Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / The Big Steal: Ideology, Interest, and the Undoing of Intellectual Property with Professor Jonathan Barnett
Transcript
- 0:06Welcome to today's webinar. I'm Rudy Lara. I'm
- 0:09a member of the Board of Governors of the Beverly
- 0:11Hills Bar. I'm delighted to introduce today's
- 0:14speaker. He's Professor Jonathan Barnett. Professor
- 0:18Barnett specializes in antitrust, intellectual
- 0:21property, and corporate and business law. He
- 0:24has a focus on innovation policy and strategy
- 0:27in technology markets. Professor Barnett. is
- 0:31director of the media entertainment and technology
- 0:34law program at USC Law School. He's published
- 0:37in the Harvard Law Review, Harvard Journal of
- 0:40Law and Technology, Yale Law Journal, Journal
- 0:43of Legal Studies, Jury Metrics, Review of Law
- 0:46and Economics, and that's just to name a few.
- 0:49He also regularly comments in the press and at
- 0:53conferences on legal and policy issues concerning
- 0:56antitrust and intellectual property. In 2021,
- 1:01Professor Barnett authored his first book, Innovators,
- 1:04Firms, and Markets, the Organizational Logic
- 1:07of Intellectual Property. And last year, Professor
- 1:11Barnett returned with his second book, The Big
- 1:14Steal, Ideology, Interest, and the Undoing of
- 1:16Intellectual Property. Today, Professor Barnett
- 1:20will be discussing The Big Steal and several
- 1:22of his critical findings in that book on the
- 1:24transformation of copyright law. and how creative
- 1:28industries have responded to the changes in IP
- 1:31protections for content owners. So we're honored
- 1:35to have you, Professor Varnette. And with that,
- 1:38I'll be passing the mic to you. Thank you. All
- 1:42right. Really great to be here. It's a real pleasure
- 1:46to speak in front of the association today. The
- 1:50book that I'll be presenting, The Big Steal,
- 1:53represents several years of research and writing,
- 1:57and it sits on top of almost two decades worth
- 2:00of legal and economic analysis of the way in
- 2:05which IP rights impacts the way individuals and
- 2:09companies can turn ideas, whether they're creative
- 2:13ideas, technological ideas into revenue. My focus
- 2:17is on the strategies that businesses with the
- 2:22advice of legal counsel used to achieve that
- 2:24objective. And my second focus is on having the
- 2:30right IP laws in place to advance the public's
- 2:34interest in the most robust creative economy
- 2:36and innovation economy we can have. All right,
- 2:40I'm gonna share my slides here. Just one moment.
- 2:58All right, so let's get started. All right, this
- 3:10book is what I call the big IP shift. This is
- 3:14a fundamental and I think under discussed transformation
- 3:18in the strength of IP protections, both on the
- 3:21creative side and on the tech side. so on patents
- 3:25on the tech side and copyright on the content
- 3:29side. Given what I understand is the association's
- 3:34focus, I'm going to focus on the content side,
- 3:36but I'm also going to talk about the tech side
- 3:39as well because there's some amazing commonalities
- 3:42between the way IP protection has changed in
- 3:45both of those sectors. And the book addresses
- 3:48three big questions. First is a legal question.
- 3:52I document step -by -step how in the courts,
- 3:56in Congress, in the antitrust agencies this shift
- 3:59occurred. It's a one -way shift every way you
- 4:02look. Pretty much every opportunity that a government
- 4:05entity has had to weaken IP protection since
- 4:09about the mid -2000s, they've done so. The second
- 4:13is why did that happen? And that's really the
- 4:16heart of the book that I'll be getting into.
- 4:19It's a confluence of business interests and ideological
- 4:23interests, hence the subtitle of the book. And
- 4:26the third question, which is the most complex
- 4:29question, I'll leave that to the end, is this
- 4:32shift a good thing? Is this a good thing for
- 4:35all stakeholders in our innovation economy? And
- 4:39by innovation economy, I mean the tech sector
- 4:41and the creative sector. Now, I just want to
- 4:46lay out some big picture concepts before we I
- 4:50promise we're going to get into some of the nitty
- 4:52gritty legal details. And the example I'm going
- 4:55to use is something that I know should be familiar
- 4:58to everyone. And that's the smartphone device
- 5:01that we use for better or worse pretty much all
- 5:04the time. And I'm going to focus on the smartphone
- 5:07because I want you to think about that as a type
- 5:10of digital platform that aggregates tech. tech
- 5:15assets, what I'm calling ICT assets, information,
- 5:17communication, technology assets, and creative
- 5:21assets. And then I want to just go up one step
- 5:23on top of the supply chain. Who's producing those
- 5:27assets? In the entertainment industry in Southern
- 5:30California, we know who that is. Those are the
- 5:33production companies and the thousands, tens
- 5:36of thousands of individuals that are active in
- 5:39that industry. What I'll be getting into in a
- 5:43little bit more detail, though it's not super
- 5:46fine amount unless you have questions about it,
- 5:48because my focus on content is on the tech innovators.
