Latest / Cult of Conspiracy / #1135- The Malware That Stopped Iranian Nukes, Stuxnet!
Transcript
- 0:16Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to the show.
- 0:18Speaker 2: This is the Cult of Conspiracy, and I am the
- 0:22Speaker 2: Cage tonight and today. Yeah, I know we're still doing
- 0:25Speaker 2: our series with the underground Cities and all of the things. Yes,
- 0:28Speaker 2: But through a weird change of events, I found myself
- 0:31Speaker 2: doing some research into a topic that apparently everybody knew about,
- 0:37Speaker 2: but I sure as hell never had. And the more
- 0:39Speaker 2: I looked into it, the more I realized, I don't
- 0:40Speaker 2: think many people actually know about this. So I'm going
- 0:44Speaker 2: to paint you a picture.
- 0:45Speaker 1: Ravenly.
- 0:46Speaker 2: It is the year two thousand, right, y two K,
- 0:50Speaker 2: all the things going on. Everybody was worried that the
- 0:53Speaker 2: computer systems were all going to shut down at midnight
- 0:57Speaker 2: on y two K because somehow these.
- 0:59Speaker 1: I thought the world was Spacien and not the computers.
- 1:02Speaker 1: I thought it was just end.
- 1:04Speaker 2: I heard so many stories, some say that, you know,
- 1:06Speaker 2: all the volcanoes are going to erupt because they have to,
- 1:09Speaker 2: because you know, volcanoes totally keep track on what year
- 1:13Speaker 2: a D we're currently living in because.
- 1:16Speaker 1: Nature, you know, I don't know.
- 1:18Speaker 2: And that was the thing I heard a lot.
- 1:20Speaker 1: All I heard was going to end like that. That
- 1:22Speaker 1: was it, Like that was armageddon, like we're just gonna die.
- 1:25Speaker 2: The more prominent theory that I remember hearing, and then
- 1:29Speaker 2: more of the uh of the research I've done into
- 1:32Speaker 2: Y two K was primarily around computers. They thought that
- 1:36Speaker 2: the banking systems, our defense systems, the stocks, all that
- 1:40Speaker 2: were going to just tank at midnight because well, you know, computers,
- 1:45Speaker 2: they're not rigged to be able to read past nineteen
- 1:47Speaker 2: ninety nine. It's like a thing. They were never programmed
- 1:50Speaker 2: for that.
- 1:51Speaker 1: And so to us now, we're thinking, unfortunately they survived.
- 1:55Speaker 2: Well, I mean, we're from our perspective today, we're thinking, like, yeah,
- 1:58Speaker 2: computer can definitely go to the next like it would
- 2:02Speaker 2: just go over to January first, two thousand, like it's
- 2:05Speaker 2: it's well within its capabilities to make a calendar, you
- 2:09Speaker 2: know what I mean. But to the people of nineteen
- 2:11Speaker 2: ninety nine, this was the wildest shit they'd ever thought of.
- 2:15Speaker 2: And then that was like a part of the zeitgeist.
- 2:17Speaker 2: Somebody somewhere once said, oh, you know, Windows ninety nine,
- 2:21Speaker 2: they don't have a Windows two thousand, they're only programmed
- 2:23Speaker 2: to go to that far. And everybody was like, oh
- 2:25Speaker 2: my god, that makes sense.
- 2:26Speaker 1: And it just ran and it just became a thing.
- 2:28Speaker 1: It's weird how some of the things spread, like wildfire
- 2:31Speaker 1: that you don't really like. How did that even happen?
- 2:34Speaker 1: But that was the first time I ever watched Independence
- 2:36Speaker 1: Day was like the Y two K.
- 2:40Speaker 2: Yes, at a Y two K party, you watched the
- 2:43Speaker 2: movie where the aliens invade Earth?
- 2:46Speaker 1: Like, maybe that's why I have a think about aliens
- 2:49Speaker 1: a little bit, just a little bit.
- 2:51Speaker 3: Yeah.
- 2:52Speaker 1: No, we're at my friend's house down the street.
- 2:54Speaker 2: They they were a mere child, five years old and
- 2:57Speaker 2: five were you talking trying to make you younger chick?
- 3:00Speaker 2: Which is fucking yeah? Sure, five years old? Why two
- 3:02Speaker 2: K is going down?
- 3:03Speaker 1: Five years old?
- 3:05Speaker 2: Fine, thirty years old?
- 3:07Speaker 1: Why two K? Here we go?
- 3:08Speaker 2: You know what, there's no pleasing these fucking people.
- 3:10Speaker 1: Don't sixty two years old? Eight years It's been eighty
- 3:15Speaker 1: four years. You know what? It was a Titanic moment. Okay,
- 3:20Speaker 1: oh my god. First of all, fuck that old bitch.
- 3:23Speaker 1: You know that bitch could have moved over. Okay, you've
- 3:26Speaker 1: seen the diagrams. I know you have, because I've seen them.
- 3:29Speaker 1: Even all that, all.
- 3:30Speaker 2: That, I'm not saying I could forgive I could have
- 3:32Speaker 2: moved over. No, I'm not saying I could forgive her
- 3:35Speaker 2: letting Jack drown. No, I can't forget none of that. Fine,
- 3:38Speaker 2: but the at least at the very end, have a
- 3:41Speaker 2: redemption arc where you give this jewel, the heart, the
- 3:46Speaker 2: heart of the sea, heart of the ocean, whatever the fuck.
- 3:48Speaker 2: It doesn't matter, It doesn't matter.
- 3:50Speaker 1: It's not real.
- 3:51Speaker 2: But like the whole thing that was supposed to fund
- 3:54Speaker 2: this whole boat ride where she tells her granddaughter about
- 3:57Speaker 2: how she slummed it and got boned out in the
- 4:00Speaker 2: back of a fucking model te Okay, all that you
- 4:05Speaker 2: were supposed to be funded by the finding of this
- 4:07Speaker 2: jewel she had in her pocket the whole time.
- 4:11Speaker 1: That's that's what you're mad about.
- 4:13Speaker 2: No, it's like Grandpa Joe in Willie Wonka. Grandpa Joe
- 4:16Speaker 2: is the lowest, slimiest piece of shit ever.
- 4:21Speaker 1: Oh yeah, because he's faking all that shit.
- 4:23Speaker 2: Oh he's just Oh I.
- 4:24Speaker 1: Have no business smoking up, HiPE, How poor this family is.
- 4:27Speaker 1: He's up dancing and shit, no Caine, the fuck.
- 4:31Speaker 2: We're getting way off topic here.
- 4:32Speaker 1: We are, way off way off topic. Anyway, All right,
- 4:35Speaker 1: back to the point.
- 4:36Speaker 2: So Y two K goes down, All right, great, Right
- 4:38Speaker 2: after that we have nine to eleven, and the world,
- 4:42Speaker 2: as far as the American zeitgeist is concerned, the.
- 4:44Speaker 1: World is now at war.
- 4:46Speaker 2: Not actually, of course, but we sure the fuck were
- 4:48Speaker 2: and the world trade centers were hit. So it's the
- 4:50Speaker 2: same saying it's it's what what you know? But anyway,
- 4:53Speaker 2: we go to war in Afghanistan out of nowhere. Two
- 4:56Speaker 2: years later, two thousand and three, we're in war with
- 4:59Speaker 2: the Rock that nobody asked for but Dick Cheney has
- 5:03Speaker 2: been pushing for since like ninety one and shit. So
- 5:06Speaker 2: like weird chain of events, but somehow we have two
- 5:09Speaker 2: separate wars being fought in two separate countries, and we're
- 5:12Speaker 2: doing these things. And the big push that got us
- 5:16Speaker 2: into Iraq. You remember what it was, the weapons of
- 5:19Speaker 2: mass destruction. Oh yeah, yeah, we believe Saddam has has
- 5:23Speaker 2: nuclear weapons nuclear The thing.
- 5:26Speaker 1: I remember about that was is my mom actually took
- 5:29Speaker 1: off work and came and picked me up.
- 5:31Speaker 2: Wait nine eleven or Saddam.
- 5:32Speaker 1: No for the war when we made the announcement, came
- 5:36Speaker 1: over the radios and stuff. She actually, like.
- 5:39Speaker 2: Crack in two thousand and three, she picked you up
- 5:41Speaker 2: from school.
- 5:42Speaker 1: Yeah, well so so nine to eleven. My mom worked
- 5:46Speaker 1: at the trade centers.
- 5:47Speaker 2: Yeah, well one yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
- 5:49Speaker 1: And so she they had them there and then they
- 5:53Speaker 1: got them, uh they were able to get them like
- 5:56Speaker 1: back out to because she had to read the tremet
- 5:59Speaker 1: for forty five minutes.
- 6:00Speaker 2: Shut down the public transit.
- 6:02Speaker 1: Yeah, it was a big thing. And so, you know,
- 6:04Speaker 1: we didn't have cell phones and stuff. So all I
- 6:07Speaker 1: knew was that she was at the World Trade Center.
- 6:10Speaker 1: I had no idea what was going to happen. I
- 6:11Speaker 1: didn't know if she was gonna if they were gonna
- 6:13Speaker 1: do that to that set, which I was like, there's no, yeah,
- 6:18Speaker 1: we had yeah, we had the World Trade Center in
- 6:20Speaker 1: Oregon too, and so they they evacuated because they weren't
- 6:24Speaker 1: sure what was going to happen.
- 6:25Speaker 2: But that's fair.
- 6:26Speaker 1: Yeah, so no, eventually, you know whatever. But for some reason,
- 6:29Speaker 1: my mom, when the war conversation happened, the announcement was made.
- 6:34Speaker 1: I don't know if my mom, like I can't remember
- 6:36Speaker 1: if there was a reason why she got off of work,
- 6:38Speaker 1: But anyway, she came and we sat and we listened
- 6:40Speaker 1: to it broadcasting over the radio, and she explained me
- 6:44Speaker 1: what that meant for America, of like what this means
- 6:46Speaker 1: for Americans as an a war going on, and like
- 6:50Speaker 1: what what's gonna happen and what you know, people are
- 6:53Speaker 1: gonna die and all this stuff. And I was like,
- 6:55Speaker 1: I mean, we've been at were a lot of times,
- 6:57Speaker 1: but like it wasn't really. I was like, oh, okay,
- 7:00Speaker 1: you know she said a lot of stuff about the money,
- 7:03Speaker 1: like the aspect of the money that was going to
- 7:05Speaker 1: change for a lot of Americans. Absolutely correct, you know,
- 7:09Speaker 1: I was. I was in middle school.
- 7:10Speaker 2: I kind of was like, okay, so this is for
- 7:12Speaker 2: nine to eleven.
- 7:13Speaker 1: Correct, this was for no, this is for arac Yeah.
- 7:17Speaker 2: So we had already been at war for two years
- 7:19Speaker 2: in Afghanistan by that, well knows.
- 7:21Speaker 1: Yeah, so Afghanistan first, Yes, she sad.
- 7:24Speaker 2: So it was when nine eleven the whole announcement eleven
- 7:27Speaker 2: comes on. This battle will take timers all, but make
- 7:29Speaker 2: no mistake about it, we will win. That was yeah, yeah,
- 7:32Speaker 2: for sure, for sure. So then everybody was a gung
- 7:35Speaker 2: ho everybody, Republican, Democrat, black, white, didn't matter. We knew
- 7:41Speaker 2: al Qaeda was about to get that come up ins
- 7:44Speaker 2: and we were all about it rightfully. So, well, not exactly,
- 7:47Speaker 2: it was an inside job, but and in that moment,
- 7:50Speaker 2: the Red, White and Blue and Toby Keith's career became
- 7:53Speaker 2: a thing.
- 7:54Speaker 1: Honestly, I will say though, shout out to Toby Keith
- 7:57Speaker 1: for being honestly like one of the best humans. He
- 8:01Speaker 1: actually performed. When I was in Afghanistan, they backed Obama.
- 8:05Speaker 2: Well, the every character has.
- 8:08Speaker 1: Everybody has fault, you know what I will say, as
- 8:11Speaker 1: a performer just yet of his political show. He came
- 8:15Speaker 1: to Afghanistan and I happen to be in the fob
- 8:17Speaker 1: when he was performing, and I got to like stand
- 8:19Speaker 1: in front row. He was fucking amazing, by the way,
- 8:22Speaker 1: like he performed all over for troops and he was
- 8:26Speaker 1: just the most like fantastic human ever. So hell yeah,
- 8:29Speaker 1: I'll say that, at least for that. I don't I
- 8:31Speaker 1: don't know about all political stuff, but.
- 8:33Speaker 2: There shouts out to Haley Williams, who also did a
- 8:38Speaker 2: lot of USO tours. I was at a boot camp
- 8:40Speaker 2: in SI with her step brother.
- 8:42Speaker 1: I don't even know who that is, what I would
- 8:46Speaker 1: I'd have to see the face. I probably know the
- 8:47Speaker 1: face or the song, but like.
- 8:49Speaker 2: You know her, her music probably about up up up up,
- 8:53Speaker 2: about up up up up up up.
- 8:57Speaker 1: Yeah, you're will crash out. They claim to be emo
- 9:04Speaker 1: and don't know. Hailey Williams. Wow, I'm not gonna lie
- 9:08Speaker 1: to you. I don't know if I actually I might.
- 9:11Speaker 2: Sir Haley Williams. Right now, Holy shit, this is mind blowing.
- 9:16Speaker 1: It's late at night. I'm having anyway, Haley Williams, Yeah,
- 9:21Speaker 1: holy fuck. As soon as you see you're like, oh, her.
- 9:24Speaker 2: I know you. I know you're gonna I know I
- 9:27Speaker 2: know that.
- 9:27Speaker 1: You know that, I know you, right, don't tell me
- 9:31Speaker 1: you don't know the band? Oh yeah, okay, wow Paramore. Yeah.
- 9:37Speaker 1: I couldn't think of her name though. Okay, said Paramour,
- 9:41Speaker 1: and I would be.
- 9:41Speaker 2: Like, yeah, she has had a phenomenal solo career as
- 9:45Speaker 2: well as I know. Besides the point, I was at
- 9:47Speaker 2: SI with her stepbrother Jay. If you're out there listening,
- 9:50Speaker 2: call me you dick, love you to death. Anyway, beside
- 9:52Speaker 2: the point, So back to the back to the to
- 9:55Speaker 2: the point of this episode.
- 9:56Speaker 1: God damn it.
- 9:57Speaker 2: So we get way off in the weeds here there
- 10:00Speaker 2: we were, y TK. So all right, why duk at
- 10:04Speaker 2: boom boom boom. Now two thousand and three, we're already
- 10:07Speaker 2: at war in Afghanistan, we're fucking up the Taliban and
- 10:10Speaker 2: al Qaeda all the things. We're learning very quickly that
- 10:12Speaker 2: this is a clandestine country and that we stepped off
- 10:15Speaker 2: into something here that we didn't really fully understand. Okay,
- 10:18Speaker 2: but fine, now we have Iraq and the key point
- 10:24Speaker 2: behind this was the weapons of mass destruction, right, so
- 10:28Speaker 2: Dom's got these nukes. We got to go in there
- 10:29Speaker 2: and get these nukes. Except for the fact that Jesus,
- 10:33Speaker 2: no nuclear weapons were ever discovered recovered, No enriched uranium
- 10:41Speaker 2: was ever discovered or recovered. No, he had sar and
- 10:45Speaker 2: gas bombs, but we're the ones that sold those to them,
- 10:48Speaker 2: right from some of the bio labs that we had
- 10:51Speaker 2: going on in Ukraine and all the things. But beside
- 10:53Speaker 2: the point, in that timeframe, Iran was still a bit
- 10:58Speaker 2: of an asshole as they are still, and they were
- 11:02Speaker 2: talking about their nuclear capabilities. They were trying to enrich
- 11:06Speaker 2: uranium to get to weapons grade, even though they claimed
- 11:10Speaker 2: publicly that it was strictly for nuclear power for their country.
- 11:14Speaker 2: Then they decided to kick out the uh I. Forget
- 11:18Speaker 2: what the group is, basically the people that's in charge
- 11:20Speaker 2: of the nuclear you know, uranium enrichment and they're the
- 11:25Speaker 2: ones that come in and inspect your equipment to make
- 11:28Speaker 2: sure you're not going past a certain level. So as
- 11:31Speaker 2: far as uranium enrichment goes from three percent on down
- 11:36Speaker 2: enriched you can power nuclear power five percent, you're solid
- 11:41Speaker 2: like you're good to go. There is zero reasons why
- 11:44Speaker 2: somebody would enrich uranium to twenty percent unless you are
- 11:48Speaker 2: trying to achieve weapons grade uranium.
- 11:50Speaker 1: Are you with me now? Okay?
- 11:53Speaker 2: So, when Iran decided that they were gonna go nuclear
- 11:56Speaker 2: for power, quote unquote, and then they were kicking out
- 11:59Speaker 2: the official body, the international officiating body is going to
- 12:02Speaker 2: come in and make sure that they're not doing some fuckshit.
- 12:05Speaker 2: So then we understand at this point that they are
- 12:07Speaker 2: absolutely making the push to have nuclear weapons. And to
- 12:13Speaker 2: us in America that's not that much of a threat.
- 12:16Speaker 2: But to one of our homies in the Middle East, Israel,
- 12:20Speaker 2: which I understand the political climate today, people are wanting
- 12:23Speaker 2: to renegotiate how friendly we are with the nation of Israel.
- 12:28Speaker 2: And that's fine, that's a conversation that we can have.
- 12:30Speaker 2: I'm here for it. But at that point in two
- 12:33Speaker 2: thousand and three era, we knew that Iram was making
- 12:37Speaker 2: this push, but we couldn't justify sending in troops whenever.
- 12:41Speaker 2: We just did this in Iraq and found nothing, you
- 12:45Speaker 2: see what I'm saying. So we had to do something.
- 12:48Speaker 2: So US in Israel decided, let's try to fuck up
- 12:54Speaker 2: their ability to enrich uranium. And how do we do that? Well,
- 13:01Speaker 2: not to get too much into the nitty gritty of
- 13:03Speaker 2: how you turn uranium into weapons grade uranium, but let's
- 13:08Speaker 2: say at a certain point it involves.
- 13:10Speaker 1: Something called a centrifuge. And if you don't know what
- 13:12Speaker 1: that is, think of a.
- 13:13Speaker 2: Like a dryer. It spins, right, a clothing dryer, right,
- 13:16Speaker 2: It just spins and spins and spins. A centrifuge or centrifugal,
- 13:21Speaker 2: depending on the process you're in, spins fast as fuck.
- 13:25Speaker 2: And by that I mean like could be anywhere from
- 13:28Speaker 2: one thousand RPMs to ten thousand RPMs, depends on the process. Okay,
- 13:32Speaker 2: these motors, big fucking motors, spin like crazy, and this
- 13:35Speaker 2: is part of the enrichment process for the work I
- 13:38Speaker 2: used to do. As a matter of fact, we had
- 13:39Speaker 2: to work on these a lot. From my area of it.
- 13:43Speaker 2: I had to work on the components that made sure
- 13:45Speaker 2: that it was spinning correctly and what and shaking what
- 13:47Speaker 2: and wobbling what and going too fast kind of things.
- 13:49Speaker 2: The mechanics were the ones that actually did, like the
- 13:52Speaker 2: motorized work on it. But beside the point, we found
- 13:57Speaker 2: that the way that they were enriching uranium could be hacked,
- 14:03Speaker 2: for lack of better words, and instead of hacking it
- 14:07Speaker 2: for some sort of spyware where we can see what
- 14:09Speaker 2: we're what they're doing, and you know, we can keep
- 14:12Speaker 2: track of it, the powers that be decided to spice
- 14:18Speaker 2: it up a little bit and essentially force one thousand
- 14:22Speaker 2: centrifuges to all like shit the bed and tear themselves
- 14:26Speaker 2: apart over the course of a few months. And then
- 14:31Speaker 2: it continued, and then it continued and to the point
- 14:34Speaker 2: to where it was finally discovered and finally acknowledged in
- 14:38Speaker 2: the twenty twelve time frame.
- 14:40Speaker 1: Under Obama.
- 14:42Speaker 2: This started. Oh and don't get me wrong, Obama like
- 14:45Speaker 2: he fucking ramped it up. Bush started it. Bush started
- 14:49Speaker 2: this whole thing him and I forget who the president
- 14:52Speaker 2: of Israel was at the time. We'll talk about it
- 14:53Speaker 2: a bit. But between the Israeli Unit eighty two hundred,
- 14:57Speaker 2: which is very similar to our NSSA and our CIA,
- 15:02Speaker 2: and the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a dude
- 15:06Speaker 2: name Cartwright. We decided to get together, get with some
- 15:11Speaker 2: tech nerds and figure out a way to install a
- 15:14Speaker 2: worm from a USB port into the UH. It's pretty smart.
- 15:21Speaker 2: The secret nuclear facility in Iran that never existed yet
- 15:26Speaker 2: somehow a lot of wild shit went down for their
- 15:29Speaker 2: nuclear capabilities.
- 15:31Speaker 1: It didn't stop anything.
- 15:33Speaker 2: It did kick the ball down the road about ten
- 15:35Speaker 2: to fifteen years, give or take. But we're currently in
- 15:38Speaker 2: the situation that we're here in now because of.
- 15:41Speaker 1: The same conversation.
- 15:42Speaker 2: This is what it looks like when we're going kinetic
- 15:45Speaker 2: ie dropping bunker busters like we did last year with
- 15:48Speaker 2: Israel or bombing the fuck out of Iran. Look, we
- 15:50Speaker 2: are right now as opposed to how we did it
- 15:53Speaker 2: before with like, maybe we don't bomb the fuck out
- 15:55Speaker 2: of them, maybe we just destroy their infrastructure to where
- 15:59Speaker 2: there's no way that they can make this happen.
- 16:03Speaker 1: Well, I mean they didn't make no Lego movie about it,
- 16:05Speaker 1: So did it happen? Oh?
- 16:07Speaker 2: I forgot about the Lego movies. Yeah, now this is
- 16:10Speaker 2: all bullshit and conspiracy. Obviously, Maybe what we're talking about, so.
- 16:16Speaker 1: I don't know.
- 16:17Speaker 2: Maybe Iran will make a lego skit about Stucksnet, which
- 16:23Speaker 2: is the point this is called. This episode is about Stucksnet,
- 16:28Speaker 2: which might sound crazy, but again, the more we get
- 16:31Speaker 2: into it and the more we break this down, it
- 16:33Speaker 2: is ingenious. But it only worked to a point. The
- 16:36Speaker 2: worst part was when it got out onto the main
- 16:38Speaker 2: Internet and shut down all kinds of shit in twenty thirteen.
- 16:42Speaker 2: Yeah oops, big oops, big oops.
- 16:45Speaker 1: If you will, Oh well, so yeah, we're gonna go
- 16:49Speaker 1: in on it, y'all.
- 16:50Speaker 2: We're gonna talk about it start to finish here, I'm
- 16:52Speaker 2: gonna go ahead and share the screen. We're gonna read
- 16:54Speaker 2: some articles, got some Wikipedia things pulled up, I got
- 16:56Speaker 2: a YouTube video. It's gonna talk about it. We are
- 16:58Speaker 2: gonna learn all about this crazy operation Olympic Games kickstarted
- 17:04Speaker 2: by President Bush, continued and fucked up by President Obama
- 17:10Speaker 2: about how the Internet can and shall screw us over
- 17:15Speaker 2: if we allow it to. Now, let's talk about that
- 17:17Speaker 2: with the AI conversation at the end. But I'm jumping
- 17:19Speaker 2: way ahead of myself. But anyway, if you'd like to
- 17:22Speaker 2: see what we were talking about rather than just hear
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- 18:56Speaker 2: come check us out without further ado. I'm gonna go
- 18:58Speaker 2: ahead and share the screen. Let's talk about the guy
- 19:00Speaker 2: that actually.
