Latest / The Fourcast / Iran on the brink: what is driving nationwide unrest?

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Iran on the brink: what is driving nationwide unrest? · The Fourcast

• 0:00
  The regime is dying a death by 1000 cuts, anyone of which could
• 0:03
  prove fatal. It could subside, but it could
• 0:06
  very easily tip over. I see the Islamic Republic still
• 0:09
  very much in command and control.
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  Is this part of maybe a cycle of protests that can eventually
• 0:15
  become revolutionary? I think so, But I certainly
• 0:19
  don't think that the system is going to just fall overnight.
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  Will Donald Trump intervene militarily, as he has threatened
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  to do? Yes or no?
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  Hello and welcome to the forecast.
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  Iran is in the grip of its most intense unrest in years.
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  What began in Tehran's bizarre over soaring prices and the
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  collapsing currency has spread across 27 provinces, with
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  inflation above 50% and the government's struggling to
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  contain anger over corruption and falling living standards.
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  Human rights groups now say that at least 25 people have been
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  killed, more than 1000 arrested as police move into
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  universities. And the judiciary warns that any
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  period of concessions is now over.
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  And into this crisis, just a few days after U.S. military strikes
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  against Caracas and the abduction of President Maduro
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  and his wife, comes fresh intervention from Donald Trump,
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  vowing that the US, yes, the US will defend Iranian protesters,
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  prompting Tehran to accuse Trump of psychological warfare.
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  Well, joining me now to discuss all this is Professor Ali
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  Ansari, a leading voice in Iran's modern history, and
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  Doctor Salam Vakil, Director of Middle East and North Africa
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  Programme at Chatham House. Welcome to you both.
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  Let's try and first of all, get some sort of idea of what's
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  going on inside Tehran, inside Iran.
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  There's other 27 provinces. Ali, first to you.
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  How serious is this and compared to the unrest of a few years ago
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  when people descended on the streets of the big cities?
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  In terms of, of, of numbers involved, they're probably not
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  as large as they were in 2022 or indeed in 2019, but they seem to
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  be broader. They certainly became much more
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  violent much earlier than they had in, in previous occasions.
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  And you, you, you know, you certainly get the, the, the mood
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  music is, is, is turning again. It, this is not a sort of a
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  call, this is a, this is a, a protest that's erupted from
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  economic obviously discontent, but it's rather swiftly turned
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  into a political, you know, political challenge to the
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  regime. And it's just yet another, you
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  know, cycle of protests that the regime is having to cope with.
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  And it's, it's, you know, every time these protests emerge, it
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  gets weaker and weaker. I mean, it, it, it has less room
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  for manoeuvre. It has less capabilities to deal
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  with things. And, you know, the real problem
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  for the regime here is that now it's decided now is the time to
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  reform in the middle of a fully fledged sort of like political
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  crisis. And, you know, most of us
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  observing Iran would have thought that the time for
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  serious structural reform would have been much, much earlier,
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  certainly several years ago and and not now.
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  So the threat to the regime really is that its own response
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  to what's going on, its inability to respond in some
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  ways or, or its unwillingness to respond is actually going to
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  make matters much, much worse. And so, you know, I, I often use
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  this phrase that the regime is dying a death by 1000 cuts and
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  anyone of which could prove fatal.
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  So this is the way I I, I tend to look at things that it it
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  could subside, but it could very easily tip over.
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  Salam. I remember from my very vaguely,
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  from my Iranian revolutionary history that in the revolution
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  in 79, it was the Bizarres, the merchant class of big cities
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  like Tehran turning against the Shah that made all the
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  difference. Is that what we're seeing right
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  now? And explain to us the the
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  context of this economic crisis. Sure.
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  Well, happy to be with you for this important discussion.
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  Let's start first with the revolution because you reference
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  the importance of the bazaar. And I think certainly strikes
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  and the support of the bazaar has been important for the
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  revolutionary momentum going into 1979.
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  But the principal protests that began were actually 1977 and
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  19781979 was the sort of end of the Shaw's monarchy and the
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  beginning of what was an unknown for Iran.
