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The Reality of the Law | C. S. Lewis · Reformed Thinking

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  Reformed thinking. Welcome to the deep dive.
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  Today we're looking into something that's, well, it's
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  right at the heart of what it means to be human.
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  We're going to be examining some sources that really dig into
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  this persistent feeling we all have about right and wrong.
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  Right, this absolute certainty that some things are fair and
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  others aren't. Exactly.
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  And our main source for this is going to be some material from
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  CS Lewis, a lot of it drawn from his work in Mere Christianity.
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  He has this term for it. He calls it the law of human
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  nature. And our mission really, for this
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  deep dive is to get to the bottom of his argument.
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  Why does he claim that this standard of decent behavior,
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  this moral compass we all seem to have, isn't just a social
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  convention? Right.
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  That's not just a matter of taste or something we made-up
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  for convenience, he's arguing. It points to something,
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  something real, something external to us.
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  Yes, something completely separate from just observing how
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  people happen to act on any given day.
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  And Lewis? He kicks the whole thing off
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  with two observations he makes about people.
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  These seem simple, but they're actually quite strange when you
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  think about them. They really are.
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  So the first one is just this, that human beings all over the
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  earth have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a
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  certain way. A standard of Fair play or
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  decency or morality. He uses a few different names
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  for it. Yeah, and we appeal to it all
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  the time. It's what's behind our
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  complaints, our arguments, our demands for justice is that
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  feeling of hey, that's not fair, we all know it.
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  We. Do.
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  And then the second observation is the one that really sets up
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  the problem, which is that we don't actually do it.
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  We know this law, we know the standard of Fair play, but we
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  don't follow it. We consistently, reliably fail
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  to practice the very behavior we expect from others it.
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  Sounds so basic when you put it like that, doesn't it?
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  We know the rules and we break them.
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  But for Lewis, this is not a trivial point.
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  This tension, this gap between the law we acknowledge and the
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  lies we actually live, he says. That's the starting point for
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  finding any real truth about ourselves and the universe.
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  Yeah, the fact that we can even recognize a standard that we are
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  capable of breaking, that requires a serious explanation.
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  It can't just be brushed aside. And that's really where the
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  critical analysis has to begin. OK, but if you accept that, you
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  immediately run into a pretty big objection.
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  I mean, it's the first thing I would think of.
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  I think it's what most people would think that, well, breaking
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  the moral law just means we're not perfect, and why should
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  anyone expect us to be? Nothing is perfect.
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  Exactly. So what?
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  We're imperfect creatures. A tree can be imperfect.
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  A stone could be imperfect. Why is it such a big deal if
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  humans are? Well, this is the first major
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  distinction Lewis makes, and it's a critical 1.
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  He argues that when we use the word imperfect or bad for a
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  human's moral failure, we mean something completely different
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  than when we apply it to, say, a rock or a tree.
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  How so? Well, think about a purely
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  physical object, a stone, for example.
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  It just it is what it is. It operates according to its
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  physical nature and the forces acting on it.
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  Full stop. Right.
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  And if I say a stone has the wrong shape, what am I really
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  saying? You're saying it's the wrong
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  shape for something you want to do with it.
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  OK, so if I'm building a wall and I need a flat stone but I
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  pick up a jagged one, yeah, the jagged 1 is wrong for my
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  purchases. Exactly for your purposes, the
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  jaggedness isn't a failure on the stones part.
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  It hasn't broken the law of being a good stone.
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  It's just the result of geology, of weathering of all these
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  physical forces. It's inconvenient for you, but
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  that's all it is. It hasn't failed to live up to
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  some sort of stone ideal. Not at all.
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  And the same goes for the tree. You might call a tree bad
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  because it's stunted and doesn't give you the shade you wanted.
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  But Lewis's point is, given the poor soil it had, the lack of
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  rain, the specific weather conditions, that bad tree was
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  obeying the laws of botany just as perfectly as a huge healthy
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  1. I see.
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  So it's state is a necessary result of its circumstances.
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  It couldn't have been anything else.
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  Precisely. There's no sense in which you
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  can look at that tree and say it ought to have grown taller.
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  It simply did what the laws of nature dictated under those
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  specific conditions. It's always conforming to
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  physical law. I can't disobey gravity.
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  It can't disobey the principles of cellular biology.
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  OK. So if you take that framework
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  where physical objects are always conforming to their
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  nature, then the way humans fail to conform to the moral law
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  suddenly looks very, very different.
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  It stands out. It really does, because the
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  standard of behavior for a person is clearly not just
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  defined by what people in fact do.
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  If it were, then what if the law of human nature worked like the
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  law of gravity? Then being selfish would be like
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  trying to float upwards. It would be impossible.
