Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 015 - Ap Bac and Related Matters
Transcript
- 0:01Speaker 1: Chapter fourteen of Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:05Speaker 1: five by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a
- 0:10Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:15Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:21Speaker 1: Chapter fourteen, op Bach and related matters. American support arrested
- 0:29Speaker 1: many adverse trends in Vietnam, and by May nineteen sixty two,
- 0:33Speaker 1: Secretary of Defense McNamara was looking ahead to the end
- 0:37Speaker 1: of the counterinsurgency. As he said at his conference in Honolulu,
- 0:41Speaker 1: the military assistance program for Vietnam would then be somewhere
- 0:45Speaker 1: between fifty million dollars and seventy five million dollars a year.
- 0:50Speaker 1: McNamara was hoping to phase out the war in Vietnam
- 0:53Speaker 1: and in the near future to send home major US
- 0:56Speaker 1: combat advisory and logistic activities. No doubt heartened by the
- 1:01Speaker 1: signing of a new agreement on LAOS, he directed General
- 1:04Speaker 1: Harkins macv commander to draw up a program. The plan
- 1:09Speaker 1: would prepare Vietnamese armed forces to fight and win the
- 1:12Speaker 1: war themselves, so that a systematic withdrawal of American forces
- 1:16Speaker 1: could be geared to the headway made six months ago,
- 1:20Speaker 1: said the Defense Secretary. We had practically nothing, and we
- 1:23Speaker 1: have made tremendous progress to date. However, we have been
- 1:27Speaker 1: concentrating on short term crash type actions and now must
- 1:31Speaker 1: look ahead to a carefully conceived long range program. He
- 1:35Speaker 1: then asked how long it would take to eliminate the
- 1:37Speaker 1: Viet Cong as a disturbing force. General Harkins replied about
- 1:42Speaker 1: one year from the time that we are able to
- 1:44Speaker 1: get the Vietnamese fully operational and really pressing the VC
- 1:49Speaker 1: in all areas, assuming that it would take about three
- 1:52Speaker 1: years to bring the Viet Cong under control. The Secretary
- 1:55Speaker 1: directed Harkins to plan on this basis. Besides training the
- 1:59Speaker 1: Vietnamese to manage the war themselves, Harkins was to arrange
- 2:03Speaker 1: a turnover of materiel to them. The objective, McNamara said
- 2:07Speaker 1: is to give SVN an adequate military capability without the
- 2:11Speaker 1: need for special U S military assistance. The size of
- 2:16Speaker 1: the American contributions was substantial. By mid August, there would
- 2:20Speaker 1: be eleven thousand, four hundred twelve U S personnel in Vietnam,
- 2:24Speaker 1: two thousand, two hundred eighty two Air Force seven thousand,
- 2:28Speaker 1: nine hundred forty six Army, six hundred forty three Navy,
- 2:31Speaker 1: and five hundred forty one Marine Corps. Of the seven
- 2:35Speaker 1: hundred sixty seven million dollars in materiel program since nineteen
- 2:39Speaker 1: fifty six, more than six hundred million dollars had been delivered.
- 2:43Speaker 1: Airfields refurbished or set to be included Tonsenut, benhoit Ples,
- 2:49Speaker 1: coup Neitrang de Nang Quinant, bommetou Hui, and Tuehui. A
- 2:56Speaker 1: like upgrading of land and naval facilities was under way.
- 3:00Speaker 1: The military assistance program, subject to congressional approval, called for
- 3:05Speaker 1: one hundred seventy seven million dollars in fiscal year nineteen
- 3:08Speaker 1: sixty two and one hundred sixty seven million dollars the
- 3:11Speaker 1: next year. Over and above these totals, the United States
- 3:15Speaker 1: had given Vietnam over one point five billion dollars for roads, railways,
- 3:21Speaker 1: electric lines, water, communications, hospitals and schools. US advisors operated
- 3:29Speaker 1: from Joint General staff to battalion level, and some worked
- 3:33Speaker 1: with province chiefs and training centers. Farm Gate had trained
- 3:37Speaker 1: and certified sufficient Vietnamese crews to man a second fighter
- 3:40Speaker 1: squadron that flew missions out of Natrang. The Air staff
- 3:44Speaker 1: had approved sending four L twenty eights to farm Gate
- 3:47Speaker 1: for forward air controller duty. Two more glass nosed B
- 3:51Speaker 1: twenty six's were on hand for reconnaissance. Mule Train was
- 3:55Speaker 1: supplied as second C one twenty three Squadron to achieve
- 3:58Speaker 1: the quick reactional Lamay desired. Ignoring these hopeful signs, LeMay
- 4:04Speaker 1: remained skeptical. The Air Force Chief's disagreement with the war
- 4:08Speaker 1: strategy was widely known among the top US leaders, and
- 4:11Speaker 1: Admiral Felt alluded to it at the May Secretary of
- 4:14Speaker 1: Defense conference. General O'Donnell pack Aff, Commander in chief, was
- 4:19Speaker 1: disappointed with the emphasis on politics and economics at the conference.
- 4:23Speaker 1: So many civilians were there that he could not make
- 4:26Speaker 1: his points. Instead of preparing for victory in three years,
- 4:30Speaker 1: he wanted to urge actions at once, better utilization of
- 4:34Speaker 1: available air in South Vietnam, improved airlift management, and a
- 4:39Speaker 1: three star slot for the Air Force deputy to Harkins.
- 4:43Speaker 1: General anthus told the conferees that the basic stumbling block
- 4:46Speaker 1: to expanding the Vietnamese Air Force a precondition to removing
- 4:50Speaker 1: US Air Force elements, was the shortage of pilots. There
- 4:54Speaker 1: was no debate on this. What mattered was that McNamara
- 4:58Speaker 1: had set nineteen sixty five as the planning date for
- 5:01Speaker 1: ending US involvement in Vietnam, and Harkins needed to make
- 5:05Speaker 1: it possible. By September. Macvie prepared a national campaign plan
- 5:11Speaker 1: as a guide. After briefing mister McNamara. In October, General
- 5:15Speaker 1: Harkins presented the plan to the Joint General Staff and
- 5:18Speaker 1: the Vietnamese President. DM informally approved the blueprint in principle,
- 5:23Speaker 1: and on November twenty sixth did so formally. No immediate
- 5:27Speaker 1: implementation followed, but rather a discussion of when execution should begin.
- 5:32Speaker 1: Not really a series of maneuvers, the plan was more
- 5:36Speaker 1: an organizational and conceptual framework, a setting for the process
- 5:40Speaker 1: of rooting out the guerrillas. A key provision was the
- 5:43Speaker 1: restructuring of the Vietnamese armed forces. This would deprive provincial
- 5:48Speaker 1: chiefs of control over paramilitary forces in their areas and
- 5:52Speaker 1: of their freedom to appeal directly to DM, placing the
- 5:56Speaker 1: paramilitary forces squarely in the military chain of command, and
- 6:00Speaker 1: would do away with the provincial chief's private armies. Sink
- 6:05Speaker 1: Pack harbored reservations as to the costs and the ability
- 6:08Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese to train sufficient personnel in time, and
- 6:12Speaker 1: Macvee revised the plan in December nineteen sixty two and
- 6:16Speaker 1: again in early nineteen sixty three. The plan's intelligence annex
- 6:21Speaker 1: contained merely territorial data and a map of what Macvie
- 6:24Speaker 1: thought were the viet Cong tactical zones and secret bases.
