Latest / Security Sutra – Cybersecurity Startups and Venture Capital by Startuprad.io™ / DORA Compliance Decoded: Giles Inkson on Operational Resilience for Fintech
Transcript
- WEBVTT 00:00:05.217 --> 00:00:12.737 Welcome to StartupRad.io, your podcast and YouTube blog covering the German 00:00:12.737 --> 00:00:17.657 startup scene with news, interviews and live events. 00:00:13.040 --> 00:00:18.960 Music. 00:00:19.877 --> 00:00:23.717 Hello and welcome everybody. This is Joe from StartupRad.io, 00:00:23.957 --> 00:00:27.837 your startup podcast, YouTube blog and internet radio station from Germany, 00:00:27.957 --> 00:00:28.937 Austria and Switzerland. 00:00:28.937 --> 00:00:35.177 Today, I do have another expert interview with you, talking about Dora again. 00:00:35.597 --> 00:00:41.457 We have been in the past hearing one guest who was talking about third-party 00:00:41.457 --> 00:00:44.457 assets on your website that you need to take care of. 00:00:44.797 --> 00:00:49.417 This time, I do have Giles here as a guest. Hey, how are you doing? 00:00:50.437 --> 00:00:54.857 Hi, nice to see you. Thanks for having me on. Totally my pleasure. 00:00:54.857 --> 00:01:00.337 You are Director of Services EMEA at NetSpy, and we will be talking a little 00:01:00.337 --> 00:01:03.957 bit broader about DORA and what you should do. 00:01:04.117 --> 00:01:07.937 I do have a few questions to guide you through this interview, 00:01:07.997 --> 00:01:10.957 and hopefully it will be very useful for everybody of us. 00:01:11.077 --> 00:01:16.217 But before we get started, can you introduce yourself a little bit to our audience? 00:01:16.357 --> 00:01:19.917 Keep in mind, most people will just listen to us. Of course. 00:01:20.237 --> 00:01:26.517 So I'm Giles, and I look after a number of different testing services. 00:01:26.697 --> 00:01:29.337 So I am a security tester. And 00:01:29.337 --> 00:01:33.837 before that, involved in IT infrastructure for a long time in my career. 00:01:34.317 --> 00:01:39.157 So in terms of my profession now, what I do is something called red teaming. 00:01:39.357 --> 00:01:42.617 And that is an expression of 00:01:42.617 --> 00:01:47.157 security testing. it's essentially organization-wide resiliency testing. 00:01:47.357 --> 00:01:54.657 And it's the type of testing that sort of DORA asks us to undertake and Tiber2 00:01:54.657 --> 00:01:57.237 and other frameworks, things like CBEST, for instance, in the UK, 00:01:57.517 --> 00:01:59.177 and other frameworks globally. 00:02:00.057 --> 00:02:06.177 It is essentially, for want of a better way of putting it, I'm a hacker, but in a good way. Yeah. 00:02:08.094 --> 00:02:13.994 You are, can you say, an ethical hacker? Correct. Yes, absolutely. An ethical hacker. 00:02:15.354 --> 00:02:18.774 I see. So today we're talking about DORA. 00:02:18.974 --> 00:02:23.914 No, it's not a first name of a lady. It's the Digital Operational Resilience 00:02:23.914 --> 00:02:26.034 Act from the European Union. 00:02:27.774 --> 00:02:35.234 And before we do get started, right now, it's already in force. 00:02:35.234 --> 00:02:39.554 But we do know the way bureaucracy work. 00:02:41.414 --> 00:02:44.994 Likely next year, the first checks will be done by authorities, 00:02:45.194 --> 00:02:46.774 by auditors, and so on and so forth. 00:02:46.914 --> 00:02:52.554 So this is the time to really get your stuff done, to really get down to business. 00:02:52.934 --> 00:02:56.774 If you appear or think you have some holes in there. 00:02:56.774 --> 00:03:02.774 And for this reason, we go a little bit broadly over the whole regulation and 00:03:02.774 --> 00:03:08.574 tell you potential places where you may have to work on before you get audited. 00:03:09.574 --> 00:03:13.194 Should we start with government and risk management? 00:03:14.234 --> 00:03:19.874 Please. Governance structure. Have I established a clear governance framework 00:03:19.874 --> 00:03:25.794 for digital operational resilience and are roles and responsibilities well defined? 00:03:25.794 --> 00:03:28.394 And that is a pretty interesting question. 00:03:28.414 --> 00:03:33.534 And what kind of answer should an entrepreneur have except for yes, of course? 00:03:36.634 --> 00:03:42.894 Yeah, that's a really interesting one. I think it's about the evidence base 00:03:42.894 --> 00:03:44.514 and the rationale behind it. 00:03:44.574 --> 00:03:48.814 And I think that's the kind of some of the core aspect to this. 00:03:48.814 --> 00:03:54.914 So if you can prove the rationale of that structure and sort of why you've made 00:03:54.914 --> 00:03:57.294 the choices that you have, I think that's a key component of it. 00:03:58.974 --> 00:04:02.774 Reasoning behind things, if that makes sense. It's not just the process, 00:04:02.774 --> 00:04:05.954 and I think that's one of the things that is critical to this. 00:04:06.134 --> 00:04:09.674 It's about the reasoning for the process and sort of the evaluation, 00:04:09.914 --> 00:04:11.374 the showing you're working, if you will. 00:04:11.674 --> 00:04:14.534 But I think this is really trying to prize out, if that makes sense. 00:04:14.534 --> 00:04:18.414 So that means if an auditor asks you, why did you do that? 00:04:18.554 --> 00:04:23.474 You should have a pretty good reason. But I do believe most will have thought 00:04:23.474 --> 00:04:26.034 it through at this point. 00:04:26.374 --> 00:04:33.294 Then we're talking about risk management strategy, having a comprehensive risk 00:04:33.294 --> 00:04:38.714 management framework to address all potential ICT risks. 00:04:38.714 --> 00:04:44.334 Can you first tell us a little bit what ICT risks are and then what you would 00:04:44.334 --> 00:04:51.354 expect from such a risk management strategy if you would look at it from an outside perspective? 00:04:51.714 --> 00:04:53.834 So I think there is a... 00:04:54.917 --> 00:04:58.677 A significant amount of this that is kind of understanding your organization 00:04:58.677 --> 00:05:03.777 and sort of where you sit within the market, where you intend to be in sort 00:05:03.777 --> 00:05:05.657 of three, five, ten years time, for instance, 00:05:05.977 --> 00:05:10.737 and sort of where you need to integrate to be able to understand what those risks might be. 00:05:11.777 --> 00:05:15.377 The component parts of your business and what keeps you operational is really important. 00:05:15.557 --> 00:05:19.177 You know, what are the cogs that keep the business turning from an IT perspective, 00:05:19.177 --> 00:05:23.157 the critical, important functions, to use the sort of the terminology there? 00:05:23.157 --> 00:05:29.637 These are the component parts of the business that you absolutely must keep 00:05:29.637 --> 00:05:30.857 running and operational. 00:05:31.117 --> 00:05:37.197 And that's why operational resiliency is a big part of this risk management approach, if you will. 00:05:38.877 --> 00:05:42.897 Actually, funny thing in German, it's called information and communications 00:05:42.897 --> 00:05:48.157 technology, information and communications technology, IKT-risiko. 