Latest / UK Column Radio / Jobst Landgrebe on hype cycles - Jerm Warfare

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Jobst Landgrebe on hype cycles - Jerm Warfare · UK Column Radio

0:35
None. You've written a new book called
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The Hype Cycle. What is the Hype Cycle?
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The Hype Cycle is a book about the way in which we are
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basically culturally governed. So we live in a in an age where
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it's harder to govern people because they're not afraid of
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God anymore. And the old narrative that the
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state represents God and therefore we should fear the
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state when we fear God doesn't work anymore.
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And then there is at least the Western Hemisphere, there's not
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yet enough poverty to govern by famine and, and you know,
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massive suppression of, of the basic needs.
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So, so when people are are not hungry and don't believe in God
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anymore, it becomes hard to govern then and need to
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recognise this. And also other classical
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thinkers at the beginning, at the third of the 19th of the
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20th century said it will be harder to rule if you don't have
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faith anymore. And so the the now you need to
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replace classical faith by some ideology to to rule.
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And communism did this via via the communist Marxist ideology.
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We did it for many decades in the West by consumerism, which
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work pretty well and get kind of basic economic participation of
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everyone in consumerism. But now we have more scarcity.
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And so now the the new pattern of rule is these hype.
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The are these hype cycles, which are there are two types.
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There are scientific heights which are based on, on the
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sciences like climate type or COVID type.
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And then they there are cultural hypes like the diversity equity
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inclusion hype or transgender hype.
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And both are used to create a permanent state of emergency, to
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get people to obey to the rule and to the political reformation
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of the elite. So OK, so you're arguing that
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these hype cycles are manufactured, therefore they are
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not organic? Can hype cycles be organic?
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So, so they are to a certain extent organic.
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So it's clever rulers always utilise spontaneously evolving
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cultural trends to utilise them and to reinforce them.
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So it's it's impossible to to to force the population to buy into
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hype for to which it's not anyhow prone which is not
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already spontaneously evolving. For example, they tried the
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vaccination hype 15 years ago against Sask of 1 and MERS and
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also the swine through the bird through the 2000 tens and it
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failed because the populations were not ready.
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But then ten years later in 2020, they could, there was a
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certain cultural readiness to accept the COVID hype and, and
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only the northern hemisphere countries accepted it.
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You know, the southern hemisphere where you live, the
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hype didn't work as well, especially in, in, in sub
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Saharan Africa. They, they didn't buy into it.
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So it really depends. It's it's also has a spontaneous
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aspect to it. But then why do some hype cycles
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become so appealing? That has to do a lot with huge
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cultural differences today, thanks to globalism, which is
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itself a hype, which I also discussed in the book.
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Thanks to globalism, we have this illusion that the culture
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is similar everywhere, But that's just a western cliche in
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in reality, as you know, living in South Africa, you live in a
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very western sub community of South Africans, but there's also
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a non western community in South Africa, right?
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And and the culture differences are massive.
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And and I think the the culture differences explain why some
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populations accept such hypes and others don't, and that some
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hypes work very well somewhere and don't work in other places.
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The implication of saying cycle means that it repeats.
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I believe that it that, that these hypes have always played a
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role in in mass psychology and in human perception.
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And I think that they, they are a repeating element of, of
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dominance and rule. And I think that that what
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changes are the contents, right? So a very interesting example
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was from 2020 to, to the, to the spring of 2022, we had this
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corona height cycle and then which was expensive to to
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maintain because if you observe what was going on with your bare
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eyes without reading the press, you couldn't see anything.
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OK, you could see that there were lockdowns and people
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wearing masks, but nobody was. But when, when the plague was
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devastating Europe, you could see piles of dead bodies on the
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streets waiting to be taken away by the lorries and so on.
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And, and so there was nothing like this happening.
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So it was very expensive to sustain the hype and it cost a
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lot of money. And when they stopped spending
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this money and reporting if the hype died away, but then they
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immediately started to Ukraine hype everywhere.
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We saw Ukraine flags here in Europe and and so their new hype
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was created, which was much more artificial than the COVID hype
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actually. And so you could see how they
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switched from one hype pattern to the next.
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That's what I mean with the work cycle.
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Is the purpose of a hype cycle to manipulate?
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Yeah, so it's it's about getting people to buy into into
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accepting the political will formation of a minority.
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So there's a a tiny minority which which has some political
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goals it wants to achieve. And these political goals are
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harmful to the vast majority of the population because they're
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not in their interest like the feudal Lords they were all the
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time fighting to to to get bigger territories that they
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could rule in the Middle Ages and also the Renaissance.
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And this was of course, not in the interest of the peasants who
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were producing all the goods, right?
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And to justify it, there was an ideology.
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And that's it's the same today. We have a very small elite that
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is ruling the West and, and a lot of what it's doing is not in
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our interest, but they have to kind of hide it.
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And that's why they create this hyper ideology.
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Is a variation of your two hype cycles of fear and hope.
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Yes, yes. So, so usually what you very
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often have, you have a fear hype cycle that is started 1st and
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then you have a hope hype. So for example in the Cold War,
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the fear hype was the Soviet Union is going to attack Western
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Europe, which was never the case.
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The Soviets never planned, Charlie didn't plan it and then
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also called shove and Brezhnev didn't plan to invade Western
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Europe. They had other goals.
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You know, they wanted to consolidate their huge empire,
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which was almost, it was super big geographically, it's still
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right. And they had other aims.
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And, but the fear cycle was created that people should be
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afraid of the Russians. And then hope was nuclear
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armament and also conventional armaments.
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So there was then a hope cycle created.
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Oh, but if we, you know, if we spend billions and billions of
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the taxpayer money for, for weapons, then we can have hope
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that the, that the Russians cannot attack us.
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So that's, that was a classical fear hope cycle.
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Another one was the COVID, the COVID fear of the virus and the
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hope from the vaccine. In your book you lay out a bunch
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of hope cycles. Take me through some of them.
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So hope cycles. So one is the Vex, so the HIV
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treatment hope, the hope of of of being able to heal COVID.
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The quantum hype is also hope cycle.
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Then diversity, equity inclusion hype which is a cultural hype is
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also hope cycle because it hopes to change all the the grievances
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of of mankind. Transgender hype is a hope
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cycle. Gender language hype is a hope
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cycle. So many of these positive hypes
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which are which can be subsumed under what I call possible and
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collectivism, others call it cultural Marxism.
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These are all hope cycles as well.
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OK. And then you also have a whole
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bunch of fear cycles, AI being one of them.
