Latest / Under Review: The Verification Project / FAA Shutdown & Project 2025: Grounded — What Really Happened?
Transcript
- 0:02SPEAKER_00: Attention, please.
- 0:04SPEAKER_00: Passengers for British Airways flight two one four five to London.
- 0:10SPEAKER_01: Friday, November thirteenth, twenty twenty-six.
- 0:14SPEAKER_01: It's the middle of a Friday afternoon.
- 0:17SPEAKER_01: Across the United States, millions of Americans are going about their business.
- 0:23SPEAKER_01: Some are heading home from work.
- 0:25SPEAKER_01: Some are traveling for the weekend, and others are just simply trying to get home to their families.
- 0:31SPEAKER_01: And then something extraordinary happens.
- 0:34SPEAKER_01: The Federal Aviation Administration issues a nationwide ground stop.
- 0:40SPEAKER_01: It wasn't just one airport, it wasn't just one airline, it was the entire country.
- 0:48SPEAKER_01: Planes were preparing to depart are ordered to remain on the ground.
- 0:52SPEAKER_01: Air traffic already in the air, continue operating under established safety procedures as controllers work to bring them safely to their destinations.
- 1:01SPEAKER_01: Thousands of flights were canceled, airports descended into chaos, and passengers are stranded everywhere.
- 1:09SPEAKER_01: And suddenly, Americans are starting to ask a very reasonable question.
- 1:13SPEAKER_01: What in the hell just happened?
- 1:16SPEAKER_01: The explanation coming from the federal government?
- 1:18SPEAKER_01: A telecommunication network problem.
- 1:22SPEAKER_01: Equipment being replaced at a remote FAA facility in Arkansas, network instability, an extraordinary amount of connection traffic, problems spreading across air traffic control facilities.
- 1:35SPEAKER_01: And the government says the system was stabilized and flights could resume roughly four and a half hours later.
- 1:43SPEAKER_01: Now, maybe that's exactly what happened.
- 1:46SPEAKER_01: Maybe an equipment change went wrong, a series of technical safeguards failed, and the FAA made the appropriate decision to stop departures until that system was stable.
- 1:57SPEAKER_01: But there's something we need to talk about.
- 2:00SPEAKER_01: Because when something of this magnitude happens, there are Americans who don't simply accept the government's first explanation.
- 2:07SPEAKER_01: Some immediately ask whether that failure was preventable.
- 2:11SPEAKER_01: Others ask whether somebody is trying to cover something up.
- 2:15SPEAKER_01: And some wonder whether the crisis was deliberately created.
- 2:19SPEAKER_01: No, does asking those questions mean there's evidence of a conspiracy?
- 2:24SPEAKER_01: Absolutely not.
- 2:26SPEAKER_01: But does our government have a history that helps explain why Americans ask those questions?
- 2:32SPEAKER_01: It certainly does.
- 2:34SPEAKER_01: And here's where the story becomes especially interesting.
- 2:38SPEAKER_01: Years before this incident, a conservative policy blueprint called Project 2025 proposed fundamentally restructuring the Federal Aviation Administration and the organization responsible for air traffic control.
- 2:53SPEAKER_01: Then, following the November 13 grounding, the Trump administration renewed its demand for tens of billions of dollars to overhaul the aviation system.
- 3:04SPEAKER_01: That doesn't prove those events are connected by anything other than a long-standing infrastructure problem.
- 3:11SPEAKER_01: But the timing, it makes the policy decisions worth examining.
- 3:15SPEAKER_01: Who made the decisions?
- 3:17SPEAKER_01: Who controls the infrastructure?
- 3:19SPEAKER_01: And who benefits from the proposed changes?
- 3:21SPEAKER_01: And what evidence do we have that the government's proposed solution would prevent another incident?
- 3:28SPEAKER_01: Today we're investigating the FAA shutdown, the people responsible for American Aviation Policy, Project 2025, and the reasons public trust in government has deteriorated over decades.
- 3:41SPEAKER_01: We have some answers today, we have considerably more questions, and we're not going to manufacture conclusions just because an unanswered question makes for an interesting story.
- 3:53SPEAKER_01: Welcome to Under Review, the Verification Project, the conversations we're told not to have.
- 4:00SPEAKER_01: Why don't Americans trust their government?
- 4:04SPEAKER_01: Now, before we get into the routers, the contractors, the politicians, and Project 2025, I want to establish something real quick.
- 4:13SPEAKER_01: Americans' distrust of the federal government is measurable.
- 4:17SPEAKER_01: It's not something we have to speculate about.
- 4:20SPEAKER_01: According to Pew Research Center, in 1958, approximately 73% of Americans said they trusted the federal government to do what was right just about always or most of the time.
- 4:34SPEAKER_01: By September 2025, 17%.