- 19:01Speaker 1: Installed the worm. I'm gonna again paint you a picture.
- 19:04Speaker 2: We're in Iran, Okay, They're at a little nuclear site,
- 19:08Speaker 2: and you got this maintenance tech dude. He's been working
- 19:10Speaker 2: there for a few months. He's European and no one
- 19:14Speaker 2: really thinks anything of him. Pretty pretty basic, average Joe
- 19:19Speaker 2: blow type of dude, a guy that wouldn't stand out
- 19:21Speaker 2: in a crowd of workers. Wearing hard hats, go into
- 19:24Speaker 2: the smoke pen, you know what I'm saying, Just your
- 19:26Speaker 2: average guy. And he just so happens to be carrying
- 19:30Speaker 2: a thumb drive. And he goes to this main room,
- 19:35Speaker 2: right and I don't know specifically if it was a
- 19:37Speaker 2: computer room, a mainframe room, a PLC rack, whatever the
- 19:41Speaker 2: case was.
- 19:42Speaker 1: But he goes there and to do some maintenance repair.
- 19:45Speaker 1: But while he's there, just kind of.
- 19:46Speaker 2: Slips a little thing in as he was instructed to do,
- 19:49Speaker 2: and walks out and goes about his way. What this guy,
- 19:53Speaker 2: Eric von Satan, what he actually just did was started
- 19:57Speaker 2: something that could not be stopped and would not be
- 20:00Speaker 2: stopped until basically Snowden blew.
- 20:02Speaker 1: The lid off of it years later.
- 20:06Speaker 2: Yeah, Edward Snowden, we're talking that guy, So, Edward or
- 20:09Speaker 2: Eric excuse me, Edward Snoden, Eric von Saban. He was
- 20:14Speaker 2: from the Netherlands, right, and he was a Dutch engineer.
- 20:17Speaker 2: He was allegedly allegedly recruited in two thousand and eight
- 20:23Speaker 2: by the Dutch intelligence services and the Military Intelligence and
- 20:28Speaker 2: Security Services basically two different groups here, the General Intelligence
- 20:32Speaker 2: and Security Service and the Military intelligence either way to
- 20:36Speaker 2: infect the enriched centrifuge infrastructure at the Natan's nuclear facility
- 20:41Speaker 2: in Iran with the stucksnet malware in two thousand and nine.
- 20:47Speaker 2: This industrial espionage operation required years of preparation and cooperation
- 20:52Speaker 2: between the CIA and Moussade. It cost a billion dollars
- 20:56Speaker 2: in collaborative effort known as Operation Olympic Games. Stuck's net
- 21:02Speaker 2: reportedly ruined almost one fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges.
- 21:07Speaker 1: I bet they wont that motherfucking dead so bad, so
- 21:10Speaker 1: let's talk about that.
- 21:11Speaker 2: Two weeks after this was planted, he fell off his
- 21:16Speaker 2: motorcycle and died. No foul play was, you know, suspected.
- 21:21Speaker 1: Come on, you kill Eric? Yeah, man, poor Eric.
- 21:26Speaker 2: So he apparently died two weeks after Stuck's next stucks
- 21:30Speaker 2: nets attack at the age of thirty six, in an
- 21:33Speaker 2: apparent single vehicle motorcycle accident in Dubai.
- 21:38Speaker 1: Yeah okay, yeah, Like, there's no way I would sign
- 21:41Speaker 1: up for this shit. They always killed people that helped
- 21:44Speaker 1: people out.
- 21:45Speaker 2: He was married, he had two kids, all these things.
- 21:48Speaker 2: He seemed like he was just your average guy, but
- 21:51Speaker 2: he was a loose end. And two weeks after he
- 21:53Speaker 2: slipped that thumb drive in Apparently he just went off the.
- 21:58Speaker 1: Road and he's broke his wet slicks you know from
- 22:02Speaker 1: the old cartoons, because you know how wet do Bybee.
- 22:05Speaker 1: You know what I'm saying. There's what you remember, like
- 22:07Speaker 1: in Wiley Coyote. Just throw up a little sign wet
- 22:10Speaker 1: slick like this. Yeah, exactly how it happened.
- 22:13Speaker 2: So and he fell off his bike, whatever, he broke
- 22:15Speaker 2: his neck. He allegedly died instantly.
- 22:19Speaker 1: Whatever.
- 22:20Speaker 2: But basically they had to tie up that loose end.
- 22:23Speaker 2: So this is really where we begin. And let's talk
- 22:26Speaker 2: about what Stuck's net is. Okay, So well, I agree,
- 22:32Speaker 2: it's not my favorite name. I don't love it. But
- 22:37Speaker 2: Snuck's neck it sounds like stucks Stuck's net.
- 22:41Speaker 1: It sounds like knock, that's what it sounds like. I'm
- 22:45Speaker 1: sorry every time you say it, I'm like snook.
- 22:48Speaker 2: Oh my god. Okay, this is from Stanford. Here it
- 22:52Speaker 2: says the countdown to zero day. We'll talk about what
- 22:55Speaker 2: a zero day is. And if you know anything about
- 22:59Speaker 2: computer program to have to find a zero day trigger
- 23:03Speaker 2: in a program is difficult. Stucks net had four and it, Yeah,
- 23:09Speaker 2: this was almost untraceable unless you knew exactly what you
- 23:13Speaker 2: were looking for and where to look for it, which
- 23:16Speaker 2: is kind of how it was programmed to do. Anyway,
- 23:19Speaker 2: we're getting ware of it ourselves here anyway, So the
- 23:21Speaker 2: United States has thrust itself in the world into the
- 23:25Speaker 2: era of cyber warfare. Kim Zeter, an award winning cybersecurity
- 23:29Speaker 2: journalist for Wired magazine, told a Stanford audience, Now I
- 23:33Speaker 2: tried pulling up the Wired article. First of all, way
- 23:37Speaker 2: too fucking long. And second you had to be like
- 23:39Speaker 2: a member and pay a subscription to pull it, which
- 23:42Speaker 2: is so stupid. I do love Wired, I love their publication,
- 23:45Speaker 2: but at the same time, I'm not paying for that.
- 23:47Speaker 1: But anyway, moving on here.
- 23:49Speaker 2: Zeter discussed in her book Countdown to Zero Day, which
- 23:52Speaker 2: details the discovery and unraveling of stucks net, the world's
- 23:56Speaker 2: first cyber weapon. Stucks Net was the name given to
- 24:00Speaker 2: a highly complex digital malware malware that targeted and physically
- 24:04Speaker 2: damaged Iran's clandestine nuclear program from two thousand and seven
- 24:09Speaker 2: until its cover was blown in twenty ten by computer
- 24:12Speaker 2: security researchers. The malware targeted the computer systems controlling physical
- 24:17Speaker 2: infrastructure such as centrifuges and gas valves. So let me
- 24:23Speaker 2: give y'all at least a little bit of an idea here.
- 24:26Speaker 2: If I have a machine, if I have a motor
- 24:28Speaker 2: that is supposed to be running at one thousand rpm, okay,
- 24:32Speaker 2: a thousand rotations permitted, cool, that's what it's rated for.
- 24:35Speaker 2: This machine was built to run.
- 24:36Speaker 1: At that speed.
- 24:37Speaker 2: Cool, and out of nowhere, beyond my control, this machine
- 24:41Speaker 2: jumps up to like eighteen hundred rpm and then drops
- 24:46Speaker 2: down to like four hundred rpm and then jumps back
- 24:50Speaker 2: up to eighteen hundred RPMs. You're gonna destroy your motor.
- 24:54Speaker 2: You're gonna destroy your gearbox, You're gonna like, there's so
- 24:57Speaker 2: many things about it that's gonna cause vibrations, rattling, things
- 25:00Speaker 2: going off center, just knocking itself loose and or like
- 25:04Speaker 2: spinning itself apart, which I've seen them do. It is terrifying.
- 25:09Speaker 2: But so you understand what I'm saying here, right, If
- 25:12Speaker 2: you don't have a motor that is rated to go
- 25:13Speaker 2: that speed or drop to that slow of a speed
- 25:17Speaker 2: like that, you're fucking yourself, which is the entire point
- 25:20Speaker 2: of what they were doing.
- 25:21Speaker 1: But we'll get to more of it.
- 25:22Speaker 2: Reports following its discovery attributed the creation and deployment of
- 25:26Speaker 2: stucks net to the United States and Israel. New York
- 25:29Speaker 2: Times quoted anonymous US officials claiming responsibility for stucksnt. So Zeter,
- 25:35Speaker 2: the author, began reporting on the cyber weapon in twenty ten, quote,
- 25:39Speaker 2: when the first news came out, I didn't think much
- 25:42Speaker 2: of it. The title of her book refers to zero
- 25:46Speaker 2: day attack, which exploits a previously unknown vulnerability in a
- 25:50Speaker 2: computer application or an operating system. That's what a zero
- 25:53Speaker 2: day is. It's an unknown backdoor, if you will, into
- 25:58Speaker 2: a computer program that can and will be exploited. Watching
- 26:03Speaker 2: the system, I'm sorry, Watching the semantic researchers unravel stucks net,
- 26:09Speaker 2: I knew it was I knew. What fascinated me was
- 26:11Speaker 2: the process and brilliance of the researchers. The detective story
- 26:15Speaker 2: is what pulled me in. So Zetter's book follows computer
- 26:19Speaker 2: security researchers from around the world as they discover and
- 26:22Speaker 2: disassemble stucks net over the course of months, much longer
- 26:26Speaker 2: than any time spent in typical malware. The realization that
- 26:30Speaker 2: stucks net was the world's first cyber weapon sent shockwaves
- 26:33Speaker 2: through the tech community, yet did not create as much
- 26:37Speaker 2: of a stir in the mainstream society. It's funny because
- 26:41Speaker 2: a lot of people still don't know Stuck's Net or
- 26:43Speaker 2: haven't even heard of it. The recent valid vandalization of
- 26:47Speaker 2: Sony seems to have finally gotten people's attention. It was
- 26:51Speaker 2: not a case of true cyber war a where warfare.
- 26:55Speaker 2: I think that was supposed to be warfare, but it
- 26:57Speaker 2: came out wherefair Okay, so it's not a case of
- 27:00Speaker 2: true cyber warfare. But I'm glad that my book came
- 27:03Speaker 2: out right before it happened, because its perception is a
- 27:08Speaker 2: nation state attack has led to interest in all nation
- 27:11Speaker 2: state attacks, including stucks Net. The Snowden Leaks also put
- 27:15Speaker 2: cyber warfare.
- 27:16Speaker 1: On the map.
- 27:17Speaker 2: See they played they spelled it right there.
- 27:19Speaker 1: I don't know what that was about anyway.
- 27:21Speaker 2: So this is her actually speaking on behalf of the book,
- 27:24Speaker 2: what she found, and a little background information into stucks
- 27:28Speaker 2: Net before we get more into it.
- 27:30Speaker 1: The author Wired magazine reporter Kim Zetter miss Zetter, what
- 27:35Speaker 1: is or what was stucks Net?
- 27:38Speaker 3: Stuck's Net was a virus slash worm that was used
- 27:43Speaker 3: to attack Iran's nuclear plant in the tons. It's a
- 27:48Speaker 3: uranium enrichment plant, and so the worm was designed to
- 27:52Speaker 3: manipulate the computers that control this interfuges and speed them
- 27:57Speaker 3: up and slow them down in order to degrade the
- 28:00Speaker 3: level of uranium enrichment, and also to do some wear
- 28:04Speaker 3: and tear on the centrifuges and destroy them.
- 28:07Speaker 1: What was unique about stucks.
- 28:09Speaker 3: Net, Well, Stuck's Net was really sophisticated. Its First of all,
- 28:13Speaker 3: I guess the most unique thing is that this was
- 28:15Speaker 3: a virus that was designed to physically destroy something. So
- 28:19Speaker 3: in the past, we've seen malware that stills passwords, it
- 28:21Speaker 3: stills credit card numbers, things like that, but we'd never
- 28:25Speaker 3: seen something that was designed to physically destroy essentially leap
- 28:29Speaker 3: out of the digital world into the physical realm and
- 28:31Speaker 3: have some kind of kinetic activity. So that was the
- 28:34Speaker 3: first thing that made stex net unique. Other than that
- 28:37Speaker 3: it was really sophisticated. It was as I mentioned, it's
- 28:41Speaker 3: designed to increase and increase and slow the speed of
- 28:44Speaker 3: the centrifuges. But while it was doing that, it also
- 28:47Speaker 3: did this remarkable trick, which was to make the operators
- 28:52Speaker 3: at the plant think that the operations were perfectly normal.
- 28:56Speaker 3: So what it did was it recorded normal activity on
- 28:58Speaker 3: the computers first, and then it played back that normal
- 29:01Speaker 3: activity to the monitoring machines when stucks net was actually
- 29:05Speaker 3: doing the sabotage. So that was something remarkable about it.
- 29:09Speaker 3: And one more thing that was remarkable was that stucks
- 29:12Speaker 3: net used what are called zero days five zero days
- 29:15Speaker 3: to spread, And a zero day is a vulnerability and
- 29:17Speaker 3: software that's unknown to the software vendor, so therefore no
- 29:21Speaker 3: patch exists, and zero days tend to be fairly rare,
- 29:26Speaker 3: and they're also time consuming and expensive to find for
- 29:30Speaker 3: the vulnerabilities and also to develop exploits for them. So
- 29:34Speaker 3: generally we see maybe one zero day used in an attack,
- 29:37Speaker 3: and this one used five zero days.
- 29:40Speaker 1: Where and how was stucks net developed and by.
- 29:42Speaker 3: Whom, Well, we believe it was developed by the US
- 29:47Speaker 3: and Israel, and it was tested both here in the
- 29:51Speaker 3: US and in Israel. Where and how This was a
- 29:56Speaker 3: process that took a number of years to develop. There
- 29:59Speaker 3: were multiple teams working on it. We had to have
- 30:01Speaker 3: separate teams working on the actual centrifuges to determine the
- 30:05Speaker 3: effect that stucks and it would have on them. So
- 30:08Speaker 3: in that regard, that requires material scientists to examine the centrifuges,
- 30:13Speaker 3: how speeding them up would affect them, how slowing them
- 30:15Speaker 3: down would affect them. Then you have a team that
- 30:18Speaker 3: is looking at the siemens controllers, the computers that are
- 30:22Speaker 3: controlling the centrifuges, and you need to find vulnerabilities in that,
- 30:25Speaker 3: and you need to find ways of getting your worm
- 30:27Speaker 3: onto the system and in a way that will hide
- 30:30Speaker 3: it so no one can discover it. And then you
- 30:32Speaker 3: had a third team that was developing the spreading mechanisms,
- 30:36Speaker 3: the zero days and things like that. So there are
- 30:38Speaker 3: multiple teams over a minimum of six months, probably longer.
- 30:42Speaker 3: The centrifuge research itself probably took a couple of years,
- 30:48Speaker 3: and then it all came together around two thousand and seven,
- 30:51Speaker 3: two thousand and eight.
- 30:52Speaker 1: And when you say the US, do you mean the
- 30:54Speaker 1: Defense Department?
- 30:56Speaker 3: This would be so there are multiple agencies that worked
- 30:59Speaker 3: on it. This would have been is a covert operation.
- 31:03Speaker 3: So getting the worm onto a system requires an agency
- 31:08Speaker 3: that has covert authorities. In that case, we're talking with
- 31:12Speaker 3: the CIA. Developing a code like this, of course requires
- 31:18Speaker 3: really elite programmers, and so we're looking at elite teams
- 31:22Speaker 3: with the NSA. The Edward Snowden documents have pointed to
- 31:26Speaker 3: a lot of the activity of those elite teams that
- 31:29Speaker 3: are designed to do a deep espionage and what's called
- 31:33Speaker 3: CNA computer network attacks, and so that would have been
- 31:37Speaker 3: also in conjunction with the military. The US Cyber Command
- 31:39Speaker 3: is sort of an umbrella of NSA and the militaries.
- 31:46Speaker 1: Kim Zetter, where where did the name come from?
- 31:48Speaker 3: Stuck's net was?
- 31:51Speaker 2: So I'm not going to play any more of that one,
- 31:53Speaker 2: actually because it cut off right there.
- 31:54Speaker 1: But if you want to see the whole interviews on
- 31:56Speaker 1: c SPAN.
- 31:57Speaker 2: But so I said there was four zero day. A
- 32:00Speaker 2: lot of the information that I found said four. She
- 32:03Speaker 2: is saying five. But either way, to have one zero
- 32:06Speaker 2: day is ridiculous in and of itself. To have two
- 32:11Speaker 2: unheard of four or five, that's fuck it like, actually
- 32:16Speaker 2: unheard of, that is ridiculous.
- 32:17Speaker 1: Ship But though it is, the way that she broke
- 32:21Speaker 1: it down made a hell of a lot of sense.
- 32:22Speaker 1: I mean, you're gonna you'd have to have had multiple
- 32:24Speaker 1: teams to be able to test all the components of it.
- 32:28Speaker 1: The biggest thing is to be able to get it
- 32:31Speaker 1: into there without being detected.
- 32:33Speaker 2: So yes, agreed, and so all right, how did they
- 32:37Speaker 2: test it?
- 32:37Speaker 1: You might ask, Well, they probably took our they our stuff,
- 32:41Speaker 1: and this was like, fuck it, let's we got plenty
- 32:43Speaker 1: on backup. Let's just try it out. Yes and no,
- 32:47Speaker 1: they tested on Russia. No, no, even worse in China, Israel,
- 32:52Speaker 1: Israel them, Well they were testing it on their ship.
- 32:56Speaker 2: It's the same as to say that America tests it
- 32:59Speaker 2: on our own.
- 33:00Speaker 1: Come on, now, we basically give them all their shit.
- 33:02Speaker 2: So like, okay, which is how we got in this position,
- 33:05Speaker 2: to be honest with you. So all right, let's backtrack here.
- 33:08Speaker 2: So Stucksnet itself was developed, they allege as a.
- 33:14Speaker 1: Joint operation between US and Israel.
- 33:16Speaker 2: For the record, no one has ever actually still to
- 33:19Speaker 2: this day, nobody's ever acknowledged that it's under.
- 33:22Speaker 1: Sure it was some kind of whatever. I mean, They
- 33:25Speaker 1: probably just were like, hey, so we're doing this, We're
- 33:27Speaker 1: gonna test on your shit. We'll give you more shit
- 33:29Speaker 1: later on.
- 33:31Speaker 2: Okay. This would have been like if the Joker batman, right,
- 33:34Speaker 2: and the Joker killed a person and left a Joker
- 33:37Speaker 2: playing card on the body, and then they're like, oh,
- 33:40Speaker 2: this was the Joker, and the Joker's like, I don't
- 33:42Speaker 2: know Whi's talking about, dude, that's essentially what this is
- 33:45Speaker 2: with like it was obviously Israel and America, and it's like,
- 33:47Speaker 2: I don't.
- 33:48Speaker 1: Know, I don't even know which talk about right now.
- 33:50Speaker 2: Yeah, it has all of the hallmarks. Your signature is
- 33:53Speaker 2: right here, bro.
- 33:56Speaker 1: I don't even know if that's mine. So we're comfiicient
- 33:58Speaker 1: with it, I mean realistic to make sure that they
- 34:01Speaker 1: had at least four to five So all.
- 34:03Speaker 2: Right, all right, here's even more background onto this. So
- 34:07Speaker 2: Siemens is a company, it's one of the big ones
- 34:09Speaker 2: as far as the tech industry is concerned.
- 34:11Speaker 1: Yea, right.
- 34:12Speaker 2: I used to work on Semens components for a lot
- 34:15Speaker 2: of the things. And so there's a thing called a
- 34:16Speaker 2: PLC programmable logic controller and typically these are used in
- 34:21Speaker 2: manufacturing facilities where you just need a machine to do
- 34:25Speaker 2: of the same function over and over again indefinitely. Okay,
- 34:29Speaker 2: you program it in. It's all you know. If this happens,
- 34:34Speaker 2: and this happens, then this component moves. Okay, it's a
- 34:38Speaker 2: lot of stops and goes as far as like mechanics
- 34:40Speaker 2: are concerned.
- 34:41Speaker 1: Cool.
- 34:42Speaker 2: So as a way to find a weakness in the
- 34:45Speaker 2: manufacturing of these components for nukes.
- 34:49Speaker 1: They reached out to Siemens.
- 34:51Speaker 2: And these Germans had no idea why the American government
- 34:55Speaker 2: specifically was asking these very poignant questions about a very
- 35:02Speaker 2: specific PLC that they have. It's not like it's one
- 35:04Speaker 2: that's only used in nuclear manufacturing. No, it's just like
- 35:08Speaker 2: that specific model, Like I guess, yeah, we could, we
- 35:11Speaker 2: could look and see if there's a vulnerability. But it's
- 35:14Speaker 2: a PLC something that you program typically on site. Like
- 35:18Speaker 2: it's not. You can you can have it pre programmed
- 35:21Speaker 2: from the manufacturer and run it that way. But typically
- 35:24Speaker 2: a do with a laptop, once it's plugged in and
- 35:27Speaker 2: set up, sets up the whole code for it, and
- 35:29Speaker 2: then it's set for good. It's not something that typically
- 35:32Speaker 2: somebody would call the manufacturer to ask about this. But
- 35:36Speaker 2: they answered again, they had no idea what this was about.
- 35:40Speaker 2: They basically found a weakness in a local component. I'm
- 35:46Speaker 2: trying to find a way to explain this.
- 35:48Speaker 1: Okay.
- 35:50Speaker 2: Let's say that Ford is coming out with a new
- 35:53Speaker 2: Ford F one fifty Okay, and they whoever they might
- 35:58Speaker 2: be in this case, let's just say the United States
- 36:01Speaker 2: government they want to fuck up a specific F one fifty.
- 36:06Speaker 2: So they call Ford and they ask, hey, man, is
- 36:08Speaker 2: there any kind of weird things going on with the
- 36:10Speaker 2: transmission for this year and make and model of f
- 36:16Speaker 2: one fifties that you may or may not have sold
- 36:18Speaker 2: around the Texas area between this month and this month.
- 36:24Speaker 2: Ford would be like, Uh, we can run some numbers
- 36:27Speaker 2: and see, but I guess I'm sure. Yeah, there's a
- 36:31Speaker 2: couple of things wrong with this one. In this one
- 36:33Speaker 2: factory defaults. But they were seeing as no big deal whatever, Okay, great,
- 36:36Speaker 2: and then you never hear from them again. What would
- 36:40Speaker 2: the government do with that? To fuck with that transmission,
- 36:43Speaker 2: you would have to have a guy on the ground locally,
- 36:45Speaker 2: but actually put his physical hands on that component to
- 36:48Speaker 2: fuck with it. It's not something you can like wire
- 36:51Speaker 2: in from DC, you know what I'm saying. So for
- 36:54Speaker 2: this PLC to have a fault, you would have to
- 36:56Speaker 2: get a guy to go in physically and do something
- 36:59Speaker 2: with it locally. It's not something you'd be able to, like,
- 37:02Speaker 2: you know, send a Wi Fi link across the pond
- 37:06Speaker 2: and and fuck up their system. This is also a
- 37:08Speaker 2: part of how and why, like you're saying, like the
- 37:12Speaker 2: the the program itself of stucksnet is impressive in and
- 37:15Speaker 2: of itself. More impressive is the way they got this
- 37:19Speaker 2: dude from the Netherlands, Eric rip friend of the show,
- 37:24Speaker 2: to be the Patsy.