- 5:52But the thought I want to just leave you with
- 5:54right now is that the brains behind the smartphone,
- 5:58the computing and communications technologies
- 6:00that make those work, those tend not to be technologies
- 6:04that are developed by the platforms that you're
- 6:07seeing day to day. But the smartphone, the device
- 6:11maker, or the search engine, or the social media
- 6:16aggregation engine, they rely on this technology,
- 6:20they rely on this content, but they tend not
- 6:24to produce that content. They tend not to produce
- 6:27that technology. Why is this business point so
- 6:31critical? Because it means that for platforms,
- 6:35both on the content side and the tech side, They're
- 6:38consuming technology. They're consuming content.
- 6:42That means that it's an input. Any business wants
- 6:46to reduce its inputs. You're a restaurant owner.
- 6:49You want to pay as little as possible for the
- 6:52materials that you need to produce food for your
- 6:55customers. And usually the way that we do that,
- 6:58that a business does that, is through negotiation.
- 7:01But the platforms are so large that what I show
- 7:04in the book is that they have been able to exert
- 7:07influence to change the underlying rules of the
- 7:11game in tech and content markets. And what rules
- 7:14are those? Those are the property rights rules,
- 7:17the IP rules. And how have they changed those
- 7:20rules? They've made IP rights weaker. And what
- 7:24I'll try to show to you is that by making IP
- 7:27rights weaker, You can pay less for content that
- 7:32you need if you're a platform. You can pay less
- 7:35for tech that you need if you're a platform.
- 7:38In many cases, you can pay nothing at all. And
- 7:42if you change the rules of the game the way that
- 7:45you want, it is all perfectly legal. In a nutshell,
- 7:50that is what this book is about. Let me illustrate
- 7:54this for you. through the concept that's a common
- 7:58term in Silicon Valley, commoditization. Let's
- 8:02just explain that with an example. Back in 94,
- 8:06Netscape is a startup. They come out with a new
- 8:08product, Navigator, internet browser. They're
- 8:11the pioneer. They sell it for free to home users,
- 8:14about $40 if you're a business user. Microsoft.
- 8:19views this as a competitive threat, and within
- 8:22a year, working 24 hours around the clock, spending
- 8:25hundreds of millions of dollars, they largely
- 8:28replicate the technology you get Internet Explorer
- 8:31given away for free in Windows. It's in Windows
- 8:36with no increase in the price. Now, did Bill
- 8:40Gates just burn hundreds of millions of dollars
- 8:43for nothing in one year? No, not at all. because
- 8:47Netscape could not compete anymore when it could
- 8:50not charge anything for its product. Because
- 8:53unlike Microsoft, that product wasn't subsidized
- 8:57by anything else inside its bundle. Netscape
- 8:59had no bundle. Microsoft did. What the tech platforms
- 9:05have done, I argue in this book, is to attempt
- 9:09to commoditize content and commoditize technology.