- 4:41SPEAKER_01: That means approximately 83% of respondents did not select either of those two high trust responses.
- 4:48SPEAKER_01: Now, that doesn't mean 83% believe the government is conspiring against them.
- 4:53SPEAKER_01: It doesn't mean that they think every government official is corrupt.
- 4:57SPEAKER_01: And it doesn't mean they all share the same political beliefs.
- 5:01SPEAKER_01: But it does mean that confidence in Washington is extraordinarily low compared to what it was in the late 1950s.
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: And this is not exclusively a Republican problem or a Democratic problem.
- 5:15SPEAKER_01: Pure's historical data shows that trust tends to increase among supporters of the party controlling the White House.
- 5:22SPEAKER_01: When their party is out of power, confidence tends to fall.
- 5:26SPEAKER_01: In other words, Americans often judge government trustworthiness partially through the political lens of who happens to be running it.
- 5:33SPEAKER_01: But there's something deeper here.
- 5:36SPEAKER_01: There are documented events in American history where government officials deceived the public, concealed misconduct, or pursued objectives that harmed the very people they were supposed to protect.
- 5:50SPEAKER_01: Let's look at a few.
- 5:51SPEAKER_01: In 1962, senior military officials developed a proposal known as Operation Northwoods.
- 5:59SPEAKER_01: The proposal contemplated manufacturing incidents that could be blamed on Cuba to create justification for American military intervention.
- 6:07SPEAKER_01: Among the ideas were staged attacks and simulated civilian aircraft incident.
- 6:12SPEAKER_01: Now, there's an important distinction.
- 6:15SPEAKER_01: Operation Northwoods was proposed.
- 6:18SPEAKER_01: It was not carried out, though we know of.
- 6:22SPEAKER_01: But the fact that senior military officials formally considered manufacturing a justification for war is historically documented.
- 6:30SPEAKER_01: And two years later came the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
- 6:32SPEAKER_01: In 1964, the Johnson administration reported attacks on American naval vessels.
- 6:38SPEAKER_01: The first encounter occurred.
- 6:40SPEAKER_01: But a subsequent a subsequent NSA historical investigation concluded that the alleged second attack never happened.
- 6:50SPEAKER_01: Nevertheless, the reported attacks helped secure congressional authorization that enabled a major expansion of American involvement in Vietnam.
- 6:59SPEAKER_01: Then there was the Tuskegee syphilis study.
- 7:03SPEAKER_01: For decades, federal public health researchers deceived participants and withheld available treatment from men with syphilis.
- 7:12SPEAKER_01: These men were not deliberately infected by the study, despite a common misconception, but they were denied informed consent and appropriate treatment.
- 7:21SPEAKER_01: Then I ran Contra.
- 7:23SPEAKER_01: During the Reagan administration, officials secretly facilitated arms transactions involving Iran, and proceeds were diverted to support the Contras in Nicaragua.
- 7:33SPEAKER_01: The operation Fast and Furious, a federal firearm investigation in which the ATF allowed suspected traffickers to acquire firearms that agents failed to adequately track, weapons that reached criminal organizations in Mexico.
- 7:47SPEAKER_01: And then Iraq.
- 7:49SPEAKER_01: Americans are told that Saddam Hussein's government possessed dangerous weapons capabilities.
- 7:54SPEAKER_01: The administration also made claims about links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda that went beyond what intelligence supported.
- 8:02SPEAKER_01: The invasion happened.
- 8:03SPEAKER_01: The stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction that were central to the public justification were never found because they never existed.
- 8:12SPEAKER_01: Now, I want to be very careful here.
- 8:14SPEAKER_01: These are two different cases.
- 8:17SPEAKER_01: Some involve intentional deception, some involve covert operations, some involve failures of oversight, and then some involve claims that were proved false or were overstated.
- 8:33SPEAKER_01: They should not all be labeled as false flags.
- 8:37SPEAKER_01: But they illustrate why government credibility is not something that can be simply demanded.
- 8:44SPEAKER_01: It has to be earned.
- 8:46SPEAKER_01: And that brings us to a modern question about financial interest in public office.
- 8:51SPEAKER_01: Because Americans aren't only concerned about whether their government tells the truth, they're also concerned about what and whose interest their elected officials are serving.
- 9:04SPEAKER_01: There is another reason questions about government motives deserve examination here.
- 9:10SPEAKER_01: There's an intersection of public office and private financial gain.
- 9:14SPEAKER_01: Donald Trump returned to the presidency in January 2025 with extensive business interests.
- 9:21SPEAKER_01: His family's cryptocurrency ventures have attracted significant investment and generated substantial report revenue.
- 9:29SPEAKER_01: Reuters has investigated financial gains associated with Trump family cryptocurrency businesses during his second administration.
