Latest / In These Times with Rabbi Ammi Hirsch / Jonathan Spyer

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Jonathan Spyer · In These Times with Rabbi Ammi Hirsch

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I am Rabbi Ami Hirsch of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in New York.
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And you're listening to In these Times,
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The Assad family's six decade rule over Syria has ended after 13 years of civil
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war with a lightning rebel advance that seized Damascus and toppled the regime
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to help us understand how this happened.
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Seemingly out of nowhere.
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And what this means for Syria, Israel, the Middle East, and the rest of the world.
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I asked analyst, researcher, and journalist Dr.
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Jonathan Spyer to join me today.
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The author of "Days of the Fall: A reporter's journey in the Syria and
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Iraq wars," based on his numerous trips to Syria and Iraq, he's also reported
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extensively from Ukraine, and he fought in the IDF during the Second Lebanon War.
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Dr.
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Spyer is one of the foremost experts on the Levant, And yet,
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"...Let me just say that had we been having this conversation 11 days
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ago, I would not have predicted that Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham was about to go
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barreling down Syria and take Damascus."
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Dr.
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Jonathan Spyer, thank you for coming on on this short notice
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and during a dramatic week.
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Welcome to In These Times.
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Thank you very much, Rabbi Hirsch, and thanks for the invitation.
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You're one of the, uh, great experts on, uh, the Levant and
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that part of, uh, the world.
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Before we get into your understanding of what actually happened this week,
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you have a fascinating background.
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Uh, you traveled in areas of, uh, Syria and Iraq.
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You uncovered evidence of use of chemical weapons.
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It led to a groundbreaking book.
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Could you tell us about your travels in that part of the world?
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Absolutely.
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Yeah.
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I mean, basically when the Syrian war broke out in 2011, 2012, I had already
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been seeking to report actively in the Levant and in Iraq for about five
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years at that time, five, six years.
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And of course, when the war broke out, this created an enormous opportunity.
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We were all kind of aware.
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that, you know, we were witnessing history in the making.
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And in a way, precisely because ground reporting became quite difficult
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and quite challenging at that time, it also became enormously valuable.
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That's to say there was a huge amount of information.
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Uh, in there, which people just weren't necessarily getting.
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So I, like many others at that time, kind of made it my mission.
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I mean, I was already a field reporter, but I sort of made that a very, very
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central part of my work pretty much for the subsequent, I guess, seven, eight
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years, uh, going regularly into Syria, regularly into Iraq, uh, seeking to
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report from all sides and from all angles with all the combatant sides who were
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willing to listen to, to speak to me.
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What year did that begin?
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Well, I mean, the very first, uh, sort of reporting trip of that kind that I
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made was actually to Lebanon in 2007.
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But I would say in terms of reporting the Syrian war, and of course the
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Syrian crisis broke out in 2011, and I made my first inter Syria war,
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torn Syria, so to speak, in early 2012, in February, March of 2012.
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And who were you working for?
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At
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that time, the papers that I wrote from that trip was actually the now
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defunct Weekly Standard magazine, Tablet magazine, the Jewish
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magazine, and the Jerusalem Post.
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Those were the three papers that I kind of had deals with for that first
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trip, which was to Idlib province, which is of course later on turned out
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to be, you know, a very, very historic ground for the Syrian revolution.
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Revolution.
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I do remember a young guy in Idlib at that time saying to
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me, his name was Mokhi Adin.
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He made the prediction to me, this thing started in Idlib
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and it will finish in Idlib.
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And for many years I thought, well, that was a cute prediction.
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And as it turns out, he was exactly and precisely right.
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That the force that eventually destroyed the Assad regime was made possible out of
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Idlib province and rebel control of it.
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You, you traveled through pretty rough territory and interacted with
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pretty bad guys, and you're Jewish.
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I think you were Israeli at that time as well as being a UK subject.
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Did that cause any problems for you?
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Were you ever, were you afraid?
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It takes a certain kind of person to go in there and do what you did.
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I mean, it does, it does very much depend.
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As I said, I was trying to work with all the different sides in the conflict.
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And I would say that both with regards to security arrangements and with regard
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to how they would relate to Jewish or even Israeli people, uh, it varied
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as to who you were dealing with, you know, the easiest people to work with.
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With the Kurdish fighters, both in Iraq and Syria,
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everything was very above board.
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Um, of course with the Sunni Islamist rebels and all the more
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so with pro Iran, uh, elements, that was, that was not the case.
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And there was a need to have a certain degree of security.
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Um, it often went up to the point of having to have assumed
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identities and assumed biographies and all that kind of fun stuff.
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Uh, with regard to the Sunni Islamist rebels, it was often
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very chaotic on their side.
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So it was kind of possible just to sort of turn up and be whoever, and
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they would, you know, just kind of welcome you in and say, well, okay,
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if you're here, you can come and work.
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So it really did vary very much depending on who we were dealing with.
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And of course I interviewed ISIS people also, but I never was never
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able to enter the ISIS controlled area.
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I interviewed ISIS members in southern Turkey close to the border.
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And there, of course, it goes without saying, there was a need for an
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assumed identity and an element of, uh, of that type of, uh, of work.
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But you didn't, uh, obsess about, uh, being kidnapped or
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harmed in some kind of way?
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No, I didn't.
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Because I think when you're dealing with any type of work where there's also,
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let's say, an element of physical danger.
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Of any kind, really, you know, people will, will always tell you that
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you've got so much to do, you're not sort of there to experience risk.
