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09 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Book nine, Chapter one. In all friendships, however, which are of
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a dissimilar species, the analogous, as we have already observed, equalizes and
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preserves friendship. Thus, for instance, in the political friendship to the shoemaker,
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a retribution is made for his shoes according to their worth, and to
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the weaver and other artificers. Here therefore a common measure money is employed,
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and to this everything is referred, and by this is measured. But in
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the amatory friendship, sometimes indeed the lover accuses the object of his love that,
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though he loves her beyond measure, he is not beloved in return,
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though if it should so happen, he has nothing which can excite love.
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Frequently, however, she who is beloved, complains that her lover, having
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formerly promised everything, now performs nothing that he had promised. But things of
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this kind happen when the one indeed loves the object of his love on account
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of pleasure, but the other loves her lover on account of utility, And
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these things are not present with both. For since the friendship exists on account
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of these things, a dissolution of it takes place when those things are not
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accomplished, which are the final causes of their love. For they do not
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love each other but what each possesses, which is not stable. Hence,
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such also are their friendships, viz. They are not stable. The friendship,
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however, which is founded in manners i e. Virtuous friendship, since
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it exists per se or independent of external circumstances, is permanent, as we
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have before observed. But friends also disagree when other things happened to them,
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and not those which were the objects of their desire. For when a man
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does not obtain that which he desired, it is just as if he obtained
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nothing. Thus, a certain person promised a harper that he would reward him
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in proportion to the excellence of his singing. But in the morning, when
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the harper demanded the fulfillment of his promise, he said that he had returned
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pleasure for pleasure. If therefore, this i e. Pleasure had been the
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wish of each the harper would have been sufficiently recompensed. But if the object
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of the one was delight and of the other gain, and if the object
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of the one was accomplished but not of the other, the compact between them
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was not well fulfilled. For a man will attend to those things of which
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he is in and for the sake of them, will give what is requisite.
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With respect, however, to the recompense which ought to be made,
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whether ought it to be estimated by him who gives or by him who receives.
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For he who gives first seems to leave to the receiver what the recompence
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should be, which they say Protagoras also did, for when he had taught
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anything, he ordered the learner to estimate what appeared to him to be the
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worth of the knowledge he had gained, and he received according to his valuation.
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But in things of this kind, to some persons it is sufficient to
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say, quote sufficient be the price a friend appoints close quote. Those however,
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who, having first received money, afterwards perform nothing which they had promised
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to do on account of the excess of magnitude of their promise, are deservedly
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accused, for they do not perform what they had agreed to accomplish. But
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the sophists perhaps are compelled to do this because no one would give money for
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those things which they know. These, therefore, because they do not perform
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that for which they received a reward, are justly blamed. With those persons,
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however, among whom there is no compact for services performed. We have
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already observed that those who first give to others on their own account are not
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to be blamed. For of this kind is the friendship, which is founded
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in virtue. Retribution also must be made according to deliberate choice, for this
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is the province of a friend and of virtue. This conduct, likewise,
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as it seems, should be adopted by those who are associates in philosophy.
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For the worth of philosophy is not to be measured by money, nor can
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any honor be conferred equivalent to its dignity. But perhaps it is sufficient that
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a recompense as great as possible is made in the same manner as towards the
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gods and parents, where however, the gift is not such as this,
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but is conferred with a view to a certain thing, i e. With
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a view to some recompense. A remuneration perhaps ought especially to be made,
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which to both friends will appear to be according to dessert. But if this
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should not happen to take place, it may not only appear to be necessary,
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but also to be just. That he who first received should determine what
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is an equal compensation for if as much advantage or pleasure is returned as was
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received, the remuneration will be according to dessert. For this also appears to
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take place in traffic. And in some places there are laws which forbid any
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judicial processes respecting voluntary contracts, as if it that in communions of this kind
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there should be no other judge, nor any other law, but that all
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differences should be decided by the person in whom trust is reposed and by whom
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such contracts are used. For they think that he who was instructed to estimate
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the retribution will judge more justly than he who reposed that trust, since for
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the most part, those who possess and those who wish to receive anything do
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not estimate equitably. For every one thinks that his own property and what he
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gives are of great value. At the same time, however, the retribution
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should be as great as it is determined to be by those who receive the
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gift. Perhaps, however, a thing is not to be estimated to be
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worth so much as it appeared to its possessor, but to be worth as
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much as he would have estimated it to be before he possessed it. Chapter
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two. Such particulars, However, as the following are dubious, viz.
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Whether all things are to be assigned to a father, and he is to
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be obeyed in all things, or whether the sick man ought indeed to obey
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the physician, and he who votes for the general of an army ought to
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give the preference to a man skilled in warlike concerns. And in a similar
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manner, whether it is proper to be subservient to a friend rather than to
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a worthy man, and whether remuneration is rather to be made to a benefactor
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than to an associate, if it is impossible to make it to both.