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  I think the protests that we're seeing are being very much
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  instigated by a huge pressure on Iranians from an economic
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  crisis, currency collapse, if you will.
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  Inflation is above 50% week by week.
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  Prices of basic staples from eggs to milk to rice are just
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  increasing in extraordinary ways.
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  And, and this just is making life incredibly hopeless, if not
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  sort of at a dead end for Iran. And I think that's what
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  precipitated that. What began as strikes quickly
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  spread into universities and then spread out into small
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  towns, primarily on the western side of Iran, but not solely.
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  And, you know, I think there are different dynamics at play.
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  But what's driving the protests are economic issues,
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  hopelessness, people that feel like they have nothing to lose.
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  And this, the system, the Iranian elected and unelected
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  system, have taken a new approach.
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  The Ali referred to trying to acknowledge that they've made
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  mistakes, trying to appeal for mediation, engaging in some
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  important subsidy reform and currency exchange rate
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  unification. But those measures on their own
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  aren't real solutions. Iran's problem is structural,
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  its systemic, and it requires the Iranian political
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  establishment to align, to unify, and to agree on
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  negotiations with the US administration.
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  It's only through a protracted negotiations that Iran can solve
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  its economic crisis by time with its population that is deeply
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  frustrated and had enough, as well as of course address it's
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  regional and geopolitical challenges.
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  I mean, Ali, you mentioned 1000 cuts there.
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  And, you know, we've been talking to people inside Iran
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  all day long, you know, on the phone.
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  And what they're basically telling us is that this is the
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  final store. They put up with so much, you
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  know, nonsense over the years with so much repression, so many
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  kind of failed opportunities, so many limited horizons.
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  And along comes this, you know, renewed version of a long
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  standing economic crisis. And they've simply had enough.
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  Is that accurate? And and when it does boil over,
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  you know when that thousandth cut appears, is it decisive?
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  Well, I think it, I think it could tip.
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  I mean, this, this, this is the issue.
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  I mean, it could have tipped earlier.
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  They've, they've managed to sort of to contain previous protests.
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  But the fact is, you know, Sanam was saying earlier, they haven't
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  actually dealt with any of the serious structural issues that
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  that affect the, the Iranian political economy.
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  And I mean, there's massive corruption.
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  And of course they will always look abroad and say, well, we
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  have a lot of pressure from abroad and the sanctions and of
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  course that doesn't help. But I don't myself see it as the
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  central cause behind the, the, the, the problem in, in Iran,
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  which is, which is essentially that you have an exemplary case
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  of bad governance. I mean, it's, it's enormously
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  bad. And they, they've managed
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  somehow to sort of maintain a, a, a sort of an ideological, I
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  suppose, a conviction among among those core supporters to
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  keep them going. But I think you're quite right.
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  And it's the sense I get from people often, you know, not very
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  politically minded people, but they've just had enough.
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  And there's a huge amount of anger among people now.
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  Some will go out and demonstrate, Others will just
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  sit tight and wait to see what happens.
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  Others may go on strike. I mean, I think we have to keep
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  an eye out for the strike. And I think ultimately you have
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  to see what happens with the security services and, and, and,
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  and those, those tools that the regime has to keep matters
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  suppressed. We know, for instance, in the
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  Massa Amini demonstrations and protests that in some cases, you
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  know, there was a lot of reluctance among some elements
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  to actually indulge in some of the repression going on.
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  So we have to watch closely and see what happens now.
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  And I think the longer this drags out with everything else
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  that's going on. And, you know, we mentioned
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  earlier, the international environment isn't terribly good.
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  You know, it, it's a you know, it, it, it's, it doesn't bode
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  well. And we should add here also, and
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  I mean, I know this is a, it's certainly interesting.
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  As a historian, I can tell you that there's a huge amount of
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  pack of nostalgia going on in the air.
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  And it is nostalgia. For the family, the former
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  shark. Yes, I mean, so basically they
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  they, they, they've been fed a steady diet over the last 10 or
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  15 years of sort of films and other things of what was going
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  on prior to 1979. And, you know, obviously this
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  has, you know, told a younger generation generation, you know,
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  the, the, the younger generations that they that life
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  could be different. You know, it's as simple as
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  that. It's it's a visual treat.
