationed in Copenhagen.
- 0:16SPEAKER_00: He's also a research fellow at the NATO Defense College,
- 0:19SPEAKER_00: and he's going to give us an overview of What exactly is going on with NATO?
- 0:23SPEAKER_00: How are things within the alliance?
- 0:25SPEAKER_00: Is Canada beginning to take its military situation seriously?
- 0:28SPEAKER_00: And then we wrap up with a conversation about what's going on in the Arctic
- 0:31SPEAKER_00: and what kind of threats we are concerned about up there.
- 0:34SPEAKER_00: That's today on The Line.
- 0:48SPEAKER_01: This episode is brought to you by BioCanRx.
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: If a drug is discovered in a Canadian lab and conducts successful clinical trials
- 0:58SPEAKER_01: in Canada, there's a chance it will be launched in Canada.
- 1:02SPEAKER_01: So how do we get more drugs out of Canadian labs and keep them here?
- 1:06SPEAKER_01: This summer,
- 1:06SPEAKER_01: The Line is partnering with BioCanRx,
- 1:09SPEAKER_01: a federally funded Canadian not-for-profit research network,
- 1:12SPEAKER_01: to learn about cutting-edge cancer immunotherapy research
- 1:15SPEAKER_01: that they're helping Canadian researchers bring from labs to patients
- 1:18SPEAKER_01: and clinical trials, all in Canada.
- 1:21SPEAKER_01: Every year,
- 1:22SPEAKER_01: around 500 million is spent on Canadian cancer research,
- 1:26SPEAKER_01: but 70% of that is for early stage work,
- 1:29SPEAKER_01: discovering whether a therapy can do something in the lab.
- 1:31SPEAKER_01: That leaves limited resources for the complex and often disjointed process
- 1:35SPEAKER_01: of moving Canadian innovations from discovery to a clinical trial,
- 1:39SPEAKER_01: and hopefully into the health system.
- 1:42SPEAKER_01: BioCanRx has stepped into the gap.
- 1:45SPEAKER_01: They specialize in translational research,
- 1:48SPEAKER_01: the unsexy work that makes for boring press releases but gets results.
- 1:52SPEAKER_01: 16 Canadian cancer immunotherapy clinical trials in just a decade,
- 1:57SPEAKER_01: treating more than 400 patients.
- 1:59SPEAKER_01: Thanks to this,
- 2:00SPEAKER_01: BioCanRx has firsthand experience with the systemic disconnects
- 2:04SPEAKER_01: that are trapping discoveries in Canadian labs or sending them out of the country
- 2:09SPEAKER_01: to be developed.
- 2:10SPEAKER_01: They have straightforward ideas about how to fix the problems.
- 2:13SPEAKER_01: And spoiler alert, the answer isn't just add more money.
- 2:17SPEAKER_01: Visit biocanrx.com to learn more.
- 2:24SPEAKER_00: So, Mr. Adolf Belanger, congratulations on your recent name change and marriage.
- 2:30SPEAKER_00: And thank you so much for joining us on On The Line.
- 2:32SPEAKER_02: Thank you very much.
- 2:33SPEAKER_02: Happy to be here.
- 2:35SPEAKER_00: So I'm going to dig right into it.
- 2:37SPEAKER_00: I'm just wondering if you can,
- 2:39SPEAKER_00: from your perspective,
- 2:39SPEAKER_00: give us just a general overview of Canada's position in NATO,
- 2:45SPEAKER_00: the state of NATO,
- 2:47SPEAKER_00: and what some of our strategic strengths and weaknesses are right now.
- 2:51SPEAKER_00: What are the things that Canadians need to be focusing on at present?
- 2:54SPEAKER_00: So kind of a broad subject,
- 2:56SPEAKER_00: and I'm just going to open the floor and just sort of allow you to give us
- 3:00SPEAKER_00: a bird's eye view of what you're seeing right now.
- 3:02SPEAKER_02: Sure.
- 3:05SPEAKER_02: Let's turn the question around.
- 3:06SPEAKER_02: I think it's going to be easier context-wise.
- 3:09SPEAKER_02: With the return of Donald Trump to the White House,
- 3:13SPEAKER_02: which is a process that,
- 3:14SPEAKER_02: before I get into it, is a process that had started way before The Line.
- 3:32SPEAKER_02: Crimea in 2014 changed everything when the Russians did the special operation
- 3:37SPEAKER_02: to Crimea away from the Ukrainians.
- 3:41SPEAKER_02: And when Trump came back to office,
- 3:42SPEAKER_02: he came very, very hard with the European allies are not pulling their way.
- 3:47SPEAKER_02: They're not doing enough.
- 3:48SPEAKER_02: We want to shift.
- 3:49SPEAKER_02: The Line, theline.
- 4:04SPEAKER_02: A lot of the security was all built on if ever there's a conflict or there's a war,
- 4:09SPEAKER_02: the Americans are going to come in afterwards as a resupply reinforcement in order
- 4:15SPEAKER_02: to do all of this.
- 4:20SPEAKER_02: There's the American line and there's the actual line where, yes,
- 4:25SPEAKER_02: it's true that the Europeans had pulled back across the board on many things related
- 4:31SPEAKER_02: to security.
- 4:31SPEAKER_02: However,
- 4:32SPEAKER_02: it was also great for the Americans who could But now,
- 4:34SPEAKER_02: with Donald Trump,
- 4:36SPEAKER_02: we have this massive shift that is occurring where,
- 4:38SPEAKER_02: on the one hand,
- 4:39SPEAKER_02: the allies are spending more on defense, but they're also absolutely...
- 4:51SPEAKER_02: And when we talk about responsibility, we're talking more into the command structure.
- 4:57SPEAKER_02: So the way that NATO's built,
- 4:59SPEAKER_02: very rapidly for the listeners,
- 5:01SPEAKER_02: you have the headquarter,
- 5:03SPEAKER_02: which is the political dimension of NATO, where policy is made, where decision...
- 5:08SPEAKER_02: The strategic decision of the alliance are made,
- 5:12SPEAKER_02: which is supported by options and so on from the strategic headquarter,
- 5:16SPEAKER_02: which is in most, which is shaped.
- 5:18SPEAKER_02: And then once something is decided,
- 5:20SPEAKER_02: then this is sent back down to what we call the Joint Force Command,
- 5:24SPEAKER_02: where the plans, the actual plan, how do we achieve this?
- 5:28SPEAKER_02: The objective that we were given by the political level,
- 5:32SPEAKER_02: this is all mapped out and put to paper there.
- 5:35SPEAKER_02: And then what we call the execution.
- 5:38SPEAKER_02: So if ever we need to put these plans into practice,
- 5:40SPEAKER_02: there is a war,
- 5:41SPEAKER_02: and then we need to activate them, and then we need to set troops here and there.
- 5:45SPEAKER_02: And how we do that,
- 5:46SPEAKER_02: that's usually falling down to what we call the component command,
- 5:49SPEAKER_02: which are like those something like that.
- 5:51SPEAKER_02: In this whole reshuffling,
- 5:54SPEAKER_02: What used to be a lot of American commands are now in European hands.
- 5:57SPEAKER_02: So Norfolk,
- 6:00SPEAKER_02: which is primarily for Canadian interests of the North,
- 6:04SPEAKER_02: has been given leadership by a—the leadership is now a British general.
- 6:12SPEAKER_02: In Russum,
- 6:12SPEAKER_02: which is mostly for Europe and Central Europe,
- 6:15SPEAKER_02: it's been given,
- 6:16SPEAKER_02: if I remember correctly,
- 6:17SPEAKER_02: to a German general,
- 6:19SPEAKER_02: assisted by the Poles,
- 6:21SPEAKER_02: and then Naples,
- 6:22SPEAKER_02: which is the rest of the Mediterranean and so on,
- 6:24SPEAKER_02: has been given, for example, to an Italian general.
- 6:28SPEAKER_02: But also all of the troop requirements for everything that NATO needs to do and
- 6:33SPEAKER_02: to put its family of plans.
- 6:35SPEAKER_02: And when I say family of plans is basically the defense plans to put
- 6:38SPEAKER_02: into effect is meant to be done by Europeans.
- 6:42SPEAKER_02: And I'm sure your listeners have seen it countless times.
- 6:45SPEAKER_02: Every other week we get, well, the U.S. are removing X amount of troop from Europe.
- 6:51SPEAKER_02: The U.S.
- 6:51SPEAKER_02: is no longer going to give access to some of its air-to-air refueling capacity and
- 6:56SPEAKER_02: so on.
- 6:58SPEAKER_00: I just want to make sure that I understand that properly.
- 7:00SPEAKER_00: So a lot of the actual leadership that is happening at sort of like the secondary
- 7:04SPEAKER_00: and tertiary levels of the NATO alliance,
- 7:06SPEAKER_00: that's been devolved to more and more European leaders.
