Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2018] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in
- 0:072018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles
- 0:11commonly called GAAP. The components of that figure
- 0:15are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non
- 0:21cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets arising almost
- 0:25entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz, $2.8
- 0:29billion in realized capital gains from the sale of
- 0:32investment securities, and a $20.6 billion loss from a
- 0:36reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that
- 0:40existed in our investment holdings.
- 0:42A new gap rule requires us to include that last item in
- 0:46earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017
- 0:49annual report, neither Berkshire's Vice Chairman,
- 0:52Charlie M Unger nor I believe that rule to be sensible.
- 0:56Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at
- 0:59Berkshire this mark to market change would produce what I
- 1:02described as wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.
- 1:06The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our
- 1:09quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth
- 1:13quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4
- 1:18billion respectively. In the second and third
- 1:21quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion.
- 1:27In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses
- 1:31that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory
- 1:35operating earnings in all quarters for the year.
- 1:38Those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by
- 1:4441%. Wide swings in our quarterly
- 1:47GAAP earnings will inevitably continue.
- 1:49That's because our huge equity portfolio valued at nearly $173
- 1:54billion at the end of 2018 will often experience one day price
- 1:59fluctuations of $2.00 billion or more, all of which the new rule
- 2:04says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line.
- 2:07Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in
- 2:11stock prices, we experienced several days with a profit or
- 2:14loss of more than $4 billion. Our advice focus on operating
- 2:19earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of
- 2:23any variety. My saying that in no way
- 2:26diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire.
- 2:29Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial
- 2:33gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.
- 2:36Long time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the
- 2:39different way in which I opened this letter for nearly three
- 2:44decades. The initial paragraph featured
- 2:46the percentage change in Berkshire's per share book
- 2:49value. It's now time to abandon that
- 2:51practice. The fact is that the annual
- 2:54change in Berkshire's book value, which makes its farewell
- 2:57appearance on page 2, is a metric that has lost the
- 3:00relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made
- 3:03that so. First, Berkshire has gradually
- 3:06morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in
- 3:09marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating
- 3:14businesses. Charlie and I expect that
- 3:16reshaping to continue in an irregular manner.
- 3:19Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market
- 3:22prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating
- 3:26companies to be included in book value at an amount far below
- 3:30their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years.
- 3:34Third, it is likely that overtime Berkshire will be a
- 3:37significant repurchaser of its shares.
- 3:39Transactions that will take place at price is above book
- 3:42value but below our estimate of intrinsic value.
- 3:46The math of such purchases is simple.
- 3:48Each transaction makes per share intrinsic value go up, while per
- 3:52share book value goes down. That combination causes the book
- 3:56value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with
- 4:00economic reality. 3IN future tabulation S of our financial
- 4:04results, we expect to focus on Berkshire's market price.
- 4:08Markets can be extremely capricious, just look at the 54
- 4:12year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire
- 4:16stock price will provide the best measure of business
- 4:19performance. Before moving on, I want to give
- 4:22you some good news, really good news that is not reflected in
- 4:25our financial statements. It concerns the management
- 4:28changes we made in early 2018 when AJ Jane was put in charge
- 4:34of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority
- 4:37over all other operations. These moves were overdue.
- 4:41Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone with
- 4:44supervising operations. AJ and Greg have rare talents
- 4:48and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.
- 4:51Now let's take a look at what you own.
- 4:53Focus on the forest, Forget the trees.
- 4:55Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details
- 4:59of our many and diverse businesses, our economic trees
- 5:03so to speak. Analysis of that type can be
- 5:05mind numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens
- 5:10ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased
- 5:14and unlikely to be around a decade from now.
- 5:17Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and
- 5:21beauty. Fortunately, it's not necessary
- 5:23to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough
- 5:27estimate of Berkshire's intrinsic business value.
- 5:30That's because our forest contains 5 Groves of major
- 5:33importance, each of which can be appraised with reasonable
- 5:37accuracy in its entirety. Four of those Groves are
- 5:40differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets
- 5:44that are easy to understand. The fifth hour huge and diverse
- 5:48insurance operation delivers great value to Berkshire in a
- 5:51less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.
- 5:55Before we look more closely at the first four Groves, let me
- 5:58remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital
- 6:02to buy ably managed businesses in whole or part that possess
- 6:06favorable and durable economic characteristics.
- 6:10We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.
- 6:13Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests.
- 6:17Far more often we find the attributes we seek in publicly
- 6:21traded businesses in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10%
- 6:25interest. Our two pronged approach to huge
- 6:28scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and at
- 6:32times give Susan important advantage.