- 37:26Speaker 1: So to speaker Stein.
- 37:30Speaker 2: Von Saban's Uric von Lichtenstein.
- 37:35Speaker 1: We're going to say Eric now.
- 37:36Speaker 2: It's Eric von Lichtenstein now from Galdalin, yep. Obviously famous
- 37:41Speaker 2: joust friend of the show.
- 37:43Speaker 1: Anyway.
- 37:44Speaker 2: So but you see the this is there's so many
- 37:48Speaker 2: things that had to line up perfectly for this to work,
- 37:51Speaker 2: and it did.
- 37:52Speaker 1: It probably was, I mean, like she said, it was
- 37:54Speaker 1: years in the making. I mean, there are so many
- 37:57Speaker 1: things that you need to account for and then to
- 38:00Speaker 1: be able to get it all in that little hard
- 38:02Speaker 1: rub and then trust old boy just happens to have
- 38:05Speaker 1: access to it and all these scenes and just at
- 38:07Speaker 1: the right time, and no one is going to be
- 38:09Speaker 1: down there. Could you imagine how nervous he was? Oh
- 38:12Speaker 1: my god, oh my god. Yes, And then as soon
- 38:15Speaker 1: as he did, yeah, that he dies. He dipped.
- 38:18Speaker 2: He went to Dubai two weeks after this happened, and
- 38:20Speaker 2: keep in mind he was only working there for a
- 38:21Speaker 2: few months, but you know, enough time to like get
- 38:25Speaker 2: everybody comfortable with seeing him around or whatever. And two
- 38:29Speaker 2: weeks after he installed this worm, this virus, if you will,
- 38:34Speaker 2: into the system, he dips. He's in Dubai riding his motorcycle,
- 38:38Speaker 2: living his life, and they're like, yeah, no, bro. And
- 38:41Speaker 2: he was married to an Iranian. So he was from
- 38:43Speaker 2: the Netherlands, but he was married to an Irani. And
- 38:45Speaker 2: that's how he even got the job. It was, it
- 38:47Speaker 2: was a whole thing, the salty. Oh, it's it's crazy.
- 38:51Speaker 2: But but and again you got to keep in mind
- 38:54Speaker 2: the climate. Right two thousand and three, we invade Rock,
- 38:57Speaker 2: we find no weapons of mass instruction.
- 39:00Speaker 1: We couldn't tell the American people.
- 39:02Speaker 2: Were about to do some function to Iran for the
- 39:04Speaker 2: same thing after we just blew our load to no
- 39:07Speaker 2: avail in the Iraq situation, so we had to do
- 39:10Speaker 2: it covert. So Israel was developing a nuclear site. They
- 39:14Speaker 2: wanted to become a nuclear player. Now they already had
- 39:17Speaker 2: nuclear weapons that we gave them, but as far as
- 39:19Speaker 2: nuclear power was concerned, it was this, uh, the worst
- 39:24Speaker 2: kept secret of.
- 39:25Speaker 1: The Middle East.
- 39:27Speaker 2: That way, I'm being honest. Everybody knew. Israel always of
- 39:30Speaker 2: course denied Tony deny. I don't know what you're talking about,
- 39:32Speaker 2: plead the fifth whatever or whatever their version of the
- 39:34Speaker 2: Fifth is. But everybody knew that that site specifically was
- 39:40Speaker 2: Israel's nuclear site that they were developing.
- 39:42Speaker 3: It was.
- 39:43Speaker 1: It was a horribly kept secret.
- 39:45Speaker 2: But because it was still in the building stages of it,
- 39:47Speaker 2: the centrifuges were being installed, so they used them as
- 39:52Speaker 2: the test run, if you will, and they just wanted
- 39:54Speaker 2: to see would this work. Could we force this mechanical
- 39:58Speaker 2: device to spin itself into oblivion?
- 40:01Speaker 1: And then let's backtrack it even further.
- 40:04Speaker 2: Can we get this device, this program to record normal
- 40:10Speaker 2: everyday operations, and then by the time the people running
- 40:13Speaker 2: the facility realize that something's gone horribly wrong, there's already
- 40:17Speaker 2: like twenty machines that are now fucked up instead of
- 40:19Speaker 2: just the one. And then even further, how can we
- 40:24Speaker 2: fit all of that onto a flash drive?
- 40:28Speaker 1: Alien tech? Obviously alien tech.
- 40:31Speaker 2: And then once we get all of these components together,
- 40:36Speaker 2: now we need to make sure that it can't go
- 40:38Speaker 2: live until we want it to go live. Okay, good,
- 40:42Speaker 2: got that check. And then also we have to find
- 40:45Speaker 2: a willing participant to basically sacrifice their life.
- 40:49Speaker 1: To install it. I mean they probably told him that
- 40:52Speaker 1: he was gonna be fine and here's a bunch of
- 40:53Speaker 1: money and like all this crap game.
- 40:56Speaker 2: They told him he was going to get American citizenship
- 40:58Speaker 2: or some shit. He was probably hiding out.
- 40:59Speaker 1: In Dubai, probably got like, you know, a billion dollars
- 41:02Speaker 1: and was like, holy shit, this is gonna be awesome.
- 41:05Speaker 1: Oh man, uh.
- 41:07Speaker 2: In those days, billionaire in two thousand and three, two
- 41:10Speaker 2: thousand and five timeframes when they really started to work
- 41:12Speaker 2: on it.
- 41:13Speaker 1: It was installed in eight. No way a billion. I
- 41:15Speaker 1: don't even know if we had billionaires in eight maybe Gates.
- 41:18Speaker 1: I have no idea, to be honest with you, but.
- 41:20Speaker 2: They definitely they had. They give him a pretty sizeable bag.
- 41:24Speaker 1: I would think, so, how did this Well, I guess
- 41:27Speaker 1: we're going to get to that. I want to understand
- 41:29Speaker 1: who was able to figure out that, Like, clearly something
- 41:33Speaker 1: was happening, but you know, no one really knew for
- 41:37Speaker 1: years what that something was.
- 41:39Speaker 2: So that's kind of why and how Aroan hasn't been
- 41:42Speaker 2: able to develop nukes because it took them years to backtrack.
- 41:47Speaker 2: Basically had to shut the site down because the computers
- 41:50Speaker 2: are showing that everything's running correctly. But I'm watching this
- 41:53Speaker 2: thing tear itself apart, so something is wrong here. They
- 41:56Speaker 2: had to go all the way back to the PLC rack.
- 41:59Speaker 2: They had to work their way upwards from there to
- 42:01Speaker 2: make sure that that was the only spot that it was.
- 42:04Speaker 2: And that's before it jumped onto the internet. Oh oh yeah,
- 42:07Speaker 2: stucks that made its way to the World Wide Web.
- 42:10Speaker 1: What's crazy, though, is like I wonder, I wonder how
- 42:13Speaker 1: they found it, Like I wonder how they were able
- 42:15Speaker 1: to like finally trace it back. But I mean people
- 42:18Speaker 1: that understand this computer stuff though, are crazy smart.
- 42:21Speaker 2: Like, yeah, I tried, I really did.
- 42:25Speaker 1: While I was working in that field.
- 42:26Speaker 2: There's certain things, certain components that I like really dove
- 42:30Speaker 2: in on to try to become a better employee. And
- 42:32Speaker 2: then there were certain things where it's like I would
- 42:35Speaker 2: have to go to specialized training to understand what I'm
- 42:38Speaker 2: even reading right now. Like I don't speak code. I
- 42:41Speaker 2: can I can read binary, hexadecimal and octadecimal. I can
- 42:45Speaker 2: program PLCs. I could do these things to a certain level.
- 42:48Speaker 2: But like, brother, you're talking about doing some wild you know,
- 42:53Speaker 2: some computer program that I first off don't have access to,
- 42:57Speaker 2: a second I've never heard of before, And third, I
- 43:00Speaker 2: might know one guy from college that might know what
- 43:03Speaker 2: I'm even looking at, right, and no.
- 43:04Speaker 1: Two guys actually, off the top of my head that
- 43:06Speaker 1: would be the people. Actually one of them disappeared into
- 43:09Speaker 1: the into the government, and like, I'm not even actually,
- 43:15Speaker 1: you know, I'm not even exaggerating, Old Higgins. Wherever you Wiggins,
- 43:20Speaker 1: wherever you are, Higgins, I know you're out there, and
- 43:22Speaker 1: I'm sure you're somehow going to find this because Bro
- 43:25Speaker 1: is so smart. But yeah, I know he would be
- 43:27Speaker 1: the one to be able to do this.
- 43:29Speaker 2: Me shout out to Higgins, friend of the show he is, Yeah,
- 43:32Speaker 2: shout out. He'd be a great guy to have on
- 43:34Speaker 2: the show.
- 43:35Speaker 1: I doubt he'd be down and even find him anymore.
- 43:37Speaker 1: He literally went to work for the government and disappeared. Higgins.
- 43:41Speaker 2: If you're listening, Bro, drop us a.
- 43:42Speaker 1: Line off of all like all sources traces everything he's gone. God,
- 43:48Speaker 1: like your mail a letter to our po box. Speaking
- 43:52Speaker 1: of I know that he probably will somehow hear this.
- 43:55Speaker 1: I don't know why I know this, but like I
- 43:57Speaker 1: just feel it in my soul somehow way. But we
- 44:00Speaker 1: know a lot of people. I know a lot of
- 44:02Speaker 1: people that are in a lot of different weird places
- 44:04Speaker 1: in the world. But this stuff, though my mom would
- 44:07Speaker 1: be able to do it, not me. I'm I don't
- 44:09Speaker 1: understand it all because it's so even when I had
- 44:11Speaker 1: a program stuff from the basic level, so I had
- 44:14Speaker 1: to like build an entire program and like code it
- 44:17Speaker 1: out for cell phones to be able to talk to
- 44:19Speaker 1: each other and stuff, and for phones to be able
- 44:21Speaker 1: to work and stuff. Man, the only reason I'm gonna
- 44:24Speaker 1: be really honest that was the equipment you were physically
- 44:26Speaker 1: working on with your hands. So like you got me.
- 44:28Speaker 1: I got to like type on the computer, though I
- 44:30Speaker 1: had to like put them all together, and then I
- 44:32Speaker 1: had to like program it out. Memorization was my friend.
- 44:37Speaker 1: Like that's that's how I was able to do it.
- 44:38Speaker 1: But like just sitting with this stuff, I've watched people
- 44:42Speaker 1: that were actually smart enough to like break down codes
- 44:45Speaker 1: and like they're looking at all these things, and I
- 44:47Speaker 1: was like, what are we looking at? Like they're literally
- 44:49Speaker 1: just numbers. It might confused, but I look, I'm be
- 44:53Speaker 1: honest with you.
- 44:53Speaker 2: I thought I was I thought I was smart when
- 44:55Speaker 2: I learned how to program my radio. Yeah, because they
- 44:59Speaker 2: taught us how to do it to the tune of
- 45:00Speaker 2: Iron Man.
- 45:01Speaker 1: Nice.
- 45:02Speaker 2: Yeah, fuck now I forgot the first one, the first
- 45:04Speaker 2: two of it something something load and so that's how
- 45:08Speaker 2: you load my radio. Yeah, And I was.
- 45:11Speaker 1: Like, oh, I can remember that. I've already forgot it.
- 45:14Speaker 3: I mean.
- 45:16Speaker 1: That's what's crazy, though, is it's ever changing, like all
- 45:18Speaker 1: of us is, Yeah, constantly changing and involving. I think
- 45:21Speaker 1: the people that actually are hackers and do all that stuff,
- 45:25Speaker 1: you know, that's a level of genius though that oh
- 45:28Speaker 1: I would never come to like.
- 45:29Speaker 2: This required two separate groups of hackers geniuses, Like literally
- 45:34Speaker 2: all of them had to be geniuses to figure this out. So,
- 45:36Speaker 2: you know, we always talk about that the government definitely
- 45:38Speaker 2: has hacker groups. We're gonna be talking about two of
- 45:41Speaker 2: them on this one that are like famously known to
- 45:44Speaker 2: be Dark Web hackers that.
- 45:46Speaker 1: Like the thing that people don't know, like even I
- 45:49Speaker 1: know this. And I've been like, let's be really honest,
- 45:52Speaker 1: outside of like coming on the podcast, I've been living
- 45:55Speaker 1: in books, yeah, and like reading research and doing that stuff.
- 45:58Speaker 1: So like for me to know this, you guys all
- 46:01Speaker 1: know this. I feel like.
- 46:02Speaker 2: People might like they know it the same way that
- 46:06Speaker 2: they know that the refrigerator is currently on right now, right, Yeah,
- 46:11Speaker 2: like your refrigerator is running, catch it? No, no, no,
- 46:14Speaker 2: sious though, like, oh, you know I loved Dad Joe
- 46:19Speaker 2: dad jokes. You're solid anyway, you know that your refrigerator
- 46:23Speaker 2: is currently running, even though you don't actually know that.
- 46:27Speaker 1: Yeah, you know.
- 46:27Speaker 2: It's kind of like that. People probably know that there's
- 46:30Speaker 2: government sanctioned hacker groups operating at their behest, but they
- 46:34Speaker 2: haven't really given it much thought beyond that.
- 46:37Speaker 1: It's just one of those things. I don't know that
- 46:39Speaker 1: makes sense. When I was younger, and I was just
- 46:41Speaker 1: like cool, that is never going to be me. But like, look,
- 46:45Speaker 1: my mom built an entire system from the ground up,
- 46:48Speaker 1: like literally train herself built it for the entire company,
- 46:51Speaker 1: which the company she worked for was massive, by the way,
- 46:55Speaker 1: it is a massive company. She's the one that created
- 46:58Speaker 1: the entire system they still use to day. And I
- 47:01Speaker 1: was like, she would tell me about this stuff, and
- 47:02Speaker 1: I was like, man, I'm gonna go into the garden keyboard.
- 47:08Speaker 1: It's a keyboard for you. She showed me. Shit, nos,
- 47:15Speaker 1: it's like boo, my my dad needs some help out
- 47:19Speaker 1: there cleaning the cars or the chickens, or I'll go
- 47:22Speaker 1: water the plants. I'll go poll some wheeds. I was
- 47:24Speaker 1: like me, and she's like, yeah, you gotta like type here,
- 47:27Speaker 1: type here, click click. I was like, man, you lost
- 47:30Speaker 1: me on click one and type what, Like what are
- 47:33Speaker 1: we talking? I'm gonna have to get a notepad, like
- 47:35Speaker 1: I need you to tell me everything step by step
- 47:38Speaker 1: by step, and even then I'll probably fuck it up.
- 47:41Speaker 1: What's crazy, though, is I taught myself radio stuff.
- 47:43Speaker 2: So yeah, because it was important to you because it
- 47:46Speaker 2: was your job, right and it's something that was essentially
- 47:49Speaker 2: life or death at a certain point, So it got
- 47:50Speaker 2: a little more serious.
- 47:51Speaker 1: Yeah, radios and blue Force trackers and stuff like that,
- 47:54Speaker 1: which is like a computer program and stuff, you know,
- 47:57Speaker 1: and satellites and that stuff. Maybe because I just I
- 48:01Speaker 1: was like determined to make sure that we had the
- 48:03Speaker 1: best calm up possible because you know, people's lives literally
- 48:06Speaker 1: depended on it.
- 48:08Speaker 2: It's a little a little different scope, you know, a
- 48:11Speaker 2: little more weight behind it.
- 48:12Speaker 1: But just like sitting on the computer, I've actually like
- 48:14Speaker 1: looked into trying to do that, like the coding and
- 48:17Speaker 1: stuff like we're talking about. And I looked at it
- 48:19Speaker 1: for about five minutes and I was like, I don't
- 48:22Speaker 1: speak computer I was like, man, that's why fron was
- 48:25Speaker 1: a great movie.
- 48:26Speaker 2: For the job that I had. It was very much
- 48:29Speaker 2: like on my tools, like, yeah, every now and then
- 48:31Speaker 2: I have to get a laptop and hook up. But
- 48:33Speaker 2: that was the rare exception, you know what I mean?
- 48:37Speaker 2: That was that was the maybe maybe once every six
- 48:40Speaker 2: months there was something that required that level of technical
- 48:43Speaker 2: know how. Everything else was was fucking hand tools.
- 48:46Speaker 1: I feel like I drive truck like yo, like motor
- 48:49Speaker 1: T style on on this. Yes, shout out to motor
- 48:52Speaker 1: T Marines. We're not not on you. I will, but.
- 48:56Speaker 2: Rude, no, I'm not saying all motor Te marines or
- 49:00Speaker 2: ship I'm saying that the ones that I personally dealt
- 49:02Speaker 2: with in d C.
- 49:05Speaker 1: Were Okay, d C is like a fucking unicorn whatever
- 49:11Speaker 1: situation of another one, So like I recognize that, let's
- 49:15Speaker 1: just like bear with it, Okay, everything about you DC
- 49:18Speaker 1: is like fucking out of Narnia straight up. Like experiences
- 49:24Speaker 1: may very vastly from different planes in the Marine Corps,
- 49:28Speaker 1: like his experiences. My experiences are like completely and day,
- 49:32Speaker 1: night and day. I have friends that have experienced totally
- 49:34Speaker 1: different things. Hell, I still find out new moss in
- 49:38Speaker 1: the Marine Corps. That I'm like, what the fuck is that? Like?
- 49:42Speaker 2: Random use specialized things. It's like, there's only a thousand
- 49:45Speaker 2: of you in the entire Marine Corps. How do you promote?
- 49:47Speaker 1: Well, we kind of don't. Why are you doing this?
- 49:51Speaker 1: It's what the for? The fire and rescue people. Have
- 49:55Speaker 1: you ever met some of them? I met too, So
- 49:57Speaker 1: I've met so I knew for them because they happened
- 50:01Speaker 1: to be hunging, hanging out in calm school.
- 50:04Speaker 2: Were they like wingside was around the wing only I've
- 50:08Speaker 2: met two of them on a range one time. That's
- 50:10Speaker 2: the same place I met the weatherman, which was crazy.
- 50:13Speaker 1: There's a Marine Corps weatherman.
- 50:14Speaker 2: On airstrips because he has to know They have to
- 50:17Speaker 2: know the humidity, they have to know the wind direction,
- 50:20Speaker 2: all these things. I three weatherman. I'm like, so how
- 50:23Speaker 2: many of though? Were only this many in the wing?
- 50:25Speaker 2: I'm like, so you promote? When that guy gets out, I'm.
- 50:28Speaker 1: Like, fuck that he does pretty much. Look, I will
- 50:33Speaker 1: say though, that I that mos Tho the Fire and
- 50:36Speaker 1: Rescue is probably one of the toughest, most physically demanding
- 50:41Speaker 1: moses out of anyone in the Marine Corps. I witnessed
- 50:45Speaker 1: some of it. And I've actually talked to the people
- 50:47Speaker 1: that like actually passed, and I actually know two that
- 50:51Speaker 1: failed and became calm people. And I will say it
- 50:55Speaker 1: is by far one of the toughest, if not like
- 50:58Speaker 1: in the top three toughest moss in the Marine corps.
- 51:02Speaker 1: Like straight up, I want no problems with these people.
- 51:05Speaker 1: I want no smoke.
- 51:06Speaker 2: Oh no, ah no. But the two that I met,
- 51:10Speaker 2: they were stationed on an airstrip so that if there
- 51:13Speaker 2: was a crash land they could respond.
- 51:15Speaker 1: For a wild time. Anyways, back to.
- 51:17Speaker 2: Sorry, sorry sorry, So countdown to zero also places Stuck's
- 51:23Speaker 2: Net in political context. The first version of Stuck's Net
- 51:27Speaker 2: was built and unleashed by the Bush administration in two
- 51:30Speaker 2: thousand and seven. According to Zetter, Iran accelerated its enrichment
- 51:34Speaker 2: process in two thousand and eight, so they installed it
- 51:38Speaker 2: right at a critical point when Iran was trying to
- 51:40Speaker 2: ramp up production. President Obama inherited the program. He not
- 51:44Speaker 2: only continued it, but accelerated it.
- 51:47Speaker 1: So here's the deal.
- 51:47Speaker 2: When Bush was doing his pass down with Obama, he like,
- 51:51Speaker 2: of all the things, all things, Yes, we got this
- 51:53Speaker 2: going on. Listen, there's this secret program.
- 51:56Speaker 1: Keep going with it. If you don't want.
- 51:58Speaker 2: To deal with Iran attacking Israel and that to us problem,
- 52:01Speaker 2: you need to just lean into this. Let the nerds
- 52:04Speaker 2: do their nerd thing and let them fuck up the
- 52:07Speaker 2: Iranian nuclear shit to where we don't actually have to
- 52:09Speaker 2: shoot a bullet. And Obama was like, got you say
- 52:14Speaker 2: less and just decided to throw more funding behind it.
- 52:17Speaker 2: Super low key under the radar. So anyway, Another more
- 52:22Speaker 2: aggressive version of stucks net was released in June two
- 52:25Speaker 2: thousand and nine, and again in twenty ten. Obama gave
- 52:29Speaker 2: the order to unleash stucks Net while publicly demanding Iran
- 52:32Speaker 2: to open itself up to negotiations. This is this is
- 52:35Speaker 2: that that'll rope a dope. You know what I'm saying.
- 52:39Speaker 1: Look over here. Meanwhile, I'm fucking you over here, and
- 52:42Speaker 1: you know what I'm saying.
- 52:43Speaker 2: You're looking at my face listen, iron Actually I'm not
- 52:46Speaker 2: trying to do my my Obama pression.
- 52:47Speaker 1: Oh god, here we go.
- 52:48Speaker 2: We need the iatola to come to the negotiation tables
- 52:53Speaker 2: and uh stop this whole nuclear fiasco before it happens.
- 52:59Speaker 2: I actually do a pretty decent Obama.
- 53:01Speaker 1: It's alright, it's all right, one, all.
- 53:05Speaker 2: Meanwhile, in reality, they were They were slipping an even
- 53:10Speaker 2: harder to find, more aggressive version of the virus into
- 53:13Speaker 2: their nuclear program. And old BOYD already died. So how
- 53:17Speaker 2: they do that, you might ask, It's a great question.
- 53:19Speaker 2: Let's read more. Obama gave you Orr said that, ra
- 53:23Speaker 2: I'm sorry. The effectiveness of the world's first cyber weapon
- 53:26Speaker 2: remains a subject of debate. The most optimistic assessment of
- 53:29Speaker 2: Stuck's net is that it delayed and slowed Iran's uranium
- 53:33Speaker 2: development enough to dissuade Israel from unilaterally striking the country,
- 53:38Speaker 2: and it afforded time for intelligence and diplomatic efforts. Stuck's
- 53:42Speaker 2: net contributed to dissension and frustration among the upper ranks
- 53:46Speaker 2: of Iran's government. The head of Iran's nuclear program was
- 53:49Speaker 2: replaced and bought time killed he obviously he was killed,
- 53:54Speaker 2: and it bought time for harsh economic sanctions to impact
- 53:57Speaker 2: Iranian public to a point. To a point, right, like
- 54:03Speaker 2: Iran has always had their homies that they do business with,
- 54:06Speaker 2: they have become ostracized from the rest of the world community.