- 7:09SPEAKER_00: Is that in direct response to Donald Trump and his threats over the last year?
- 7:17SPEAKER_02: Yes, that's part of the burden-shifting process.
- 7:20SPEAKER_02: Yes, which is in large part driven by...
- 7:27SPEAKER_02: U.S. demand.
- 7:28SPEAKER_02: U.S. demand, okay.
- 7:30SPEAKER_00: So it's not like NATO's taking it or taking the U.S. toys away.
- 7:35SPEAKER_00: The U.S. has demanded that burden shifting and the European militaries are stepping up.
- 7:39SPEAKER_00: Okay.
- 7:40SPEAKER_02: Exactly.
- 7:42SPEAKER_02: Oh, yes, I'll let you.
- 7:43SPEAKER_02: I'm sorry.
- 7:43SPEAKER_02: I'm sorry.
- 7:45SPEAKER_00: That all sounds actually really positive.
- 7:47SPEAKER_00: I think my question here is,
- 7:49SPEAKER_00: do allied nations have a clear picture about what the U.S. actually wants?
- 7:55SPEAKER_00: There was recently a tweet sort of thread by Elbridge Colby that basically said,
- 8:01SPEAKER_00: I mean,
- 8:01SPEAKER_00: my interpretation of it was,
- 8:03SPEAKER_00: look, we want none of the responsibility but all of the power.
- 8:06SPEAKER_00: We want to shift all of the burden to our allies,
- 8:10SPEAKER_00: but we still want to be making the decisions and we still want to force you
- 8:12SPEAKER_00: to buy all your weapons from us.
- 8:14SPEAKER_01: You're not far off.
- 8:16SPEAKER_01: You're not far off.
- 8:17SPEAKER_02: You're not far
- 8:18SPEAKER_01: off.
- 8:19SPEAKER_01: Okay.
- 8:21SPEAKER_02: So what we know, right?
- 8:23SPEAKER_02: I think you mentioned Colby Eldridge,
- 8:26SPEAKER_02: and I think his most recent speeches,
- 8:29SPEAKER_02: I believe,
- 8:29SPEAKER_02: I cannot remember if he gave,
- 8:31SPEAKER_02: I think he gave it at the foreign minister, at the foreign ministerials.
- 8:35SPEAKER_02: Because NATO,
- 8:37SPEAKER_02: one of the big events that they hold every year is that there's all of
- 8:41SPEAKER_02: the defense ministers of the alliance congregate at NATO HQ
- 8:46SPEAKER_02: to discuss defense policy.
- 8:48SPEAKER_02: And then afterwards, it's what we call the foreign ministerials where...
- 8:54SPEAKER_02: Ministry for Foreign Affairs or in Canada for Global Affairs are converging to HQ
- 9:00SPEAKER_02: to discuss foreign policy.
- 9:02SPEAKER_02: And in the speech that he gave,
- 9:04SPEAKER_02: he basically said that we want a NATO 3.0 that is a lot more like NATO 1.0.
- 9:13SPEAKER_02: So there.
- 9:14SPEAKER_02: That brings us to the 50s.
- 9:16SPEAKER_02: And what happened in the 50s is that the Americans,
- 9:20SPEAKER_02: sensing that they wanted to reduce their commitment,
- 9:24SPEAKER_02: their physical troop commitment to Europe after the war and be able to reduce
- 9:29SPEAKER_02: the amount of soldiers that they had,
- 9:31SPEAKER_02: that's when they extended the nuclear umbrella to the alliance, right?
- 9:37SPEAKER_02: Saying, we're pulling back troops, but we will defend the alliance with our nuclear weapons.
- 9:46SPEAKER_02: And at least to my sense,
- 9:50SPEAKER_02: when I hear Colby Albrecht going at a 3.0 that looks like 1.0,
- 9:56SPEAKER_02: it's starting to drastically sound like we want to go back at a time where
- 10:01SPEAKER_02: the troops were Europeans,
- 10:06SPEAKER_02: but the nuclear deterrent is American.
- 10:10SPEAKER_02: Primarily American.
- 10:12SPEAKER_00: So the blood price is all paid by the allies
- 10:15SPEAKER_00: and America contributes technological expertise and advancement.
- 10:21SPEAKER_02: I wouldn't put it exactly that way.
- 10:23SPEAKER_02: I think you're quoting, what was his name?
- 10:25SPEAKER_02: Our former, he never met, Michael Ignatieff in his book about Kosovo, right?
- 10:29SPEAKER_02: That the American did the bombing and the Kosovo did the dying.
- 10:34SPEAKER_02: But in this case, it's essentially the boots on the ground, right?
- 10:39SPEAKER_02: For an attack on Europe, shame the Europeans.
- 10:43SPEAKER_02: Because it's European security.
- 10:44SPEAKER_00: Which doesn't strike me as an unreasonable ask.
- 10:49SPEAKER_02: It's not unreasonable.
- 10:52SPEAKER_02: So I think the thing that many of us are struggling with is the way under which it's done.
- 10:57SPEAKER_02: Because I mentioned earlier,
- 10:59SPEAKER_02: it's been a process of about 15,
- 11:01SPEAKER_02: 20 years now of the United States wanting to pull back from NATO.
- 11:05SPEAKER_02: Well, not pull back from NATO,
- 11:09SPEAKER_02: reduce their share of the spending and the troops,
- 11:12SPEAKER_02: and then balance the sheet out, so to speak.
- 11:16SPEAKER_02: Bush had done something similar.
- 11:17SPEAKER_02: Obama had started to do something similar.
- 11:20SPEAKER_02: The Crimea happens, and the Americans realize this is really not a good time to...
- 11:26SPEAKER_02: Reship burden in that way.
- 11:28SPEAKER_02: So we're going to postpone that.
- 11:31SPEAKER_02: And then Trump arrived,
- 11:34SPEAKER_02: first mandate,
- 11:36SPEAKER_02: very similar argument, convinced by a lot of his advisors not to push that way.
- 11:41SPEAKER_02: There's famously that moment where,
- 11:44SPEAKER_02: what was the name of his chief of staff,
- 11:46SPEAKER_02: John Kelly,
- 11:48SPEAKER_02: and he said,
- 11:48SPEAKER_02: as a businessman, I'm going to walk in there and I'm going to tell them that I quit.
- 11:53SPEAKER_02: So that they'll finally believe that I'm serious.
- 11:56SPEAKER_02: And John Kelly said, well, if you do that, I'm quitting this minute.
- 11:59SPEAKER_02: This is not a business deal.
- 12:01SPEAKER_02: This is international politics.
- 12:02SPEAKER_02: And that's not how this works.
- 12:04SPEAKER_02: And then we got Biden.
- 12:06SPEAKER_02: We got the war in Ukraine.
- 12:07SPEAKER_02: So NATO takes a role into supporting through procurement and various other ways
- 12:15SPEAKER_02: to support the Ukrainian war effort.
- 12:18SPEAKER_02: And then we have Donald Trump that comes back with everything that we know in the moment.
- 12:26SPEAKER_00: So what's different about the Trump approach here?
- 12:28SPEAKER_00: Is it just tones?
- 12:31SPEAKER_02: It's not just stone.
- 12:33SPEAKER_02: The best diplomacy is usually done in private,
- 12:37SPEAKER_02: especially when you have to tell nations that you're dissatisfied with them and
- 12:43SPEAKER_02: that you want them to do more.
- 12:45SPEAKER_02: Now, you do this for two reasons.
- 12:48SPEAKER_02: At the end of the day, NATO is there and is meant to deter Russian aggression against Europe.
- 12:56SPEAKER_02: But for deterrence to hold,
- 12:59SPEAKER_02: and for the listeners,
- 13:00SPEAKER_02: deterrence is a simple concept at the beginning of it is stopping an adversary
- 13:06SPEAKER_02: from doing something it wants to do by a variety of means.
- 13:10SPEAKER_02: Either you threaten to punish them.
- 13:11SPEAKER_02: So you just raise the costs across the board.
- 13:28SPEAKER_02: But this to be credible, you need to have a unified front.
- 13:32SPEAKER_02: You need to have an outlook that everybody says, okay, yeah.
- 13:36SPEAKER_02: And so that's why you have a tendency to not air these kinds of disagreements in
- 13:41SPEAKER_02: the media or publicly,
- 13:43SPEAKER_02: because there's an argument that says that it reduces the credibility
- 13:46SPEAKER_02: of your alliance if your more influence and your stronger member says, okay.
- 13:53SPEAKER_02: Well, I don't like Spain.
- 13:54SPEAKER_02: They're not paying enough.
- 13:56SPEAKER_02: So if Spain is in trouble, I'm not coming.
- 13:58SPEAKER_02: So all of a sudden there's a door that's open.