- 6:28Speaker 1: Missing was an enemy order of battle. The Joint Chiefs
- 6:32Speaker 1: nevertheless approved the plan on March fourth, nineteen sixty three.
- 6:37Speaker 1: They recognized that success hinged on the parallel development of
- 6:41Speaker 1: many mutual supporting programs, meant to lead ninety percent of
- 6:45Speaker 1: the native population to identify with the DM government. The
- 6:50Speaker 1: trouble was that many programs lay outside the military sphere.
- 6:54Speaker 1: Civilian agencies were to work on political, economic, and social problems,
- 6:59Speaker 1: and much would rest on additional deficit spending by the
- 7:02Speaker 1: Vietnamese government. There were no doubts expressed on DM's administration
- 7:07Speaker 1: or the course of the war. The air staff, however,
- 7:11Speaker 1: wondered where the government could find enough trainees to fill
- 7:14Speaker 1: the pilot spaces. These seemed to be mere details. More
- 7:18Speaker 1: to the point was Admiral Felt's comment that DM had
- 7:22Speaker 1: finally delegated operational authority to his military commanders. The National
- 7:28Speaker 1: Campaign plan called for nine regular divisions plus other Vietnamese units,
- 7:33Speaker 1: a total ground combat force of about fifty one divisions
- 7:37Speaker 1: operating under four autonomous core tactical zone field commanders. These
- 7:43Speaker 1: troops were to decimate local Vietcong elements, cut off replacements,
- 7:47Speaker 1: and destroy supply, communications, control, and support facilities. The Communists
- 7:54Speaker 1: would first be hemmed into specific areas. Next would come
- 7:57Speaker 1: a general offensive to annihilate them by simultane's explosion operations
- 8:02Speaker 1: in the four core zones. This explosion of effort was
- 8:06Speaker 1: supposed to drive the Viet Cong out of the country
- 8:09Speaker 1: within a year. Sounds reminiscent of Korea, of course, someone said,
- 8:14Speaker 1: referring to General MacArthur's famous communicate out of the Trenches
- 8:18Speaker 1: by Christmas. General Wead macvie, chief of Staff, estimated that
- 8:24Speaker 1: the military effort to at least drive VC underground should
- 8:28Speaker 1: be concluded in one to two years. It would then
- 8:32Speaker 1: be up to GVN Government of Vietnam to take over
- 8:36Speaker 1: to win minds of people, improve economy, conduct civic action, etc.
- 8:42Speaker 1: According to General Harkins, the plan could eliminate the Viet
- 8:45Speaker 1: Cong as early as nineteen sixty three. President DM apparently
- 8:50Speaker 1: believed so too, but later would feel that the Strategic
- 8:53Speaker 1: Hamlet program first had to be completed. This could not
- 8:57Speaker 1: be done before the spring of nineteen sixty four, DM
- 9:01Speaker 1: reorganized the military in activating the Central Field Command, He
- 9:06Speaker 1: divided Vietnam into four core tactical zones, created the new
- 9:11Speaker 1: four cores in the Mekong Delta with headquarters at Kanto,
- 9:15Speaker 1: and established the Capital Military District around Saigon. The Core
- 9:20Speaker 1: Tactical Zone commanders would be given greater responsibilities. They were
- 9:24Speaker 1: to exercise operational control not only over their ground forces,
- 9:29Speaker 1: but over supporting Vietnamese Air Force elements as well. Exactly
- 9:33Speaker 1: what control the second Air Division commander was to have
- 9:36Speaker 1: over air operations was unstated, but General anthus protested placing
- 9:41Speaker 1: air power in the hands of the core commanders. He wanted,
- 9:45Speaker 1: as always, a strong tactical air control system. A related
- 9:50Speaker 1: issue was how to compute the air requirements for the
- 9:52Speaker 1: explosion ground operations. Preliminary estimates showed a doubled strikes or
- 9:58Speaker 1: t rate, along with an upturn and calls for reconnaissance,
- 10:01Speaker 1: target spotting and identification, and aerial resupply. How much and
- 10:06Speaker 1: how fast the Vietnamese Air Force could be expanded was
- 10:09Speaker 1: the central question. General Rowland, chief of the mag Air
- 10:13Speaker 1: Force Section, outlined an ambitious program. Besides a second eighty
- 10:18Speaker 1: six fighter squadron in fiscal year nineteen sixty four, he
- 10:22Speaker 1: projected two more fighter squadrons in fiscal year nineteen sixty six.
- 10:27Speaker 1: Both would be equipped with the Northrop N one fifty
- 10:29Speaker 1: six light jet fighter, later designated the F five Freedom Fighter.
- 10:34Speaker 1: Rowland envisioned the replacement of the T twenty eights in
- 10:37Speaker 1: one squadron and the A one h's in another with
- 10:40Speaker 1: F five sometime between nineteen sixty six and nineteen sixty eight.
- 10:45Speaker 1: He called for a total of nine L nineteen liaison squadrons,
- 10:49Speaker 1: one for each regular ground division, and four helicopter squadrons.
- 10:54Speaker 1: He visualized air reconnaissance handled by a squadron of four
- 10:58Speaker 1: RT thirty three's and eighteen RT twenty eights. Air transport
- 11:03Speaker 1: would be performed by a single squadron of C forty
- 11:06Speaker 1: sevens during fiscal year nineteen sixty five, and by two
- 11:10Speaker 1: C one twenty three squadrons, one each in nineteen sixty
- 11:13Speaker 1: five and nineteen sixty eight. This program was eventually trimmed.
- 11:18Speaker 1: The nine Liaison squadrons, for example, were cut to four.
- 11:22Speaker 1: Rowland also pointed out the advantage of pilot training in Vietnam.
- 11:27Speaker 1: In October, a detachment of the Air Training Command was
- 11:30Speaker 1: scheduled for movement to open an H nineteen helicopter pilot
- 11:33Speaker 1: training program at Tonsunut. Two months later, a second detachment
- 11:38Speaker 1: was dispatched to give liaison pilot training at Natreng. To
- 11:42Speaker 1: meet the rise in air requirements envisaged by the National
- 11:45Speaker 1: Campaign Plan, General Anthus in October and November nineteen sixty
- 11:49Speaker 1: two asked for these new squadrons one T twenty eight
- 11:53Speaker 1: twenty five aircraft, one B twenty six twenty five planes,
- 11:58Speaker 1: a third C one twenty three as least two r
- 12:01Speaker 1: F one oh one, two RB twenty six and three liaison.
- 12:06Speaker 1: Anthus justified the Liaison units on several grounds. General Rolland's
- 12:10Speaker 1: program had been whittled down, a current shortage of forward
- 12:14Speaker 1: air control craft had delayed or referred many strike missions,
- 12:18Speaker 1: and a step up in visual reconnaissance and convoy cover
- 12:22Speaker 1: could be foreseen. The macv J four set forth airlift
- 12:27Speaker 1: requirements in support of the National Campaign Plan. His ideas
- 12:31Speaker 1: of wholesale and retail operations resembled army thinking. He specified
- 12:37Speaker 1: selift to five port areas, then C one twenty three
- 12:41Speaker 1: lift to various air fields where U one otters, CV
- 12:45Speaker 1: two cariboos and helicopters working with the Corps were to
- 12:49Speaker 1: pick up the cargo. For ultimate delivery. He estimated having
- 12:53Speaker 1: to move thirty six thousand short tons per month by
- 12:56Speaker 1: air four point three million ton miles of air onlace.