00:05:48.377 --> 00:05:53.257 So that should give a little bit more hint about that. but please go on. 00:05:53.417 --> 00:05:59.877 The approach in terms of the strategy and the vision is you have to understand 00:05:59.877 --> 00:06:05.037 all of your assets that form part of that ICT estate and the processes and components 00:06:05.037 --> 00:06:06.717 and the human element as well, if you will, 00:06:06.777 --> 00:06:09.777 that go into that to be able to drive the business. 00:06:10.717 --> 00:06:15.177 And that accurate mapping of it is essentially the most fundamental component 00:06:15.177 --> 00:06:18.477 of that strategy, if you will. Yes, sure. 00:06:20.097 --> 00:06:22.197 Risk-venture framework, when 00:06:22.197 --> 00:06:28.397 would it be comprehensive to address all potential ICT risk? Thank you. 00:06:31.016 --> 00:06:35.216 Without understanding your entire estate and all of your ICT systems and the 00:06:35.216 --> 00:06:37.796 usage of them and sort of how they integrate to the business, 00:06:37.836 --> 00:06:42.196 it's an incredible challenge to be able to make it complete. 00:06:42.696 --> 00:06:48.056 So a strong asset inventory or a strong understanding of your own ICT systems 00:06:48.056 --> 00:06:52.676 is critical to be able to understand the risk to them or the potential risk to them. 00:06:53.316 --> 00:06:59.536 I have one question. You said it's important to have like overall overview. 00:06:59.536 --> 00:07:04.936 I do believe a lot of people tend to forget one or two tools. 00:07:05.376 --> 00:07:12.456 Do you have any experience where people usually forget some ICT assets, 00:07:12.656 --> 00:07:16.436 meaning physical or digital tools, software, IT? 00:07:17.736 --> 00:07:24.156 Yeah. So I think shadow IT as a concept is something that people talk often 00:07:24.156 --> 00:07:29.176 about, which is parts of the infrastructure that have been sort of created dynamically 00:07:29.176 --> 00:07:31.296 or by individuals or users that are unknown. 00:07:31.476 --> 00:07:36.516 And I think that's one of the key missing elements from a lot of people's asset inventories. 00:07:36.676 --> 00:07:40.256 So you have to have an element that is through known mechanisms, 00:07:40.436 --> 00:07:44.436 things like sort of databases that you might have of assets that exist already. 00:07:44.536 --> 00:07:47.696 But you also need to have the ability to dynamically map them and to be able 00:07:47.696 --> 00:07:53.716 to dynamically understand the component technology assets of your business on a continuous basis. 00:07:53.716 --> 00:07:59.696 So there are a number of sort of platforms and sources and tools that aim to 00:07:59.696 --> 00:08:04.416 do that dynamically and to varying degrees of success in the market. 00:08:04.656 --> 00:08:09.336 But doing an evaluation of those as part of your component infrastructure and 00:08:09.336 --> 00:08:14.216 looking at the efficacy of those is is a really important task as part of this 00:08:14.216 --> 00:08:18.476 kind of this overall framework development is you need to be able to assess the tools you use. 00:08:18.656 --> 00:08:22.116 In fact, it kind of almost the next level, if you will, that assess how you 00:08:22.116 --> 00:08:29.316 work. It's a bit of a non-answer almost sometimes, but the approach... 00:08:33.105 --> 00:08:36.865 You need to be able to know what you don't know and how do you quantify that? 00:08:36.985 --> 00:08:40.785 And I think that's the tricky question here is how do you map the unknown and 00:08:40.785 --> 00:08:43.785 how do you rate a tool that allows you to do that? 00:08:44.225 --> 00:08:48.465 Often people lean into things like SaaS platforms that sort of offer a, 00:08:48.545 --> 00:08:51.285 for want of a better way, a magical solution to these problems. 00:08:51.505 --> 00:08:56.745 I think validation and checking and due diligence, again, another core concept 00:08:56.745 --> 00:09:00.385 of this act and what it tries to instill, key components of that. 00:09:00.385 --> 00:09:06.025 So you need to make sure that you are checking and validating the software that 00:09:06.025 --> 00:09:11.345 you use, even that you use to understand your business and evaluate itself, if that makes sense. 00:09:12.245 --> 00:09:15.705 So you shouldn't have any freelancers who 00:09:15.705 --> 00:09:19.005 do have developed proprietary tool they transfer 00:09:19.005 --> 00:09:22.025 data and then put it back into your system that that's the 00:09:22.025 --> 00:09:28.085 kind of risk we're talking about plus getting your data into a third-party software 00:09:28.085 --> 00:09:36.145 and not be aware of that do you have because this shadow it is always a pretty 00:09:36.145 --> 00:09:39.945 difficult topic especially to figure out Oh, 00:09:40.525 --> 00:09:44.725 if you have something like that, I once talked to a guest and they say, 00:09:44.825 --> 00:09:48.345 yeah, look at the company credit card bills. 00:09:48.805 --> 00:09:52.525 If there's software charge, that could be a good hint. 00:09:53.005 --> 00:09:59.385 Do you have any other ideas, suggestions how somebody may find, 00:09:59.665 --> 00:10:07.965 may learn more about potential shadow software where they could find hints about it? 00:10:08.655 --> 00:10:13.395 Yeah, there are elements. So some of this might be externally facing, 00:10:13.535 --> 00:10:15.875 for instance, so internet facing and available to the public, 00:10:15.895 --> 00:10:17.175 and you may not be aware of it. 00:10:17.295 --> 00:10:20.935 So there are tools and techniques and processes that you can do to dynamically 00:10:20.935 --> 00:10:27.075 scan and to sort of search for assets that might be linked to your business in some way. 00:10:27.775 --> 00:10:30.775 You know products like this are often called things like attack surface mapping for 00:10:30.775 --> 00:10:33.495 instance these are what they aim 00:10:33.495 --> 00:10:37.755 to do is look for traces of your organization externally so then that you can 00:10:37.755 --> 00:10:42.255 take sort of reparatory action or some form of action to investigate where they 00:10:42.255 --> 00:10:45.875 may have come from what the background might be credit card data is in fact 00:10:45.875 --> 00:10:50.015 quite an interesting one because company assets company finance are tracked 00:10:50.015 --> 00:10:52.955 already in a lot of organizations so that gives you that audit trail. 00:10:53.615 --> 00:10:59.695 Other sources of data, things like in the sort of the computer sort of identity 00:10:59.695 --> 00:11:03.695 sense, for instance, things like cloud services will hold databases of users. 00:11:03.855 --> 00:11:06.975 Perhaps you can track what those users, what resources they're creating. 00:11:07.195 --> 00:11:10.855 The same for sort of on-premise systems like Active Directory, for instance. 