Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Recent Trends in Premarital Agreements with Elizabeth Scully, Michelle Katz, Lauren Petkin
Transcript
- 0:05I'd like to welcome you to recent trends in premarital
- 0:09agreements. I am April Zanis. I'm the co -chair
- 0:13of the Beverly Hills Bar Association's family
- 0:16law section. We are proud to bring you fantastic
- 0:19continuing education opportunities like today's
- 0:22program and are so grateful to the people who
- 0:24volunteer to provide us with their ongoing knowledge
- 0:28and involvement. We have a program on monitored
- 0:31visitation on July 16th with Judge Lopez Gis,
- 0:35Michael Hanasab, and Robin Sachs, and a program
- 0:38entitled Mediating a Divorce After a Natural
- 0:41Disaster on July 24th with Judge Diana Gould
- 0:44-Saltman and Craig Lipsy. I am delighted to introduce
- 0:49today's speakers, Lauren Petkin, Mickey Katz,
- 0:52and the Honorable Elizabeth Scully. Lauren Petkin
- 0:56is the founder and principal attorney of Lauren
- 0:59S. Petkin Family Law and Mediation in Los Angeles,
- 1:03bringing over 34 years of family law experience
- 1:06to her practice. A former attorney at two of
- 1:10LA's leading family law firms, she has handled
- 1:13complex cases involving high asset estates, contentious
- 1:17custody disputes, everyone's favorite, and marital
- 1:20agreements. Known for her intelligent and compassionate
- 1:24approach, Lauren is dedicated to helping families
- 1:26navigate legal challenges with skill and sensitivity.
- 1:31Mickey Katz is the founder and principal attorney
- 1:34of the law and mediation offices of Michelle
- 1:37Katz, serving clients across California. She
- 1:41is a certified family law specialist and focuses
- 1:44on consensual dispute resolution in divorce and
- 1:47family law matters. With extensive experience
- 1:50in mediation and collaborative law, she is dedicated
- 1:54to helping clients find meaningful non -litigation
- 1:57solutions. And the Honorable Elizabeth Scully
- 2:00serves as a judge on the Superior Court of Los
- 2:03Angeles, bringing decades of experience in family
- 2:07law to the bench. Following her admission to
- 2:10the California Bar, she practiced at prominent
- 2:12law firms and later co -founded Jacobson Scully
- 2:16LLP. A certified family law specialist, Judge
- 2:20Scully also contributed to legal education as
- 2:23an adjunct professor at UCLA School of Law and
- 2:26Whittier College of Law. Her dedication to public
- 2:29service includes leadership roles with the Beverly
- 2:32Hills Bar Association and nonprofit family law
- 2:35organizations. She was appointed to the bench
- 2:38in 2020 and was reelected in 2022. And with that,
- 2:43let's get started. Lauren? Thank you, April.
- 2:46So you introduced us. Thank you everyone for
- 2:50joining. The goal today was to provide an update.
- 2:55Mickey, Judge Stully and I did a program in February
- 2:582022 for the Beverly Hills Bar on premarital
- 3:02agreements. So the goal today was to update with
- 3:05any new case law and also focus on the issue
- 3:09of unconscionability because it's a hot topic
- 3:12in drafting. of spousal support waivers and limitations
- 3:16as well as the overall agreement. So I'm going
- 3:20to start with the case that came down after our
- 3:23last program called a state of escrow. It's in
- 3:27your materials. It was published in May 2022.
- 3:30And although it was a probate case, it did involve
- 3:35a premarital agreement. And the holding of it
- 3:37is important. So in this case, Parties got married
- 3:43in May 2015, husband passed away in an automobile
- 3:47accident in 2018. Wife's request to be appointed
- 3:52as the personal representative of the estate
- 3:55was denied because she signed a premarital agreement
- 3:59waiving her probate rights as a survivor spouse
- 4:02and waiving her interests in husband's separate
- 4:04property. So the facts are sort of interesting
- 4:08and it's... a cautionary tale, I believe, for
- 4:11practitioners when they deal with their clients
- 4:13and drafting agreements. Shortly before their
- 4:17marriage, husband told wife, and we'll call our
- 4:19wife number two because he was previously married
- 4:22and had a child, he told his wife he wanted a
- 4:24pre -ing up. He met with his lawyer and he told
- 4:28his lawyer he wanted the pre -ing up to provide
- 4:30that his stepper property would remain his in
- 4:34the event of death or divorce. husband told wife
- 4:38that he had met with a lawyer to deal with these
- 4:40things. The agreement was sent to wife's counsel
- 4:47and wife met with her counsel for 90 minutes
- 4:51and who explained the prenuptial agreement to
- 4:54wife number two. Wife number two was very upset
- 4:57because she did not believe that husband had
- 5:00informed her the agreement would apply in the
- 5:04event of death as well as divorce. She told her
- 5:07lawyer that she wanted the probate clauses Redacted
- 5:13that's the words that case used which probably
- 5:15was removed wife's lawyer Testified at the trial
- 5:21That sorry white testified at the trial that
- 5:24she told husband That the she did not want the
- 5:29agreement to apply in the event of death and
- 5:31that husband had agreed So, wife's lawyer sent
- 5:34an email to husband's lawyer stating that it
- 5:37was the party's mutual intent to protect husband's
- 5:42property in the event of divorce, but not in
- 5:44the event of his death. Wife's lawyer asked husband's
- 5:47lawyer to remove several probate provisions that
- 5:50waived the surviving spousal interests. Now,
- 5:54at trial level, husband's lawyer testified that
- 5:58husband confirmed because husband was deceased
- 6:01and couldn't testify. that husband confirmed
- 6:03that he wanted the prenup to apply also in the
- 6:07event of his death. Husband's lawyer said that
- 6:11he responded to the redactions that wife's lawyer
- 6:14requested because they were inconsequential and
- 6:17they were merely examples. But the applicable
- 6:20part of the agreement waiving the surviving spouse's
- 6:25interests in the event of death remained. Husband's
- 6:30lawyer testified he provided wife's lawyer with
- 6:32a revised agreement and wife's lawyer was unable
- 6:37to explain why she failed to request the redaction
- 6:41of the operative probate provisions. Wife apparently
- 6:46did not receive a copy of the amendaprene up
- 6:48before she signed it. Wife's lawyer had hoped
- 6:51to see wife again before her client signed the
- 6:55agreement, but she didn't. The party signed the
- 6:58agreement on May 1, which was the day before
- 7:01their wedding on May 2, and wife testified that
- 7:06she signed it without looking at it and her lawyer
- 7:09was not present. There was no discussion of the
- 7:12pre -MA. PMA was merely a signing. Wife assumed
- 7:16that the changes that she had requested had been
- 7:19made. So this is already a red flag dealing with
- 7:22wife. The trial court, her testimony that husband
- 7:26intended to leave all of his property to his
- 7:28child from his first marriage in the event of
- 7:30his death, and the court heard testimony that
- 7:33he wanted an agreement to make certain this would
- 7:36happen. So the trial court found that the doctrine
- 7:39of mutual mistake did not apply because husband
- 7:43was not mistaken when he signed the agreement.