- 54:09Speaker 2: They're one of these nations like North Korea that like
- 54:12Speaker 2: no one wants to fuck with. But the only ones
- 54:14Speaker 2: that are willing to fuck with, like they go hard with,
- 54:17Speaker 2: you know what I mean. Same with like North Korea
- 54:19Speaker 2: and China. China doesn't like Kim Jong, but like no
- 54:24Speaker 2: one else is willing to reach out to them, so
- 54:26Speaker 2: they they're tight like that kind of thing. Iran's the
- 54:29Speaker 2: same with China and Russia.
- 54:31Speaker 1: Food for thought.
- 54:32Speaker 2: Stuck's Net actually had very little effect on Iran's nuclear program.
- 54:37Speaker 2: It was premature. It could have had a much bigger
- 54:39Speaker 2: effect had the attackers weighted. Iran still made a net
- 54:43Speaker 2: gain in their uranium stockpile while being attacked, and they
- 54:47Speaker 2: are updating their centrifuges, which would make Stuck's Net obsolete.
- 54:53Speaker 2: To say that they up their uranium stockpile, that's a
- 54:55Speaker 2: true statement.
- 54:56Speaker 3: It did.
- 54:56Speaker 1: They didn't upgrade their enriched geranium stockpile. It was all like, you.
- 55:03Speaker 2: Know, unrefined, so to speak. The more unsettling parts of
- 55:08Speaker 2: the books catalog security vulnerabilities in America's public infrastructure which
- 55:13Speaker 2: could easily be victim to a stucks Neet style attack,
- 55:17Speaker 2: and considered the implications of the era sucks Net heralded.
- 55:21Speaker 2: For example, in two thousand and one, hackers attacked California ISO,
- 55:26Speaker 2: a nonprofit corporation that manages the transmission system for moving
- 55:30Speaker 2: electricity through most of California. More recently, Zeta writes that
- 55:34Speaker 2: in twenty eleven, a security research team quote penetrated the
- 55:38Speaker 2: remote access system for the Southern California Water Plant and
- 55:42Speaker 2: was able to take control of equipment the facility used
- 55:45Speaker 2: for adding chemicals to drinking water end quote. And y'all
- 55:49Speaker 2: might remember that twenty eleven there was this whole cyber
- 55:51Speaker 2: attack where they had lost.
- 55:53Speaker 1: Control of water valves, and I remember.
- 55:56Speaker 2: People kind of downplayed that, like, oh, yeah, hackers and
- 56:00Speaker 2: get in terms of water valves. Ooh, And it's like
- 56:04Speaker 2: we should kind of look a little deeper into this.
- 56:05Speaker 2: How were hackers able to hack into a city's water
- 56:09Speaker 2: mainframe in order to shut and close and open valves?
- 56:13Speaker 2: And like, that's that's not a good thing. And if
- 56:15Speaker 2: that's vulnerable, how secure is the rest of our infrastructure.
- 56:20Speaker 2: Water's kind of critical to human life, some might say,
- 56:23Speaker 2: the second most important thing next to air. Yet somehow
- 56:27Speaker 2: some hacker group was able to just do that. Yeah,
- 56:30Speaker 2: that's a bit concerning.
- 56:32Speaker 1: You know, what kills me is the open air water
- 56:35Speaker 1: tanks and stuff back in the day. I don't know
- 56:37Speaker 1: if they still have those. Some do, but like there
- 56:40Speaker 1: was Yeah, I always thought about that when I was
- 56:42Speaker 1: driving past them, and I'm like, they're massive, huge water
- 56:46Speaker 1: tanks that are open aired, and it's like, anyone could
- 56:49Speaker 1: poison this. And I was saying about that when I
- 56:51Speaker 1: was like a kid. I was like, anybody could poison
- 56:54Speaker 1: this and at any point and then we hear all
- 56:56Speaker 1: about China's bullshit, and then you know, this happens and
- 56:59Speaker 1: it's like, okay, well, if they can do that, then
- 57:02Speaker 1: they can make all sorts of other things happen with
- 57:04Speaker 1: the water. Yeah, which we need the water to be
- 57:07Speaker 1: able to survive.
- 57:08Speaker 2: Well, so all right, throwing poison into a water tank,
- 57:11Speaker 2: I'm with you, right, but that's what we would call
- 57:13Speaker 2: a kinetic attack. There was something physical that took place there. Yeah,
- 57:17Speaker 2: And I've said the same thing. I worked at a
- 57:19Speaker 2: shell for a good chunk of time, and there's these
- 57:24Speaker 2: massive butted dying tanks that are really close to the highway.
- 57:29Speaker 1: If you don't know what butted dying is, look it up.
- 57:32Speaker 2: What I'm saying is if a person, some domestic or
- 57:36Speaker 2: foreign terroriced group were to shoot some sort of an
- 57:41Speaker 2: exploding projectile at those tanks. The city is now a crater,
- 57:46Speaker 2: jeez like, because that would set off a chain reaction.
- 57:50Speaker 2: That would set off a chain reaction. It would probably
- 57:52Speaker 2: like re route the Mississippi River on some very real levels.
- 57:56Speaker 2: These tanks are behind a chain link fence. You can
- 57:59Speaker 2: visibly see them from the road, and nobody has thought
- 58:03Speaker 2: of upping security, putting some tree foliage up in the
- 58:07Speaker 2: front to kind of block them nothing.
- 58:08Speaker 1: Because some of the stuff they have around the country,
- 58:12Speaker 1: Because I've drove around this country a lot and I
- 58:15Speaker 1: see things and I'm like, yeah, who thought of this?
- 58:18Speaker 1: Like who decided that this was like a good idea
- 58:21Speaker 1: to just like leave open and accessible to anybody at all.
- 58:26Speaker 1: And it's just like, Okay, it's wild to me. You
- 58:29Speaker 1: hear some things that don't make any lock of sense,
- 58:32Speaker 1: and then other things that make sense you just leave
- 58:35Speaker 1: completely vulnerable to any attack.
- 58:37Speaker 2: Yeah, but again we're talking about kinetic attacks. Yeah, cyber
- 58:42Speaker 2: attacks are something different.
- 58:43Speaker 1: Cyber attacks are total but like them shutting off just
- 58:46Speaker 1: the water supply and all of that. You're talking about,
- 58:48Speaker 1: what if they got ahold of the dams. Yes, the
- 58:50Speaker 1: dams are what I mean really, like, if you're really
- 58:53Speaker 1: gonna fuck with some stuff, the dams really could fucking with.
- 58:58Speaker 2: The entire drinking water situation of California, especially knowing how
- 59:03Speaker 2: much of a drought they're always in. That's bad enough,
- 59:05Speaker 2: but even still dams, Or how about the power grid?
- 59:10Speaker 1: Or how about our own nuclear power.
- 59:11Speaker 2: Plants or our own nuclear defense systems, Like there's so
- 59:17Speaker 2: many levels that like, Okay, if you were able to
- 59:19Speaker 2: do this, what's stopping you from doing that?
- 59:23Speaker 1: The power grid situation, though, is just a nightmare.
- 59:27Speaker 2: Our power grid is so I think vulnerable.
- 59:30Speaker 1: I think we're gonna have to do an actual episode
- 59:33Speaker 1: on the power grid.
- 59:34Speaker 2: Sure good.
- 59:34Speaker 1: When I learned about it the first time, I actually
- 59:37Speaker 1: tracked it through because I was in this energy class.
- 59:40Speaker 1: We're talking about all the different types of energy and stuff,
- 59:42Speaker 1: and we started talking about the power grid, and I
- 59:43Speaker 1: was like, let me look into this, and it is
- 59:47Speaker 1: just the most ridiculous thing. I mean, if we're talking
- 59:50Speaker 1: about they did this for years, yeah, and we they
- 59:53Speaker 1: know like at least it had the it's called zero
- 59:57Speaker 1: what again, zero points or zero zero?
- 1:00:00Speaker 2: I'm sorry, shit, you fucked it screwed up. Hold on,
- 1:00:03Speaker 2: we're gonna find it now on zero not zero day.
- 1:00:06Speaker 1: Huh uh? Countdown to zero day?
- 1:00:09Speaker 2: Yeah, zero day.
- 1:00:10Speaker 1: So they had five of those things, Ye easily you
- 1:00:14Speaker 1: could do. You use that and just absolutely wreak havoc
- 1:00:19Speaker 1: in so many areas oh yeah of America. I mean realistically,
- 1:00:22Speaker 1: that they attacked or just did a few centralized places,
- 1:00:27Speaker 1: we would be screwed, fucked. And it's like, Okay, well
- 1:00:30Speaker 1: you showed your hand by using this, and by doing it,
- 1:00:33Speaker 1: I guess by doing it too early, it wasn't as effective.
- 1:00:36Speaker 1: I mean, but that's the thing that is you would
- 1:00:38Speaker 1: you want them to have complete access and have everything
- 1:00:42Speaker 1: set up and then go in and do it. Your
- 1:00:44Speaker 1: chances of actually getting to that point, though, verse while
- 1:00:48Speaker 1: it's on the starting ground up and no one's really
- 1:00:50Speaker 1: paying much mind who's around, is the better optional, least
- 1:00:54Speaker 1: in my eyes.
- 1:00:55Speaker 2: Well, so this was the first cyber warfare attack that
- 1:01:00Speaker 2: had ever been committed. Now, yeah, you had like viruses
- 1:01:04Speaker 2: in like chain emails and things like the trojan horses,
- 1:01:08Speaker 2: or somebody would download some music from Pirate Bay or
- 1:01:11Speaker 2: lime Wire or frost Wire one of those where it
- 1:01:14Speaker 2: was like, okay, this probably has a virus on it. Okay,
- 1:01:16Speaker 2: that was a thing that happened this like specifically for
- 1:01:21Speaker 2: the purpose of warfare, and to go from Oh, we're
- 1:01:24Speaker 2: not just trying to shut down their computer system, We're
- 1:01:26Speaker 2: trying to make their machines destroy themselves. Nothing like this
- 1:01:30Speaker 2: had ever been attempted before. They didn't even know if
- 1:01:32Speaker 2: it was possible. But then when they realized, like, oh,
- 1:01:35Speaker 2: we could just call siemens see what the weak link is,
- 1:01:38Speaker 2: and we could hire a couple of like teams of hackers,
- 1:01:41Speaker 2: and we could get with Israel because America wanted Israel
- 1:01:44Speaker 2: in on this to be the patsy, because if this
- 1:01:47Speaker 2: was discovered, America could completely step back and be like,
- 1:01:51Speaker 2: I kid, you.
- 1:01:52Speaker 1: Hear what Israel just did that?
- 1:01:55Speaker 2: Can you believe Mussad did cyber warfare in realcy like
- 1:02:00Speaker 2: it was. I would actually argue that it was more
- 1:02:03Speaker 2: of a US thing than an Israel thing. It was
- 1:02:07Speaker 2: it's more of a threat to Israel if Iron has
- 1:02:09Speaker 2: nuclear weapons. It was more of a US as far
- 1:02:12Speaker 2: as who put the gas in the tank to make
- 1:02:14Speaker 2: this car go?
- 1:02:16Speaker 1: You know what I'm saying. We were we were footing
- 1:02:18Speaker 1: that bill like an eighty twenty split. I would I
- 1:02:20Speaker 1: would think, but cyber weapons are definitely a scary thing
- 1:02:24Speaker 1: because we don't have a lot of people that can
- 1:02:27Speaker 1: actually combat this. Like I feel, yeah, we have a
- 1:02:30Speaker 1: team obviously, we have like groups that are dedicated with Hell,
- 1:02:33Speaker 1: they made an entire new branch in the military that
- 1:02:35Speaker 1: is just for this Space Force. No, they made the
- 1:02:38Speaker 1: cyber Group. Remember they just signed it in Oh wait.
- 1:02:42Speaker 2: They're trying to make a new branch of the military
- 1:02:43Speaker 2: right now.
- 1:02:43Speaker 1: I remember they signed it in Oh god, all about
- 1:02:46Speaker 1: cyber weapons. Did they pass it? I know where they
- 1:02:49Speaker 1: were talking about. You know, I actually don't know. I'd
- 1:02:51Speaker 1: have to look it up, but I mean.
- 1:02:53Speaker 2: Dude, what is that branch going to be called the nerds?
- 1:02:57Speaker 1: I don't even know. But I'm not trying to be funny.
- 1:02:59Speaker 1: But also, like, yo, what do you call that?
- 1:03:01Speaker 2: Like we got Air Force, Army, Space Force, which is
- 1:03:04Speaker 2: already weird and crazy enough.
- 1:03:07Speaker 1: Space Force is kind of cyber Force. Like, I don't know,
- 1:03:11Speaker 1: you know what I think it is? Cyber Force was no,
- 1:03:14Speaker 1: we read it. Remember, dude, if hyber Force cyber Command, cyber.
- 1:03:25Speaker 2: Command, cyber Command, which clearly needs to be under the
- 1:03:28Speaker 2: auspices of the Space Force, that doesn't need its own
- 1:03:30Speaker 2: independent branch.
- 1:03:31Speaker 1: But like, all right, cool, I guess to be honest,
- 1:03:34Speaker 1: I don't Cybermission Force.
- 1:03:37Speaker 2: But who's that is that? It's not a branch, is it.
- 1:03:39Speaker 1: Let me see what the fuck is Trump doing now?
- 1:03:42Speaker 1: He signed one in. I'm I promise you're for I'm
- 1:03:46Speaker 1: gonna have to look into it. Yeah, because it's the
- 1:03:49Speaker 1: US Cyber Command Lunar Force. They even have like a
- 1:03:52Speaker 1: whole thing, like they have a whole website and everything.
- 1:03:56Speaker 2: I'm not sure a branch is a wing, but anyway, anyway,
- 1:04:01Speaker 2: So but to your point, yeah, we have teams that
- 1:04:04Speaker 2: are working in that regard to stop these attacks, but
- 1:04:08Speaker 2: your average citizen can't do anything about that. Most and
- 1:04:11Speaker 2: if they could, they could learn how to like, you know,
- 1:04:14Speaker 2: learn the programming code and try to find ways to
- 1:04:16Speaker 2: make themselves more secure.
- 1:04:18Speaker 1: But how many Americans are actually gonna like do that?
- 1:04:21Speaker 1: Real shit? What you find is not officially a branch yet,
- 1:04:26Speaker 1: but they have ongoing proposals and they've signed in all
- 1:04:29Speaker 1: sorts of stuff as a new service branch under the
- 1:04:31Speaker 1: Army to address the emerging cyber threats under the Army,
- 1:04:35Speaker 1: And as of like a month ago, they released a
- 1:04:38Speaker 1: whole thing saying that the US Cyber Force is inevitable.
- 1:04:44Speaker 1: It's gonna happen. It's going to be a whole new branch.
- 1:04:46Speaker 1: Because Space Forces was his first one. Now the Cyber
- 1:04:50Speaker 1: Force is this one. Because remember he's still pushing Ai
- 1:04:53Speaker 1: so hard in the race for Ai. So I wouldn't
- 1:04:56Speaker 1: doubt that this was the thing because honestly, a lot
- 1:04:58Speaker 1: of the tax feel like they're more cyber anyways. I
- 1:05:02Speaker 1: mean you could do so much from the web now
- 1:05:06Speaker 1: and access everything because everything is digital. Yeah, so instead
- 1:05:10Speaker 1: of like having somebody turning a valve somewhere doing something
- 1:05:13Speaker 1: by hand, now everything's ranmed by the computer.
- 1:05:16Speaker 3: Dude.
- 1:05:17Speaker 1: Plus you got the AIS that are integrated into everything.
- 1:05:20Speaker 2: Like, I gotta tell you, I'm happy the Marine Corps
- 1:05:22Speaker 2: is never gonna have like something under it.
- 1:05:25Speaker 1: I don't know, like the Navy. Like the Marine Corps
- 1:05:28Speaker 1: is under the Navy.
- 1:05:29Speaker 2: The Air Force was under the Army and they got
- 1:05:32Speaker 2: their own thing going on now, and now they have
- 1:05:34Speaker 2: something under them with the Space Force. The Coast Guard's
- 1:05:36Speaker 2: homeland security they don't count, and now the Army's about
- 1:05:39Speaker 2: to have the cyber Force.
- 1:05:41Speaker 1: I'm so happy.
- 1:05:41Speaker 2: The Marine Corps is just the sledgehammer that we don't
- 1:05:44Speaker 2: need something under We don't need some sort of specialized
- 1:05:47Speaker 2: department underneath us. We can do a thing, you know
- 1:05:50Speaker 2: what I mean, what would our specialized group look like?
- 1:05:54Speaker 1: Genocide?
- 1:06:00Speaker 2: We're launching the eighth branch of the United States Military,
- 1:06:04Speaker 2: the genocide Branch under the United States Marine Corps.
- 1:06:07Speaker 1: And everybody's like, what, so what, It's just kill.
- 1:06:12Speaker 2: That's it, the kill Branch. I'm here for it.
- 1:06:18Speaker 1: I'm so upset if I couldn't join, I'd be like, well,
- 1:06:21Speaker 1: what's the age bracket? What if it was like the
- 1:06:24Speaker 1: Dirty Old Veterans branch? Just have like a dirty old
- 1:06:27Speaker 1: veterans like the Dirty Dozen, except for the dirty old veterans.
- 1:06:32Speaker 2: Like I've said this for years, if you were to
- 1:06:34Speaker 2: give every redneck, don't look at their criminal history.
- 1:06:38Speaker 1: We're not here to talk about that.
- 1:06:40Speaker 2: But like nine to eleven goes down al kind, all
- 1:06:42Speaker 2: things got to get to Afghanistan. Dude, find every old,
- 1:06:46Speaker 2: fucking crotchety redneck and make sure they are well plied
- 1:06:50Speaker 2: with dip Marlboro Reds and as much beer as they require.
- 1:06:54Speaker 2: Do not skimp on the beer, and tell them that
- 1:06:57Speaker 2: there's no hunting limit on this particular thing like this
- 1:07:01Speaker 2: whole situation will be done before hunting seasons out.
- 1:07:04Speaker 1: There's a whole thing going around right now about this
- 1:07:07Speaker 1: guy in the UK that challenged Americans and said, we
- 1:07:10Speaker 1: want you to send one hundred Americans a verse one
- 1:07:14Speaker 1: hundred of us no weapons and we'll see who wins. Brother,
- 1:07:18Speaker 1: the comments in the videos that have spun from this,
- 1:07:22Speaker 1: and then I watch Old Boy today with one hand
- 1:07:26Speaker 1: carrying a fucking badger, a honey badger carried a badger
- 1:07:31Speaker 1: and she's like that ain't no puppy baby, and he's like,
- 1:07:34Speaker 1: oh I but still look at it. It's so cute.
- 1:07:37Speaker 1: This motherfucker is like ah, and he's like just one
- 1:07:41Speaker 1: hand in it.
- 1:07:41Speaker 2: And it's like Redbeard Gingerous, fuck camouflage pants, no shirt man,
- 1:07:47Speaker 2: like the man knows the way around the trailer.
- 1:07:49Speaker 1: I was like, so you want to put up him
- 1:07:52Speaker 1: and some Florida man's and some blackheads and some waffle
- 1:07:55Speaker 1: house workers' sam and uh, you want to throw them
- 1:08:01Speaker 1: in a fight over there? Like like no, I know
- 1:08:04Speaker 1: that Britain has. It's like rough areas. They're scrappy. I
- 1:08:08Speaker 1: will say they are. They are scrappy and they can
- 1:08:10Speaker 1: fight real good in a lot of videos I've seen.
- 1:08:13Speaker 1: They're they're pretty good fighters.
- 1:08:14Speaker 2: I've met the British Royal Marines. There are some solo jets.
- 1:08:17Speaker 2: They're really bad gents. But we're talking just your average
- 1:08:21Speaker 2: run of the mill American, your average running the mill brit.
- 1:08:25Speaker 1: Yeah, we're just talking about the average.
- 1:08:27Speaker 2: We're just do we really want that? Like, does does
- 1:08:30Speaker 2: Britain want that smoke?
- 1:08:31Speaker 1: Like? Actually, I feel like some of them do. Someone
- 1:08:34Speaker 1: want to talk shit, but hey, we can all be
- 1:08:37Speaker 1: their helicleberryes.
- 1:08:38Speaker 2: No, it's like Britain needs they can move here. We're
- 1:08:41Speaker 2: not a Muslim nation like the UK is right now,
- 1:08:44Speaker 2: like y'all could come here and just like try it,
- 1:08:47Speaker 2: you know, try try being an American for a little bit,
- 1:08:50Speaker 2: then come with that same energy.
- 1:08:51Speaker 1: I love a lot of English people that I've met though.
- 1:08:54Speaker 1: They're just so fantastic.
- 1:08:55Speaker 2: So you know why they're fantastic because you met them
- 1:08:58Speaker 2: here and they are so fucking happy to be in America.
- 1:09:01Speaker 1: Now. I mean a lot of I'm like I was
- 1:09:04Speaker 1: friends with those some that are overseas, like I told
- 1:09:06Speaker 1: you still yeah oh wow rip yeah, no, they like
- 1:09:10Speaker 1: they're gone. We have quite a few listeners from over
- 1:09:12Speaker 1: there too, and like they're I feel bad for everybody
- 1:09:16Speaker 1: that's suffering through a lot of what they're going through.
- 1:09:17Speaker 1: But to the point though that they I.
- 1:09:21Speaker 2: Don't know, every British person ever talked to like wishes
- 1:09:24Speaker 2: they were in America.
- 1:09:25Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I mean that's that's fair. But they have
- 1:09:28Speaker 1: great architecture at least.
- 1:09:30Speaker 2: Yeah, it is pretty cool. I have a friend of
- 1:09:32Speaker 2: mine who she lives in a house that's like four
- 1:09:35Speaker 2: hundred years old. Yeah, and I'm like, what, like that's
- 1:09:39Speaker 2: like a normal thing for her little area, And I'm
- 1:09:41Speaker 2: just like.
- 1:09:42Speaker 1: That's so much cool shit over there when.
- 1:09:43Speaker 2: Your house is older than my country. And she's like, yeah, yeah,
- 1:09:47Speaker 2: it's just how it is.
- 1:09:49Speaker 1: It's just how it is.
- 1:09:50Speaker 2: And like the town's built so dense that like nobody's
- 1:09:52Speaker 2: tearing it down to build something new, Like no one's
- 1:09:55Speaker 2: got money like that. So she's just yeah, I would
- 1:09:57Speaker 2: just keep updating it. But they still have this issue
- 1:09:59Speaker 2: against air conditioning, which is still do.
- 1:10:02Speaker 1: Not understand that. But that's a whole I told you.
- 1:10:04Speaker 2: About that chick. How about yogurt on the windows?
- 1:10:07Speaker 1: Yeah, dude, it's really it's but it's become a political thing.
- 1:10:12Speaker 2: I'm seeing articles like is air conditioning a conservative ploy?
- 1:10:17Speaker 2: They are politicizing air conditioning because apparently sweat is like
- 1:10:24Speaker 2: it's a Republican.