00:11:11.415 --> 00:11:14.955 Those are means by which you can have a look at what resources are being spun 00:11:14.955 --> 00:11:17.135 up, but that's not dynamic. That's fairly static. 00:11:23.035 --> 00:11:26.315 The regulation talks about ICT risk 00:11:26.315 --> 00:11:30.215 assessment how frequently should 00:11:30.215 --> 00:11:35.655 you do that and how I mean there are of course different methodologies but how 00:11:35.655 --> 00:11:43.675 would you go about figuring out what methodology one should use that's an interesting 00:11:43.675 --> 00:11:49.315 uh an interesting topic um you have to assess it Again, I think that's a really important thing. 00:11:49.415 --> 00:11:52.555 And I think this is kind of, again, this is the territory of non-answer again, 00:11:52.715 --> 00:11:54.815 where you're expected to do 00:11:54.815 --> 00:11:57.215 the due diligence, but often there's not a great deal of guidance on it. 00:11:57.335 --> 00:12:00.335 And to be able to prove and validate that and argue the case for it, 00:12:00.335 --> 00:12:03.955 again, is one of the key things. But in terms of the. 00:12:04.793 --> 00:12:08.113 In terms of the sort of the way that you manage that due diligence on third 00:12:08.113 --> 00:12:11.253 party suppliers, existing and new ones, a lot of organizations. 00:12:11.473 --> 00:12:17.653 For instance, that I've spoken to are re-evaluating contracts as a result of this act. 00:12:17.793 --> 00:12:22.193 So that's kind of a one-time monolithic sort of evaluation of those organizations 00:12:22.193 --> 00:12:25.333 and how they treat their own security as part of that supply chain risk piece. 00:12:25.333 --> 00:12:30.573 But also when you are updating or changing contracts or when you are refreshing 00:12:30.573 --> 00:12:35.733 service contracts with those organizations, that's when you should be doing this assessment, 00:12:35.893 --> 00:12:40.273 for instance, or at least on a yearly basis or an annual basis to make sure 00:12:40.273 --> 00:12:42.873 that you are regularly reviewing and revisiting them. 00:12:42.993 --> 00:12:48.133 And I think the review and revisit is another core component to this is you 00:12:48.133 --> 00:12:53.593 can't treat something as trusted if you've done this forever, if you know what I mean. 00:12:53.593 --> 00:12:56.893 So if you've done your due diligence once, that doesn't mean that that due diligence 00:12:56.893 --> 00:13:00.253 continues year after year, year after year. 00:13:00.393 --> 00:13:03.313 Organizations can become insecure that you deal with as a supplier, 00:13:03.413 --> 00:13:05.193 for instance, over the course of their lifetime. 00:13:05.393 --> 00:13:08.513 So what you need to be doing is making sure that you're continuously checking 00:13:08.513 --> 00:13:13.533 those, understanding their downstream processes for sort of how they manage 00:13:13.533 --> 00:13:17.653 their own vulnerabilities, their own risk management approaches, their own processes. 00:13:17.653 --> 00:13:21.333 And that's one of the big challenges around this 00:13:21.333 --> 00:13:27.053 act is organizations are now presented with how do they present information 00:13:27.053 --> 00:13:33.633 about how and where they are vulnerable to their clients without giving away 00:13:33.633 --> 00:13:36.433 data that is sensitive or controlled under other legislation, 00:13:36.593 --> 00:13:37.913 things like GDPR, for instance. 00:13:38.173 --> 00:13:43.673 And that's a very tricky question to get an accurate and clear answer on. 00:13:43.753 --> 00:13:46.513 And I think that's been one of the challenges for organizations trying to solve this. 00:13:47.833 --> 00:13:53.533 When we're talking about DORA here we're talking about incident reporting and 00:13:53.533 --> 00:14:00.793 management can you help us to understand this field first step how do you, 00:14:01.660 --> 00:14:05.160 identify an incident. What is the level? 00:14:06.060 --> 00:14:09.820 Again, it's a little bit subjective here. When is it an incident? 00:14:11.020 --> 00:14:14.460 Yeah, absolutely. So you have to need to have a reasonable level of confidence 00:14:14.460 --> 00:14:19.460 that this is a operationally affecting incident, cyber security or otherwise. 00:14:19.700 --> 00:14:23.800 So, you know, for instance, the one that a lot of people lean towards is cyber 00:14:23.800 --> 00:14:26.140 security incident or a breach, for instance. 00:14:26.740 --> 00:14:31.980 You need to have a good degree of confidence of that is a genuine breach, 00:14:32.120 --> 00:14:34.400 for instance, and be able to report that as soon as possible, 00:14:34.640 --> 00:14:36.020 ideally within 24 hours. 00:14:36.220 --> 00:14:42.000 So you need to have a strong ability to respond to these types of events and 00:14:42.000 --> 00:14:47.120 identify them, triage them, and treat them as quickly as possible, i.e. 00:14:47.240 --> 00:14:50.060 Identify them as quickly as possible. And then you've got a responsibility at 00:14:50.060 --> 00:14:54.240 that point to do the notification process and follow through the rest of your 00:14:54.240 --> 00:14:55.880 incident response plan. 00:14:56.140 --> 00:14:59.180 And that can vary depending on what type of incident you face. 00:14:59.600 --> 00:15:05.560 So in a lot of breaches, for instance, you see things like ransomware affecting organizations. 00:15:06.300 --> 00:15:12.380 That type of breach is very, very fast moving, typically, in the market for a lot of organizations. 00:15:12.980 --> 00:15:17.800 So there's a real challenge with the timing of being able to identify something 00:15:17.800 --> 00:15:21.480 like this, respond to it, and sort of recover from it, as well as going through 00:15:21.480 --> 00:15:23.240 the notification process at the same time. 00:15:23.240 --> 00:15:27.380 And I think that's where we'll see a real stretch for organizations to meet 00:15:27.380 --> 00:15:28.360 that compliance standard. 00:15:28.600 --> 00:15:34.900 How do you show that you can do the identification process and adapt and prevent 00:15:34.900 --> 00:15:36.220 and recover from a threat at 00:15:36.220 --> 00:15:39.540 the same time, for instance? So it's a really tricky thing to get right. 00:15:40.480 --> 00:15:44.200 It needs to be documented. You need to be able to, again, justify it. 00:15:44.260 --> 00:15:49.400 You need to be able to talk about why you believe that the method and approach 00:15:49.400 --> 00:15:50.640 that you're using is appropriate. 00:15:50.640 --> 00:15:54.920 Because when you come to audit, you will need to go through that process. 00:15:54.920 --> 00:15:58.360 You will need to meet the challenge of, you know, these questions being asked 00:15:58.360 --> 00:16:00.600 of your organizations and why you've chosen that. 00:16:00.780 --> 00:16:06.300 If you don't have a robust set of evidence behind it, about behind why you've 00:16:06.300 --> 00:16:09.580 made the choices, then there is a high likelihood that, you know, 00:16:09.660 --> 00:16:11.380 you'll need to take some measure afterwards. 