- 9:37SPEAKER_01: And then separately, Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and former White House advisor, established an investment firm that received$2 billion commitment from the Saudi Arabia Sovereign Wealth Fund after Kushner left the government.
- 9:52SPEAKER_01: Now let's be precise about that.
- 9:54SPEAKER_01: $2 billion investment into a fund is not the same as a$2 billion of personal profit.
- 10:01SPEAKER_01: And a business benefiting financially does not by itself establish a corrupt transaction.
- 10:09SPEAKER_01: But those relationships raise legitimate questions about conflicts of interest, access, foreign influence, and whether public decisions might intersect with private financial incentives.
- 10:21SPEAKER_01: Consider another example here.
- 10:23SPEAKER_01: In 2018, journalist Jamal Khashaghi was murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
- 10:31SPEAKER_01: American intelligence later assessed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salam, also known as MBS, approved an operation to capture or kill him.
- 10:41SPEAKER_01: The United States nevertheless maintained its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia across subsequent administrations.
- 10:49SPEAKER_01: Some defend that decision as necessary diplomacy involving security, energy, and regional stability.
- 10:56SPEAKER_01: Others argue that it demonstrates how a strategic and economic interest can outweigh accountability.
- 11:03SPEAKER_01: Both the intelligence finding and the continuation of their relationship are part of a historical record.
- 11:10SPEAKER_01: And this matters to our discussion because when Americans see government officials, their relatives, or connected businesses benefiting from arrangements involving powerful interests, some begin to question whether public decisions are being made primarily for the public good.
- 11:27SPEAKER_01: But there's a boundary that we need to maintain.
- 11:30SPEAKER_01: None of those financial arrangements establishes that the Trump family, Kushner, or any connected business had anything to do with the FAA outage.
- 11:40SPEAKER_01: We have not found evidence of any of that.
- 11:43SPEAKER_01: We're simply discussing them because this episode is partly about public trust.
- 11:49SPEAKER_01: And public trust is affected by transparency, conflicts of interest, accountability, and whether officials can demonstrate that their decisions serve the public.
- 11:59SPEAKER_01: Which brings us back to aviation.
- 12:01SPEAKER_01: Because on November 13th, the government had had to make an extraordinary decision involving the safety of the flying public.
- 12:10SPEAKER_01: So let's take a look at what actually happened.
- 12:14SPEAKER_01: According to the FAA or the Federal Aviation Administration, network instability began around 3 30 p.m.
- 12:21SPEAKER_01: Friday afternoon Eastern time or 1530.
- 12:24SPEAKER_01: Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy placed the onset at approximately 3.36 p.m.
- 12:31SPEAKER_01: At 354, the FAA issued a nationwide ground stop.
- 12:36SPEAKER_01: At that moment, approximately 3,500 aircraft were already in the air.
- 12:42SPEAKER_01: The FAA did not simply lose the ability to communicate with every aircraft, and that's an important distinction to make here.
- 12:49SPEAKER_01: Some communication frequencies continued functioning, some radar feeds remained available, air traffic controllers continued guiding aircraft, and the FAA says every aircraft was safely brought down and critical operations were maintained.
- 13:05SPEAKER_01: So when the pilots say that the radios were working, that does not automatically contradict the government's explanation.
- 13:13SPEAKER_01: The problem was instability across the broader network.
- 13:17SPEAKER_01: According to the FAA, 17 of its 22 regional air traffic control centers experienced problems with instability also spreading into terminal radar approach control facilities.
- 13:29SPEAKER_01: 17 out of 22.
- 13:31SPEAKER_01: That is not a minor localized inconvenience.
- 13:34SPEAKER_01: That is a major disruption affecting much of the National Air Traffic Management System.
- 13:40SPEAKER_01: And the FAA says that it made the decision to stop departures because it could not accept the risks associated with inconsistent communications and radar information.
- 13:51SPEAKER_01: Now that decision is understandable from a safety perspective, but here's what we need to investigate.
- 13:57SPEAKER_01: What created that instability in the first place?
- 14:00SPEAKER_01: The FAA's preliminary explanation points to network equipment associated with being performed by L3 Harris, a private government contractor.
- 14:10SPEAKER_01: That work involved replacing aging copper-based telecommunications connections with fiber technology.
- 14:16SPEAKER_01: A router was deployed at a communication site in El Dorado, Arkansas.
- 14:21SPEAKER_01: Investigators also identified a site in Amarillo, Texas as a possible source of excessive network traffic.
- 14:28SPEAKER_01: The FA reported approximately 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds.
- 14:34SPEAKER_01: Now that traffic disrupted the network and affected the reliability of information reaching air traffic facilities.
- 14:41SPEAKER_01: L3 Harris isolated the suspected locations.