- 6:35In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been
- 6:38clear. Many stocks have offered far
- 6:41more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses
- 6:44in their entirety. That disparity LED us to buy
- 6:47about $43 billion of marketable equities last year while selling
- 6:52only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the
- 6:56companies in which we invested offered excellent value far
- 7:00exceeding that available and takeover transactions.
- 7:03Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most
- 7:07valuable Grove in Berkshire's forest remains there many dozens
- 7:11of non insurance businesses that Berkshire controls usually with
- 7:14100% ownership and never with less than 80%.
- 7:18Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year.
- 7:22When we say earned, moreover, we are describing what remains
- 7:26after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial
- 7:30compensation whether cash or stock based, restructuring
- 7:34expenses, depreciation, amortization and Home Office
- 7:37overhead. That brand of earnings is a far
- 7:40cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and
- 7:43corporate CEOs. Too often their presentations
- 7:47feature adjusted EB at DAA measure that redefines earnings
- 7:51to exclude a variety of all to real costs. 4 For example,
- 7:56managementists sometimes assert that their company's stock based
- 7:59compensation shouldn't be counted as an expense.
- 8:03What else could it be? A gift from shareholders and
- 8:05restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year's exact
- 8:09rearrangement won't recur. But restructurings of one sort
- 8:13or another are common in business.
- 8:15Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our
- 8:18shareholders have always borne the cost of doing so.
- 8:22Abraham Lincoln once posed the question, if you call a dog's
- 8:25tail a leg, how many legs does it have And then answered his
- 8:29own query 4 because calling a tail a leg doesn't make it 1 AB
- 8:34would have felt lonely on Wall Street.
- 8:36Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition related
- 8:39amortization expenses of $1.4 billion detailed on page K-84
- 8:45are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization
- 8:49costs to gap earnings when we are evaluating both private
- 8:53businesses and marketable stocks.
- 8:55In contrast, Berkshire's $8.4 billion depreciation charge
- 9:00understates our true economic cost.
- 9:02In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply
- 9:07remain competitive in our many operations.
- 9:10Beyond those maintenance capital expenditures, we spend large
- 9:13sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a
- 9:17record $14.5 billion last year in plant equipment and other
- 9:22fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.
- 9:26Berkshire's runner up Grove by value is its collection of
- 9:29equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in
- 9:35a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity
- 9:38investments were worth nearly $173 billion at year end, an
- 9:42amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold
- 9:46at its year end valuation federal income tax of about
- 9:50$14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain.
- 9:54In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long
- 9:57time. Eventually, however, gains
- 10:00generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.
- 10:04Our invest EES paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum
- 10:09that will increase in 2019. Far more important then the
- 10:13dividends though are the huge earnings that are annually
- 10:17retained by these companies. Consider as an indicator these
- 10:21figures that cover only our five largest holdings year in
- 10:25Berkshire's share in dollars millions of company ownership
- 10:28dividends 1. Retained earnings 2.
- 10:31American Express 17.9 percent 237 dollars $997 Apple 5.4
- 10:39percent 745-2502 Bank of America 9.5 percent 551-2096 Coca-Cola
- 10:499.4 percent 600-2421 Wells Fargo 9.8 percent 809-1263 Total 2966
- 11:00dollars $6837 1 based on current annual rate 2 based on 2018
- 11:07earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.
- 11:10GAAP, which dictates the earnings we report, does not
- 11:13allow us to include the retained earnings of Invest EES in our
- 11:17financial accounts, but those earnings are of enormous value
- 11:21to us over the years. Earnings retained buy our Invest
- 11:25EES viewed as a group have eventually delivered capital
- 11:28gains to Berkshire that totaled more than $1.00 for each dollar
- 11:32these companies reinvested for us.
- 11:34All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics and most use
- 11:38a portion of their retained earnings too repurchase their
- 11:41shares. We very much like that.
- 11:44If Charlie and I think an Invest EES stock is underpriced, we
- 11:48rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase
- 11:51Berkshire's ownership percentage. 5 pay raise.
- 11:55One example drawn from the table above.
- 11:57Berkshire's holdings of American Express have remained unchanged
- 12:01over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership
- 12:05increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchase S made by
- 12:11the company last year. Berkshire's portion of the $6.9
- 12:15billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about
- 12:2096% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company.
- 12:25When earnings increase in shares outstanding decrease owners so
- 12:30Vertim usually dowel 1/3 category of Berkshire's business
- 12:33ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share
- 12:36control with other parties. Our portion of the after tax
- 12:40operating earnings of these businesses, 26.7% of Kraft
- 12:44Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas and
- 12:4938.6% of Pilot Flying totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.