- 7:46The court agreed that wife two and her lawyer
- 7:49did not want the agreement to apply in the event
- 7:52of husband's death. but her unilateral mistake
- 7:56was insufficient to justify rescission of the
- 8:00agreement because there was insufficient evidence
- 8:03that husband had encouraged her or foster her
- 8:06mistaken belief. The court found that wife bore
- 8:09the risk of her misgate because she did not act
- 8:13with reasonable care when she failed to read
- 8:15the agreement and failed to consult with her
- 8:18attorney after it was revised. The court of a
- 8:21deal affirmed the trial court on a somewhat different
- 8:24basis. It held that the failure to make a reasonable
- 8:29inquiry to ascertain or make an effort to understand
- 8:33the meaning and content of the contract precludes
- 8:37rescission for unilateral mistake. A party may
- 8:40rescind a contract when consent was given by
- 8:44mistake, provided the mistake is not caused by
- 8:47the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the
- 8:51person making the mistake. So wife's mistake
- 8:55was she did not know the facts as they were.
- 8:58She had a mistaken belief as to the legal consequences
- 9:01of the real facts. She could not argue that her
- 9:05execution of the revised agreement was due to
- 9:08any mistake of law by her lawyer because she
- 9:11and her lawyer never discussed the revised agreement.
- 9:16The court said, quote, the mere fact that a mistaken
- 9:20party could have avoided the mistake by the exercise
- 9:24of reasonable care does not preclude avoidance
- 9:28on the grounds of mistake. So the key was wife's
- 9:32failure to read the revised agreement and consult
- 9:35with her own lawyer to ensure that she understood
- 9:38its contents and meaning and it was a dereliction
- 9:42of her duty which precluded her from getting
- 9:45relief. The court also said, quote, failure to
- 9:49make reasonable inquiry to ascertain or an effort
- 9:54to understand the meaning and context of the
- 9:56contract upon which one relies constitute neglect
- 10:01of a legal duty and such as will preclude recovery
- 10:05for unilateral mistake of fact. So, you know,
- 10:10wife's failure was profound. She was aware of
- 10:12the draft. She was aware that there were probate
- 10:16waivers in the agreement that prevented her surviving
- 10:18spouse rights that were disturbing to her because
- 10:21she talked to her husband. That should have led
- 10:24her to exercise additional caution. It should
- 10:28have led her to read the revised agreement. I
- 10:30mean, this case to me is so clear cut, right?
- 10:36But it is a cautionary tale for practitioners
- 10:38that you have to make an attempt to go over the
- 10:43agreements with your client. We can't force our
- 10:46clients to read them. We rely on the fact that
- 10:48they read them. We do our CYA letters. We have
- 10:52initials on the agreement that says, I've read
- 10:54and understand every page. And Judge Dully, is
- 10:59there anything else you would like to add to
- 11:01this, to the case that, in my opinion, was rightly
- 11:04decided? Thanks so much for including me. It's
- 11:08a pleasure to be here. Yeah, I think always.
- 11:12There are lessons to be taken from drafters and
- 11:16from people that are working as consulting attorneys
- 11:20for parties, negotiating and entering into these
- 11:24agreements. And there is a lot that you all can
- 11:29do to make sure that there's clear documentation
- 11:34and opportunities to confirm that someone has
- 11:38read and understood it. Lauren mentioned And
- 11:42some of those examples, clear anecdotal examples
- 11:47and agreements, drafting using as little legalese
- 11:53as possible and clear layperson's language can
- 11:57help, provisions that people have to initial
- 12:00can help, videotaping, signing ceremonies can.
- 12:05help and having recitations and agreements that
- 12:09set forth the timelines pursuant to which things
- 12:13unfolded. And or if you're the consulting attorney
- 12:18or the attorney of record, making sure that your
- 12:22notes and your billing records are very clear
- 12:24about when you met with the client and how often
- 12:29and how long the meetings lasted and documenting
- 12:34what took place. so that you're protecting yourself
- 12:41against the implication that this didn't happen.
- 12:44And more importantly, so that you're really making
- 12:48sure that people don't sign things that they
- 12:50don't understand and that your job as the gatekeeper
- 12:54of making sure clients have informed consent
- 12:57is well done. Because of course, protecting the
- 13:03interests of the professionals is, of course,
- 13:06important to everyone, but also making sure that
- 13:08people aren't in this situation. And I'd comment,
- 13:12too, I do see arguments a lot to the effect of,
- 13:18I had no idea what I was signing. I didn't read
- 13:21it. I relied on other people. And it always surprises
- 13:25me. I wonder if there's some sort of vestigial
- 13:29wishful thinking from back in the day when premarital
- 13:33agreements were less customary or before the
- 13:37Uniform Premarital Act agreed, when people sort
- 13:40of have a sense that it doesn't really count
- 13:43and you're going to be able to get out of it
- 13:45by just sort of throwing up your hands and saying,
- 13:48you know, I was focused on, you know, wedding
- 13:50details and I didn't read it. whatever the reason
- 13:54is. And I think that kind of argument is challenging
- 14:00for the judicial officer because I think the
- 14:03laws... clear in the law that's cited in the
- 14:08case that people do have a responsibility to
- 14:12act with basic self -preservation and to take
- 14:15seriously and engage seriously in this contracting
- 14:20that's incredibly important to them and to their
- 14:23future financial rights. But so, you know, the
- 14:28language in this case tells me that, you know,
- 14:31there's really no ambiguity in the law that this
- 14:33sort of throwing up your hands and saying, I
- 14:36had no idea what I was doing, please save me
- 14:38from my own signature isn't something that's
- 14:43likely to be compelling in court. And it is,
- 14:47you know, as Warren discussed, it is a probate
- 14:50case. It is talking about rescission and kind
- 14:54of contracty flavored remedies as opposed to
- 14:581615. But it's a reminder that traditional contract
- 15:04defenses like rescission do apply in the context
- 15:08of premarital agreements. And the case makes
- 15:12the point that because of the facts and circumstances
- 15:16and unique relationships involved, it's possible
- 15:20that circumstances relating to those defenses
- 15:24that might not be sufficient to rescind a commercial
- 15:28contract might still support, might still render
- 15:33a premarital agreement unenforceable. So a minor
- 15:38point, but also kind of a nice reminder that
- 15:41we do need to be looking at standard contract
- 15:44defenses as well as the provisions of 1615 and
- 15:48the family code. Right. Those are good points.