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It is not therefore easy to determine all such particulars accurately, for they have
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many and all various differences in magnitude and parvitude, in the beautiful and the
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necessary. But it is not a manifest that not all things are to be
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given to the same person, and that, for the most heart, benefits
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are rather to be returned to those from whom they were received, than gifts
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are to be bestowed on associates. Just as it is more proper to return
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alone to him from whom it was borrowed than to make a present to an
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associate. Perhaps. However, this must not always be done, For if
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anyone should be made a prisoner by robbers, it may be inquired whether he
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who redeems him should be redeemed in his turn be he who he may,
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or whether the price of redemption should be given to him who demands it as
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is due, though he has not been taken prisoner, or whether, in
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preference to all these, a father ought to be redeemed, For it would
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seem that a man should rather ransom his father than himself. Universally, Therefore,
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as we have said, a debt ought to be paid. But if
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the donation surpasses in the beautiful or the necessary, we should incline to it
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rather than to the discharge of a debt. For sometimes it is not equitable
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to return a benefit which another person has first conferred, when he indeed conferred
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the benefit, knowing that it was bestowed on a worthy man. But the
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retribution will be made to one whom he who is to make it believes to
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be a depraved man. For neither sometimes is alone to be granted to him
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who has lent for the one. Indeed, i e. The depraved man,
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thinking that he shall receive back what he has lent grants alone to the
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worthy man, but the other i e. The worthy man does not expect
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that what he has lent will be returned by the depraved man. Whether therefore
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the thing thus exists in reality the merit of the parties is not equal,
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or whether it does not thus exist, but it is fancied that it does,
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they will not appear to act absurdly. Therefore, as it has frequently
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been observed, assertion's concerning passion and actions are similarly definite and certain with the
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things about which they are conversant. It is not therefore it manifest that the
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same things are not to be bestowed on all men, nor all things on
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a father, as neither are all things to be sacrificed to Jupiter. Since,
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however, different things are to be returned to parents, brothers, associates,
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and benefactors, a retribution is to be made to each of such things
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as are proper and appropriate. And thus indeed men appear to act, for
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they invite their kindred to weddings, since the genus of these is common,
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and therefore the actions also which are conversant with this are common. For the
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same reason. Likewise, they think it especially necessary that kindred should be present
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at funerals. But it would seem that it is especially necessary to supply our
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parents with nutriment, because we are their debtors, and it is more beautiful
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to supply with these things the causes of our existence than ourselves. Honor also
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is to be paid to parents, as to the gods. Yet not every
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honor is to be paid to them, For neither is the same honor to
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be paid to a father and a mother, nor again to a wise man,
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or to the general of an army. But to a father paternal and
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to a mother maternal honor is to be paid to every elderly man. Likewise,
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honor is to be paid according to his age, by rising from our
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seat and resigning it to him, and by other things of the like kind
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to associates again and brothers. Freedom of speech must be granted, and a
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participation in common of all things to kindred, also to those of the same
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tribe, to fellow citizens, and to all the rest of mankind. We
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should endeavor to distribute what is appropriate, and judicially determine what pertains to each
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according to familiarity and virtue, or use a judgment therefore may more easily be
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made respecting those who are of the same genus, But in those of a
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different genus the decision is more difficult. We must, not, however,
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on this account, desist, but determine as far as circumstances will permit.
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Chapter three. The dissolution also of friendships is attended with a doubt, viz.
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Whether friendship is to be dissolved with those who do not continue to be
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our friends, or shall we say that with those who are friends on account
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of advantage and delight when they no longer possess these It is by no means
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absurd that the friendship should be dissolved, for they were the friends of these
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things viz. Of things advantageous and delectable. In these failing, it is
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reasonable to suppose that they will no longer be attached to each other. He,
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however, may be justly accused who loving another person on account of advantage
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or delight pretends that he loves on account of manners i e. Virtuously,
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For as we said in the beginning, numerous dissensions take place among friends when
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they are not in reality such friends as they fancy they are. When therefore
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any one is deceived and apprehends that he is beloved on account of his manners,
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though at the same time he does nothing that is virtuous. He should
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blame himself. But when he is deceived by the pretensions of the others,
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it is just to accuse the deceiver, and more so than those who adulterate
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money, because the improbity pertains to a more honorable thing. If, however,
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he admits him into his friendship as a good man, but he becomes
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a bad man, or should appear to have become a bad man, is
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he still to be beloved? Or is this not possible? Since not everything
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deserves to be beloved, but that only which is good. Neither therefore is
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a bad man to be beloved, nor is it necessary that he should,
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For it is not fit to be a lover of what is depraved, nor
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to be assimilated to a bad man. And we have already observed that the
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similar is a friend to the similar. Is the friendship therefore to be immediately
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dissolved? Or shall we say, not with all persons, but with those
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who are incurable on account of their depravity, For assistance ought rather to be
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given to the manners of those who are capable of being corrected than to their
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worldly possessions, because this is better and more adapted to friendship. He,
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however, who dissolves such a friendship, will appear not to act at all
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absurdly, for he was not a friend to this man, or to a
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man of this description. Hence, as he cannot restore him, being thus
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changed to virtue, he he abandons him. But if the one indeed continues
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such as he was at first, and the other should become more worthy,
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so as very much to transcend in virtue, is the latter still to use
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the former as a friend, or is this not possible? This, however,
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becomes especially evident in a great interval, as in the friendships formed from
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childhood. For if one of these should still remain a child in understanding,
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but the other should be a most excellent man, how can they be friends
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when they are neither addicted to the same pursuits, nor delighted and pained with
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the same things. For neither will these be present with them towards each other.
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But without these they cannot be friends, for they cannot live together.
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Concerning these particulars, however, we have already spoken. Shall we say therefore
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that when the friendship is dissolved, the one ought, nevertheless, so to
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conduct himself towards the other as if he had never been his friend, Or
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is it necessary that he should still retain the memory of their past friendship.
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And as we think it is proper to gratify friends rather than strangers, thus
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also shall we say something must be conceded to former friends on account of pristine
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friendship, when the dissolution of it was not occasioned by an excess of depravity.