- 12:55In our 4th Grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at year end in year
- 13:01S treasury bills and other cash equivalents and another $20
- 13:05billion in miscellaneous fixed income instruments.
- 13:09We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having
- 13:13pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents
- 13:17to guard against external calamities.
- 13:19We have also promised to avoid any activities that could
- 13:22threaten our maintaining that buffer.
- 13:25Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress.
- 13:28In managing I will make expensive mistakes of Commission
- 13:31and will also miss many opportunities, some of which
- 13:34should have been obvious to me. At times our stock will tumble
- 13:38as investors flee from equities, but I will never risk getting
- 13:42caught short of cash. In the years ahead we hope to
- 13:45move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that
- 13:48Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for
- 13:51that, however, are not good. Prices are sky high for
- 13:55businesses possessing decent long term prospects.
- 13:59That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us
- 14:03again expanding our holdings of marketable equities.
- 14:07We continue nevertheless to hope for an elephant sized
- 14:10acquisition even at tour ages of 88 and 95 in the young one.
- 14:16That prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie's to beat
- 14:19faster. Just writing about the
- 14:21possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to
- 14:24soar. My expectation of more stock
- 14:27purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to
- 14:31how stocks will behave next week or next year.
- 14:34Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our
- 14:36activities. Our thinking rather is focused
- 14:39on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is
- 14:43worth more than its market price.
- 14:45I believe Berkshire's intrinsic value can be approximated by
- 14:48summing the values of our four asset laden Groves and then
- 14:52subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually
- 14:55payable on the sale of marketable securities.
- 14:58You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the
- 15:01major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain
- 15:05of our wholly owned businesses. Forget that thought.
- 15:08It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful
- 15:12companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale.
- 15:15Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find.
- 15:19Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.
- 15:22The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an
- 15:26expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire's non
- 15:29insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our
- 15:32ownership of the first four Groves is financed by funds
- 15:35generated from Berkshire's Fifth Grove, a collection of
- 15:38exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds float a
- 15:42source of financing that we expect to be cost free, or maybe
- 15:45even better than that over time. We will explain the
- 15:49characteristics of float later in this letter.
- 15:51Finally, a point of key and lasting importance, Berkshire's
- 15:55value is maximized by our having assembled the five Groves into a
- 16:00single entity. This arrangement allows us to
- 16:02seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of
- 16:06capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund
- 16:10assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take
- 16:14advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.
- 16:18At Berkshire, the whole is greater, considerably greater
- 16:21than the sum of the parts 6 Repurchase S and reporting
- 16:25earlier, I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time
- 16:28be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a
- 16:32discount to Berkshire's intrinsic value, which certainly
- 16:35will be our intention, Repurchase S will benefit both
- 16:39those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.
- 16:42True, the upside from repurchase S is very slight for those who
- 16:46are leaving. That's because careful buying
- 16:48buy us will minimize any impact on Berkshire stock price.
- 16:52Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an
- 16:56extra buyer in the market. For continuing shareholders, the
- 16:59advantage is obvious. If the market price is a
- 17:02departing partners interest at say 90 on the dollar, continuing
- 17:07shareholders reap an increase in per share intrinsic value with
- 17:11every repurchase buy the company.
- 17:14Obviously, repurchase S should be price sensitive.
- 17:17Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value destructive, a
- 17:21fact lost on many promotional or ever optimistic CEOs.
- 17:26When a company says that it contemplates repurchase S, it's
- 17:29vital that all shareholder partners be given that
- 17:32information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value.
- 17:36Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in
- 17:39this report. We do not want a partner to sell
- 17:42shares back to the company because he or she has been
- 17:44misled or inadequately informed. Some sellers, however, may
- 17:49disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found
- 17:53investments but they consider more attractive than Berkshire
- 17:56shares. Some of that second group will
- 17:58be right. There are unquestionably many
- 18:01stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.
- 18:04In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide
- 18:07it's time for them or their families to become net consumers
- 18:11rather than continuing to build capital.
- 18:13Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group.
- 18:16Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.
- 18:20For 54 years, our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been
- 18:24made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying,
- 18:27not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have
- 18:31never focused on current quarter results.
- 18:33Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500
- 18:38that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance
- 18:41sheets. I, of course, regularly view the
- 18:44monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries, but Charlie
- 18:48and I learn of Berkshire's overall earnings and financial
- 18:51position only on a quarterly basis.
- 18:54Furthermore, Berkshire has no company wide budget, though many
- 18:57of our subsidiaries find one useful.