- 14:01SPEAKER_02: Now, is it true or is it just blunder to get Spain to pay more?
- 14:06SPEAKER_02: Put yourself in the shoes of an adversary and that becomes fungible because
- 14:11SPEAKER_02: then depending on how much you value whichever objectives that you might have,
- 14:18SPEAKER_02: Your take on the situation may go from one to the other.
- 14:23SPEAKER_02: And in this case, uncertainty.
- 14:26SPEAKER_02: But it's not the right kind of uncertainty.
- 14:28SPEAKER_02: And that's the main difference that we're seeing at the moment.
- 14:32SPEAKER_00: Another way of putting this might be leverage has a cost.
- 14:36SPEAKER_00: So the cost of the leverage that Trump is using by engaging in this kind
- 14:40SPEAKER_00: of public saber-rattling or...
- 14:44SPEAKER_00: Disrespect of the allies comes at the cost of a higher uncertainty value,
- 14:49SPEAKER_00: the higher the probability that an adversary might actually
- 14:54SPEAKER_01: take him up on
- 14:54SPEAKER_01: the offer, so to speak.
- 14:55SPEAKER_00: So, look, if I'm going to play devil's advocate here, I would say, OK, sure.
- 15:00SPEAKER_00: But for the price of that increased uncertainty, Donald Trump's getting what he wants.
- 15:04SPEAKER_00: He's got he's getting everything that America has been trying to achieve for
- 15:08SPEAKER_00: the last, what, 15 years by your your
- 15:10SPEAKER_01: your your measure.
- 15:13SPEAKER_02: Okay, let's say for the sake of argument that I agree with you.
- 15:16SPEAKER_00: Okay.
- 15:18SPEAKER_02: And you'll see why, where I'm going with this.
- 15:20SPEAKER_02: Maybe.
- 15:20SPEAKER_02: Let's say that in the very short
- 15:21SPEAKER_01: term, the United States
- 15:22SPEAKER_02: are getting what they want.
- 15:24SPEAKER_02: In the medium term, well, now it becomes a new problem.
- 15:27SPEAKER_02: So we've already seen it with the Iran War.
- 15:30SPEAKER_02: If all of this had been done in private,
- 15:33SPEAKER_02: I am not so certain that countries like,
- 15:36SPEAKER_02: because for Spain,
- 15:38SPEAKER_02: for example,
- 15:38SPEAKER_02: it was extremely unpopular to have the US use their airfields,
- 15:43SPEAKER_02: for example, to support the war in Iran.
- 15:46SPEAKER_02: But now in a scenario where maybe Donald Trump would have been a lot more quiet
- 15:50SPEAKER_02: and is worth doing this,
- 15:51SPEAKER_02: well, then maybe the Spaniards would have tried to figure out a way to help.
- 15:57SPEAKER_02: A bit away from public eye so that they can politically be okay and support an ally.
- 16:03SPEAKER_02: But in this case, they had no incentive to do it.
- 16:05SPEAKER_02: And if we project ourselves in the future,
- 16:07SPEAKER_02: what we're seeing right now,
- 16:09SPEAKER_02: take a look at how the Germans,
- 16:11SPEAKER_02: for example,
- 16:12SPEAKER_02: are responding these days to American provocations in the media
- 16:16SPEAKER_02: or American criticism.
- 16:18SPEAKER_02: They are a lot more assertive than they used to be.
- 16:20SPEAKER_02: Five years ago, the kind of tone we're seeing from Germany would have been unearthed.
- 16:25SPEAKER_02: Why?
- 16:25SPEAKER_02: Because they're re-army,
- 16:27SPEAKER_02: they have the ambition of becoming the strongest land power in Europe,
- 16:30SPEAKER_02: and they can do it, and they can make it there.
- 16:34SPEAKER_02: It's an industrial force.
- 16:36SPEAKER_02: By reshuffling a little bit and putting emphasis on industrial development
- 16:41SPEAKER_02: for defense, they'll be fine.
- 16:43SPEAKER_02: It will take time, five to ten years probably, but it will take time.
- 16:46SPEAKER_02: But what you're having now is allies that are going to become a lot more assertive
- 16:51SPEAKER_02: because not only are they buying up their own means of defense,
- 16:57SPEAKER_02: they will take less and less time
- 17:03SPEAKER_02: Well, the word I'm looking for is probably not gray for air.
- 17:06SPEAKER_02: But they're going to have a shorter leash,
- 17:08SPEAKER_02: let's say, when it comes to letting the United States pile up on them.
- 17:12SPEAKER_01: And we're seeing that a little bit more with Canada as well, right?
- 17:15SPEAKER_02: In the way the federal government is responding to the Americans in the way
- 17:20SPEAKER_02: that Canada... And you know what?
- 17:22SPEAKER_02: Let me jump right there.
- 17:23SPEAKER_02: Canada historically...
- 17:25SPEAKER_02: It was a bit less interested in NATO,
- 17:27SPEAKER_02: but although we were,
- 17:28SPEAKER_02: we always had an interest in NATO,
- 17:31SPEAKER_02: but for everything that had to do with the North,
- 17:34SPEAKER_02: we always said that it was a bilateral thing.
- 17:36SPEAKER_02: We were not interested into having NATO in the North and into the Arctic.
- 17:41SPEAKER_02: For us, it was bilateral,
- 17:43SPEAKER_02: it was the integration with the US through NORAD and through everything that we do
- 17:48SPEAKER_02: over there.
- 17:49SPEAKER_02: But now all of a sudden...
- 17:51SPEAKER_02: For an America that says that North America is our playground as per
- 17:56SPEAKER_02: that national security strategy, well,
- 17:58SPEAKER_02: all of a sudden,
- 17:59SPEAKER_02: one of the ally that was helping in this turns around and says,
- 18:02SPEAKER_02: no, I mean, for the Arctic now, it's a multilateral thing.
- 18:06SPEAKER_02: And we cannot do it alone.
- 18:07SPEAKER_02: Why?
- 18:08SPEAKER_02: Directly leading from the US.
- 18:09SPEAKER_02: So I think short term, yes,
- 18:11SPEAKER_02: let's say,
- 18:11SPEAKER_02: let's say for the sake of argument,
- 18:13SPEAKER_02: say that he got what he wanted, like Mark Rutha is saying, right?
- 18:16SPEAKER_02: Like he got, he got the allies to invest and so on.
- 18:20SPEAKER_02: And I think the allies are getting what they want in a sense.
- 18:24SPEAKER_02: And the alliance is not imploded.
- 18:27SPEAKER_02: It's not great, right?
- 18:28SPEAKER_02: And the relationships are going to be,
- 18:30SPEAKER_02: I don't think they can be fully repaired down The Line,
- 18:33SPEAKER_02: but at least they're not unmanageable.
- 18:36SPEAKER_02: But I think medium term,
- 18:37SPEAKER_02: in terms of influence,
- 18:38SPEAKER_02: Within the alliance,
- 18:40SPEAKER_02: because you mentioned at the beginning,
- 18:42SPEAKER_02: the United States are going to find it a lot more difficult.
- 18:47SPEAKER_02: And more than that,
- 18:47SPEAKER_02: I have been arguing a lot recently in these kinds of events that it's going
- 18:51SPEAKER_02: to be untenable if the US want to maintain the same level of influence
- 18:56SPEAKER_02: while having other allies pony up more of the money,
- 19:00SPEAKER_02: the troops and so on to make the alliance work.
- 19:03SPEAKER_02: And more than that,
- 19:04SPEAKER_02: What the US may not like is that the US do like a unified NATO because
- 19:08SPEAKER_02: when they need it, it's better for action.
- 19:10SPEAKER_02: We've seen it in against that.
- 19:13SPEAKER_02: But now when they pull back, we're seeing a bit more conflict arising between nations.
- 19:17SPEAKER_02: It's a bit more difficult to get the nation to play along over some issues,
- 19:24SPEAKER_02: which in the long run can be a problem.
- 19:25SPEAKER_02: So short term, maybe.
- 19:28SPEAKER_02: Let's say I agree.
- 19:31SPEAKER_02: Long term, This is what in the field we call negative externality.
- 19:36SPEAKER_02: It's not going to be a net positive for the Trump administration.
- 19:39SPEAKER_02: I just don't think that.
- 19:41SPEAKER_02: While I think that the strategist and the career diplomats realizes it,
- 19:49SPEAKER_02: I don't think that the White House does.
- 19:52SPEAKER_00: Or they just don't care.
- 19:55SPEAKER_02: Either or.
- 19:59SPEAKER_01: This episode of On The Line is also brought to you by
- 20:02SPEAKER_01: the Forest Products Association of Canada.
- 20:05SPEAKER_01: Canada's forest products sector is not asking Ottawa to start over.