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Chapter four. With respect however, to friendly offices and those things by
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which friendships are defined, they seem to proceed from the conduct of a man
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towards himself. For he is defined to be a friend who wishes well to
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another and performs things which are really or apparently good for his sake, or
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who wishes his friend to exist and live for his sake, just as mothers
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are affected towards their children, or friends who for a time are offended with
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each other. Others, however, define a friend to be one who lives
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with another person and who chooses the same things or mutually grieves and rejoices with
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him. But this also especially happens to mothers. By some one of these
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particulars. Likewise they define friendship. Each of these, however, exists in
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the worthy man towards himself, but they exist in other men so far as
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they apprehend themselves to be worthy. For it seems, as we have before
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observed, that virtue and a worthy man are a measure to every one.
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Since a worthy man accords with himself and aspires after the same things with his
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whole soul i e. With both the rational and irrational part. Hence,
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he wishes for himself both real and apparent good, and acts conformably to his
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wishes. For it is the province of a worthy man to labor in what
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is good, and this for his own sake. Since he labors for the
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sake of his dionoetic part, which each of us appears to be i e.
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In which our very essence consists. He also wishes that he himself may
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live and be preserved, and especially this part by which he is wise.
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For to a worthy man existence is a good thing. Every One, however,
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wishes well to himself. But there is no one who, if he
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should become a different person from what he is, would choose, having lost
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his identity, that the person into whom he is changed, should possess all
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things. For now also God possesses good, but he always remains such as
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he is, whatever that may be. It would seem, however, that
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each of us is that which energizes intellectually, or that each of us is
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principally this. Such a man also wishes to live with himself, since he
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does this willingly, for the remembrance of what he has done is delightful to
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him, and his hopes of what is future are good. But such things
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are delectable. He abounds likewise in his Dionoeitic part with contemplations, and he
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is especially pained and pleased in conjunction with himself, for the same thing is
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always painful and pleasing to him, and not a different thing at a different
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time, Since, as I may say, he is without repentance i e.
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He does nothing of which he has occasion to repent. Since therefore each
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of these things is present with the worthy man towards himself, but he is
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disposed towards his friends in the same manner as towards himself, For a friend
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is another self. This being the case, the friendship also of these appears
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to be something, and those with whom these things are present appear to be
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friends. At present, however, we shall omit the consideration whether or not
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there can be friendship between a man and himself. But it would seem that
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there may be friendship between a man and himself when the rational and irrational parts
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are no longer two things, but one thing, through their union and consent,
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And also because an excess of friends ship resembles the regard which a man
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has for himself. The particulars likewise which we have mentioned, are seen to
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take place among the multitude, though they are depraved characters. Shall we say
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therefore, that so far as they are pleasing to themselves and apprehend themselves to
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be worthy, so far they participate of these things. For these things are
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not inherent, nor do they even appear to be inherent in any one of
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those who are very depraved and wicked. And nearly indeed, they are not
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inherent even in those who are merely depraved, for they are discordant with themselves,
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and like the incontinent, they desire one thing but wish another, For
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they choose delectable things which are noxious, instead of those things which appear to
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them to be good. Others again, through timidity and indolence, abstain from
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doing those things which they think are best for themselves. But those by whom
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many and dreadful deeds are performed, and who are hated on account of their
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gravity, fly from life and destroy themselves. Deprived men likewise search for those
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with whom they may pass their time, but fly from themselves. For they
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recollect when they are alone the many crimes they have committed, and expect the
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evils which are attendant on such wickedness will befall them. But they forget these
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when they are with others, Possessing likewise nothing amiable, they are not affected
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in a friendly manner towards themselves. Persons therefore of this description neither rejoice nor
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condole with themselves. For their soul is in a state of sedition, and
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one part of it indeed is pained on account of depravity when it abstains from
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certain things, but the other part is delighted. And the one part indeed
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draws this, but the other that way the soul, as it were,
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being lacerated by sense and reason. If, however, it is not possible
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for him to be at one and the same time pained and pleased yet after
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a short time he is pained that he was pleased, and wishes that these
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delectable things had not befallen him. For bad men are full of repentance.
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The bad man, therefore, does not appear to be disposed in a friendly
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manner, even towards himself, because he possesses nothing amiable. But if it
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is very miserable to be in this condition, every one should strenuously fly from
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depravity and endeavor to be worthy. For thus a man will be disposed in
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a friendly manner towards himself, and will become the friend of others. Chapter
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five. Benevolence, however, resembles indeed friendship, yet is not friendship,
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for benevolence may be exerted towards unknown persons and latently, but friendship cannot.
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These things therefore have been asserted before. But neither is it dilection, for
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it has not either impulse or appetite, and these are consequent to dilection,
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and dilection indeed subsists in conjunction with custom. But benevolence may be suddenly produced.
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Thus the spectators sometimes becomes suddenly benevolent towards those who contend for prizes at
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public solemnities and unite with them in their wishes for success. But they do
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not at all co operate with them, for as we have said, they
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become suddenly benevolent towards them and love them superficially. Benevolence, therefore appears to
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be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure received through the sight is
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the beginning of love. For no one loves who has not been previously delighted
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with the form of the beloved object. He, however, who is delighted
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with this form, does not love the more on that account, but his
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love is then more ardent when he longs for the object of his love when
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absent, and desires her presence. Thus, also it is impossible for men
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to be friends unless they have been first benevolent. But those who are benevolent
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only do not, on the account, love each other the more, for
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they only wish well to those to whom they are benevolent, but they do
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not co operate with them in anything, nor do they endure any molestation for
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their sake. Hence, it may be metaphorically said that benevolence is sluggish friendship,
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but by length of time and custom it may become friendship. Yet not
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that friendship which is founded in utility, nor that which is founded in delight.