- 14:44SPEAKER_01: The FAA then disabled broadcasting functionality on similar routers as a precaution.
- 14:50SPEAKER_01: And after monitoring the system for stability, officials lifted the nationwide ground stop at 8 15 Friday evening.
- 14:58SPEAKER_01: But that is not the same as completed root cause investigation.
- 15:02SPEAKER_01: We still need to know exactly what caused the routers to have to begin to behave that way.
- 15:08SPEAKER_01: And where was there a configuration error?
- 15:11SPEAKER_01: Was there a problem in the equipment?
- 15:13SPEAKER_01: Was there a network design flaw?
- 15:16SPEAKER_01: Were protections against excessive traffic inadequate?
- 15:19SPEAKER_01: Was the change properly tested?
- 15:22SPEAKER_01: And why could an issue associated with remote facilities propagate across so much of the national system?
- 15:29SPEAKER_01: And here's another important detail.
- 15:31SPEAKER_01: The FAA acknowledges that maintenance at major air traffic facilities is generally conducted at nighttime.
- 15:38SPEAKER_01: But the work associated with this incident was performed during the day because it was at a remote facility.
- 15:44SPEAKER_01: The agency says that this kind of work had routinely been performed without causing such problems, and now it says it will reevaluate its maintenance practices.
- 15:55SPEAKER_01: My question is simple here.
- 15:57SPEAKER_01: If a network is critical enough that its instability can force the entire country to stop departing aircraft, what safeguards should be acquired before changes are made to it?
- 16:07SPEAKER_01: Where was the risk assessment?
- 16:09SPEAKER_01: Where was the change control process?
- 16:11SPEAKER_01: Where were the rollback procedures?
- 16:13SPEAKER_01: And who approved the work in the first place?
- 16:16SPEAKER_01: Those aren't accusations of sabotage, those are basic operational accountability questions, and there's another important development here.
- 16:23SPEAKER_01: The equipment manufacturer Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, whose Juniper technology was involved, reportedly stated that the equipment operated according to the configuration supplied by the installer.
- 16:35SPEAKER_01: That statement doesn't establish who made an error, or even whether the configuration itself was wrong.
- 16:41SPEAKER_01: But it makes the installation and approval process especially important, because the next question becomes, well, who configured the equipment?
- 16:49SPEAKER_01: Who approved the configuration?
- 16:52SPEAKER_01: And who verified that the change would not compromise the broader network?
- 16:56SPEAKER_01: Those were answers we intend to pursue.
- 17:00SPEAKER_01: So let's talk about leadership.
- 17:03SPEAKER_01: The United States Secretary of Transportation is Sean Duffy.
- 17:06SPEAKER_01: Duffy is an attorney, former district attorney, former member of Congress, and former television personality from MTV.
- 17:14SPEAKER_01: His congressional background centered heavily on financial services and economic policy.
- 17:19SPEAKER_01: He did not arrive in the Department of Transportation with a documented professional background operating an airline, an airport, or an air traffic control network.
- 17:27SPEAKER_01: Now, does that automatically disqualify someone from serving as transportation secretary?
- 17:33SPEAKER_01: Absolutely not.
- 17:34SPEAKER_01: Cabinet secretaries are responsible for policy, management, budgets, appointments, and oversight.
- 17:41SPEAKER_01: They're not required to personally operate every system within their department, but it does make the expertise of their leadership teams, their advisors, and their decision-making processes extremely important.
- 17:53SPEAKER_01: The FAA administrator, Brian Bedford, he does have extensive aviation and industry experience, including serving as an airline executive.
- 18:02SPEAKER_01: So the relevant question is not simply whether Duffy has ever worked in aviation, it's whether the department had qualified technical leadership, whether identified risks were communicated to decision makers, and whether those risks were properly managed.
- 18:17SPEAKER_01: Now let's look at what happened after the Trump administration returned to office.
- 18:21SPEAKER_01: In February 2025, hundreds of probationary FAA employees were terminated and had broader federal workforce reductions via our friends at Doge.
- 18:32SPEAKER_01: So, some of those terminations were later rescinded.
- 18:35SPEAKER_01: Approximately 360 employees were reportedly reinstated.
- 18:40SPEAKER_01: But here's something we haven't been able to establish just yet.
- 18:44SPEAKER_01: How many actually returned to their jobs out of that 360?
- 18:48SPEAKER_01: How many declined reinstatement?
- 18:50SPEAKER_01: And how many returned but later resigned?
- 18:53SPEAKER_01: And what technical knowledge or institutional experience was lost during that disruption?
- 19:00SPEAKER_01: There's also the question of voluntary departures, early retirements, and other workforce reductions.
- 19:06SPEAKER_01: The FAA had long-standing staffing problems before this administration, and the administration has also reported substantial hiring of air traffic controller trainees.