- 20:10SPEAKER_01: The federal government has heard the advice,
- 20:12SPEAKER_01: it has recognized the challenges, and it has put a plan on the table.
- 20:16SPEAKER_01: Now the test is action.
- 20:19SPEAKER_01: That means clearing made-in-Canada barriers,
- 20:22SPEAKER_01: regulatory duplication,
- 20:23SPEAKER_01: transportation bottlenecks,
- 20:25SPEAKER_01: and uncertainty around predictable access to manage our forests.
- 20:29SPEAKER_01: It means working with provinces to protect communities from wildfire risk
- 20:33SPEAKER_01: and giving companies the confidence to invest here at home.
- 20:37SPEAKER_01: Nearly 200,000 Canadians working in this sector are looking for results.
- 20:41SPEAKER_01: The playbook is written.
- 20:43SPEAKER_01: Now Ottawa needs to deliver.
- 20:52SPEAKER_00: I want to talk about the state of the alliance from your perspective,
- 20:55SPEAKER_00: because I think this is really interesting.
- 20:57SPEAKER_00: I'm sure you read it.
- 20:58SPEAKER_00: There was a Wall Street Journal article that came out a few weeks ago explaining
- 21:02SPEAKER_00: that Mark Carney had been working for months behind the scenes to try and...
- 21:08SPEAKER_00: Hushes, wake some of the European allies up to the fundamentally changed arrangement
- 21:14SPEAKER_00: between America and the rest of the world.
- 21:17SPEAKER_00: And initially,
- 21:18SPEAKER_00: these overtures were not particularly well received until Greenland was sort of what
- 21:23SPEAKER_00: the reporting suggested.
- 21:25SPEAKER_00: Once Greenland happened,
- 21:26SPEAKER_00: that fundamentally shifted how a lot of Europeans are seeing
- 21:31SPEAKER_00: and approaching America.
- 21:33SPEAKER_00: And I don't think it's wrong to say that there are many people who have argued
- 21:38SPEAKER_00: that Threats around Greenland have broken a lot of trust in America's goodwill
- 21:44SPEAKER_00: and capacity to serve as a world leader in a way that may not be reparable.
- 21:50SPEAKER_00: What's your take on that?
- 21:55SPEAKER_02: I think the timing, I think, I think the article got the timing right.
- 21:59SPEAKER_02: I think the problem of Canada and one of
- 22:01SPEAKER_02: the reasons why maybe it was not well received from
- 22:05SPEAKER_02: the European allies was this like,
- 22:08SPEAKER_02: since the nineties,
- 22:10SPEAKER_02: Canada's,
- 22:11SPEAKER_02: Canada's not shifting,
- 22:14SPEAKER_02: but let's say that we did not uphold the promises
- 22:16SPEAKER_02: that we put forward many times now.
- 22:20SPEAKER_02: I think we also need to understand the difficult situation of a lot of
- 22:24SPEAKER_02: the politicians in Canada when it comes to defense,
- 22:27SPEAKER_02: because prior to Greenland and what we're seeing with the Americans right now,
- 22:32SPEAKER_02: we are in a very inviolable position.
- 22:36SPEAKER_02: Defense-wise, we're surrounded by three oceans, one that's frozen.
- 22:40SPEAKER_02: It's extremely difficult to attack Canada because of this,
- 22:43SPEAKER_02: with a steadfast highlight to the south with whom we had
- 22:45SPEAKER_02: a fantastic relationship overall.
- 22:48SPEAKER_02: So then try and tell your population that you need to make efforts and shift money
- 22:55SPEAKER_02: from other programs and other priorities to reinvest it in the fence.
- 22:59SPEAKER_02: And for a long time,
- 23:00SPEAKER_02: it was career suicide for most politicians that would try to really push
- 23:05SPEAKER_02: a strong investment that way.
- 23:07SPEAKER_00: I don't give Canada as much slack as you do, but...
- 23:12SPEAKER_00: That's fine.
- 23:12SPEAKER_00: I mean, we at The Line are pretty,
- 23:14SPEAKER_00: like, aggressive on Canada's lack of holding up its defense commitments.
- 23:18SPEAKER_00: But, you know, fair point.
- 23:20SPEAKER_00: Fair point that there might be easier to piece dividends.
- 23:22SPEAKER_00: For sure.
- 23:23SPEAKER_02: Listen, by all means, keep them to account.
- 23:27SPEAKER_02: Make sure that they put the money where they do.
- 23:28SPEAKER_02: And I'm fairly critical myself.
- 23:30SPEAKER_02: But I do think that there's one thing to understand.
- 23:34SPEAKER_02: It's very important is that the voter themselves have a responsibility when it comes to that.
- 23:41SPEAKER_02: They have historically punished the Canadian government when it comes to procurement issues.
- 23:47SPEAKER_02: Right?
- 23:48SPEAKER_02: The Harper government was punished over the F-35s.
- 23:51SPEAKER_02: The Trudeau government, among other things, was punished over defense priorities.
- 23:55SPEAKER_02: And we can go back like this.
- 23:56SPEAKER_02: So...
- 23:58SPEAKER_02: So that's why I think I'm consilient in the sense that I think
- 24:03SPEAKER_02: the Canadian population also has a say into how Canada can and not.
- 24:09SPEAKER_02: Because at the end of the day, we're a democracy.
- 24:12SPEAKER_02: And if voters don't like spending priorities,
- 24:15SPEAKER_02: well, once we come to voting, then it changes things.
- 24:18SPEAKER_02: All there is to say, I think Greenland was extremely traumatic, I think, for the Alliance.
- 24:26SPEAKER_02: It was taken extremely seriously.
- 24:27SPEAKER_02: There was a report that came out,
- 24:29SPEAKER_02: I can't remember in which newspaper,
- 24:31SPEAKER_02: saying that Denmark had sent blood and explosives to Greenland.
- 24:36SPEAKER_02: You don't do that when you don't take a threat seriously,
- 24:39SPEAKER_02: that you may actually have to defend the island.
- 24:43SPEAKER_02: It's coming from...
- 24:45SPEAKER_02: Because we add this idea, right,
- 24:46SPEAKER_02: that we moved away from,
- 24:49SPEAKER_02: especially among alliances and especially among democracies,
- 24:53SPEAKER_02: from conquest as a mean to acquire what you want.
- 24:57SPEAKER_02: And especially for the Danes,
- 24:58SPEAKER_02: the 1951 treaty they signed with the United States essentially gave Washington a lot
- 25:06SPEAKER_02: of rights when it comes to building...
- 25:10SPEAKER_02: Building up their military presence there, right?
- 25:13SPEAKER_02: So it was really, what is going on?
- 25:16SPEAKER_02: And on top of it, the justification that was given for
- 25:21SPEAKER_02: For Greenland,
- 25:22SPEAKER_02: made very little sense to anyone with two eyeballs that can look at charts and see,
- 25:27SPEAKER_02: yeah, there's not really Russian and Chinese ships in the area.
- 25:33SPEAKER_02: It's like the Russian did a nuclear exercise coming close to Alaska,
- 25:38SPEAKER_02: but it was a bit nonsensical, I think.
- 25:40SPEAKER_00: So just to be clear,
- 25:42SPEAKER_00: I think the existing NATO agreement would have given America basing rights in
- 25:45SPEAKER_00: the north of Greenland anyway.
- 25:47SPEAKER_02: It's not the NATO agreement, it's the agreement with Denmark.
- 25:50SPEAKER_02: Oh, sorry, okay, with the
- 25:51SPEAKER_00: agreement with Denmark.
- 25:52SPEAKER_02: They have a bilateral agreement from 1951.
- 25:55SPEAKER_00: Okay,
- 25:55SPEAKER_00: so America could have put a base up there if they were actually seriously concerned
- 25:59SPEAKER_00: about this.
- 25:59SPEAKER_00: I do want to get into the Arctic and the threat that
- 26:03SPEAKER_00: the Russians potentially do pose to both us and the other Arctic nations in
- 26:08SPEAKER_00: a minute.
- 26:08SPEAKER_00: But the logic that Trump was using to expand,
- 26:13SPEAKER_00: to argue for his expansionist aims scared the allies.
- 26:20SPEAKER_00: I think that's safe to say.
- 26:23SPEAKER_02: Yes.
- 26:23SPEAKER_02: Well, great.
- 26:27SPEAKER_02: I don't think it's a logic that was used.
- 26:29SPEAKER_02: It's the fact that the Americans in public up until the Munich Security,
- 26:37SPEAKER_02: was it Davos or the Munich Security Conference?
- 26:39SPEAKER_02: I think it was Davos.
- 26:42SPEAKER_02: Until then,
- 26:43SPEAKER_02: that they did not rule out using force on Denmark,
- 26:48SPEAKER_02: on Greenland, which is affiliated to Denmark under the governance agreement.
- 26:55SPEAKER_02: Everybody realized what is going on, right?