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For benevolence does not subsist on account of these things. For he indeed,
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who is benefited, distributes benevolence in return for the favors he has received
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in so doing, acting justly. But he who wishes prosperity to the actions
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of anyone, hoping that through him he shall be enriched, does not appear
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to be benevolent to him, but rather to himself, as neither is he
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a friend if he pays attention to him with a view to a certain advantage.
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In short, benevolence is produced through virtue and a certain probity when some
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one appears beautiful or brave or the like to another person, in the same
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manner as we said it was produced towards those who contend for prizes at public
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solemnities. Chapter six. Concord likewise, appears to pertain to friendship, on
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which account it is not an agreement in opinion, For this indeed may exist
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between those who are ignorant of each other. Nor are those said to be
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concordant who are unanimous about anything. As about the celestial bodies. For it
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does not belong to friendship to be concordant about these things. But cities are
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said to be concordant when they are unanimous about things which contribute to the general
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good, and when they deliberately choose the same things and do what has been
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deemed in common fit to be done. Men are therefore concordant about practical affairs,
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and of these about such as surpass others in magnitude, and which may
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befall two persons or all men. Thus cities are in conquers court when it
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appears to all citizens that magistrates should be elected, or that a warlike compact
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should be formed with the Lacedaemonians, or that Pitacus should be the Arkon,
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because he also is willing to accept this office. But when each of the
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citizens wishes to be himself the Arkhon, as was the case among the Phoenicians,
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then they are in a state of sedition. For concord does not consist
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in each person forming the same conception about a thing, whatever that thing may
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be. But when they agree in wishing the same thing to the same person,
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as when the people and worthy men agree in wishing that the most excellent
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men may govern, for thus all the citizens obtain what they desire. Concord,
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however, appears to be political friendship, as also it is said to
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be, for it is conversant with what is advantageous and with those things which
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relate to the purposes of life. But a concord of this kind exists among
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worthy men, for these are in concord with themselves and with each other,
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since they are, as I may say, conversant with the same things.
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For the wishes of men of this description are permanent and do not undergo a
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flux and reflux like the euripus. For their will is directed two things,
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just and advantageous, and the is the desire in common. But bad men
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cannot be concordant except in a small degree, just as they cannot likewise be
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friends, since they desire in things advantageous to have the greater part themselves,
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but in labors and ministrant services they are deficient. Each, however, wishing
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that these things may befall himself, he explores how he may prevent others from
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obtaining that which he desires. For concord perishes when justice, which is a
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common good, is not preserved. It happens, therefore, that they are
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in a state of sedition, compelling indeed each other, but being themselves unwilling
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to do what is just Chapter seven. Benefactors, however, appear to love
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in a greater degree those whom they benefit than those who are benefited do their
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benefactors, and the cause of this is investigated as a thing not conformable to
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reason. To most men, therefore, the cause appears to be this,
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that these are debtors and those the persons to whom they are indebted. Hence,
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as in loans, debtors wish their creditors not to be in existence,
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but creditors are concerned for the safety of their debtors. Thus, also benefactors
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wish those whom they have benefited to exist in order that they may obtain a
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recompense, but those who are benefited are not concerned about making a recompense.
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Epicarmus, therefore, perhaps would say that these things are asserted by most men
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in consequence of looking to the depravity of mankind. But to act in this
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manner seems to be conformable to human nature, For the multitude are unmindful of
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the benefits they have received, and are more desirous to be benefited than to
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benefit. It would seem, however, that the cause of this is more
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natural and does not resemble that which pertains to the loan of money. For
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creditors do not love their debtors, but wish them to be preserved for the
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sake of receiving what they have lent. But benefactors love and are fond of
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those they have benefited, though at present they derive no advantage from them,
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nor are likely to drive any in future. And this also happens to be
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the case with artificers, for every artist loves his own work more than he
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would be beloved by it if it should become animated. Perhaps, however,
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this particularly happens to be the case with poets, for they love their own
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poems beyond measure, and have an affection for them as if they were children.
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Similarly, therefore, to this is that which pertains to benefactors, for
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he who is benefited is their Hence this person is more dear to them than
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a work is to him by whom it is produced. The cause, however,
30:07
of this, is that existence is to all beings eligible and lovely.
30:14
But we exist in energy, for we exist by living and acting. He
30:18
therefore, who produces a work is in a certain respect in energy in the
30:22
work. Hence he loves the work with a parental affection, because existence also
30:29
is dear to him. But this is natural, for what the agent is
30:33
in capacity is indicated by the work in energy. At the same time,
30:37
also to the benefactor, that which results from the action is beautiful, so
30:44
that he is delighted with him in whom it is inherent. But to him
30:48
who is benefited, nothing is beautiful in the benefactor. But if anything is,
30:52
it is utility. Then this is in a less degree delightful and lovely.
30:57
The energy, however, of good, is delectable, as is likewise
31:03
the hope of future and the memory of past good. But the good is
31:07
most delectable, which subsists in energy, and in a similar manner that which
31:11
is lovely to him who benefits. Therefore the work remains. For a beautiful
31:17
deed is lasting, but to him who is benefited the advantage passes away.