- 19:00Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company
- 19:03has never had a quarterly number to hit.
- 19:05Shunning the use of this bogeys ends an important message to our
- 19:09many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.
- 19:13Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad
- 19:16corporate behavior, both accounting and operational,
- 19:19induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street
- 19:22expectations. What starts as an innocent fudge
- 19:25in order to not disappoint the streets, a trade loading at
- 19:29quarter end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses or
- 19:33drawing down a kooky jar reserve can become the first step toward
- 19:37full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers just
- 19:40this once may well be the CE OS intent.
- 19:43It's seldom the end result, and if it's OK for the boss to cheat
- 19:46a little, it's easy for subordinates to rationalize.
- 19:50Similar behavior at Berkshire. Our audience is neither analysts
- 19:54nor commentators. Charlie and I are working for
- 19:57our shareholder partners. The numbers that flow up to us
- 20:00will be the ones we send on to you. 7 non insurance operations
- 20:04from lollipops to locomotives. Let's now look further at
- 20:08Berkshire's most valuable Grove Hour collection of non insurance
- 20:12businesses, keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily
- 20:15hand our competitors information that might be useful to them.
- 20:19Additional details about individual operations can be
- 20:22found on Pages K -, 5 K -22 and pages K -, 40 K -51.
- 20:29Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre tax income
- 20:33in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017.
- 20:40Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount
- 20:45of that gain. I will stick with pre tax
- 20:47figures in this discussion, but our after tax gain in 2018 from
- 20:51these businesses was far greater, 47%, thanks in large
- 20:55part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective
- 20:59at the beginning of that year. Let's look at why the impact was
- 21:02so dramatic. Begin with an economic reality.
- 21:06Like it or not, the US government owns an interest in
- 21:10Berkshires earnings of a size determined by Congress.
- 21:14In effect, our country's Treasury Department holds a
- 21:17special class of our stock, call this holding the A A shares that
- 21:21receives large dividends, that is, tax payments from Berkshire.
- 21:25In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate
- 21:30was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well
- 21:34with its A A shares. Indeed, the Treasury stock,
- 21:38which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved
- 21:43into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to
- 21:46the federal government. Last year, however, 40% of the
- 21:50government's ownership 1435 THS was returned to Berkshire free
- 21:55of charge when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%.
- 21:59Consequently, our A&B shareholders received a major
- 22:03boost in the earnings attributable to their shares.
- 22:06This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of
- 22:10the Berkshire shares. You and I own the same dynamic
- 22:14moreover enhance the intrinsic value of almost all of the
- 22:18stocks Berkshire holds. Those are the headlines, but
- 22:21there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain.
- 22:24For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility
- 22:28operation get passed along to its customers.
- 22:31Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial
- 22:34dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little
- 22:37changed at about 13%. This lower rate has long been
- 22:42logical because our invest EES have already paid tax on the
- 22:45earnings that they pay to us. Overall, however, the new law
- 22:49made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more
- 22:52valuable, which suggests that return to the performance of our
- 22:55non insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in
- 22:59this Grove are B NSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy. 90.9%
- 23:04owned. Combined they earn $9.3 billion
- 23:08before tax last year, up 6% from 2017.
- 23:12You can read more about these businesses on pages K -, 5 K -10
- 23:17and pages K - 40 K -45. Our next 5 non insurance
- 23:22subsidiaries as ranked by earnings but presented here
- 23:26alphabetically. Clayton Holmes, International
- 23:29Metalworking, Lubrizo, El Marmon and Precision Cast Parts had
- 23:33aggregate pre tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from from
- 23:39the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.
- 23:43The next 5 similarly ranked and listed Forest River, Johns,
- 23:47Manville, ME Tech, Shaw and TT I earned 2.4 dollars billion pre
- 23:53tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.
- 23:58The remaining non insurance businesses that Berkshire owns
- 24:01and there are many had pre tax income off $3.6 billion in 2018
- 24:06versus $3.3 billion in 2017. Eight insurance float and the
- 24:13funding of Berkshire, our property casualty PC insurance
- 24:16business, our fifth Grove, has been the engine propelling
- 24:20Berkshire's growth since 1967, the year we acquired National
- 24:24Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire and
- 24:28Marine for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the
- 24:33largest property casualty company in the world as measured
- 24:37by net worth. One reason we were attracted to
- 24:39the PC business was the industry's business model.
- 24:43PC insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later.
- 24:47In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to
- 24:51asbestos or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch
- 24:55over many decades. This collect now, pay later
- 24:58model leaves PC companies holding large sums, money we
- 25:02call float, that we'll eventually go to others.