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Yes, AI is a big fear cycle, though there's also a bit of
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hope in it, because we are told that AI will wipe out human
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labour, that will replace human labour and make us superfluous.
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And that is also AI could become more intelligent than man and
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then rule the world and that we have to be afraid of this and to
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take measures against this. Just quickly on that, a little
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bit of a segue, but I was having a conversation a few days ago
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with, with a family member and he was saying that in, for
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example, in the agricultural sector here in South Africa,
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many farmers are mechanising and using more technology, which
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which comes at the cost of, of labour.
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You, you, you start firing farm workers because you have you're
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employing you using more machines.
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And he was making the point that those farm workers will end up
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on the streets. So if you look at the history of
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industrialisation, what happened in the 19th century was that
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first there were there were a lot of farm labour hands were
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underemployed which went into the cities when it is
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realisation happened. And then of course what also
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happened that was that agriculture was mechanised and
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that there was less work. Now, these people didn't end up
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on the street because the, the, the quickly growing industrial
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production soaked them up, right?
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And so basically they, they just changed their jobs from farm
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working to working in factories. And I think that if you have a
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growing economy, there's always work, but people have to change
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the type of work they do in their lifetime.
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And, you know, and part of me, I'm an old Social Democrat.
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So I believe that the state, one of the tasks of the state is to
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help the very low educated people to change the job, right,
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not by subsidising them, but to, to but to offer programmes for
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re educating them out or helping them to evolve that they can
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meet this challenge of changing job.
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To some extent that this is a role the state can take.
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But but but these transitions are natural in a in since we
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have industrialization and and this type of mechanisation is a
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blessing and not, not a threat. The the nature of the work is
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changing. New work is coming up now.
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If AI however could mechanise all the intellectual work that
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is being done, also the simple one that's done by clerks.
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If that would be the case, if for example there would no, no
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not be any need anymore for phone, right, For phone based
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services, then then there would be a real problem because then
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the AI could take up all the work.
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But this will not happen because AI is not intelligent but but
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but so there is the classical mechanisation I think is a
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blessing because it's it removes repetitive and hard labour and
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frees us of it and gives us opportunities to have more
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interesting work. But if AI could really take over
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everything humans do, then it would be a real problem.
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There seems to be a false dichotomy.
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The fear is based on the fact that the amount of work
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available is like a closed system, and you're suggesting
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it's actually an infinite system.
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Yes, so exactly. So it's an open system.
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So basically, of course, there are limits to gross a certain
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amount of people on Earth is probably, there's probably
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certain maximum where it's still, you know, pleasant to
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live on Earth, but we don't know where this maximum is.
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But but the problem of overpopulation is anyhow already
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over. We don't have this problem
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anymore because globally fertility rates are declining.
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And it might actually become the opposite that we might become
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worried about fertility. But, but with regard to but this
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taking aside, yes, I think that that there is no natural limit
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to growth and that that a growing economy can always
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create new opportunities for work and for for for
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participation, for economic participation, which is what
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work in the end is, you know. One of the biggest fear cycles
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in existence is the climate change one.
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I actually was myself believing in the climate type until maybe
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2012 when I sat at a dinner next to a geophysicist to explain to
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me that this is all ridiculous. And he started getting paper and
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writing down the equations to model the climate, the IPCC's
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model. He he sketched it out for me.
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That was laughing at it. And then I started reading and
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read a lot of literature until I was ready to write this book
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chapter which summarises the main arguments that that though
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man may contribute to very small extent to the global warming
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that we have experienced since 1850, the contribution of man is
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small and it's mostly natural cycle.
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And so and so that the whole everything around climate
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emergency and man made climate change is real nonsense.
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And that we that we should not try to to change the the natural
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cause of the climate by artificial.
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Sure. But this is the largest agenda
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in the world. I mean, this is pretty much the
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heart of the IPCC. It's the heart of the G20 that
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just occurred here in South Africa.
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It's the heart of everything, the carbon economy.
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Yes, now the only way to crack it is like the way that Luther
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cracks the Catholic dogma of the 16th century, right by by
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pointing out it's inner self contradictions and problems and,
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and, and unveiling it as what it was a huge what the hugest fear
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hype cycle ever was, was Catholic theology of the 16th
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century. And now we have a similarly big
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fear narrative that is that resembles the Catholic one of
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the 16th century, which is the climate panic, which is promoted
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by by the new church, right. There's like these institutions
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act like a huge big church. Curtis Javan, whom I really
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don't like, calls it the cathedral to symbolise it.
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I just, I, I think it's just a new religion with the very same
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function than the Catholicism of the 16th century, which is to
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instil massive fear into the population, then get them to buy
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these indulgency letters. And today the indulgency letters
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is to buy into this global agenda, the global green agenda,
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which I think is terrible, It's destructive, it's taking away
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life. And it's it's, it's the worst
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thing that we have seen probably as a fear cycle since, since the
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16th century. I've invited Curtis onto my
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show, but he hasn't responded. I'm fascinated by why you don't
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like the cathedral concept. I, I I I always thought it was
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quite good. I don't like Curtis Jarvin
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because he's a transhumanist. So his whole philosophy is based
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on transhumanism on the on the which is also hype, which I
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describe in the book. And transhumanism is the idea
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that, that, that we can use technology to change the nature
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of humans and, and either to fuse humans with, with machines
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to create sidewalks, to create artificial intelligence that can
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read our thoughts and, and rule us.
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And it's also the idea that we can genetically optimise
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ourselves. All of this is scientific
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nonsense. And it all of this is
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impossible, as I show in the with Barry in the AI book, but
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also in the high book. But Curtis, Javin and also Nick
16:10
Land make this wrong idea the foundation of their entire
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political philosophy. And then they develop a
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political philosophy based on transhumanism, which is which is
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massively a technocratic. So they are both technocrats
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justifying a technocratic rule by a small minority that they
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want to abolish political participation in the political
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reformation. So interviewing him is certainly
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interesting because he's very radical and very important.
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He's basically the ideological foundation of Elon Musk is all
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Harari, yes, and Yuval Harari, he's A and so on.
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So he's very important today, but his thinking is very shallow
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and, and that's very interesting.
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Let me just say this one cent is that it's so shallow because the
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Catholic Church had a very, very complicated foundation,
17:02
philosophical foundation, which was very sophisticated.
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And so had the bourgeois ideology proclaimed by John
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Locke, David Hume and and and Immanuel Kant.
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But today's transhumanists technocrats have a very shallow
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ideology. No, I agree with you.