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  If a person did something selfish and we were just
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  describing facts, then selfishness would just become
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  part of the definition of human nature.
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  You couldn't call it wrong. But we do, all the time.
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  We know people can act differently than they ought to.
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  We know they can choose to defy that standard.
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  And that single fact separates human action from the rest of
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  physical nature. It puts the moral law on a
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  completely different level from the physical laws that govern a
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  star or a cell. So this forces us to really
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  think about what we even mean when we use the word law.
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  Exactly. When we talk about the laws of
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  nature in science, gravity, thermodynamics, that kind of
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  thing, Lewis suggests we might not even be using the word law
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  in the strictest sense. It might be more of a metaphor.
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  Right, it's an interesting way to put it.
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  So let's really break that down. The difference between a law
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  that describes and a law that prescribes.
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  When we look at a physical law like a stone falling, what are
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  we actually saying? Well, Lewis's point is that
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  saying a stone obeys the law of gravitation might not mean much
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  more than this is what stones in fact always do.
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  Yeah, we don't imagine the stone is thinking to itself.
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  Ah yes, I must remember my orders in the universe and fall
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  downwards now. Right.
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  There's no sense of compulsion or choice.
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  We just observe a pattern for a stone or an electron or a
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  planet. What it does is the whole story.
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  The law is just our summary of that observed behavior.
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  It's purely descriptive. There's nothing above and beyond
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  the actual facts, as he puts it. Exactly.
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  The physical laws just document what is.
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  OK, now let's contrast that really sharply with the law of
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  human nature, the law of decent behavior.
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  This law most certainly does not mean what human beings in fact
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  do. Not even close because as we
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  already said, people break it constantly.
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  If the law of decent behavior was just a description of what
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  we do, then lying, cheating, and betraying would just be data
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  points. They'd just be part of the
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  definition of human behavior. You could never condemn someone
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  for murder because the act of murder itself would just be
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  another fact to add to the summary.
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  But the moral law doesn't work that way.
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  It tells us what we ought to do, even when we're doing the exact
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  opposite. And this is where that huge
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  philosophical split happens with human morality.
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  Something else comes into the picture that is above and beyond
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  the simple facts of what happened.
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  So you have two different layers of reality in a way.
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  That's a good way to put it. You have the facts.
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  This is how people are behaving. And then you have something else
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  entirely. This is how they ought to behave
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  for the rest of the physical world.
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  The facts are the whole story, but for us, our factual behavior
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  is always being measured against this other thing, this external
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  standard. And it takes a real mental shift
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  to accept that an ought can be just as real as it does.
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  We observe the world, we catalog what is.
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  But the second we start talking about right and wrong, we're
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  admitting there's this other realm of reality about what
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  should be. It's a very peculiar
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  distinction, and because it's so strange, it makes people, Oh
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  well, it makes them uncomfortable.
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  And that discomfort leads them to try and explain it away,
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  right? To try and reduce the moral law
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  to something more manageable, something we created ourselves.
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  Yes, to reduce it to something material like instinct or social
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  conditioning or just pure convenience.
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  Because if you can do that, if you can show the moral law is
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  just something we invented, then this whole argument for an
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  external, real Stanford just disappears.
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  So Lewis anticipates this and takes on those explanations
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  directly. He does.
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  He puts them under the microscope.
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  The first big one he critiques is what you could call the
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  convenience argument. OK, what's the gist of that?
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  The argument is basically this. When you say someone shouldn't
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  do something, all you really mean is that what they're doing
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  is inconvenient for you or for the group.
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  Morality is just a fancy word for self-interest.
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  That's a very common sort of cynical view of things.
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  Right is what helps me, wrong is what hurts me.
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  Exactly. But for that to be true, our
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  moral feelings, our sense of blame, should line up directly
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  with how much harm or inconvenience we suffer.
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  And Lewis says it just doesn't. The evidence from our own
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  reactions proves that's not what's going on.
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  Right, let's walk through one of his analogies, the one about the
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  train seat. It's a great illustration.
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  So imagine you're on a crowded train and you've spotted an
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  empty corner seat. In scenario one, another person
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  sees it too. They're just a bit quicker than
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  you, and they get to it First. They sit down.
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  It's inconvenient for you. You lost the seat, right?
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  I'm annoyed, but that's life. OK, now scenario two.
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  You're heading for the seat. You put your bag down to market,
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  you turn your back for a second and someone else comes along,
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  shoves your bag onto the floor and takes the seat.
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  Oh, I'm much more than annoyed now.
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  Now I'm angry. Exactly.