31:22
The memory, likewise of beautiful deeds is delectable, but the memory of useful
31:27
actions is not very delightful, or is so in a less degree. It
31:32
appears, however, that the contrary takes place with respect to expectation and dilection
31:37
indeed resembles production. But to be beloved is similar to the being passive to
31:44
love. Therefore, and such things as pertained a friendship are consequent to those
31:48
who excel in action. Again, all men love in a greater degree things
31:53
which are laboriously obtained. Thus, for instance, men love the wealth which
31:59
they have themselves procured more than that which they have received from others. It
32:04
appears, therefore that to be benefited is a thing unattended with labor, but
32:09
that to benefit is laborious. On this account, also, mothers love their
32:14
children in a greater degree than fathers, for the part which they sustain in
32:19
the generation of them is more laborious than that which fathers sustained, and they,
32:23
in a greater degree know that they are their own offspring. But it
32:28
would seem that this reasoning also is adapted to benefactors. Chapter eight. It
32:35
may, however, be doubted whether a man ought to love himself more than
32:38
some other person, For those are reprehended who love themselves transcendently, and they
32:45
are called as a thing disgraceful lovers of themselves, and a bad man.
32:51
Indeed, appears to do everything for the sake of himself, and in a
32:54
greater degree the more he is deprived. Hence he is accused as doing nothing
33:00
without a view to his own advantage. But the worthy man does everything on
33:06
account of the beautiful in conduct, and he acts in a greater degree in
33:12
this manner and for the sake of his friend, the more worthy he is.
33:16
But he neglects to act for his own sake. The deeds, however,
33:21
of men, are discordant with these assertions, not unreasonably, for they
33:27
say that he who is eminently a friend ought to love his friend in an
33:30
eminent degree. But he is eminently a friend who wishes well to him who
33:37
is the subject of this wish for his sake, though no one should know
33:40
it. These things, however, are especially inherent in a man towards himself,
33:46
and therefore everything else by which a friend is defined. For we have
33:51
before observed that all friendly offices proceed from himself and purveyed to others, And
33:58
all proverbs accord with this, such as that friends are one soul, that
34:02
among friends all things are common, that friendship is equality, and that the
34:08
knee is near to the leg. For all these things are especially present with
34:14
a man towards himself, since a man is especially a friend to himself,
34:19
and therefore he is especially to be beloved by himself. It may, however,
34:24
be reasonably doubted which of these arguments it is requisite to follow, since
34:30
both of them are accompanied with probability. Perhaps, therefore it is necessary to
34:35
divide such like arguments and to distinguish how far and in what respect each of
34:40
them is true. If therefore we understand in what manner each of these denominates
34:46
a man a lover of himself, perhaps the thing will become manifest. Those
34:52
therefore, who consider this as a disgraceful thing call those men lovers of themselves
34:58
who distribute to themselves the great part in wealth and honors and corporeal pleasures.
35:05
For the multitude aspire after these things and are earnestly employed in endeavoring to acquire
35:10
them as being the best of things, and on this account they become objects
35:15
of contention. Hence, those who vindicate to themselves more of these things than
35:21
is fit are subservient to desires, and in short, to passions and the
35:25
irrational part of the soul. But the multitude are persons of this description.
35:31
Hence also the appellation was derived from the multitude who are deprived justly. Therefore
35:38
are those reprehended who are, in this way lovers of themselves. That the
35:44
multitude, however, are accustomed to denominate those who distribute to themselves things of
35:49
this kind lovers of themselves, is not inmanifest. For he who always earnestly
35:54
endeavors to act justly or temperately, or to act according to any other of
36:00
the virtues, the most of all things, and in short, who always
36:04
vindicates to himself that which is beautiful in conduct, such a man will never
36:08
be called by anyone a lover of himself, nor will he be blamed by
36:13
anyone. It would seem, however, that such a man as this is
36:17
in a greater degree a lover of himself, For he distributes to himself things
36:22
which are most eminently beautiful and good, is gratified in his most principal part
36:28
intellect, and in all things, is obedient to it. But as that
36:34
which is the most principal thing in a city appears to be most eminently the
36:37
city, and this is the case in every other system of things, thus
36:42
also that which is most principal in man is especially the man. He therefore,
36:47
who loves this principal part of himself, is especially a lover of himself,
36:52
and is gratified with this. Hence also one man is denominated continent and
36:59
another incontinent, because in the former intellect has dominion, but has not in
37:05
the latter. In consequence of every man being this i e. Intellect,
37:10
men likewise appear to have performed things, and to have performed them willingly,
37:15
which they have especially performed in conjunction with reason. That every man therefore is
37:22
principally intellect, and that the worthy man principally loves this is not in manifest.
37:28
Hence he will be especially a lover of himself, according to a different
37:32
species of self love from that which is disgraceful, and differing as much from
37:37
it as to live according to reason differs from living according to passion, and
37:43
as much as the desire of that which is beautiful in conduct differs from the
37:47
desire of that which appears to be advantageous. All men therefore approve of and
37:53
applaud those who, in a manner superior to others, endeavor to perform beautiful
37:59
actions. But if that which is really beautiful in conduct was that for which
38:02
all men contend, and if they endeavored to perform the most beautiful deeds,
38:08
whatever is becoming would be possessed by all men in common, and the greatest
38:13
of goods by every one, particularly since virtue is a thing of this kind.