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  And of course, you know, what you're seeing 46 years after the
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  revolution, a chance that I think many of us would never
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  have really thought would be heard again in Iran, which is,
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  you know, Long live the king. I mean it, it's quite
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  extraordinary. But it's a very sad indictment,
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  I have to say, if you pulled to look at it that way, or a poor
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  indictment on the way in which the Islamic Republic has run
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  affairs. SO22 questions.
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  The first one is briefly do you think repression still works in
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  as it did a couple of years ago? Absolutely.
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  The repression and the repressive capacity of the state
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  is very much underway. You yourself outlined the very
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  many tragic deaths that we are learning about the detention and
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  arrests of of over 1000 people so far.
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  I expect it to go higher. What the Islamic Republic has
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  developed through decades of managing protests is a crackdown
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  playbook, and they are using it. And with every protest they
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  learn and they adapt and at the same time they round up
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  dissenters from within the system itself.
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  So I fully expect that repression to still be an
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  important tool for the system survival.
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  And without all of the features of a revolution, which include a
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  breakdown of the elite, shifts from the army or the security
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  services, I I see the Islamic Republic still very much in
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  command and control. And while this protest is indeed
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  threatening and I think was certainly inevitable, I don't
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  think that this is the one that everyone is hoping for.
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  Is this part of maybe a cycle of protests that can eventually
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  become revolutionary or lead to a change in the regime?
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  I think so. But it's not going to be the one
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  that necessarily leads to the collapse of the Islamic
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  Republic. I think that is something we're
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  living through and witnessing, but I certainly don't think that
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  the system is going to just fall overnight.
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  I think it's important to walk through what is and was is not
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  possible for Iranians. I think certainly there's
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  nostalgia, but I think that nostalgia isn't necessarily
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  based on reality. It's it's based on sort of myth.
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  Young people clearly haven't opened their history books and
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  perhaps they should read 1 of Professor Ali Ansari's history
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  books to remind themselves of life under the Palavi monarchy.
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  A Palavi monarchy that was certainly more secular and
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  certainly socially liberal, but one that also had a security
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  force that was quite brutal and arrested and and detained plenty
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  of students. A Pan Levy monarchy actually.
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  Also, I'd like to remind people in the region of the Middle East
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  that are also nostalgic for the Pan Levy's.
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  Pan Levy monarchy didn't just sit tight within Iran's borders.
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  Pan Levy monarchy supported proxy groups in Kurdistan and in
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  southern Lebanon. The Pan Levy monarchy took the
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  islands from the UAE in 1971 and also laid claim to Bahrain in
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  1969. At questions that I've also
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  asked Reza Panavi himself. But if we talk about Reza Panavi
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  himself, it's important to think about his biography, what he
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  brings to the table. There was an opportunity after
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  the Masa Amini protests to bring together a group of the Iranian
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  diaspora that very much fell apart because of competition,
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  because Reza Pandavi didn't want to work as part of a team.
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  And I'll be very honest, as someone who is regularly trolled
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  by monarchists who can't stand that, I would like to see a more
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  democratic Iran rather than a monarchical Iran.
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  I find the people around Reza Pandavi to not really reflect or
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  demonstrate the values and principles that are needed in a
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  sort of new governance structure that would come after the
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  Islamic Republic. So I I refuse to think that he
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  is the best and the brightest. And I certainly think that Iran
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  and Iranians that have exported themselves across the world have
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  definitely produced more sound and capable people than someone
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  who's sat in the in Bethesda for 46 years really actually not
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  developing his credentials. OK.
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  Ali, do you think, is there any evidence at all that the Trump
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  administration is talking to the son of the late Shah about a
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  possible transition? I mean, it's it, it is
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  interesting because you do get, you know, the odd commentary
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  coming out of the Trump White House.
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  But on the other hand, it seems to be also they, they, they are
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  alert enough to the notion that any change or any significant
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  change will come from within the country.