- 1:10:25Speaker 1: Democrat thing over there.
- 1:10:27Speaker 2: Oh well whatever, Okay, the crunchies over there are like
- 1:10:30Speaker 2: ace is bad for the earth.
- 1:10:32Speaker 1: She's crying. Meanwhile, everybody's like, dude, fuck you, I love
- 1:10:36Speaker 1: my don't we don't have to sweat if we don't
- 1:10:38Speaker 1: need to, you know, like, okay, to the.
- 1:10:41Speaker 2: Back to the point here. Anyway, So the Obama administration
- 1:10:43Speaker 2: is publicly announced that shoring up infrastructure security is a
- 1:10:48Speaker 2: top priority. ZETR finds this ironic because unleashing stucksnet has
- 1:10:52Speaker 2: opened the US up two attacks using the same malware,
- 1:10:56Speaker 2: which we can talk about in a bit about the
- 1:10:59Speaker 2: argument of how stucks net got out into the mainframe
- 1:11:02Speaker 2: and absolutely did wreak a little bit of havoc on
- 1:11:05Speaker 2: the United States.
- 1:11:06Speaker 1: There's actually a list.
- 1:11:07Speaker 2: Of countries that it had a little bit of some playtime,
- 1:11:11Speaker 2: and we're on the list, among some other nations. We'll
- 1:11:15Speaker 2: talk about that a bit. Anyway, when you launch a
- 1:11:17Speaker 2: cyber weapon, you don't just send the weapon to your enemies.
- 1:11:20Speaker 2: You send the intellectual property that created it and the
- 1:11:23Speaker 2: ability to launch the weapon back against you, which is understandable.
- 1:11:27Speaker 2: It's like reverse engineering. Once they figure it out, they
- 1:11:29Speaker 2: can just replicate it, add a little extra flare to it,
- 1:11:33Speaker 2: add a couple more of these zero days to it,
- 1:11:35Speaker 2: and then tada, Now it's something that you can't see.
- 1:11:38Speaker 2: You no reverse So Marcus Rinnan, one of the early
- 1:11:42Speaker 2: innovators of the computer firewall, called Stuck's net a stone
- 1:11:46Speaker 2: throne by people who live in a glasshouse. One of
- 1:11:50Speaker 2: the dudes who created the firewall said that about this, wow.
- 1:11:54Speaker 1: Yeah.
- 1:11:55Speaker 2: More broadly, stucks Net heralded an era of cyber warfare
- 1:11:58Speaker 2: that could prove to be more to instructive than the
- 1:12:00Speaker 2: nuclear era. For Zetter, there is also irony to the
- 1:12:04Speaker 2: use of cyber weapons to combat nuclear weapons. She quotesnet
- 1:12:09Speaker 2: Cannet Benedict, God, what a weird name. Cannet Benedict, the
- 1:12:14Speaker 2: executive director of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pointing
- 1:12:18Speaker 2: out quote that the first acknowledged military use of cyber
- 1:12:22Speaker 2: warfare is ostensibly to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
- 1:12:27Speaker 2: A new age of mass destruction will begin. In an
- 1:12:30Speaker 2: effort to close a chapter from the first age of
- 1:12:33Speaker 2: mass destruction, that's actually pretty deep. That's absolutely wild, and
- 1:12:41Speaker 2: a lot of people have the same fears. The US
- 1:12:43Speaker 2: lost the moral high ground from where it could tell
- 1:12:45Speaker 2: other countries to not use digital weapons to resolve disputes.
- 1:12:49Speaker 2: No one has been killed by a cyber attack, but
- 1:12:51Speaker 2: I think it's only a matter of time. For the record,
- 1:12:55Speaker 2: we lost the moral high ground, arguably in the sixties.
- 1:13:00Speaker 2: Just throwing it out so like it's cool. There's nothing
- 1:13:03Speaker 2: new here. We're doing some foul ass shit. But anyway,
- 1:13:06Speaker 2: all right, a little bit of the background into this
- 1:13:09Speaker 2: book that talks about it. Here countdown to zero day,
- 1:13:13Speaker 2: Kim Zetter, I highly recommend people go read the book.
- 1:13:15Speaker 2: Shout out to Kim's Edter, friend of the show. And
- 1:13:18Speaker 2: now let's talk a little bit more about Operation Olympic Games,
- 1:13:21Speaker 2: which is what the code name for this was. So
- 1:13:23Speaker 2: it was an unacknowledged campaign of sabotage by means of
- 1:13:27Speaker 2: cyber disruption directed at Iranian nuclear facilities by the United
- 1:13:31Speaker 2: States and Israel. Allegedly as reported, it is one of
- 1:13:35Speaker 2: the first known uses of offensive cyber weapons. Started under
- 1:13:38Speaker 2: the administration of George Bush in two thousand and six,
- 1:13:42Speaker 2: The Olympic Games was accelerated under Obama, who heated Bush's
- 1:13:45Speaker 2: advice to continue cyber attacks on the Iranian nuclear facility
- 1:13:49Speaker 2: at Natan's. That same spot is also one of the
- 1:13:53Speaker 2: spots that Trump Trump Trump dropped the crazy deep bunker buster.
- 1:13:58Speaker 2: It was at this facility, this same one that we
- 1:14:00Speaker 2: had been fucking with for the past like fifteen years
- 1:14:03Speaker 2: or whatever.
- 1:14:04Speaker 1: You know.
- 1:14:05Speaker 2: Anyway, Bush believed that the strategy was the only way
- 1:14:09Speaker 2: to prevent in its really conventional strike on Irani and
- 1:14:12Speaker 2: nuclear facilities. So we were trying to keep it out
- 1:14:15Speaker 2: of going kinetic by trying to go sneaky, sneaky, you know,
- 1:14:19Speaker 2: do a little secret squirrel shit. And now look, Iran
- 1:14:22Speaker 2: doesn't have nukes, So it seems like the weapon or
- 1:14:24Speaker 2: the mission was a success. In reality, y'all I did
- 1:14:28Speaker 2: was kick the can down the road two administrations. We
- 1:14:32Speaker 2: could argue four administrations, and now we're having the same problem,
- 1:14:36Speaker 2: except now we are absolutely making it kinetic. The straight
- 1:14:39Speaker 2: of horn Moves is closed every other day, and dude,
- 1:14:42Speaker 2: I'm so fucking tired of hearing Trump do this shit where.
- 1:14:45Speaker 1: We're about to unleash absolute havoc.
- 1:14:48Speaker 2: The likes of which the world has never seen. Since
- 1:14:51Speaker 2: World War Two, and then Iran's like, okay, listen, we're
- 1:14:53Speaker 2: willing to come to the negotiation table. All right, we're
- 1:14:56Speaker 2: gonna put the bombs down. We're gonna talk. Give it
- 1:14:59Speaker 2: three days. The talks are not happening. We're gonna bomb
- 1:15:02Speaker 2: the shit out of them. Okay, now we're ready to
- 1:15:04Speaker 2: go to the talks. Okay, we're gonna put the bombs down.
- 1:15:06Speaker 2: We're gonna talk. It's been this on repeat four months
- 1:15:11Speaker 2: and I'm over it. Just drop the fucking bombs and
- 1:15:13Speaker 2: let's move on with their lives. Not nukes, obviously, but yeah,
- 1:15:17Speaker 2: we could send them back to the Stone Age.
- 1:15:19Speaker 1: I mean. But that's the thing, though, is they're only
- 1:15:21Speaker 1: going to put the citizens that don't want anything to
- 1:15:23Speaker 1: do with this in harm's way. They're gonna take all
- 1:15:26Speaker 1: the other dipshit citizens and all the people that are
- 1:15:28Speaker 1: loyaled to them, and then they're gonna move those out
- 1:15:31Speaker 1: of the places that they're gonna get dropped on.
- 1:15:33Speaker 2: So they don't give a fuck about their own citizens.
- 1:15:35Speaker 2: They just murdered thirty thousand of them in a week.
- 1:15:37Speaker 1: And remember I'm talking about those that are loyal. I'm
- 1:15:39Speaker 1: talking about the ones that were riding through the streets.
- 1:15:42Speaker 1: The women that they had parading around. I don't know
- 1:15:45Speaker 1: if you ever saw those videos, oh with the hood jobs.
- 1:15:47Speaker 1: They were like parading for the Ayatola. Yes, and they
- 1:15:50Speaker 1: were like in the back of the cars and they
- 1:15:52Speaker 1: were all doing all this stuff because that'd be there
- 1:15:54Speaker 1: they get the shit be down when they get home.
- 1:15:56Speaker 1: They were driving too, they were trying to show they
- 1:15:58Speaker 1: were trying to show that they were aggressive. Wow, And
- 1:16:02Speaker 1: they had how many wrecks were there that day because
- 1:16:04Speaker 1: they put all the women at the at that one
- 1:16:07Speaker 1: facility place too that they were trying to like they
- 1:16:09Speaker 1: had it surround them. You know, they've surrounded those places
- 1:16:12Speaker 1: that they were supposedly supposed to bomb. I know you're
- 1:16:14Speaker 1: I'm existing. I'm not. I'm not.
- 1:16:16Speaker 2: Every Every fucking curve in Tehran has black marks on it.
- 1:16:19Speaker 1: Now, I swear it got Mmm who's hit more curves? Women?
- 1:16:27Speaker 1: Women more than men. I think that's a mathematical certainty.
- 1:16:29Speaker 2: But especially because these women haven't driven in years and
- 1:16:34Speaker 2: now they're just on the.
- 1:16:35Speaker 1: Road you've ever seen You've never seen the Middle Eastern
- 1:16:39Speaker 1: people would drive. And it is it is the thing.
- 1:16:41Speaker 2: It is the part that it was the rear view mirrors, like.
- 1:16:45Speaker 1: On the hood. Yeah, they'd be rallying. Man, they the
- 1:16:51Speaker 1: crazy stuff, and I'm like, I'm here for it. Let's go.
- 1:16:54Speaker 1: But like, uh yeah, no.
- 1:16:56Speaker 2: Y shouts out to the Middle Eastern truck drivers who
- 1:16:59Speaker 2: have turned the cab of their ride into a Turkish bazaar.
- 1:17:03Speaker 1: You're doing the most this, and you know what, I
- 1:17:05Speaker 1: respect the hustle. I will say, I miss bazars. Oh man,
- 1:17:08Speaker 1: they're fucking They're awesome.
- 1:17:10Speaker 2: You've seen the trucks I'm talking about, right, Yeah, No,
- 1:17:12Speaker 2: I have all the dangling shit. They got a whole
- 1:17:14Speaker 2: chandelier in their shit for no reason other than because
- 1:17:17Speaker 2: it's pimping. And it's like, you know what, Basher, you
- 1:17:20Speaker 2: get it. You get the gaudiness. I like, you would
- 1:17:23Speaker 2: fit in any trailer park in the South. Fuck yah anyway,
- 1:17:27Speaker 2: well maybe not, maybe not, I don't know anyway, So
- 1:17:30Speaker 2: moving forward here, the operation produced a sophisticated computer virus
- 1:17:34Speaker 2: known as stucksnet, which was designed to disrupt Iran's uranium
- 1:17:38Speaker 2: enrichment efforts. So we're not going to get into the
- 1:17:40Speaker 2: two deep into the history here. We talked about during
- 1:17:42Speaker 2: Bush's term, General Cartwright, who at the time was the
- 1:17:46Speaker 2: UH the head of the United States Strategic Command, later
- 1:17:49Speaker 2: on to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Basically,
- 1:17:53Speaker 2: he was the the key component of this operation. He
- 1:17:57Speaker 2: was like the one pushing it at that level and
- 1:17:59Speaker 2: assigning the money to where it was supposed to go.
- 1:18:02Speaker 2: Collaboration happened with Israel's sigant or sigent excuse me, Intelligence
- 1:18:07Speaker 2: Service Unit eighty two hundred, and if you haven't seen,
- 1:18:11Speaker 2: their logo looks like a green floor to leave with
- 1:18:13Speaker 2: some wild shit coming off the sides. It's essentially Israeli NSA,
- 1:18:19Speaker 2: but not locally like the NSA in America is trying
- 1:18:22Speaker 2: to spy on the American population. The Iranian Iran excuse me,
- 1:18:27Speaker 2: the Israeli unit eighty two hundred is surveilling the Israeli
- 1:18:31Speaker 2: people and the Gozens and the Palestinians all that, but they're.
- 1:18:36Speaker 1: Surveilling all kinds of shit around them, you know what
- 1:18:38Speaker 1: I'm saying, like their nosy shits.
- 1:18:40Speaker 2: Israel is the size of New Jersey. So just to
- 1:18:44Speaker 2: be clear here, their reach is a little further than.
- 1:18:48Speaker 1: The Jersey shore, you know what I'm saying.
- 1:18:49Speaker 2: They got a little more sick.
- 1:18:51Speaker 1: Shunk they actually you know what, Oh boy.
- 1:18:55Speaker 2: That was an excellent way to plug in the snookschnuck
- 1:18:57Speaker 2: on that one schnukchok, Like.
- 1:18:59Speaker 1: Yeh one, what fucking the leader of issuel right now?
- 1:19:02Speaker 1: Net and Yaho is schnook schnock. Think about it, Think
- 1:19:06Speaker 1: about him acting the way he acting the way she
- 1:19:09Speaker 1: did during that episode.
- 1:19:11Speaker 2: Oh, I don't know, I've never seen an episode.
- 1:19:13Speaker 1: No, no, I'm talking about the episode of South Park.
- 1:19:16Speaker 1: Oh if you actually think about it, and yeah, who
- 1:19:20Speaker 1: is jumping on people? Humping them?
- 1:19:21Speaker 3: Yeah?
- 1:19:22Speaker 1: Well he's one in his way or that's his only
- 1:19:25Speaker 1: like he is like it is my way or the highway.
- 1:19:27Speaker 2: Bro, that's that's a wild image. I don't thing I'm
- 1:19:29Speaker 2: gonna be able.
- 1:19:30Speaker 1: To get him. You're welcome, every one of you.
- 1:19:34Speaker 2: A short fat Net and Yahoo with a giant nose
- 1:19:37Speaker 2: with the fucking the bump on his head.
- 1:19:39Speaker 1: But it's not a bump. It's not the snookie bump.
- 1:19:41Speaker 2: It's the yamaka. Yeah's snow and just like humping random
- 1:19:46Speaker 2: people and it's like.
- 1:19:47Speaker 1: H stop it, ben. Yeah.
- 1:19:48Speaker 2: Basically, oh my god, he's easy, like, oh man, and
- 1:19:53Speaker 2: how many You're welcome?
- 1:19:55Speaker 1: Now? Every one of you is going to think about this.
- 1:19:57Speaker 2: Well, it's it's probably accurate because how many of the
- 1:20:01Speaker 2: Israeli prime ministers were on the Epstein files, so like
- 1:20:04Speaker 2: on some very real levels, or at Robert Maxwell's funeral,
- 1:20:07Speaker 2: so like, there is way more than a like, it's
- 1:20:11Speaker 2: not even a gred than zero percent chance, there's probably
- 1:20:13Speaker 2: like a fifty to fifty shot that you're actually on
- 1:20:16Speaker 2: the money here.
- 1:20:17Speaker 1: You're welcome. Everyone that hasn't seen that episode, please go
- 1:20:20Speaker 1: watch South Park. Also shout out to South Park. If
- 1:20:23Speaker 1: they could sponsor us, that'd be great.
- 1:20:26Speaker 2: But yeah, Trey Parker and Matt Stone really do be
- 1:20:28Speaker 2: doing the most.
- 1:20:29Speaker 1: You cannot you can't unsee it now and you can't.
- 1:20:32Speaker 1: I'm stuck here now forever, all of us together are
- 1:20:35Speaker 1: going to think of Israel es schnookchunk just in Yahoo.
- 1:20:37Speaker 1: But I mean, why not? Why not all? Why not
- 1:20:40Speaker 1: Jersey this sorry blumpkin, sorry fucking oh my god. And now,
- 1:20:50Speaker 1: oh you're talking about the Israeli coast, you mean the
- 1:20:52Speaker 1: Jersey shore. See, oh my god.
- 1:20:55Speaker 2: If there is some sort of a guido culture in
- 1:20:58Speaker 2: Tel Aviv, which it might be, that's that's arguably the
- 1:21:02Speaker 2: gayest city in the world, is Tel Aviv. So there's
- 1:21:04Speaker 2: got to be some sort of a Jersey Shore like
- 1:21:07Speaker 2: remnant there that's like doing the fists bumping and all
- 1:21:10Speaker 2: about the fucking gim tann laundry and shit.
- 1:21:12Speaker 1: I'm so happy that I made this comparison.
- 1:21:14Speaker 2: I'm very Upselty. You've made this comparison that I can't
- 1:21:17Speaker 2: unmake there now it's out there.
- 1:21:19Speaker 1: Sorry, Dougie the Bumpkin. I mean, I.
- 1:21:22Speaker 2: Don't think I've ever met somebody from Jersey that, aside
- 1:21:25Speaker 2: from the people around the Jersey Shore area or like
- 1:21:28Speaker 2: Hoboken or right outside of New York City though, just
- 1:21:31Speaker 2: think that they're New Yorkers, which is an insultable whatever
- 1:21:34Speaker 2: the rest of the state, most of them hate it.
- 1:21:37Speaker 1: We have a lot of we have actually quite a
- 1:21:39Speaker 1: few Jersey people. Yo. Hit us in the comments.
- 1:21:42Speaker 2: If you're from Jersey and actually love your state.
- 1:21:44Speaker 1: Tell us all about the Jersey genuine.
- 1:21:48Speaker 2: All I have ever heard is aside from Jersey Shore people,
- 1:21:52Speaker 2: because it's like New Orleans people. That's not the entire
- 1:21:54Speaker 2: state of Louisiana, but New Orleans people think that it is.
- 1:21:56Speaker 2: You know what I mean, Jersey Shore people think that
- 1:21:58Speaker 2: they're speaking on behalf of to be yes. It's like
- 1:22:01Speaker 2: Portland people, they think they're speaking on behalf of the
- 1:22:03Speaker 2: entire beaver state, and it's like, no, no, we're.
- 1:22:07Speaker 1: The duck state.
- 1:22:08Speaker 2: You mean, isn't your state animal A beaver?
- 1:22:11Speaker 1: Doesn't matter, but we are. I'm not talking about the
- 1:22:13Speaker 1: college I am. Okay.
- 1:22:16Speaker 2: I was about to say, because Jersey is the garden state,
- 1:22:19Speaker 2: whether you knew that or not. And I was going
- 1:22:21Speaker 2: to say that, like they think we're.
- 1:22:23Speaker 1: The nursery capital of the entire garden and the nursery
- 1:22:27Speaker 1: are a little different, right, matter, It doesn't matter.
- 1:22:31Speaker 2: Are you trying to flex on Jersey?
- 1:22:33Speaker 1: You're Oregon.
- 1:22:35Speaker 2: Ya could accidentally flex.
- 1:22:37Speaker 1: On I'm just kidding. I'm not having beef with the
- 1:22:39Speaker 1: Jersey people.
- 1:22:40Speaker 2: At least they can slaughter their own cattle.
- 1:22:43Speaker 1: Look, it hasn't passed yet, Okay, I'm very upset that
- 1:22:46Speaker 1: it might.
- 1:22:47Speaker 3: Very not.
- 1:22:48Speaker 1: It is not going to pass as of right now.
- 1:22:50Speaker 1: It stands that there's one hundred and seventeen thousand votes.
- 1:22:53Speaker 1: For those of you wondering what we're talking about, it's
- 1:22:54Speaker 1: peace ACKed that I bitch about a lot. If you're
- 1:22:56Speaker 1: an Oregon, vote no the peace ack. Yeah, tell everyone
- 1:23:00Speaker 1: everyone that is listening to on the West coast, please share.
- 1:23:03Speaker 2: If you like dairy products from your area. If you
- 1:23:07Speaker 2: like locally raised and you know, ethically produced beef, pork, chickens.
- 1:23:13Speaker 1: And local science, se is from anything.
- 1:23:16Speaker 2: If you like salmon, if you like that thing that
- 1:23:19Speaker 2: your state is so well known for.
- 1:23:21Speaker 1: If you like your dog.
- 1:23:22Speaker 2: And would like to possibly breed or buy a puppy
- 1:23:25Speaker 2: from a breeder, or whatever basic things. Vote no to
- 1:23:29Speaker 2: the Peace Act. Yeah, it's all we're saying. But anyway,
- 1:23:33Speaker 2: Jersey Shore does not speak the on behalf of the
- 1:23:35Speaker 2: entire garden state. But everybody from Jersey I've ever met,
- 1:23:39Speaker 2: like they acknowledge how much it sucks, but they have
- 1:23:42Speaker 2: like developed a taste for it, and they like they
- 1:23:44Speaker 2: enjoy that it's shit. I don't, and I'm not saying
- 1:23:47Speaker 2: that Jersey shit for my own self. I've passed through it.
- 1:23:49Speaker 2: I've never spent a lot of time there. From what
- 1:23:51Speaker 2: I've seen, it's not horrible. The people that live there, though,
- 1:23:54Speaker 2: hate it, but like refuse to move because it's a
- 1:23:58Speaker 2: Jersey thing. It's like a It's like okay, fine whatever,
- 1:24:01Speaker 2: But anyway, moving forward, how he got on the fucking
- 1:24:04Speaker 2: schnook and on net and Yahoo AGA because he is
- 1:24:07Speaker 2: because of Unit eighty two hundred, that's where we were, Okay,
- 1:24:10Speaker 2: I had to backtrack my own self here. Israel's involvement
- 1:24:14Speaker 2: was important to the United States because the former had
- 1:24:17Speaker 2: quote deep intelligence about operations at Natans that would be
- 1:24:21Speaker 2: vital to the preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. To
- 1:24:25Speaker 2: prevent a conventional strike, Israel had to be deeply.
- 1:24:29Speaker 1: Involved in Operation Olympic Games.
- 1:24:32Speaker 2: The resulting program, code named Olympic Games, produced a computer
- 1:24:35Speaker 2: virus developed by the two countries, referred to as the
- 1:24:38Speaker 2: Bug quote unquote internally and later identified publicly as stucksnet,
- 1:24:44Speaker 2: and it was called that by the IT community.
- 1:24:46Speaker 1: The malicious software.
- 1:24:47Speaker 2: Temporarily halted approximately one thousand of the five thousand centrifugions
- 1:24:52Speaker 2: from spinning at NATANS. A programming error later caused the
- 1:24:56Speaker 2: worm just spread to computers outside of Natans When an
- 1:24:59Speaker 2: engineer left Naton's and connected his computer to the Internet.
- 1:25:03Speaker 2: The American and Israeli made bug failed to recognize that
- 1:25:07Speaker 2: its environment had changed. The code replicated on the Internet
- 1:25:10Speaker 2: and was subsequently exposed for public dissemination. IT security excuse me.
- 1:25:16Speaker 2: Security firms Samantec and Casper Sky Lab have since examined
- 1:25:21Speaker 2: stucks net. It is unclear whether the United States or
- 1:25:24Speaker 2: Israel introduced the programming error. So essentially, Homeboy left Iron
- 1:25:33Speaker 2: went to Europe, plugged up as you normally would do,
- 1:25:36Speaker 2: and the virus decided to just jump onto the.
- 1:25:40Speaker 1: World Wide Web. I feel like it was just like
- 1:25:42Speaker 1: continued if he Some said it still has I wouldnt
- 1:25:47Speaker 1: doubt it.