- 9:14Now, consumers often like this because they get
- 9:17stuff that they used to have to pay for, let's
- 9:20say $15 for a CD. You get that for zero. Not
- 9:25only do you get that CD for zero, you get all
- 9:28the CDs in the world for zero. But what does
- 9:31that do for the incentives of the record labels
- 9:34and the artists they support? That's also what
- 9:37this book is about. Now, why have I shown you
- 9:42the Microsoft Netscape commodization strategy,
- 9:45which doesn't have anything to do with changing
- 9:47IP rules? Consider what Microsoft did here. It
- 9:53took a big gamble. It spent hundreds of millions
- 9:55of dollars. It might not have succeeded in replicating
- 10:00Navigator. It might not have succeeded in attracting
- 10:03users to migrate away from Navigator, which was
- 10:07very popular. over to Internet Explorer. So that
- 10:12was a big gamble. You can achieve roughly the
- 10:16same outcome by lobbying and advocating to reduce
- 10:23or eliminate IP rights over your competitors'
- 10:27technology. If that's their only product they
- 10:30won't be able to compete with you, you'll get
- 10:32that technology and incorporate it into your
- 10:34bundle. That too is what this book's about. Now,
- 10:39how do I know why am I so sure that digital platforms
- 10:44don't like IP? Because you might be skeptical
- 10:46about that. Because I should be clear that most
- 10:51of the large tech platforms spend considerable
- 10:54amounts of their revenues on R &D. They themselves
- 10:58are innovators to a certain extent. But how do
- 11:02I know that they don't like IP rights? Well,
- 11:06What I did is I collected all of the amicus briefs
- 11:09filed in US Supreme Court patent related cases
- 11:12over a 10 year period. Without going into each
- 11:16and every group here, if you look right at the
- 11:19bottom of the slide, you'll see the platform
- 11:21firms filed 77 briefs in those cases. And they
- 11:28favored, they took a position favorable to the
- 11:31alleged infringer almost 80 % of the time. They
- 11:36took a position favorable to the patent owner
- 11:38about 1 % of the time. Now I want to draw your
- 11:43attention to another statistic, which I'll bring
- 11:46back in later. If you go right at the top of
- 11:49the screen, venture capital firms who back innovators,
- 11:55what percentage of time do they favor the patent
- 11:57owner? 100 % of the time. So I'd like to keep
- 12:01that in mind when we get to the third question
- 12:04about whether what's happened is good for the
- 12:07innovation economy. What about in copyright?
- 12:13Here I collected briefs from the Supreme Court,
- 12:17the Second Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit. Let's
- 12:21look again at the bottom of the screen where
- 12:23you've got your search engines. What percentage
- 12:26of the time do they favor the alleged infringer?
- 12:29almost 90%. Copyright owner, about a little bit
- 12:34more than 5%. Unsurprisingly, if we go to the
- 12:37top of the screen, the constituency that produces
- 12:42the content that fuels search engines, because
- 12:47otherwise there'd be nothing to search, favors
- 12:50the copyright owner about three quarters of the
- 12:53time. The reason I collect this data is because
- 12:59there's lots of arguments about whether strong
- 13:02IP, weak IP, whether it benefits certain industries
- 13:05or not. And a lot of that is very theoretical.
- 13:10But an easier and arguably more reliable way
- 13:13to ask whether IP rights benefit or harm a certain
- 13:16industry is just to see what does that industry
- 13:19actually think about it. And we can see that
- 13:21through the AMCAS briefs that have been filed.
- 13:29Now, an important question that's addressed in
- 13:32the book is why is it that, as I said, courts,
- 13:37Congress, antitrust agencies, since roughly the
- 13:40mid -2000s through the present, with a few exceptions,
- 13:45they have almost always accepted and adopted
- 13:48the view advocated for by digital platforms to
- 13:55weaken IP rights. Why is it that policymakers
- 14:00have apparently reached the view that weakening
- 14:05copyright, weakening patents is in the public
- 14:08interest. And the argument made in the book is
- 14:13that the mechanism that explains this, that accounts
- 14:17for this very consistent tendency, is what I
- 14:21call an accidental alliance. What I mean by that
- 14:25is that roughly around the same time that digital
- 14:28platforms rise in prominence in the economy and
- 14:32start to advocate and lobby for weaker IP rights,
- 14:38concurrently they're emerged in the academy,
- 14:44specifically much not all of, much of the legal
- 14:48academy, a school of thought that is deeply skeptical
- 14:55of the value of robust IP rights or in some cases,
- 14:59any IP rights at all. The book argues that it's
- 15:04the confluence of the business interests of digital
- 15:08platforms. Again, nothing nefarious about it.
- 15:13Every business wants to reduce its input costs.
- 15:16They have achieved that objective through lobbying
- 15:18and advocacy. It's the confluence of those activities
- 15:22with ideas propounded and developed in the legal
- 15:30academy and portions of the economics community.
- 15:35And the simple fact that consumers just like
- 15:37getting things for free. I like getting things
- 15:39for free and you probably do too. The confluence
- 15:42of these three forces created an intellectual
- 15:46climate that was favorable towards weakening
- 15:50IP rights. Policymakers are sensitive to intellectual
- 15:54climates. They're sensitive to what they think
- 15:57their constituents want and believe, and they
- 16:00responded accordingly. That's the basic framework
- 16:04of the book. What I'll be showing you in the
- 16:07remainder of the presentation, until Rudy tells
- 16:11me I've run out of time and I hope to reserve.
- 16:14time for questions at the end. So please post
- 16:17your questions to the Q &A and I will endeavor
- 16:21my best to get to them. I'll be now going through
- 16:25in detail exactly how this accidental alliance
- 16:30occurred. How did ideas coming from the academy
- 16:35intersecting with advocacy from the tech business
- 16:39community or the platform business community
- 16:42more precisely? How did that result in this weak
- 16:47IP policy trajectory? So let's start with content.
