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Ian Bremmer on Navigating a Fragmenting World · Columbia Energy Exchange

• 0:00
  Ian Bremmer:
• 0:01
  I think one of the long-term implications of the Iran war is that the GCC is increasingly not fit for purpose. The Emiratis will tell you that in a time of war, this is when you really know who your friends are. Number one for them in this environment has been Israel. Saudis, it's a very different story. It's Pakistan, it's Egypt, it's Turkey. I think that becomes bigger, not smaller after this war is over or as it comes to a pause. So the changing geopolitics in the Middle East, a very, very significant takeaway here.
• 0:02
  Bill Loveless:
• 0:03
  The global order that shaped the past several decades is giving way to a more fragmented and uncertain world. Longstanding alliances are under strain. Economic integration is giving way to competition and geopolitical risk is once again, a central driver of markets and policy. These shifts are not abstract. They are reshaping trade flows, disrupting supply chains, and contributing to volatility in energy markets and the broader economy, affecting everything from fuel prices to the cost of goods.
• 0:04
  So how might great power competition, geopolitical fragmentation, and global instability redefine the international landscape? And what will that mean for policymakers, businesses, and the global energy system? This is Columbia Energy Exchange, a weekly podcast from the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. I'm Bill Loveless.
• 0:05
  Today on the show, Jason Bordoff talks to Ian Bremmer at the Center on Global Energy Policy's Energy Summit 2026 in New York City.
• 0:06
  Ian Bremmer is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, a leading geopolitical risk advisory firm, and GZERO Media, a digital media company providing coverage of international affairs. He's the author of 11 books, including his latest work, The Power of Crisis: How Three Threats and Our Response Will Change the World. Among his many other activities, Ian teaches at Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. Here's Jason and Ian Brummer. I hope you enjoy their conversation.
• 0:07
  Jason Bordoff (02:12):
• 0:08
  Great to have you here, Ian. Professor here at SIPA and founder and president, of course, of Eurasia Group. Tennis Aficionado. Thank you for making time.
• 0:09
  Ian Bremmer (02:22):
• 0:10
  Tennis partner to Jason. Yeah, that's important.
• 0:11
  Jason Bordoff (02:24):
• 0:12
  That's important. Your weekly email is must-reading for lots of people who pay attention to this world. And in your most recent, yesterday, you argue, I think, that the US seems to want a ceasefire. You think it's likely to be extended. And then over the weekend, we saw the US reportedly seizing an Iranian ship. It seems like people are on planes headed to Pakistan now. Can you just give us a sense of where you think we are in this moment? Do the Iranians think they have the upper hand right now?
• 0:13
  Ian Bremmer (02:56):
• 0:14
  So first of all, I enjoyed the first panel. I caught most of it. That was a great kickoff. A lot of wonderful people here. I'm sure everyone understands and appreciates that. So it's nice to be sharing a stage with you. I'm glad I was in town. Look, I don't know if the Iranians think they have the other upper hand, but they're certainly acting like they have a lot of leverage. And the fact that President Trump has had to flip, and one of the biggest flips he's made has not been rhetorical in the last six weeks. It's been going from taking the sanctions off of Iran for export and letting them make a lot more money than they were making to a blockade. And that is a display of willingness to take more economic pain, which he doesn't want to do because he understands that he needs more leverage with the Iranians.
• 0:15
  Not the best look, right? That to me means a lot more than I think I count five times now that he- I mean,
• 0:16
  Jason Bordoff (03:57):
• 0:17
  There was a lot of economic pain before. This is a bit additional because you're basically taking some Iranian oil exports off the market, but trying to target, make sure they feel pain.
• 0:18
  Ian Bremmer (04:05):
• 0:19
  Make sure they feel pain. Again, I mean, their economic environment in terms of ... Well, again, you're the energy guy. I'm not, but I just think that what Trump is doing is trying to have a little more credibility at the table before this second round of Islamabad talks. My understanding as of an hour ago is that Ghalibaf is definitely attending as long as Vance definitely is. So, I don't think there's any question around having a second round. And it's very clear to me that Trump wants to announce a win. He's desperate to announce a win. He wants to get past this.
• 0:20
  Jason Bordoff (04:41):
• 0:21
  So, what does that look like? What does a deal look like, do you think, that allows some ceasefire and resolution?