- 13:01Speaker 1: This was almost twice the capacity of the two C
- 13:04Speaker 1: one twenty three squadrons and the CV two Company already
- 13:07Speaker 1: in Vietnam. In December, General Harkins requested two more C
- 13:12Speaker 1: one twenty three squadrons, thirty two aircraft and an additional
- 13:16Speaker 1: CV two company sixteen planes for arrival in the first
- 13:20Speaker 1: three months of nineteen sixty three. At first, the Civilian
- 13:24Speaker 1: Irregular Defense Group program was managed out of the American
- 13:27Speaker 1: Embassy by the CIA. Later the program went under MACV
- 13:32Speaker 1: and the U. S. Army Special Forces Provisional formed at
- 13:35Speaker 1: Nitreng on September fifteenth, nineteen sixty two, working through the
- 13:40Speaker 1: Tactical Air Control System and the Air Operations Center. Farmgate
- 13:45Speaker 1: had serviced these units while General anthus wished to continue
- 13:49Speaker 1: the practice. General Harkins preferred to give the Special Forces
- 13:53Speaker 1: their own organic airlift and fire support. A miniature tactical
- 13:57Speaker 1: air force. Harkins was thinking of setting aside four L
- 14:01Speaker 1: twenties or L twenty eights for liaison, four CV two
- 14:05Speaker 1: cariboos for airlift, and twelve UH one armed helicopters and
- 14:09Speaker 1: four ov Ie Mohawks for strikes. These crafts were to
- 14:13Speaker 1: be controlled by the Special Forces commander at Natrang. General
- 14:17Speaker 1: anthus descended on the ground that the twenty four aircraft
- 14:21Speaker 1: would displace the Vietnamese planes at Natrang. He remarked that
- 14:25Speaker 1: every ground unit could not have its own separate air force.
- 14:29Speaker 1: Admiral Felt ruled in favor of central control of air support.
- 14:33Speaker 1: He expressly said that he would allow no assignment of
- 14:36Speaker 1: airpower direct to the Vietnamese irregulars or to the US
- 14:40Speaker 1: Special Forces. Harkins next proposed to use Air America contract
- 14:45Speaker 1: airlift for this purpose. In the end, a compromise was arranged.
- 14:50Speaker 1: The Mohawks and Cariboos disappeared from the proposal with Defense
- 14:54Speaker 1: Secretary MacNamara's approval. The Secretaries of the Army and Air
- 14:58Speaker 1: Force sent twelve non organic helicopters and four liaison planes
- 15:03Speaker 1: to Vietnam for the Special Forces to enable Team chiefs
- 15:06Speaker 1: to visit remote and otherwise inaccessible posts. Harkins agreed to
- 15:11Speaker 1: use the other craft within the tactical air control system,
- 15:15Speaker 1: but in December and overfelt subjections, he withdrew the four
- 15:19Speaker 1: Army Caribou transports from the Southeast Asia Military Airlift System
- 15:23Speaker 1: and committed them to direct support of the Special Forces.
- 15:28Speaker 1: Preliminary explosion operations got under way in late October nineteen
- 15:32Speaker 1: sixty two. Ranger forces gathered for a penetration into viet
- 15:37Speaker 1: Cong Zone D in fuk Long, ben Long and Fukton Provinces,
- 15:41Speaker 1: called a special Tactical Zone in spite of poor weather
- 15:45Speaker 1: and deficient target marking. Eighty sixes on November twentieth conducted
- 15:50Speaker 1: pre landing bombardment. Five mule trains C one twenty threes
- 15:54Speaker 1: and twelve Vietnamese C forty sevens dropped five hundred paratroopers
- 15:59Speaker 1: at a site selected as a base camp on the
- 16:01Speaker 1: eastern edge of Zone D. On December nineteenth, troops moved
- 16:06Speaker 1: into Zone D, where double tree canopy cover towered to
- 16:09Speaker 1: eighty feet planes flew eight interdiction strikes and also closed
- 16:13Speaker 1: support missions. On the twenty third, a B twenty six
- 16:17Speaker 1: dropped napalm, and on January first, nineteen sixty three, A
- 16:21Speaker 1: B twenty six and two T twenty eights attacked with
- 16:24Speaker 1: general purpose bombs. Results in this thickly forested but fairly
- 16:28Speaker 1: dry terrain turned out better than expected. An Army adviser
- 16:32Speaker 1: who visited four interdiction targets found proof of a hasty
- 16:36Speaker 1: enemy retreat. Rockets and fifty caliber rounds had pierced the
- 16:40Speaker 1: jungle canopy, and five hundred pound bombs had smashed trees
- 16:44Speaker 1: to scatter lethal wood fragments. There were ten fresh Viet
- 16:48Speaker 1: Cong graves. In three weeks, the rangers killed sixty two
- 16:53Speaker 1: Vietcong and took ten prisoners, at a cost of twelve
- 16:57Speaker 1: killed and sixty eight wounded. When a report revealed a
- 17:01Speaker 1: large Viet Kong assembly east of the city of Tennen
- 17:05Speaker 1: in northern Teennen Province, three Corps hurriedly launched a three
- 17:09Speaker 1: day helliborn assault by the fifth Division on December nineteenth.
- 17:13Speaker 1: The size of the enemy force was overstated, but the
- 17:16Speaker 1: troops caught three Viet Kong. The prisoners gave the locations
- 17:20Speaker 1: functions and staffing of twelve headquarters of the National Liberation Front.
- 17:26Speaker 1: After special agents verified this information, three Corps asked the
- 17:30Speaker 1: Joint General Staff to authorize a three day strike against
- 17:33Speaker 1: the headquarters. Most of the twelve lay within ten miles
- 17:36Speaker 1: of the Cambodian border, too close in the opinion of Americans.
- 17:41Speaker 1: The Joint General Staff disapproved the air attacks, but President
- 17:44Speaker 1: Diem considered the chance too attractive. He set the operation
- 17:48Speaker 1: for January two, nineteen sixty three. The operation was planned
- 17:53Speaker 1: to kick off with a heavy, hour long air attack
- 17:56Speaker 1: against nine targets most distant from the border. Some delayed
- 18:01Speaker 1: action bombs would be used. Next was to be a
- 18:04Speaker 1: drop of twelve hundred and fifty paratroops and a helicopter
- 18:07Speaker 1: landing of a Ranger battalion covered by light strafing attacks.
- 18:12Speaker 1: The fighters would fly airborne alert from daybreak to dark,
- 18:16Speaker 1: with Sea forty seven's helping out through the night. President
- 18:20Speaker 1: Diem wanted American pilots to keep an eye on Vietnamese
- 18:23Speaker 1: troops and prevent them from straying across the border into Cambodia,
- 18:28Speaker 1: so that advance reconnaissance flights would not warn the enemy.
- 18:31Speaker 1: Key commanders flew over the terrain in a C one
- 18:34Speaker 1: twenty three, the entire force of twenty six Vietnamese, eighty
- 18:39Speaker 1: sixes and farm gates sixteen B twenty sixes and twenty
- 18:43Speaker 1: four to twenty eights at Benhoit engaged in the operation.