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You're there to do a particular task.
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That you've set yourself and so you have so much to think about to get that right
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and to do it effectively that generally you can't, you just don't have time
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to be thinking about being frightened.
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Listen, you guys who go in there for the sake of the story and for the sake
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of uncovering uh, certain truths that are hidden from the rest of us, you
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have a certain makeup and it's really an admirable thing and the world owes
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you a lot because what you uncovered there is directly relevant to the
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future of, uh, Um, not only that part of the world, but the West as well.
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So if I can ask you, um, now to explain what happened, uh, this week,
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are, are there any good guys there?
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So Assad fell, he was a terrible person, but are the forces that overthrew him
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any better in terms of their approach to their own populations, let alone,
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uh, relationships with the West?
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I think it's complex and we do have to differentiate between the very different
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elements, uh, on the opposition side.
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And I'm not going to go on to say, and there's a bunch of them that are, you
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know, absolutely tremendous and virtuous, not that, but there are gradations there.
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With regard to the regime, I mean, the Assad regime and the people around him,
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you know, as is now becoming apparent.
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to the world because of the evidence emerging from Assad's places of
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incarceration and specifically the Sadnaya jail close to Damascus, it's becoming
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apparent to the world that this regime deserves to be placed alongside the very
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worst regimes known to history in terms of its record of its treatment of other human
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beings, both Syrians and non Syrians.
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Um, there is of course, absolutely nothing to be said in its defense with regard
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to the opposition, the force that has basically achieved the destruction of the
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Assad regime, pretty much single handedly.
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I mean, this was, it wasn't really a coalition of rebel forces.
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It was a single force, which is Hayat Tahrir al Sham.
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is a Salafi jihadi organization.
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That is to say it is an extreme Sunni Islamist organization.
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And frankly, I would not encourage people to expect anything particularly positive
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to come out of organizations like that.
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And I think it's already becoming apparent.
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The Ayat Tahrir al Sham is in the process of setting up a very
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repressive Sunni Islamic successor regime to the Assad regime.
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Where the caveats and complexities come in, I would say, are in two areas.
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Firstly, in the south of Syria, there were also small rebel groups
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that mobilized in Daraa province, Druze forces in Suwayda province.
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when it became apparent that Assad looked like he was going to fall.
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And these are rebels who are not necessarily Sunni.
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Islamists, some of them, by the way, have worked closely with Israel in the
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past, in the course of the civil war.
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These are, you know, local fighters who wanted to rid
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themselves of a repressive regime.
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They are not as significant as HTS.
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HTS is going to make the government, but we certainly shouldn't forget them.
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And lastly, of course, with regard to the Kurdish forces that control,
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currently at least, 30 percent of Syria, namely Syria, east of the Euphrates.
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Those are the forces that united with United States and Western
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air power in order to destroy the Islamic State caliphate a decade ago.
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And in so doing, I think performed a vital work for humanity.
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So while they are not by any means a perfect administration, yeah, they are.
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You know, those are forces that are certainly worth aligning with
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and certainly worth, uh, defending.
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I want to have you, uh, help us understand what was the background
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to this lightning overthrow of Assad and then, uh, what, in your view,
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will happen in the coming period.
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You paid credence to the suggestion that In one way or another, you can track
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what happened during the last two weeks to October 7th and to Israel's response.
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Okay, so that's a very interesting way of framing that vitally important question.
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First of all, with regard to the issue of October 7th, yeah, I do,
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uh, I do think there's a connection.
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It's simply in the following terms.
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Assad's problem, Assad had a number of problems that caused him to fall, but a
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central one, this time around, was that the forces that mobilized to help him
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a decade ago didn't mobilize this time.
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One is Russia, of course, and the other was Iran and its
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various proxy and client allies.
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And this time, neither of those mobilized.
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With regard to Russia, Israel's actions since October 7th had no relevance.
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Russia did not intervene because it's bogged down in a massive strategic
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challenge, namely trying to push forward in its, uh, invasion of Ukraine.
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But the second component, namely the inability slash unwillingness of the
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Iranians this time to mobilize in support of their friend in need, the Syrian
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dictator, I think does derive directly both from the fact that Iran is still
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engaged in a several front war with Israel, and maybe even more tangibly That
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the main paramilitary client or proxy that Islamic Republic of Iran used a decade
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ago and would have used again, had they been able to this time around, namely
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the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, is currently in a state of absolute disarray.
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And that is directly related to Israel's actions, not since October 8th, 2023,
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actually, but basically since September of this year, the, uh, assault.
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Which Israel has basically subjected Lebanese Hezbollah to.
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Uh, since September, uh, has effectively decapitated that organization, killed,
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of course, it's a historic strategic leader, Hassan Nasrallah, but also
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the next couple of, uh, layers of leadership below him, crippling the
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organization's fighting capacity, uh, and, uh, taking down a massive
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number of its rank and file fighters.
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Because to the extent That Lebanese Hezbollah simply was not able to
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mobilize, to mobilize in a very small way, an inconsequential way at the
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end, but to any extent to save Assad.
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So in this respect, yes, I think that Israel's response to the Iran Leb
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regional axis, and I should include, by the way, Israel's destruction of
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Iranian air defenses in October 26, which leaves Iran a little bit helpless.
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So it's not really in a situation to escalate against Israel either
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at the present time, including that Israel's treatment of Iran and its
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allies in the course of the last year was a significant, maybe even.