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  And I think most people are, are, are aware of that.
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  I mean, the, the nostalgia is, is, is really developed on the
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  back of, you know, in the sense of Salam says, the sort of
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  social and economic development of the country of the 50 years
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  prior to, prior to the revolution.
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  And, and of course, the revolution basically inherited a
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  fairly powerful state. I mean, we, we shouldn't, we
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  shouldn't underestimate that. And, you know, it took both the
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  good and the bad of that state and, and, and basically, I think
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  May, may discarded the good and made the bad very, very much
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  worse. But it's, it's, it's, you know,
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  that there are clear indications for people, as we were saying
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  earlier, who are quite desperate about, you know, what's going
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  on. You know, the, the, the general
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  economic, the, the situation of Pahlevi Iran is, is, is, is
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  obviously attractive to them. And, and you know, those, those
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  were the days, for instance, in a very simple way that the
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  Iranian passport could get you to many different countries
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  without a visa, for instance. I mean, now it's, it's basically
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  impossible. So there's all that.
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  But I also agree that, you know, I think that Reza Pahlavi would
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  make his would, would, would make his position considerably
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  stronger, shall we say, if he actually developed a good
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  constitutional platform and a democratic platform in which he,
• 15:13
  you know, in, in which he wanted to pursue.
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  And of course, you know, we haven't really seen any of that
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  so far. So I mean, it, it doesn't, you
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  know, I think the nostalgia is precisely that it's a sort of a
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  rather vague notion of the fact that, well, things were better
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  once. And, and as I said, it's, it's,
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  it's a reflection really of how bad things have become.
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  So let's get on to Donald Trump then.
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  I mean, is it, is it possible, do you think that he will come
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  good on his threats first to you, Ali, of some kind of
• 15:39
  intervention in Iran? And if he does so, will he do it
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  through his proxies in the form of Benjamin Netanyahu?
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  Because that is the other thing that's changed in the last few
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  years. We had that mini 12 day war
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  between Israel and Iran with American intervention.
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  I mean, it's certainly very possible, but I mean, I think
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  the most important thing here is that he's he's basically said in
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  only the way that he can say it, it has to be said that, you
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  know, we're we're watching and, you know, obviously he says then
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  we'll take action. And I think that probably has
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  done quite a bit in Tehran. I mean, particularly after the
• 16:10
  whole Maduro business that, you know, people have realised here
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  that there is there is a, you know, we have to remember that
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  when President Trump was first elected, there was quite a lot
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  of enthusiasm in Iran about the fact that they thought they
• 16:22
  could do business with a businessman.
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  Basically that here was a Republican who didn't give two
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  hoots about human rights and, you know, and he was a
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  businessman. So, you know, the art of the
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  deal sold very well in Persian translation, it has to be said.
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  So initially they had some quite positive notions and of course
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  when they were dealing with Witkoff and others prior to the
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  prior to the war, there were a lot of very positive voices
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  coming out of Tehran about the Trump administration and rather
• 16:47
  less complimentary commentary coming about the Europeans.
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  Now I think they've sort of realised that that just isn't,
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  you know, that isn't going to happen.
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  And, and I think, you know, that the whole Trump intervention is
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  just another problem for them to try and accommodate and to try
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  and sort of factor into their decision making, which I have to
• 17:07
  say at the moment, I mean, they, they, I still think they're, as
• 17:10
  someone said to me, you know, badly concussed after the 12 day
• 17:12
  war and they still really haven't decided what they're
• 17:14
  doing so. Salim one of the things, of
• 17:17
  course, one of the reasons why this the 12 Day war was for the
• 17:21
  ostensible reason was to try and contain Iran's nuclear program.
• 17:24
  And then, of course, Donald Trump got very huffy and puffy
• 17:28
  when it was suggested to him that actually not all the
• 17:30
  nuclear capability had been totally obliterated as he
• 17:33
  claimed. What do we know about Iran's
• 17:35
  nuclear program since the the June war?
• 17:37
  You know, had they started rebuilding?
• 17:39
  Had they started to regroup? Do we know?