38:19
Hence, it is necessary that a good man should be a lover of
38:22
himself, for he himself is benefited by acting well, and he also benefits
38:28
others. But it is not proper that a depraved man should be a lover
38:31
of himself, for he will hurt both himself and his neighbors in consequence of
38:37
being subservient to base passions. With the depraved man, therefore there is a
38:43
dissonance between what he ought to do and what he does. But with the
38:47
worthy man, those things which he ought to do he also does. For
38:52
every intellect chooses that which is best for itself, and the worthy man is
38:57
obedient to intellect. That, however, which is asserted of the worthy man,
39:01
is true, that for the sake of his friends and his country,
39:06
he will do many things, even though it should be requisite to die for
39:09
them, for he will give up riches and honors, and in short,
39:14
those goods which are the objects of contention with mankind, in order that he
39:17
may vindicate to himself that which is beautiful in conduct. For he will rather
39:23
choose to be very much delighted for a short time than to experience a small
39:28
delight for a long time, and to live worthily for one year than casually
39:32
for many years. He will also prefer one beautiful and great action to many
39:38
and small actions. And this perhaps happened to be the case with those who
39:44
have died for their country or their friends. Worthy men therefore choose a great
39:49
good for themselves, and will give up their riches in order that they may
39:52
obtain a greater number of friends. For thus indeed, riches befall the friend
39:58
of the worthy man. But that which is really beautiful befalls the worthy man
40:02
himself. But he distributes to himself the greater good. There is also the
40:07
same mode of conduct with him as to honors and dominion, for he will
40:13
give up all these to his friend, for this to him is beautiful and
40:17
laudable. Reasonably, therefore does he appear to be a worthy man who chooses
40:22
that which is beautiful in conduct instead of these things. It may likewise happen
40:29
that he may give up actions to his friends, and that it may be
40:31
better for him to be the cause of their being performed by his friends than
40:36
to do them himself. Hence, in all audible things, the worthy man
40:39
appears to distribute to himself more of that which is truly beautiful after this manner.
40:45
Therefore, as we have said, it is necessary that a man should
40:49
be a lover of himself, but it is not proper he should be so
40:52
in the way in which the multitude love themselves. Chapter nine. With respect
41:00
to the happy man, also it is doubted whether he will be in want
41:04
of friends or not. Ford is said that those who are blessed and sufficient
41:08
to themselves have no need of friends, because things truly good are present with
41:13
them as they are. Therefore, say they sufficient to themselves. They are
41:17
not in want of anything, but a friend, being a man's other self,
41:22
imparts to him those things which he cannot obtain through himself. Whence,
41:27
also it is said, quote, when divinity is propitious, what need is
41:31
there of friends? Close quote. It seems, however, to be absurd,
41:37
that those who attribute every good to the happy man should not give him
41:39
friends, which appear to be the greatest of external goods. But if it
41:45
is the province of a friend, rather to benefit than to be benefited,
41:49
And if it is also the province of a good man and a virtue to
41:52
benefit, and it is better to do good to friends than to strangers,
41:57
the worthy man will want those who may be benefited by him. Hence,
42:00
likewise, it is inquired whether there is more need of friends in adversity than
42:06
in prosperity, because he who is unfortunate is in want of those by whom
42:10
he may be benefited, and the fortunate are in want of those whom they
42:15
may benefit. Perhaps, however, it is also absurd to make the blessed
42:20
man a solitary being, for no one would choose to possess every good by
42:23
himself, since man is a social animal and is naturally adapted to live with
42:29
others. This therefore will also be the case with the happy man, for
42:34
he possesses those things which are naturally good. But it is evident that it
42:37
is better to pass the time with friends and worthy men than with strangers and
42:43
casual persons. Hence the happy man has need of friends in what respect?
42:47
Therefore, is the first assertion true that the happy man is not in want
42:52
of friends. Is it because the multitude think those persons to be friends who
42:57
are useful to them. The blessed man, there for will not be in
43:00
any want of such persons, since real good is present with him. Neither
43:06
therefore will he be in want of those who are friends on account of the
43:09
delectable, or he will want them but for a short time, for since
43:15
his life is delightful, he will be in no want of adventitious pleasure,
43:20
but not being in want of friends. Of this description, he does not
43:23
appear to be in want of friends. This, however, perhaps is not
43:28
true. For it was observed by us in the beginning that felicity is a
43:32
certain energy. But with respect to energy, it is evident that it is
43:37
in generation, or is passing into existence, and is not present with him
43:43
who energizes, like a certain possession. But if to be happy consists in
43:47
living and energizing, and the energy of the good man is of itself worthy
43:52
and delectable, as we observed in the beginning, if also that which is
43:58
appropriate ranks among the number of things that are delightful. But we are more
44:01
able to survey our neighbors than ourselves, and their actions than our own and
44:07
if the actions of worthy men that are friends are delightful to good men,
44:12
bracket, for both have those things which are naturally delectable close bracket. If
44:17
this be the case, the blessed man will be in want of such friends
44:21
as these, since he deliberately chooses to survey worthy and appropriate actions. But
44:28
the actions of a good man who is a friend are of this description.
44:32
It is likewise thought to be necessary that the happy man should live delectably.
44:37
The life therefore of a solitary man is indeed difficult, For it is not
44:44
easy for a man to energize continually by himself, but with others, and
44:49
towards others it is easy. The energy therefore will be more continued, which
44:54
is delectable by itself, which should necessarily be present the blessed man. For
45:01
the worthy man, so far as he is worthy, rejoices in the actions
45:06
which are conformable to virtue, but is indignant with those which proceed from vice.
45:12
Just as a musician is delighted with beautiful melodies, but is pained with
45:15
those that are bad. A certain exercise of virtue likewise will be produced from
45:21
living with good men. As also the oddness says to those, however,
45:27
who consider this affair more physically, it appears that a worthy friend is naturally
45:30
eligible to a worthy man, For it has been said by us that what
45:37
is naturally good is of itself to a worthy man, good and delectable.