- 19:16SPEAKER_01: Both of these things matter, but hiring a trainee is not the same as having an experienced, fully certified controller.
- 19:24SPEAKER_01: And controllers, they aren't the only people who needed to maintain a safe aviation system.
- 19:29SPEAKER_01: There are engineers, there are technicians, safety specialists, system integrators, contract managers, cybersecurity professionals, and people responsible for maintaining and modernizing the infrastructure.
- 19:44SPEAKER_01: So here's a question for the administration.
- 19:46SPEAKER_01: When Doge and federal leadership pursued workforce reductions, what assessment was performed to determine whether those reductions could slow modernization, weaken oversight, or reduce technical capacity?
- 20:00SPEAKER_01: Did those decisions contribute to Friday's incident?
- 20:03SPEAKER_01: We simply don't know.
- 20:05SPEAKER_01: But could staffing losses make it more difficult for an agency to modernize aging infrastructure?
- 20:10SPEAKER_01: That's a legitimate operational risk to examine.
- 20:14SPEAKER_01: And we have another reason to ask, because the Government Accountability Office, also known as the GAO, has repeatedly documented serious weaknesses in the FAA's aging system and modernization efforts.
- 20:27SPEAKER_01: In a 2024 assessment, more than three-quarters of the air traffic control systems reviewed were classified as unsustainable or potentially unsustainable.
- 20:39SPEAKER_01: And in September of 2026, the Government Accountability Office identified major weaknesses in the planning and integration of modernization work.
- 20:49SPEAKER_01: That means the government knew the infrastructure was vulnerable.
- 20:53SPEAKER_01: Not necessarily vulnerable to this exact failure, but vulnerable in a broader operational sense.
- 20:59SPEAKER_01: So the accountability question is not limited to who installed a router on Friday.
- 21:05SPEAKER_01: It does include what the government knew about the systemic weaknesses, what it did to address them, and whether the people responsible for improvement had the resources and authority they actually needed.
- 21:18SPEAKER_01: Now, we get to the part of the investigation that originally caught my attention was the connection between the current administration and Project 2025.
- 21:29SPEAKER_01: For anyone unfamiliar, Project 2025 is a conservative presidential transition in policy blueprint organized by the Heritage Foundation and participating contributors.
- 21:40SPEAKER_01: It's a published set of proposals.
- 21:42SPEAKER_01: Not every proposal is administration policy, and the existence of a proposal does not establish that it has been implemented.
- 21:50SPEAKER_01: But the document gives us a concrete record of what its authors wanted to change.
- 21:56SPEAKER_01: Chapter 19 addresses the Department of Transportation.
- 22:00SPEAKER_01: Was written by Diana, uh, sorry, Diana, my butcher last name.
- 22:04SPEAKER_01: Um, Fertgott Roth, an economist who previously served in senior transportation and economic policy roles during Republican administrations.
- 22:14SPEAKER_01: The chapter also acknowledges contributions from several other policy figures, including Stephen Bradbury.
- 22:21SPEAKER_01: Bradbury subsequently became Deputy Secretary of Transportation under President Trump.
- 22:26SPEAKER_01: Now, that personal connection is worth noting.
- 22:30SPEAKER_01: But Bradbury has also publicly distanced himself from a certain privatization proposal in that chapter.
- 22:37SPEAKER_01: So we need to distinguish his documented contributions from the position he currently supports.
- 22:44SPEAKER_01: Now, what does the chapter actually propose?
- 22:47SPEAKER_01: On page 633, it recommends separating the FAA from the Department of Transportation, or at a minimum, separating the Air Traffic Organization from the FAA.
- 22:59SPEAKER_01: The Air Traffic Organization is part of the FAA responsible for providing air navigation services.
- 23:05SPEAKER_01: The chapter also calls for restructuring the agency's funding and making it operate more like a business.
- 23:11SPEAKER_01: Other discussion in the chapter addresses user fees and alternative financing mechanisms.
- 23:18SPEAKER_01: Now, there are important distinctions here.
- 23:20SPEAKER_01: Separating the FAA from DOT is not automatically the same thing as selling air traffic control to a private company.
- 23:28SPEAKER_01: Separating air traffic operations from safety regulation is not automatically the same thing as creating a for-profit corporation either.
- 23:36SPEAKER_01: And using private contractors is not the same thing as transferring legal control of the entire system.
- 23:43SPEAKER_01: We need to be specific about which proposal we're discussing, because supporters of structural reform argue that the existing system is too dependent on annual congressional funding and too slow to adopt modern technology.
- 23:57SPEAKER_01: They point to other countries that use different organizational models and methods.
- 24:02SPEAKER_01: Canada, for example, they operate its uh air navigation services through NAV Canada, a private nonprofit corporation.