• 17:41
  Well, what we we do know is that the US and intelligence agencies
• 17:50
  more broadly agree that Iran has halted enrichment and the, the,
• 17:57
  the program as we knew it is, is frozen.
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  Obviously, we don't know if there's anything incendiary
• 18:03
  happening underground, but certainly I would imagine that
• 18:06
  Israel and the US are, of course, keeping track and, and
• 18:11
  using satellites to monitor these facilities.
• 18:14
  Fordo hasn't been touched and the International Atomic Energy
• 18:18
  Agency hasn't gone back into Iran to examine the facilities
• 18:22
  as well. So for the time being, Iran is
• 18:26
  actually playing ball and and appeasing Trump with this
• 18:30
  narrative, whether it's true or untrue that the nuclear program
• 18:35
  is is frozen in time. But that isn't on its own going
• 18:39
  to prevent perhaps another strike or another round between
• 18:44
  Israel and Iran because Prime Minister Netanyahu Yahoo was in
• 18:47
  Mar a Lago and even prior to that making a case that Iran is
• 18:51
  recapitalizing its ballistic missiles.
• 18:55
  And indeed, of course, the Islamic Republic is preparing
• 18:59
  building back its defense capabilities for what it is
• 19:03
  calculating will be a more deadly but perhaps a needed
• 19:06
  round to create balance between a Tehran and Tel Aviv.
• 19:10
  But also to create the conditions for talks, which is
• 19:15
  ultimately what Tehran needs. Iran is calculating that it has
• 19:21
  the ability to withstand a longer fight than the Israelis
• 19:26
  do. That's one.
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  And two, they think that, you know, obviously they can survive
• 19:34
  and come out less bloody. That would create a more level
• 19:38
  playing field for negotiations. But you know, this is the year
• 19:42
  where that could certainly play out.
• 19:44
  The Israelis might be misreading the protests in Iran and and
• 19:49
  think that the system is weak and thereby this is a great
• 19:53
  opportunity to weaken it further.
• 19:55
  Right. I interviewed the Iranian
• 19:58
  foreign minister who died in that helicopter crash a few
• 20:00
  years ago. And my final question to him,
• 20:02
  and he didn't like it, was are you more afraid of a Donald
• 20:05
  Trump election? Or your own people.
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  And he said, you know, we're afraid of the people love us,
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  we're a great democracy, and we are not afraid of Donald Trump
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  whatsoever. I wonder, Salaam, if Trump were
• 20:17
  to repeat his threats, if you're an oppositional figure inside
• 20:21
  Tehran, is that helpful or is that unhelpful?
• 20:25
  It's a tricky 1. I think that, you know, Donald
• 20:29
  Trump's threats and what we have seen over the past few days in
• 20:32
  Venezuela is a cautionary tale for the Islamic Republic and for
• 20:36
  Iranians, for the opposition, for those aspiring for something
• 20:39
  different. If, you know, certainly with
• 20:44
  young people out on the streets and really have had enough,
• 20:47
  yeah, maybe they feel more emboldened and they think Trump
• 20:51
  could be on their side. But I wouldn't trust Trump too
• 20:54
  much because at the same time, removing Ali Khamenei without
• 20:58
  actually sort of dismembering the structure of the Islamic
• 21:02
  Republic isn't going to provide or or, you know, give Iranians
• 21:07
  maybe what they seek. And so I think that we should be
• 21:11
  arguing for a more nuanced approach, nuanced analysis.
• 21:16
  Obviously, whatever change in the regime that is going to come
• 21:20
  through the death of Khamenei or the agency of Iranians
• 21:23
  themselves should come actually not with just thinking about
• 21:27
  getting rid of them, but thinking more deeply about what
• 21:30
  comes next. Right, Ali.
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  I mean, we haven't talked to Al Khamenei, the supreme leader, at
• 21:36
  all. He is a very old man by all
• 21:38
  accounts. He is a very frail man.
• 21:40
  And he's come out of his, you know, summer bunker during the
• 21:43
  war looking even more frail. You know, are his days literally
• 21:47
  numbered? Is there a succession plan?