- 15:54I was just going to say that when I draft agreements,
- 15:58or I'm on the reviewing end of premarital agreements,
- 16:01I tell my clients, especially the younger one,
- 16:04first time marriages, that this is one of the
- 16:06most important legal documents you will ever
- 16:08sign next to your estate plan, and maybe next
- 16:12to buying a home, and I really force them to
- 16:16read it, whether they want to or not. Even if
- 16:18it means getting on a Zoom and going it through
- 16:21page by page. to making sure because in today's
- 16:25world, I'm just a lot of people don't read anymore,
- 16:28especially when it comes to legal documents.
- 16:31So that's the estate of escrow. Nikki, did you
- 16:35want to add anything to that before we move on?
- 16:38Well, one thing that occurs to me to mention
- 16:42is that I'm in a green up agreement in which
- 16:48I'm the consulting attorney for the bride to
- 16:51be. I had my usual Zoom session where I go over
- 16:57and review the document with the client, sort
- 17:00of page by page, screen sharing on the Zoom.
- 17:05And I tried something that I thought would be
- 17:12interesting. And I enabled the Zoom, I enabled
- 17:16the AI function of the Zoom to transcribe the
- 17:22meaning not thinking that I could rely on it
- 17:26for complete accuracy but I was curious to see
- 17:30how accurate it would be and I was really astonished
- 17:35when at the end of the session within two minutes
- 17:40there was a you know four or five page transcript
- 17:44of everything I'd gone over with the client and
- 17:48how long it took and all the all the all the
- 17:52issues that I covered. And I had to go through
- 17:56it and interlineate my own edits, but I was really
- 18:02astonished. All those years I've been consulting
- 18:05attorney on prenups. I never had this tool before,
- 18:09and it was really remarkable. I'm not sure I'm
- 18:13supposed to recommend it, but you might try it
- 18:17for fun. The Zoom AI summary is sort of cool.
- 18:23That's a whole nother webinar on the app. But
- 18:27definitely when we're talking about Zoom, the
- 18:30client is summarizing. what you've got over.
- 18:33It's an important tool. Yes, yes, yes. OK, so
- 18:38that's the estate of escrow. The other case that
- 18:42came down since our last presentation of February
- 18:452022. Is the marriage of last which came down
- 18:52in 2023. This was an interesting case. The agreement
- 18:57had a waiver of spousal support. And, but it
- 19:02doesn't stop there. And this is really another
- 19:04cautionary tale for practitioners when they go
- 19:08to court on an RFO for support. So Mickey, take
- 19:12it away on the marriage of last. Thanks for Mr.
- 19:16Last. Before I get started on the three cases,
- 19:20we want to talk about last factor and Zucker.
- 19:26I wanted to just briefly summarize the California
- 19:30Family Code 1615C, which outlines the requirements
- 19:36that have to be found in order to support the
- 19:43ruling that the premarital agreement is valid,
- 19:47that under 1615C, all premarital agreements are
- 19:53presumed to be invalid. unless there is a showing
- 19:58of five different factors and the statute lays
- 20:03out what those factors are. The party against
- 20:11whom enforcement is sought was represented by
- 20:14legal counsel. The party had seven days from
- 20:17the circulation of the final draft to the date
- 20:21of signing. There was full financial disclosure.
- 20:26No guns were involved in achieving the signature.
- 20:32That is no duress, fraud or undue influence.
- 20:37The parties had capacity to make an agreement.
- 20:41And the fifth thing, that may be more than five,
- 20:43but the fifth, the last thing on the laundry
- 20:46list is other factors that the court deems relevant
- 20:51to the execution of the agreement. So the burden
- 20:57is really on the person who seeks to enforce
- 21:01the agreement to demonstrate that the agreement
- 21:04is valid. And we're also dealing with section
- 21:081612C. And that code section says that any spousal
- 21:17support provision, whether it's a waiver or a
- 21:20limitation, is not enforceable. if the, just
- 21:26from the get -go, if the person seeking support
- 21:30was not represented by council, or if, and this
- 21:35is a public policy argument, if the agreement
- 21:38was unconscionable at the time of enforcement.
- 21:43And in last, one of the holdings was that the
- 21:47appellate court has the power to review the Court
- 21:53has the power to review the unconscionability
- 21:58at the present time of the spouse's waiver or
- 22:04limitation as an obligation the court has to
- 22:11determine correct public policy. So if it looks,
- 22:16but doesn't pass the smell test, then the court
- 22:21has the power. to hold the waiver unconscionable.
- 22:25But in the last, there was another important
- 22:28wrinkle to the case. Maybe I should talk about
- 22:37how the case came about. The husband, the wife,
- 22:42there was a premarital agreement. the couple
- 22:45was separated, wife filed an RFO for temporary
- 22:50support despite the waiver in the, in the premarital
- 22:55agreement. And the trial court, something like,
- 23:06on appeal, right? On appeal, the husband argued
- 23:11that the that the spouse support waiver was enforceable
- 23:18and that the court erred in making an award of
- 23:21temporary support. But the appellant court said,
- 23:25and this is where I think it's kind of an op.
- 23:28Well, the appellant court said, no, you have
- 23:31to have had a hearing. on the validity of the
- 23:36premarital agreement from the ghetto and the
- 23:38trial court must make these findings until 1615
- 23:43C. And in that they had no such findings, the
- 23:51court said that the order for temporary support
- 23:55should remain in effect. However, the husband
- 24:00had a remedy in that he could go back to court
- 24:03and seek to recapture any amount. He could go
- 24:08back to court, ask for a determination that the
- 24:13waiver was consumable in the moment. And if that's
- 24:17the case, then the trial court could order the
- 24:21wife to disgorge the spousal support payments
- 24:24that she had gotten, which seems kind of like
- 24:28a lot of work. Why didn't they just rule on it
- 24:32in the beginning? But the husband didn't ask,
- 24:35so he didn't get, and that was the result in
- 24:39the appellate court. So the next case we wanted
- 24:43to talk about. There's a couple of procedural
- 24:50issues that I think we want to bring up. When
- 24:53I first read the case, I thought, huh. Do we
- 24:56do anything different in our drafting of agreement?