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Decisive, but certainly not exclusive factor in explaining the
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reasons for Assad's rapid collapse.
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The issue, which I think we should discuss of the central and pivotal role played
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by the Republic of Turkey, which I think really stands at the center of the, uh,
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insurgent and Islamist success this time, of course, wasn't to do with Israel.
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But the weakening of Iran, which undoubtedly plays a central role in
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Assad's collapse, is yeah, pretty much the work of Israel over the course of the
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last year and especially since September.
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So if you look back at the events of October 7th, it was launched in the
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first place to attack Israel from several fronts, remake the Middle
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East to a certain degree in Iran's favor and Hezbollah and Hamas's favor.
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So looking back at how events eventually unfolded in the 14, 15
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months since, is it accurate to say that was a massive miscalculation
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both on the part of Hezbollah and Iran and Hamas for that matter?
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Yeah, I think so.
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I mean, Um, we should note that all the evidence suggests that Hamas had not,
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uh, informed or coordinated the October 7th assault and massacre, uh, with its
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allies in Lebanon or indeed in Tehran.
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So from their point of view, uh, yeah, it turned out to be a clear
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miscalculation in the sense that the Iranians did not fully mobilize
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simultaneously on, uh, Hamas's behalf.
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By the way, many people here in Israel have said to me, including people from
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border communities and people involved in security, that had the Iranians and
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Hezbollah mobilized simultaneously with Hamas coming from Gaza on October 7th,
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things might have looked A lot different.
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In other words, some of the stuff that Iran and Hezbollah have done
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since October 7th, had they done it on the same day as Hamas assault,
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Israel would have faced a much more difficult situation, but they didn't.
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So yes, uh, they mobilized piecemeal and partially.
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And as it turns out, yeah, I mean, I think in terms of, uh, you know,
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the results being what matters here, it was a massive miscalculation.
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They intervene partially to help Hamas.
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Hamas, uh, carried out, clearly carried out October 7th to try
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to strategically transform the situation in the Middle East.
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And arguably they have strategically transformed the situation in the
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Middle East, but not to their benefit.
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It now looks like The main strategic result of October 7 is the decline and
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near collapse of the Iran led regional alliance and the thwarting or defeat, if I
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can put it that way, of Iran's strategy of use of proxy militias in order to advance
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Iranian power across the Middle East.
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And that's Inevitably, that's good for Israel, right?
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No matter what eventually develops in Syria.
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The fact that the Iranian axis has been so weakened, at least in the
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short term, is good for Israel.
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Do you agree with that?
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Yeah, I do.
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I think, I mean, there's no, there is no downside from an Israeli
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point of view to the weakening of the Iran led regional axis.
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It has been the central enemy of Israel.
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Over the last decade or decade and a half, but it doesn't mean, of
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course, that what's coming next, or what's coming to fill the vacuum,
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uh, left by the decline or retreat of Iran, uh, is necessarily positive.
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So, I want to ask you Do you think it's fair to suggest that
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Israel's unwillingness to abide by the American preference?
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They were always worried about starting a regional war and they
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cautioned against going into Gaza.
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They cautioned against Philadelphia.
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They cautioned against Rafa.
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They cautioned against launching a full scale war on Hezbollah.
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In retrospect.
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Do you think that the Americans were overly cautious and it's a
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good thing that the Israelis in the end decided to ignore that advice?
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I, I would say advice.
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I would, it, it, you could even call it pressure.
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Really
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pressure.
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There was pressure.
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As we now, as we, we know, we're probably gonna find out in the
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future that there was more pressure that we even currently know.
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Do I think it was a good thing?
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Yeah, unambiguously, I do think that it's a good thing.
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Indeed, I think that friends of the United States, of whom I'm certainly one, and
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I think most people in Israel certainly are too, might want to suggest that it
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may even be possible that there's even maybe a lesson in this here for America.
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I mean, let's remember, the United States has had two very major involvements.
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In the Middle East over the course of the last two decades, the invasions
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of Afghanistan and Iraq, and in my estimation, both of those ended in clear
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defeats for the United States of America.
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And both of them were conducted along lines that Israel very clearly
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has not been trying to emulate in the course of the last year.
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Israel has been adopting a very, very different approach, not an approach based
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on Trying to work with local partners or strengthen local partners, not an
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approach based on hearts and minds, an approach absolutely based on kinetic
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action, if I can put it that way, and very good intelligence work and very
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judicious use of air power in particular.
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Now, it's a very different way of doing this.
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It's a very different way of dealing with arguably some quite
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similar enemies, by the way.
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And in some cases, even the same enemies as the ones that
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the Americans were fighting.
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In Iraq, and maybe even in Afghanistan, too, in the sense
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of Sunni political Islam.
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And I think it's produced very different results.
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So, yeah, I think that Israel was right not to take the advice.
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In a certain sense of folks whose track record, at least when it comes to conflict
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in the Middle East over the last decade or two, is not stellar, let's say.
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And I think from that point of view, the events of the last year may indeed be
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a subject for some study by students of policy and strategy and military affairs.
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I think it might be fair to say there are three major powers in the Middle
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East, Israel, Turkey, and Iran.
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What is Turkey's role in all of this?
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Turkey has been strengthened significantly as a result of Assad's fall.
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They, they pushed for it, they wanted it, they supported it.
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What do they have to gain from all of this?
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And I say that also in the context of the uneven relationship that's
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developed, uh, with Israel and to a certain degree with NATO in the West.
