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Virginia Robert's Rejects Ghislaine Maxwell's Summary Judgement Push (Part 5) (6/9/26) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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This episode, we're going to pick up where we left
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off with Virginia Roberts' response to the Glain Maxwell attempt
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to get a summary judgment in their defamation case. So
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let's get right back to it. Number two, Defendant is
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liable for the media's publication of the defamatory statement. After arguing,
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contrary to the New York law, that she is not
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liable for the media's publication of her own press release,
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Defendant next argues that she is not liable for the
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media's publications of the defamatory statement contained within her press
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release if the media chose to make even the tiniest
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of editorial changes. If we understand defendant's argument correctly, any
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emission of any language from a press release is somehow
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a selective partial publication for which she escapes liability motion
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at fourteen. Once again, this claim is absurd on its face.
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It would mean that a defamer could send to the
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media a long attack on a victim with one irrelevant sentence,
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and when the media quite predictably cut that sentence, well,
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they escape liability for the attack. Moreover, even on its face,
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the clan presents a jury question of what changes would
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be in context viewed as selective or partial publications, something
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that only a jury could determine after hearing all of
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the evidence. In support of this meritless argument, defend insides
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Ran versus New York Times Company for the proposition that
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a defendant cannot be liable for a publisher's editing and
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excerpting of a statement four thirty nys dot two D
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two seventy one two seventy four seventy five a dot
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d dot two D four seventeen four twenty two n
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dot y dot a dot d nineteen eighty. This argument
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fails for several reasons. First, there is no republication by
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the media. As a matter of law. Defendant issued a
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defamatory statement to the press, and its publication as defendant intended,
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is not a republication under the law as discussed above. Second,
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there was no editing or a paraphrasing or taking the
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quote out of context of the core defamatory statement in
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the press release that Miss Roberts is a liar. The
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obvious lies passage is the heart of the message defendant
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sent to the press that Miss Roberts was lying about
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her past sexual abuse. Even in isolation, Defendant's quote stating
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that Miss Roberts claims or obvious lies does not distort
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or misrepresent the message Defendant intended to convey to the
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public that Miss Roberts was lying about her claims. As
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this Court explained in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, this
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case involves statements that explicitly claim the sexual assault allegations
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or false Roberts versus Maxwell one six five f Dot
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supp Dot three D one seven one fifty two SDNY
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twenty sixteen. Furthermore, the facts at issue here make the
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RAND holding in opposite. In RAND, a newspaper paraphrased and
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sanitized defendant's words. No such changing, sanitizing, or paraphrasing occurred
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in the instant case. The media quoted defendant statement accurately.
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Further the phrase at issue in RAND was that certain
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people screwed another person. The speaker newspaper used the term
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screwed in reference to our record label's dealings with a
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performing artist. N did not mean screwed in a literal sense,
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but as rhetorical hyperbole, and as such is not to
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be taken literally. By contrast, there is no hyperbole in
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defendance defamatory statement, and it was never distorted or paraphrased
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by any publication known to Miss Roberts. A jury could
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reasonably conclude that defendant statement that Miss Robert's claims of
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child sex abuse or obvious lies is not a rhetorical
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device nor hyperbole, but a literal and particular affirmation that
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Miss Roberts lied. Accordingly, there is no support in the
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factual record that the media reporting what defendants stated that
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Miss roberts claims of childhood sexual abuse are obvious lies
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is a distortion of the defendant's message or hyperbole. Even
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a cursory review of the press release would lead to
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that conclusion. Moreover, to the extent that there is any
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dispute that defendant statement had a different meaning outside of
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the context of the remainder of the press release, such
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a determination of meaning and interpretation is a question of
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fact for the jury to decide, and is inappropriate for
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determination upon some rejudgment. B Material issues of fact preclude
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some rejudgment. One the bardon declaration presents disputed issues of fact.