- 24:59Oh, right. Yes. But then in talking to some colleagues,
- 25:04it sort of came to light that maybe to help protect
- 25:10a spousal support waiver or limitation that we're
- 25:15putting into the agreement that both parties
- 25:17are agreeing to at that time, that we could add
- 25:20a provision, something to the effect of shifting
- 25:23the burden of proof to the person who's trying
- 25:27to set aside the waiver limitation in the future
- 25:31and having the parties acknowledge this case
- 25:35in remarriage of last and have them agree that
- 25:39they are waiving the holding of last, abrogating
- 25:43the holding of last and agree that there's no
- 25:46presumption that the support waivers in their
- 25:49premarital agreement are unenforceable before
- 25:52court determination because that was the problem
- 25:54that Mr. Last faced. So whether that would hold
- 26:00up in court, I don't know, but Judge Scully,
- 26:02in light of this holding and do you think adding
- 26:07a provision like that in a prenup would be something
- 26:09that the trial court would strongly consider
- 26:13in upholding the waiver until there's a bifurcated
- 26:16trial on the issue of temporary support? Yeah,
- 26:20well, I think that the language of 1615c that
- 26:27Mickey helpfully outlined at the beginning of
- 26:29her remarks is always the starting point for
- 26:33the court. And I'm focusing on 1615c5, quote,
- 26:41any other factors the court deems relevant, right?
- 26:46Which is simultaneously maybe my favorite. and
- 26:50my least favorite provision of 1615. But I don't
- 26:55see why that doesn't give the court a hook to
- 26:59say anything else the court deems relevant includes
- 27:03specific contractual language in the premarital
- 27:07agreement that deals with this issue or that's
- 27:10anti -last language or something like that. I
- 27:14don't see any reason why I would be precluded
- 27:17from considering that. And I think that any other
- 27:21factors the court deems relevant certainly, it
- 27:26seems to me, and there's no law on it, but I
- 27:29would think that that would cover agreements
- 27:32that the parties reached about this. A couple
- 27:36other comments, if I might. So this issue of
- 27:42burdens of proof. in the context of enforcing
- 27:46premarital agreements and in the context of marriage
- 27:50of last where there is a request for temporary
- 27:53support is very, very confusing. And that is
- 28:00because the 1615A places the ultimate burden
- 28:09on the person against whom enforcement is sought,
- 28:15right? But ASCRA, because ASCRA discusses this
- 28:20issue as well, and last, clearly put some kind
- 28:24of burden of production, at least, on the person
- 28:28who's trying to enforce the agreement, not the
- 28:32person that's trying to invalidate it. So there's
- 28:36this inconsistency or kind of oppositionality
- 28:48in how the cases are interpreting the code and
- 28:52in terms of who has the burden of proof. Sometimes
- 28:56when cases are set for a long -cause trial in
- 29:00Department 35 on these kinds of issues, my pretrial
- 29:03orders include a specific requirement that people
- 29:07meet and confer as to exactly who has the burden
- 29:10of proof and who has the burden of... production
- 29:13and persuasion and any other burden on the issues
- 29:17that I'm going to be deciding. And I do that
- 29:19because there is so much confusion about it.
- 29:23And I want parties and counsel to be very clear
- 29:26on that as they're working their cases up. I
- 29:30also now am always looking at these cases from
- 29:34the point of view of the family law judicial
- 29:37officer sitting in a home court, not in a designated
- 29:41trial court where we have a little bit more freedom
- 29:43to control the calendar. judicial economy and
- 29:48when and how are these hearings going to happen
- 29:51and how are we streamlining things and how are
- 29:54we avoiding additional hearings is very, very
- 29:58important to those judicial officers and so by
- 30:01extension to parties and council litigating there.
- 30:05And to me, what the husband did in last makes
- 30:10a lot more sense. Remember last says, husband
- 30:16had requested that the issue of the validity
- 30:19of the prenup be bifurcated, and that the decision
- 30:23about whether or not to award temporary support
- 30:26be continued until after that decision had been
- 30:29made. And that's sort of instinctually how I
- 30:33would have approached it had I been representing
- 30:35Mr. Last, because It's sort of unclear to me
- 30:41what a facial review for 1615C factors looks
- 30:48like in reality on the ground and whether that's
- 30:52something that would be handled on the papers.
- 30:55It seems to me that that is something that easily
- 30:58might require an evidentiary hearing. And so
- 31:04that means that if there's this issue of temporary
- 31:08spousal support requested when there's a prenup
- 31:11waiving it, we're setting up a little mini perhaps
- 31:17trial on duplicative issues, but in a context
- 31:22where the person has a burden that isn't the
- 31:26same as the burden that would be at the ultimate
- 31:29trial. And I worry that that's inefficient. So
- 31:36I'd say, first of all, think about if you're
- 31:42going to be the one who wants to enforce the
- 31:44agreement, you're going to have to make a simple
- 31:48expedited facial showing to a trial court. that
- 31:54addresses those 1615 C factors. And some of those
- 31:59seem pretty easy to handle on the papers in an
- 32:02RFO context, right? You could prove that someone
- 32:06was represented by counsel by attaching a copy
- 32:09of the attorney certification or something like
- 32:11that. Or you can prove the seven days by confirmation
- 32:16or by the recitals of the agreement if you've
- 32:19included recitals about the timing, stuff like
- 32:22that. But the any other factors, people aren't
- 32:29necessarily going to know in advance. 1615C4,
- 32:35where it's talking about things not being executed
- 32:38under duress or fraud or undue influence. And
- 32:42practically speaking, to me, those sound like
- 32:44things that would be hard to decide in an RFO
- 32:47context on papers, you know, and might require
- 32:50some kind of evidentiary hearing. And so it remains
- 32:57to be seen what this is actually going to look
- 32:59like. But I would suggest that if you're litigating
- 33:03this issue, very, very early on, you meet and
- 33:07confer to figure out, number one, are we all
- 33:10on the same page about who has the burdens and
- 33:13what that's going to look like? Number two, LAST
- 33:16makes it clear that for better or for worse,
- 33:19you have to file a specific RFO that asks the
- 33:23court to make these findings. So don't forget
- 33:26to do that. Even if you think it's dumb or would
- 33:29have been folded into your bifurcation request,
- 33:33that's logical. But if you're complying with
- 33:36LAST, it's very clear that they're requiring
- 33:38people to do that. And maybe talk to your opposing
- 33:41counsel about then having a stipulation to bifurcate
- 33:46the issue and sort of trailing that RFO to the
- 33:51time of the bifurcated trial on validity, but
- 33:55at least you've got it on file so that you know
- 33:59that you're in compliance with. with Last. And
- 34:04the other thing that Last tells us, I think,
- 34:07is that it's incredibly important to make sure
- 34:09that you've clearly requested that the court
- 34:11reserve retroactivity over the issue of the temporary
- 34:15support. because if we are, you know, we've kind
- 34:21of got this interim thing that might permit some
- 34:24support, but at the end of the day, somebody
- 34:26might be able to, you know, the person challenging
- 34:29the agreement might be able to meet that burden,
- 34:33and that means there's gonna be this sort of
- 34:35weird recapture. I mean, you've got to make sure
- 34:37that the court retains the ability to do that.
- 34:41And I see at one level why... You know retroactivity
- 34:47may be the best that anyone can do to protect.