45:42
To live, however, is in animals defined by the power of sense,
45:45
but in men by the power of sense or intellection. But power is referred
45:52
to energy, and that which has the principal authority in a thing consists in
45:55
energy. It seems, therefore, that to live is properly either to perceive
46:00
sensibly or intellectually, And to live is among the number of things which are
46:06
good and delectable, for it is a definite thing. But that which is
46:12
definite pertains to the nature of the good, as it also appeared to the
46:15
Pythagoreans, And that which is naturally good is also good to the worthy man.
46:22
Hence, to live appears to all men to be delightful. A depraved
46:25
and corrupted life, however, not not to be assumed nor a life of
46:30
pain, for such a life is indefinite, as well as the things which
46:35
belong to it. This, however, will be more evident in what we
46:39
shall say concerning pain hereafter. But if to live is itself good, it
46:45
is also delectable. And it appears that it is so from this that all
46:50
men aspire after it, and especially worthy and blessed men, For to these
46:54
life is most eligible, and the life of these is most blessed. However,
47:00
who sees perceives that he sees. He who hears perceives that he hears,
47:06
and he who walks perceives that he walks, And in a similar manner
47:09
in other things, there is something which perceives that we energize. But we
47:14
may perceive that we perceive, and we may understand that we understand. For
47:20
us, however, to perceive that we perceive, or to understand that we
47:23
understand, is for us to be For we have said that our very being
47:28
consists in perceiving, sensibly or intellectually. But for a man to perceive that
47:34
he lives is among the number of things essentially delectable. For life is naturally
47:39
good, and for man to perceive that good is present with him is delightful.
47:45
But to live is eligible, and especially to good men, because existence
47:51
to them is good and delectable. For having a cosensation of essential good,
47:55
they are delighted as however, the worthy man is disposed towards himself. Thus
48:01
also he is disposed towards his friends. For a friend is another self,
48:07
as therefore it is eligible to everyone for himself to exist. Thus also,
48:13
or similarly, it is eligible to him for his friend to exist. But
48:17
we have said that existence is eligible because it is for a man to perceive
48:22
himself, which is good, and a sensation of this kind is of itself
48:28
delightful. It is necessary, therefore that he should, at the same time
48:31
perceive that his friend exists. But this will be affected by living together with
48:37
him, and in a communication with him of words and thoughts, For it
48:42
would seem that in this way men are said to live together, and not
48:45
as cattle by feeding in the same place. If therefore, existence is of
48:51
itself eligible to the blessed man, since it is naturally good and delectable,
48:55
the like also must be asserted of a friend. And hence a friend will
49:00
be among the number of eligible things to the happy man. But that which
49:05
is eligible to him ought to be present with him, or in this respect
49:08
he will be indigent. The man, therefore, who is to be happy,
49:13
will require worthy friends. Chapter ten. Our numerous friends therefore to be
49:20
procured. Or, as it appears to be elegantly said of hospitality, quote,
49:25
want not nor be of multitudes a guest close quote. May it also,
49:31
in friendship be appropriately said that a man should neither be without a friend,
49:37
nor again should have an excess of multitude of friends. This assertion,
49:40
therefore, will indeed appear to be very much adapted to those who regard utility
49:45
in friendship, For to be alternately subservient to many persons is laborious, and
49:52
life is not sufficient to them to perform this. Hence, more friends than
49:55
are sufficient for the proper purposes of life, are are superfluous, and are
50:00
impediments to a worthy life. Hence there is no need of them. And
50:06
with respect to the friends that are procured for the sake of pleasure, a
50:09
very few are sufficient in the same manner as sauced to food. But whether
50:15
or not ought a good man to have many worthy friends, or shall we
50:19
say that there is a certain measure of a multitude of friends in the same
50:22
manner as there is of a city. For a city will not consist of
50:27
ten men, nor is it any longer a city if it is composed of
50:30
a hundred thousand men. Perhaps, however, one certain number of citizens cannot
50:37
be assigned, but every number may be admitted, which is between certain definite
50:42
terms of friends. Therefore, there is also a certain definite multitude, And
50:46
perhaps those persons are not numerous with whom it is possible for a man to
50:51
live. For this appears to be a thing of a most friendly nature.
50:54
But that it is not possible for a man to live with many and distribute
50:59
himself among them is not a manifest. Farther still, it is necessary,
51:05
if the friends are numerous, that they should be friends to each other,
51:07
if all of them intend to pass the time with each other. But this
51:10
among many friends is laborious. It is likewise difficult to rejoice and grieve appropriately
51:16
together with many persons, for it is probable that it may, at one
51:21
and the same time happen that a man ought to rejoice together with one person
51:24
and grieve together with another. Perhaps, therefore, it is well not to
51:29
endeavor to have a great number of friends, but as many as are sufficient
51:32
for the purposes of social life, For it would seem that it is not
51:37
possible to be very much a friend to many persons. Hence, neither is
51:42
it possible to love many? For love is a certain excess of friendship.
51:45
But this is confined to one person, and therefore vehement love must be confined
51:51
to a few. That this, indeed is the case, seems to be
51:55
verified by themselves. For there are not many, according to that friendship which
52:01
subsists among associates. But the friendships which are celebrated are said to have subsisted
52:07
between two persons. Those, however, who are the friends of many persons
52:12
and are familiarly conversant with all of them, appear to be the friends of
52:15
no one except politically. And these persons are also called obsequious. It is
52:22
possible, therefore, to be politically a friend to many persons, though he
52:27
who is so should happen not to be obsequious, but a truly worthy man.