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The primary basis of defendant's motion for some rejudgment is
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there attorney self serving post talk Abbi David, wherein he
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sets forth his alleged intent with regard defendants defamatory statement.
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Miss Roberts disputes defendants attorneys alleged and unproven intent not
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to mention defendants intent not only because defendant refuses to
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turn over her attorney's communications, but also because questions of
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intent are questions of fact to be determined by a
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Trier effect. Furthermore, ample record evidence contradicts the claimed intent
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a The Barden declaration is a deceptive backdoor attempt to
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inject Barden's advice without providing discovery of all attorney communications.
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In her brief, defendant discloses her attorneys alleged legal strategy
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and alleged legal advice. However, she deliberately states that her
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attorneys intended instead of her attorney advised when discussing her
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attorney's legal strategy and advice, using that phrase at least
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thirty seven times, and using phrases such as Barden's beliefs, purposes, goals,
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and contemplays twenty five other times, all the while defendant
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is claim privilege as to her communications with Barden. Defendant
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attempts to convince the court that she only granted Gal
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permission to publish the defamatory statements as part of mister
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Barden's deliberated and carefully crafted MSJA at sixteen legal strategy
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and advice. Yet she still refused to turn over her
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communications with Barden under the auspices of attorney client privilege.
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Such gamesmanship should not be permitted. If the court were
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to consider the Barden declaration, which it shouldn't, it would
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be on a ruling on less than complete record, because
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based on this declaration, it is necessary that defendant discloses
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all communications with him and possibly others. Miss Roberts doesn't
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have those communications. The court doesn't have those communications. Therefore,
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defendant is asking for some rejudgment on an incomplete record.
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The court should also not consider the Bardon declaration because
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it will be an admissible as unduly prejudicial. It is
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a self serving declaration by a non deposed witness, made
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without turning over the documents that are relevant to the declaration.
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Ce e g. Rubins versus Mason, three eighty seven ft.
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Three d one eighty three, one eighty five, Second Circuit,
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two thousand and four. We find that the District Court
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predicated its grant of some rejudgment as to liability on
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an Avid David from the arbitrator who presided over the
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underlying arbitration, the probative value of which was substantially outweighed
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by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Avid David therefore
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should not have been admitted. We therefore vacate the grant
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of some rejudgment to the defendant on liability and remand
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to the District Court b defendant. Some rejudgment arguments require
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factual findings regarding Barton's intent, thereby precluding some rejudgment. Even
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were the Court to consider this declaration and representations therein
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which it should not. The declaration itself demonstrates that the
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Court would have to make factual findings as to what
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mister Barton's intent really was. Finding about intent are appropriate
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at the summary judgment stage, as this Court and the
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Second Circuit Court have recognized. This Court has explained, if
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it is necessary to resolve inferences regarding intent, summary judgment
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is not appropriate. Sweet Jay, citing Patrick versus le Fey,
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seven forty five f dot two D one fifty three
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one fifty nine, Second Circuit nineteen eighty four, Freedman versus
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Meers four eighty two f dot two D. Four thirty
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five four to thirty nine, Second Circuit, nineteen seventy three.
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See there are factual disputes regarding Bardon's declaration. Finally, there
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are material disputes over the statements in the Bardon declaration
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because they are directly refuted by record evidence. For example,
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the Instant motion and the Bardon declaration describe the press
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release merely as a doc ca him in expressing his
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mister Bardon's opinion in the form of a legal argument
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as a lawyer would be as opposed to a press
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release for dissemination by the media to the public. Record
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evidence refutes this claim. As one, the press release was
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sent to journalists two, media publishers or in house counsel. Two.
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The press release instructed the journalists to publish the defamatory statement.
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Please find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Miss
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Maxwell three. It was issued by a publicist on Defendant's
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behalf and not an attorney, without any reference to attorneys
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or laws. Indeed, gu testified that Barton was unavailable to
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approve the statement, and for Gau testified that he issued
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the statement only after he understood defendant to have signed
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off on it, in understanding he formed based on defendant's
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positive command to him. This is the agreed statement. Question
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when you sent that email, were you acting pursuing to
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Miss Maxwell's retention of your services? Answer? Yes, I was.