- 34:51The competing rights of the parties here last
- 34:55talks a lot about the public policy surrounding
- 34:58temporary support and we want to make sure that
- 35:01people are able to maintain the standard of living
- 35:03and that their economic circumstances aren't
- 35:07so Oppressive or unstable that they're unable
- 35:11to litigate the validity of these agreements
- 35:13as they have the right to do But at the same
- 35:18time, I have some concerns about retroactivity
- 35:23really being able to ultimately make everybody
- 35:26whole in an appropriate way. Because people that
- 35:29have a legitimate need for temporary spousal
- 35:31support aren't saving it, they're spending it.
- 35:34The whole point is they need it in order to meet
- 35:37their living expenses. And so if you have a community
- 35:41estate that's big enough or other assets or something
- 35:45to wear at the end of the day, even if, and we
- 35:48all know temporary spousal support, sometimes
- 35:52it's not so temporary and those orders are in
- 35:54place for years and years and years. property
- 35:59at the end of the day that you can use in order
- 36:01to make that right. That's one thing. But if
- 36:05there is not a sufficient amount of property
- 36:08and, you know, this whole procedure that's being
- 36:12set up is, you know, setting up that somebody
- 36:16might have to repay money that they spent on
- 36:19their living expenses, you know, I have some
- 36:22concerns about whether or not that actually is
- 36:25a good way to make people whole, although, you
- 36:28know, it may be the best that we can do under
- 36:30the circumstances. Right. Thank you, Judge Filley.
- 36:34All very good points. I have a feeling this isn't
- 36:36the last time we'll be hearing about this case
- 36:39of LAP. Okay. So we're going to switch gears
- 36:44a little bit and focus on a couple cases where
- 36:50spousal support, waivers or limitations were
- 36:53held unconscionable at the time of enforcement.
- 36:57So switching our brains to time of enforcement,
- 37:00when the parties separate, what the court looks
- 37:03at, because these are, in my opinion, very factually
- 37:05driven. So, Mickey, talk to us about Factor and
- 37:09Zucker. Okay. In a way, they're kind of similar
- 37:14in that the wife in both cases Well, in both
- 37:24cases, there was an imbalance of bargaining power.
- 37:27The wife didn't have as much education as the
- 37:30husband. In the case of Factor, which is a 2013
- 37:35case, the wife had pretty much stayed home. I
- 37:41think this is the one where she had six kids,
- 37:43or is that Zucker? Zucker is the six kids. So
- 37:47Factor, the wife had worked intermittently. She
- 37:52was a high school graduate. She had two kids
- 37:55in this factor case. Husband was a graduate of
- 38:00Harvard Law School. At the time they got married,
- 38:04he was earning about a million dollars annually
- 38:08and he had three million dollars in separate
- 38:11property. The husband, this is 2013, drafted
- 38:18the premarital agreement. And at the time he
- 38:23handed the wife the draft, evidently he told
- 38:27her that the spousal support waiver was non -negotiable.
- 38:34So the court found here that the spousal support
- 38:41waiver was unenforceable at the time of enforcement.
- 38:46It also found, by the way, that it was unenforceable
- 38:49at the time of execution, but that it was unenforceable
- 38:54here at the time of enforcement and refused to
- 38:59uphold it. And Zucker is similar, later case,
- 39:052022. And in that case, the wife had agreed in
- 39:10the premarital agreement to a limitation on spousal
- 39:14support. of limiting spousal support to $6 ,000
- 39:19a month. At the trial, her forensic accountant
- 39:23had testified that if you were to make an order
- 39:30that would give her enough to meet the marital
- 39:33standard of living, that under the income avail
- 39:37approach, she would be entitled to $86 ,000 a
- 39:42month. or at least under the expenditure approach,
- 39:46she would be entitled to at least $37 ,000 a
- 39:50month. In this case, the wife was unemployed
- 39:54all during the marriage. She had these six kids,
- 39:58was a long -term marriage, and the husband had
- 40:03amassed a huge fortune, and the wife had had
- 40:09mental health issues. The court said that it
- 40:15was not necessary to find that the agreement
- 40:19was unconscionable at the time of execution.
- 40:22Although I think here that it could be found
- 40:27because of the imbalance in bargaining power.
- 40:30But rather the court said that it has the power
- 40:34to shape public policy regarding premarital agreements.
- 40:39and to declare the premarital agreement unenforceable
- 40:43based on the circumstances that existed at the
- 40:46time of the evaluation of the validity of the
- 40:51agreement. So I think, actually, when I read
- 40:57both of these cases, my sense is that, and maybe
- 41:01that's the practice pointer, is if you know facts
- 41:06about the parties, like The guy went to Harvard
- 41:10Law School. Wife never had an education. A red
- 41:14flag should go off. Maybe there would have been
- 41:19a way, although I doubt it in these cases, that
- 41:22you could have included in the agreement some
- 41:27acknowledgement of the imbalance of bargaining
- 41:30power, perhaps. I don't know. Judge Scully, I'm
- 41:35not sure if that would even hold up, you know,
- 41:38if you said in the agreement that the disparity
- 41:44in their earning power would not be a basis for
- 41:48overturning the agreement. I'm not sure. But
- 41:54both of those cases are clearly, I mean, the
- 41:58facts were there from the very beginning that
- 42:01there was an imbalance. and bargaining power.
- 42:04Yeah. There were a lot of issues going on in
- 42:06Zucker. Because the three of us have been around
- 42:12for a while, we happen to know some of the lawyers
- 42:14involved in the Zucker case. And it went on for
- 42:17years and years. It's plummeted as the seven
- 42:20years. What was it? Still going on. Still going
- 42:23on. But it is the most current reported case
- 42:27in California. That is an example where the court
- 42:33set aside a spousal support limitation. So if
- 42:38you actually read the original trial court opinion,
- 42:41which was done by Judge Schneider, it gives you
- 42:45a very good view of what the trial court looked
- 42:50at in examining the competing forensic accountants,
- 42:55the marital lifestyle, the needs of the wife
- 42:57and how it came to its conclusion. A case where
- 43:02a spousal support waiver was not held unconscionable,
- 43:05it was upheld, was in Ray Marriage of Howell.