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But I was saying his his metaphor of the cathedral, I
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thought was quite accurate when he was describing the
17:22
establishment. You say you don't like that that
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metaphor. Oh, yeah, I think it's because
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it's a bit too narrow. I I rather would call it church
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because cathedral is, is, is. But it's, it's still a good
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metaphor. I mean, this guy has a gift for
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picking words. He's he's a good writer.
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That's why he's successful. I'm not saying that he's a, he's
17:41
just very shallow philosophically.
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And, and it's, it's a, it's a very interesting, it's, it's a
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very, it's a, it's a very interesting, how can I say this
17:56
phenomenon that that such a shallow thinker has such an
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important, this wouldn't have been possible two or three
18:02
generations ago. But but the, but the elite
18:04
itself has declined so much intellectually.
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I mean, if you were talking to the elite of two generations
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ago, they were quoting Romea or Tequila Des or Kant to justify
18:16
their ideas. Now they're quoting Star Wars
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and curse is Javan. But I mean, I've read, I've read
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some of the Dark Enlightenment and it was very complex.
18:26
Unless I'm I'm missing something?
18:29
Yeah, but if you compare to Khan's writings about the
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metaphysics of the state, it's still rather shallow.
18:35
It's not, it's not it culturally, it doesn't have the
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depth of, of, of, of the high end philosophy that used to be
18:43
the ideology of, of, of the West, right?
18:46
It's it's philosophically. I'm not saying the language is,
18:49
is simple or anything. I'm just saying that the ideas
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are, are very, very, you know, poorly grounded and that the
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arguments don't have the depth that that we are used to.
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Let's if you read Myselius of Padua, who invented the term
19:04
sovereignty in the in the 14th century or 15th century, it's
19:08
or, or, or Dante's writings about, about the monarchy.
19:15
They have just much more depth. You see complexity also.
19:19
Going back to the climate hype cycle, it it does seem to me
19:23
though Europe's that a lot more people today seem to be
19:28
dismissing it. Yes, so, so because I think the
19:33
reason is that to, we live in a, in a, in an age of positivism
19:38
where people expect that things that are true should also be
19:41
verifiable in reality. That's also why it was so hard
19:45
to uphold the COVID narrative because it was visible that
19:48
almost the one was dying, right. And that and, and so, and so now
19:52
with, with the climate change thing is that that there hasn't
19:56
been the, the global warming has more or less stopped 1520 years
20:00
ago. There is no no big further trend
20:02
of of further heat heating up of the planet.
20:04
I believe that's because we are back to the we have recovered
20:08
from the small eyes edge of the of the of the Renaissance period
20:11
and are now back in the Holozene norm.
20:14
So there's no further warming up.
20:16
There is no, there are no unnatural catastrophes visible.
20:20
So people think, well, why should I, you know, not have a
20:24
car anymore, not heat my house properly anymore and, and
20:27
relinquish all the goods of, of modern industrial society if, if
20:32
there's nothing is going on. So I think the the scepticism
20:34
comes from from the lack of observability of the of the
20:38
phenomena that the Hamid freaks described.
20:42
So I've had this conversation numerous times.
20:44
Their response is now always the same.
20:46
It's not about the the changing climate, but the rate at which
20:50
it changes. But but the rate of change has
20:55
totally slowed down, right? I mean, there was from 1850 to
20:59
2000, there was indeed a warm up of the, of the, of the Earth by
21:07
O .7 to O .9°, right, Which was, which is a fast rate.
21:12
But the ocean levels didn't rise.
21:15
They didn't rise significantly. They rose a little bit, but but,
21:18
but since 7000 years, they haven't risen very much.
21:20
And when it's claimed that they rise somewhere, it's because
21:23
rather the ground goes down drops because too much water has
21:27
taken out of the of, of, of the of the earth or too many
21:31
buildings are built by on the coastline.
21:32
But in reality, there is no significant increase of the
21:36
ocean levels. Now if you look at the ocean
21:39
level development since 15,000, over the last 15,000 years,
21:42
between I think 13,000 BC and 7000 BC, it rose by several 100
21:49
yards. And that's the fast climate
21:52
change. But we haven't had because that
21:54
was the end of the last big ice period.
21:57
And before that Europe was covered with A1 kilometre thick
21:59
ice shield. And when this melted away, of
22:02
course, it was a huge, within just a few thousand years, there
22:05
was a big climate change. But now we don't have any
22:07
anything like this. So if you, if you compare what
22:10
we are witnessing today against historic effects, there is
22:13
really no, no climate change. And the second argument is of
22:17
course, that the models that predict a future huge change are
22:20
mathematically nonsensical and deeply wrong.
22:23
So they are invalid models. And these invalid models are
22:26
always used by the fennet, fennet fennet fanaticists or
22:29
fanatics to point out the the problems of climate change.
22:32
But in reality, there are really there's not nothing like this
22:36
happening. But Europe's come now.
22:40
The rate of change has slowed because of all the efforts of
22:43
humanity. So we must.
22:45
Continue so. So actually the CO2 emissions
22:49
have continued to rise despite all the efforts.
22:52
The only effort that really worked out was there were these
22:57
fluoride molecules that were used in fridges, I don't
23:01
remember their name now, that were used in the 70s and 60s,
23:04
and they were banned in the 80s and to prevent the ozone
23:09
damaging of the ozone layer. And this may really have worked,
23:13
though I'm not so, so, so, so certain about it.
23:16
But, but that's all. Otherwise there, there was never
23:19
a decrease in the CO2 emissions. There are few phonetic countries
23:23
like Germany, England, Switzerland, who, who have
23:27
actually reduced their carbon dioxide emissions.
23:29
But but China, the US and, and, and Russia and India are
23:35
increasing their CO2 production so that that there has never
23:39
been any reduction. And so now we don't have a
23:43
change in the temperature anymore, despite increased CO2
23:46
production. Why is this the case?
23:49
Because we are already the CO2 concentration in the in the
23:53
atmosphere is already above the range in which it still
23:56
influences the climate, I believe.
24:00
I stood in a greenhouse where I think the CO2 parts per million
24:05
were over 1000 because obviously they're pumping in CO2.
24:09
Yes. And I didn't die.
24:11
Yopst. Of course not.
24:12
You only die if if the CO2 concentration is in the, in the
24:16
double digit percent. I don't know where the limit is,
24:19
but at 70% you die. No, it's actually not true.
24:24
It must be. It must be so high that to
24:27
become to kill you, it must be higher than 70 because if it's
24:31
70, there's still 20% oxygen. So it must displace the oxygen.