• 0:22
  Ian Bremmer (04:47):
• 0:23
  Well, he's made it easier in the sense that he has told the Gulf States that the ballistic missile issue is a regional problem and they shouldn't negotiate that. They're not happy about that, but you've taken ballistic missiles off the table, so you don't need to negotiate that. You've taken support for proxies off the table. That wasn't part of the first round, so you don't negotiate that. You need to negotiate…
• 0:24
  Jason Bordoff (05:11):
• 0:25
  Which were two issues. I don't mean to make this a partisan comment, but those were two of the criticisms that led to tearing up the JCPOA in the first place, was it didn't deal with proxies, and it didn't deal with missiles.
• 0:26
  Ian Bremmer (05:20):
• 0:27
  Well yeah, but that was Obama's JCPOA. Trump's will be better, right? Because it's Trump's. I mean, by definition, right? I mean, that's part of the issue here is that if he doesn't have his name on it, it's not okay. It's kind of like Greenland, right? So it needs to have his name on it. I wish that weren't a driver, but it is. And the other challenge is that he has no one to blame here but himself. I mean, Megyn Kelly and others tried to give him Bibi to blame, but there was no way he was going to say, "I got hoodwinked into the war by the Israelis." That was never on. So it's him. It's him. And so what does he need to negotiate? He needs an agreement on the nuclear side, which means the removal of the enriched uranium stockpiles, which both sides seem to be close to agreeing on, and an agreement on no enrichment for a period of time, which both sides are pretty far from as of today.
• 0:28
  (06:19):
• 0:29
  There's a three-page sort of document, an MOU, if you will, that is presently being circulated by the Americans through Pakistan with Iran. It is certainly not a negotiated deal. It is more a statement of principles that they would like to be able to announce, and Trump will say, "We got a deal." I think there's a decent chance that they will be able to do that at the end of, in the middle of Islamabad talks.
• 0:30
  Jason Bordoff (06:47):
• 0:31
  If that's the contours of a deal, how do you think the Israelis feel about a deal like that? And how do the other Gulf players feel about continued ability for an Iranian regime to destabilize the region?
• 0:32
  Ian Bremmer (06:58):
• 0:33
  Well, number one, the Gulf players have ... There's no such thing as the Gulf players. They all have very different individual views. I think one of the long-term implications of the Iran war is that the GCC is increasingly not fit for purpose. I think that the Emiratis and the Saudis will have a much more structural fight. The Emirates will tell you that in a time of war, this is when you really know who your friends are. Number one for them in this environment has been Israel, in the region. The Saudis, it's a very different story. It's Pakistan, it's Egypt, it's Turkey. I think that becomes bigger, not smaller after this war is over or as it comes to a pause. So the changing geopolitics in the Middle East are very, very significant takeaway here. But beyond that, I think that there's a big difference between an announcement of a deal by Trump, which I'm quite confident he'll do that.
• 0:34
  (07:56):
• 0:35
  I mean, I don't know if quite confident, 70%, 90% because we're talking about Trump and he changes his mind frequently, sometimes midstream on a tweet. But I also am quite confident that what he announces will not be what the Iranians think they've agreed to, number one. And that makes it harder to get to yes. Number two, what the Iranians agree to will not necessarily be what the supreme leader, and more importantly, what the IRGC back in Tehran is prepared to implement. Number three, as it takes time to move to implementation, it is not clear that the Israelis will continue to be comfortable with an ongoing ceasefire, specifically on the Lebanon/Hezbollah front. And number four, there are other players in the region. I mean, there are the Gulf States. There's the Houthis that we haven't heard much from. There are militias in Iraq. And it appears that, for example, that the attacks on Saudi, most of them actually came from Iraq as opposed to from Iran.
• 0:36
  (08:58):
• 0:37
  I didn't know that until the last 12 hours. That's surprising to me. So lots of ways that the deal won't hold. And the longer term economic implications of that for the United States and globally are pretty massive, right? Are pretty massive. So this to me, I mean, I think it's easy to say that this is by far the largest foreign policy mistake that Trump has made as president. I think it's easy to say that. And that would be true even if they got a deal that stuck, which I don't think they will. And it's going to crush them in the midterms, but more importantly, it's going to have big long-term implications for America's relations with other countries around the world. It helps the Chinese. It really undermines the Europeans. I mean, just lots and lots of things that we will take away from this crisis.