• 21:50
  And if there isn't 1 is that an opportunity for the regime to
• 21:54
  fall and the then, you know, the opposition to take over?
• 21:58
  Well, I think he's, he's definitely frail.
• 22:01
  I mean, in, in, in the sense that, you know, sooner or later,
• 22:03
  obviously the, the succession will have to, to kick in.
• 22:06
  I mean, it's, and, and it's been a bad year.
• 22:09
  I mean, it's been a bad year for him.
• 22:11
  And he's, and he's suddenly, certainly when you, when you
• 22:14
  listen to him, he's, he's less sure footed than he has been in
• 22:17
  the past. Even in these current protests,
• 22:19
  for instance, you know, the, the, the crackdown and the
• 22:21
  violence that took place, took place well before he even got a
• 22:24
  word in. I mean, normally he comes out
• 22:26
  and he says something, he has said something since, but
• 22:29
  originally, you know, obviously decisions were made without, you
• 22:32
  know, him, him actually making any public statements on it.
• 22:35
  I've always felt, and I've said this very clearly in the past,
• 22:38
  that I think he, his, his preferred succession is to hand
• 22:42
  over to his son. But I, I have to say, I think
• 22:45
  it's, it's probably less likely now.
• 22:47
  I mean, I, I think there are many people probably looking at
• 22:50
  the Islamic Republic and the whole concept of the, the, the,
• 22:54
  the supreme leader and probably thinking that when harmony dies,
• 22:58
  that might be the opportunity for some sort of serious change.
• 23:02
  Now, how easy that would be absent any other sort of
• 23:06
  development. And I'm, you know, I'm less
• 23:09
  convinced that the Islamic Republic is as stable as, as, as
• 23:12
  maybe Sanam suggested earlier. I mean, I, I think they're much,
• 23:15
  much more fragile than that. So depending on the decisions
• 23:18
  they make and how they go forward, yes, I mean, I, I think
• 23:22
  there could be an opportunity on his, on his passing for some,
• 23:27
  you know, some of the internal opposition, if you will, to come
• 23:30
  forward and, and, and, and, and start to provide an alternative.
• 23:34
  It's going to be painful, by the way.
• 23:35
  I mean, this is the problem. These deep structural sort of
• 23:38
  problems that Iran has are not going to be solved overnight.
• 23:41
  And I, I draw attention to the fact, you know, that we haven't
• 23:44
  really talked about that the environmental crisis hitting the
• 23:46
  country, which is enormous. I mean, it's far more
• 23:49
  catastrophic than I think people realize.
• 23:51
  And you had this. What do you mean by?
• 23:53
  That essentially they're running out of water.
• 23:55
  I mean, they're, you know, they, they have so mismanaged the
• 23:57
  water resources, which has been something that Iranian states
• 24:00
  from ancient times to the present have always been.
• 24:04
  You know, basically it's their primary task is to manage the
• 24:07
  water resources of the Iranian plateau and basically the
• 24:09
  Islamic Republic through over farming, poor planning, building
• 24:12
  dams in the wrong place, so on and so forth, has basically
• 24:15
  drained much of the aquifers underneath the Iranian plateau.
• 24:18
  So, and they're in a very serious problem of being unable
• 24:21
  to supply many of the major cities with water not on on a
• 24:25
  regular basis. And and we came precariously
• 24:28
  close to what people call day 0 where they were actually going
• 24:31
  to be running out of water in total in some of the major
• 24:33
  cities. Now they've had a period of sort
• 24:36
  of snow and rainfall in others. But again, it's part of the
• 24:39
  fallacy I think that occurs even within Iranian, you know,
• 24:43
  governmental outlet that they think that, you know, a couple
• 24:46
  of weeks of rainfall are going to solve the problem.
• 24:48
  It just isn't. It might delay the problem, but
• 24:50
  it's not solving the problem. And even those, you know,
• 24:54
  insiders such as Callantadi, who is the old minister of
• 24:57
  agriculture, I mean, he's basically done a mea culpa and
• 25:00
  basically said, you know, we screwed up.
• 25:02
  I mean, we screwed up very badly.