24:35
And where you have this, where people are really dying is in,
24:38
in wine Cellars, if there's no control of the air movement that
24:42
the CO2 that comes from the wine barrels is displacing the, the,
24:46
the oxygen and people entering there to do some work, they can
24:49
actually get into ACO 2 narcosis and die.
24:52
So this is, has regularly happened in, in wine production
24:55
and, and it's very dangerous. But, but, but of course, we are
24:58
here talking 1000 parts per million is, is just one per mil.
25:02
So it's not toxic at all. Another fear hype fear hype
25:08
cycle in your book is medical medical interventions.
25:11
I mean COVID is just one, AIDS is another.
25:15
But you would think, you would think by now we would be
25:19
magnificently healthy with all the medical interventions.
25:22
It doesn't seem to be the case. So, so one has to be very
25:26
careful when talking about medicine.
25:28
So if you think of surgery which arose from warfare, of course
25:33
modern surgery was a product of warfare.
25:34
Surgery is wonderful because because if you have a
25:37
complicated fracture of your arm or leg, you became a cripple
25:42
before modern surgery was invented.
25:44
Now with modern surgery, you can hear these such accidents and,
25:48
and they're not very, not so rare.
25:50
So they occur quite frequently. They shall just fall down the
25:52
stairs. You can have such a fracture,
25:54
you can, you could even die of it because if you had an open
25:57
fracture, it could become infected and then you could die
25:59
of the bacterial infection. So there are areas of medicine
26:01
that are wonderful, like modern surgery.
26:04
Also, you know, heart transplantation, which was
26:06
invented in your country and, and, and many other aspects of
26:10
medicine like the ability to, to have antibiotics against,
26:13
against bacteria. So the, the reason though that,
26:18
that we are not very much healthier is, is that this has
26:21
been offset by the negative effects of medicine.
26:23
And we also are to some extent poisoning big parts of the
26:28
population using the wrong medicine or also by poisoning
26:31
our environment. And that's what's offsetting the
26:33
progress that I've just described.
26:35
These are scientists, these are doctors.
26:38
They've all had immense training.
26:39
They know what they're doing. Yes, so it's, it's, it's a, it's
26:43
a massive cultural hype and to and, and as you can see, I mean,
26:49
what's interesting is that with the, with the COVID vaccines,
26:52
the mRNA vaccines, people have become suspicious of them,
26:55
right? Even normal people who trust
26:57
their doctors are not suspicious of these types of vaccines.
27:00
So I think if the damage that's done by drug is big enough, you
27:04
can have kind of a reaction, a gut reaction by the population.
27:07
But of but you're right, there's a big discrepancy between the
27:10
knowledge and training and reputation of the doctors and
27:12
the normal people. And this is what sustains the
27:15
medical hypes. Now, the problem is that that
27:19
that though, you know, for a long time the Pharmaceutical
27:22
industry has produced drugs that were harmful, there was never
27:26
systematic poisoning of the population.
27:28
And knowing systematic poisoning of the population, like with
27:31
you, look like acid space vaccines.
27:33
And that is what worries me. That's why I wrote the book,
27:36
because the hypes have become more and more aggressive.
27:39
And now we have a situation which is similar to what the
27:41
Britons did in China in the 19th century with the Opium Wars,
27:45
that we are forcing a toxic drug on the on our own population.
27:49
So the Britons did it quote unquote to the Chinese
27:53
underdogs, you know, who they didn't perceive as real humans,
27:57
but we do it to our own population.
27:59
So I think that's very worrying. But the problem with a hype like
28:05
like the Medical 1 is that you end up seeing a lot of binary
28:09
responses. Well, I'm not going to trust any
28:12
doctor anymore. I'm not going to trust any
28:13
medicine anymore. And that is also a little bit
28:16
too much to the to the other side, because it ignores it
28:18
ignores complexity and nuance. Exactly.
28:21
So, so it's very hard when you get abused like our populations
28:26
got abused by the medical system during the COVID period.
28:30
It creates overreactions. And so people are in a way, you
28:33
know, avoiding doctors altogether, saying we don't
28:36
believe in anything anymore. That may be very stupid.
28:38
So because modern medicine is has also many, many good
28:42
potentials. But but I have had the
28:44
experience that many of my friends keep calling me because
28:47
I, as you know, I started medicine and mathematics, but I
28:49
also started medicine. I'm also a medical doctor.
28:51
So they called me and said, should I take this drug or that
28:54
drug? The doctors is, is has
28:56
prescribed it, But I don't know whether I should trust him
28:57
anymore. So this is very bad that the
28:59
trust has eroded, but it has eroded for a good reason.
29:03
It's more of an academic discussion, but globalism versus
29:07
globalisation. I just, I just want some
29:09
clarity. When you talk about
29:10
globalisation, what do you mean? So when I talk about the
29:15
traditional globalism is about is David Ricardo's idea of the
29:20
competitive advantage, competitive advantage that you
29:23
have an advantage in one country and another advantage in another
29:26
country. And by exchanging goods, both
29:28
countries benefit, right. So one country has has very,
29:32
very rich soil, the other country where you can produce
29:34
agricultural goods very easily. The other one has minerals and
29:37
can export the minerals. And now you can exchange the
29:39
goods and create a mutual benefit.
29:41
That's, that's the old idea of globalism.
29:44
It never worked like the car described it, but but there is
29:47
something to, to international trade as a, as a beneficial
29:52
social norm. And this is what classical
29:55
globalism is. Globalisation is, is an
29:58
ideology. Or maybe I, I maybe I just
30:03
confounded the two terms. I don't know, but it doesn't
30:05
matter. One of them I describe as
30:06
positive, which is made basically, I think it's worth
30:09
globalisation. I'm sorry, which which is
30:11
basically the, the, the, the trade of goods for the benefit
30:14
of everyone. And globalism is the ideology
30:17
that that there should be unified global culture and also
30:21
one world government, right? And, and I think that that that
30:26
this is a dangerous ideology. And I think it's wrong to
30:30
believe that only one set of ideas should be applied to
30:33
everyone and that everybody should live under 1
30:35
jurisdiction. I think it's a very, very
30:38
dangerous ideology. That's globalism.
30:40
Globalisation is just the exchange of goods, which is
30:42
fundamentally a good idea. But what's wrong with having
30:46
central governance? You know, this is a good thing.
30:48
This, this, this can bring more harmony.
