Latest / Logic Library / 02 - Apology of Socrates - Plato
Transcript
- Part two. Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me. There was an understanding between us that you should hear me to the end. I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out. But I believe that to hear me will be good for you. And therefore I beg that you will not cry out. I would have you know that if you kill such a one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Nothing will injure me, not melitus, nor yet aneitis. They cannot, for a bad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself. I do not deny that Annidas may perhaps kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights. And he may imagine, and others may imagine, that he is inflicting a great injury upon him, But there I do not agree. For the evil of doing as he is doing, the evil of unjustly taking away the life of another is greater far. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am His gift to you, for if you kill me, you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly given to the state by God. And the State is a great and noble steed, who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the State, And all day long, and in all places, am always fast you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, And therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel out of temper, like a person who has suddenly awakened from sleep, and you think that you might easily strike me dead as a knightis advises, and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God, in his care of you, sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to you by God, the proof of my mission is this. If I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the neglect of them. During all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue. Such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I gained nothing, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in my doing so. But now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one. Of that they have no witness, and I have a sufficient witness to the truth of what I say my poverty. Some one may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you why you have heard me speak at sundry times and in diverse places of an oracle or sign which comes to me and is the divinity which moleitest ridicules in the indictment. This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began come to me when I was a child. It always forbids, but never commends me to do anything which I am going to do. This is what deters me from being a politician, and rightly as I think, for I am certain, O Men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago and done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling you the truth, For the truth is that no man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly striving against the many lawless and unrighteous deeds which are done in a state, will save his life. He who will fight for the right, if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private station, and not a publicman. I can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but what you value far more actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my own life, which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that as I should have refused to yield, I must have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts, not very interesting, perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held, O, Men of Athens, was that of senator the tribe Antiochus, which is my tribe had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the Battle of Arguinacy, and you proposed to try them in a body contrary to law, as you all thought afterwards. But at the time I was the only one of the pritenes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you. And when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk having law injustice with me, rather than take part in the injustice, because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda and bade us bring lee on the Salaminian from Salamus, as they wanted to put him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes. And then I showed, not in word only, but indeed, that if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my great and only care was lest I should do an un righteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong. And when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to solemnis and fetched leon. But I went quietly home, for which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words. Now, do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years if I had led a public life, supposing that, like a good man, I had always maintained the right and had made justice as I ought the first thing? No, indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private. And never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples, or to any other not that I have any regular disciples. But if anyone likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who pay but anyone, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me, and listen to my words. And whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, neither resolve can be justly imputed to me. For I have never taught or profess to teach him anything. And if anyone says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private, which all the world has not heard, let me tell you that he is lying. But I shall be asked, why do people delight in continually conversing with you. I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this matter. They like to hear the cross examination of the pretenders to wisdom. There is amusement in it. Now. This duty of cross examining other men has been imposed upon me by God, and has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power has ever intimated to any one. This is true, O Athenians, or if not true, would be soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting the youth, those of them that are now grown up and have become sensible, that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers and take their revenge, or if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands? Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself. And there is Critobulus, his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanius of Sphaetus, who is the father of Eskensia. He is present. And also there is Antophon of Cesaphus, who is the father of Epigenes. And there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus, the son of Theosdoceeces, and the brother of Theodotus. Now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he at any rate will not seek to stop him. And there is Perillus, the son of Demodocus, who had a brother Pijis, and Adeimantus, the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present. And Eontodorus, who is the of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might mention a great many others some of whom Melitus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech, And let him still produce them if he has forgotten. I will make way for him, and let him say if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corruptor, of the injurer of their kindred as Meletus and Anetas call me not the corrupted youth. Only there might have been a motive for that. But their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? Why indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is a liar. Well, Athenians, This and the like of this is all the defense which I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is offended at me when he calls to mind how he himself, on a similar or even a less serious occasion, prayed and entreated the justice with many tears, and how he produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together with a host of relations and friends, whereas I, who am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things. The contrast may occur to his mind, and he may be set against me and vote in anger because he is displeased at me on this account. Now, if there be such a person among you mine, I do not say that there is to him, I may fairly reply, my friend, I am a man, and like other men, a creature of flesh and blood, and not of wood or stone, as Homer says. And I have a family, yes, and sons are Athenians three in number one almost a man, and two others who are still young. And yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not not from any self assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question of which I will not now speak. But having regarded a public opinion, I feel that such conduct would be discreditable to myself and to you, and to the whole state. One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at any rate, the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men. And if those among you, who are said to be superior in wisdom and courage and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct. I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner. They seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live. And I think that such are a dishonor to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians sometimes give honor and command, are no better than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who have a reputation. And if they are done, you ought not to permit at them. You ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city ridiculous than him who holds his peace. But setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be something wrong in asking a favor of a judge and thus procuring an acquittal instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment. And he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws and not according to his own good pleasure. And we ought not to encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves to be encouraged in this habit of perjury. There can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I considered dishonorable and impious and wrong, especially now when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of belitus. For if o men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not so far otherwise, For I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God, I commit my cause to be determined by you as is best for you and me. There are many reasons why I am not grieved, o, men of Athens, at the vote of condemnation. I expected it, and I am only