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I should preface the remarks I'm about to make by saying that I
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am very much not a friend of the current Turkish government or regime.
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I certainly like Turkey very much, the country, and I've spent a
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considerable amount of time there.
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This is not in any way, I think, a positive regime.
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The reason why I wanted to preface those remarks is because I'm about
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to say something very praising of the Turkish government and of its leader,
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President Erdogan, namely that it was his.
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strategic foresight more than any other single factor that led to the
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possibility of Hayat al Hirasham's victory in the course of the last two weeks.
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What do I mean by that?
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It's, it's a very plain and clear point.
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Uh, five, six, seven years ago, The world, including the West, including
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Israel, was saying, okay, the Syrian rebellion is basically done.
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Assad has won, Iran and Russia have won.
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This thing is finished.
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You can say it's a good thing.
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You can say it's a bad thing, but it's a reality.
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And the only significant country that stood out.
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And they said, no, well, you know, we're just not abandoning
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the Sunni Arab Rebellion.
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We're going to stay in occupation of a little area of northwest Syria, and we're
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going to allow the insurgents, the Sunni Islamist forces, to keep on building and
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to incubate their new organizations and to train and to get ready with Turkey.
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And people couldn't figure out what Erdogan was doing, and people, smart
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people who, you know, who didn't, uh, necessarily support or oppose
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him, were just saying, Surely, eventually, Erdogan's gonna realize
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he's wasting his time with this.
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This is just pure cussedness and bloody mindedness on his part.
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He's just not prepared to accept that his side of being defeated.
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Well, here we are.
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And all of that comes down to the decision by Erdogan not to abandon
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the Sunni Islamist rebellion.
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So I say this in no way to, because I regard either him or the fighters he
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supported as positive, I certainly don't.
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But when it comes to effectiveness and strategic foresight, I think it's
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necessary to give credit where it's due.
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And right now, it's certainly due to the Turkish president.
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At the same time, uh, he's quite a ferocious enemy of the Kurds.
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The Kurds are allies of, uh, Israel in the West, um, and I think they control
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something like 30 percent of formal Syria.
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How do you see that playing out?
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Yeah.
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It hasn't been sufficiently covered in media coverage of events in Syria
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because of course of the very dramatic, uh, occurrences regarding Damascus and
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Homs and Amr and then Aleppo before that.
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But there is a second offensive underway, erupting out of Turkish controlled
22:35
Northwest Syria, being carried out by a parallel insurgent force to Hayat Tahrir
22:40
al Sham, a thing called the Jaysh Suri, or Syrian National Army, which is in
22:45
its entirety a creation of the Turks.
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And this force is conducting its Uh, fight against the Kurds.
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And it has now taken the town of Manbij.
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And I was speaking to Syrian Kurdish friends who told me that this force
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has now crossed the Euphrates and is pushing towards the town of Kobani.
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And they have genuine fear, given the nature of this force, that something
23:10
terrible might be about to happen if the Syrian National Army enters Kobani.
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When I say something terrible, I mean a massacre and ethnic cleansing.
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Uh, what they've told me.
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Is that the SNA fighters are not particularly good fighters.
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And if it was a straight fight between them and the Kurdish fighters,
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they'd be able to hold them back, certainly had to defeat them.
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But the problem is, at least from what I've been told, that Turkish
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drones, Turkish artillery, and indeed Turkish air power, now is being
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deployed in support of those fighters.
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As a result, the Kurds are finding it very, very difficult indeed
23:44
to mount an effective defense.
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And a kind of SOS is being raised by the Syrian Kurdish authority now, both
23:51
to the United States, also to other countries that have expressed support
23:55
for them in the past, because they really are in a tight spot right now.
23:59
And unless something is done, uh, we could be looking at some very, very
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Uh, worrying developments east of the Euphrates in the period ahead.
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So, let me ask you, uh, what you think about the coming months and years.
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I, I hesitate to do this because prophecy is difficult to begin with.
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Uh, it's a fool's, uh, errand and, and, uh, things are seen, at least
24:23
from my, uh, Innocent lay perspective so chaotic in Syria that well, they
24:28
surely are my maybe and nobody really knows What what what is going to happen?
24:34
But how do you see the next period unfolding?
24:38
Do you think it's pie in the sky there?
24:40
Jolani gave a nice interview on CNN recently and talked about democracy
24:48
and respecting people's rights.
24:50
And I mean, these forces are, are really, really bad forces in
24:55
control of Syria at this point.
24:58
What do you think are the prospects of Syria becoming a, a more decent place?
25:04
More decent place, I think, might be hoping for a bit too much.
25:07
Uh, Jolani is a, is a, again, an effectual leader.
25:11
If we want to look at the ways in which he will try to lead, we have
25:15
some precedent to look at because of course Jolani has been running a
25:20
little government of his own now for the last five years inside the area we
25:25
were talking about before of Northwest Syria that the Turks kind of carved
25:28
out for the rebels because Jolani and Hayat Tahrir al Sham created their own.
25:35
De facto government, which they called the Syrian Salvation Government.
25:39
And it ruled over Idlib province in the four or five years prior to the
25:42
current events that we're witnessing.
25:44
What did that governance look like?
25:47
Well, it wasn't the Islamic State caliphate.
25:50
It wasn't the sort of lurid government.
25:53
celebration of everything that was evil and wicked in the human possibility
25:57
and the way the Islamic State was.
25:59
And it wasn't, it wasn't something utterly insane of that kind.