30:50
This can bring less poverty, it can bring more equality, et
30:54
cetera, et cetera, more egalitarianism.
30:57
Yes, so, so the the key idea is self determination and
31:01
subsidiarity here. So what is self determination?
31:04
Self determination means that people who have a similar
31:07
culture decide at a local level how the what the state should do
31:13
and how the necessity of the state, which is a necessity in
31:16
human life, should be dealt with and fulfilled.
31:19
So the state needs to collect taxes so which it takes away the
31:23
product of our labour to do set to to to create a public good.
31:27
How should this public good look like?
31:29
How how much would the state be allowed to take away from us and
31:32
what should it really do? And, and the more you
31:35
centralised, the further away you get from the people
31:38
contributing to the state and the more you create an elite
31:42
that is detached from those who actually pay the taxes and have
31:46
to toil for, for the, for the state.
31:49
And, and, and that's the, the big problem with centralised
31:51
government is that it, that, that, that it's, it's very, very
31:55
prone to abuse. So if the government is local
31:58
and, and state officials abuse their power, it's immediately
32:02
found out and, and they are stopped from doing it.
32:05
So the control of power is very good if you have power at the
32:08
local level. That was even true in feudalism
32:11
because because a ruling knight with a small parish that he was
32:15
ruling just a few thousand citizens, they could immediately
32:17
spot when he was doing something wrong and then they could
32:20
protest. And there was he couldn't abuse
32:23
to, to to to more than a certain extent.
32:26
And, and I think that if you abstract government and make
32:30
create units that are further and further apart from the
32:32
citizens, the chance of the citizens to participate in the
32:35
political will formation becomes worse and worse.
32:38
And this is what those those naive proponents of
32:41
centralization don't. They don't see they they don't
32:44
see that that the biggest evil of communism was centralisation
32:48
because it takes away the participation possibilities of
32:51
the citizen that creates an anonymous terrible structure
32:54
which is in Kafkaesque and which, which roots in a in a
32:57
cold and detached way against the will of the population.
33:01
That's what's always happening when you centralise.
33:04
But let me play devil's advocate if you don't mind, please.
33:07
I was recently in China and it's it's quite centralised and
33:12
authoritarian, highly safe, highly efficient, everything
33:17
seems to go according to how it's supposed to go.
33:22
So I think that that China is is a very complicated phenomenon.
33:27
I think that China is a very heterogeneous country.
33:29
I think that there is a a stretch of the country by the
33:33
coast. It has become very homogenised
33:35
and that has a tradition of centralised culture where this
33:39
works. But then in the periphery, which
33:41
you never see as a foreigner, there is also a lot of conflict
33:44
because the culturally different people living in the periphery
33:47
don't want this centralised rule.
33:49
They would like to decide to live in a different way and they
33:52
are forced to, to, to follow the centralised rules and that, that
33:58
doesn't work very well. So I think this is a picture
34:01
that we have of China's westerners is distorted by the
34:04
places that we, that we visit and, and, and also the China
34:10
never has had a culture of mass participation in the political
34:13
will formation. It has always been centralised,
34:15
always elitist. So the Chinese are used to being
34:18
governed in this way like the Russians are.
34:21
But in the West we have had for, for since 2 1/2 thousand idea, 2
34:27
1/2 thousand years, the idea that citizens should rule
34:29
themselves, right? That they should, that they
34:32
should be their own masters, that they should be able to
34:35
decide about their own, the way they live and form their own
34:38
ideas and participate in the power and in and also in the
34:43
fruit of of society. And this idea is, is is was born
34:47
in Athens and it's spread all over the West and it's still
34:50
very powerful idea. And so therefore it's not
34:52
possible to rule Westerners like you can rule the Chinese.
34:56
But is the idea of centralization centred around
35:02
scalability? Let me give you an example.
35:05
Is it fair to say that your home is quite centralised because it
35:08
makes it more efficient? Yes, but it's a small unit, but
35:13
of course you have central heating in, in your home, right?
35:16
Because having multiple wood burning stuffs in the house like
35:20
it was, you know, 100 years ago is less efficient.
35:23
So of course the idea of centralization is can drive
35:27
efficiency and and also efficacy both, right.
35:31
So it can make, it can create better effect and also at at
35:34
less cost. However, this that's also true
35:38
at the, at the state level. And there are some, some goals
35:40
and projects for which a centralised community can make
35:46
sense or even a centralised governance body, like for
35:48
example, for space exploration. It's so expensive, right, That
35:52
it makes sense to build the International Space Station with
35:55
the participation of all the States and to create a, a body
35:58
that governs this International Space Station and so on.
36:01
And and if there were to be a true pandemic, it might also be
36:07
justified to create a global body to fight it in a in a
36:10
synchronous and coordinated manner.
36:13
So so it all depends on the problem at hand.
36:15
Now at the moment I see very few problems that, that that
36:19
requires such efforts. And most problems should be, you
36:22
know, managed at the local or at the state level, but not at at
36:26
the global level. But, but if such problems arise,
36:29
we have a kind of state of emergency about which I also
36:31
talk in the last chapter of the book.
36:33
And then there's a justification for centralised government and
36:36
also for for pausing democratic participation, because
36:40
democratic participation is not is is is time costly?
36:44
Are there any hype cycles that have a positive net effect?
36:48
Yeah. So one good example is
36:49
Reformation. I think you are, you are
36:52
yourself upon such an example, right?
36:54
You're not Catholic, are you? I'm not Catholic.
36:56
Yeah, so, so I think you answers the word Protestants and
37:00
Protestantism is is is. It was a hype in the in the 16th
37:05
century, but it was a positive vibe because it transformed
37:08
Europe, it made Europe more innovative.
37:10
It led the ultimately to democratisation enabled
37:13
enlightenment. So, so, so, so there are ideas
37:19
that become contagious and they also become hypes.
37:21
If you look at the, at the, you know, the, the, the, the way
37:25
that, that Protestism spread in the 16th century, which was very
37:28
positive. I also believe to that to some
37:30
extent enlightenment itself was a positive hype.
37:33
Of course that there are exaggerations and problems, but
37:36
overall I think that new ideas that arise spontaneously and
37:39
become fascinating to many people that that can be very,
37:42
very positive. The same is the fascination for
37:45
technology. So why are young people studying
37:48
engineering or physics? Because they get fascinated by
37:50
technology. They, they are hyped by it.
37:52
They, they find it, they find it just intriguing that the way you
37:55
can manipulate nature that create technology, they, they
37:58
become engineers and without engineers, nothing would work.