00:16:11.540 --> 00:16:16.980 So if you've got good justification, you may well have to take less action to 00:16:16.980 --> 00:16:20.660 sort of get up to the right standard for next year and years after that. 00:16:20.780 --> 00:16:23.580 So the improvement plan will be much reduced, if you will. 00:16:24.419 --> 00:16:32.899 I see. We've been talking about communicate, communication, reporting of incidents, 00:16:33.199 --> 00:16:36.119 of course, to the relevant authorities and the stakeholders. 00:16:36.219 --> 00:16:39.579 But what kind of channels would you use? 00:16:39.659 --> 00:16:44.819 Because I do believe it's not secure enough and not sufficient to just send 00:16:44.819 --> 00:16:47.119 an email. Hey, guys, look at this. Something happened. 00:16:48.459 --> 00:16:52.979 Yeah, absolutely. So in these types of incidents, especially in a cybersecurity 00:16:52.979 --> 00:16:55.579 incident where the systems you 00:16:55.579 --> 00:16:58.639 use to actually send those emails may be compromised in and of themselves, 00:16:58.999 --> 00:17:05.939 there is a balance between sort of using the systems that are breached and some 00:17:05.939 --> 00:17:07.799 other out-of-band method, like 00:17:07.799 --> 00:17:11.879 a telephone call or an SMS or a reporting platform or something similar. 00:17:11.879 --> 00:17:17.699 So some nations, for instance, will have direct report that you can do through 00:17:17.699 --> 00:17:18.659 a website, for instance. 00:17:18.979 --> 00:17:24.299 Those are methods that are often used. If you are in a market that is heavily 00:17:24.299 --> 00:17:31.679 regulated already, you will often have a contact or a representative or an agency, if you will, 00:17:31.699 --> 00:17:38.959 or a TCT in the sort of the Tiber terms that you would make contact with. 00:17:39.019 --> 00:17:40.779 So you would have a familiar contact normally. 00:17:41.879 --> 00:17:46.179 Typically, they would be a first point or a local law enforcement agency if it's relevant as well. 00:17:47.719 --> 00:17:55.759 That's a tricky one with the balance of sort of when and where you are allowed 00:17:55.759 --> 00:17:56.639 to do that in some regions. 00:17:56.799 --> 00:17:59.519 But I won't go too far into that because there be dragons. 00:18:02.579 --> 00:18:06.739 Plus, we're just trying to provide here a high-level summary for the audience 00:18:06.739 --> 00:18:12.579 that they can start thinking about. But where may they be a weakness not to 00:18:12.579 --> 00:18:14.619 be found in your first audit? 00:18:14.799 --> 00:18:19.519 Because that's what everybody wants to avoid. And that's why we are here and talking today. 00:18:20.979 --> 00:18:25.559 I would like to go a little bit over to the topic of third-party risk management. 00:18:25.779 --> 00:18:32.339 You've been already talking about adjusting the contract with vendors here. 00:18:35.679 --> 00:18:41.819 I'm pretty confident everybody now has already the class, the, the, the, the, um, 00:18:42.864 --> 00:18:49.104 the required criteria in their evaluation, 00:18:49.584 --> 00:18:57.884 third-party ICT providers, and so on and so forth, how would you proceed with existing vendors, 00:18:58.904 --> 00:19:05.484 that may be a little bit late to come by or promise something and didn't deliver 00:19:05.484 --> 00:19:11.184 yet because that's a problem for you and not necessarily for them? Absolutely. 00:19:12.504 --> 00:19:16.764 So there is guidance to say that you need to have good termination procedures 00:19:16.764 --> 00:19:18.044 in place as well, for instance. 00:19:18.284 --> 00:19:23.904 So the ability to terminate contracts with the sort of supply chain or with 00:19:23.904 --> 00:19:28.004 third parties when they are shown to not be complying. 00:19:28.204 --> 00:19:31.284 And I think that's a you need to be able to pull that plug and have a process 00:19:31.284 --> 00:19:34.324 for it and be resilient against the impact that that might have. 00:19:34.324 --> 00:19:39.404 And I think that's especially seen for managed service providers or managed 00:19:39.404 --> 00:19:43.784 security service providers, especially in the ICT realm, which is a common practice. 00:19:44.204 --> 00:19:49.324 Outsourced IT, outsourced security operations center or outsourced endpoint 00:19:49.324 --> 00:19:54.864 detection and response are all things that you may have to terminate them and 00:19:54.864 --> 00:19:58.284 the agreement with them if they're unable to provide sufficient improvement 00:19:58.284 --> 00:19:59.524 or documentation or evidence. 00:20:01.304 --> 00:20:06.304 Of course, you should have by now at least looked and adjusted the contract 00:20:06.304 --> 00:20:08.264 and service level agreements. 00:20:08.884 --> 00:20:14.344 Do you think there is a minimum of clauses you must put in this contract with 00:20:14.344 --> 00:20:18.104 third parties to align with DORA? Absolutely. 00:20:18.684 --> 00:20:23.584 So their ability to share their own security process with you, i.e. 00:20:23.624 --> 00:20:28.044 Their vulnerability management, their own sort of incident response procedures, 00:20:28.384 --> 00:20:31.704 and sort of what the expected SLAs around those are, so that they are communicating 00:20:31.704 --> 00:20:36.024 to you if they present a risk to you. And I think that's one of the core elements. 00:20:36.704 --> 00:20:42.464 In terms of the other pieces, so contractually speaking, you mentioned that 00:20:42.464 --> 00:20:47.084 they've, sorry, contractually speaking, you know, these things are negotiated already. 00:20:49.515 --> 00:20:53.615 At that point, it's data management, I think, and it's handling of your data 00:20:53.615 --> 00:20:56.795 and segregation of your data and evidence of that would be another key component as well. 00:20:56.935 --> 00:21:00.735 How do they deal with your data in relation and how do they protect that data? 00:21:01.155 --> 00:21:05.875 So I've seen in a number of examples, for instance, large service providers 00:21:05.875 --> 00:21:08.895 are now providing that level of attestation to their clients, 00:21:08.975 --> 00:21:11.955 for instance, and that's part of the negotiations that are ongoing for them. 00:21:14.155 --> 00:21:25.015 Let us go a little bit into the ICT tools and systems, the integrity, system integrity. 00:21:25.375 --> 00:21:30.635 Everybody needs to ask themselves, are my current systems resilient enough to 00:21:30.635 --> 00:21:34.935 withstand operational disruptions as outlined in DORA? 00:21:34.935 --> 00:21:43.275 But what would that mean for me as a maybe smaller startup fintech here? 00:21:44.575 --> 00:21:53.235 Yeah, absolutely. So I think as a smaller organization, the cost overhead of 00:21:53.235 --> 00:21:56.015 compliance and being able to show compliance, 00:21:56.135 --> 00:22:00.095 build the process is a big consideration for them. 00:22:00.095 --> 00:22:05.855 Equally, the nature of a startup or a scale-up is that they are dynamic organizations. 