• 0:38
  Jason Bordoff (09:46):
• 0:39
  And it's a world of continued uncertainty, even if you claim the straight is open, our tanker's going to go through with the risks that they might get stuck there, because this is just going to flip back and forth. You're talking about a kind of highly dynamic, uncertain environment, not a resolution. Everything is back to normal for some significant period of time.
• 0:40
  Ian Bremmer (10:04):
• 0:41
  I mean, it turns out, right? So what I call a GZERO world and started talking about that in 2012 and hoped hope that it wasn't going to move as far in that direction as it has, is that when the United States rejects being the guarantor of collective security for its allies, when it rejects promoting free trade, when it rejects rule of law, and no one else is prepared or capable of responding. I mean, Mark Carney gave a great speech in January, but it's not as if three months later there are a group, a constellation of middle powers that are coordinating to fill the breach of the United States. That is not a thing. That doesn't exist. It turns out that in that environment, a 100 plus trillion-dollar global economy is extremely vulnerable to political actors that wish to disrupt it. And that might be the single biggest implication of GZERO.
• 0:42
  (11:04):
• 0:43
  And the fact that Trump has decided to test that proposition with a war that he believed would be over within days, but so badly misunderstood the Iranian willingness to respond, the Iranian capability to disrupt, and even the resilience of the Iranian military, which there the US military just got that wrong. I mean, what we're seeing presently in their ability to continue with ballistic missile strikes to dig out after strikes have occurred, to re-arm and coordinate with even a week of a ceasefire. I mean, that's not on Trump, that's on the military planners. So there's just a lot here of global vulnerability that was underappreciated in a GZERO environment.
• 0:44
  Jason Bordoff (11:54):
• 0:45
  I want to ask you one other question about Iran, but then I'm going to come to AI. So you mentioned a lot of players we haven't heard much from the Houthis you mentioned. And Dan asked about the future of the trade of Hormuz. We ran out of time, but I think one additional thing one could say about that is maybe it'll be a little less important in the future. If people double down on these bypass routes, I mean the East West pipeline might be the most important piece of oil infrastructure in the world right now, but that only works if you have safety in the Red Sea. So why are they quiet right now?
• 0:46
  Ian Bremmer (12:23):
• 0:47
  Well, my understanding is that there were a lot of Houthi soldiers that started receiving half salaries about two and a half, three weeks ago, and that appears to be from Saudi Arabia. So they're essentially paying protection money to ensure that the Houthis don't hit them. And that seems like a relatively smart thing. Now long term, I don't think it's a safer global order when you're paying off an organization like the Houthis. That doesn't strike me as the foundation of something that you want to see long term. But I mean, for now, a lot more money has to be spent on resilience and that's part of resilience. Part of resilience will be more money on critical infrastructure and hardening targets that weren't thought to be as vulnerable, desalination plants. Part of it will be building infrastructure for other land-based alternatives. The Chinese feel pretty good right now.
• 0:48
  (13:13):
• 0:49
  They have Turkmenistan, they have Power of Siberia. I mean, this is a different environment to think about those investments. I do think the Gulf is going to look also not just geopolitically, but sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf are going to completely change what their long-term priorities are and what they're going to invest in. I mean, I worry, are the Saudis really going to be leaning into AI in the next three years, the way that they were starting to, albeit late. What's going to happen with ... I mean, we saw Liv, the golf. I don't care. I hate golf, but nonetheless, I mean, it's going to be done this year. I think Istanbul is going to be a huge winner, a huge winner. I was with some of their senior officials last week at the IMF World Bank, and I've never seen such a happy group strategically because I mean, people need to get to the Middle East.
• 0:50
  (14:01):
• 0:51
  They need to meet with these people. They've got a real hub, they've got five-star hotels, they've got real tourism, and they're going to lean into that. So these are all big, big resilience plays that are going to happen as a consequence of what you're talking about.
• 0:52
  Jason Bordoff (14:16):
• 0:53
  We were joking, coming back to AI now about bringing questions, generating questions from people, having people collate and collect questions, or the information business that you are in or a research institute and a think tank are in. Is that all completely disrupted by AI? And why do people need to come and listen to you and I have a conversation when you can ask Claude and ChatGPT how to make sense of the world?