• 25:03
  And we should have planned 20 years ago for various sort of
• 25:06
  like environmental projects, dam building, irrigation and others,
• 25:10
  which we didn't do. And the aquifers are now down
• 25:13
  and they will not recover, he said.
• 25:14
  They will not recover to their previous levels.
• 25:17
  Interesting. Salam, let's talk a little bit
• 25:19
  about Iran's friends. I mean, George Bush used to have
• 25:21
  this phrase the axis of evil, and Iran was very much part of
• 25:24
  that. You know, are they getting a lot
• 25:26
  of support from the Russians? I know they've been providing
• 25:28
  the Russians with drones. Are they getting a lot of port
• 25:31
  from the support from the Chinese?
• 25:32
  I know the Chinese have been buying Iranian oil.
• 25:35
  You know, what's that relationship like?
• 25:36
  And are those friends of Iran motivated enough to support what
• 25:41
  could be a crumbling regime? I think the the the foreign
• 25:45
  relationships are certainly interesting to watch.
• 25:49
  I mean, I think the principle network of friends are Iran's
• 25:53
  counterweight to the axis of evil.
• 25:55
  It was called the axis of resistance.
• 25:58
  The the terminology developed in reaction to George W Bush's sort
• 26:05
  of cute phrasing. And the axis of resistance is
• 26:09
  the Iran sort of backed and built network of States and non
• 26:13
  state actors that support resistance against Israel and
• 26:17
  resistance against the United States.
• 26:19
  That's included Hezbollah, the Houthis groups in Iraq, and
• 26:24
  there have been serious setbacks.
• 26:26
  And they've all been massively weakened by the Israelis,
• 26:28
  haven't they? And the Israelis have really
• 26:29
  destroyed Iran's kind of regional empire, if you like.
• 26:34
  Weekend, I wouldn't say destroyed.
• 26:36
  And so this is where I think the nuance is a little important.
• 26:38
  Certainly there have been huge setbacks.
• 26:40
  I think the primary set back has been in the context of Syria,
• 26:44
  where for over 4 decades Iran cultivated a relationship with
• 26:47
  the Assad regime and with the assets now hanging in a Dasha
• 26:51
  and Moscow, Iran has, you know, lost all of that investment.
• 26:57
  What's happened also in Venezuela with Maduro, you know,
• 27:01
  obviously being removed is another other loss for Iran
• 27:04
  because that was a relationship that Iran cultivated in EU, s s
• 27:08
  Western Hemisphere. So there have been real setbacks
• 27:13
  in in that grouping. But to answer your question more
• 27:17
  specifically, ties with Russia and China are humming along.
• 27:22
  They're neither overwhelming, but they Iran has not been
• 27:25
  abandoned by these partners either.
• 27:29
  China continues to provide these sort of economic lifeline for
• 27:34
  the Islamic Republic. And there have been some
• 27:38
  suggestions that China has helped Iran recapitalize its
• 27:43
  ballistic missile program since the war last year.
• 27:46
  And the Russians are important, more important than are is often
• 27:50
  reported in security, intelligence and military ties.
• 27:55
  And of course the economic nature of the relationship is
• 27:58
  limited, but that's still 1 where the two countries
• 28:02
  collaborate. Let me just add one more thing
• 28:04
  about the region. While Iran's non state based
• 28:08
  relationships have certainly been less beneficial for Iran,
• 28:15
  Iran has improved its ties with almost all countries across the
• 28:19
  Middle East and North Africa and that has been a positive.
• 28:22
  Iran's normalization with the Arab world is in a stronger
• 28:27
  footing than it has ever been. I just want to ask you both, you
• 28:30
  know, to do something outrageous, which is a little
• 28:32
  prediction. I'm going to give you a couple
• 28:34
  of nuanced possibilities. So first, you, Ali, do you think
• 28:39
  by the end of the year we're going to see regime change in
• 28:43
  Iran brought about either by Donald Trump's intervention by
• 28:47
  the people uprising against the regime as we're seeing bits of
• 28:51
  happening right now, or will the regime carry on, perhaps
• 28:55
  rebooted by some kind of deal concocted by Steve Witkoff?