00:22:05.895 --> 00:22:10.755 They need to be able to adapt and respond, and they are the guerrilla fighters, 00:22:10.875 --> 00:22:15.235 if you will, of the business world. 00:22:15.395 --> 00:22:18.175 And that's one of the things that makes this quite tricky is because you're 00:22:18.175 --> 00:22:24.795 asking them to build a rigid structure and to do things that may prevent some 00:22:24.795 --> 00:22:30.175 level of innovation. And I think that's part of the pushback that some organizations have said. 00:22:31.235 --> 00:22:35.695 Cost is kind of probably going to come first for a lot and then complexity afterward, 00:22:35.695 --> 00:22:39.555 I would say, for the implementation and the challenges for them. 00:22:42.355 --> 00:22:46.955 You're talking about rigid systems, dynamic startups here. 00:22:47.155 --> 00:22:54.895 I was wondering, do you have seen any good solutions, any good systems? 00:22:54.895 --> 00:22:58.915 How do startups do work with backup and recovery? 00:22:59.115 --> 00:23:04.675 Because they tend to change a lot of what they're doing and how they're doing this. 00:23:04.835 --> 00:23:10.975 And their backup and recovery needs to adjust. So how do they keep pace with 00:23:10.975 --> 00:23:13.555 their current development in terms of backup and recovery? 00:23:14.215 --> 00:23:22.395 That's a really interesting question. And one that I think the hard part is 00:23:22.395 --> 00:23:27.355 to design a system when you are a small organization and have the scale that 00:23:27.355 --> 00:23:29.955 you will reach in mind and understand how to build for that scale. 00:23:30.435 --> 00:23:36.175 And for backup and recovery, the system that applies to a smaller company with 00:23:36.175 --> 00:23:40.095 five people, for instance, to one that has a thousand people or anywhere in 00:23:40.095 --> 00:23:42.095 between, it's tricky to get that scaling right. 00:23:43.295 --> 00:23:45.835 What you need to be able to do is build the. 00:23:47.465 --> 00:23:50.205 Build the backup scalability and the 00:23:50.205 --> 00:23:53.085 recovery scalability into every machine in 00:23:53.085 --> 00:23:55.825 a granular way so this is where a lot of organizations are turning 00:23:55.825 --> 00:23:59.965 to things like SaaS platforms that offer that backup and retention dynamically 00:23:59.965 --> 00:24:03.125 without them really doing any sort of thought there are 00:24:03.125 --> 00:24:06.965 some pitfalls to that approach you're outsourcing the risk to another vendor 00:24:06.965 --> 00:24:15.605 rather than sort of doing the full process yourself for instance if you so finding 00:24:15.605 --> 00:24:21.265 a good place to retain the original backups is a good start. 00:24:21.805 --> 00:24:26.705 Looking at how you can backport new iterations of systems or new generations 00:24:26.705 --> 00:24:29.025 of architecture into that is a key component. 00:24:29.545 --> 00:24:32.525 Things like immutability, for instance, are another element that people often 00:24:32.525 --> 00:24:35.905 think about and talk about is whether or not those backups can be changed. 00:24:37.985 --> 00:24:43.825 The regular review of what you are doing as part of that backup and generational 00:24:43.825 --> 00:24:50.805 changes and the transformation journey are – it's very difficult. 00:24:50.965 --> 00:24:53.225 You have to track it over its lifespan, if that makes sense. 00:24:53.305 --> 00:24:57.305 So you have to kind of understand those systems as they evolve and start to plan forward. 00:24:58.585 --> 00:25:04.165 Spelled out in every aspect. And I do believe after the first audits, 00:25:04.165 --> 00:25:06.545 there will be some issues coming up. 00:25:06.665 --> 00:25:13.385 People will discuss it on events. And over time, it will be an established enforcement. 00:25:13.825 --> 00:25:18.385 As well as rules and guidance people can adhere to. 00:25:18.525 --> 00:25:22.445 But right now we do have a little bit of wiggle room in some areas. 00:25:22.445 --> 00:25:26.425 And that's why we try to cover as much space as we're doing here. 00:25:28.085 --> 00:25:32.885 Talking about monitoring and testing, especially penetration testing, 00:25:32.885 --> 00:25:34.005 you've been talking about. 00:25:34.165 --> 00:25:41.185 I do know there is some guidance here in Germany, especially from BSI and other associations. 00:25:42.165 --> 00:25:48.585 What kind of standards and certifications would you use and recommend for your clients to do that? 00:25:49.385 --> 00:25:57.245 Yeah, it's an interesting one. So under the Tiber standard that's been across 00:25:57.245 --> 00:25:59.025 EU for some time now for a number of years, 00:25:59.325 --> 00:26:03.965 there were originally some guidelines around qualifications that organizations 00:26:03.965 --> 00:26:09.965 and the team members within them would have to have to conduct tests under the Tiber framework. 00:26:09.965 --> 00:26:14.245 But actually those are not enforced anymore. 00:26:14.565 --> 00:26:18.545 And there's a bit of a gap there. Although a lot of the organizations will still 00:26:18.545 --> 00:26:23.225 refer to them as the kind of the standard that is expected. 00:26:24.996 --> 00:26:30.376 What i would tend to advise is look for organizations that have individuals tested, 00:26:31.476 --> 00:26:37.016 tested and accredited as well as the organization itself to a recognized industry standard level, 00:26:37.636 --> 00:26:45.536 so for instance for the tlpt or the similar standards threat-led pen test under 00:26:45.536 --> 00:26:50.736 dora or essentially advanced testing or advanced red teaming intelligence-led red teaming. 00:26:52.716 --> 00:26:56.076 The typical standard is something like a sort 00:26:56.076 --> 00:27:00.396 of a crest certification like a cc sam or a cc sas for operators and managers 00:27:00.396 --> 00:27:03.836 you're looking at something that has a bit of a history and a legacy for instance 00:27:03.836 --> 00:27:09.136 other other similar standards exist as well and there's a lot of emergent organizations 00:27:09.136 --> 00:27:15.236 now that are bringing really good forward thinking standards to the to the fore, 00:27:16.216 --> 00:27:19.996 um i would also expect organizations to 00:27:19.996 --> 00:27:23.116 perform due diligence tech and so would so would uh so and 00:27:23.116 --> 00:27:25.936 that's what the standard advise is so looking at the 00:27:25.936 --> 00:27:28.876 individuals who are conducting testing whether it's advanced or 00:27:28.876 --> 00:27:34.636 basic if you will um and their experience and capability so sort of five years 00:27:34.636 --> 00:27:39.156 of experience testing against financial services organizations for a uh an experienced 00:27:39.156 --> 00:27:43.296 red team operator is considered uh to be the appropriate amount to amount to 00:27:43.296 --> 00:27:46.536 conduct tlpt or timer in these instances. 