- 26:59SPEAKER_02: And that, yeah, that may be that we need to be a bit more concerned about the aim of the Allies.
- 27:05SPEAKER_02: But more than that...
- 27:08SPEAKER_02: That we do need to take our security a lot more seriously than the Europeans need to
- 27:13SPEAKER_02: the gang up, but also that smaller and medium sized power cannot go in alone, right?
- 27:18SPEAKER_02: Like that they do need a form of defense agreement to be
- 27:26SPEAKER_02: I would wager,
- 27:29SPEAKER_02: not that I had private discussion on this,
- 27:31SPEAKER_02: but I would wager that it's around that moment that what we like to call
- 27:36SPEAKER_02: the European pillar plus Canada and NATO really formalized that the allies decided,
- 27:42SPEAKER_02: okay,
- 27:42SPEAKER_02: this is going to be where our security happened,
- 27:45SPEAKER_02: and this is going to be how it happens,
- 27:47SPEAKER_02: and then why European allies became a lot more receptive to the
- 27:55SPEAKER_02: I think it's reflective a little bit in the most recent declaration in
- 28:00SPEAKER_02: the Ankara Summit, running the wording of the European allies plus Canada.
- 28:05SPEAKER_02: It gets very, very center under every single heading that, A, we're taking care of business.
- 28:13SPEAKER_02: Yes, all of the allies are in Article 5, but we're also taking care of business.
- 28:20SPEAKER_00: It does sound like there's a bit of a middle power containment strategy happening,
- 28:24SPEAKER_00: where the middle powers of Europe
- 28:29SPEAKER_00: and Canada are working on a kind of plan B is
- 28:33SPEAKER_00: the wrong way to put it.
- 28:34SPEAKER_00: But if America does go pear-shaped, we need a security net.
- 28:40SPEAKER_00: And Canada is in a bit of a strategically...
- 28:45SPEAKER_00: Is it a geographically strong position to help with a containment strategy because
- 28:49SPEAKER_00: of just our interdependence and proximity to the United States?
- 28:53SPEAKER_01: Is that kind of how we're reading it here?
- 28:56SPEAKER_02: I don't know if I would go to containment, maybe, but there's certainly a...
- 29:06SPEAKER_02: A series of hedging strategies that are being put together.
- 29:10SPEAKER_02: We're seeing a lot of response to the United States that, okay, let me fall back.
- 29:17SPEAKER_02: And I'll stay on what I know most,
- 29:19SPEAKER_02: but the issue at the moment is that we cannot have the Americans fully disengage
- 29:24SPEAKER_02: from NATO.
- 29:25SPEAKER_02: If we are the NATO allies.
- 29:27SPEAKER_02: Because they still provide technology and enablers that are crucial to
- 29:33SPEAKER_02: the way NATO wants to fight and to fulfill the plan.
- 29:36SPEAKER_02: Mostly because the industrial base of Europe is not there yet to be able
- 29:42SPEAKER_02: to replace piece for piece.
- 29:44SPEAKER_02: Or, as I argue elsewhere,
- 29:45SPEAKER_02: the European allies have not yet figured out that they need to change the way
- 29:51SPEAKER_02: that they will fight in the future to adapt their industry better.
- 29:55SPEAKER_02: Whether you go in one way or another.
- 29:57SPEAKER_00: The word yet there is doing some work.
- 30:00SPEAKER_00: Am I wrong?
- 30:01SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
- 30:02SPEAKER_02: Well, so I didn't want to go into like the super nitty gritty,
- 30:05SPEAKER_02: but the NATO right now has a,
- 30:08SPEAKER_02: the war fighting concept of NATO is called multi-domain operations.
- 30:11SPEAKER_02: People, please go have a look.
- 30:13SPEAKER_02: But all of this to say,
- 30:15SPEAKER_02: it's a very digitally central concept where you need an awful lot of data.
- 30:23SPEAKER_02: In order to be able to fight in what they call the speed of relevance,
- 30:28SPEAKER_02: to fight faster than your adversary,
- 30:30SPEAKER_02: to be able to take faster decisions in order to be able to achieve victory.
- 30:35SPEAKER_02: And all of this is based on some technologies that the European don't fully have and
- 30:42SPEAKER_02: that are supplied by the US.
- 30:43SPEAKER_02: And what we argued with my colleague, Olivia Schmidt and Esben Larsing is...
- 30:48SPEAKER_02: Fighting like the Americans without the Americans is a dead end and is not a good idea.
- 30:53SPEAKER_02: So therefore,
- 30:54SPEAKER_02: we need to rethink how we're going to fight in Europe with the means that we have
- 31:00SPEAKER_02: in order to then be able to adapt our industrial capacity at the moment to move in
- 31:06SPEAKER_02: that direction
- 31:06SPEAKER_01: with the aspiration.
- 31:08SPEAKER_02: Of being able to have like more technologically advanced data focused kind
- 31:14SPEAKER_02: of fighting
- 31:15SPEAKER_01: a little bit like the Ukrainians are doing,
- 31:17SPEAKER_01: for example,
- 31:17SPEAKER_02: with the Delta system and so on.
- 31:20SPEAKER_02: Um, so yes, it does a lot of, there's a lot of, yeah.
- 31:25SPEAKER_00: I want to get back to the word yet because I think that's a pretty crucial statement here.
- 31:29SPEAKER_00: But I see there's kind of two strategic approaches to reducing dependence on America.
- 31:36SPEAKER_00: One is you build up your digital capacity and your digital technology in Europe.
- 31:42SPEAKER_00: And then the second one is you re-embrace analog, right?
- 31:46SPEAKER_00: I mean, both of these strategies can happen simultaneously.
- 31:48SPEAKER_00: And then the third one is You also look to more non-conventional warfare-like drones
- 31:54SPEAKER_00: with Ukraine leading the way on some of that.
- 31:58SPEAKER_00: We've demonstrated that guerrilla warfare
- 32:01SPEAKER_00: and more drone-based warfare are pretty capable approaches to dealing with
- 32:09SPEAKER_00: a highly competent modern army.
- 32:13SPEAKER_00: So there's that.
- 32:14SPEAKER_00: And then I want to get back to the conversation around yet, because if...
- 32:18SPEAKER_00: NATO is not ready to exist without America right now.
- 32:23SPEAKER_00: Realistically, how long would it take for a NATO to exist without America?
- 32:31SPEAKER_02: I think, let's say that yet, and we'll go back to software-centric warfare argument.
- 32:39SPEAKER_02: Most analyses that I've seen from people that I think are credible...
- 32:46SPEAKER_02: To change,
- 32:48SPEAKER_02: to basically put together the full array of what we need,
- 32:52SPEAKER_02: especially the supply chains, the military mobility in Europe, and so on.
- 32:57SPEAKER_02: I think we're talking probably between five to 10 years.
- 33:00SPEAKER_00: But even then.
- 33:02SPEAKER_00: Even by Canadian standards, I'm like 20 to 40 minimum.
- 33:06SPEAKER_02: No, no, no.
- 33:07SPEAKER_02: Okay.
- 33:07SPEAKER_02: Let's be very clear, right?
- 33:09SPEAKER_02: It's five to 10 years.
- 33:10SPEAKER_02: Okay.
- 33:12SPEAKER_02: It's five and seven years minimum with sustained political will.
- 33:18SPEAKER_00: That's always the tricky part, isn't it?
- 33:20SPEAKER_00: It's only the tricky part.
- 33:22SPEAKER_02: Well, it depends.
- 33:23SPEAKER_02: And again,
- 33:24SPEAKER_02: the
- 33:26SPEAKER_02: sad thing about this is the threat level is going to determine also
- 33:31SPEAKER_02: the political will to keep on going, right?
- 33:34SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
- 33:36SPEAKER_02: We can do incredible things when we believe a threat is imminent,
- 33:42SPEAKER_02: when the population believes that a threat is imminent,
- 33:45SPEAKER_02: and we shift resources in order to be able to achieve the goal while having
- 33:51SPEAKER_02: a population that's ready to endorse,
- 33:54SPEAKER_02: to support the hurt that comes with these kinds of policies, right?
- 34:00SPEAKER_02: But...
- 34:01SPEAKER_02: Again, what is the threat landscape going to look like in five to ten years?
- 34:05SPEAKER_02: It's open to interpretation.
- 34:08SPEAKER_02: I think
- 34:12SPEAKER_02: it will in large part matter how the Ukraine war ends.
- 34:19SPEAKER_02: And the state of the Russian Armed Forces economy and so on and so forth,
- 34:25SPEAKER_02: by that point, it will modify.
- 34:28SPEAKER_02: But let's make no mistake, right?
- 34:30SPEAKER_02: The policy disagreement that Russia had with Ukraine and also with NATO is not going away.