38:01
So, so, so hype waves are important for human societies.
38:06
It's not. It's not necessarily something
38:08
negative. I'm not sure if this is in your
38:10
book because I, I went through it fairly quickly, but political
38:13
hype cycles also a very interesting phenomenon if you
38:16
look at Obama and Trump and the hype around them, which was a
38:22
combination of, of, of organic and, and manufactured.
38:27
Yes. So I only talk.
38:30
Yes, go ahead. No, no, sorry.
38:32
I was going to add to that, that, that, that if you talk to
38:35
the mega folks that will tell you that this is a positive net
38:39
effect hype. But if you obviously, you talk
38:41
to the Democrats, they'll, they'll, they'll say no.
38:46
OK, so these political hypes are very short lived and their task
38:50
is to convince the population that the opponent to the to the
38:54
current administration is actually a real alternative.
38:58
I believe that we live in post democratic societies in the West
39:02
where the, the opponent up for election is not anymore an
39:06
alternative and doesn't change the way that we are ruled.
39:09
It's only a small cultural change.
39:12
And Trump is, is actually in some respects a real change, but
39:16
not fundamentally, fundamentally the same families who own, you
39:20
know, the, the entire, what I call strategic property.
39:24
They, they dominate the political agenda and they create
39:27
the political will that we experience and, and the, the
39:31
politics, the politicians that are chosen only have the task
39:35
to, to make the rule that we are under acceptable.
39:39
So I think these hypes around all Trump is really alternative
39:43
and so on. They're very superficial and
39:45
they are they'll they are a sign of lack of understanding how the
39:49
political will formation in the West really works today.
39:53
But they're also a combination of both fear and hope at the
39:57
same time. Yes, you absolutely.
40:00
And, and it's it's, it's very important to mobilise the
40:03
emotions of the population and democracy to sustain the
40:07
illusion of participation. And if you believe that by
40:10
voting Trump you can really change something significantly,
40:15
then that's good. But in reality, I believe that
40:17
the changes. That the changes that that Trump
40:23
is making are not made because because because the political
40:28
elites are following the will formation of the masses, but
40:32
because the real elites see that the old pattern was in some ways
40:36
inefficient for their own goals. Like mass migration is it was
40:41
the United States were very favourable to mass migration.
40:44
The elites were very much in favourite.
40:46
Now it seems that they have changed their mind.
40:48
Now this they they they seem to think that mass migration is
40:51
also bad for their own intentions and benefits.
40:55
Hypes or cycles? Then is there any point in
40:59
pushing back since they're just going to come back?
41:02
Well, it yes. So if you push back against
41:05
certain types. So the at some point the Chinese
41:07
managed to get rid of the opium import or the opium trade that
41:13
was forced upon them by the British, right?
41:15
So there are some, some types of hype or, or rule which is
41:20
formulated as hype, which are very, very dangerous.
41:22
Like in our case, the nucleic acid based vaccinations.
41:26
And you know, they are now planning to, to change the anti
41:29
vaccination schedule to nucleic acid space vaccinations.
41:32
This would be, would be terrible.
41:34
It would really, really kill a lot of children.
41:36
It would be absolutely horrible. And so I think it's, even if a
41:39
new hype cycle will come, it's very important to fight against
41:42
the most dangerous ones to avoid this type of abuse.
41:45
The same is true for the war hype.
41:47
We I've attempt on war hype as well.
41:49
And war is so destructive and dangerous that I think it's
41:51
worth arguing against war to prevent it from happening.
41:55
And, and I think so there are some hypes which are so terrible
41:59
that that they should be actively that we need to have
42:03
active resistance against them. I don't mean to sound nihilistic
42:07
but I don't think the average person approves of war.
42:12
It always comes from high up and whether or not we say anything
42:16
or higher, many protests we have, it doesn't seem to make a
42:19
difference. Well, that's not entirely true.
42:21
So I believe that that now in Western Europe it has become
42:25
culturally very hard to mobilise the population to fight an
42:30
enemy. And the reason is the low birth
42:32
rate. So if you have a birth surplus
42:35
with three or four sons per family, it's clear that that
42:39
that not every son can take on the business of the father, take
42:42
on the farm and so on. So you have if you have a birth
42:45
surplus of males, you need to consume these males and then you
42:49
have a cultural situation which in which war becomes acceptable
42:52
and at a natural activity. But in western populations.
42:56
And the same is true for Russia and China.
42:58
With so little children, the anti northern hemisphere doesn't
43:00
have enough children. It's very difficult to convince
43:03
populations of the necessity of war.
43:05
So I think that there are cultural preconditions for war
43:09
that are not met very well anymore.
43:11
And so therefore it's it's actually a possibility that we
43:14
might be successful in arguing against war in given this
43:18
cultural situation we are in. So basically, choose your
43:21
battles. Yes, exactly.
43:24
Now in the book you could argue, but you didn't choose your
43:26
battles jobs. You covered so many hypes.
43:28
That's true. But that's because I'm an
43:30
intellectual sitting at his desk and writing.
43:32
But but if I won't be a political activist and and fight
43:37
really in the public sphere in a visible way, more visible way,
43:41
then I would pick some topics. And this is what political
43:44
parties do now. Now I can afford the luxury to
43:47
think through different types of vibe.
43:50
But but but but but if I would be a real activist I would I
43:53
would pick my battles. So OK, so which battles then do
43:57
you think are the ones to to pick?
44:01
I think, I think the most important one is, is medicine.
44:07
The most important ones are medicine to fight against this,
44:10
this abuse of the medical system for for the profit of the
44:14
Pharmaceutical industry, against the interest of the population
44:17
and to fight this poisoning of the population.
44:20
Then I think the climate hype needs to be fought because it's
44:23
destroying us and it's basically preparing Western countries to
44:26
be subdued by the East because the Eastern countries are not
44:30
following the climate hype. And so they will outperform us
44:33
industrially more and more. And that at some point we will
44:36
fall into their dominion realm of dominion.
44:39
And I don't want to lose my autonomy.
44:40
I don't want to be governed by Russians or Chinese, to be
44:43
honest, right? I mean, they may be very
44:44
efficient, but I prefer the Western model.
44:47
So, so I, I, I think the climate type is the second one, which
44:50
must be addressed, addressed at the third one.
44:54
So medical hype, climate type, these are the two worst.
44:57
And then yes, I think the whole collectivism is, is very bad as
45:02
well. The wokeness I, I call it
45:05
diversity, equity and inclusion hype.