00:27:48.357 --> 00:27:53.317 Need to validate those and sort of do those checks. 00:27:53.517 --> 00:27:58.837 Again, understand the justification for it, and the best approach and the approach 00:27:58.837 --> 00:28:03.277 that I've seen most welcomed is to talk to your authority, your regulator, if you will, 00:28:03.737 --> 00:28:06.877 and sort of run your approach past and say, we've checked these, 00:28:07.077 --> 00:28:10.717 do these meet your standard, are there any other standards that you would like us to meet? 00:28:12.257 --> 00:28:18.577 So again, no fixed qualifications at this moment in time, but look for accredited, credible, 00:28:18.877 --> 00:28:22.737 longstanding institutions, if you're in any doubt, and do the due diligence 00:28:22.737 --> 00:28:27.257 on the individual testers themselves that will be performing work on your ICT 00:28:27.257 --> 00:28:28.977 systems, critical, important functions. 00:28:29.637 --> 00:28:31.357 And that's kind of the right approach. 00:28:34.537 --> 00:28:40.157 I do believe something very similar would be required for the resilient testing, 00:28:40.337 --> 00:28:44.717 except level of testing to demonstrate digital operation resilience. 00:28:46.057 --> 00:28:50.937 I would be a little bit more interested in threat intelligence. 00:28:50.937 --> 00:28:56.257 You already talked about real time threat intelligence. How is the best practice 00:28:56.257 --> 00:28:59.837 to integrate that as far as you've seen? 00:29:00.857 --> 00:29:05.717 It's a really interesting um concept so 00:29:05.717 --> 00:29:08.777 the threat intelligence plays 00:29:08.777 --> 00:29:13.857 an important part in understanding how to design against threats to your resiliency 00:29:13.857 --> 00:29:19.277 so having a constant feed and knowing the types of organizations that or or 00:29:19.277 --> 00:29:24.017 threat actors or groups that might be targeting your your organization or one 00:29:24.017 --> 00:29:27.837 similar to you on a continuous basis is really really important, 00:29:28.377 --> 00:29:32.017 That helps you design against them, if you will. The. 00:29:35.772 --> 00:29:39.112 There is a difference between sort of continuous threat intelligence and that 00:29:39.112 --> 00:29:45.292 element, as well as something that might be a standalone report or a point in time assessment. 00:29:46.432 --> 00:29:52.032 You need to have continuous feeds of what's directly interacting with your systems. 00:29:52.132 --> 00:29:55.652 For instance, that's what a lot of threat intelligence providers will now do. 00:29:55.812 --> 00:29:58.932 So they'll be looking at who's actually actively scanning your networks. 00:29:59.112 --> 00:30:00.392 What can that be attributed to? 00:30:01.752 --> 00:30:04.672 Likewise organizations that are able to sort of 00:30:04.672 --> 00:30:07.552 get into the sort of the dark recesses of 00:30:07.552 --> 00:30:10.532 the internet deep web dark web those types of things and 00:30:10.532 --> 00:30:13.512 look for evidence of threat actors 00:30:13.512 --> 00:30:17.872 targeting your organization and then there's also things like sort of nation 00:30:17.872 --> 00:30:21.972 state or nation state linked groups that might be targeting you for strategic 00:30:21.972 --> 00:30:27.632 advantage for instance a lot of financial sector organizations will be targeted 00:30:27.632 --> 00:30:30.892 because they're prime targets for nation state level groups. 00:30:31.572 --> 00:30:35.912 So having the feed and the understanding of what's going on on that side of 00:30:35.912 --> 00:30:39.432 things, who they might be, what they might be targeting, have they made some 00:30:39.432 --> 00:30:43.352 kind of public announcement, or have they affected similar organizations is 00:30:43.352 --> 00:30:44.052 really, really important. 00:30:45.432 --> 00:30:48.332 Equally, that information source, that threat intelligence source could be a 00:30:48.332 --> 00:30:52.872 platform or a vendor or a threat intelligence team you have yourself or threat 00:30:52.872 --> 00:30:56.532 intelligence capability you have of your own or it could be your peers in the 00:30:56.532 --> 00:31:01.452 market it could be the other financial institutions or similar types of institutions 00:31:01.452 --> 00:31:04.232 or the ICT institutions that provide services into them, 00:31:05.092 --> 00:31:09.332 is sharing information. And that's another core core tenet of this is actually 00:31:09.332 --> 00:31:15.092 sharing that information about near misses, incidents, events between the different 00:31:15.092 --> 00:31:18.712 parts of the ecosystem is another source of really valuable threat intelligence. 00:31:18.952 --> 00:31:23.072 And there needs to be a good way to share that in a private way and not expose 00:31:23.072 --> 00:31:27.272 each other's vulnerabilities and issues for competitive advantage, for instance. 00:31:27.832 --> 00:31:31.032 That sounds like a lot of lunch appointments you're recommending 00:31:31.032 --> 00:31:34.132 here yeah i 00:31:34.132 --> 00:31:36.852 think uh i think uh everyone's waistlines would have increased i think 00:31:36.852 --> 00:31:40.772 that's the side effect of uh of this i see 00:31:40.772 --> 00:31:44.012 we'll be back with policies and procedures after 00:31:44.012 --> 00:31:52.992 a little break for our sponsor okay 00:31:52.992 --> 00:31:59.072 we are back here with giles um we are still talking about dora giving you a 00:31:59.072 --> 00:32:04.272 high-level overview here of steps you should and could have taken. 00:32:05.012 --> 00:32:10.392 As we said, it's not really yet enforced. It's not yet audited. 00:32:10.592 --> 00:32:15.972 That's why we give you a very broad, very high-level overview of the steps. 00:32:16.172 --> 00:32:21.752 We would take questions we would ask. Therefore, you could go through and start 00:32:21.752 --> 00:32:24.592 thinking, hmm, did I miss something? Is everything in there? 00:32:24.592 --> 00:32:29.172 I will also link for the German authorities here. 00:32:29.332 --> 00:32:38.652 They have some guidelines for the enforcement of, have some guidelines for DORA. 00:32:38.972 --> 00:32:45.872 I'll link it here in the show notes. Unfortunately, it is not in English. 00:32:46.112 --> 00:32:50.572 Nonetheless, let's talk a little bit about policy and staff training because 00:32:50.572 --> 00:32:53.472 one kind of reinforces the others. 00:32:55.132 --> 00:33:02.632 We assume you currently have policies for operational resilience reviewed, 00:33:02.912 --> 00:33:11.252 but how often, how frequently do you need to adopt them to evolve in order to keep current? 00:33:11.572 --> 00:33:16.472 The world changes rapidly. So all the time is the optimal answer, 00:33:16.632 --> 00:33:20.812 but possibly also equally not the realistic one. So as a minimum, 00:33:21.032 --> 00:33:24.572 you'd need to be sort of annually reviewing as an absolute minimum. 