- 18:47Speaker 1: Their day long support was called splendid. The paratroopers and
- 18:51Speaker 1: rangers suffered nine casualties, but killed seventy six feet kong
- 18:55Speaker 1: and captured individual weapons and documents. Early assessments, based on
- 19:00Speaker 1: prisoner of war interrogations and on an intercepted Vietcong radio message,
- 19:05Speaker 1: credited the air strikes with killing about four hundred persons.
- 19:08Speaker 1: Later information coming from Cambodia raised the number to between
- 19:12Speaker 1: eight hundred and one thousand. American observers praised the operation
- 19:17Speaker 1: as the most successful ever undertaken in three Corps, terming
- 19:21Speaker 1: it an intelligent use of tactical air support. Overshadowing these
- 19:26Speaker 1: encouraging successes was the failure near the village of Opbach
- 19:30Speaker 1: in four Corps. Opbach involved the seventh Division, reputed to
- 19:35Speaker 1: have killed more Vietcong and the Mekong Delta than any
- 19:38Speaker 1: other division. So well had the seventh performed in the
- 19:41Speaker 1: important plane of reads that it appeared to have wrested
- 19:44Speaker 1: control from the Communists. The enemy leaders seemed on the
- 19:48Speaker 1: point of pulling back their regular units to sanctuary bases.
- 19:53Speaker 1: Late in December nineteen sixty two, intelligence pinpointed a Vietcong
- 19:58Speaker 1: radio in a relatively out of re a near Ap Bach.
- 20:02Speaker 1: The village was situated in a complex of hamlets thirty
- 20:05Speaker 1: five miles southwest of Saigon and around fifteen miles northwest
- 20:10Speaker 1: of the seventh Division command post at Meitou, capital of
- 20:14Speaker 1: Din Toong Province. In this rice growing delta region, canals,
- 20:19Speaker 1: dikes and dirt roads channeled movement. Villages and tree lines
- 20:24Speaker 1: offered cover and concealment to defenders. Soft fertile earth made
- 20:28Speaker 1: digging foxholes easy, and paddies gave good fields of fire.
- 20:33Speaker 1: Nearly a company of Vietcong troops was suspected to be
- 20:36Speaker 1: in position to protect the radio, which was supposed to
- 20:39Speaker 1: transmit for the Vietcong Central Office for South Vietnam. On
- 20:43Speaker 1: December twenty ninth, the newly appointed seventh Division commander decided
- 20:47Speaker 1: to knock out this prize. He selected two battalions from
- 20:52Speaker 1: different regiments, a company of mechanized infantry and in one
- 20:55Speaker 1: thirteen amphibious armored personnel carriers, a ranger company, and three
- 21:00Speaker 1: battalions of artillery, two of one hundred five millimeter and
- 21:04Speaker 1: one of one hundred and fifty five millimeter howitzers. A
- 21:07Speaker 1: paramilitary provincial force of three battalions would help out. The
- 21:12Speaker 1: division commander planned helleborne landings north and west of op Bach.
- 21:16Speaker 1: These troops to sweep south and meet the M one
- 21:19Speaker 1: thirteens rolling north. Lieutenant Colonel John P. Van, senior U S.
- 21:24Speaker 1: Army adviser, wished to start the operation at once to
- 21:27Speaker 1: avert intelligence leaks. He suggested December thirty first at the latest,
- 21:32Speaker 1: but helicopters were not to be had before January second,
- 21:36Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three. Major Herbert L. Prevost, a US Air
- 21:41Speaker 1: Force ear liaison officer, first learned of the operation on
- 21:45Speaker 1: December thirtieth. He ready to plan for strike aircraft support,
- 21:49Speaker 1: but discovered on the thirty first that all available aircraft
- 21:53Speaker 1: would be supporting the operation in northern Teinen Province. The U.
- 21:57Speaker 1: S Army ninety third Helicopter Company nonetheless agreed to go
- 22:01Speaker 1: ahead with the helicopter landings. It furnished ten transport helicopters
- 22:05Speaker 1: plus one UH one B and four HU one A
- 22:09Speaker 1: helicopter gunships armed with rockets and machine guns to fly
- 22:12Speaker 1: cover and fire support missions. At the final briefing on
- 22:16Speaker 1: January first, Major Prevost accented the absence of fighter support.
- 22:21Speaker 1: Perhaps he suggested the Air Operations Center would respond to
- 22:25Speaker 1: emergency strike requests. He alerted the center to the possibility.
- 22:30Speaker 1: The provincial troops deployed at six thirty on the second
- 22:33Speaker 1: of January and the operation commenced shortly thereafter. Instead of
- 22:38Speaker 1: meeting a Viet Cong company near Op Bach, seventh Division
- 22:42Speaker 1: ran into a battalion armed with heavy machine guns, automatic rifles,
- 22:48Speaker 1: and sixty millimeter mortars. The foe was dug in under
- 22:52Speaker 1: the tree lines bordering the helicopter landing zones. The first
- 22:56Speaker 1: three helicopter lifts from Tan Yep Airfield landed safely, but
- 23:00Speaker 1: during the landing of the fourth, an H twenty one
- 23:03Speaker 1: was down by enemy fire. The UH one gun ship
- 23:07Speaker 1: sought in vain to suppress the ground fire. They used
- 23:10Speaker 1: up eighty four hundred rounds of thirty caliber and seven
- 23:14Speaker 1: point six two millimeters machine gun ammunition, along with one
- 23:18Speaker 1: hundred two point seven five inch rockets. An H twenty
- 23:21Speaker 1: one trying to rescue. The crew of the downed helicopter
- 23:24Speaker 1: was shot out of the sky and a UH one
- 23:27Speaker 1: B was disabled and it crashed. Two other damaged H
- 23:31Speaker 1: twenty one's made it back to tunhip. At ten oh five,
- 23:36Speaker 1: a Vietnamese L nineteen over op Bach radioed the Air
- 23:40Speaker 1: Operations Center for help. The center diverted two eighty six's
- 23:45Speaker 1: armed for strafing, and they arrived at ten thirty five. Afterwards,
- 23:49Speaker 1: the center kept B twenty six's and T twenty eights,
- 23:53Speaker 1: also armed for strafing, continuously active in the Oppoch area.
- 23:58Speaker 1: These planes failed to quiet the U S enemy guns.
- 24:01Speaker 1: Not until the arrival of a farm Gate B twenty
- 24:04Speaker 1: six at fifteen forty did things look up. This aircraft's
- 24:08Speaker 1: repeated runs with napalm bombs, rockets, and guns broke the
- 24:13Speaker 1: Vietcong defensive position near the village. By then, the Communists
- 24:19Speaker 1: had won the battle. They pinned down the Helliborn forces
- 24:23Speaker 1: and put the armored company out of action by focusing
- 24:26Speaker 1: fire on the gunners of the personnel carriers. The gunners
- 24:29Speaker 1: were exposed from the waist up. The four Corps commander
- 24:33Speaker 1: and the senior US Army adviser, Colonel Daniel B. Porter
- 24:37Speaker 1: Junior had reached Tanjip at noon, they suggested a paratrooper
- 24:42Speaker 1: drop east of Op Bach to block viet Cong escape routes.