45:08
I think that's also very bad type of hype because it seduces
45:11
young people into into following an ideology that is that is
45:15
solar. They believe they do something
45:17
that is morally superior, but in reality they are only
45:20
implementing the the rule of a tiny minority.
45:25
So this is also important type to to fight and and to get back
45:31
to reason. You know, we can all have
45:33
various opinions on what's happening in in Palestine with
45:36
with Israel. And we know that American
45:39
foreign policy is strongly, strongly influenced by it's kind
45:44
of a pro Israel or Israel first position.
45:46
And this connects to the idea, the ideology of Zionism.
45:51
What interests me is what appears to be a very anti Jewish
45:56
sentiment. Yeah, that's very interesting.
45:58
There's a new wave of anti Semitism that's very strong that
46:01
we haven't witnessed since 80 years in Europe and in the in
46:05
the whole world. Now this time it's much more
46:07
complicated because it's a global phenomenon.
46:09
Because also of course there there's a lot of pro Muslim and
46:13
Muslim origin of this. But ultimately I think one has
46:18
to differentiate between anti Semitism and anti Zionism.
46:22
So I am very, I come from my father's from a Jewish family.
46:26
I have a lot of Jewishness in me.
46:28
I'm very pro Jewish, but I'm anti Israel.
46:30
I think it was a mistake to set up the Jews in Israel.
46:33
I think they belong to Europe. So I'm a Euro Zionist.
46:36
I would prefer the Jews to, to, to, to live in Europe.
46:40
It would be great for, for us, you know, because this, this is
46:42
a very gifted people and culturally and also ethnically
46:47
very gifted. It would be wonderful to have
46:49
them back here. So that's what I think would be
46:51
the best because I think that the Jews have no future in
46:54
Palestine because they're surrounded by their where their
46:56
worst enemies. And as soon as the US is not
46:59
able to support any more the state of Israel, there will be a
47:02
catastrophe. So I would rather say they
47:04
should come back to Europe sooner than later.
47:06
So I'm very much in favour of them being here.
47:10
But but but so this is so. I'm critical of Israel but very
47:13
pro Jewish which is a rare combination.
47:15
Yeah, but the point I was making is that the anti Jewish
47:18
sentiment, which is pervasive now across the West, it seems to
47:24
be some sort of manufactured hype.
47:26
I don't think it's organic. It has, yes.
47:29
It has an organic component which is that there has been in
47:32
the West always been subcutaneous lated antisemitism,
47:37
which like there has also been a Russia phobia and that you
47:40
basically utilise this. So this is 1 factor.
47:45
Another factor is that now we have 25,000,000 Muslims living
47:48
in Europe and also I don't know how many million in the US and
47:51
they are being taught within their religion that Jews are the
47:54
enemy. So these are two natural trends,
47:57
but these trends are exploited to create a hype.
48:00
And there are there are political movements which are
48:02
which are benefiting from this a lot on the left right of the
48:06
political spectrum. I don't like the left right
48:08
distinction anymore, but this is very characteristic of cultural
48:11
Marxism. And it goes back to Zeid's book,
48:16
Edward Zeid's book Pubs in the 70s, Orientalism, where he
48:21
basically criticises western, the Western view of, of, of
48:27
Muslims and, and Islam. And and I think there is a
48:31
postmodern trend that is anti Semitic and that that
48:34
postmodernism contains an anti Semitic threat that is now being
48:39
exaggerated and exploited. So in your book The Hype Cycle,
48:45
you also reference what's your name?
48:46
Arnold Shkalski. So, so yes.
48:53
Well, his name is Hemucheltzky, and I use the pseudonym Arnold
48:58
Cheltzky because because I, I'm big fan of Arnold Gill
49:03
Hamucheltzky. Arnold Gill was a German
49:05
philosopher and sociologist, and Cheltzky was his pupa.
49:08
He was a sociologist. That's why I used the
49:10
combination of the names as a pseudonym.
49:13
That's where the confusion comes in if people look at your book.
49:16
Yes, exactly. And, and I, I didn't, I didn't
49:20
write it under my own name because I was afraid that I
49:22
might suffer repression because of the medical chapter.
49:26
But then my professional situation has changed and now I
49:28
feel free to disclose the the pardon.
49:31
That right there is a major issue of the modern world
49:35
Europe's the fact that you are fearful of publishing your ideas
49:40
under your name. Yes, it is.
49:42
But but it's historically the norm.
49:44
So the period in which we had real freedom of opinion was
49:47
rather short and and the historical norm is that the
49:51
state is afraid of the citizen and therefore suppresses freedom
49:54
of opinion. And we are in this situation
49:56
again and it's, it's very sad and very dangerous.
49:59
And I have a lot of also in my, I've had already quite a lot of
50:03
professional repression because of my opinions.
50:06
And they are, they're labelled as right wing or something like
50:09
this, which is complete nonsense.
50:10
I'm just a traditional rationalist Aristotelian
50:13
Khantian. I'm not, I'm, you know, just a
50:16
sober scientist. I have no political agenda of my
50:19
own. I'm not, I'm almost apolitical.
50:22
I'm just in favour of truth and and rationalism.
50:25
It's interesting because you are referencing the state doing the
50:29
suppressing, but during the COVID era all of my videos on
50:33
YouTube were being removed and that's a private company.
50:36
Yeah. So I think we have a that's also
50:38
something I mentioned in the book that we have now synthesis
50:44
of the state and big corporation.
50:46
So the big corporation that the state were very close to get
50:49
together and so that the line of difference between the state and
50:53
the big corporations has blurred and all states apparatus has
50:56
become so big that the best business model for big
50:59
corporations is to work together with the state.
51:01
Because then it's you old. You don't have to convince end
51:03
consumers. You can just convince public
51:06
servants to make a law that privileges you.
51:08
And then you can sell billions of of corner shots, right?
51:12
So basically of COVID shots. So basically I think we have a
51:15
private public partnership in the very worst sense that's
51:19
that's dominating Western societies.
51:22
A characteristic of a hype cycle is the speed or the the
51:26
acceleration. I'm guessing that you don't get
51:30
slow hypes. That's a good point.
51:36
So so Noah hype is by it's very nature contagious and fast and
51:41
also convincing many people. So so yes, there is there.
51:47
There are long term ideologies of faith systems like
51:51
Christianity, Islam, but but but hype movements are are usually
51:57
rapid and you can see Protestantism as a hype movement
52:01
that spread very rapidly and very intense.
52:02
Yes, so you're right. Do you get small hypes or small
52:06
hype cycles? Yes, yes they are.