- 25:04Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own
- 25:08benefit. Though individual policies and
- 25:11claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds
- 25:14usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume.
- 25:18Consequently, as our business grows so does our float and how
- 25:22it has grown as the following table shows.
- 25:25Year Flaught and Millions 1970 dollars Thirty Nine 1980230719
- 25:3391,632 Two thousand 27,871 2010 65,832 2018 122,732 Includes
- 25:49float arising from life, annuity and health insurance businesses.
- 25:53We may in time experience a decline in float.
- 25:56If so, the decline will be very gradual.
- 25:58At the outside no more than 3% in any year.
- 26:02The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can
- 26:05never be subject to immediate or near term demands for sums that
- 26:09are of significance to our cash resources.
- 26:12That structure is by design and is a key component in the
- 26:15unequalled financial strength of our insurance companies.
- 26:19That strength will never be compromised if our premiums
- 26:22exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses.
- 26:26Our insurance operation registers in underwriting profit
- 26:29that adds to the investment income the flow produces.
- 26:32When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money and
- 26:37better yet, get paid for holding it.
- 26:39Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy
- 26:43result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed,
- 26:47that it sometimes causes the PC industry as a whole to operate
- 26:51at a significant underwriting loss.
- 26:53That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its
- 26:57float. Competitive dynamics almost
- 26:59guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float
- 27:03income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record
- 27:07of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared
- 27:10to other American businesses. Nevertheless, I like our own
- 27:14prospects. Berkshire's unrivaled financial
- 27:17strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our
- 27:20float than that generally available to PC companies.
- 27:24The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage
- 27:28and occasionally offer major opportunities.
- 27:30When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand.
- 27:34Moreover, our PC companies have an excellent underwriting
- 27:37record. Berkshire has now operated at an
- 27:40underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years.
- 27:44The exception being 2017 when our pre tax loss was $3.2
- 27:49billion. Four, the entire 16 years pan
- 27:53our pre tax gain totaled $27 billion of which $2 billion was
- 27:58recorded in 2018. Nine, that record is no
- 28:02accident. Disciplined risk evaluation is
- 28:05the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the
- 28:08benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results.
- 28:12All insurers give that message lip service.
- 28:15At Berkshire, it is a religion, Old Testament style.
- 28:18In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources,
- 28:22debt and equity. At Berkshire, we have two
- 28:25additional arrows in the quiver to talk about, but let's first
- 28:28address the conventional components.
- 28:30We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be
- 28:34noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant
- 28:38debt juices the returns for equity owners, and these more
- 28:42venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time.
- 28:45At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit
- 28:48vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal.
- 28:51A Russian roulette equation usually win.
- 28:54Occasionally Dye may make financial sense for someone who
- 28:57gets a piece of a companies upside but does not share in its
- 29:01downside. But that strategy would be
- 29:03madness for Berkshire. Rational people don't risk what
- 29:07they have and need for what they don't have and don't need.
- 29:10Most of the debt you see on our consolidated balance sheet, see
- 29:13page K-65, resides at our railroad and energy
- 29:17subsidiaries, both of them asset heavy companies.
- 29:21During recessions, the cash generation of these businesses
- 29:25remains bountiful. The debt they use is both
- 29:27appropriate for their operations and not guaranteed by Berkshire.
- 29:31Our level of equity capital is a different story.
- 29:34Berkshire's $349 billion is unmatched incorporate America.
- 29:39By retaining all earnings for a very long time and allowing
- 29:43compound interest to work its magic, we have amassed funds
- 29:47that have enabled us to purchase and develop the valuable Groves
- 29:51earlier described. Had we instead followed a 100%
- 29:55payout policy, we would still be working with the $22 million
- 29:59with which we began fiscal 1965. Beyond using debt and equity,
- 30:04Berkshire has benefited in a major way from 2 less common
- 30:07sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have
- 30:11described so far. Those funds, though they are
- 30:14recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been
- 30:18of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity.
- 30:22That's because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting
- 30:25earnings. In effect, we have been paid in
- 30:28most years for holding and using other people's money.
- 30:31As I have often done before, I will emphasize that this happy
- 30:35outcome is far from a sure thing.
- 30:37Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take
- 30:41many years to surface. Think asbestos.
- 30:44A major catastrophe that will dwarf Hurricanes Katrina and
- 30:48Michael will occur perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades
- 30:51from now. The big one may come from a
- 30:54traditional source, such as a hurricane or earthquake, or it
- 30:57may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack
- 31:01having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now
- 31:05contemplate. When such a mega catastrophe
- 31:08strikes, we will get our share of the losses and they will be
- 31:11big, very big. Unlike many other insurers,
- 31:14however, we will be looking to add business the next day.