surprised that the votes were so nearly equal, For I had thought that the majority against me would have been far larger. But now had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think that I have escaped militus. I may say more, for without the assistance of Anneitis, and like on anyone may see that he would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine, if a thousand druc me. And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, o, men of Athens, clearly that which is my due and what is my dee? What return shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life, but has been careless of what the many care for wealth and family interests at military offices, and speaking in the assembly and magistracies and plots and parties, reflecting that I was really too honest a man be a politician and live. I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself, but where I could do the greatest good privately to every one of you. Thither I went and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state, before he looks to the interests of the state, And that this should be the order which he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such an one, doubtless some good thing, O, Men Ofvathens, if he has his reward, and the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure that he may instruct you. There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in the Britannium, O menvaisans a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough, and he only gives you the appearance of happiness. And I give you the reality that if I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say that maintenance in the Britannium is the just return. Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one, although I cannot convince you the time has been too short. If there were a law at Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you. But I cannot in a moment refute great Slanders. And as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death, which Meletust proposes. When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil? Why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison and be the slave of the magistrates of the year of the eleven, or shall the penalty be a fine an imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection I should have to lie in prison for money I have none and cannot pay. And if I say exile, and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix, I must indeed be blinded by the love of life. If I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my citizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you will have no more of them, others are likely to endure me. No, indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life I should lead at my age, wandering from city to city, ever changing my place of exile, and always being driven out. For I am quite sure that wherever I go there as here, the young men will flock to me. And if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their request. And if I let them come, their fathers and friends would drive me out. For this, someone will say, yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue and then you may go into a foreign city. No one will interfere with you. Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this, For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious. And if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of these other things about which you hear me, examining myself and others is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you. Also, I have never been accustomed to think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money, I might have estimated the offense at what I was able to pay and not have been much the worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, And therefore I propose that penalty. Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends, here bid me say thirty mine, and they will be the sureties. Let thirty mini be the penalty, for which sum they will be ample security to you. Not much time will be gained o Athenians in return for the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that you killed Socrates a wise man. For they will call me wise, even though I am not wise when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far from death. I am speaking now not to all of you, but only to those who have condemned me to death, And I have another thing to say to them. You think that I was convicted because I had no words of the sort which would have procured my acquittal. All mean if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so. The deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words, certainly not. But I had not the boldness, or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to do, weeping and wailing and lamenting and saying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common or mean when in danger. Nor do I now repent of the style of my defense. I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak to you in your manner and live. For neither in war, nor yet at law, ought I or any man to use every way of escaping death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape death. And in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness, for that runs faster than death. I am old and moved slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart, hence, condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death. They too go their ways, condemned by the truth, to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong, and I must abide by my award, let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated, and I think that they are well. And now, o men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you, for I am about to die, and in the hour of death, men are gifted with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you, who are my murderers, that immediately after my departure, punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on me, will surely away you me. You have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose, far otherwise, For I say that there will be more accusers of you than there are now, accusers whom hitherto I have restrained, And as they are younger, they will be more inconsiderate with you, and you will be more offended at them. If you think that by killing men you can prevent someone from censuring your evil lives, you are mistaken. That is not a way of escape which is either possible or honorable. The easiest and the noblest way is not to be disabling others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my departure to the judges who have condemned me, friends who would have acquitted me. I would like also to talk with you about the thing which has come to pass. While the magistrates are busy, and before I go to the place at which I must die, stay then a little, for we may as well talk with one another while there is time. You are my friends, and I should like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to me. Oh, my judges, for you I may truly call judges. I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the divine faculty of which the internal Oracle is the source, has constantly been in the habit of opposing me, even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter. And now, as you see, there has come upon me that which may be thought and is generally believed to be the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of our position, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when I was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking at anything which I was going to say. And yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did, touching the matter in hand, as the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this silence? I will tell you it is at intimation that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error, for the customary sign would surely have opposed me, had I been going to evil and not to good. Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good, for one of two things. Either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now, if you suppose that there is no consciousness but a sleep, like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep is undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life, better and more pleasantly than this one, I will not say a private man, but even the great king will not find many such days or nights when compared with the others. Now, if death be of such a nature, I say that to die is gain, for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, oh, my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed, when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aechus and Triptolemus and other sons of God who are righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Mousais and Hesiod and Homer. Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again, I myself too shall have a wonderful interest in their meeting, and conversing with Polymedes and Ajax, the son of Telemann, and any other ancient hero who has suffered death through an other unjust judgment, and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge. As in this world, so also in the next, and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or numberless others men and women too? What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions? In another world, they do not put a man to death for asking questions, assuredly not, for besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal if what is said is true. Wherefore, O Judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods, Nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from trouble. Wherefore the oracle gave me no sign, for which reason. Also I am not angry with my condemners or with my accusers. They have done me no harm, although they did not mean to do me any good, And for this I may gently blame them. Still I have a favor to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, o my friends, to punish them, and I would have you trouble them. I have troubled you if they seem to care about riches for anything more than about virtue, and if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing, then reprove them as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your hands. The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways. I to die and you to live. Which is better? God only knows. And of Apology by Plato