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  But think about it, the physical results, the inconvenience is
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  identical in both cases. You don't have the corner seat.
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  So if morality was just about convenience, you should feel the
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  same way about both people. But I absolutely don't.
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  The first person played by the rules, they were just faster.
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  The second person cheated. They broke the unspoken rule of
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  fairness. And that's the whole point.
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  Your moral judgment, your anger, it isn't triggered by the loss
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  of the seat. It's triggered by the violation
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  of the standard, the violation of the ought.
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  That's a really clear way to put it.
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  The inconvenience is the same, but the moral feeling is
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  completely different. He uses another example that's
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  just as good, the one about tripping someone.
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  Imagine someone tries to trip you on purpose.
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  They're malicious, but they're also clumsy, and they miss
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  completely. You're not hurt at all.
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  I'm still going to be furious with them.
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  Of course, now imagine someone else isn't looking where they're
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  going. They stumble and they
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  accidentally knock you over and you break your arm.
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  It's a serious injury, a massive inconvenience.
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  After the initial shock, am I going to be morally outraged at
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  them? No.
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  I'll be in pain, but I won't blame them in the same way.
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  Right. If morality was just about
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  avoiding harm or inconvenience, the person who accidentally
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  broke your arm should get all the blame, and the person who
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  tried to trip you but failed should get none.
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  But our moral sense works the exact opposite way.
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  We care about the intent, the violation of the rule against
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  trying to harm people, not the outcome.
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  The intent is what matters. It's a devastating counter
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  argument to the idea that morality is just a calculation
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  of what's useful or harmful to us.
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  It really is. And he has one more example on
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  this point that really drives it home, the one about the traitor
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  in a war. Oh, this one is fascinating.
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  In a war, if someone from the other side betrays their own
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  country and gives you secret information, that person is
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  incredibly useful to you, right? They're providing an enormous
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  convenience, a huge advantage. Absolutely.
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  They might help you win the war. And yet, as Lewis points out,
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  the very people who are using the traitor, paying him,
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  benefiting from his actions, they still despise him.
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  They might call him human vermin.
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  They use him, but they don't respect him.
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  Exactly why? If morality is just about what's
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  convenient for me, I should see this traitor as a great and good
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  man. But nobody does.
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  Even the side he helps sees his act of betrayal as fundamentally
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  wrong. The moral judgement stands
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  completely apart from the calculation of utility.
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  So bringing that all together, it seems pretty clear decent
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  behavior is not just about what happens to be useful to me at
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  any given moment. No, and in fact, it often
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  demands the exact opposite of what would pay us personally.
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  It requires you to be honest when a lie would be easier to
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  keep a promise that's become a huge burden to.
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  Act against your own immediate self-interest.
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  Yes, which completely torpedoes the idea that morality is just a
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  sophisticated form of personal convenience.
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  OK, so if the idea of individual convenience doesn't hold up, the
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  next logical step for a skeptic is to broaden the scope to zoom
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  out. Right.
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  Which brings us to the second major argument Lewis tackles.
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  We can call it the societal benefit argument.
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  And the claim here is that, OK, maybe it's not about my personal
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  benefit, but it's about what pays off for the human race as a
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  whole. Yes.
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  The idea that we have this sense of right and wrong because as a
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  species we figured out that society works better if everyone
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  plays fair. It's a kind of group survival
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  instinct. And on the surface, that sounds
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  very plausible. I mean, it's true, isn't it?
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  A society where people are generally really unselfish and
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  honest is a much safer and happier place than one where
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  everyone is just out for themselves.
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  It is absolutely true. Louis doesn't dispute that for a
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  second. That's a fact about how the
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  world works. But as an explanation for where
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  our sense of ought comes from, he says it falls into a classic
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  logical trap. It's circular reasoning.
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  It's completely circular. It assumes the very thing it's
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  trying to explain. OK, let's walk through that
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  logic so it's really clear. Suppose I'm the person who
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  doesn't see why I should be unselfish, and I ask you, why
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  ought I to be unselfish? And I, using the societal
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  benefit argument, would say because being unselfish is good
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  for society. Okay, but then I could just ask
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  the next obvious question and why should I care about what's
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  good for society, especially if being selfish right now would
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  really benefit me and only hurt society in some tiny abstract
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  way? What can I possibly say to that?
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  The only real answer I have left, if I'm not going to appeal
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  back to your own self-interest, is to say, well, because you
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  just ought to be unselfish. And we're right back where we
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  started. The argument has to assume the
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  existence of the ought to make its case.
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  It does. It doesn't explain the origin of
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  the ought at all. It just states that
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  unselfishness is a component of a healthy society, which is
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  true, but it's more of a definition than an explanation.