- 24:10SPEAKER_01: The United Kingdom also has a different model, including NATS.
- 24:14SPEAKER_01: Those arrangements provide examples of how countries can separate air navigation operations from traditional government departments.
- 24:23SPEAKER_01: And I'll pause here for a quick second.
- 24:25SPEAKER_01: I just want to again call out Canada and the UK creative private nonprofit corporations.
- 24:31SPEAKER_01: In the US, there's not a chance in hell it would be a nonprofit corporation.
- 24:36SPEAKER_01: So just want to call that out.
- 24:38SPEAKER_01: Now, let's get into the trade-offs.
- 24:41SPEAKER_01: Who sets the fees?
- 24:42SPEAKER_01: Who decides which airports receive investment?
- 24:45SPEAKER_01: How are smaller airports protected?
- 24:48SPEAKER_01: And who is responsible when something goes wrong?
- 24:50SPEAKER_01: What information remains accessible to the public?
- 24:53SPEAKER_01: And what oversight does Congress retain?
- 24:55SPEAKER_01: Those questions matter because air traffic control is not simply another business.
- 25:00SPEAKER_01: It's essential national infrastructure, and the public has a substantial interest in its reliability, safety, accessibility, and accountability.
- 25:10SPEAKER_01: As of this recording, the FAA remains within the Department of Transportation and the Air Traffic Organization remains within the FAA.
- 25:20SPEAKER_01: So the major structural separation proposed in Project 2025 has not been completed as of today.
- 25:28SPEAKER_01: But the federal government already relies heavily on private contractors for aviation infrastructure, which brings us to the money.
- 25:38SPEAKER_01: Now let's identify something that often gets lost in political debates.
- 25:42SPEAKER_01: Privatization isn't always an all-or-nothing decision.
- 25:47SPEAKER_01: Government agencies can remain publicly controlled while outsourcing substantial technical and operational work.
- 25:54SPEAKER_01: That's already happening today at the FAA.
- 25:57SPEAKER_01: L3 Harris operates the telecommunication network involved in Friday's disruption.
- 26:02SPEAKER_01: Transportation Secretary Duffy has said that the contractor owns the network and has provided those services for more than 20 years.
- 26:10SPEAKER_01: Separately, the FAA selected Periton to serve as prime system integrator for its broader modernization initiative.
- 26:19SPEAKER_01: Those are two different roles here.
- 26:21SPEAKER_01: And we should not confuse the contractor involved in Friday's equipment work with the contractor coordinating the broader modernization program.
- 26:30SPEAKER_01: But both illustrate how private companies are already deeply involved in the nation's aviation infrastructure.
- 26:37SPEAKER_01: So when someone proposes restructuring the FAA, we need to ask what would actually change?
- 26:43SPEAKER_01: Like, would contractors receive more responsibilities?
- 26:47SPEAKER_01: Would private organizations gain additional control over infrastructure?
- 26:51SPEAKER_01: Would airlines pay different fees?
- 26:54SPEAKER_01: Would smaller airports face higher costs?
- 26:57SPEAKER_01: Would the federal government retain the same ability to intervene?
- 27:00SPEAKER_01: And who would ultimately bear the financial risk?
- 27:03SPEAKER_01: Now consider what happened on Friday.
- 27:05SPEAKER_01: Before the nationwide grounding, the administration had already been requesting approximately$30 billion in additional aviation infrastructure funding.
- 27:16SPEAKER_01: After the grounding, Transportation Secretary Duffy went on air and called for$50 billion.
- 27:25SPEAKER_01: It's$50 billion with a B like Bravo or boy.
- 27:30SPEAKER_01: Now additional investment may be justified.
- 27:33SPEAKER_01: The AFA's age infrastructure is well documented.
- 27:36SPEAKER_01: This is not a new phenomenon.
- 27:38SPEAKER_01: But we need to understand exactly how that money would be used.
- 27:43SPEAKER_01: Which systems would be replaced, which contractors would receive the work, what performance requirements would apply, and how much funding has already been appropriated, and how much has actually been spent.
- 27:56SPEAKER_01: I'm gonna pause there for a second.
- 27:59SPEAKER_01: My credibility lies in the fact that I have a degree in political science, I have an MBA in data analytics, and I just so happen to drive strategy for a Fortune 5 company.
- 28:09SPEAKER_01: So when I go back and I look at all these questions, I'm already seeing significant holes across the board in serious cause for concern.
- 28:19SPEAKER_01: We would love to know on the systems that are being replaced, who selected the systems, who selected the contractors, was the request or proposal, was this just like a single source uh contract, um, the performance requirements, the metrics, how they're being measured, and then how much of that 50 billion would be going into someone's pocket as pure profit?
- 28:44SPEAKER_01: Those are all questions we have, and we all have a right to know.