- 31:17The final funding source, which again Berkshire possesses to an
- 31:20unusual degree is deferred income taxes.
- 31:23These are liabilities that we will eventually pay, but that
- 31:26are meanwhile interest free. As I indicated earlier, about
- 31:30$14.7 billion of our $50.5 billion of deferred taxes arises
- 31:35from the unrealized gains in our equity holdings.
- 31:39These liabilities are accrued in our financial statements at the
- 31:42current 21% corporate tax rate, but will be paid at the rates
- 31:46prevailing when our investments are sold.
- 31:49Between now and then, we in effect have an interest free
- 31:52loan that allows us to have more money working for us in equities
- 31:56than would otherwise be the case. 10A.
- 31:59Further $28.3 billion of deferred tax results from our
- 32:03being able to accelerate the depreciation of assets such as
- 32:07plant and equipment and calculating the tax we must
- 32:10currently pay. The front ended savings and
- 32:12taxes that we record gradually reverse in future years.
- 32:16We regularly purchase additional assets.
- 32:18However, as long as the present tax law prevails, this source of
- 32:23funding should trend upward over time.
- 32:25Berkshire's funding based that's the right hand side of our
- 32:28balance sheet should grow primarily through the earnings
- 32:31we retain. Our job is to put the money
- 32:34retained to good use on the left hand side by adding attractive
- 32:38assets. GEICO and Tony Nicely that title
- 32:41says it all. The company and the man are
- 32:43inseparable. Tony joined GEICO in 1961 at the
- 32:47age of 18. I met him in the mid 1970.
- 32:51Yes, at that time GEICO, after a 4 decade record of both rapid
- 32:56growth and outstanding underwriting results, suddenly
- 32:59found itself near bankruptcy. A recently installed management
- 33:03had grossly underestimated Geico's lost costs and
- 33:07consequently underpriced its product.
- 33:10It would take many months until those lost generating policies
- 33:13on Geico's books, there were no less than 2.3 million of them,
- 33:17would expire and could then be repriced.
- 33:20The company's net worth, in the meantime, was rapidly
- 33:23approaching 0. In 1976, Jack Byrne was brought
- 33:27in as CEO to rescue GEICO. Soon after his arrival, I met
- 33:31him, concluded that he was the perfect man for the job, and
- 33:35began to aggressively buy GEICO shares.
- 33:37Within a few months, Berkshire bought about 1/3 of the company,
- 33:41a portion that later grew to roughly 1-2 without our spending
- 33:45a dime. That's stunning.
- 33:47Accretion occurred because GEICO, after recovering its
- 33:50health, consistently repurchased its shares.
- 33:53All told, this half interest in GEICO cost Berkshire $47 million
- 33:58about what you might pay today for Atrophy Apartment in New
- 34:01York. Let's now Fast forward 17 years
- 34:04to 1993, when Tony Nicely was promoted to CEO.
- 34:08At that point, Geico's reputation and profitability had
- 34:12been restored, but not its growth.
- 34:14Indeed, at year in 1992, the company had only 1.9 million
- 34:19auto policies on its books, far less than its pre crisis high in
- 34:24sales volume. Among you's auto insurers, GEICO
- 34:28then ranked an undistinguished 7th.
- 34:30Late in 1995, after Tony had re energized GEICO, Berkshire made
- 34:35an offer to buy the remaining 50% of the company for $2.3
- 34:39billion, about 50 times what we had paid for the first half.
- 34:43And people say I never pay up. Our offer was successful and
- 34:48brought Berkshire a wonderful but underdeveloped company and
- 34:51an equally wonderful CEO who would move GEICO forward beyond
- 34:56my dreams. GEICO is now America's number 2
- 34:59auto insurer with sales 1200% greater than it recorded in
- 35:041995. Underwriting profits have
- 35:06totaled $15.5 billion pre tax since our purchase and float
- 35:11available for investment has grown from $2.5 billion to $22.1
- 35:17billion. By my estimate, Tony's
- 35:20management of GEICO has increased Berkshire's intrinsic
- 35:23value by more than $50 billion. On top of that, he is a model
- 35:27for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000
- 35:31associates to identify and Polish abilities they didn't
- 35:34realize they possessed. Last year Tony decided to retire
- 35:38as CEO and on June 30th TH he turned that position over to
- 35:42Bill Roberts, his long time partner.