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  Lewis has a great analogy with football.
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  Yes, he says. If someone who knows nothing
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  about football asks you, what's the point of playing?
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  It's no good to tell them the point is to score goals.
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  Right, because trying to score goals is the game of football.
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  You haven't explained the reason for the game, you've just
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  described what the activity consists of.
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  Saying the point of football is to score is just another way of
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  saying football is football. And that applies directly to the
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  moral question. If someone asks why should I
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  behave decently and you say to benefit society.
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  You're doing the same thing because benefiting society is
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  one of the things that decent behavior is.
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  It's part of the definition. You're just saying decent
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  behavior is decent behavior. You're.
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  Not giving an external reason for it, you're just describing
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  it. Exactly.
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  The argument collapses because it can't provide a foundation
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  for that initial obligation. It just confirms what we already
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  feel, that we ought to be unselfish.
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  You can't tell us why that feeling is there in the first
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  place. So after breaking down these two
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  major attempts to explain away the moral law, where does that
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  leave us? Well, it leaves us with a very
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  strong case that the moral law is not easily reduced to
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  something else. And this is where we can start
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  to synthesize what Lewis is building.
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  We can start to say what this law is by first being very clear
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  about what it is not. So first, we've established it's
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  not just a description of human behavior.
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  It's not like gravity. It's a prescription of how we
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  should behave. Right.
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  And 2nd, it's not just a personal whim or a fancy we can
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  get rid of if we try to genuinely abandoned the idea of
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  right and wrong, language itself would start to break down so
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  much of our conversation. Praise blame argument would
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  become nonsense. It's too deeply wired in how we
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  think and communicate and 3rd, which is what we just spent time
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  on. It's not just a statement about
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  what's convenient for us, either individually or as a group.
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  So we've ruled out the major material and psychological
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  explanations. We have.
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  And once you've done that, Lewis says, you're forced toward a
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  rather stark conclusion. This rule of right and wrong,
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  this law of human nature, it must somehow be a real thing.
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  Real in what sense? Not like a chair is real.
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  No, not real like a chair or a planet.
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  Real in the sense that it exists independently of us.
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  It's not something we invented. It's something we find pressing
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  on us. It makes demands of us, and it
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  judges us when we fail to meet them.
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  It's something we discover, not something we create.
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  That's a huge step, because if this law is real, but it's
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  clearly not a physical fact in the the normal sense, then what
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  does that imply about the universe?
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  It implies that there must be more than one kind of reality.
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  Fair in the one kind of reality. Yes, there's the kind of reality
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  that science studies, the facts of how things behave.
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  The stone falls, the water boils at a certain temperature, humans
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  sometimes act selfishly. Those are the descriptive facts,
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  yes, But then there must be another kind of reality as well.
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  The reality of the standard, the ought the fact that humans ought
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  not to act selfishly. And this ought is real because
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  it has real effects in the world.
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  Undeniably, it's the foundation for our legal systems.
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  It's the source of shame and guilt.
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  It's the reason we demand justice and feel outrage.
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  It's a genuine force that shapes how we think and act and
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  organize our societies. So yes, we have to conclude that
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  there's something real operating above and beyond the simple
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  facts of our behavior, a real law that we encounter.
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  And it's a law that, unlike the law of gravity, we find we can
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  choose to break. And that's maybe the most
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  mysterious part of all, which is what tells us we couldn't have
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  been its author. And really, for you listening,
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  that's the core idea we wanted to pull from the material today.
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  The very simple everyday act of making a moral judgement, of
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  blaming a person who cheats you, but not a storm that ruins your
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  picnic. That act confirms that we all
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  operate as if there's a real governing standard that exists
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  outside of our own physical actions and desires.
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  That's right. We ought to be fair.
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  We ought to be kind. And that that's the inescapable
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  reality. It's there whether we obey it or
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  not. It really changes how you think
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  about your own conscience. That little voice of guilt or
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  that feeling of I should have done better isn't just, you
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  know, some psychological quirk or something your parents told
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  you. In this view, it's the evidence.
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  It's the confirmation of this real external standard, pressing
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  in on the facts of your own life.
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  Thank you for joining us for this deep dive into the source
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  material and this idea of the reality of the moral law.
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  And maybe it's a final thought to leave you with If it's true
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  that the physical laws of the universe just describe what
• 18:52
  happens operating out of necessity, and the law of human
• 18:55
  nature describes what ought to happen, and yet we are clearly
• 18:58
  able to break it, then what does that imply about the one who is
• 19:02
  the source of that law? Consider what kind of a source
• 19:05
  it would have to be to create a law that is real, but that we
• 19:08
  are also genuinely free to disobey.