- 1:25:47Speaker 2: Some say that they haven't actually gotten a handle on it.
- 1:25:49Speaker 2: But there's also a couple of the earlier what you
- 1:25:54Speaker 2: might call the younger brother of stucks net that never
- 1:25:56Speaker 2: actually got popular but still very much exists. And then
- 1:25:59Speaker 2: there's there has been those that have come after it
- 1:26:02Speaker 2: and used it as inspiration. So yes to all of
- 1:26:05Speaker 2: the above. Kind of sort of early in his presidency,
- 1:26:10Speaker 2: Obama expanded the cyber operation, authorizing its continuation even after
- 1:26:15Speaker 2: the accidental spread beyond Iran in twenty ten. So even
- 1:26:19Speaker 2: after this was open to the public like that, he
- 1:26:21Speaker 2: basically was like, yeah, well I didn't hear no bell
- 1:26:24Speaker 2: he died.
- 1:26:25Speaker 1: Sorry.
- 1:26:27Speaker 2: He judged the program still effective and allowed the attack
- 1:26:30Speaker 2: to proceed. We already talked about Eric von Saban, who
- 1:26:32Speaker 2: allegedly allegedly infiltrated in the town's nuclear facility. He died
- 1:26:38Speaker 2: in a motorcycle wreck in Dubai. So, anyway, the investigation.
- 1:26:43Speaker 2: In June of twenty thirteen, it was reported that Cartwright
- 1:26:46Speaker 2: was the target of a year long investigation by the
- 1:26:48Speaker 2: Department of Justice into the leak of classified information about
- 1:26:52Speaker 2: the operation to the US media. In March twenty fifteen,
- 1:26:56Speaker 2: it was reported that the investigation had stalled amid concerns
- 1:26:59Speaker 2: that necessary evidence for prosecution was too sensitive to reveal
- 1:27:04Speaker 2: in court. So they knew that he was guilty, but
- 1:27:10Speaker 2: they also knew that arraigning him and just going through
- 1:27:13Speaker 2: discovery would also reveal things that are still in play currently. Okay,
- 1:27:18Speaker 2: so nobody ever saw Justice quote unquote for this whatsoever. Actually,
- 1:27:23Speaker 2: so now stucks net itself. Okay, this is from Wikipedia.
- 1:27:28Speaker 2: We're not going to read the entire thing. It's a very,
- 1:27:30Speaker 2: very long article, but we are basically gonna get to
- 1:27:34Speaker 2: a couple of the points here. So stucks net specifically
- 1:27:37Speaker 2: targets programmable logic controllers or PLCs right, which allowed the
- 1:27:41Speaker 2: automation of electro mechanical processes such as those used to
- 1:27:45Speaker 2: control machinery and industrial processes, including gas interfuges for separating
- 1:27:50Speaker 2: nuclear material, exploiting four zero day flaws in the system.
- 1:27:54Speaker 2: You see what I'm saying. Summer saying five. Some are
- 1:27:56Speaker 2: saying four either way too much, one is crazy? Two
- 1:28:00Speaker 2: heard of four or five? Like we're talking like this
- 1:28:03Speaker 2: is like sixty chess.
- 1:28:04Speaker 1: Honestly, like the overkill.
- 1:28:06Speaker 2: If it's worth doing, it's worth overdoing.
- 1:28:08Speaker 1: I mean, why not? You only might get one shot?
- 1:28:11Speaker 1: So why not? Noise? That was my foot hidden?
- 1:28:14Speaker 2: Oh okay, yeah, you might only get one shot maybe,
- 1:28:18Speaker 2: And so you just want to make sure that there's
- 1:28:20Speaker 2: a couple of fail safes.
- 1:28:21Speaker 1: Because like, well, I mean you spend all that time,
- 1:28:24Speaker 1: energy and money. Yeah, Like so if you get caught,
- 1:28:27Speaker 1: one gets caught, it's gonna still keep going and they're
- 1:28:30Speaker 1: gonna have to find the other three to four left.
- 1:28:33Speaker 1: I mean, why not? Absolutely makes sense me.
- 1:28:36Speaker 2: So stucks Net functions by targeting machines using the Microsoft
- 1:28:40Speaker 2: Windows operating system and networks, then seeking out Siemens Step
- 1:28:45Speaker 2: seven software. I got a little bit of training in
- 1:28:47Speaker 2: step seven while I was working in the field. Stuck's
- 1:28:50Speaker 2: net reportedly compromised. Iranian PLC is collecting information on industrial
- 1:28:54Speaker 2: systems and causing the fast spinning centrifugions to tear themselves apart.
- 1:28:59Speaker 2: Stuck That's design and architecture are not domain specific and
- 1:29:03Speaker 2: could be tailored as a platform for attacking modern SCADA
- 1:29:08Speaker 2: and PLC systems, i e. In factory assembly lines or
- 1:29:12Speaker 2: power plants, most of which are in Europe, Japan, and.
- 1:29:15Speaker 1: The United States.
- 1:29:16Speaker 2: Stucks that reportedly destroyed almost one fifth of the Iran's
- 1:29:20Speaker 2: nuclear centrifuges. Targeting industrial control systems, the worm infected over
- 1:29:25Speaker 2: two hundred thousand computers and caused one thousand machines to
- 1:29:28Speaker 2: physically degrade. That's I would call that a raging success.
- 1:29:34Speaker 2: But again, even with that success, it just kicked the
- 1:29:38Speaker 2: can down the road a decade or so. True, like
- 1:29:41Speaker 2: real shit. If it worked so effectively, we wouldn't be
- 1:29:46Speaker 2: attacking Iran right now for the nukes that they may
- 1:29:48Speaker 2: or may not be working on, and we wouldn't have
- 1:29:50Speaker 2: sent bunker busters to their three biggest facilities last year.
- 1:29:54Speaker 2: Stowing it out. Stucks net has three modules. A worm
- 1:29:59Speaker 2: that it executes all routine related or all routines rather
- 1:30:03Speaker 2: related to the main payload of the attack. A link
- 1:30:06Speaker 2: file that automatically executes the propagated copies of the worm,
- 1:30:11Speaker 2: and a root kit component responsible for hiding all malicious
- 1:30:15Speaker 2: files and processes to prevent detection of stucksnet. So we
- 1:30:19Speaker 2: got the actual worm itself, the actual virus.
- 1:30:23Speaker 1: If you will, the link file.
- 1:30:25Speaker 2: This is the one that just basically replicates it and
- 1:30:27Speaker 2: just copy and copy and copies and helps it spread
- 1:30:30Speaker 2: like a virus. And then the rootkit, which is essentially
- 1:30:33Speaker 2: the cover that was the thing that recorded the regular
- 1:30:36Speaker 2: operating procedures to where the computer system showed, Oh it's
- 1:30:40Speaker 2: rated for a thousand RPMs. It's running a thousand RPMs.
- 1:30:42Speaker 1: Perfect, look at it go. In reality, their.
- 1:30:45Speaker 2: Shit was just tearing itself apart just a few you know. Wow,
- 1:30:50Speaker 2: I don't know how close the control room is to
- 1:30:52Speaker 2: the facility, to the components themselves, but yeah, I'm just saying,
- 1:30:58Speaker 2: unless you had eyes on.
- 1:30:59Speaker 1: The machine, you wouldn't have known what was going on.
- 1:31:02Speaker 2: But continuing here, in the absence of either criteria, I'm
- 1:31:06Speaker 2: sorry I jumped ahead here. It is typically introduced to
- 1:31:10Speaker 2: the target environment via an infected USB flash drive, thus
- 1:31:15Speaker 2: crossing any air gap. Now what an air gap is,
- 1:31:18Speaker 2: and you're gonna hear that term brought up a couple
- 1:31:19Speaker 2: of times. It's basically like the thing that would prevent
- 1:31:24Speaker 2: something bad from happening, right, Like, for instance, with stucksnet,
- 1:31:28Speaker 2: you can't like send an email and have it open,
- 1:31:32Speaker 2: and that would immediately start the infection on this right.
- 1:31:35Speaker 2: You can't wi fi it over, you can't bluetooth it over.
- 1:31:39Speaker 2: So the fact that it has to physically be installed
- 1:31:42Speaker 2: is an air gap.
- 1:31:43Speaker 1: Yeah.
- 1:31:44Speaker 2: So they found a guy who was willing to bridge
- 1:31:47Speaker 2: that gap, if you will, and he died two weeks later.
- 1:31:51Speaker 2: The worm then propagates across the network, scanning for semens
- 1:31:55Speaker 2: step seven software on computers controlling a PLC and the
- 1:31:58Speaker 2: absence of either and stucks net becomes dormant inside the computer.
- 1:32:04Speaker 2: So if it got there and didn't see what it
- 1:32:05Speaker 2: was looking for, it just stays there until one day
- 1:32:08Speaker 2: somebody hooks it up to what.
- 1:32:09Speaker 1: It's looking for, and then it starts.
- 1:32:12Speaker 2: If both the conditions are fulfilled, stucksnet introduces the infected
- 1:32:15Speaker 2: root key into the PLC in step seven software, modifying
- 1:32:19Speaker 2: the code and giving unexpected commands to the PLC while
- 1:32:22Speaker 2: we're turning a loop of normal operation system values back
- 1:32:26Speaker 2: to the user. Long story short, the computer is showing
- 1:32:29Speaker 2: a thousand RPMs. The machine's supposed to be going that way,
- 1:32:32Speaker 2: and it's showing that across all boards. Meanwhile, everything is
- 1:32:36Speaker 2: going horribly wrong just a few feet away. So let's
- 1:32:40Speaker 2: talk about how it was discovered. It was discovered by
- 1:32:43Speaker 2: Sergei Alasin from a Belarusian antivirus company called virus block.
- 1:32:49Speaker 2: Ata initially spread via Microsoft Windows and targeted Siemens industrial
- 1:32:54Speaker 2: control systems. While it is not the first time that
- 1:32:56Speaker 2: hackers have targeted industrial systems nor the first public known
- 1:33:00Speaker 2: intentional act of cyber warfare to the to be implemented,
- 1:33:04Speaker 2: it is the first discovered malware that spies on and
- 1:33:07Speaker 2: subverts industrial systems and the first to include a PLC
- 1:33:12Speaker 2: root kit. So the warm initially spreads indiscriminately, but includes
- 1:33:17Speaker 2: a highly specialized malware payload that is designed to target
- 1:33:20Speaker 2: only Semens Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions, which is the
- 1:33:25Speaker 2: SCADA system. So basically, unless you were running a Semens
- 1:33:30Speaker 2: on this, it wasn't going to do anything to you,
- 1:33:33Speaker 2: which is kind of crazy that it was that it was.
- 1:33:37Speaker 2: It was that specific, yeah, but intelligently designed like this
- 1:33:42Speaker 2: was this was so.
- 1:33:43Speaker 1: Strategic and they thought of everything they had to.
- 1:33:46Speaker 2: They really did, they absolutely did. So anyway, continuing on,
- 1:33:51Speaker 2: I just want to give a couple of the timelines
- 1:33:53Speaker 2: on what was going on with this, with the discovery
- 1:33:56Speaker 2: and things. So in May twenty eleven, the PBS program
- 1:34:01Speaker 2: Need to Know cited a statement by Gary Seymour, which
- 1:34:05Speaker 2: is the White House coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons
- 1:34:08Speaker 2: of Mass Destruction, in which he said, quote, We're glad
- 1:34:12Speaker 2: that they, the Iranians, are having trouble with their centrifuseed
- 1:34:15Speaker 2: machines and that we are doing everything we can do
- 1:34:19Speaker 2: to make sure that we complicate matters for them.
- 1:34:24Speaker 1: Okad.
- 1:34:25Speaker 2: That was in twenty eleven, before all this was like known.
- 1:34:29Speaker 2: We're just like, well, we're happy they're having problems, and
- 1:34:31Speaker 2: we are doing everything we can to.
- 1:34:33Speaker 1: Make sure they keep having problems. Continuing on here.
- 1:34:37Speaker 2: According to The Daily Telegraph, a show reel was played
- 1:34:41Speaker 2: at a retirement party for the head of the IDF,
- 1:34:44Speaker 2: Gabby Ashkanazi. His last name is Ashkanazi. Wow, that's okay,
- 1:34:51Speaker 2: including references to stucksnet as one of his operational successes
- 1:34:55Speaker 2: as the IDF Chief of Staff. So twenty eleven, this
- 1:34:59Speaker 2: was understood in certain circles that this was going. On
- 1:35:03Speaker 2: June one, twenty twelve, an article in The New York
- 1:35:06Speaker 2: Times reported that stucks net was part of a US
- 1:35:08Speaker 2: Israeli intelligence operation named Operational Olympic Games, devised by the
- 1:35:13Speaker 2: NSA under Bush and executed under Obama. July twenty fourth,
- 1:35:17Speaker 2: twenty twelve, an article by a reporter for c NEET
- 1:35:22Speaker 2: reported that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran emailed f
- 1:35:26Speaker 2: secured chief research officer Miko Kiponen sure to report a
- 1:35:33Speaker 2: new instance of malware. Christmas Day, twenty twelve, an Iranian
- 1:35:39Speaker 2: semi official news agency announced there was a cyber attack
- 1:35:43Speaker 2: by stuxnet, this time on the industries in the southern
- 1:35:47Speaker 2: area of the country. The malware targeted a power plant
- 1:35:50Speaker 2: and some of the other industries in the hormosgen province
- 1:35:55Speaker 2: in twenty twelve. According to Eugene casper Sky, who was
- 1:35:59Speaker 2: the security casper Sky Security Internet, the worm also infected
- 1:36:05Speaker 2: a nuclear power plant in Russia. Casper Sky noted, however,
- 1:36:09Speaker 2: that since the power plant is not connected to the
- 1:36:11Speaker 2: public Internet, the system should remain safe. Okay, that was
- 1:36:16Speaker 2: yeah anyway, anyway, So we're not going to go into
- 1:36:19Speaker 2: the entire history of it. We kind of covered the
- 1:36:21Speaker 2: good parts, I would think, but I do think it's
- 1:36:24Speaker 2: also worth mentioning this so. Casper Sky Lab experts initially
- 1:36:28Speaker 2: estimated that stucksnt began spreading around March or April of
- 1:36:32Speaker 2: twenty ten, but the first variant of the worm appeared
- 1:36:35Speaker 2: in June two thousand and nine. On July fifteenth, twenty ten,
- 1:36:38Speaker 2: the day of the worm's existence became widely known, a
- 1:36:41Speaker 2: distributed denial of service attack targeted the servers of two
- 1:36:45Speaker 2: leading mailing lists on industrial system security. This attack, from
- 1:36:49Speaker 2: an unknown source but possibly related to stucks net, disabled
- 1:36:53Speaker 2: one of the lists, interrupting a key information source for
- 1:36:56Speaker 2: power plants and factories. Separately, researchers at Semtech uncovered a
- 1:37:01Speaker 2: version of stuxnet computer virus that was used to attack
- 1:37:04Speaker 2: Iran's nuclear program in November of two thousand and seven,
- 1:37:07Speaker 2: with evidence indicating it was under development as early as
- 1:37:11Speaker 2: two thousand and five, when Iran was setting up its
- 1:37:13Speaker 2: uranium enrichment facilities. A second variant with substantial improvements appeared
- 1:37:18Speaker 2: in March twenty ten, reportedly due to concerns that stucksnt
- 1:37:22Speaker 2: was not spreading fast enough. This is when Obama took.
- 1:37:26Speaker 1: Over and threw gas on the fire, so to speak.
- 1:37:29Speaker 2: A third variant with minor improvements followed in April of
- 1:37:33Speaker 2: twenty ten. The worm contains a component with a build
- 1:37:36Speaker 2: time stamp from the third of February twenty ten, and
- 1:37:40Speaker 2: on November twenty fifth, twenty ten, sky News in the
- 1:37:43Speaker 2: United Kingdom reported receiving information from an anonymous source that
- 1:37:47Speaker 2: an unidentified IT security organization claiming that stucks net or
- 1:37:51Speaker 2: a variation of the worm had been traded on the
- 1:37:54Speaker 2: black market. So now we're talking stucks net was basically
- 1:37:58Speaker 2: being open air traded on the dark web, so to speak.
- 1:38:03Speaker 2: In twenty fifteen, Casper sky Lab reported that the Equation
- 1:38:06Speaker 2: Group had used two of the same zero day attacks
- 1:38:09Speaker 2: prior to their use in Stucksnet, in another malware called
- 1:38:13Speaker 2: fanny dot BPM. Now you might be asking what is
- 1:38:17Speaker 2: the Equation Group?
- 1:38:18Speaker 1: Well, I'm so glad that you asked.
- 1:38:20Speaker 2: The Equation Group is a highly sophisticated state sponsored cyber
- 1:38:24Speaker 2: espionage threat actor active since at least two thousand and one,
- 1:38:28Speaker 2: widely believed to be linked to the United States National
- 1:38:30Speaker 2: Security Agency or the NSA, specifically, It's tailored Access Operations Unit.
- 1:38:36Speaker 2: The group is considered one of the most advanced cyber
- 1:38:38Speaker 2: attack operations ever discovered.
- 1:38:42Speaker 1: So things would be.
- 1:38:43Speaker 2: Like one of these hacker groups that work for the
- 1:38:45Speaker 2: government another one that we're gonna hear a lot from
- 1:38:48Speaker 2: which both of them were working in this are called
- 1:38:50Speaker 2: the Shadow Brokers. The Shadow Brokers are a hacker group
- 1:38:54Speaker 2: that emerged in the mid In mid twenty sixteen, they
- 1:38:57Speaker 2: published several weeks containing hacking tools in including several zero
- 1:39:01Speaker 2: day exploits from the Equation Group, who are widely expected
- 1:39:04Speaker 2: to be a branch of the NSA of the United States. Specifically,
- 1:39:09Speaker 2: these exploits are vulnerabilities targeted enterprise firewalls, antivirus software, and
- 1:39:14Speaker 2: Microsoft products. The Shadow Brokers originally attributed the leaks to
- 1:39:19Speaker 2: the Equation Group threat Actor, who have been tied to
- 1:39:22Speaker 2: the NSA Tailored Access Operations Unit. All of this, by
- 1:39:26Speaker 2: the way, was discussed in the WikiLeaks, So just so
- 1:39:29Speaker 2: we're all clear here, it's sitting like some crazy off
- 1:39:31Speaker 2: the wall thing anyway. Twenty nineteen, the Chronicle researchers Juan
- 1:39:37Speaker 2: Andreas Guerrero Sayid and Silas cut Jesus, you got four
- 1:39:42Speaker 2: names on one and two on the other. Okay, presented
- 1:39:44Speaker 2: findings indicating that at least four distinct threat actor malware
- 1:39:48Speaker 2: platforms collaborated in developing the different versions of Stucksnet. The
- 1:39:53Speaker 2: collaboration was referred to as A or as gossip Girl,
- 1:39:58Speaker 2: a name derived from a threat group mentioned in classified
- 1:40:02Speaker 2: CSEC slides that included Flame.
- 1:40:04Speaker 1: Gossip Girl.
- 1:40:06Speaker 2: UH is described as a cooperative umbrella encompassing the Equation Group,
- 1:40:10Speaker 2: Flame Doku, and flower Shop, also known as Chess Sire cat.
- 1:40:15Speaker 1: Cairly a girl named this.
- 1:40:18Speaker 2: Maybe, but basically these groups, the Equation Group, Flame Doku,
- 1:40:23Speaker 2: and flower Shop, all of these are essentially state sanctioned
- 1:40:27Speaker 2: hacker groups. So interesting if you're ever curious about if
- 1:40:31Speaker 2: our government or are if our tax dollars are going
- 1:40:34Speaker 2: towards hacking us. Yes, because all these are under the NSA.
- 1:40:39Speaker 1: I wonder if all the people that work there are
- 1:40:40Speaker 1: going to be able to be sanctioned into cyber force.
- 1:40:43Speaker 1: Like maybe he just moves them over and it's like
- 1:40:46Speaker 1: here you go. You guys, are you're a general now you.
- 1:40:49Speaker 2: Used to work for the NSA, Now you're a sergeant.
- 1:40:52Speaker 2: It's like I'm a what, yeah, I get to work
- 1:40:55Speaker 2: chop shop.
- 1:40:56Speaker 1: Let's go. What have you like? Made them all top
- 1:40:58Speaker 1: ranking people and was like, all right, here you go,
- 1:41:00Speaker 1: here you go.
- 1:41:01Speaker 2: Is it crazy that I just want to be like
- 1:41:02Speaker 2: a supply sergeant for the Space Force.
- 1:41:05Speaker 3: No.
- 1:41:05Speaker 1: I actually just had this conversation this morning or this
- 1:41:08Speaker 1: afternoon with my skatest fucking joke. You're talking about like
- 1:41:12Speaker 1: military branches and all of this stuff, and I was like, look,
- 1:41:15Speaker 1: if you're gonna do anything Space Force as your friend, yes,
- 1:41:19Speaker 1: I was like twenty I was like two thy two
- 1:41:21Speaker 1: hundred members only I was like, you're gonna you're gonna
- 1:41:25Speaker 1: live a life of luxury. Okay, God, like maybe you
- 1:41:29Speaker 1: get to play war games too, So I.
- 1:41:30Speaker 2: Know one's gonna fuck with you because no one knows
- 1:41:32Speaker 2: how to like, yeah, they're gonna make fun of you
- 1:41:35Speaker 2: for being Space Force.
- 1:41:35Speaker 1: But he's like super okay. He is really tech savvy
- 1:41:40Speaker 1: like my mom is, and like I'm like this is
- 1:41:43Speaker 1: this is gonna be your gam You're super into space,
- 1:41:45Speaker 1: you're super into like alien crap, and you're super into
- 1:41:49Speaker 1: sci fi and cyber stuff and computers and all of this.
- 1:41:53Speaker 1: I was like melded into one. I don't want him
- 1:41:56Speaker 1: to join the military at all, but if I if
- 1:41:59Speaker 1: he decides to, like that's what we just called to do. I'mlike,
- 1:42:05Speaker 1: space Force is your friend.
- 1:42:06Speaker 2: Obviously, maybe cyber Force. Maybe we'll see if that becomes
- 1:42:09Speaker 2: a thing. Maybe anyway, So in twenty twenty, researcher Fecundo
- 1:42:15Speaker 2: Munos probably butchered it presented finding suggesting that Equation Group
- 1:42:20Speaker 2: may have collaborated with stucksnet developers in two thousand and
- 1:42:24Speaker 2: nine by providing at least one zero day exploit and
- 1:42:27Speaker 2: one exploit from two thousand and eight that was actively
- 1:42:30Speaker 2: used by the Configer, computer Worm and Chinese hackers. We
- 1:42:34Speaker 2: could do a whole other episode on Conficker if y'all want,
- 1:42:36Speaker 2: But anyway, in twenty seventeen, a group of hackers known
- 1:42:39Speaker 2: as the Shadow Brokers leaked a collection of tools attributed
- 1:42:43Speaker 2: to the Equation Group. We just read about that, including
- 1:42:45Speaker 2: new versions of both exploits compiled in twenty ten. Analysis
- 1:42:49Speaker 2: of the leak data indicated significant code overlaps, as both
- 1:42:53Speaker 2: stucksnet exploits and the Equation Group's exploits were developed using
- 1:42:57Speaker 2: a set of libraries called the xploit development framework. This
- 1:43:02Speaker 2: was also leaked by the Shadow Brokers, so clearly they
- 1:43:05Speaker 2: were in the same ballpark, probably the same office.