- 43:09And that was a 2011 case. That one, the court
- 43:13found the agreement was executed voluntarily
- 43:16and that the terms were not unconscionable. And
- 43:20the facts, you know, sort of bear that out. The
- 43:23party had comparable net incomes. They executed
- 43:27their agreement. in 1999. So that was before
- 43:32the enactment of the current iteration of Family
- 43:35Code section 1612. The trial court ruled that
- 43:40the wife failed to prove that the agreement was
- 43:44unconscionable, finding that the parties had
- 43:46made fair, reasonable, full disclosures of property
- 43:50within the agreement. Additionally, the trial
- 43:54court in that case found there was not a great
- 43:57disparity in the income of the parties and their
- 44:00respective estates at the time they entered into
- 44:03the agreement, established that there was not
- 44:08a significant inequality of bargaining power,
- 44:10which goes to your point, Nikki. So the appellate
- 44:13court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
- 44:17the spousal support waiter in that agreement
- 44:19was not unconscionable. You know this issue as
- 44:26a practical matter when you're on the reviewing
- 44:28or drafting side and especially when you're on
- 44:31the Drafting side and your client wants a waiver
- 44:34limitation and clients say to me You know will
- 44:38this hold up the answer has to be I don't know
- 44:41That this is our state of our law our family
- 44:44code 1612 is what it is. It's totally factually
- 44:48driven to some futuristic point in time where
- 44:52none of us have a crystal ball. That's the problem
- 44:55with these. We do the best we can. And that's
- 44:58what I tell clients. They can offer to do anything
- 45:01they want on the property, but when it comes
- 45:03to support, it really is in a state of flux.
- 45:07So Judge Sully, why don't you discuss some of
- 45:11the factors that the courts have looked at and
- 45:14any factors that also you think about that would
- 45:17be important to you in looking at whether a waiver
- 45:20limitation you're looking at is unconscionable
- 45:24or not. Sure. I'm happy to summarize that. And
- 45:28I think drawing on the comments of each of you,
- 45:31one of the overarching considerations has to
- 45:34do with whether there is a significant inequality
- 45:37of bargaining power and what specific steps were
- 45:42taken in order to level that playing field. And
- 45:46it may be that if you have someone that... is
- 45:51a certified family law specialist on one side
- 45:55and somebody that doesn't have formal education
- 45:58at all on the other side. Just to use an example,
- 46:02I mean, it can't be true that it would be impossible
- 46:05to ever construct an enforceable agreement involving
- 46:09the people with that level. But you would have
- 46:12to look at what concrete steps were taken. And
- 46:15again, competent counsel, again, having it all.
- 46:19documented, perhaps mediating the terms of the
- 46:23premarital agreement and having the emotional
- 46:25layer of a mediator or some kind of collaborative
- 46:30process. Those are certainly options, making
- 46:35sure people have enough time, making sure just
- 46:38what... And it is going to be fact -specific
- 46:40what those inequalities are. But it's an opportunity
- 46:48for creativity on the part of the drafters working
- 46:51with parties who you sincerely believe want to
- 46:54have this agreement and have the capacity to
- 46:57enter into an agreement that is workable and
- 46:59they have their reasons for wanting to do it.
- 47:02you know, to take the steps that you can think
- 47:05of in order to convince someone, you know, the
- 47:09hypothetical judicial officer at the end of the
- 47:12day, looking over your shoulder to say, you know,
- 47:15how can you make me feel okay about this, given
- 47:19these inherent inequalities, you know, what did,
- 47:23what did you, what concrete steps did you take?
- 47:26And I will say, I will cop to have... being around
- 47:30forever, but I just want to make it clear, I
- 47:32haven't had any conversations with any of the
- 47:34attorneys involved in Zucker or any of these
- 47:36other cases. So I don't have any independent
- 47:39knowledge of that. But when we look at the cases,
- 47:43you can see the courts are focusing on education
- 47:47levels. That seems to be something that's important.
- 47:51There's language in Zucker about mental health
- 47:54issues. I think one of the parties perhaps had
- 47:58an eating disorder, and there was an indication
- 48:02that there had been some kind of trauma background.
- 48:06There's a lot of work and research about how
- 48:09to practice law in a trauma -informed way and
- 48:14may be useful to look at that if you have a client
- 48:18that's had that experience. Again, as part of
- 48:22this exercise of creatively taking documentable
- 48:27steps to levelize the playing field. The courts
- 48:33are looking at earnings and earning capacity
- 48:36and income. Some of these factors that start
- 48:40to sound a lot like 4320 factors seem to be relevant
- 48:46and people's net worths. Whether, again, there's
- 48:50some kind of health issue or mental health issue
- 48:53or disability. and what steps have been taken
- 48:58there. Something that hasn't been specifically
- 49:03mentioned in cases that I've seen, but obviously
- 49:07is the subject of kind of growing statutory language
- 49:10and awareness in California is this issue of
- 49:13coercive control. And if there's a domestic violence
- 49:18component or coercive control facts or allegations
- 49:23or perhaps a prior case involving the parties
- 49:26and now they've reconciled and are trying to
- 49:29do this, or at the time of the enforcement when
- 49:33the court is looking at it, I think that facts
- 49:38tending to show that there was coercive control
- 49:41involved certainly relates to that. inequality
- 49:45of bargaining power and whether there was informed
- 49:48consent. And in, I think, both Factor and Zucker,
- 49:54there was reference to what the die line number
- 49:59would be. And I think that's interesting. So
- 50:02if you are litigating this and if it's a situation...
- 50:09Well, I guess it could be if there's a waiver
- 50:11or if there's a limitation. But look at what
- 50:14the person would get under the agreement. And
- 50:16if guideline support would be $800 ,000 a month,
- 50:21then maybe that's kind of an efficient, effective
- 50:25way to point out that someone might. have concerns
- 50:31about unconscionability. So don't forget to run
- 50:35guidelines and compare those. I think that's
- 50:37definitely something that... that the court could
- 50:41consider. And then just always in the back of
- 50:45everyone's mind when you have a very fact -intensive
- 50:50analysis like this, is the court's consideration
- 50:54of the credibility of the parties. And it may
- 50:59not be its own unique separate factor that the
- 51:01court's looking at, but it's certainly... a lens
- 51:05through which the court is considering evidence
- 51:07about all of these other factors, and you can't
- 51:11understate the importance of the court's credibility
- 51:14determinations in this context. OK. So again,
- 51:22these waivers of spousal support in agreements,
- 51:27a little bit of a landmine. We do the best we
- 51:30can as practitioners. We still do them. We have
- 51:34to make sure our clients understand that this
- 51:38part is not guaranteed in stone in the future,
- 51:41and because we don't know what the future will
- 51:43hold. On the other side of the coin, our last
- 51:48issue that we're going to talk about for the
- 51:50remaining minutes, and I notice we have three
- 51:52questions, so we'll try and get to them. This
- 51:57is something that I'm asked all the time. When
- 52:00more and more agreements that I seem to be either
- 52:03reviewing or drafting are ones where there is
- 52:06limited community property, it's just what couples
- 52:09want, whether it's a first time marriage or later
- 52:12a life marriage. So more and more seem to be
- 52:14dealing with agreements where parties are entering
- 52:17into agreements. They are proactively agreeing
- 52:20will be limited community property despite the
- 52:23disparity in earnings and assets at the time
- 52:26they're entering into the agreement. And assuming,
- 52:31and this is really ultimately a question, you
- 52:34know, for Judge Scully, but Mickey, for you to
- 52:36weigh in, assuming parties follow the statutory
- 52:40framework of Family Code 1615, they crossed their
- 52:44T's, they got their I's, they have financial
- 52:47disclosure, they follow the seven -day rule,
- 52:50they both have independent family law, competent
- 52:53counsel, and let's assume they don't even have
- 52:57a waiver limitation of support, put that aside.