• 0:54
  Ian Bremmer (14:41):
• 0:55
  Yeah. Well, I mean, first, there's so much that you are improving the capacity to do higher level work. So I mean, you're doing more human networking and human intelligence connecting and building communications with people and people that have those skill sets become more valuable. One of the big problems for academia and one of the big problems for people with analytic temperaments is a lot of them have overdeveloped their baseline research and underdeveloped their management skills, their people skills, their organizational skills. And yet when you have AI that is really good at researching and analyzing, it's the other skillsets that you really need more of. So I mean, the fact that now anyone has a competent researcher at their fingertips, but only if they know how to manage and organize well. So do you hire a bunch of people that know how to manage and organize well?
• 0:56
  (15:34):
• 0:57
  We have 250 people in my organization. I know that we could use a thousand. I don't have money for a thousand. So for us, AI is not displacing workers. AI is allowing us to actually have more effective labor. It's allowing us to essentially hire staff that we can't afford. And I think there are a lot of people that are in that environment, but there's no question that if you play that out for five years, we have no idea what life looked like, but we just don't know.
• 0:58
  Jason Bordoff (16:00):
• 0:59
  What did you make of the Claude Mythos announcement and visit to the White House and the ability for these frontier models to expose the kind of gaps in our infrastructure that evidently, they can?
• 1:00
  Ian Bremmer (16:13):
• 1:01
  So a couple things. First, when I first saw the Mythos announcement, I thought, well, here would be a good argument for the Defense Production Act. That is not why Anthropic got hit with it. It was actually just an unnecessary fight with one of the least capable members of Trump's cabinet, Pete Hegseth. So that I think is now behind us because the Trump administration understands that these guys are systemically important. I think one of the biggest takeaways will be that even in an environment like the United States today where AI is self-regulating and captures the regulatory process, there is now an understanding that there will need to be some form of serious safety protocol by the government to ensure that it's not just self-reporting. Anthropic was completely self-reported, right? I mean, it was because they saw that they had this incredibly capable, extremely dangerous model, and there was nothing legally stopping them from just putting it out there.
• 1:02
  (17:19):
• 1:03
  Now, they probably would've had massive numbers of lawsuits and liability as a consequence of the knock-on effects of that. So I think that any organization, even one potentially badly oriented inside the US would've ended up doing the same thing if they knew what they had, but this is going to be driven by government. Powell, Bessent understand the systemic danger here. And so I think we're going to have a very different regulatory environment on that issue for AI very soon. But what does that mean for other governments, for other countries whose companies right now are not a part of the initial 40? What does it mean for countries that don't trust the United States? That are trying to hedge? What does it mean for Mark Carney who's saying that the US relationship is a vulnerability? What does it mean for the Europeans who don't think they can rely on the transatlantic relationship when the United States, through its AI companies, own the future of their security. Not about NATO, own the future of their security, anything with software on it.
• 1:04
  (18:22):
• 1:05
  And I think the answer is they're in trouble, right? I don't think they have any choice, but American foundational models with the US government and then try to find a way somewhere else in the stack to have some form of safeguard for their data and the rest. But this is an enormously uncomfortable position, could not happen at a worse time for a lot of these other countries.
• 1:06
  Jason Bordoff (18:43):
• 1:07
  And the AI revolution at an energy conference will often be talked about both for what AI can do to help the energy system as a tool, but also how much energy it takes. We see the backlash on affordability and domestic electricity price issues. Maine just banned new data centers while it studies that. But when you look from a global standpoint at how different countries and regions are approaching this extraordinary tool and innovation, you mentioned the Saudis before, will they lean in as much? I'm curious the different approaches and what that might mean for the geopolitical world that we're in right now.
• 1:08
  Ian Bremmer (19:15):
• 1:09
  Well, I think the right approach is building capabilities that are relevant and unique to individual countries. I got a note this morning from my friend, the Norwegian prime minister, who's on a plane up to see the biggest new data center being built, he thinks, in Europe, in the Arctic Circle, it's incredibly cheap energy. Microsoft's going to be the principal customer for it. This is something that Norwegians can do. It will be safe. It will be stable. It will have reliability. That's the right thing for them to lean into. In some countries, it'll be unique data sets that are very relevant and that will give them leverage. In some, it will be sectoral capabilities and networks of clients, of people, of individuals, of scientists that they will use for AI applications. It is not sovereign AI LLM models, in my view. I think that one of two things will happen.