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Question when you say a greed statement, can you tell
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me more about what you mean? Who agreed to the statement? Answer?
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I need to give you some context if I may,
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about that statement. So this is on New Year's Day.
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I was in France, So the email time here is
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twenty one forty six in French time and twenty two
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forty six, And I was getting up early the next
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morning to drive my family back to the south of
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France to England, which is a fourteen hour journey door
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to door. So on the morning of the second of January,
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bearing in mind that Miss Maxwell I think was in
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New York, then she was five hours behind, so there
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was quite a lot of sort of time difference between
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the various countries here, I sent her an email, I believe,
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saying parsing this forwarding this email to her saying how
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do you wish to proceed? And I was on the telephone.
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I had two telephones in the car. I received an
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excess thirty phone calls from various media outlets on the
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second of January, all asking for information about how Miss
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Maxwell was looking to respond to the latest court filings
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which were filed on the thirtieth of December, as I understand,
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and by clothes towards close of play on the second
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I received an email forwarded by Miss Maxwell containing a
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draft statement which my understanding was the majority of which
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had been drafted by mister Bardon, with a header along
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the lines of this is the agreed on statement at
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close of play on the second So I was I
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had gone under the channel tunnel and I was sitting
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on the other side, and that email, which my understanding
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was that it had been signed off on by the
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client effectively, was then sent out to a number of media,
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including mister Ball and various other UK newspapers. Question, mister Gal,
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when you say end of play and close of play,
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are you referring to sending the email that is exhibit
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to answer? Yes, I am question. The subject line does
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have FW, which to me indicates it's a forward. Do
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you know where the rest of the email chain is? Answer?
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My understanding of this is it was a holiday in
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the UK, but mister Barden was not necessarily accessible at
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some point in time, so this had been sent to
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him originally by Miss Maxwell, and because he was unavailable,
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she forwarded it to me for immediate action. I therefore responded, Okay, Glaine,
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I'll go with this. It is my understanding that this
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is the agreed statement. Because the subject of the second
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one is urgent. This is the statement, so I take
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that as an instruction to send it out as a
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positive command, this is the statement. Accordingly, record evidence shows
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that the press release was intended as press release and
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not as a legal argument. Record evidence also establishes that
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defendants circulated the press release to Barden and Gal and
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then gave a positive command to Gou to publish it. Additionally,
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there is no indica that the press release is a
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legal opinion. To the contrary, It was issued by and
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specifically attributed to a woman who has personal knowledge of
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whether Miss roberts claims of sexual abuse are true, and
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she states that Miss Roberts is a liar. At the
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very least, all of these factual issues must be considered
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by a jury. Another example is that defendant states that
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Gau served only as mister Bardon's conduit to the media,
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and mister Barden was directing the January tewod through fifteenth
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statement to a discrete number of media representatives. Barden wasn't
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directing anything. He wasn't even in the loop when defendant
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decided to publish the statement, and the documents prove it. Indeed,
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the press release itself states that it is on behalf
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of Miss Maxwell, not Barton. It was the defendant who
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gave the positive command to gou to publish it. These
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are just a couple of examples among many of the
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purported facts asserted Indefendant's motion and Barden's declaration that are
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directly refuted by facts in the record. Finally, neither the
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media nor the general public could have known that the
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statement should be attributed to Barton. His name was nowhere
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in it. Nor is there any reference to Council argument
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that the context is the media knowing Bardon's intent or
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involvement is unsupported by the record. The significant factual disputes
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about Barden alone prevent some rejudgment. All right, folks, we're
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going to wrap up right there, and then in the
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next episode we'll pick up where we left off. All
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of the information that goes with this episode can be
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found in the description box.