- 53:00But in the property part, it is clearly unequal
- 53:04at the beginning, and it is going to be even
- 53:07more unequal if Basher bid they get divorced.
- 53:10I'm asked all the time, you know, will this agreement
- 53:13be upheld? What's the consideration for the bride
- 53:18waiving all of this? And will it be unconscionable?
- 53:21And it's my opinion, and Judge Tilley can correct
- 53:25me, that You know, you don't need, quote unquote,
- 53:28consideration for a prenup. That's what Family
- 53:30Code 1611 says. It's different than a contract
- 53:35in that way because of the type of agreement
- 53:38you're entering into. And if people want to enter
- 53:44into an agreement with counsel and it's voluntary
- 53:47and full knowledge, knowing that you're unequal
- 53:49at the beginning and you may even be more unequal
- 53:52at time of separation, it's their right to do
- 53:54it. There may be other issues, moral, ethical,
- 53:59therapeutic, where they need to talk about this
- 54:02because there's resentment, but that's not the
- 54:05legal issue. And so, you know, the question is,
- 54:09is that agreement that follows the statutory
- 54:12framework of 1616, despite the inequality and
- 54:17putting aside the spousal board section going
- 54:20to be upheld as valid under our family code?
- 54:25section. My opinion is yes, but this is where
- 54:29I open it up to Mickey and Judge Kelly for their
- 54:32opinion. Did you want to go, Mickey? No, I wanted
- 54:38to choose to go first. Yeah, I'm happy to do
- 54:41that. The stereotypic example that we customarily
- 54:51think of is where it's a moneyed husband and
- 54:56where it is a bride who has fewer financial options.
- 55:03But let's remember that many times it is the
- 55:07groom that's waving and that these are issues.
- 55:10They are very present in same sex relationships.
- 55:13So we know that the gender of the people involved
- 55:16Is it going to be determinative in that this
- 55:18looks all kinds of ways? And let's remember,
- 55:23too, that we also have the 1615A inquiry about
- 55:28voluntariness and the other things. I mean, I
- 55:33think that there isn't any way to guarantee any
- 55:37ultimate result. The best that you can do is
- 55:40be mindful of all of these factors and do your
- 55:43best to document that. And, you know, I think
- 55:47it's by design that the door has been left open
- 55:51for an exercise of discretion on the part of
- 55:53the judicial officer. The cases talk about courts
- 55:57shaping public policy with regard to these waivers.
- 56:01You know, they want to make sure that the family
- 56:04court sitting as a court of equity at the end
- 56:06of the day is sort of a fail safe, I think. to
- 56:11protect people if something is really truly unconscionable.
- 56:15But I think there's also really something to
- 56:17be said here about judicial philosophies and
- 56:21different courts have different points of view
- 56:26about the role of the court in intervening. to
- 56:32kind of save people from their signatures. And
- 56:35on the one end, you have an idea that we want
- 56:40to respect private ordering and private contracting
- 56:44and the capacity of individuals to plan for themselves
- 56:48what they want their finances and their relationships
- 56:51to look like. The law has lots of protections
- 56:55built in to make sure that there is informed
- 56:58consent happening. And if those are followed,
- 57:03it is respectful of litigants and also stops
- 57:09chaos and allows people to sort of rely on what
- 57:13the agreement is going to look like, right? Because
- 57:16it creates chaos and instability if people operate
- 57:20financially or relationship -wise, assuming that
- 57:23something is going to look a certain way. And
- 57:25ultimately, that turns out not to be true. other
- 57:30side that it is a court of equity. There's important
- 57:34public policies about making sure that people
- 57:37are able to support themselves and not become
- 57:41dependent on family or on the state at the end
- 57:44of the day, that they have the resources available
- 57:47to litigate their cases. And we didn't really
- 57:52talk about attorney fees in particular, but I
- 57:55think that it's very intertwined, these waivers
- 57:57or limitations on fees. And that it's by design
- 58:02that someone has to look at the totality of the
- 58:05circumstances at the end of the day and be comfortable
- 58:08that something is fair and appropriate. And if
- 58:11it's not, that the court should step in. and
- 58:15make its own determination, and that that is
- 58:18more important than honoring whatever the agreement
- 58:21of the parties were at the beginning. And I think
- 58:24that there's merit to both of those perspectives
- 58:28on opposite sides of the spectrum. And you will
- 58:31certainly find judicial officers that tend to
- 58:34lean in one direction or the other or have a
- 58:39certain philosophy about really how interventionist
- 58:44the court should be in the private relationship
- 58:47ordering. Good point. Mickey, do you have anything
- 58:51you want to add to that? This part of the conversation
- 58:56reminded me of a point I wanted to make in last
- 58:59that seems somewhat related. In last, the...
- 59:09The premarital agreement provided that in lieu
- 59:14of spousal support, the wife would get X number
- 59:19of dollars in payments through the course of
- 59:22the marriage, plus the husband had agreed in
- 59:26the premarital agreement to transmute his separate
- 59:30property house to community property. So, I don't
- 59:34have an answer, but the question is, if the spousal
- 59:38support provision is held to be unconscionable
- 59:41and severed from the rest of the agreement, does
- 59:44the rest of the agreement fail for lack of consideration
- 59:48for the transmutation of the house to community
- 59:53property and the payments to the wife throughout
- 59:58the marriage of the cash? Just a question. Yeah,
- 1:00:03it's a good point. Um, it's 1 30 I Don't know
- 1:00:09if Are we done? Are we people still on we have
- 1:00:13some questions? So yes, I know like to take the
- 1:00:17time to answer some please feel free Let me see
- 1:00:21if there's one or two here that Hi, April. Bye.
- 1:00:25I was just gonna say yeah, if you want to go
- 1:00:27through a couple questions You have time people
- 1:00:29can stay as long as you'll like The first one,
- 1:00:34I have no idea. Here's the question. Can arbitration
- 1:00:37clauses for lump sum upfront consideration push
- 1:00:41all issues into binding arbitration or is that
- 1:00:45too viewed as presumptively invalid? Can arbitration
- 1:00:51clauses for lump sum upfront consideration push
- 1:00:55all issues in the binding arbitration or is that
- 1:00:58too viewed as presumptively invalid? Yeah. Well,
- 1:01:01so off the top of the court's head, there's...