26:03
It was a deeply repressive Sunni Islamic form of governance, which made
26:07
non Muslims second class subjects or second class, I hesitate to use the word
26:13
citizens, but second class inhabitants.
26:16
It did not, however, carry out to mass slaughter or enslavement of non
26:21
Muslims in the way that ISIS did.
26:23
But what it certainly was, was an authoritarian form of rule in which
26:27
notably the official positions of government were held by people other
26:33
than Abu Muhammad al Zulayni, and at the same time, he was the real power.
26:37
So that looks to be like what he's currently trying to create in Damascus.
26:42
He's just announced the appointment of an interim prime minister yesterday.
26:47
The man's name is Mohamed al Bashir, and we know about him because he
26:52
was Joulani's Prime Minister of the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib.
26:56
So it tells us he's a little bit trying to replicate that model in which, once again,
27:00
Mohamed al Bashir handles all kinds of administrative tasks, but the real power
27:06
behind him is Hayat al Risham's guns, and behind them, the decider, Al Bashir.
27:11
is Abu Muhammad al Julani.
27:12
Power is his game.
27:14
That's what he's after.
27:15
Much more so, I think, than the implementation of this or that ideology.
27:21
So what I think we are witnessing is the birth of a very repressive form
27:27
of Sunni Islamist governance, now holding power for the first time,
27:33
consequentially, in the, uh, Levant.
27:35
Islamic State, of course, was a kind of experiment in governance,
27:38
as was Hamas in Gaza, but these were provisional and partial and
27:42
certainly never accepted by the world.
27:44
I think Jolani stands a fairly good chance of becoming the accepted leader of Syria
27:49
if he doesn't make any massive mistakes.
27:52
So that's what I think we're looking at.
27:53
I think that we can tell quite a bit about where this may be
27:57
heading from Israel's actions.
27:59
Israel, as you are aware, has been engaged in a very large scale process of
28:03
destruction of Syrian weapons capacity.
28:06
And that's clearly because Israel thinks that what's about to be born
28:09
is something very negative indeed.
28:11
I would tend to concur.
28:14
with that assessment.
28:16
Now, could it get worse than that?
28:18
That's what I think is fairly certain.
28:20
Could it be something worse than that?
28:22
Could we be heading for a kind of Libya scenario in which this new government
28:26
doesn't succeed at even creating order even in its own repressive terms across
28:30
Syria, but rather we have a kind of fragmentation and ongoing war between
28:35
different forces inside broken Syria?
28:38
That's possible too.
28:39
That's kind of the other possible scenario I would suggest.
28:42
One in which rather than Jolani sort of putting a repressive
28:46
hold over the country.
28:48
Instead, you have the emergence of a Jolani dominated administration,
28:52
but then you have other forces within the, uh, former rebels who are not
28:56
satisfied with what he's done, who start to organize against him, who
29:00
start to seek to undermine him.
29:01
That you would also have elements from the former regime who are very worried
29:05
now that you would have those people trying to organize maybe with the
29:08
help of Iran, the help of Lebanese, Hezbollah, and that you would also have
29:12
the Kurdish forces holding out as I hope they will east of the Euphrates
29:16
and keeping their authority guide.
29:18
And then you'd have a kind of Libya situation of a sort of
29:20
fragmentation and partial collapse.
29:23
of the country.
29:24
That, I would say, is just as realistic as the prospect of a new
29:27
centralized Sunni Islamist Syria headed by Zulani in Damascus.
29:32
I don't really see there being much of a third alternative.
29:35
I think it's going to be either one or the other of those scenarios, I would suggest.
29:41
Either of those scenarios portend tense and belligerent attitudes towards Israel.
29:49
Is that right?
29:51
Yeah, I think that's, that's an uncertainty.
29:53
I mean, unfortunately, what the Syrian civil war consisted of.
29:59
was in effect an Iran supported brutal dictatorship, the Assad
30:04
regime, facing against a Sunni Islamist insurgency, looking to
30:09
create Sunni Islamist governance.
30:11
Nothing within that possibility, I think, portends well for Israel.
30:17
And I would add, In the past when Israel has made peace successfully with its Arab
30:22
uh, neighbors, specifically with Egypt, it was when Egypt was at the end of a
30:26
trajectory of ideological governance.
30:29
The free officers remember, came to power in Egypt in 52.
30:32
There was no less than three full scale wars that their regime fought against
30:38
Israel at 56, 67 and 73 before, you know, at the end of that trajectory.
30:44
The ideology hadn't worked out.
30:46
The leaders were getting older.
30:47
The leaders were tired.
30:48
Then they decided it was maybe time to give the next generation
30:51
a chance and to make peace.
30:53
I would remind all of us that Abu Muhammad al Jolani is a young
30:57
leader of an ideological movement.
30:59
So in a certain sense, we're only at the very beginning of his trajectory.
31:03
The possibility, therefore, that he will adopt a kind of pragmatic
31:06
view and be willing to coexist or sell less to make formal peace with
31:11
Israel, I think is fairly remote.
31:13
So,
31:15
that explains, as you mentioned, Israel's, uh, really immediate bombardment of, uh,
31:21
Syrian assets, military assets, trying to take out as many of them as, uh, possible.
31:25
And I would also add, they immediately moved into the buffer zone in the
31:30
Golan Heights and seized control over the Syrian part of the Golan
31:35
Heights, the Hermon Mountain.
31:36
Um, the Israelis, uh, define that as a temporary, uh, measure,
31:41
but That's gonna be a long time.