00:33:24.792 --> 00:33:29.732 But if you're undergoing major change as a business, you're taking on new initiatives 00:33:29.732 --> 00:33:33.592 or you've acquired, say, for instance, mergers and acquisitions are a thing 00:33:33.592 --> 00:33:34.752 that happens all the time. 00:33:35.292 --> 00:33:39.612 Perhaps you've got an influx of new people in the team. 00:33:40.692 --> 00:33:43.832 When there's a major event like that, then you need to start building that in. 00:33:43.832 --> 00:33:47.492 Much like if you were building a new product or developing something new, 00:33:47.592 --> 00:33:49.852 you'd want to test that when there's a major update to it. 00:33:50.652 --> 00:33:54.452 You'd do the same for your business and its people and your culture to make 00:33:54.452 --> 00:34:00.272 sure that that is well understood, adopted, part of the onboarding process, if you will. 00:34:00.732 --> 00:34:02.932 So, yeah, major changes and at least annually. 00:34:03.697 --> 00:34:07.517 Yeah, and staff training should take place on a regular basis. 00:34:07.957 --> 00:34:13.917 I vividly remember that I had a few years ago a company here in the interview 00:34:13.917 --> 00:34:16.197 that offered this kind of testing. 00:34:16.377 --> 00:34:19.397 They just sent out mails and looked who clicked on the links. 00:34:19.517 --> 00:34:24.497 And I remember the answer, most clicks came from top management, 00:34:24.737 --> 00:34:26.737 but they are also the fastest ones to learn. 00:34:30.277 --> 00:34:36.837 I think there'll be a lot of required trainings and don't make it like a boring 00:34:36.837 --> 00:34:39.617 online presentation, a YouTube video or something like that. 00:34:40.037 --> 00:34:45.137 Make it interactive. That usually helps a lot more, especially I can tell from 00:34:45.137 --> 00:34:51.417 my past, especially if you get your staff, a group of people together, 00:34:51.657 --> 00:34:56.477 try to do the penetration testing themselves or at least give some ideas. 00:34:56.737 --> 00:35:03.117 It's really interesting how dark some people's thoughts can get here. 00:35:07.217 --> 00:35:10.897 Talking a little bit about cross-border compliance. 00:35:14.717 --> 00:35:19.377 Assuming you're a little bit bigger company, but even in financial services, 00:35:19.437 --> 00:35:23.657 if you have a few hundred employees, you're not really necessarily that big, 00:35:23.837 --> 00:35:30.997 but you can have operations in multiple EU countries or outside of EU countries. 00:35:31.217 --> 00:35:33.437 How does DORA apply there? 00:35:34.877 --> 00:35:38.157 That's a it's an interesting um dilemma for 00:35:38.157 --> 00:35:40.957 a lot of organizations so we uh have had the privilege 00:35:40.957 --> 00:35:44.597 of working with global organizations that are facing this same challenge so 00:35:44.597 --> 00:35:47.957 it may be that for instance um you 00:35:47.957 --> 00:35:51.897 face the challenge of multiple regulatory compliance 00:35:51.897 --> 00:35:56.217 so it could be different regions you have to comply to and a common practice 00:35:56.217 --> 00:35:58.777 for a lot of organizations when they start to get a bit larger or a bit more 00:35:58.777 --> 00:36:03.157 global in this side uh is to look at the most stringent requirement and try 00:36:03.157 --> 00:36:07.197 and comply to that or try and go for the kind of the path of most resistance 00:36:07.197 --> 00:36:10.677 where it comes to the compliance journey. And that's a typical approach. 00:36:11.917 --> 00:36:12.817 If you are. 00:36:15.157 --> 00:36:19.797 Sort of taking kind of taking this as a fairly sweeping legislation as it is 00:36:19.797 --> 00:36:24.757 and with lots of lots of kind of enforcement power, it's likely that this legislation 00:36:24.757 --> 00:36:27.257 will probably be the most stringent standard that you face. 00:36:29.297 --> 00:36:34.837 Targeting DORA and the ACT and the various articles underneath as the primary 00:36:34.837 --> 00:36:36.677 component is probably the most sensible approach. 00:36:38.357 --> 00:36:42.197 There are other standards of a similar nature, but I would suggest that this 00:36:42.197 --> 00:36:46.857 is probably the most complex for a lot of organizations to undertake and target 00:36:46.857 --> 00:36:48.117 this first in this instance. 00:36:50.057 --> 00:36:55.777 Data localization. Of course, Because it's always preferable to have the data 00:36:55.777 --> 00:37:00.537 within the country where you're regulated, where you're located. 00:37:01.797 --> 00:37:05.157 Are there specific requirements to store the data, for example, 00:37:05.317 --> 00:37:08.217 within the European Union to ensure compliance? 00:37:09.252 --> 00:37:14.972 Absolutely. So the data itself, much like some of the kind of the elements around 00:37:14.972 --> 00:37:19.152 sort of GDPR and what that brought in for a lot of global sort of companies, if you will, 00:37:19.572 --> 00:37:24.792 having that data where it is relevant stored in the European Union is the right 00:37:24.792 --> 00:37:25.652 approach in this instance. 00:37:25.652 --> 00:37:30.452 And so it should be residing there and you should be able to sort of see, 00:37:30.612 --> 00:37:33.172 as we say in the UK, farm to plate. 00:37:33.392 --> 00:37:38.772 So when you have a meal and maybe you have meat or whatever it might be, 00:37:38.972 --> 00:37:42.452 you know where that data has been held throughout its lifecycle. 00:37:43.032 --> 00:37:48.132 So being able to trace that back and make sure that you understand its location 00:37:48.132 --> 00:37:52.152 in full and that your suppliers are able to give you that information as a key component to that. 00:37:52.292 --> 00:37:55.072 So that goes downstream as well as for yourself, if you see what I mean. 00:37:55.072 --> 00:37:59.852 So cloud providers, for instance, often will allow you to put your data in specific 00:37:59.852 --> 00:38:01.652 regions if that's the way that you operate. 00:38:01.852 --> 00:38:04.292 So that's the right approach in this instance. 00:38:04.512 --> 00:38:12.392 If you are consuming services, SaaS services, or web-based products, by the way of putting it, 00:38:13.112 --> 00:38:17.712 that are based in other regions, that's a good reason and a good time to do 00:38:17.712 --> 00:38:21.572 a review and understand whether or not they're compliant to this legislation. 00:38:22.872 --> 00:38:30.452 I see. The last topic that I have here is pretty funny because it's areas of uncertainty. 00:38:30.832 --> 00:38:35.972 We've learned throughout this interview, which we're now asking you questions 00:38:35.972 --> 00:38:37.072 for more than 40 minutes, 00:38:37.232 --> 00:38:44.012 that we do have a big area of uncertainty, which kind of is all around Dora 00:38:44.012 --> 00:38:46.932 because it's not enforced yet. There are some guidelines. 00:38:47.132 --> 00:38:50.432 There will be some incidents. There will be some learnings. There will be a 00:38:50.432 --> 00:38:57.712 lot of lunches we've learned. And over time, this will disappear. 