- 1:01:10Arbitration is authorized and permitted in certain
- 1:01:14contexts in family law cases, but not in others
- 1:01:18because parties can't reach agreements that deprive
- 1:01:22the court of jurisdiction, for example, over
- 1:01:25custody and visitation issues or over child support
- 1:01:28issues. We wouldn't be contracting about custody
- 1:01:31and visitation in a premarital agreement anyway
- 1:01:34for that. reason. But I think that in some context,
- 1:01:42it is permissible to contract to binding arbitration.
- 1:01:46And I don't know of any law that it would be
- 1:01:49presumptively invalid except just being mindful
- 1:01:53of that issue of depriving the court of jurisdiction
- 1:01:56over things. OK. Joseph asks, is there any case
- 1:02:05or statutory law addressing drafting a premarital
- 1:02:09agreement for another attorney who is husband
- 1:02:12to be? Any special rules to follow or helpful
- 1:02:16hints to ensure a premarital agreement for an
- 1:02:18attorney is enforced? No, just kidding. I mean,
- 1:02:25I'm not aware of any special rules because the
- 1:02:28attorney to be groomed, like any other groom
- 1:02:31as far as I'm concerned, then they ask a lot
- 1:02:34more questions and you want to cross your t's
- 1:02:36and dot your i's. But I'm not aware of any case
- 1:02:40or statutory law. But usually, usually when it
- 1:02:45comes up in these kinds of cases that somebody
- 1:02:49was an attorney, that is not a good fact for
- 1:02:52the, just the attorney. Because of this overarching
- 1:02:56concern about inequality of power. So, you know,
- 1:03:01we talked about it a little bit and, you know,
- 1:03:03I don't know that, you know, there isn't a silver
- 1:03:05bullet or a panacea, but if someone has, you
- 1:03:09know, more sophisticated knowledge, then you
- 1:03:12make sure the other person has representation
- 1:03:15and adequate time and explanation and any sort
- 1:03:18of accommodations or anything else that they
- 1:03:20would need in order to try to equalize that.
- 1:03:23And it's that kind of thing that I was suggesting
- 1:03:26is really an opportunity for creativity on the
- 1:03:28part of the people representing these parties
- 1:03:32and trying to honor whatever their intent is
- 1:03:36about how they want to operate. But it goes to
- 1:03:40the inequality of bargaining power. That's a
- 1:03:43good point. All right, another one by Jack. Jack,
- 1:03:46you are drafting prenotes. All right, could any
- 1:03:48such presigning mediator they be agreed upon
- 1:03:52arbitrator at finding arbitration selected by
- 1:03:56both parties with approval of both counsel pre
- 1:03:59-dispute. Kanay said, well, just off the top
- 1:04:02of my head, most mediators that mediate prenups
- 1:04:07are not judges. They're family law attorneys.
- 1:04:10So number one, you would not want, you would
- 1:04:13not use them for binding arbitration in the future.
- 1:04:17The question is that if you're going to have
- 1:04:19to use a retired judge, let's say, to mediate
- 1:04:23your prenup, could that judge be used as the
- 1:04:28binding arbitrator later on? I would think no
- 1:04:31from a strategic point of view, but legally,
- 1:04:35I don't know the answer to that. So, Skelly,
- 1:04:37I don't know if you know either. Again, this
- 1:04:43is no great wisdom off the, you know, just sort
- 1:04:45of my gut response. And if these issues came
- 1:04:49up in Department 35, I would certainly be willing
- 1:04:51to consider any authority anyone has to the contrary.
- 1:04:54But I think it creates an issue regarding mediation,
- 1:04:59confidentiality. Then if an agreement is mediated,
- 1:05:06then those communications are confidential, and
- 1:05:10the California evidence code precludes that person
- 1:05:13from being called as a witness, something like
- 1:05:16that. And then if you have the same person being
- 1:05:22the arbitrator, that means the decision maker
- 1:05:25is someone that has been privy to all of the
- 1:05:27confidential communications, and you might or
- 1:05:29might not want that. But I just see an immediate
- 1:05:34issue about mediation potentiality. Jack asks,
- 1:05:38do you use video recording at signing? I don't
- 1:05:42anymore, Jack, to be honest. We used to do it
- 1:05:44in the olden days, but nowadays we just don't.
- 1:05:49And in fact, I still am old school, as is Mickey,
- 1:05:52when I still do originals in person by council
- 1:05:58and parties that more and more I'm dealing with
- 1:06:01people that actually don't even keep the original
- 1:06:03copies anymore. More and more lawyers are having
- 1:06:06the clients keep the original and are only doing
- 1:06:09digital copies. So I don't use video recording.
- 1:06:13That's not to say if you have a big concern about
- 1:06:16the mental health of a party or if there was,
- 1:06:20you know, extreme resentment or unhappiness and
- 1:06:22you want to protect your client, then you should
- 1:06:25have a video recorder. Okay. Christina asks,
- 1:06:33I heard in another seminar that attorney certifications
- 1:06:37typically included in premarital agreements were
- 1:06:41not required or recommended. The concern expressed
- 1:06:44was that this may impact liability of the attorney
- 1:06:48involved. What are your thoughts or comments
- 1:06:50on this? We all have them in ours. I think, if
- 1:06:56anything, the attorney, the more concern is the
- 1:07:00waiver of attorney -client privilege. And to
- 1:07:03me, the party's on notice that when this attorney
- 1:07:07certification says, I've gone over this agreement,
- 1:07:10my client indicates they understood it before
- 1:07:13they signed it, that to me, it's important that
- 1:07:16the party understand that if there's ever a dispute
- 1:07:20later about the agreement, that puts the client
- 1:07:23at odds with their attorney that their attorney
- 1:07:27can produce any and all evidence to show that
- 1:07:31their client understood the agreement. So that's
- 1:07:34the potential waiver of privilege. But to me,
- 1:07:36the attorney certification enhances and protects
- 1:07:40the lawyer because they have a document signed
- 1:07:43by their clients saying, yes, I agree to this.
- 1:07:48Mickey, I don't know if you have any further
- 1:07:49thoughts on that one. I agree with you, Lauren.
- 1:07:56I mean, I would never do a premarital agreement
- 1:07:59that didn't have attorney certification. I'm
- 1:08:04being summoned. So unfortunately, I think we
- 1:08:08have to stop there. But thank you for your excellent
- 1:08:10and thoughtful questions. Thank you so much,
- 1:08:13everybody. And April, if you're still on. And
- 1:08:17everybody, thanks so much. You may be eligible
- 1:08:22for CLE credit in your state. Visit bhba .org
- 1:08:26slash podcasts for more information