31:44
They're not, they're not leaving that part of the Golan Heights anytime soon.
31:47
Right.
31:48
I would think that's right.
31:49
I mean, from the Israeli point of view, the dm, you know, the DMZ, the
31:52
demilitarized zone, which was created by the separation of forces, uh,
31:56
agreement in 1974, was conducted with a Syrian regime that no longer exists
32:02
and that therefore the agreement is.
32:04
Do you think, with all of these forces fighting over, uh, Syria, and with, uh,
32:10
invasion of territories, just seizing territories, the, the borders of that
32:15
part of the world were set in, during World War I, in the Sykes Picot Agreement.
32:20
I think that was 1916.
32:22
Does that have any meaning anymore?
32:24
Is that ever going to be a demarcation line in the future?
32:29
I mean, the interesting thing has been in the course of the last decade when
32:34
these borders have been in all parts of the region rendered largely fictional
32:39
and not only in the areas affected by Sykes Picot, but I'd say beyond
32:43
that also in Libya and also in Yemen.
32:48
Official state borders have been rendered largely fictional.
32:52
You could even argue In the case of Israel, or the area between the
32:56
Jordan River and the sea, that the emergence of the Hamas enclave was
32:59
kind of a similar thing, where a de facto statelet, a kind of de facto
33:04
terrorist sovereignty came into being without any official recognition.
33:08
But what's been notable in the case of Iraq and Syria and Yemen, I would say,
33:13
and Libya too, is on the one hand, the borders have become largely fictional.
33:18
On the other hand, there is an enormous reluctance on the part
33:22
of The international community, I don't like the term, but you know,
33:25
this is the states of the world to formally recognize new borders.
33:31
There's a very, very clear reluctance to allow any of these countries
33:35
to formally break apart, even when de facto they have broken apart.
33:39
And this strikes me as anomalous.
33:41
And I think it's something which probably the stakes of the
33:44
world should try to move beyond.
33:46
As an example, in 2017, and I was there and witnessed it.
33:50
There was an internationally observed, very fair independence referendum
33:54
held in the Kurdish regional government, part of Northern Iraq.
33:57
And over 90 percent of residents voted for secession, for independence from
34:02
Iraq, but they were prevented by force from doing so by Iran supported militias.
34:07
And the world didn't really make a squeak.
34:09
The world didn't say, well, that's kind of not really fair.
34:12
So, you know, there's a, there's a awareness that these countries have.
34:15
But there's an enormous reluctance to acknowledge that and perhaps build a
34:20
new diplomacy with regard to the facts on the ground in the Middle East.
34:25
Marc Thiessen
34:25
Two more brief questions.
34:27
I know you can spend hours on them, but I want to talk to you about the Americans
34:31
and then finally about the Iranians.
34:34
What do you think?
34:34
There's a new administration coming in.
34:37
What do you think the American approach should be and what
34:40
do you think it will be?
34:42
Uh, what I think it should be, I, we've discussed earlier that the
34:45
Iran led regional axis has taken a number of very significant hits
34:50
over the course of the last year.
34:53
The Iran led regional axis is of course committed to Israel's destruction, but
34:58
it's also committed to the expulsion of the United States from the region
35:02
and to acquiring dominance over U.
35:05
S.
35:05
associated countries, notably in the Persian Gulf.
35:10
Uh, area.
35:11
That means, in my view, that if an enemy that's committed to your
35:15
undoing is suddenly vulnerable, you'll be well advised to keep pushing.
35:21
I think that Iran is very vulnerable at the present time, and what I sincerely
35:25
hope begins in the new year with the coming into office of the president elect.
35:32
is a newly confident forward strategy in which the goal should be the demise
35:40
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
35:42
Because without that regime falling into Iran, you cannot have normalcy,
35:47
not in Iraq, not in Yemen, not in Lebanon, not with regard to the Israeli
35:52
Palestinian conflict, and probably not also even in Syria, even if its
35:57
main client has just fallen there.
35:59
So that's what I think should happen, and I think that Israel
36:03
should have a part in that.
36:04
Other regional assets and allies should have a part in it, and it should be
36:07
led by the United States of America.
36:09
What do I think will happen?
36:12
I hope that's what will happen, of course, and there's some
36:14
evidence to suggest that it may.
36:16
There are people who think that way, such as, for example, the soon
36:20
to be Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who I think would probably
36:24
sign on to most of what I just said.
36:27
Uh, so we'll see.
36:29
The president elect is, of course, famously unpredictable and can
36:33
go in all kinds of directions.
36:34
So I wouldn't want to say with any certainty that that
36:37
strategy will be followed.
36:39
Uh, I hope it will be.
36:40
And when it comes to predictions, let me just say that, have we
36:43
been having this conversation?
36:45
Eleven days ago, I would not have predicted that Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham
36:49
was about to go barreling down Syria and take Damascus, so I'm probably
36:52
not the best one to make predictions.
36:55
One final question, and it was a good segue to my question about Iran.
36:58
How stable do you think that regime is and how realistic would it be to
37:05
topple that regime as you yourself pointed out a few minutes ago?
37:10
In the course of the last five years, Iran has experienced two episodes of very
37:15
serious discontent in the period 2019 in a limited way and then in a very very
37:21
extensive and serious way in 2021, 2022.
37:25
And the events of 2022, many Iranians tell me, represented the most
37:30
significant domestic unrest that the Islamic Republic of Iran has ever
37:34
experienced since its inception in 1979.