00:38:57.712 --> 00:39:01.312 But right now, we're trying to help you a little bit here. 00:39:01.612 --> 00:39:07.632 Where would you say the implementation guidelines are still ambiguous? 00:39:10.932 --> 00:39:15.732 How or where are they for you? And how would you seek clarification? 00:39:17.212 --> 00:39:21.032 That's a really interesting topic for a lot of organizations at the moment. 00:39:21.032 --> 00:39:26.592 So, for instance, things like the RTSs themselves are due to be published fairly soon. 00:39:26.692 --> 00:39:29.092 I think that's around March time that we're looking to see those. 00:39:30.752 --> 00:39:34.952 And there are still quite a few big question marks around things like a lot 00:39:34.952 --> 00:39:37.432 of organizations are interested in pooled testing, for instance, 00:39:37.672 --> 00:39:42.732 and the kind of the role of service providers that a lot of organizations will use for. 00:39:44.046 --> 00:39:49.646 There are still, dare I say it, quite a few question marks, lacks of answers, 00:39:49.826 --> 00:39:54.266 even from sort of the kind of the top down, the authorities themselves about 00:39:54.266 --> 00:39:55.386 sort of how that will play out. 00:39:55.666 --> 00:40:00.806 And that shows the complexity of this and what's trying to be achieved. 00:40:01.046 --> 00:40:05.766 So it's trying to tie organizations together to get them to communicate and 00:40:05.766 --> 00:40:10.006 to be able to share that data in a collaborative way. But the reality of that 00:40:10.006 --> 00:40:11.066 is very difficult to implement. 00:40:11.906 --> 00:40:15.446 Sorry, could you remind me of the question again? Yeah, sure. 00:40:18.006 --> 00:40:23.466 We've been talking about unclear guidelines and how you would seek clarification for them. 00:40:23.986 --> 00:40:29.186 Yeah, absolutely. So in terms of the way that you would be able to seek guidance for such a thing, 00:40:29.406 --> 00:40:36.306 speaking to the authority that you have in your region or when that's assigned 00:40:36.306 --> 00:40:40.326 and sort of getting the guidance directly from them is definitely a good thing to do. 00:40:40.326 --> 00:40:42.426 So being communicative, almost 00:40:42.426 --> 00:40:46.526 over-communicative, and asking those questions is the right approach. 00:40:46.626 --> 00:40:50.746 And it's been something that's worked for sort of organizations trying to get 00:40:50.746 --> 00:40:53.506 themselves ready for Tiber testing in years past, for instance. 00:40:54.666 --> 00:40:58.526 Talking, asking the question of your authority once they've been enshrined, 00:40:58.686 --> 00:41:03.026 hopefully in March, will be the right way to make sure that you've got the right 00:41:03.026 --> 00:41:06.006 information and the right point of contact, if that makes sense, 00:41:06.086 --> 00:41:09.006 or the right structure and the right approach. 00:41:10.566 --> 00:41:19.826 For what level of compliance would you aim usually you should aim for good enough to pass, 00:41:20.846 --> 00:41:29.566 an audit you should also take the opportunity to look a little bit through the 00:41:29.566 --> 00:41:31.746 cyber security of your organization, 00:41:32.086 --> 00:41:40.346 what kind of level would you recommend for your clients to implement in order 00:41:40.346 --> 00:41:44.346 to not really get in any big trouble? 00:41:44.566 --> 00:41:48.086 Do everything as best as you can, ask as many questions as you can, 00:41:48.226 --> 00:41:50.806 and then you should be at least okay? 00:41:51.186 --> 00:41:55.766 Well, it is possible to ask too many questions and to force yourself down a 00:41:55.766 --> 00:42:00.226 path that's too complex. So I would start with the questions to understand the 00:42:00.226 --> 00:42:03.726 size of that delta to start with. 00:42:05.206 --> 00:42:06.406 In terms of the. 00:42:08.343 --> 00:42:11.383 Do the best that you can approach um i think 00:42:11.383 --> 00:42:14.163 it's difficult to go wrong but that you 00:42:14.163 --> 00:42:17.483 know the reality the commercial reality of that can be can be quite challenging 00:42:17.483 --> 00:42:20.243 um it could cost quite a lot to be 00:42:20.243 --> 00:42:23.123 able to do the best you can and you may not get business support for it or investment 00:42:23.123 --> 00:42:28.963 or funding whatever it might be so the minimum level is probably the realistic 00:42:28.963 --> 00:42:33.683 level for a lot of organizations in this instance um but have a plan a plan 00:42:33.683 --> 00:42:39.023 rather to improve beyond that point and a structured set of goals that you want to exceed that. 00:42:39.243 --> 00:42:42.703 Start with that minimal and work your way up. And in continuous improvement 00:42:42.703 --> 00:42:46.003 and showing that continuous improvement in your approach, your thinking, 00:42:46.323 --> 00:42:50.463 your documentation and the process and building that out over time is the right 00:42:50.463 --> 00:42:52.263 way to stay ahead of that curve. 00:42:52.423 --> 00:42:55.443 If you treat this as point in time, I'm good for now. 00:42:56.003 --> 00:42:59.683 Nothing changes, that the world changes around you. You will find that there 00:42:59.683 --> 00:43:02.063 is a compliance gap 12 months, 18 months, 00:43:02.383 --> 00:43:06.403 24 months away so make sure that you are hitting 00:43:06.403 --> 00:43:09.163 that minimum at least to start with as much as possible and then 00:43:09.163 --> 00:43:11.783 planning forward to try and get better over time and i 00:43:11.783 --> 00:43:14.603 think that's what this is trying to encourage i was aiming for 00:43:14.603 --> 00:43:19.203 the continuous improvement as well as i've seen a lot of consulting projects 00:43:19.203 --> 00:43:24.323 in the past they they really blow up they they became much much bigger than 00:43:24.323 --> 00:43:32.763 you would expect and that's what you've been referring to with the exploding costs so um Basically, 00:43:33.043 --> 00:43:38.343 you should aim at a level where you feel secure that you've done enough. 00:43:38.503 --> 00:43:41.743 And as you said, you can ask too many questions. 00:43:43.463 --> 00:43:49.663 And guys, keep in mind, this is not a regulatory or legal advice here. 00:43:49.943 --> 00:43:54.263 That is just a place to start doing your own homework. 00:43:56.403 --> 00:44:01.043 Josh, I do believe I bothered you with a lot of questions here. 00:44:01.823 --> 00:44:07.623 We talked a lot of high-level stuff, and I do believe some people listening 00:44:07.623 --> 00:44:12.863 to this really got some value added out of it because they have now some areas 00:44:12.863 --> 00:44:18.643 where they can think and rethink their approach to DORA. Thank you very much. Thank you. 00:44:24.523 --> 00:44:34.143 That's all folks. Find more news, streams, events, and interviews at www.startuprad.io. 00:44:34.563 --> 00:44:36.643 Remember, sharing is caring. 00:44:37.360 --> 00:44:50.175 Music.