- 24:46Speaker 1: The division commander and Colonel Van agreed, and that afternoon
- 24:49Speaker 1: the Joint General Staff chose three paratrooper companies from nearby
- 24:53Speaker 1: Tonsenut Boarding six C one twenty three's three hundred and
- 24:58Speaker 1: nineteen troops floated down close to Opbach at eighteen fifteen.
- 25:03Speaker 1: Because their drop zone placed them west rather than east
- 25:06Speaker 1: of the village, they were in no position to stem
- 25:09Speaker 1: the enemy retreat. During the night, separate Vietnamese units engaged
- 25:14Speaker 1: in firefights with one another, while the Vietcong battalion escaped
- 25:18Speaker 1: with its wounded and all but four of its dead.
- 25:21Speaker 1: As regular troops moved cautiously into Opbach the next day,
- 25:26Speaker 1: advance elements came under the fire of friendly mortars. Five
- 25:30Speaker 1: men were killed and fourteen wounded. The final reckoning was
- 25:34Speaker 1: sixty five Vietnamese and three Americans killed, one hundred Vietnamese
- 25:38Speaker 1: and six US advisers wounded, fourteen helicopters hit by enemy
- 25:43Speaker 1: fire and five shot down. The Vietnamese captured two Viet Kong,
- 25:48Speaker 1: found four bodies and killed an estimated one hundred enemy. Afterwards,
- 25:53Speaker 1: the Vietcong admitted eighteen killed, thirty three wounded, three missing,
- 25:57Speaker 1: plus twenty nine civilians killed. Clearly, the combat had been
- 26:01Speaker 1: poorly managed and poorly fought. The Vietnamese and Americans lost
- 26:06Speaker 1: in prestige and in reputation for power. Colonel Van subsequently
- 26:11Speaker 1: suggested that several Vietnamese officers should be relieved of command.
- 26:16Speaker 1: He spoke bitterly to newsmen of wrong decisions during the battle.
- 26:21Speaker 1: On General Harkins's orders. The Vietnamese Joint Operations Evaluation Group
- 26:26Speaker 1: came up with the reasons for the Opbach defeat. There
- 26:30Speaker 1: had been no prior air ground planning and no fighter
- 26:33Speaker 1: escort for cover. When Vietnamese Air Force and farm Gate
- 26:37Speaker 1: strike aircraft were diverted to Op Bach, the crews did
- 26:40Speaker 1: not know the local situation. Communications between friendly forces had
- 26:45Speaker 1: been deficient, and no fire support coordination center existed. Armed
- 26:50Speaker 1: H twenty one's had tried to rescue down crews before
- 26:54Speaker 1: Vietcong fire was silenced. Paratroopers dropped shortly before nightfall, had
- 26:59Speaker 1: been in properly loaded and briefed. They had fought friendly
- 27:03Speaker 1: troops without waiting for the final report Harkins asked the
- 27:07Speaker 1: Vietnamese to relieve two commanders to Admiral Felt, the unescorted
- 27:13Speaker 1: helicopter operation at ap Bach was wrong. Visiting Vietnam, he
- 27:18Speaker 1: spoke with GM and senior Vietnamese and American officials. He
- 27:22Speaker 1: told Harkins experiences taught us that the VC are not
- 27:26Speaker 1: surprised by helicopter landings and are able to ambush helicopters.
- 27:31Speaker 1: Felt could not understand how commanders could ignore the fundamentals
- 27:35Speaker 1: of warfare by failing to prepare the landing area. He
- 27:39Speaker 1: could not conceive how they could have decided to conduct
- 27:42Speaker 1: a key operation when available air support was busy elsewhere.
- 27:46Speaker 1: It was time that everyone learned that armed helicopters were
- 27:50Speaker 1: no adequate substitute for fighter support. All helicopter lifts needed
- 27:56Speaker 1: strike aircraft. When Felt questioned whether macvie was downgrading air activities,
- 28:02Speaker 1: General Harkins explained that there were too few tactical aircraft
- 28:06Speaker 1: in Vietnam to cover every heliborne mission. As a matter
- 28:10Speaker 1: of fact, he said, twenty four operations in the preceding
- 28:14Speaker 1: month had been without air cover. General anthus proposed exact
- 28:19Speaker 1: procedures to make certain that Vietnamese ground commanders and U. S.
- 28:23Speaker 1: Army helicopter companies coordinated helicopter assault actions. Only the Air
- 28:28Speaker 1: Operations Center could assure that fighters preceded and protected every
- 28:32Speaker 1: heliborne landing. The Vietnamese Air Force could furnish core commanders
- 28:37Speaker 1: with strafing, close air support, reconnaissance, photography, and airlift, but
- 28:43Speaker 1: centralized control over all airpower guaranteed fast emergency reaction. That
- 28:49Speaker 1: each Core commander wielded virtually absolute control over airpower within
- 28:54Speaker 1: his boundaries led to peculiar situations. In January nineteen sixty three,
- 28:59Speaker 1: for example, air interdiction was out of the question in
- 29:02Speaker 1: four Corps. The Corps commander simply refused such missions to
- 29:06Speaker 1: avoid political repercussions if non combatants were accidentally killed or wounded.
- 29:12Speaker 1: On the second of January, the I Corps commander ordered
- 29:15Speaker 1: no strikes to be flown without his personal approval. Inasmuch
- 29:19Speaker 1: as he was often away from his headquarters at Dinang,
- 29:22Speaker 1: it was usually impossible to fill requests from the field
- 29:26Speaker 1: for immediate help. Later that year, a new Korps commander
- 29:30Speaker 1: used the Vietnamese C forty seven flair ships as his
- 29:33Speaker 1: personal transports. He assigned helicopters and liaison planes to divisions
- 29:38Speaker 1: and task forces permanently, rather than in line with mission needs.
- 29:43Speaker 1: The Joint General Staff required no advance notice from Corps
- 29:46Speaker 1: on operations being planned and executed unless the commander wanted
- 29:51Speaker 1: more aircraft from Saigon. Given these conditions, a well coordinated
- 29:55Speaker 1: country wide air campaign against the Viet Cong was unthinkable.
- 30:01Speaker 1: Also impeding well integrated air operations was the U. S.
- 30:04Speaker 1: Army practice of making aviation units an integral part of
- 30:08Speaker 1: the ground forces. The bitterness of the roles and missions
- 30:12Speaker 1: argument spilled over when General Anthus several months later pinned
- 30:17Speaker 1: the failure at Op Bach on the Army's air concepts.
- 30:21Speaker 1: He dubbed the Army a customer that is also a competitor.
- 30:25Speaker 1: Seeing the specter of more op Box to come, he
- 30:28Speaker 1: said that in some ways, it would be better if
- 30:31Speaker 1: the Army suffered a few relatively minor reverses at this time. Certainly,
- 30:37Speaker 1: it would be better if their concept of close air
- 30:40Speaker 1: support were discredited now in a relatively inexpensive way, than
- 30:44Speaker 1: to wait for the ultimate catastrophe. Their concept must lead
- 30:47Speaker 1: us to at a time and place where we will
- 30:51Speaker 1: not have the elasticity we presently enjoy. Admiral Felt also
- 30:55Speaker 1: believed that the Air Operation Center and the Airlift Coordinating
- 30:59Speaker 1: Board had to be fully exploited for combined and joint
- 31:02Speaker 1: ground and air operations. He judged this the way to
- 31:06Speaker 1: make best use of limited air resources and facilities. Until
- 31:11Speaker 1: the Army Air Effort joins the club, General O'Donnell stated,
- 31:15Speaker 1: with the intent to cooperate wholeheartedly in the achievement of
- 31:18Speaker 1: valid operational objectives, there will not be unity in the
- 31:22Speaker 1: air effort. The US Air Force Element of Strike Command,
- 31:28Speaker 1: a joint readiness force in the United States, proposed a
- 31:31Speaker 1: return to World War II organizational procedures. That is, the
- 31:35Speaker 1: Air Force would own and man air request communications down
- 31:39Speaker 1: to Army battalion level. To expand communications for air liaison
- 31:43Speaker 1: officers and forward air controllers, the Air Staff furnished second
- 31:48Speaker 1: Air Division with twenty contingency teams. Each consisted of an
- 31:52Speaker 1: airman operator and a commercial KWM to a single side
- 31:57Speaker 1: banned suitcase radio. Although messages were speeded to the Air
- 32:02Speaker 1: Operations Center, there were too few teams to go around.