37:38
So my sense from that and from our conversations with Iranians is
37:43
that this is not a popular regime.
37:44
And this is not a, that's not a controversial thing to say.
37:47
Many Iranian analysts and observers and citizens will tell you.
37:52
that the core support of this regime is probably around 20
37:56
percent of the population.
37:59
But I think most serious analysts of Iran will tell you also that
38:03
that 20%, you know, it might be narrow support, but it's deep.
38:08
Those are people who have benefited enormously from their
38:11
association with the regime.
38:13
Ideology, Iranian friends tell me, is not as strong there in any way as it used to
38:18
be in the early days of the regime, but self interest certainly is there, and
38:23
that provides an incentive for them to fiercely Defend the regime, and they are
38:28
well organized, and they're well armed.
38:30
So, it means that anybody who wants to make revolution in Iran will have to get
38:35
past some pretty formidable barriers.
38:38
The other thing to note is that as of now, at least, there does not appear to be
38:42
anything remotely resembling a nationwide, let alone united revolutionary leadership.
38:48
So my view is that that is a necessary element that needs to
38:51
be established and only Iranians themselves can establish that.
38:55
Maybe with the help of external forces, we can think of examples known
39:00
to history, such as the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917.
39:03
The Bolsheviks were certainly an authentic local force.
39:07
But their ability to organize was made possible by the
39:11
support of the German Empire.
39:12
So external forces can play a role too.
39:15
I sincerely hope that the enemies of Islamic Republic of Iran are thinking
39:20
about ways to work with Iranians inside Iran who want to bring down this regime.
39:25
That has historical precedence.
39:28
That can be done.
39:29
I think the regime is vulnerable.
39:31
I think internally they've messed up the economy.
39:34
They've messed up the husbandry of Iran's resources, the management
39:38
of its water, for example, the management of its agricultural land.
39:41
Inflation is high.
39:42
The currency is not doing well.
39:44
I think that the defeat region wide, which they're in the, process of suffering at
39:48
the hands of Israel will wipe out also any claim they may have had, that we may
39:53
not be able to manage Iran internally, but hey, we're kind of making Iran,
39:56
uh, advance, uh, on the regional level.
39:59
That's not going to be true either.
40:00
So I think the legitimacy is going to be further declining.
40:02
So yeah, everything's there to make revolution in Iran and the bringing
40:07
down of Islamic Republic a possibility.
40:10
But once again, one should not predict anything like that.
40:12
There's, there's everything to work for.
40:14
It's what I would say.
40:15
And do you think that the Israelis and or the Americans will take out the nuclear
40:21
facilities before Iran gets a bomb?
40:25
And are the Israelis even capable of doing that on their own?
40:28
I
40:29
think that Israel clearly is capable of doing very severe damage.
40:34
To the Iranian nuclear program, taking it out once and for all completely
40:39
and conclusively, probably not.
40:41
It's not even clear that America can do that in the sense that in the
40:45
Iranian case, unlike in the previous Syrian or Iraqi cases, the nuclear
40:49
knowhow in Iran is produced by the Iranian higher education system.
40:55
In other words, these aren't foreign specialists coming in to Iran.
40:59
So I mean, if the knowledge is there, then even if the current program
41:01
was destroyed in its entirety.
41:04
You could still theoretically, you know, pick up the pieces and start again.
41:07
Can very, very serious damage be done, certainly by the United States, yes.
41:11
I think also by Israel, and I hope that there are serious considerations to that
41:17
being given for the following reason.
41:19
Some smart Iran analysts are saying that if the proxy strategy has been defeated.
41:25
Then it is natural, it will be natural for Iran to fall back on its other
41:29
areas of strength and power projection.
41:32
One of those is ballistic missiles.
41:34
The other is the nuclear program.
41:36
And therefore, from that point of view, there is a greater chance
41:39
now that we could see Iran trying to move towards a rapid breakout
41:44
and testing of a nuclear weapon.
41:46
That may have been the case even just a year ago.
41:49
I hope that our intelligence is good enough to know when that decision is made
41:53
and that we'll have enough time between the decision being made and the weapon
41:57
being tested to then act militarily.
41:59
We'll have to, I guess, wait and see, and I guess we're
42:01
going to find out quite soon.
42:03
Dr.
42:04
Jonathan Spire, thank you, uh, thank you very much for, uh, being
42:08
with us, for spending this time.
42:10
In particular, for all of the work you've already done,
42:13
your expertise, your courage.
42:15
Uh, keep writing, keep thinking, and I wish you and your family a joyous
42:19
Hanukkah and a good and productive 2025.
42:22
Thank you very much, Rabbi Hess.
42:28
When leaders launch wars, what may begin with tactical victory often
42:32
ends up in catastrophic defeat.
42:34
Amen.
42:35
While we never know what tomorrow brings, especially in the Middle East, I think
42:39
it is not too early to conclude that what began with a devastating defeat
42:43
for Israel on October 7th, 2023, has turned into an overwhelming victory.
42:49
It came at an unimaginable price.
42:53
Fifteen months of war and counting.
42:55
1, 200 innocent Israelis slaughtered in their homes and in the fields.
43:00
Another 800 plus soldiers killed.
43:02
Thousands wounded in combat.
43:04
250 hostages, a hundred of whom are still captive.
43:09
The erosion of Israel's diplomatic standing and the explosion of
43:12
anti Semitism in the West, severe damage to the Israeli economy,
43:17
morale, and social cohesion.