• 1:10
  (20:09):
• 1:11
  Either it'll continue to be winner take most. And so a relatively small number of companies in the US and China will just continue to blaze past anyone that tries and you're going to be spending a lot of money to be farther and farther back, or it's going to become commoditized. Those models will be too expensive, but good enough will be good enough. Then you will have spent a lot of money to catch up on something that becomes essentially free and that's not the value add.
• 1:12
  Jason Bordoff (20:34):
• 1:13
  But that discussion we had on the last panel about people feeling more concerned about integration into a global economy, dependence on these global players, the idea that countries are just going to want to pursue their own AI strategies and control their own technology,
• 1:14
  Ian Bremmer (20:47):
• 1:15
  That's just
• 1:16
  Jason Bordoff (20:47):
• 1:17
  Not-
• 1:18
  Ian Bremmer (20:48):
• 1:19
  If you're talking about the entire stack, that seems completely ... It's a myth.
• 1:20
  Jason Bordoff (20:52):
• 1:21
  Yeah.
• 1:22
  Ian Bremmer (20:52):
• 1:23
  Yeah. It's not happening.
• 1:24
  Jason Bordoff (20:54):
• 1:25
  There's a question that's come in, I don't know if it's the GZERO media platform or our own, but they're both great, about China and what China's military support for Iran means for the conflict and for geopolitics. And maybe you could comment more broadly, is China the winner in this that some people seem to think it is.
• 1:26
  Ian Bremmer (21:08):
• 1:27
  Well, I was with the Chinese ambassador a few days ago and he was very forthright in saying that the Chinese would not provide any direct military support for Iran period. And it was interesting that he was as strident on that. I think that was in response to the MANPADs report that were making the rounds. And then Trump said that he didn't really trust that intelligence. Remember he said he was going to put 50% more tariffs on China, which then backed away from that. There have been ... I mean, that Iranian vessel that was boarded and the Americans say it's dual use, which would mean it would fall under UN sanctions to the Iranians. That's interesting. Came from China. Chinese haven't said anything about it so far. They've been quiet, so they don't want to have a problem here. They offered their five points with Pakistan.
• 1:28
  (21:58):
• 1:29
  They want to show that they are responsible, but they don't want a leadership role in negotiations. That's interesting. I think that the Chinese have played this relatively well for themselves, which is there's not much upside for China to be seen in leading a process that might not work and where they don't actually have a huge amount of leverage to play directly and wouldn't want to play it even if they had it. So instead, what I see them doing, it's what they just did on Taiwan. It's long term. I'd be very worried if China had elections. I'd be very worried if Xi Jinping had midterms in November and lots of unemployment and young people lying flat and big corporate debt problems. While the Americans are distracted and taking sort of the THAAD missile system out of South Korea, going to the Middle East, Europeans are all distracted by Russia-Ukraine.
• 1:30
  (22:46):
• 1:31
  In that environment, I could see them much more risk acceptant around Taiwan. That's not what they're doing. What they're doing is long-term, no regret, no risk moves to take advantage of the United States undermining its own reliability with allies globally. Now, China still has problems. I mean, their economic model right now is focused on enormous amounts of low cost manufacturing for export, which is causing backlash in Europe slowly, because the Europeans need the Chinese for lots of other reasons, and in the global South, in different countries, in different ways. But in terms of Xi Jinping's ability to have more influence globally and invest in the big long-term technologies at scale, for me, Davos this year after Mark Carney, the most interesting thing was when Trump announced the Board of Peace and he got all those important countries to join him on stage, Paraguay and Azerbaijan, Mongolia was there, Belarus.
• 1:32
  (23:45):
• 1:33
  It was a rogues gallery. And the Chinese immediately said not no, but hell no, as my mom used to say to me as a kid when I asked for things I wasn't allowed to have. And why did they say not no, but hell no, because they don't want to join the board of peace. They want to be number one in the UN, and that's the right thing for them. They don't have a problem with American-based architecture. They just want to control it. This whole responsible stakeholder stuff was, "Oh, they're going to align with the Americans. The US will be the leaders in all this architecture." Turns out the Chinese see that this is perfectly good architecture as long as the Americans aren't running it. And long term, we should worry about that. Trump does not seem to mind that. I think Xi Jinping is just very excited about welcoming Trump and he thinks that Trump is going to give him the store on Taiwan.
• 1:34
  (24:35):
• 1:35
  He'll make a statement that actually says that we don't support Taiwanese independence.