- 1:43:08Speaker 1: To be honest.
- 1:43:09Speaker 2: Now I want to talk about the affected countries of
- 1:43:12Speaker 2: stucks net because it went a little further than anticipated.
- 1:43:15Speaker 2: So Iran was if we're looking at a one hundred
- 1:43:19Speaker 2: percent piece of the pie, Iran was fifty eight point
- 1:43:22Speaker 2: nine percent of that pie. Was where stucks net got busy.
- 1:43:26Speaker 2: Indonesia eighteen point two percent, India eight point three percent,
- 1:43:31Speaker 2: azer by John two point six percent, the United States
- 1:43:35Speaker 2: we developed it and ended up getting fucked by it
- 1:43:38Speaker 2: one point six percent, Pakistan one point three percent, and
- 1:43:42Speaker 2: other countries nine point two So just in total here,
- 1:43:45Speaker 2: but primarily Iran. Obviously that was the entire purpose of
- 1:43:50Speaker 2: it being launched. But when Old Boy left and plugged
- 1:43:54Speaker 2: up his computer that happened to have stucks net on it.
- 1:43:56Speaker 2: But it was laying dormant because it saw no systems
- 1:43:58Speaker 2: that it could affect. As soon as I got onto
- 1:44:01Speaker 2: the Internet, it found ways to perform its function, if
- 1:44:05Speaker 2: you will, And yeah, it was. It was a whole
- 1:44:08Speaker 2: whole situation. And I'm not going to get into all
- 1:44:10Speaker 2: the nitty gritty here, but on screen you can see
- 1:44:13Speaker 2: Windows was affected by it. Step seven software PLC infection.
- 1:44:18Speaker 2: These these are the PLCs that I was talking about that.
- 1:44:21Speaker 2: I used to work on install program all of the things,
- 1:44:25Speaker 2: and it was specifically looking for these, which is crazy
- 1:44:29Speaker 2: in and of itself. Now there is a way to
- 1:44:32Speaker 2: remove it. Semens has released a detection and removal tool
- 1:44:35Speaker 2: for stucks neet. Semens recommends contacting customer support if an
- 1:44:39Speaker 2: infection is detected, and advises installing Microsoft updates for security
- 1:44:44Speaker 2: vulnerabilities and prohibiting the use of third party USB flash drives.
- 1:44:48Speaker 1: I wonder how much Bill Gates made off of this?
- 1:44:50Speaker 1: Oh right, Oh come on, man, you know damn good
- 1:44:54Speaker 1: and well he got a portion of this pie.
- 1:44:56Speaker 2: Wait a minute, you mean to tell me that I
- 1:44:58Speaker 2: can now just start releasing up dates and now all
- 1:45:00Speaker 2: these big manufacturing facilities have to purchase it.
- 1:45:04Speaker 1: When did he meet? The whole thing about like Apple
- 1:45:08Speaker 1: computers can't get viruses.
- 1:45:12Speaker 2: I don't know if I've ever heard that. I'm pretty
- 1:45:14Speaker 2: confident they can.
- 1:45:15Speaker 1: You never heard that, Like, I don't even know if
- 1:45:17Speaker 1: it's actually real or not, but.
- 1:45:20Speaker 2: You never heard there's a way. You know, we can,
- 1:45:23Speaker 2: we can make this thing crash out if we wanted to.
- 1:45:26Speaker 1: But I don't know. Yeah, you can.
- 1:45:29Speaker 2: Your and iPhone can get viruses.
- 1:45:32Speaker 1: I don't know, because like that's I remember that being
- 1:45:35Speaker 1: like a whole thing of like it can't get viruses. Yes,
- 1:45:38Speaker 1: they can get viruses, but yeah, no, like I remember
- 1:45:42Speaker 1: that was like a whole thing. I remember a talking
- 1:45:44Speaker 1: point people talk about like you know, they can't get
- 1:45:47Speaker 1: any viruses, blah blah blah.
- 1:45:49Speaker 2: Was that just a sales picture? Was that actually based
- 1:45:51Speaker 2: in reality?
- 1:45:52Speaker 1: I don't know actually, but yeah, they have built in protections,
- 1:45:56Speaker 1: the deeper, the X, the X Protector, the new Max
- 1:46:01Speaker 1: have them all where families as well. But I was
- 1:46:04Speaker 1: just curious because if we're talking about them utilizing his stuff, yeah,
- 1:46:09Speaker 1: you know, and then what he was he part of this,
- 1:46:13Speaker 1: like could be able to use that to help protect
- 1:46:16Speaker 1: his stuff later on.
- 1:46:17Speaker 2: So to my knowledge, no, and with the research I've done,
- 1:46:21Speaker 2: Microsoft I don't believe was complicit in this. But I
- 1:46:23Speaker 2: do think that their program is and I don't want
- 1:46:26Speaker 2: to say simple to make it seem like, oh anybody
- 1:46:29Speaker 2: could figure it. No, no, no, But as far as like
- 1:46:30Speaker 2: computer software is concerned, Microsoft is relatively simple.
- 1:46:36Speaker 1: It's made for you know, ease of user.
- 1:46:38Speaker 2: Yeah, you know, so, I mean it's it's not too
- 1:46:41Speaker 2: terribly crazy to get a virus in there that could
- 1:46:43Speaker 2: tear it apart. But yeah, he absolutely made some money
- 1:46:47Speaker 2: on the back end of trying to fix the problem.
- 1:46:49Speaker 2: Guarantee that where there's where there is catastrophe, there.
- 1:46:52Speaker 1: Is money to be made.
- 1:46:53Speaker 2: That is a fact. So anyway around was targeted. We
- 1:46:56Speaker 2: talked about the naton's nuclear facility. Israel also had their
- 1:47:01Speaker 2: own shake on this. The United States had some issues
- 1:47:04Speaker 2: with it, the joint effort and other states and targets
- 1:47:09Speaker 2: North Korea. It was actually there was an attempt to
- 1:47:12Speaker 2: send it to North Korea, according to reports by Reuters.
- 1:47:16Speaker 2: The NSA also tried to sabotage North Korea's nuclear program
- 1:47:20Speaker 2: using a version of stucksnet. The operation was reportedly launched
- 1:47:23Speaker 2: in tandem with the attack that targeted Iranian centrifusions in
- 1:47:27Speaker 2: two thousand and nine twenty ten. But there's a problem.
- 1:47:30Speaker 2: There's a big problem with the North Korean side of it.
- 1:47:33Speaker 2: The nuclear program shares a number of similarities with Iranians,
- 1:47:36Speaker 2: both having been developed with the technology transferred from Pakistani
- 1:47:39Speaker 2: nuclear scientist Aq Khan. But the problem is the effort
- 1:47:43Speaker 2: failed because North Korea's extreme secrecy and isolation made it
- 1:47:47Speaker 2: impossible to introduce stucksnet into the nuclear facility.
- 1:47:51Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, you'd have to get somebody on the
- 1:47:53Speaker 1: deep inside, Like Eric.
- 1:47:54Speaker 2: Can't walk up into North Korea and act like he's
- 1:47:57Speaker 2: an average Joe over there.
- 1:48:00Speaker 1: I don't even know how you'd really, Like, you'd have
- 1:48:01Speaker 1: to do so much to try to even get it
- 1:48:03Speaker 1: into the country, let alone somebody that would willingly risk
- 1:48:07Speaker 1: knowing that they're going to die, Like basically, they.
- 1:48:09Speaker 2: Just know they're going to die, they wouldn't. Hell, if
- 1:48:11Speaker 2: you leave the country, your grandchildren are going to be
- 1:48:16Speaker 2: serving a life of hard labor for you, Like that's
- 1:48:19Speaker 2: how they do it. Like your cousins people and your
- 1:48:21Speaker 2: family you've never met are going to be serving life
- 1:48:23Speaker 2: of hard labor because you escaped. Let's go ahead and
- 1:48:26Speaker 2: fuck up their whole nuclear program. Like no, they'll wipe
- 1:48:29Speaker 2: off your entire bloodline from the map.
- 1:48:31Speaker 1: Oh yeah for sure.
- 1:48:32Speaker 2: So anyway, I just thought it was worth mentioning North
- 1:48:35Speaker 2: Korea also had their share on this one. But anyway,
- 1:48:38Speaker 2: there is in fact a secret twin. But I don't
- 1:48:41Speaker 2: want to jump ahead just yet. I do want to
- 1:48:44Speaker 2: talk about this so right now I have on warfronts.
- 1:48:49Speaker 1: It's a Simon Whistler show. Y'all know I'm a fan
- 1:48:51Speaker 1: of his content.
- 1:48:52Speaker 2: And this is also going to be talking a little
- 1:48:54Speaker 2: more in depth about the other side of stucks neet.
- 1:48:58Speaker 2: Let's learn together.
- 1:49:04Speaker 4: The significance of the Starksnet attacks were unprecedented. This was
- 1:49:08Speaker 4: the first time a nation state have been able to
- 1:49:10Speaker 4: remotely destroy the infrastructure of another nation state through digital means.
- 1:49:15Speaker 4: The genie was out of the bottle, or at least
- 1:49:17Speaker 4: it was for the public. Starks Net wasn't simply the
- 1:49:20Speaker 4: first cyber weapon created by world powers. It was the
- 1:49:23Speaker 4: most successful by far that is publicly known, but it's
- 1:49:27Speaker 4: not the first. And the more you delve into the
- 1:49:29Speaker 4: true origins of Starksnet, the stranger things become. To really
- 1:49:31Speaker 4: understand where it came from, we need to go back
- 1:49:34Speaker 4: further than you could possibly imagine. Five years after its discovery,
- 1:49:37Speaker 4: in twenty fifteen, it was found that there were links
- 1:49:40Speaker 4: in Stocksnet's code that relate to a mysterious hacker organization
- 1:49:44Speaker 4: known as the Equation Group. It was on earth by
- 1:49:46Speaker 4: the Kaspersky Lab, one of the foremost global organizations on cybersecurity,
- 1:49:50Speaker 4: noticing several distinct similarities between the code in various other
- 1:49:53Speaker 4: viruses such as fanny Flame and flower Shop, as well
- 1:49:56Speaker 4: as Starksnet. For example, prior to Starksnet, two of the
- 1:49:59Speaker 4: four zer Roodee exploits that it used were discovered in
- 1:50:02Speaker 4: other malware that predates Starksnet's existence, meaning at the very
- 1:50:06Speaker 4: least those who created starks Net and the Equation Group
- 1:50:09Speaker 4: collaborated on their work or there was overlap in personnel.
- 1:50:12Speaker 4: The Equation Group's oldest code goes back to two thousand
- 1:50:15Speaker 4: and one, but according to the Kaspersky Lab, they could
- 1:50:18Speaker 4: have been in operation as early as nineteen ninety six.
- 1:50:20Speaker 4: The Equation Group have targeted a geopolitical level infrastructure all
- 1:50:23Speaker 4: over the world, from governments and diplomatic institutions, to aerospace
- 1:50:27Speaker 4: and energy groups, to nuclear research and nanotechnology. Only a
- 1:50:30Speaker 4: group with incredible technical prowess, the funding to develop such malware,
- 1:50:34Speaker 4: and the intelligence to deploy it all over the globe
- 1:50:36Speaker 4: would be able to do what the Equation Group had done.
- 1:50:38Speaker 4: The Kasperski Lab seems to think so, too, describing them
- 1:50:41Speaker 4: as the most advanced hackers they've ever seen due to
- 1:50:45Speaker 4: having self destruct features another similarity to starksnets in their code.
- 1:50:49Speaker 4: It's difficult to ascertain the real numbers affected by the group.
- 1:50:51Speaker 4: While only five hundred malware infections could be found, the
- 1:50:54Speaker 4: real number could be in the tens of thousands, and
- 1:50:57Speaker 4: nobody has any idea they existed for at least a
- 1:51:01Speaker 4: decade and a half. Due to all the similarities to
- 1:51:04Speaker 4: starks NEETs, alongside the technical prowess of their work, the
- 1:51:07Speaker 4: Equation Group is assumed to be heavily linked to the
- 1:51:09Speaker 4: Tailored Access Operations unit of the NSSA. The NSA code
- 1:51:13Speaker 4: words straight Acid and straight Shooter have been found in
- 1:51:16Speaker 4: the Equation Group's code. A former NSA employee told Reuters
- 1:51:19Speaker 4: that Kasperski's analysis was correct and that people still in
- 1:51:22Speaker 4: the intelligence agency valued these spying programs as highly as starksnet.
- 1:51:26Speaker 4: Another former intelligence operative stated that the NSA had developed
- 1:51:29Speaker 4: the ability to conceal spyware in hard drives, but said
- 1:51:32Speaker 4: he did not know which spy efforts relied on it.
- 1:51:35Speaker 4: It would be confirmed by Edward Snowden's whistleblowing in twenty
- 1:51:38Speaker 4: thirteen that the NSSA did have domestic and international spying
- 1:51:41Speaker 4: operations ongoing. In twenty seventeen, a group of hackers called
- 1:51:44Speaker 4: the Shadow Brokers stole data belonging to the Equation Group,
- 1:51:47Speaker 4: the most recent of which was from twenty thirteen. This
- 1:51:50Speaker 4: would align with the nssa's information lockdown. Since Snowden's leaks,
- 1:51:53Speaker 4: it appears that starksnet was not the only cyber weapon
- 1:51:56Speaker 4: being developed by the USA, which begs the question, what
- 1:52:00Speaker 4: else don't we know?
- 1:52:03Speaker 1: Agreed one hundred percent.
- 1:52:05Speaker 2: So all right, so now we understand that sucks net
- 1:52:09Speaker 2: had its roots way earlier. Back he's talking about possibly
- 1:52:13Speaker 2: in the nineties.
- 1:52:14Speaker 1: Yeah, nineteen ninety six, I think you.
- 1:52:15Speaker 2: Said ninety six or ninety seven.
- 1:52:17Speaker 1: One of these.
- 1:52:17Speaker 2: It's like the hacker groups themselves who are installing this malware,
- 1:52:23Speaker 2: installing these worms for the specific function that's kind of
- 1:52:27Speaker 2: been around for a little minute, but never had it
- 1:52:29Speaker 2: been done to the tune of making a computer system
- 1:52:33Speaker 2: fuck up actual physical hardware. So it's just it's mind
- 1:52:37Speaker 2: blowing the levels that they went to make this work
- 1:52:41Speaker 2: in the manner that they did. And now let's talk
- 1:52:44Speaker 2: about one of these that might pre date stucks net
- 1:52:47Speaker 2: Fast sixteen. And if you've never heard of that, don't worry.
- 1:52:51Speaker 2: I had never heard of it before I started doing
- 1:52:52Speaker 2: this research. Pre stucks net sabotage tool was built to
- 1:52:56Speaker 2: subvert nuclear weapons simulations. Yeah, so all right, let's talk
- 1:53:02Speaker 2: about this. This is a new analysis confirms the targeted
- 1:53:05Speaker 2: applications and reveals Fast sixteen was tailored to corrupt uranium
- 1:53:09Speaker 2: compression simulations central to nuclear weapons design. So the Fast
- 1:53:15Speaker 2: sixteen's hook engine is selectively interested in high explosive simulations
- 1:53:19Speaker 2: inside ls.
- 1:53:21Speaker 1: DINA and autodyne.
- 1:53:23Speaker 2: All evidences suggest that attackers were specifically targeted simulations of
- 1:53:28Speaker 2: nuclear detonations. The malware checks for the density of the
- 1:53:32Speaker 2: material being simulated and only acts when that value passes
- 1:53:36Speaker 2: thirty grams per centimeter square or cubed per cubic gram
- 1:53:42Speaker 2: cubic gram centimeter.
- 1:53:45Speaker 1: Don't get me.
- 1:53:46Speaker 2: I mean, I understand it's a density thing. I understand that,
- 1:53:49Speaker 2: but like I've actually I don't think I've ever seen
- 1:53:51Speaker 2: a metric version of that gram per cubic centimeter. But
- 1:53:56Speaker 2: like we usually say like pound per square inch, you
- 1:53:58Speaker 2: know what I mean, Like I understand, sorry for everybody
- 1:54:01Speaker 2: who doesn't speak freedom units. I just I don't think
- 1:54:04Speaker 2: I've ever actually read that out loud, like a metric
- 1:54:08Speaker 2: like that. Anyway, The threshold uranium can only reach under
- 1:54:12Speaker 2: the shock of compression of an implosion device, So I
- 1:54:16Speaker 2: didn't know that when uranium reaches that level, it's obviously
- 1:54:20Speaker 2: that it's exploding thirty grams per cubic centimeter. That's interesting, okay.
- 1:54:27Speaker 2: Up to ten distinct software builds carried Taylor hooks, suggesting
- 1:54:32Speaker 2: a sustained operation that tracks target organization software updates over years.
- 1:54:38Speaker 2: The tampering only activates during full scale transient blast and
- 1:54:42Speaker 2: detonation runs, and fast sixteen propagates within a target network
- 1:54:46Speaker 2: using share enumeration and impersonation, but is built not to
- 1:54:51Speaker 2: leave that network, so it wouldn't be one of these
- 1:54:55Speaker 2: things where as soon as it gets to the Internet
- 1:54:57Speaker 2: it just multiplies like crazy, just gets there and stays
- 1:55:01Speaker 2: there kind of thing. So overview. In April of six
- 1:55:05Speaker 2: twenty six, our peers in The Sentinel One published the
- 1:55:08Speaker 2: first public analysis of fast sixteen, a previously undiscovered sabotage
- 1:55:14Speaker 2: framework whose oldest components appear to date from around two
- 1:55:17Speaker 2: thousand and five, approximately two years before Stuck's Net first
- 1:55:22Speaker 2: became active, but learning what we learned about earlier, it
- 1:55:26Speaker 2: was being developed at the same time. Right two thousand
- 1:55:29Speaker 2: and five, they were absolutely working on Stuck's Net, but
- 1:55:33Speaker 2: this was also being worked on probably I would say
- 1:55:36Speaker 2: by the same groups in the same offices from the
- 1:55:39Speaker 2: same payer, honestly.
- 1:55:41Speaker 1: I mean yeah.
- 1:55:43Speaker 2: So the framework consists of several or service binary that
- 1:55:47Speaker 2: embeds an early LUA five point zero virtual machine, a
- 1:55:51Speaker 2: boot start file system driver that intercepts and patches executable
- 1:55:56Speaker 2: code as it is read from a disc, and a
- 1:55:59Speaker 2: rule driven hook engine that rewrites rewrites very specific instruction
- 1:56:03Speaker 2: sequences inside a single narrowly defined targeted application. Now, I
- 1:56:07Speaker 2: know I'm just throwing out a lot of big words here,
- 1:56:09Speaker 2: but essentially it intercepts and it's for watching, right, It's
- 1:56:15Speaker 2: it intercepts and reads a thing and then sends it forward.
- 1:56:18Speaker 2: But like now you get to see what's happening, and
- 1:56:20Speaker 2: you might be able to alter what is said. It's
- 1:56:22Speaker 2: for the purpose of sabotage, not for the purpose of spying.
- 1:56:25Speaker 1: Does that make sense now?
- 1:56:28Speaker 2: Confirming the target application down here, they even show like
- 1:56:33Speaker 2: a bit of the code and I'm not even reading it,
- 1:56:35Speaker 2: but it says below is an example of rules forty
- 1:56:39Speaker 2: six and forty seven, which capture and overwrite a very
- 1:56:42Speaker 2: specific x eighty seven floating point sequence which I'm not
- 1:56:47Speaker 2: going to read this because it doesn't make sense in English,
- 1:56:49Speaker 2: but the computer speaks that language if you understand what
- 1:56:52Speaker 2: I'm saying. The patterns, the patterns of the rules match
- 1:56:56Speaker 2: against do not match against every Intel four train compiled
- 1:57:01Speaker 2: Single Precision Explicit Dynamic SOLVAD of that era, but are
- 1:57:04Speaker 2: found in versions of ls DINA and AutoDim. These patterns
- 1:57:08Speaker 2: are specific to different versions of the software, and some
- 1:57:11Speaker 2: could belong to other simulation programs as well. Anyway, long
- 1:57:15Speaker 2: story short, it came in two different mechanisms, Mechanism A
- 1:57:18Speaker 2: and Mechanism B. Long story short, it did the things
- 1:57:21Speaker 2: that it needed to do. Mechanism A took the data,
- 1:57:23Speaker 2: mechanism be altered the data, so to speak. And I'm
- 1:57:26Speaker 2: oversimplifying this, and then mechanism see scent it.
- 1:57:30Speaker 1: Continuing on here. It was strictly for.
- 1:57:33Speaker 2: The nuclear detonation simulation, but all this ties into Iran
- 1:57:38Speaker 2: the year's lineup. What was being done for the principle
- 1:57:42Speaker 2: of sabotaging Iran's nuclear capabilities in this timeframe lineup. I
- 1:57:46Speaker 2: would argue that fast sixteen was being developed around the
- 1:57:49Speaker 2: same time, if not literally, in tandem with Stucksnet, but
- 1:57:52Speaker 2: it's no one knew about it until now. Like we
- 1:57:55Speaker 2: only just really quote unquote discovered it a few months ago. Interesting,
- 1:58:00Speaker 2: So looking at all these things, we have been trying
- 1:58:02Speaker 2: to keep nukes out of Iran's hands for years actually,
- 1:58:07Speaker 2: I would say two decades. And although operational Olympic Games
- 1:58:12Speaker 2: was a success, it didn't exactly stop anything.
- 1:58:17Speaker 1: Was it that successful though, Like realistically, if we're talking
- 1:58:20Speaker 1: about five thousand and it took out one thousand, like
- 1:58:24Speaker 1: if it was like twenty five hundred, I'd feel like
- 1:58:26Speaker 1: that is a solid success. Now I will say it's
- 1:58:28Speaker 1: a success because it was the first cyber attack that
- 1:58:31Speaker 1: was able to actually execute, continue to run for several
- 1:58:34Speaker 1: years without being able to be found and stop. So
- 1:58:38Speaker 1: technically that is a success I meant in the sense
- 1:58:41Speaker 1: of how many they were able to shut off.
- 1:58:44Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, it wasn't like an overwhelming victory for
- 1:58:50Speaker 2: the United States or Israel.
- 1:58:52Speaker 1: Mean, but it did put it back more so that's
- 1:58:53Speaker 1: a positive. But now we're in this situation, it's like, yeah, yeah, Tebaud,
- 1:58:59Speaker 1: they couldn't put like a little tiny bomb that like
- 1:59:02Speaker 1: when detonated, but then it just like fries everything, you know.
- 1:59:08Speaker 2: And it's interesting you say that because Israel did that
- 1:59:11Speaker 2: with the pagers. You remember that.
- 1:59:13Speaker 1: I don't actually.
- 1:59:17Speaker 2: Last year or two years ago, the pagers that blew
- 1:59:20Speaker 2: up in everybody's pockets.
- 1:59:23Speaker 1: I'm gonna be honest with you, I didn't actually hear
- 1:59:25Speaker 1: about that.