- 34:38SPEAKER_02: Because what the war ended up doing is reinforcing that, yeah,
- 34:42SPEAKER_02: reinforcing Baltics,
- 34:43SPEAKER_02: being like, yeah,
- 34:45SPEAKER_02: That was not a bad idea to join NATO,
- 34:47SPEAKER_02: given how Russia still settles its policy issues.
- 34:52SPEAKER_02: Finland,
- 34:53SPEAKER_02: despite being unhappy about the speed of certain things,
- 34:58SPEAKER_02: They're probably happy that they joined NATO and so on, right?
- 35:01SPEAKER_02: So the issue is not going away.
- 35:04SPEAKER_02: The time frame will depend a little bit as what Russia looks like at the end of
- 35:10SPEAKER_02: the conflict,
- 35:11SPEAKER_02: what Europe looks like,
- 35:13SPEAKER_02: how astronomical the new,
- 35:16SPEAKER_02: like the deterrence output of NATO is after all of the reshuffling and whether
- 35:23SPEAKER_02: the industry that's on and whether,
- 35:24SPEAKER_02: and I'm going to pivot to your question,
- 35:27SPEAKER_02: Whether we are getting the right lessons from Ukraine in the sense of what I think,
- 35:35SPEAKER_02: yes,
- 35:35SPEAKER_02: Ukraine,
- 35:36SPEAKER_02: when you look at Ukraine,
- 35:37SPEAKER_02: you thought, oh yeah, okay, we're kind of going back to the old days.
- 35:40SPEAKER_02: Well, yes and no.
- 35:42SPEAKER_02: In Ukraine,
- 35:43SPEAKER_02: what's interesting is that the rear,
- 35:44SPEAKER_02: the concept of the rear doesn't really exist anymore because of the drones,
- 35:50SPEAKER_02: but also the level of connectivity and the speed at which data and targeting,
- 35:54SPEAKER_02: because analyze and targeting is done.
- 35:57SPEAKER_02: Right?
- 35:57SPEAKER_02: Historically,
- 35:58SPEAKER_02: when you look at a frontline,
- 35:59SPEAKER_02: you have your frontline and let's say five kilometers on each side,
- 36:02SPEAKER_02: that was kind of a safe haven, so to speak.
- 36:04SPEAKER_02: You could resupply, you could shoot wounded, and you can prepare and so on.
- 36:09SPEAKER_02: And at the moment, what they call the dead zone is about 25 kilometers on both ends.
- 36:14SPEAKER_02: And more than that,
- 36:16SPEAKER_02: Both of their territories is now subject to long, long range precision strike.
- 36:21SPEAKER_02: So it's not only at the frontline that the fighting's happening or striking targets,
- 36:26SPEAKER_02: thousands of kilometers within what it's more salient because of the size of Russia.
- 36:32SPEAKER_02: Like the Ukrainians are able to strike targets a thousand kilometers within Russian territory.
- 36:37SPEAKER_02: Right.
- 36:37SPEAKER_02: And all of this is enabled by connectivity, data and software.
- 36:45SPEAKER_02: And I am not a full expert on this,
- 36:49SPEAKER_02: so I'm parroting a little bit what my very brilliant friends working
- 36:52SPEAKER_02: on these issues are arguing.
- 36:55SPEAKER_02: But they said the move that Ukraine did is that they put a lot of the complexity
- 36:59SPEAKER_02: of warfare within the software so that they can invest in cheaper platforms.
- 37:06SPEAKER_02: So that the means you use for war become a bit more disposable,
- 37:11SPEAKER_02: but the heavy lifting is done within the software that analyze the data that comes
- 37:17SPEAKER_02: in, figure out the target
- 37:21SPEAKER_02: and allows to strike with precision.
- 37:24SPEAKER_02: So it's a move away from what we call platform-centric warfare.
- 37:27SPEAKER_02: For listeners, a platform is a frigate, like a ship.
- 37:30SPEAKER_02: That's a platform, right?
- 37:32SPEAKER_02: We're at something that's a bit more.
- 37:34SPEAKER_02: And looking at what Canada is buying at the moment,
- 37:39SPEAKER_02: I am not fully certain we're buying into these lessons.
- 37:43SPEAKER_02: And now that's not to say that we need the discard platform because the Arctic is
- 37:47SPEAKER_02: a different environment and we will need some of this.
- 37:50SPEAKER_02: And Powering electrical device in the Arctic, for example, is difficult because of the cold.
- 37:57SPEAKER_02: Anyone that has an electric vehicle understand
- 38:01SPEAKER_02: that your batteries are becoming less efficient,
- 38:03SPEAKER_02: for example, and it's a lot more difficult.
- 38:05SPEAKER_02: But it's not to say that we should start looking into kind of a hybrid means there
- 38:11SPEAKER_02: with conventional platform and what kind of software and software
- 38:17SPEAKER_02: Uh, on-demand vehicles and so on could help us.
- 38:19SPEAKER_02: However,
- 38:20SPEAKER_02: just very briefly on this one for,
- 38:24SPEAKER_02: for no, no, no, just very fast for people who are critical.
- 38:29SPEAKER_02: If you look at the ideas website,
- 38:31SPEAKER_02: which is the departments of defense kind of innovation hub thing
- 38:35SPEAKER_02: where they're trying to get companies to go solution.
- 38:38SPEAKER_02: Well, at the moment, Canada is asking for an alternative to Palantir.
- 38:42SPEAKER_01: Hmm.
- 38:43SPEAKER_02: So interesting.
- 38:45SPEAKER_02: So there is thinking.
- 38:46SPEAKER_02: There's good thinking looking into that kind of future.
- 38:53SPEAKER_01: This episode of On The Line is also brought to you by Cameco Corporation.
- 38:58SPEAKER_01: In nuclear energy, timelines and costs matter.
- 39:01SPEAKER_01: Incomplete designs carry real risk of delays and cost overruns.
- 39:05SPEAKER_01: That's why the AP1000 reactor is the right choice for Canada.
- 39:09SPEAKER_01: It is already operating today and ready now to deliver the power we need
- 39:13SPEAKER_01: with 100% Canadian ownership and strong participation from Canadian suppliers.
- 39:19SPEAKER_01: If we are serious about building Canada and powering it on time and on budget,
- 39:24SPEAKER_01: the choice is clear.
- 39:25SPEAKER_01: The AP1000 reactor is the only option that delivers.
- 39:29SPEAKER_01: To learn more, visit ap1000.cameco.com.
- 39:37SPEAKER_00: This is what I'm curious about because,
- 39:39SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 39:39SPEAKER_00: one of the debates that is happening this week is, look, Carney came to power.
- 39:45SPEAKER_00: He was all elbows up.
- 39:47SPEAKER_00: We have massively increased our spending into...
- 39:52SPEAKER_00: We're looking at increasing recruitment, doing all the things that we're supposed to be doing.
- 39:57SPEAKER_00: But one of the fundamental questions I still have is how much of this is
- 40:00SPEAKER_00: about actually creating a degree of sovereign capability,
- 40:07SPEAKER_00: not necessarily opposing the United States, but independent to the United States?
- 40:11SPEAKER_00: And how much of this is just a reworked jobs program?
- 40:15SPEAKER_00: Or re-economic growth strategy.
- 40:19SPEAKER_00: How much of this is just us saying, look,
- 40:21SPEAKER_00: we're going to spend X amount of dollars in defense,
- 40:23SPEAKER_00: but then you start to dig into the details and it's all dual-use infrastructure,
- 40:28SPEAKER_00: or we're just using this as an excuse to speak.
- 40:30SPEAKER_00: Somewhere in the middle.
- 40:31SPEAKER_00: So there's a.
- 40:59SPEAKER_02: I'm not sure if they want me to out them on this, but there's two very serious scholars.
- 41:04SPEAKER_00: We do need to out them on this.
- 41:05SPEAKER_00: Out everyone.
- 41:06SPEAKER_02: No, no.
- 41:07SPEAKER_02: I mean, the paper is not in finished writing, so I don't want anybody scooping them.
- 41:11SPEAKER_02: But my friend, Justin,
- 41:13SPEAKER_02: I see his colleague, Phil, I guess, are at the moment working on what does it mean?
- 41:22SPEAKER_02: An independent, sovereign capacity for Canada.
- 41:25SPEAKER_02: So they're working on this.
- 41:28SPEAKER_02: What I think Canada is realizing now is somewhere in the middle
- 41:34SPEAKER_02: of everything we've been talking about is that we will,
- 41:39SPEAKER_02: considering the size of our territory,
- 41:41SPEAKER_02: considering our commitments,
- 41:43SPEAKER_02: and considering where the threats might be coming from,
- 41:47SPEAKER_02: it's great to think about a sovereign capacity Capacity,
- 41:52SPEAKER_02: but nothing we will do will be outside of NATO,
- 41:55SPEAKER_02: most likely, because we'll need allies.