- 35:45I've known and watched Bill operate for several decades and
- 35:48once again Tony made the right move.
- 35:51Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest
- 35:54of his life. He's incapable of doing less.
- 35:57All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks.
- 36:01I had the list 11 investments. Below we list our 15 common
- 36:06stock investments that at year end had the largest market
- 36:09value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz
- 36:12Holding 325442152 shares because Berkshire is part of a control
- 36:17group and therefore must account for this investment on the
- 36:21equity method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire
- 36:23carries its Kraft Heinz Holding at a gap figure of $13.8
- 36:28billion, an amount reduced by our share of the large write off
- 36:32of intangible assets taken by Kraft Heinz in 2018.
- 36:36At year end, our Kraft Heinz Holding had a market value of
- 36:40$14 billion and a cost basis of $9.8 billion 123,118 percentage
- 36:49of company shares, company owned cost market.
- 36:52Charlie and I do not view the $172.8 billion detailed above as
- 36:57a collection of ticker symbols of financial dalliance to be
- 37:01terminated because of downgrades by St. expected Federal Reserve
- 37:05actions, possible political developments forecast by
- 37:09economists, or whatever else might be the subject dujour.
- 37:13What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of
- 37:16companies that we partly own and that on a weighted basis are
- 37:20earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required
- 37:24to run their businesses. These companies also earn their
- 37:28profits without employing excessive levels of debt. 12
- 37:32Returns of that order by large, established and understandable
- 37:36businesses are remarkable under any circumstances.
- 37:40They are truly mind blowing when compared against the return that
- 37:43many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade, 3%
- 37:47or less than 30 year U.S. Treasury bonds for example.
- 37:52On occasion, A ridiculously high purchase price for a given stock
- 37:56will cause a splendid business to become a poor investment, if
- 38:00not permanently, at least for a painfully long period.
- 38:03Over time, however, investment performance converges with
- 38:07business performance, and as I will next spell out, the record
- 38:11of American business has been extraordinary.
- 38:14The American Tailwind. On March 11th TH it will be 77
- 38:18years since I first invested in an American business.
- 38:22The year was 1942, I was 11 and I went all in investing 114.75
- 38:29dollars. I had begun accumulating at age
- 38:316. What I bought was 3 shares of
- 38:33Cities Service preferred stock. I had become a capitalist and it
- 38:37felt good. Let's now travel back through
- 38:40the 277 year periods that preceded my purchase.
- 38:43That leaves us starting in 1788, a year prior to George
- 38:48Washington's installation as our first president.
- 38:51Could anyone then have imagined what their new country would
- 38:54accomplish in only 377 year lifetimes?
- 38:57During the 277 year periods prior to 1942, the United States
- 39:02had grown from 4 million people, about 1/2 of 1% of the world's
- 39:07population, into the most powerful country on Earth.
- 39:10In that spring of 1942, though, it faced a crisis.
- 39:15EU EST and its allies were suffering heavy losses in a war
- 39:19that we had entered only three months earlier.
- 39:22Bad news arrived daily. Despite the alarming headlines,
- 39:26almost all Americans believed on that March 11th TH that the war
- 39:30would be 1. Nor was their optimism limited
- 39:33to that victory. Leaving aside congenital
- 39:35pessimists, Americans believed that their children and
- 39:39generations beyond would live far better lives than they
- 39:42themselves had led. The nation's citizens
- 39:44understood, of course, that the road ahead would not be a smooth
- 39:48ride. It never had been.
- 39:51Early in its history, our country was tested by a civil
- 39:54War that killed 4% of all American males and LED President
- 39:58Lincoln to openly ponder whether a nation so conceived and so
- 40:02dedicated could long endure. In the 1930s, America suffered
- 40:07through the Great Depression, a punishing period of massive
- 40:10unemployment. Nevertheless, in 1942 when I
- 40:14made my purchase, the nation expected post war growth, a
- 40:18belief that proved. To be well founded, in fact, the
- 40:22nation's achievements can best be described as breathtaking.
- 40:25Let's put numbers to that claim. If my 114.75 dollars had been
- 40:30invested in a no fee S&P 500 index fund and all dividends had
- 40:35been reinvested, my stake would have grown to be worth pre taxes
- 40:39$606,811.00 on January 312019. Latest data available before the
- 40:46printing of this letter. That is again a 5288 for one.
- 40:51Meanwhile a $1 million investment by a tax free
- 40:55institution of that time, say a pension fund or college
- 40:58endowment, would have grown to about 5.3 dollars billion.