- 32:05Speaker 1: General anthus eventually suggested setting up an air request net
- 32:10Speaker 1: within the Vietnamese ground forces. General O'Donnell felt sure that
- 32:14Speaker 1: the tactical air control system had proved its worth in
- 32:18Speaker 1: the Battle for ap Bach. After all, it had diverted
- 32:21Speaker 1: planes to aid Vietnamese troops at a critical time. With
- 32:25Speaker 1: an air request net, he suggested the system would be
- 32:28Speaker 1: flexible enough to support the decentralized national campaign plan. General
- 32:33Speaker 1: Harkins disagreed. He said geography and imperfect communications ruled out
- 32:39Speaker 1: direct centralized control of the total air effort. Better, he thought,
- 32:43Speaker 1: to commit teams of Vietnamese and US Air Force strike
- 32:46Speaker 1: aircraft to the core tactical zones and under their control.
- 32:51Speaker 1: Harkins said the main function of the Joint Operation Center
- 32:54Speaker 1: was to redistribute planes among the several zones according to
- 32:58Speaker 1: the tempo of local operations. These and other factors induced
- 33:03Speaker 1: MACV in March to form a flight service Center and
- 33:06Speaker 1: network at Tonsonut, to which every military flight would report.
- 33:11Speaker 1: General Harkins sought by this action to satisfy, in part,
- 33:14Speaker 1: Admiral Felt's wish for General Anthus, the MACV Air Component
- 33:18Speaker 1: Commander to possess complete coordinating authority over air operations in Vietnam.
- 33:25Speaker 1: Seeking to settle the matter once and for all, Admiral
- 33:28Speaker 1: Felt compromised. He asked Harkins to operate US Air Force
- 33:33Speaker 1: aircraft in Vietnam under the Tactical Air Control System. The
- 33:37Speaker 1: Air Operations Center was to assign or allocate aircraft to
- 33:41Speaker 1: the control of the Tactical Core for fixed periods. Feldt
- 33:45Speaker 1: also requested Harkins to bring US Army aviation units under
- 33:49Speaker 1: the control system. Placing air operations under centralized control would
- 33:54Speaker 1: prevent mutual interference, facilitate flight following, simplify air defense, identify
- 33:59Speaker 1: aasation problems, and upgrade combat support. General Harkins responded that
- 34:05Speaker 1: the Tactical Air Control System had not the communications for
- 34:09Speaker 1: precise coordination. In July, he gave the mac v J
- 34:13Speaker 1: three Army Air Operations Section General supervision over US Marine
- 34:18Speaker 1: Corps and U S Army Aviation. He designated the Marine
- 34:22Speaker 1: Corps Headquarters in I Corps and the Army Aviation Battalion
- 34:26Speaker 1: Headquarters in the other corps zones to direct their air operations.
- 34:31Speaker 1: General Anthus protested the arrangement, saying it would create two
- 34:35Speaker 1: and perhaps five separate air control systems and separate air
- 34:39Speaker 1: wars within Vietnam. Harkins replied, let's give these things a
- 34:44Speaker 1: three or four month trial. He promised to change the
- 34:47Speaker 1: setup if it failed to work. The controversy reflected an
- 34:52Speaker 1: overall decentralization. After Michael V. Forrestall of the White House
- 34:56Speaker 1: staff and Roger Hillsman of the State Department visited Vietnam
- 34:59Speaker 1: and DA December nineteen sixty two, they criticized the elaborate
- 35:03Speaker 1: set piece military operations and the use of air power.
- 35:07Speaker 1: Too many people, They informed President Kennedy were managing the
- 35:10Speaker 1: American effort there was no overall direction. They recommended a
- 35:15Speaker 1: single strong executive, possibly a general, preferably a civilian an ambassador,
- 35:20Speaker 1: to dominate all departments and agencies in the country and
- 35:24Speaker 1: to give a single thrust to the multiple activities. The
- 35:28Speaker 1: US Air Force Directorate of Plans drafted a position paper
- 35:32Speaker 1: for possible use by General LeMay at the Joint Chiefs
- 35:35Speaker 1: Meeting of January seventh, nineteen sixty three. According to the paper,
- 35:40Speaker 1: the situation was of the greatest concern, even though many
- 35:44Speaker 1: US programs enjoyed a long lead time. But when I
- 35:48Speaker 1: see the Viet Cong continue to grow in strength, I
- 35:51Speaker 1: can only assume that we are not winning. Army and
- 35:56Speaker 1: Air Force doctrinal disputes ought to be taken out of Vietnam.
- 36:01Speaker 1: Sink Pack's requests should receive prompt attention. Harkins was in
- 36:06Speaker 1: need of the best possible advice through an Air Force deputy,
- 36:10Speaker 1: and anthus should manage all air operations. The major political
- 36:14Speaker 1: obstacle of the war was DM's failure to secure the
- 36:17Speaker 1: real support and backing of his people. The major military
- 36:21Speaker 1: obstacle was trying to erase the guerrillas in the face
- 36:24Speaker 1: of a seemingly endless stream of replacements. Needed were greater
- 36:28Speaker 1: US air power until the Vietnamese Air Force could go
- 36:31Speaker 1: it alone in country pilot training of Vietnamese and destruction
- 36:36Speaker 1: of Vietcong food crops. We should consider now the application
- 36:40Speaker 1: of selected measured sanctions against the North. Vietnamese actions would
- 36:45Speaker 1: range from infiltrating agents through air bombardment to blockade. Whatever
- 36:51Speaker 1: was said at the January seventh meeting, the chiefs chose
- 36:54Speaker 1: to send General Earl G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff,
- 36:58Speaker 1: and a team of senior officers from the military services
- 37:01Speaker 1: to Vietnam. The group's mission was to form a military
- 37:06Speaker 1: judgment as to the prospects for a successful conclusion of
- 37:09Speaker 1: the conflict within a reasonable period of time. The team
- 37:13Speaker 1: spent January fourteenth through thirtieth in Vietnam. Soon after the
- 37:17Speaker 1: battle at Op Bach, the members examined the national campaign
- 37:21Speaker 1: plan and endorsed the concept of many small operations with
- 37:25Speaker 1: decentralized control, undertaken at an accelerated pace by each Corps
- 37:30Speaker 1: division and sector commander in his own area. They noted
- 37:34Speaker 1: with approval that the tempo of small actions was quickening
- 37:38Speaker 1: to four hundred and fifty per month, and they looked
- 37:40Speaker 1: for an upsurge in the future. The group was pleased
- 37:44Speaker 1: with what appeared to be adequate coordination of political, economic,
- 37:48Speaker 1: and military matters. Paying little attention to the Battle of
- 37:52Speaker 1: Op Bach, the team heard General Harkins announced satisfaction with
- 37:56Speaker 1: the air organization. His staff needed no stronger in air
- 38:00Speaker 1: force representation. Thev I Mohawks could do more than reconnaissance.