- 41:58SPEAKER_02: So therefore,
- 41:59SPEAKER_02: the word of the day that needs to be more important is less independent
- 42:04SPEAKER_02: and more interoperable.
- 42:06SPEAKER_02: Meaning they were capable of fighting with allies in very similar fashion.
- 42:10SPEAKER_02: And I think when you look as to why we went with the submarines that we went to,
- 42:16SPEAKER_02: that's probably this kind of thinking that's operating.
- 42:20SPEAKER_02: The reason why...
- 42:23SPEAKER_02: I haven't looked at the recent development for the millionth time
- 42:28SPEAKER_02: that we're deciding that we might not want the F-35s.
- 42:32SPEAKER_02: But I think with Saab, we had discussions with Saab.
- 42:35SPEAKER_02: Well, you know,
- 42:36SPEAKER_02: because of Sweden now being in the alliance,
- 42:38SPEAKER_02: it's somewhere, somehow, an interoperable fighter.
- 42:42SPEAKER_02: Although, if I remember correctly, Saab's fighter jet have an American engine.
- 42:47SPEAKER_02: But I need to be fact-checked on this.
- 42:48SPEAKER_02: But I think they do.
- 42:49SPEAKER_00: Yeah, they do.
- 42:50SPEAKER_00: They do.
- 42:51SPEAKER_02: I think they do.
- 42:52SPEAKER_00: Although I think some of the other allies are working for workarounds on that one too.
- 42:57SPEAKER_02: Yeah.
- 42:58SPEAKER_02: So, and the thing is, is at the moment, I think there's a dual track happening in St. John.
- 43:06SPEAKER_02: We need to continue NATO's focus on, we need to be able to fight today, fight tonight.
- 43:15SPEAKER_02: And we also need to, and this is in large part, and this is what has a lot of domestic issues.
- 43:23SPEAKER_02: Because try to explain to the French population that they should maybe invest
- 43:28SPEAKER_02: into German submarines because they're a bit more advanced
- 43:32SPEAKER_02: and we can get them faster.
- 43:34SPEAKER_02: These conversations are extremely difficult to have.
- 43:37SPEAKER_02: And I'm not saying that is the case.
- 43:39SPEAKER_02: I'm just giving an example on the top of my head.
- 43:41SPEAKER_02: So you have this trap.
- 43:42SPEAKER_02: We need to fight tonight and we need to be able to sustain a conflict with Russia if it happens.
- 43:46SPEAKER_02: But we also need to diversify and move away from American enablers because we see
- 43:52SPEAKER_02: that The current administration has used them as leverage in order
- 43:56SPEAKER_02: to get what they wanted elsewhere.
- 43:58SPEAKER_02: So we need to become more independent when it comes to this.
- 44:00SPEAKER_02: And then the real question is going to be what kind of strategy in the long run is
- 44:05SPEAKER_02: the European and Canadian industry going to take when it comes to developing?
- 44:11SPEAKER_02: In an ideal world, everybody will kind of agree to, hey, this is our comparative advantage.
- 44:17SPEAKER_02: This is our comparative advantage.
- 44:20SPEAKER_02: We'll build this, you build this, you build that, and blah, blah, blah.
- 44:23SPEAKER_02: But then somebody will raise their hands like, yeah, but what happens if it happens?
- 44:26SPEAKER_02: So you can see the devolving series of issues that we may have down The Line looking
- 44:33SPEAKER_02: at that,
- 44:34SPEAKER_02: which is a long-winded answer to say this is probably what explains
- 44:38SPEAKER_02: the continued support of American products.
- 44:42SPEAKER_02: First, they're available and they're useful, although...
- 44:46SPEAKER_02: A lot of nations are starting to question that because I think it's Estonia
- 44:50SPEAKER_02: that guns some of their contracts pushed back for years.
- 44:53SPEAKER_02: And I'll say, hey, with Iran, we can't fulfill this contract.
- 44:56SPEAKER_02: So they'll want an alternative.
- 44:58SPEAKER_02: And for Canada, well, there is a need.
- 45:03SPEAKER_02: No matter what we do,
- 45:04SPEAKER_02: and I'm not an economist,
- 45:05SPEAKER_02: but a lot of what we do is intertwined with the U.S.,
- 45:10SPEAKER_02: especially when you look at the facts in the Arctic.
- 45:12SPEAKER_02: When you look at NORAND, we do the detection of Most of the analysis is done by the Americans.
- 45:20SPEAKER_02: Takeaway that I would like to give to
- 45:24SPEAKER_02: your listeners is a lot of these issues,
- 45:30SPEAKER_02: you and I can summarize a lot of those probably in one sentence or two for
- 45:38SPEAKER_02: a headline of a newspaper article or something like this.
- 45:43SPEAKER_02: But realistically,
- 45:44SPEAKER_02: these are extremely complex issues that have a lot of ramifications and lots
- 45:50SPEAKER_02: of unintended consequences that we need to think through.
- 45:53SPEAKER_02: And not only that,
- 45:55SPEAKER_02: those decisions are taken by people whose job is only guaranteed in as much
- 46:02SPEAKER_02: as they're voted in by their electorate, which compounds the issue.
- 46:08SPEAKER_00: Bloody democracies.
- 46:09SPEAKER_00: So messy.
- 46:11SPEAKER_02: No, listen,
- 46:12SPEAKER_02: I'm the first one to say I do not want to live in any other system than a democracy.
- 46:18SPEAKER_02: I love democracies,
- 46:21SPEAKER_02: but we also need to understand that they come with some issues when it comes
- 46:25SPEAKER_01: to these kinds of things.
- 46:26SPEAKER_02: And if we're cognizant of this,
- 46:29SPEAKER_02: but I think the reason why I say this is that one of the things that frustrates me
- 46:33SPEAKER_02: a lot at the moment is that there seems to be a lack of courage When it comes
- 46:39SPEAKER_02: to actually leveling up with population as to what we need to do for our security
- 46:45SPEAKER_02: and defense,
- 46:46SPEAKER_02: what it's going to take, and the expected cost in the short and medium term.
- 46:52SPEAKER_02: Because there's going to be.
- 46:54SPEAKER_02: And I think the Canadian population is receptive to this.
- 46:59SPEAKER_02: I mean, we've seen it with the elbows-up moment,
- 47:03SPEAKER_02: with the response to Trump tariff, the response to the 51 state threats.
- 47:08SPEAKER_01: Canadians are ready to pick up that burden.
- 47:12SPEAKER_02: It's just that I think it needs to be explained.
- 47:15SPEAKER_02: In clear language, the strategic communication, so to speak, needs to be done.
- 47:22SPEAKER_02: And the electorate needs to be told what the trade-offs are going to be
- 47:27SPEAKER_02: and why we're doing these trade-offs and why inaction is going to be a problem
- 47:33SPEAKER_02: in clear terms that people that have...
- 47:38SPEAKER_02: I have little interest in defense, which I don't blame them, can also understand.
- 47:43SPEAKER_02: Because otherwise,
- 47:45SPEAKER_02: the only thing that it's going to create is systemic resentment than voting
- 47:50SPEAKER_02: for individuals that promise to actually disengage with these issues,
- 47:56SPEAKER_02: which in the long run will probably prove to be less secure for the country.
- 48:01SPEAKER_02: So we need to start the messaging yesterday morning.
- 48:05SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I mean,
- 48:06SPEAKER_00: don't get me started on my frustration with the lack of strategic communications
- 48:09SPEAKER_00: on ample display when it comes to the Canadian side.
- 48:11SPEAKER_00: I think it's been a disaster.
- 48:13SPEAKER_01: But that's another conversation.
- 48:14SPEAKER_01: Last thing I want to talk to you here is, like,
- 48:17SPEAKER_01: let's take
- 48:19SPEAKER_00: the idea of America as a strategic adversary off the table for just
- 48:22SPEAKER_00: a minute and talk about our known actual adversaries, China and Russia.
- 48:28SPEAKER_00: And the threat that they pose to the Arctic.
- 48:30SPEAKER_00: I mean, I know the Americans have stated very clearly and openly
- 48:34SPEAKER_00: that they are deeply concerned about the Arctic.
- 48:37SPEAKER_00: They're deeply concerned about Canada's seeming incapacity to defend it adequately.
- 48:42SPEAKER_00: And they're concerned about,
- 48:44SPEAKER_00: as the Northwest Passage opens up as a result of global warming,
- 48:46SPEAKER_00: they're concerned about China and Russia engaging in those spaces.
- 48:51SPEAKER_00: Are those legitimate concerns?
- 48:54SPEAKER_00: What's your read on it?
- 49:00SPEAKER_02: I think it is legitimate concern.
- 49:02SPEAKER_02: I mean, yes, the timeline is a bit broader than I think we expect.