52:30
But it is not possible to be a friend to many on account of
52:35
virtue and for their own sake. But we must be satisfied if we can
52:39
find a few such i e. Who are true friends Chapter eleven. But
52:46
whether is there more need of friends in prosperity or in adversity? For in
52:52
both they are sought after. For those who are in adversity require assistance,
52:58
and those who are in prosperity are in want of associates and those whom they
53:02
may benefit, since they wish to confer favors on others. In adversity.
53:07
Therefore, friends are more necessary, on which account. When this is the
53:12
case, there is need of useful friends. In prosperity, However, friends
53:16
are a more worthy and beautiful possession, on which account, Also, men
53:21
whose circumstances are prosperous search for worthy friends, for it is more eligible to
53:27
benefit these, and with these to pass through life. For the presence itself
53:30
of friends is delightful, both in prosperity and adversity, since the grief of
53:37
those who are in affliction is lightened when their friends participate of their sorrow.
53:42
Hence, likewise, it may be doubted whether friends share a part of the
53:45
affliction of their friends, as if it were part of a burden. Or
53:51
is this not the case, But the presence of friends being delightful, the
53:54
conception that they participate of the sorrow produces a diminution of the grief. Whether
54:00
therefore those who are in affliction are alleviated through these causes or through some other
54:06
cause, we shall omit to investigate. What we have mentioned, however,
54:10
appears to happen, But the presence of friends appears to be something mixed.
54:15
For the sight itself of friends is delectable, and especially to those in adverse
54:21
circumstances, and it becomes a certain auxiliary against affliction. For a friend possesses
54:28
a consoling power, both in his presence and his words if he is dexterous,
54:32
since he knows the manners of his friend and with what he is pleased
54:37
and pained. It is painful, however, to perceive that our friend is
54:42
afflicted by our misfortunes. For everyone avoids being the cause of pain to his
54:46
friends. Hence, those who are of a virile nature are careful to prevent
54:51
their friends from being afflicted in conjunction with themselves, unless they perceive that by
54:57
subjecting their friends to a little pain, they shall themselves eels experience and alleviation
55:00
of great affliction. And in short, they do not permit others to lament
55:06
with them, because they are not themselves addicted to lamentation. But women who
55:10
are weaker than the rest of their sex and men who resemble them are delighted
55:15
with those who groan with them, and love them as their friends and the
55:20
associates of their sorrow. In all things, however, it is necessary to
55:24
imitate the better character. But the presence of friends in prosperity is attended with
55:30
a pleasing association, and with the conception that they are delighted with our good
55:35
fortune. Hence, it would seem to be necessary that in prosperity we should
55:39
readily and cheerfully invite our friends to partake of our good fortune. For it
55:45
is beautiful to be beneficent, but that we should be remiss in inviting them
55:49
to partake of our ill fortune. For it is requisite to impart to our
55:53
friends as little as possible of evils. Whence it is said quote that I
55:59
am wretched is sufficient close quote. But friends are then especially to be called
56:05
upon, when having received small molestations, we can be greatly benefited by their
56:09
presence. On the contrary, it is perhaps proper to go to those who
56:14
are in adversity, uncalled, and cheerfully, for it is the province of
56:19
a friend to benefit and especially to benefit those who are in want and who
56:22
do not think fit to solicit relief. For this is better and more delectable
56:28
to both with fortunate friends. However, we should cheerfully co operate, for
56:32
in prosperity also there is need of a friend. But we should slowly betake
56:37
ourselves to a friend in order to be benefited by him, For it is
56:42
not beautiful to be readily and cheerfully disposed to be benefited. It is,
56:46
perhaps, however, requisite to be cautious that we do not conduct ourselves unpleasantly
56:52
in rejecting the beneficence of our friends, for this sometimes happens to be eligible
56:58
in all things Chapter twelve. Whether therefore, as to lovers, the sight
57:04
of the beloved object is most delectable, and they prefer this sense to the
57:08
rest, because love especially subsists and is produced from this. Thus, also
57:15
it is most eligible to friends to live together. For friendship is communion,
57:20
and in the same manner as a man is affected towards himself, he is
57:23
also affected towards his friend. But it is eligible to everyone to perceive with
57:29
respect to himself that he exists and lives, and therefore this is also eligible
57:36
with respect to a friend. This energy, however, is affected among friends
57:40
by living together, so that this is reasonably desired by them, and that
57:45
in which to every one his very being consists, or for the sake of
57:50
which he chooses to live. In this he wishes to pass his life with
57:53
his friends. Hence, some friends indeed drink together, Others play at dace
57:59
together. Others engage in gymnastic exercises, and hunt together, or philosophize together.
58:05
But they severally pass their time together in that to which, of all
58:08
things in life they are most attached. For wishing to live with their friends,
58:15
they do these things and communicate with them in these through which they are
58:19
of opinion, they associate together. The friendship therefore of bad men is deprived,
58:24
for being unstable, they communicate with each other in bad things, and
58:30
they become depraved being assimilated to each other. But the friendship of worthy men
58:35
is worthy, and is mutually increased by mutual converse. They also appear to
58:40
become better by energizing with and correcting each other, for they mutually express those
58:46
things with which they are delighted. Whence it is said, quote from good
58:51
men, what is good is learnt close quote, And thus much concerning friendship
58:55
it remains to discuss in the next place pleasure. End of Book nine