52:08
They are. There have always been
52:09
historical examples of small communities following a certain
52:12
hype. For example, in Moon Star in the
52:15
16th century, there was a move. There was the, there was the
52:18
Anabaptists led by Jan van Leiden and they were fanatical
52:22
small community who took over the, the city of Munster,
52:26
created their own jurisdiction there.
52:27
And there were, that was a very local hype and it had to be
52:30
brought down by troops, by federal troops because it was so
52:34
they were so fanatical. And, and so yes, there are such
52:38
hypes. There are also these sects in
52:40
which people commit group suicide and so on.
52:43
So there are also small level, small scale hypes among close
52:46
groups. I was going to go back to the
52:48
vaccination hype. Do you think, Yops, that any of
52:51
these individuals in these organisations wake up in the
52:56
morning thinking that they themselves are evil?
52:59
This is a super interesting question that has preoccupied
53:01
the greatest thinkers. Now I think that there's a small
53:04
minority who is who knows it's evil and thinks it's evil and
53:08
enjoys being evil. The malevolent, as they are
53:10
called and Shopahar describes in Dostoevsky has a great example.
53:14
The great visitor, the Brothers Karamazov is a malevolent person
53:17
who knows that he's even and enjoys being evil.
53:20
These gobbles was a guy like this.
53:23
I also believe that Angela Mac and used that she was evil and
53:26
enjoying it. So I think that there is a tiny
53:28
minority of very cynical, very highly gifted people who are
53:32
basically enjoying being possessed, if you want to put it
53:35
in very traditional terms. But most of those who follow
53:39
such narratives think they're doing something that is morally
53:42
right, so they're not aware of it.
53:44
Otherwise they couldn't function.
53:45
Most of the people are not strong enough to to see them to
53:50
enjoy themselves being systematically evil.
53:52
Most of them need to think that they're what they're doing is a
53:54
good thing. Otherwise they couldn't go
53:56
unlike greater Tunda, right? So these people, these people
53:59
really think that they're doing something for the benefit of
54:01
mankind and they're not aware of of that.
54:04
They're following an evil pattern.
54:06
I think of individuals like it's a class Rob Yuval, Yuval Harari,
54:12
Bill Gates, even Tony Fauci. Do I mean, do they wake up
54:17
thinking that they're evil? I I kind of don't think so.
54:19
It's very hard to tell. It's very hard to tell.
54:22
Usually you need to for contemporary persons for so far
54:26
Uncle and Michael, I frankly don't know.
54:27
But, but when you look at the past and, and you have, you
54:31
know, as a historian, you can read the private correspondence
54:34
of such people and make yourself a picture, get the disclosed
54:37
ideas, talk to people who knew them personally.
54:41
Then you can kind of make, get a picture of whether they are
54:44
malevolent or just believing that they we're doing the right
54:47
thing. And so it's hard to tell from
54:50
for contemporaries whether whether they are seeing
54:53
themselves as evil or not. I don't frankly don't know
54:55
because you have to know them personally.
54:57
You have to also to, to get the opportunity to see into the way
55:01
they think. And this you can only do through
55:02
private convert correspondence, private conversations.
55:06
Do you think evil actually exists because it's always the
55:09
other person? It's always the other person
55:10
who's evil. Oh no, I don't think so.
55:13
So I think evil exists and we, we all experience it.
55:16
The, the, the tendency to, to, to do evil things.
55:19
So, so the real. So I'm a Christian, so I believe
55:22
that we are all sinners and that the, the primary mode of sinning
55:25
is to forget about God. Now, if you forget about God,
55:27
you, you start to, to, to, to, to commit other sins as well,
55:32
like lying or deceiving and so on.
55:35
And then if you systematically do this and start to enjoy this,
55:38
then you become get into the cycle of evil.
55:41
And, and so every one of us has lied and has, has deceived in a
55:45
minor way. And and so and so we all know
55:48
how it feels to the temptation to act against the laws of God
55:52
and this temptation, luring yourself into doing this.
55:56
That's even I think it really exists.
55:58
I think it's a transcendent force like God is a transcendent
56:01
force that that that that plays a huge role in our lives.
56:04
I think the modern view that evil doesn't exist, that it's
56:07
only a result of our biochemistry of our brain, a
56:10
form of aggression, all of that, I think nonsense.
56:13
I truly believe in the transcendence existence,
56:16
transcendent existence of evil like Paul did right or Jesus
56:21
himself. And I think in Matthew 4
56:22
describes very well how how the devil tries to to convince
56:29
Jesus. And I think this is a typical
56:30
pattern. Evil paints itself as beautiful,
56:33
as positive as creating order, but it does the very opposite.
56:37
And it's very tempting. And I think it truly exists and
56:39
it it plays a huge role for our lives.
56:42
And those who enjoy it would be described as sociopathic.
56:47
Yes, they are sociopaths and, and, and depending on the power
56:51
they accumulate, they, they can, you know, create a lot of damage
56:55
like Hitler, Stein or Mao, you know, who are certainly were
56:58
very evil persons. And it's, it's, it's utterly
57:01
dangerous. I also think that that Falsi is,
57:03
is evil. Whether he enjoys, I don't know,
57:06
but he, he, he has a career of creating a lot of damage in
57:09
medicine, turning medicine into weapon against the citizens.
57:13
I think, I think that these evil people that this, this and, and
57:18
yes, it's, it's had always been a challenge for mankind.
57:22
How can my audience get your book The hype cycle?
57:26
So they can just go to Amazon and search for The Hype Cycle by
57:30
Arnold Chalzki and then they can buy it.
57:34
It's still in stock. It was published in May, so it's
57:37
still available. Yeah, and they can also if you
57:41
want to know more about. Otherwise they can just Google
57:44
my name and then they will find other publications.
57:47
I've got your previous book about AI.
57:49
Where is it now? It's on my shelf.
57:50
There's some way, and I'm going to now have to get a copy of
57:54
this one also personally signed by you.
57:58
OK, I didn't. I have didn't.
58:00
No, I sent you the AI book personally.
58:03
Signed, right? Did I do that?
58:05
Yeah. So now I I have to also send you
58:08
the hype cycle book. It's it's actually very costly,
58:12
you know that. Oh, OK.
58:14
All right, we'll. All know I do it, I do it, I do
58:17
it. I don't mind.
58:21
All right, you're thank you so much for joining me in the
58:24
drenches. Thanks a lot for the invitation.
58:26
Talk to you soon again. Bye bye Jeremy.