- 38:05Speaker 1: Could they be armed with rockets? Could the rule prohibiting
- 38:09Speaker 1: armed helicopters from returning fire except in self defense be changed?
- 38:14Speaker 1: The Joint chiefs of Staff swiftly authorized U. S. Army
- 38:18Speaker 1: helicopters to engage clearly identified Viet Cong elements which are
- 38:23Speaker 1: considered to be a threat to the safety of the
- 38:25Speaker 1: helicopters and their passengers. Admiralfelt then permitted arming the Mohawks
- 38:31Speaker 1: with two point seventy five inch rockets. While the Wheeler
- 38:34Speaker 1: team was sympathetic toward augmenting Air Force units, the civilian
- 38:39Speaker 1: leadership in Washington was more concerned with turning the conflict
- 38:42Speaker 1: over to the Vietnamese. On February second, Hanoi called upon
- 38:47Speaker 1: the International Control Commission to eject from Vietnam the US
- 38:51Speaker 1: Air Force units that were playing a key role and
- 38:54Speaker 1: causing widespread damage. Secretary of State Rusk was disturbed hardly
- 39:00Speaker 1: prevent American reporters from observing and writing about US operations. However,
- 39:05Speaker 1: he wanted the embassy in Macviee to release no information
- 39:09Speaker 1: on American combat air actions the United States, Rusk said,
- 39:13Speaker 1: ought not to hand the Communists an excuse to escalate hostilities.
- 39:19Speaker 1: The US newspapers publicized the authorization for American helicopters to
- 39:24Speaker 1: fire on the enemy. Secretary McNamara refused to comment, except
- 39:28Speaker 1: to say that American military personnel were under instructions to
- 39:33Speaker 1: fire their weapons only when their own safety was at stake.
- 39:36Speaker 1: Secretary Rusk reiterated, our policy remains that the American role
- 39:40Speaker 1: in Vietnam be strictly limited to advisory, logistic and training functions.
- 39:47Speaker 1: General Wheeler's assessment in January nineteen sixty three rang with optimism.
- 39:52Speaker 1: The situation in Vietnam, Wheeler said, had been re oriented
- 39:55Speaker 1: in the space of a year and a half from
- 39:57Speaker 1: a circumstance of near desperation to a condition where victory
- 40:02Speaker 1: is now a hopeful prospect. A heartening sign was the
- 40:05Speaker 1: steep rise in American advisory strength, from nine hundred at
- 40:09Speaker 1: the start of nineteen sixty two to more than three thousand.
- 40:13Speaker 1: At first, there had been no advisers with battalions, but
- 40:16Speaker 1: now there were over four hundred. In a year, the
- 40:19Speaker 1: number of advisors helping province chiefs had grown from two
- 40:23Speaker 1: to one hundred or more. Though we have not given
- 40:26Speaker 1: ho Chi men any evidence that we are prepared to
- 40:29Speaker 1: call him to account for helping keep the insurgency alive,
- 40:33Speaker 1: Wheeler said, we are winning slowly in the present thrust.
- 40:37Speaker 1: There was no compelling reason to change. Air Force officers
- 40:43Speaker 1: on the team did not quite agree with General Wheeler's evaluation.
- 40:47Speaker 1: They believed sizable and long lasting US help a must.
- 40:52Speaker 1: The war could not be won quickly, nor could it
- 40:54Speaker 1: be won finally until the Vietnamese people got behind the government.
- 40:59Speaker 1: This demanded military, political and economic actions. US assistance is
- 41:04Speaker 1: vitally engaged in building a country, not in defending a
- 41:08Speaker 1: weak country against superior forces. Macvie intelligence estimates showed that
- 41:14Speaker 1: the number of full time Viet conguerrellas had risen through
- 41:17Speaker 1: infiltration and local recruitment to between twenty two thousand and
- 41:22Speaker 1: twenty five thousand each month. About five hundred stole into
- 41:26Speaker 1: Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia. Late in January
- 41:30Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three, a meeting was reportedly held in the
- 41:34Speaker 1: Chinese embassy at PanAm Penn, Cambodia. Representatives of Hanoi, the
- 41:38Speaker 1: National Liberation Front and the Soviets agreed to add twelve
- 41:42Speaker 1: battalions to the Viet Kong. Eight were to be transferred
- 41:46Speaker 1: from Laos and four recruited in Vietnam to the Vietcong.
- 41:50Speaker 1: The Battle of Apbach was apparently a major turning point
- 41:54Speaker 1: in the war. It instilled confidence in their ability to
- 41:57Speaker 1: fight American helicopters and armored vehicles. Enemy leaders took credit
- 42:01Speaker 1: for a new tactic. The deliberately invited battle, described as
- 42:06Speaker 1: wipe out enemy posts and annihilate enemy reinforcements. They would
- 42:10Speaker 1: often resort to this tactic in the Meekong Delta, almost
- 42:13Speaker 1: always to good advantage. On the Vietnamese side, there was
- 42:17Speaker 1: a lull and military action after ap Bach. Admiral Felt
- 42:21Speaker 1: believe the calm to have both visible and hidden, meaning
- 42:25Speaker 1: the Vietnamese seemed to be in no hurry to launch operations.
- 42:29Speaker 1: General Harkins in February nineteen sixty three wrote President DM,
- 42:33Speaker 1: urging him to swiftly exploit the initiative that his forces
- 42:36Speaker 1: seemed to have seized from the foe. Time and weather,
- 42:40Speaker 1: Harkins said, are either for us or against us. The Communists,
- 42:45Speaker 1: he added, must not be allowed to regroup or rest.
- 42:48Speaker 1: We must attack and destroy them. We must hurt them
- 42:51Speaker 1: so badly that they will be forced to apply all
- 42:54Speaker 1: their remaining resources merely to survive. Otherwise the viet Cong
- 42:59Speaker 1: might utralize much of the gain we won at great
- 43:02Speaker 1: cost and effort. But the op Bach engagement and the
- 43:06Speaker 1: American press coverage had damaged relations with the DM government.
- 43:11Speaker 1: Newspaper accounts of the battle aroused serious resentment in Vietnamese officials,
- 43:16Speaker 1: particularly David Halberstam's criticism in the New York Times of
- 43:19Speaker 1: Vietnamese performance. Newsmen spread their belief that US advisers had
- 43:24Speaker 1: died while trying to lead Vietnamese troops who would neither
- 43:28Speaker 1: follow nor fight. Embittered Vietnamese leaders complained that correspondents were
- 43:33Speaker 1: interested merely in splashing sensational news on the front pages
- 43:37Speaker 1: when Americans were hurt. Madame no Denieux recalled the Presidential
- 43:41Speaker 1: Palace bombing when she and her children were in grave danger.