- 49:10SPEAKER_02: However,
- 49:11SPEAKER_02: it is not a reason not to begin investing now in the proper infrastructure and so on
- 49:18SPEAKER_02: to be able to defend the area.
- 49:25SPEAKER_02: One thing that I think is a great exercise to do is normally when you look at
- 49:32SPEAKER_02: a world map,
- 49:34SPEAKER_02: we depict North America, Europe and Russia and Africa side by side, yes?
- 49:39SPEAKER_02: If you look at the map from the top,
- 49:44SPEAKER_02: It's a different picture that emerged,
- 49:46SPEAKER_02: one where you have Russia like this,
- 49:49SPEAKER_02: and then you have North America like that,
- 49:52SPEAKER_02: with the Green End essentially being kind of a vanguard of sort for the Arctic.
- 50:00SPEAKER_02: I'm not a climate expert.
- 50:03SPEAKER_02: I cannot tell you the rate at which we expect the ice to melt and when we can expect
- 50:09SPEAKER_02: the steady flow of ship.
- 50:11SPEAKER_02: What I can tell you is that the Russians have been investing heavily in To
- 50:15SPEAKER_02: the North Sea Passage, right?
- 50:17SPEAKER_02: In their own capacity when it comes to that.
- 50:20SPEAKER_02: When it comes to China,
- 50:21SPEAKER_02: I think the question is a little bit more moneyed and is dependent
- 50:26SPEAKER_02: on their relationship with Russia.
- 50:31SPEAKER_02: Because we know that China has claimed themselves to be a near Arctic power.
- 50:37SPEAKER_02: They have design on the Arctic and
- 50:42SPEAKER_02: But a lot of it will need to go through collaboration with Russia that as far
- 50:47SPEAKER_02: as we can tell in the moment,
- 50:49SPEAKER_02: the Russians are not necessarily willing to make, but...
- 50:55SPEAKER_02: Depending on how Ukraine goes,
- 50:57SPEAKER_02: for example,
- 50:58SPEAKER_02: and maybe a potential conflict in Taiwan, it can reshuffle the currents.
- 51:03SPEAKER_02: It's supposed to come out in a couple months now.
- 51:07SPEAKER_02: I wrote with my wife,
- 51:08SPEAKER_02: actually,
- 51:09SPEAKER_02: a scenario about what a search and rescue facility near
- 51:18SPEAKER_02: the Bering Strait could look like.
- 51:21SPEAKER_02: Even Russia and China begins to collaborate because the research
- 51:24SPEAKER_02: and rescue allows you to duck boats and land planes, right?
- 51:29SPEAKER_02: So it's kind of porch ride was another thing.
- 51:31SPEAKER_02: Is it realistic at the moment?
- 51:33SPEAKER_02: It's probably very low probability.
- 51:36SPEAKER_02: But it's the kind of scenario that we could see emerge depending on how some of
- 51:40SPEAKER_02: the pieces we have on the chain board, so to speak, reshuffle.
- 51:45SPEAKER_02: But yes, the Russian are Antarctic powered.
- 51:49SPEAKER_02: They want to be able to project power there.
- 51:51SPEAKER_02: So we need to be ready for that.
- 51:53SPEAKER_02: We need to be able to be ready to keep our freedom of movement when it comes to it
- 51:58SPEAKER_02: and to be able to deny access if we need it to.
- 52:03SPEAKER_00: On what timeframes are we looking here?
- 52:07SPEAKER_00: The Russians aren't going to make a play for the Arctic in the next six months,
- 52:11SPEAKER_00: but maybe this is something we need to start worrying about in the next six years,
- 52:17SPEAKER_00: 60 years?
- 52:18SPEAKER_00: What's the framework we're looking through here?
- 52:21SPEAKER_02: That's an excellent question.
- 52:23SPEAKER_02: I would say, from what I'm Again, this is not my sphere of expertise.
- 52:30SPEAKER_02: What I've seen, we're probably looking at something like a 15 to 20 years issue.
- 52:36SPEAKER_02: Please, please, please fact check me on this one.
- 52:42SPEAKER_00: I'm going to say, look, let's not take this totally at face value.
- 52:47SPEAKER_00: We're throwing spaghetti at a wall here so that we have an understanding.
- 52:52SPEAKER_02: Let's say it's a medium term problem.
- 52:55SPEAKER_00: Medium term problem.
- 52:56SPEAKER_00: Okay.
- 52:57SPEAKER_02: Medium term problem.
- 52:58SPEAKER_02: However,
- 53:01SPEAKER_02: building infrastructures in
- 53:04SPEAKER_02: the Arctic is not like building infrastructure downtown Toronto.
- 53:10SPEAKER_02: I had a contractor once tell me who had built stuff in the Arctic that said,
- 53:15SPEAKER_02: you basically need to,
- 53:16SPEAKER_02: before you can build, you need to build a Home Depot with you.
- 53:21SPEAKER_02: Because if you're missing three screws...
- 53:24SPEAKER_02: You cannot go to the store to get them.
- 53:26SPEAKER_02: So the logistics to be able to build these infrastructure is massive.
- 53:31SPEAKER_02: And it's also to figure out where they need to be and so on.
- 53:34SPEAKER_02: But case of point,
- 53:35SPEAKER_02: when you look at the map and you look at Russian architecture in their portion of
- 53:40SPEAKER_02: the Arctic and you look into built infrastructure in Canada,
- 53:46SPEAKER_02: the difference is stark.
- 53:47SPEAKER_02: And if I remember correctly, we only have...
- 53:53SPEAKER_02: One railroad that goes north.
- 53:58SPEAKER_02: I think it comes through Manitoba.
- 54:00SPEAKER_02: It can be wrong, but I think we have one.
- 54:02SPEAKER_02: So, and we know that moving things that the military might need needs more than one railroad.
- 54:07SPEAKER_02: So, um, Yes,
- 54:10SPEAKER_02: but the threat is, and I know you want to talk about this, sadly, I will need to go.
- 54:14SPEAKER_02: And this is the principle why I wrote that piece about the Golden Dawn saying
- 54:20SPEAKER_02: that Canada should consider it if we have command hour within it.
- 54:25SPEAKER_02: Because realistically,
- 54:27SPEAKER_02: the security problems in the Arctic before anything else will come from deep strike
- 54:31SPEAKER_02: if we ever get there.
- 54:34SPEAKER_02: Which our detection system will be necessary to find and also will need to have
- 54:40SPEAKER_02: the means to be able to strike it down.
- 54:43SPEAKER_02: And it will be great to stay in that.
- 54:46SPEAKER_02: However,
- 54:47SPEAKER_02: if it's us spending money to join a system in which we have no command decision,
- 54:52SPEAKER_02: well,
- 54:53SPEAKER_02: it's not that much different than not spending money in a system
- 54:56SPEAKER_02: that we have no command decision in.
- 55:01SPEAKER_00: Yeah, that makes sense.
- 55:02SPEAKER_00: So look, I just want to sum up what my understanding here is that Arctic, yes, the risk is real.
- 55:07SPEAKER_00: It is a medium term risk.
- 55:08SPEAKER_00: But that being said,
- 55:09SPEAKER_00: because of the logistics of the Arctic,
- 55:11SPEAKER_00: if we are to take that seriously,
- 55:13SPEAKER_00: we need to start moving now in order to address that seriously.
- 55:17SPEAKER_00: We were talking about a Golden Dome.
- 55:19SPEAKER_00: This is sort of like the North American equivalent of the Iron Dome system.
- 55:23SPEAKER_00: You don't even need me.
- 55:23SPEAKER_00: This is perfect.
- 55:24SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 55:42SPEAKER_00: I clearly do.
- 55:43SPEAKER_00: I clearly do.
- 55:45SPEAKER_00: All right.
- 55:45SPEAKER_00: Well, you have to go back to enjoy your lovely new wife.
- 55:49SPEAKER_00: And again, congratulations.
- 55:50SPEAKER_02: Yes, and I have to go have my mom put up her new blinds in your new house.
- 55:55SPEAKER_02: So I need to be able to go be a good son.
- 56:00SPEAKER_00: Thank you so much for joining us.
- 56:02SPEAKER_00: I really enjoyed this conversation,
- 56:03SPEAKER_00: and I think it just gave us a really beautiful overview of the situation from
- 56:07SPEAKER_00: a military and strategic point of view,
- 56:08SPEAKER_00: and I hope that our audience also enjoyed it.
- 56:11SPEAKER_00: If you haven't already,
- 56:11SPEAKER_00: do come check us out at www.readtheline.ca,
- 56:15SPEAKER_00: and if you haven't already, like and subscribe.
- 56:17SPEAKER_00: The buttons are below.
- 56:19SPEAKER_00: Thanks so much, and thank you again.
- 56:21SPEAKER_02: You're welcome.