43:19
80, 000 Israeli refugees displaced from their homes.
43:23
And, tens of thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese casualties, many of whom
43:28
were non combatants, and whose deaths and ongoing suffering I also mourn, despite
43:35
the support of many of them for Hamas and Hezbollah and their apparent and appalling
43:40
glee for Hamas's brutality on that day.
43:44
In prevailing, Israel has defended Western civilization itself.
43:49
If it is not acknowledged now.
43:52
It will be, when history records its judgments on our era.
43:57
While multiple factors contributed to the fall of the House of Assad, it would
44:01
not have happened at this time, without Israel's decimation of Hamas, its defeat
44:06
of Hezbollah, and its weakening of Iran.
44:10
The source of so much terror, extremism, and instability.
44:14
The world is a better place because Sinwar, Nasrallah, Def, and their
44:18
henchmen have all been sent to the place of eternal damnation reserved
44:23
for the worst of our species.
44:25
These are historic times.
44:28
The Middle East is being remade, as Sinwar intended when he launched his terror
44:32
campaign, just not in the way he wanted.
44:37
I hope that Syria can be transformed into an oasis of pluralism and human rights.
44:42
I hope that the new regime will seek peace with Israel and the West,
44:46
but it seems to me that much more likely will be the emergence of some
44:50
form of Islamist fundamentalism.
44:53
Or years of chaos and civil war.
44:56
I hope I'm wrong.
44:59
I'm not an expert on international affairs, as is Jonathan Spyer.
45:03
But I do know something about Jewish values.
45:06
While Judaism recognizes that sometimes there is no alternative to
45:09
war, our tradition yearns for peace.
45:14
Who is a hero, our sages ask?
45:17
One who turns an enemy into a friend.
45:20
Seek peace and pursue it, is Judaism's message.
45:24
All that is written in the Torah is written for the sake
45:26
of peace, the Talmud teaches.
45:29
You are your brother's keeper, Judaism insists.
45:32
We are obligated to recognize the humanity in every human being.
45:37
During the height of the Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis that
45:40
washed over Europe, I led a synagogue delegation to Greece and Germany.
45:45
We stood on the shores of the mythical island of Lesbos, 14 miles from Turkey.
45:49
Waves of desperate men, women, and children clamored to reach this beach.
45:54
Many drowning in the strait or close to the shore.
45:58
Many others were rescued, their saviors among the most admirable
46:02
souls our species can produce.
46:05
There were Israelis among the rescuers as well.
46:08
People who left their comfortable jobs and their comfortable homes, ever ready to
46:13
wade into the ocean and risk their lives to save the desperate and the drowning.
46:19
I remember meeting several Syrian children in Greece.
46:22
I asked them where they were from and they all said Palestine.
46:26
They had lived in Syria for generations.
46:28
Assad butchered their families.
46:30
They endured chemical attacks, they fled Syria, and they each responded
46:35
that they come from Palestine.
46:37
Still, all I saw were beautiful children, now refugees, swarming around us, eager
46:44
to receive not only the supplies, clothes, and treats we brought with us from the
46:48
United States, but more importantly, to connect with us on a human level.
46:54
They, who had witnessed the worst in humanity.
46:58
These kids were like any other children in the world.
47:01
They were like our children.
47:03
I could envision them on any playground and in any school in America.
47:07
Excelling in any endeavor that we value.
47:10
I think of those kids often now, seven years later, and
47:13
wonder what became of them.
47:16
I met a Yazidi young man, so traumatized by his period of captivity in ISIS and his
47:21
subsequent escape, that he couldn't even be in the same room as he told his story.
47:27
One of the social workers had to read it for him.
47:29
I met a young Yazidi woman who was a slave of ISIS.
47:34
What she endured was obvious.
47:36
She did not have to spell it out.
47:39
She wanted to meet, nonetheless, and to tell her story.
47:43
She told it in three word sentences, her eyes cast downward.
47:47
Exposing agonies that would never vanish.
47:51
This is who we are.
47:53
This is human nature.
47:56
We inflict the most horrendous brutality on each other.
48:01
But we are also those who waited on the other side, on freedom's shores.
48:06
They, too, told harrowing stories of rescue and daring, wading
48:10
into the ocean to pluck the floundering from the jaws of death.
48:14
They recounted how they left high paying, high flying jobs, to attend
48:18
to the lowest of human beings.
48:21
Jewish sages asked, Why did God choose to put the Divine
48:24
Presence in the burning thornbush?
48:27
That ugly, stout shrub.
48:31
Why not some majestic oak or cedar of Lebanon that would
48:34
symbolize the majesty of God?
48:37
The sages teach, God put the Divine Presence in the lowest of trees
48:43
to remind us that God is present.
48:45
In the lowest of human beings.
48:48
There are people in our world who take that seriously.
48:52
Be with them.
48:54
Support them.
48:56
Become one of them.
48:59
I love this poem by Seamus Heaney.
49:03
Human beings suffer.
49:05
They torture one another.
49:07
They get hurt and get hard.
49:10
No poem or play or song can fully right a wrong inflicted and endured.
49:15
So hope for a great sea change on the far side of revenge.
49:20
Believe that a further shore is reachable from here.
49:23
Believe in miracles.
49:25
That means someone is hearing the outcry.
49:28
And the birth cry of new life at its term.
49:32
It means once in a lifetime that justice can rise up and hope and history rhyme.
49:41
Until
49:45
next time, this is In These Times.