- 28:49SPEAKER_01: Now, how would the government demonstrate that another$50 billion would address the specific weaknesses exposed on Friday?
- 28:58SPEAKER_01: There's a distinction between funding modernization and privatizing air traffic control.
- 29:03SPEAKER_01: The administration's funding request does not by itself establish that the money would be used to implement Project 2025's organizational restructuring.
- 29:14SPEAKER_01: But when a major crisis occurs and pre-existing policy agenda addresses the same institution, it's reasonable to examine whether that crisis changes the political momentum behind the agenda.
- 29:26SPEAKER_01: This is not the same as saying the crisis was engineered.
- 29:31SPEAKER_01: It's simply asking whether the policy response is supported by the evidence.
- 29:37SPEAKER_01: Now let's address another question here.
- 29:40SPEAKER_01: Where was President Donald Trump while the American aviation was experiencing a nationwide groundstop?
- 29:47SPEAKER_01: According to public reporting, the president was at the White House and was briefed shortly after the disruption began.
- 29:54SPEAKER_01: He subsequently met with Transportation Secretary Duffy and Homeland Security Secretary Mark Wayne Mullen.
- 30:00SPEAKER_01: Administration officials held public briefings, and the president reportedly contacted congressional leaders regarding the aviation funding.
- 30:10SPEAKER_01: His first public comments, especially specifically addressing the incident, came Sunday.
- 30:17SPEAKER_01: In those comments, he criticized the Biden administration handling of the FAA and urged Congress to approve additional modernization funding.
- 30:25SPEAKER_01: Now, we need to distinguish a president receiving briefings from a president speaking publicly, because those are two very different things.
- 30:34SPEAKER_01: The available record does not support claiming that Trump was unaware of the incident or absent from the federal response, but it also doesn't provide a complete public accounting of every decision that he made during that four-hour grounding.
- 30:48SPEAKER_01: So there are some questions that we can ask and we should ask.
- 30:52SPEAKER_01: When was he first notified?
- 30:55SPEAKER_01: What options were presented?
- 30:57SPEAKER_01: And did the White House receive warnings about potential national impact?
- 31:01SPEAKER_01: And who participated in the decision to resume operations?
- 31:06SPEAKER_01: And what technical evidence was presented before the administration publicly attributed to the problem to the aging infrastructure?
- 31:13SPEAKER_01: Those are legitimate questions for a national event of this magnitude.
- 31:18SPEAKER_01: And for the record, I cannot point to a single time in American history when there was something that shut down the entire country where the president took 48 hours to be publicly available in front of the cameras addressing the situation head on.
- 31:36SPEAKER_01: That is an anomaly for even this president.
- 31:40SPEAKER_01: Someone who loves to be in front of the cameras and loves to be on top of social media, for him not to address this is extremely weird.
- 31:51SPEAKER_01: A nationwide aviation groundstop is extraordinarily unusual, but it is not unprecedented.
- 31:59SPEAKER_01: I remember on September 11th, 2001, when the United States shut down civilian air traffic in response to coordinated terrorist attacks.
- 32:08SPEAKER_01: I literally remember watching the look on George Bush's face when he was told about what happened.
- 32:16SPEAKER_01: That was a national security emergency.
- 32:18SPEAKER_01: And in January 2023, the FAA experienced a failure of its notice to air mission system, and that system provides pilots with critical information about aviation hazards and operating conditions.
- 32:31SPEAKER_01: The FAA ordered a nationwide pause and departures while the system was restored.
- 32:36SPEAKER_01: And in 2014, an employee deliberately set fire at an air traffic control facility near Chicago, disrupting regional aviation operations.
- 32:45SPEAKER_01: That was not a nationwide grounding, but it demonstrated that how human actions and inadequate infrastructure protections could severely disrupt air traffic operations.
- 32:56SPEAKER_01: These incidents had different causes than what we saw on Friday, and we should not imply that they are the equivalent.
- 33:04SPEAKER_01: But they provide a useful basis for examining how the FA responds to failures, will redundancies exist, and whether lessons from previous disruptions have been implemented.
- 33:16SPEAKER_01: Because one of the most important questions in any investigation is not simply whether something went wrong, it's whether the organization had reason to know something could go wrong, and whether it acted appropriately on that knowledge.
- 33:30SPEAKER_01: At this point, let's separate what we know from what we don't.
- 33:35SPEAKER_01: Because we do not want to conflate the two and we do not want to put out the idea that we know something that we truly don't know.
- 33:42SPEAKER_01: Now, here's what we know.
- 33:44SPEAKER_01: The FAA experienced serious network instability on November 13th.
- 33:49SPEAKER_01: We know that instability affected a substantial number of air traffic control facilities.
- 33:54SPEAKER_01: We know the FAA ordered a nationwide ground stop.