- 41:02Let me add one additional calculation that I believe will
- 41:05shock you. If that hypothetical institution
- 41:08had paid only 1% of assets annually to various helpers such
- 41:13as investment managers and consultants, its gain would have
- 41:16been cut in half to $2.65 billion.
- 41:20That's what happens over 77 years when the 11.8% annual
- 41:24return actually achieved by the S&P 500 is recalculated at a
- 41:2910.8% rate. 13 Those who regularly preach doom because of
- 41:34government budget deficits, as I regularly did myself for many
- 41:39years, might note that our country's national debt has
- 41:41increased roughly 4 hundredfold during the last of my 77 year
- 41:45periods. That's 40,000%.
- 41:48Suppose you had foreseen this increase and panicked at the
- 41:51prospect of runaway deficits and a worthless currency.
- 41:55To protect yourself, you might have a shoot stocks and opted
- 41:58instead to buy 31 four ounces of gold with your 114.75 dollars.
- 42:04And what would that supposed protection have delivered?
- 42:07You would now have an asset worth about $4200, less than 1%
- 42:12of what would have been realized from a simple unmanaged
- 42:14investment in American business. The magical metal was no match
- 42:19for the American metal. Our country's almost
- 42:21unbelievable prosperity has been gained in a bipartisan manner.
- 42:26Since 1942, we have had seven Republican presidents and seven
- 42:30Democrats. In the years they served, the
- 42:33country contended at various times with a long period of
- 42:37viral inflation, a 21% prime rate, several controversial and
- 42:41costly wars, the resignation of a president, a pervasive
- 42:45collapse in home values, a paralyzing financial panic and a
- 42:49host of other problems all engendered scary headlines.
- 42:53All are now history. Christopher Wren, architect of
- 42:56Saint Paul's Cathedral, lies buried within that London church
- 43:00near his tumor. Posted these words of
- 43:03description translated from Latin.
- 43:05If you would seek my monument, look around you.
- 43:08Those skeptical of America's economic playbook should heed
- 43:12his message. In 1788, Togo.
- 43:14Back to our starting point. There really wasn't much here,
- 43:17except for a small band of ambitious people in an embryonic
- 43:21governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into
- 43:24reality. Today, the Federal Reserve
- 43:27estimates our household wealth at $108 trillion, an amount
- 43:31almost impossible to comprehend. Remember earlier in this letter
- 43:35how I described retained earnings as having been the key
- 43:38to Berkshire's prosperity? So it has been with America.
- 43:42In the nation's accounting, the comparable item is labeled
- 43:45savings and save we half. If our forefathers had instead
- 43:50consumed all they produced, there would have been no
- 43:52investment, no productivity gains, and no leap in living
- 43:56standards. Charlie and I happily
- 43:59acknowledge that much of Berkshire's success has simply
- 44:01been a product of what I think should be called the American
- 44:04tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for
- 44:07American businesses or individuals to boast that they
- 44:10have done it alone. The tidy rows of simple white
- 44:13crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims.
- 44:17There are also many other countries around the world that
- 44:20have bright futures. About that we should rejoice.
- 44:24Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all
- 44:27nations thrive. At Berkshire we hope to invest
- 44:30significant sums across borders over the next 77 years.
- 44:35However, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be
- 44:39provided by that American tailwind.
- 44:41We are lucky, gloriously lucky to have that forcetour back. 14
- 44:46The Annual Meeting Berkshire's 2019 Annual meeting will take
- 44:50place on Saturday May 4th TH. If you were thinking about
- 44:54attending and Charlie and I hope you come check out the details
- 44:57on pages a -. 2 A -3 They describe the same schedule we've
- 45:02followed for some years. If you can't join us in Omaha,
- 45:05attend via Yahoo's webcast Andy Serr Wer and his Yahoo
- 45:09associates doing outstanding job both in covering the entire
- 45:14meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities,
- 45:17financial experts and shareholders from the US and
- 45:21abroad. The world's knowledge of what
- 45:23goes on in Omaha the 1st Saturday of every May has grown
- 45:27dramatically since Yahoo came on board.
- 45:30It's coverage begins at 8:45 AM Central Daylight Time at
- 45:34provides Mandarin translation. For 54 years, Charlie and I have
- 45:38loved our jobs. Daily we do what we find
- 45:41interesting, working with people we like and trust.
- 45:45And now our new management structure has made our Live 7
- 45:48more enjoyable with the whole ensemble.
- 45:50That is with AJ, IT and Greg running operations.
- 45:54A great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash
- 45:57generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock solid
- 46:01culture. Your company is in good shape
- 46:04for whatever the future brings. February 232019.
- 46:08Warren E Buffett, Chairman of the Board 15.