• 29:00
  Ali Well, on, on the qualification that historians
• 29:03
  never predict, Matt. So I, I, I want to put that
• 29:05
  caveat in there very clearly. I mean, I think, I think your
• 29:09
  former is more likely than the latter.
• 29:12
  But I want to be quite specific about the notion of regime
• 29:14
  change or regime collapse. I mean, I think that there is a
• 29:17
  serious possibility that there's going to be an economic collapse
• 29:20
  and that economic collapse will, will bring all sorts of things
• 29:23
  along with it. Whether that entails a, a, a
• 29:27
  sort of an element of sort of very direct regime change.
• 29:30
  You know, that that's a little bit more debatable because you
• 29:34
  know, those within the system will fight to the last minute, I
• 29:36
  suspect. But it could lead to a sort of
• 29:39
  a, an internal collapse of one sort or another.
• 29:42
  Not I should say, and let me emphasize this of the country
• 29:45
  per SE, but more of the system. It's the political system really
• 29:48
  that I'm thinking about. And, and one of the things we
• 29:50
  have to be very careful when we discuss these things, I think is
• 29:52
  to make clear, you know, what we're, what we're defining here.
• 29:56
  Because I think too many people conflate Iran with the Islamic
• 29:59
  Republic And, and the Islamic Republic is a political system.
• 30:01
  I don't think the the political system of the Islamic Republic
• 30:05
  as it is currently configured has a future.
• 30:07
  Salam What about you? I would say we could most likely
• 30:11
  see a change in the regime. Neither regime change I I don't
• 30:16
  see that as viable, but a change in the regime.
• 30:18
  A rebooting. A regime reboot.
• 30:21
  Well, it could be a reboot, but it depends on who comes up in
• 30:25
  the reboot. The international order and
• 30:29
  leaders around the world seem to be quite comfortable with
• 30:31
  pliable, amenable and sort of rebranded leaders.
• 30:37
  We saw that in 2025. And I think that that could very
• 30:40
  likely be a scenario we might see in Iran where, as you know,
• 30:44
  an Egypt model or a Syria model could work out as well for for
• 30:49
  Iran. But I do think that talks are
• 30:51
  still out there as a viable solution.
• 30:53
  I'm not sure the Islamic Republic is able or capable to
• 30:58
  deliver a deal they're good at. They're or they're supposedly
• 31:01
  good at negotiating. But I think we have to bend that
• 31:05
  idea at this point. And but I, you know, the talks I
• 31:09
  think are still a possibility for this year as well.
• 31:12
  And now that I've broken the ice and got you both into the
• 31:14
  prediction game, one final line. Will Donald Trump intervene
• 31:18
  military literally on behalf of the protesters, as he has
• 31:22
  threatened to do? Yes or no Saddam?
• 31:25
  No. OK.
• 31:26
  What about you, Ali? I think actually he's set
• 31:29
  himself a red line and he's very likely going to have to deliver
• 31:31
  on it, either through himself or his or his allies.
• 31:34
  Are you Israel? So that's a.
• 31:36
  Yes. I mean, I think if they continue
• 31:38
  in this way, he will, he will find himself having to deliver
• 31:42
  something. Now what that means, you know, I
• 31:44
  who knows? But yes, I mean, I think he
• 31:48
  he's, he's laid down a red line very clearly there and he'll
• 31:51
  look very silly if he does nothing.
• 31:52
  But we've got you both on the record, and we will get back to
• 31:55
  you if and when it is necessary. Hope.
• 31:58
  Sanam is right. OK, well, who knows?
• 32:02
  Thanks very much to both of you. Sanam Bakil, Ali Ansari, it's
• 32:05
  been a pleasure speaking to you. It's a really big issue at the
• 32:08
  moment. We're all focused on Venezuela,
• 32:09
  but this is this is another gathering storm.
• 32:11
  We can't take our eyes off it. Thanks to all of you for
• 32:14
  listening to the forecast. That's it from us here in
• 32:16
  Washington today. See you next time.