Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / The bill comes due for the SSO flaw that hit 138 companies
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Sunday, the thirteenth of September.
- 0:06The bill comes due for the S S O flaw that hit 138 companies.
- 0:12Last week's story about the Brevo flaw that let one attacker walk into 138 companies' accounts has its first
- 0:20quantified casualty. Trezor, the hardware wallet maker, has confirmed that phishing emails reached roughly 34
- 0:287,000 addresses in its newsletter database, and that 2,500 people clicked through, before the fraudulent domai
- 0:35n was taken offline twenty minutes after detection.
- 0:38This is what "access to 138 accounts" looks like once it reaches actual customers.
- 0:44So what actually broke here.
- 0:47Brevo is an email marketing platform.
- 0:50Thousands of businesses use it to run their newsletters.
- 0:53According to Brevo's own incident write-up, an attacker set up a normal Brevo account, switched on single sig
- 1:00n-on for it, and then invited real Brevo customers' users into that S S O configuration.
- 1:05Signing in through their own identity provider, the attacker was then able to authenticate as those invited u
- 1:11sers. Here's the bug. That access wasn't scoped to the one organisation where S S O had been enabled.
- 1:18It carried over into every organisation those users could otherwise reach.
- 1:22Think of it like a hotel keycard system with a fault in the scoping logic.
- 1:26A new guest checks in, and their card is meant to open only their own room.
- 1:32But a coding error means it also opens every other room that guest has ever had access to, at any of the hote
- 1:37l's other properties. Brevo says the attacker touched 138 accounts, used six of them to send phishing mail, an
- 1:44d pulled contact lists from 43 more.
- 1:46Trezor, BitBox and CoinTracking were among the customers whose mailing lists were misused.
- 1:52Brevo shut the vector down within two hours of first detecting it, at 08:30 U T C on 10 September.
- 1:58The lesson for Secure by Design.
- 2:01The design decision that would have prevented all of this is straightforward.
- 2:05Authorisation boundaries between tenants in a multi-tenant SaaS product must be enforced by the system itself
- 2:11. Not inferred from how an S S O configuration happens to be wired up.
- 2:16Any flow that lets one customer's identity provider vouch for access to another customer's data has skipped a
- 2:22check that should be non-negotiable.
- 2:23For UK organisations, here's the more useful takeaway, and it sits one layer up.
- 2:29Your exposure through a shared marketing or communications platform is only as good as that platform's tenant
- 2:35isolation. And you generally can't audit it yourself.
- 2:38Newsletter databases feel low-stakes, until an attacker uses your own trusted sending domain to deliver a con
- 2:45vincing "critical security alert" to your customers.
- 2:47That's exactly the trick used here, dressed up as a fake hardware vulnerability in Trezor's chips.
- 2:53Reviewing which third-party platforms hold your customer contact data, and what happens if that platform's ow
- 2:59n access controls fail, is a cheaper exercise than explaining a phishing wave to your users afterwards.
- 3:04That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:09Thanks for listening.