- 43:45Speaker 1: She said that US reports revealed solely an ill conceived
- 43:49Speaker 1: regret that the bombing had failed in its objective. The
- 43:53Speaker 1: Wheeler Report commented on the mutual dislike and distrust between
- 43:57Speaker 1: the Vietnamese government and the American press. Embarrassed by the
- 44:02Speaker 1: news reports of Vietnamese battlefield misconduct, President Kennedy strove to
- 44:07Speaker 1: repair the eroding trust between the two governments. In his
- 44:10Speaker 1: State of the Union message to Congress on January fourteenth,
- 44:14Speaker 1: he declared that the spearhead of aggression had been blunted
- 44:18Speaker 1: in Vietnam. Signs of dissension and mistrust were all too obvious.
- 44:24Speaker 1: Back in November nineteen sixty two, reports had reached Admiral
- 44:28Speaker 1: felt that DM was withdrawing more into seclusion and leaving
- 44:33Speaker 1: many decisions to his brother No Dan Yu. Both sometimes
- 44:37Speaker 1: regarded the numerous American advisers as an encroachment on Vietnamese sovereignty.
- 44:43Speaker 1: They feared that the cautious US policy in LAOS mirrored
- 44:46Speaker 1: a weakening interest in Vietnam. They were upset by Senate
- 44:50Speaker 1: Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's report in February nineteen sixty three.
- 44:55Speaker 1: It said that after seven years and four billion dollars
- 44:58Speaker 1: of American aid, the same difficulties remain, if indeed they
- 45:02Speaker 1: have not been compounded, Vietnam was less stable and more
- 45:06Speaker 1: removed from popularly responsible and responsive government. Did this foreshadow
- 45:11Speaker 1: dwindling US support? The Defense Minister scored American allegations of
- 45:17Speaker 1: hit or miss Vietnamese bombing as a corrosive influence on
- 45:20Speaker 1: the military effort. American attempts to help the government of
- 45:24Speaker 1: Vietnam create an intelligence capability were probably seen by DM
- 45:29Speaker 1: as a threat to his regime. The Minister of Interior
- 45:32Speaker 1: resented the involvement of Americans in the country as a
- 45:35Speaker 1: danger to the republic's internal politics. President DM labeled the
- 45:40Speaker 1: Special Forces, Rural Aid advisors, and the sector advisers as
- 45:44Speaker 1: particularly irritating. Even though US economic assistants financed nearly all
- 45:50Speaker 1: of the counterinsurgency, DM objected to American controls over matching
- 45:55Speaker 1: counterpart funds. He called them degrading to Vietnam's in day pendants.
- 46:01Speaker 1: In a series of private and public statements during April
- 46:05Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three, no denue dwelt upon US infringements of
- 46:10Speaker 1: Vietnamese sovereignty. Aid came, he said, with too many strings attached.
- 46:16Speaker 1: He told CIA chief John H. Richardson that it would
- 46:20Speaker 1: help if the American presence were reduced anywhere from five
- 46:23Speaker 1: hundred to three or four thousand men. Richardson got the
- 46:28Speaker 1: impression that New feared in emerging US protectorate. DM New
- 46:33Speaker 1: said had received many complaints from subordinates about their American counterparts. Publicly,
- 46:40Speaker 1: New was quoted as demanding the withdrawal of over two
- 46:43Speaker 1: thousand US advisors at lower unit levels. Obviously referring to Apbach,
- 46:49Speaker 1: He said that some American casualties had occurred because the
- 46:52Speaker 1: advisers were daredevils who exposed themselves needlessly to enemy fire.
- 46:58Speaker 1: Taking this statement as a four runner of things to come,
- 47:01Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force commander alerted his key personnel to
- 47:05Speaker 1: the possible withdrawal of US forces. He warned them to
- 47:09Speaker 1: conserve reserves, prepare to go it alone, and get ready
- 47:12Speaker 1: for hard days ahead. The Vietnamese government did not officially
- 47:17Speaker 1: request a reduction of American personnel, but news statements induced
- 47:22Speaker 1: a review of US troop levels. Evidence seemed to favor
- 47:26Speaker 1: a lesser commitment of forces. Sir Robert Thompson in March
- 47:30Speaker 1: had reported the government as beginning to win the shooting
- 47:33Speaker 1: war against the viet Cong, due chiefly to the American helicopters.
- 47:39Speaker 1: He proposed a psychological ploy that Admiral Felt passed to
- 47:43Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs by message, if things go right by
- 47:46Speaker 1: end of nineteen sixty three, Felt said, we should take
- 47:50Speaker 1: one thousand military personnel out of Arvin at one time,
- 47:54Speaker 1: make big proclamation out of this, and publicize widely. This
- 47:58Speaker 1: would show one Arvin is winning, two take steam out
- 48:03Speaker 1: of anti damites, and three dramatically illustrate honesty of US intentions.
- 48:09Speaker 1: In April, a U S National Intelligence estimate perceived improvement
- 48:14Speaker 1: in the situation, despite the absence of persuasive signs that
- 48:18Speaker 1: the Vietcong had been grievously hurt Ambassador Nolting in May
- 48:23Speaker 1: depicted relations between Washington and Saigon as delicate, but the
- 48:28Speaker 1: political and socioeconomic conditions were promising. An excellent rice crop
- 48:34Speaker 1: brightened the economic outlook. Completion of about fifty percent of
- 48:38Speaker 1: the Strategic Hamlet program extended shelter to sixty percent of
- 48:43Speaker 1: the people in defended areas. During April, the Vietnamese armed
- 48:47Speaker 1: forces took part in nine hundred offensive actions. These hopeful
- 48:52Speaker 1: signs encouraged Secretary macnamara. At his conference in Hawaii in May,
- 48:58Speaker 1: he said he would remove one one thousand Americans from
- 49:01Speaker 1: Vietnam by the end of the year to show that
- 49:03Speaker 1: things were going well. He would try to pull out
- 49:06Speaker 1: units in lieu of individuals, and upon departure their equipment
- 49:10Speaker 1: would be turned over to the Vietnamese. The conflict was
- 49:14Speaker 1: not a US war, and the United States did not
- 49:18Speaker 1: intend to fight it. Since more Americans were still arriving
- 49:22Speaker 1: in Vietnam, units and individuals then en route were to
- 49:26Speaker 1: continue their travel. There would be no personnel increases, however,
- 49:30Speaker 1: either temporary or permanent. Each of the armed services was
- 49:34Speaker 1: to take a comparable cut to hurt operations. The least
- 49:39Speaker 1: most of the returnees would come from logistic units. In
- 49:43Speaker 1: November and December, Second Air Division would lose two hundred
- 49:47Speaker 1: and forty four people. Maybe McNamara's action impressed the Vietnamese.
- 49:52Speaker 1: In June, the Joint General Staff ordered all ground forces
- 49:56Speaker 1: to operate a minimum of twenty days every month starting
- 50:00Speaker 1: July first. This was to be a total general offensive
- 50:04Speaker 1: to attain complete annihilation of the enemy and complete Vietnamese control.
- 50:10Speaker 1: General Harkins was enthusiastic the all out campaign was soon
- 50:15Speaker 1: to begin. In earnest. He knew the strategy saturate the
- 50:18Speaker 1: countryside with small and large military actions was correct. It
- 50:23Speaker 1: would fragment and destroy the viet Cong. Unfortunately, the viet
- 50:29Speaker 1: Cong had embarked on their own general offensive end of
- 50:35Speaker 1: Chapter fourteen