- 34:00SPEAKER_01: We know that air traffic already in flight were safely managed and that the ground stop was lifted at 8 15 PM Friday evening.
- 34:10SPEAKER_01: We know that a private contractor was performing telecommunications equipment work associated with this incident.
- 34:19SPEAKER_01: We know that the FAA has a long-standing infrastructure problem.
- 34:25SPEAKER_01: We know that the Trump administration made changes to the federal workforce and has pursued a major modernization initiative.
- 34:34SPEAKER_01: And we also know that Project 2025 contains proposals to restructure how the FAA and air traffic control are organized and funded.
- 34:44SPEAKER_01: But here's what we don't know.
- 34:47SPEAKER_01: We don't have the final root cause analysis yet.
- 34:51SPEAKER_01: We don't have the complete maintenance work order yet.
- 34:54SPEAKER_01: And we don't have full equipment configuration and approval history yet.
- 34:59SPEAKER_01: We don't have whether specific technical warnings were ignored, and we don't have and we don't know whether workforce changes delayed any particular modernization milestones.
- 35:11SPEAKER_01: And we also don't have a complete accounting of how many dismissed FAA employees actually returned to active work.
- 35:20SPEAKER_01: And we don't know whether the outage will produce new legislative momentum for Project 2025's structural proposals.
- 35:29SPEAKER_01: And we have not established that anyone deliberately caused this disruption.
- 35:35SPEAKER_01: And that last point is critical because we know that anytime that something happens within the US government or across the country of this magnitude, there's always going to be somebody pointing to some kind of potential conspiracy.
- 35:51SPEAKER_01: So I just want to call out, we are not doing that because we don't know what we don't know, and we will happily identify that we don't have the complete picture yet.
- 36:02SPEAKER_01: And we'll tell you exactly what we do have because that's all public information.
- 36:07SPEAKER_01: And there's a difference between a technical failure, a preventable management failure, an incident that creates political opportunity, and an intentionally manufactured crisis.
- 36:20SPEAKER_01: All four are different hypotheses, and we should not confuse one with another.
- 36:26SPEAKER_01: Our responsibility is to examine the evidence, not to decide what happened based on which explanation makes us the angriest.
- 36:36SPEAKER_01: Now here's where I land at today.
- 36:38SPEAKER_01: On November thirteenth, the federal government ordered a nationwide aviation ground stop after a serious technical disruption.
- 36:47SPEAKER_01: The government has provided a preliminary explanation for that.
- 36:52SPEAKER_01: That explanation identifies specific equipment, specific network behavior, specific facilities, and contractor activity.
- 37:02SPEAKER_01: And that gives us something concrete for us to investigate.
- 37:05SPEAKER_01: But the investigation is far from finished.
- 37:09SPEAKER_01: We still need to know who authorized the work, what testing was performed, what safeguards failed, and whether earlier warnings were addressed, and whether the decisions made by federal leadership affected the agency's capacity to modernize its systems.
- 37:26SPEAKER_01: We also need to understand the financial and political consequences.
- 37:31SPEAKER_01: Because Project 2025 proposed changing how the FAA and air traffic control operate, and the administration is now asking Congress for tens of billions of dollars to modernize the system.
- 37:44SPEAKER_01: Those proposals deserve public scrutiny, not because we've proven wrongdoing, but because the public deserves to understand how critical infrastructure is managed, how public money is spent, and who is accountable when things go wrong.
- 38:01SPEAKER_01: And remember, the Pew Research Finding we discussed earlier, 17%.
- 38:08SPEAKER_01: That is the share of Americans who said they trusted the federal government to do what's right, always or most of the time.
- 38:16SPEAKER_01: When trust is that low, a government press release is unlikely to satisfy everyone.
- 38:22SPEAKER_01: But distrust alone cannot tell us what happened.
- 38:26SPEAKER_01: And that is why we need documents.
- 38:28SPEAKER_01: We're preparing public records requests for the maintenance and configuration records, contract oversight documentation, workforce information, and the technical findings underlying the FAA's explanation.
- 38:41SPEAKER_01: We'll continue monitoring and investigation, we'll compare new evidence against what officials have already told the public, and if the government's explanation is supported by the evidence, we'll report it.
- 38:53SPEAKER_01: If the evidence contradicts that explanation, we'll report that as well.
- 38:58SPEAKER_01: And if we can't establish an answer, we'll say so.
- 39:02SPEAKER_01: Because this project was never supposed to be about proving that the government is always wrong or that one political party is always right.
- 39:10SPEAKER_01: It's simply about verification.
- 39:13SPEAKER_01: And until the unanswered questions are resolved, this investigation will remain under review.
- 39:22SPEAKER_01: Don't take my word for it.
- 39:24SPEAKER_01: Verify it.