- 1:59:26Speaker 2: Oh hold on, raven Lee, hold on, no here. So
- 1:59:30Speaker 2: the Moussad decided that they wanted to target only Hesbelah
- 1:59:36Speaker 2: members and affiliates of and so how could we do this? Somehow,
- 1:59:42Speaker 2: some way Hesbla thought that pagers were untraceable. Oh and
- 1:59:48Speaker 2: for the record, we're not talking about back in the
- 1:59:50Speaker 2: nineties when pages were still being used. I mean up
- 1:59:53Speaker 2: until like last year or the year before. Actually, yeah,
- 1:59:57Speaker 2: the year before last. They were carrying around pagers because
- 2:00:02Speaker 2: they thought that nobody could trace this. What they didn't
- 2:00:05Speaker 2: know is that these pages were built from the Israeli
- 2:00:09Speaker 2: government and inside the battery was explosives.
- 2:00:13Speaker 1: That's smart.
- 2:00:14Speaker 2: So for three years they had these pager systems that
- 2:00:18Speaker 2: were sent out to these people, all the way to
- 2:00:20Speaker 2: the president or the Prime Minister of Iran. There's a
- 2:00:24Speaker 2: picture of him sitting at a table at giving a
- 2:00:26Speaker 2: press conference. There's a pager on a table next to them.
- 2:00:29Speaker 2: Nobody uses pagers, so you know where that came from
- 2:00:33Speaker 2: and essentially they were gathering data on these dudes, locations, numbers,
- 2:00:38Speaker 2: they were using it like a phone and texting certain messages.
- 2:00:41Speaker 2: They gotten biometrics off of it, all these things, and
- 2:00:44Speaker 2: when the time came they decided to pull the trigger.
- 2:00:47Speaker 2: Only has a lot of people were killed, three thousand
- 2:00:50Speaker 2: of them. It was tiny. It's like the pages all
- 2:00:53Speaker 2: that big. Yeah, and there's all kinds of videos. For
- 2:00:57Speaker 2: years they were just collecting data and then finally they're like,
- 2:01:00Speaker 2: you know what, fuck them, just fuck them. And there's
- 2:01:04Speaker 2: videos of like this dude was at a store and
- 2:01:07Speaker 2: like was shopping and you see something in his pocket
- 2:01:09Speaker 2: just by oh, and he goes down and it's like
- 2:01:12Speaker 2: oh shit. And they were like yeah, they were waiting
- 2:01:14Speaker 2: on it. Come to find out, the pagers were made
- 2:01:16Speaker 2: from two different companies. One of them was based in Asia,
- 2:01:20Speaker 2: one of them was based in Europe. Like the battery
- 2:01:23Speaker 2: was made here, the pagers made here, both of which
- 2:01:25Speaker 2: were owned by Israel. It was top tier level espionage
- 2:01:30Speaker 2: and spy where it was phenomenal. But my point is
- 2:01:33Speaker 2: this was like a kinetic attack that took years of
- 2:01:35Speaker 2: doing all the things, all the stuff, and it was
- 2:01:38Speaker 2: too Iran. This was a cyber attack to their nuclear capabilities, which,
- 2:01:45Speaker 2: like you're.
- 2:01:45Speaker 1: Saying, like the Pager situation, I would say was a.
- 2:01:48Speaker 2: Overwhelming victory for Israel, like just by the math, top
- 2:01:53Speaker 2: to bottom, excellent execution, overwhelming success, no collateral damage that
- 2:01:59Speaker 2: I know anyway, No civilian was injured as a result
- 2:02:02Speaker 2: of or anything like that. So like top tier, top
- 2:02:05Speaker 2: tiers things they went on there Mussad. Now that being said,
- 2:02:10Speaker 2: when it came to this, yeah, only a fifth of
- 2:02:12Speaker 2: the centrifugles were actually shut down, and that did postpone
- 2:02:16Speaker 2: it because then they had to start the process of
- 2:02:18Speaker 2: because they didn't immediately know like oh man, a fifth
- 2:02:20Speaker 2: umber down and then like two days later it was
- 2:02:23Speaker 2: Israel on the Americans, like it took them forever to
- 2:02:25Speaker 2: figure out, like Okay, did we build something wrong? Did
- 2:02:29Speaker 2: our computers get programmed?
- 2:02:30Speaker 1: Is this is it? It's only that old boy that
- 2:02:33Speaker 1: released it is what got them caught because other companies,
- 2:02:37Speaker 1: I don't think he was killed.
- 2:02:38Speaker 2: I think he was killed by US or Mussad could
- 2:02:41Speaker 2: tie up a loose in oh yeah, yeah, they they
- 2:02:45Speaker 2: didn't even understand that he was the guy that.
- 2:02:47Speaker 1: Did it until years later.
- 2:02:49Speaker 2: So only after it hit the internet in like twenty
- 2:02:52Speaker 2: twelve time frame did we actually be like, Okay, are bad?
- 2:02:57Speaker 1: Am I bad? The thing the thing that may or
- 2:03:00Speaker 1: may not have done unbroken necks just happened to be
- 2:03:03Speaker 1: on the road.
- 2:03:04Speaker 2: Oh no, no, I'm talking about the virus. The virus, think
- 2:03:06Speaker 2: about Eric whatever accents every day people, I.
- 2:03:10Speaker 1: Thought you switched to Eric, and I was like, what
- 2:03:11Speaker 1: about Eric? No, no, I think I think Eric was
- 2:03:14Speaker 1: the virus. I mean, they're not going to be like,
- 2:03:16Speaker 1: they're not going to admit fully to that. They're just
- 2:03:19Speaker 1: gonna be like, was it.
- 2:03:22Speaker 2: Or was this one of those hacker groups like Q
- 2:03:25Speaker 2: Yeah it was Israel. You see what I'm saying, it's
- 2:03:29Speaker 2: it's crazy. And then the fact that a Russian power
- 2:03:32Speaker 2: plant also had issues with it, Indonesia, Pakistan, all these
- 2:03:36Speaker 2: places where it's like, Okay, the thing that we may
- 2:03:41Speaker 2: or may not have done, which I'm not saying we did,
- 2:03:44Speaker 2: are bad, but also probably wasn't even us.
- 2:03:49Speaker 1: What was it?
- 2:03:49Speaker 2: I don't even know where I was that day that
- 2:03:51Speaker 2: you're talking about.
- 2:03:52Speaker 1: What was right?
- 2:03:53Speaker 3: Right?
- 2:03:54Speaker 1: Right? Noes?
- 2:03:55Speaker 2: And then Siemens was able to like, Okay, we can
- 2:03:58Speaker 2: fix this if you find something that you think is
- 2:04:00Speaker 2: being crazy and you think it stuck's net, call customer
- 2:04:04Speaker 2: support and we can like tell you how to program
- 2:04:06Speaker 2: it to box that out, or we can send you
- 2:04:09Speaker 2: a new component that doesn't have that ability. So like,
- 2:04:11Speaker 2: either way it goes. It's handled now allegedly. But for
- 2:04:16Speaker 2: the time frame that it was in and for the
- 2:04:19Speaker 2: level of cyber warfare that this was actually able to complete, yeah,
- 2:04:24Speaker 2: I would say that it was a success. Maybe not
- 2:04:26Speaker 2: an overwhelming victory, but I would at least put it
- 2:04:29Speaker 2: as a lowercase W.
- 2:04:30Speaker 1: Yeah, I agree.
- 2:04:32Speaker 2: Unfortunately, all did was kicked the can down the road
- 2:04:34Speaker 2: a couple of decades, and Iran, as soon as they
- 2:04:37Speaker 2: figured it out and got their centrifugals back up and running,
- 2:04:40Speaker 2: started to refine it.
- 2:04:41Speaker 1: Even more, which is why we bombed.
- 2:04:43Speaker 2: The fuck out of them last year, which is why
- 2:04:44Speaker 2: we are.
- 2:04:45Speaker 1: Currently bombing the fuck out of them.
- 2:04:47Speaker 2: So Operation Olympic Games. Small victory, overwhelming though grand scheme
- 2:04:54Speaker 2: of shit, not a victory, not at all. And it
- 2:04:58Speaker 2: was brought up again by wiki leaks and by Edward Snowden.
- 2:05:03Speaker 1: Yeah, I find that to be really interesting.
- 2:05:05Speaker 2: Who is still in Russia in hiding right now? Like
- 2:05:07Speaker 2: he'll give interviews. He'll go on like a zoom call
- 2:05:11Speaker 2: with people to like talk about things, but he.
- 2:05:14Speaker 1: Knows how do we reach him? Dude? If Snowden would
- 2:05:17Speaker 1: come on the show, my god, oh my god, that
- 2:05:20Speaker 1: would be phenomena.
- 2:05:21Speaker 2: But no, snow White is uh he's living low in
- 2:05:25Speaker 2: Moscow right now. Actually, I'm not sure if he's in
- 2:05:27Speaker 2: Moscow anymore. I think he was. He defected because he
- 2:05:31Speaker 2: knew that they would find him and killed.
- 2:05:32Speaker 1: We happened to know somebody that spent twenty plus years there.
- 2:05:36Speaker 2: Maybe, dude, do you think the Good Doctor would put
- 2:05:39Speaker 2: us in I don't know if they like ran in
- 2:05:40Speaker 2: similar circles, but maybe.
- 2:05:42Speaker 1: Maybe the Doctor knows she knew a lot of people.
- 2:05:46Speaker 1: She knows a lot of people that.
- 2:05:48Speaker 2: Would be fucking wild, which I can't wait to get
- 2:05:49Speaker 2: her back on the show with the other survivors.
- 2:05:52Speaker 1: Oh, it's gonna be a play. Yeah, it's gonna be great.
- 2:05:54Speaker 1: Everyone's gonna have to listen to that episode and share
- 2:05:56Speaker 1: out because it's gonna be It's gonna be multiple survivors,
- 2:06:00Speaker 1: altar programming.
- 2:06:01Speaker 2: Yeah, and the sex magic and all the rings that
- 2:06:04Speaker 2: rolled in and the human trafficking is gonna be wild.
- 2:06:06Speaker 1: But it's gonna be a wild time. But yeah.
- 2:06:07Speaker 2: But anyway, when this with this conversation with the Stuck's
- 2:06:11Speaker 2: net and the operational Olympic Games, I would say that
- 2:06:15Speaker 2: this is highly conspiratorial and in the grand scheme of
- 2:06:19Speaker 2: shit didn't actually equate too much like all the time, lass, I.
- 2:06:24Speaker 1: Feel like it actually is the reason why cyber warfare
- 2:06:27Speaker 1: is like the true enemy. I think they they that
- 2:06:31Speaker 1: we played our hand and we played it effectively in
- 2:06:34Speaker 1: a sense, at least in one part of it. That
- 2:06:37Speaker 1: this kick started cyber warfare for everybody. Yeah, like look
- 2:06:41Speaker 1: at what you guys said, and we're able to accomplish.
- 2:06:43Speaker 2: Yeah, which is crazy that it's like it's kinetic cyber warfare.
- 2:06:47Speaker 2: I think it's physical, but it's also being done cyberly,
- 2:06:51Speaker 2: and it's like, huh.
- 2:06:52Speaker 1: I think that this was the door that opened for
- 2:06:56Speaker 1: everything else that has now led us to hear Yeah.
- 2:07:00Speaker 2: I would have to agree, honestly, which is why the
- 2:07:03Speaker 2: hacker space is so terrifying to me.
- 2:07:07Speaker 1: It is they can do so much.
- 2:07:09Speaker 2: And knowing that they can create a program like this
- 2:07:11Speaker 2: and yes it took some doing four or five zero
- 2:07:15Speaker 2: days and all these things like yeah, yeah, sure.
- 2:07:17Speaker 1: But that's not impossible. It can be done, especially by
- 2:07:20Speaker 1: a small group of.
- 2:07:21Speaker 2: Highly motivated, highly trained individuals that know exactly what to do,
- 2:07:25Speaker 2: which is why I think they're trying to create cyber
- 2:07:27Speaker 2: Force specifically for this. Hell, you could we could probably
- 2:07:31Speaker 2: argue that Stucksnet might be the origin arc. It is
- 2:07:36Speaker 2: of what we would now call the beginnings of the
- 2:07:38Speaker 2: cyber Force.
- 2:07:39Speaker 1: Yeah, one hundred percent believe that. But also it makes
- 2:07:43Speaker 1: me think of oh, damn, I can see them in mind,
- 2:07:47Speaker 1: the bugs, the Starship Trooper, No, the program, the thing
- 2:07:51Speaker 1: that we talked about, the whole They had to play
- 2:07:55Speaker 1: the games to see how far they could advance, and
- 2:07:57Speaker 1: then it all of a sudden disappeared.
- 2:07:59Speaker 2: Oh oh, you're talking about Cicada.
- 2:08:02Speaker 1: Thank you. Yeah, I can see him in my mind,
- 2:08:04Speaker 1: and I can see the name. But I was like, damn,
- 2:08:06Speaker 1: I cannot think of what it is. That was a
- 2:08:07Speaker 1: fun episode, it was, But I was sitting here while
- 2:08:10Speaker 1: you're talking about this, I was like, what if these
- 2:08:12Speaker 1: were the Cicada people. Wasn't that before or during that time? Yeah?
- 2:08:17Speaker 2: I mean, who knows, this might have been. This might
- 2:08:19Speaker 2: have been what Cicicada was about to try to find
- 2:08:22Speaker 2: people that career work for them to create stucks net
- 2:08:26Speaker 2: and other variants of it. And that's the thing. This
- 2:08:29Speaker 2: is just what we know about. There is way more
- 2:08:31Speaker 2: out there stucks nets and the fast sixteens and whatever else,
- 2:08:36Speaker 2: things that you've never.
- 2:08:37Speaker 1: Fucking heard of that are waiting right now. They're laying
- 2:08:41Speaker 1: in wait. Okay, it was a takeout part, so it wasn't.
- 2:08:43Speaker 1: It wasn't. It was afterwards though, Well you're it was
- 2:08:46Speaker 1: twenty twelve to twenty fourteen.
- 2:08:48Speaker 2: So when this allegedly got shut down, Cicada started.
- 2:08:52Speaker 1: Yeah, ooh, spicy, Spicy just saying, man, I have to
- 2:08:59Speaker 1: agree with you.
- 2:09:00Speaker 2: There is I'm not saying it's confirmed. I'm saying there's
- 2:09:02Speaker 2: a real, real think I think of Cicada every day.
- 2:09:08Speaker 1: I think it Cickada all the time.
- 2:09:11Speaker 2: I don't know why. Like so men think about either
- 2:09:13Speaker 2: World War two or Rome at least once a day,
- 2:09:16Speaker 2: think you think of Cicada at least Cada a.
- 2:09:18Speaker 1: Lot, because it like it bothers me, Like it bothers
- 2:09:22Speaker 1: me because I'm like, there's not they don't just do this.
- 2:09:25Speaker 1: And well, I guess maybe because the show that I
- 2:09:28Speaker 1: watched a year or two ago and I'll have to
- 2:09:30Speaker 1: have you watch this show. It's basically Cicada. It literally
- 2:09:35Speaker 1: it is on It's on Netflix. I'm gonna have to
- 2:09:37Speaker 1: really find it because I can't think of the name.
- 2:09:39Speaker 1: But long story short, when you talked about that show
- 2:09:43Speaker 1: or that that whole situation, all I could think about
- 2:09:46Speaker 1: was this show and how it actually pertains to So
- 2:09:49Speaker 1: may the conspiracies of our world are actually in this show?
- 2:09:53Speaker 1: And they explain it with basically aliens. I'm gonna sum
- 2:09:57Speaker 1: it up. I'm not gonna give it away, and I'm
- 2:09:58Speaker 1: not gonna talk like tell everything spoiler alert no, but
- 2:10:02Speaker 1: like it's it's not gonna spoil it. But that for
- 2:10:05Speaker 1: some reason it bothers me because I'm like, you know,
- 2:10:07Speaker 1: this is just it makes sense to me, Like obviously
- 2:10:10Speaker 1: they were having trouble finding this and they were struggling.
- 2:10:13Speaker 1: Why not host a game basically to get the job interview. Yeah,
- 2:10:18Speaker 1: get the highest hackers you can to figure this out.
- 2:10:21Speaker 1: What if it was running rampant? What if it was
- 2:10:23Speaker 1: still running rampant to the point where they couldn't shut
- 2:10:25Speaker 1: it down and the people that built it couldn't stop it,
- 2:10:28Speaker 1: so they had to find more people that were more advanced.
- 2:10:30Speaker 2: The Equation Group and the Shadow Brokers are the ones
- 2:10:33Speaker 2: that were actually making the Cicada game. And if you
- 2:10:37Speaker 2: were smart enough and had the technical know how and
- 2:10:40Speaker 2: could think outside.
- 2:10:40Speaker 1: The box, yeah, there are enough ways, and.
- 2:10:43Speaker 2: You got to the end, you got to knock on
- 2:10:45Speaker 2: the door essentially, because if you've got to that level,
- 2:10:47Speaker 2: they knew where you live.
- 2:10:48Speaker 1: Dude, they know everything. They knew everything's allot the NSA.
- 2:10:51Speaker 2: They're spying on us right as we're recording this a
- 2:10:53Speaker 2: little let me say the green dot. Yeah, the green
- 2:10:56Speaker 2: dot is on my computer. They're watching me right now,
- 2:10:58Speaker 2: like being honest here, so like.
- 2:11:00Speaker 1: Yeah, for what it is, how are you not? Really?
- 2:11:06Speaker 1: I was gonna send up before.
- 2:11:07Speaker 2: Perfect timing, But to say that Stuck's Net or with
- 2:11:12Speaker 2: these other things were possibly the predecessors for the Cicada
- 2:11:15Speaker 2: game and that the Shadow Brokers were the ones behind
- 2:11:18Speaker 2: it the entire time, Why the fuck not?
- 2:11:21Speaker 1: Yeah, Like, I trust me. I think about it all
- 2:11:24Speaker 1: the time and what it could be attached to. Like,
- 2:11:26Speaker 1: you don't understand how much I think about this because
- 2:11:28Speaker 1: I think about Peter Thiel all the programs that he
- 2:11:30Speaker 1: is involved in, and then I think about all the
- 2:11:32Speaker 1: stuff that I read with Epstein and like all the
- 2:11:35Speaker 1: scientists and all the it wasn't because it wasn't just scientists,
- 2:11:39Speaker 1: so he was super deep into all the computer stuff,
- 2:11:43Speaker 1: all the hacking, the biohacking, all this stuff that like
- 2:11:46Speaker 1: intermixed with transhumanism, all of this stuff. I'm like, the
- 2:11:51Speaker 1: more I think about it, the more I'm like, there's
- 2:11:53Speaker 1: something about that in particular, and the imagery and the
- 2:11:57Speaker 1: way that it was listed out. And then I'm not
- 2:12:00Speaker 1: gonna just got Brant and rave, but I will say
- 2:12:02Speaker 1: that I think about it quite often because I'm like,
- 2:12:04Speaker 1: it really if you think about it and you break
- 2:12:06Speaker 1: it down, it's like it's the It's like it's the
- 2:12:11Speaker 1: oracle for the matrix. That's what it reminds me of.
- 2:12:14Speaker 1: It reminds me of the oracle.
- 2:12:16Speaker 2: And also, keep in mind, Stucksnid had to be physically
- 2:12:19Speaker 2: implanted into that system. I would wager if I was
- 2:12:24Speaker 2: a betting man, which I'll know I don't do because
- 2:12:26Speaker 2: I'm so notoriously bad at it when money's on the line,
- 2:12:28Speaker 2: But if I was a betting man, I would wager
- 2:12:31Speaker 2: that they've gotten more sophisticated with it. Oh yeah, And
- 2:12:34Speaker 2: they don't have to have it plugged in via USB
- 2:12:37Speaker 2: drive anymore. I would argue they could probably send it
- 2:12:40Speaker 2: wirelessly because everything is wireless these days, everything is Bluetooth adaptable,
- 2:12:46Speaker 2: Everything is smart these days, which even to that point
- 2:12:49Speaker 2: in industry, I can't tell you how many times I
- 2:12:52Speaker 2: would walk up to a device and my phone would
- 2:12:54Speaker 2: give me a ping like do I want to connect to.
- 2:12:56Speaker 1: Bluetooth to this pressure transmitter? And I'm like, for what?
- 2:13:00Speaker 2: But siemens started being Bluetooth applicable to where you could
- 2:13:04Speaker 2: bring a device into the field and link to it
- 2:13:05Speaker 2: Bluetooth wise and make calibrations and do whatever else. Yeah,
- 2:13:09Speaker 2: So if it's got that capability, it's got to be hackable.
- 2:13:13Speaker 2: And we know that they can run programming to hack
- 2:13:15Speaker 2: anything on their phones. So it's like, I trust me.
- 2:13:19Speaker 1: The more I think about it, the more I'm like,
- 2:13:21Speaker 1: I'm convinced it's the Oracle group.
- 2:13:23Speaker 2: Indeed, indeed, I have to agree. I have to agree.
- 2:13:25Speaker 2: And so you know what, good cult members, we want
- 2:13:27Speaker 2: to hear what you think about this? What do you
- 2:13:29Speaker 2: think about stucksnet and this underground society of hackers that
- 2:13:33Speaker 2: work for the United States government under the auspices of
- 2:13:36Speaker 2: the n essay to create kinetic cyber warfare, and do
- 2:13:42Speaker 2: you think it's still going on today? What companies do
- 2:13:45Speaker 2: you think are involved with this? What groups do you
- 2:13:47Speaker 2: think are involved with this? What do you think Biden
- 2:13:50Speaker 2: did with this? What do you think Trump has done
- 2:13:52Speaker 2: with this currently with the Iran situation? But before we
- 2:13:55Speaker 2: wrap up.
- 2:13:56Speaker 1: We do need to give the shameless plugs.
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- 2:15:04Speaker 2: Yeah, which the rare cards are also pretty fucking dope,
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- 2:15:16Speaker 2: check them out, go support them. But Cult members, we
- 2:15:18Speaker 2: want to hear what you think about this conversation about
- 2:15:21Speaker 2: Stuck's Net, and the best place to let us know
- 2:15:23Speaker 2: would be too Please hit the five stars, hit the
- 2:15:25Speaker 2: Shares of Life, subscribes comments, sleeve a POSTU review, and
- 2:15:27Speaker 2: shares with their friends and family. Shares us everywhere. Here's
- 2:15:30Speaker 2: the deal. The more activity the algorithm sees across all
- 2:15:32Speaker 2: of our listening platforms. The more we get promoted more
- 2:15:34Speaker 2: potential listeners who could then become potential cult members. Are
- 2:15:37Speaker 2: there to you, Fine ladies and gentlemen, Why are you
- 2:15:39Speaker 2: ready to go check out metimistics Jonathan Show and getting
- 2:15:41Speaker 2: the same lever respect over there with the five star
- 2:15:42Speaker 2: reviews and the positivity in the comments.
- 2:15:44Speaker 1: Come check out the Cajun Night.
- 2:15:46Speaker 2: Come join each of us for our individual Patreon lives
- 2:15:49Speaker 2: we host every Wednesday night, nine pm Central.
- 2:15:51Speaker 1: Links to those are in the show notes below.
- 2:15:53Speaker 2: As well, and we thank you for everybody's already gone
- 2:15:55Speaker 2: done so. With all of this being said, this was
- 2:15:58Speaker 2: another beautiful episode of the Cult of Conspiracy and I
- 2:16:02Speaker 2: am the Cage to Night. And there's one very important, sting,
- 2:16:05Speaker 2: final piece of information needs learn just as soon as
- 2:16:08Speaker 2: humanly possible, that