• 1:36
  Jason Bordoff (24:39):
• 1:37
  Is that summit going to happen?
• 1:38
  Ian Bremmer (24:40):
• 1:39
  I think that could easily happen.
• 1:40
  Jason Bordoff (24:41):
• 1:41
  No, no, I mean the summit.
• 1:42
  Ian Bremmer (24:44):
• 1:43
  Well, if we do not have a meaningful return to hostilities in the Middle East, I think the summit will happen. The summit is not prepared for in any way, and the Chinese are not comfortable with the fact that there isn't a delegation in advance that's saying, "Okay, here's exactly what's going to be agreed to. " But Xi Jinping sees way too much opportunity in Trump coming over and one-on-one him saying, "I will give you a lot of money. I'll buy a lot of soybeans. I'll buy Boeings. All you need to do is tell me this country, excuse me, this territory thousands of miles away that you don't care about. You don't want this president to be a troublemaker. You want to be more like the KMT. Let's make a peace deal." I mean, if you talk to people around Trump that are in the administration that are more hawkish on China, they will all readily admit they have no idea what Trump will say in that conversation with Xi Jinping.
• 1:44
  (25:40):
• 1:45
  So if you're Xi, it would be dereliction of duty running the communist party not to press Trump on that individually. Like you should hang up your cleats as running China if you don't do that.
• 1:46
  Jason Bordoff (25:52):
• 1:47
  No regret. We're just about at a time, but there's a lot of business leaders in the room and you talk to CEOs and your clients all the time. Markets seem eager to rally on every ceasefire headline and the kind of restraint that one might think a negative reaction in the stock market or the bond market might have on the Trump administration doesn't seem to be bearing out in this conflict. Is there something you think investors and energy companies and others are missing or underestimating in the economic impacts of this conflict?
• 1:48
  Ian Bremmer (26:26):
• 1:49
  Sure. But I also think that markets are oriented more towards the United States. The US is a comparative winner. If you look at the damage being done to the global economy all over the world, you're much more worried about lots of other countries than you are about the United States. So there's that. Secondly, the AI companies are like, not only are they super excited with a lot of money, but their stories are even more extravagant. I mean, you've got these people saying, "We're moving to 30% GDP growth a year." I mean, it's the transhumanist and before that get on the train. There's also just a lot of people making a lot of money right now who see long-term problems, but it's still money right now. And as long as the music is playing, they're going to dance.
• 1:50
  (27:09):
• 1:51
  I do see, I talk to a lot of CEOs, which is very different from the markets, very different from investors. CEOs that are not directly or adjacent to the AI space feel very differently about this entire environment. They feel very differently about Trump, about tariffs, about structural corruption and kleptocracy. We haven't talked about that, but that is a huge problem in the United States and is a vulnerability many of these companies have as they start getting subpoenaed. I mean, I think that there's reasons to ... You hear about the K-shaped economy, you hear about consumption, sort of winner take all. I think there's a lot of that happening in the marketplace right now, but there's no question the AI is ... I mean, anyone that focuses on AI is staggered by how much faster these capabilities are moving than anyone assumed a few years ago.
• 1:52
  (27:55):
• 1:53
  And that every week that goes on, that continues to be the case.
• 1:54
  Jason Bordoff (27:59):
• 1:55
  Ian Bremmer, it's always fascinating to spend time and learn from you. The human version, the AI version, the muppet version. There is a muppet version.
• 1:56
  (28:05):
• 1:57
  The muppet version is awesome. It's true.
• 1:58
  (28:06):
• 1:59
  Ian Bremmer. Thank you for making time to be with us today. Please join me in thanking Ian Bremmer.
• 2:00
  Bill Loveless (28:14):
• 2:01
  That's it for this week's episode of Columbia Energy Exchange. Thank you again, Ian Bremmer, and thank you for listening. The show is brought to you by the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. The show is hosted by Jason Bordoff and me, Bill Loveless. Mary Catherine O'Connor produced the show. Greg Vilfranc engineered it. Additional support from Caroline Pitman and Kyu Lee. For more information about the show or the Center on Global Energy Policy, visit us online at energypolicy.columbia.edu or follow us on social media @ColumbiaUenergy. If you'd like this episode, leave us a rating on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcast. You can also share it with a friend or colleague to help us reach more listeners. Either way, we appreciate your support. Thanks again for listening. See you next week.