- 16:53One thing I do in the book is I take legal developments
- 16:56and I contextualize it with what's happening
- 17:00in the economy. So big picture on this slide.
- 17:04is that as the internet becomes more and more
- 17:08a part of daily life, as measured by the number
- 17:11of households using it on a regular basis, the
- 17:15courts become less and less hospitable towards
- 17:19robust enforcement of copyright. So let's take
- 17:24an example. 1999, Napster's launched from a college
- 17:29dorm room, and it goes what we today call viral.
- 17:34The courts initially sided strongly with the
- 17:38copyright owners and Napster was shut down. But
- 17:43if you fast forward to 2010, the landmark suit
- 17:48brought by Viacom and other content owners against
- 17:51YouTube, the court sides heavily with YouTube
- 17:57in a generous reading of a safe harbor under
- 18:03the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that I'll
- 18:05get into. What happened between 2001, 2010? A
- 18:10lot more people are using the Internet. A lot
- 18:14more people are used to getting content for free.
- 18:19And what else is happening, as I'll show you,
- 18:23is that what I call the information wants to
- 18:26be free school of thought. Sorry, one moment.
- 18:37In the academy, the information wants to be free
- 18:41school of thought, which is a slogan that I take
- 18:44from some of the writings of IP skeptical commentators
- 18:49starts to develop. And so we have on the one
- 18:54hand advocacy from platforms who have a natural
- 18:57business interest in weakening copyright, the
- 19:01public's interest in free stuff, and the academy's
- 19:08advocacy on public interest grounds that weakening
- 19:11copyright would be a good idea. Now what's happening
- 19:16in the market to the entities that produce content?
- 19:20Let's look at the music industry. When Napster's
- 19:25launched, the US music industry is in great shape.
- 19:30They're at peak revenues of roughly $22 .5 billion
- 19:34on recorded music sales in 1999. That falls to
- 19:39$10 billion by 2010, roughly cut in half, obviously,
- 19:45more than half. The copyright owners argued successfully
- 19:52in the NAFSA litigation, but pretty much unsuccessfully
- 19:55thereafter, that weakening copyright or the inability
- 20:01to enforce copyright was hurting the ability
- 20:05to capture profits on music, which in turn would
- 20:09hurt their ability to invest and promote new
- 20:12artists. That may sound like a common sense intuitive
- 20:18idea. Let's see what they thought in the academy.
- 20:23In the academy, there was an empirical study
- 20:28published in working paper form in 2007, which
- 20:35argued that piracy had no significant effect,
- 20:43no material impact. on the sales of recorded
- 20:48music. So let's state this claim in plain English.
- 20:53If this is true, it means that when you go from
- 20:58a world where you have to pay 15 .99 for a CD
- 21:02for the greatest hits of Billy Joel, speaking
- 21:07an artist I like, or getting it for free, that
- 21:14that has no significant impact on the incentives
- 21:19of consumers to keep paying $15 .99 for greatest
- 21:22hits of Billy Joel, right? Yet, during the same
- 21:28period, recorded music sales were cut more than
- 21:34half. But if the 2007 papers correct, It fell
- 21:41by more than half for some other reason. This
- 21:48paper has been widely cited. What you're seeing
- 21:51on this graph is I'm measuring the influence
- 21:55of a publication by the number of times it's
- 21:58cited in the academic literature. The 2007 study,
- 22:02which is on the right -hand side, is cited far
- 22:07more as you can see than any other study. I'm
- 22:11referring to the OSG study. Now this is interesting,
- 22:17not only because the first study that argues
- 22:21that piracy is harmless to copyright owners is
- 22:25cited the most, but also because every single
- 22:32other study, these are empirical studies that
- 22:35have tested the hypothesis. that piracy is harmless,
- 22:41except for one other study reaches exactly the
- 22:48opposite conclusion, meaning there are roughly
- 22:5230 studies on this graph. And all but two confirm
- 22:58the common sense assumption that when you offer
- 23:03something for nothing, almost everyone takes
- 23:06nothing. takes the free version rather than the
- 23:10pay version. And of course, that would explain
- 23:12why recorded music stales fall in half. But what
- 23:16this graph is illustrating in a quantitative
- 23:21way is that the dominant view in academic literature
- 23:24is that piracy is not a big deal. And why is
- 23:28that important? Because if the academy is telling
- 23:32the courts that piracy is not a big deal, Then
- 23:37when we move forward from 2001 to 2010 and the
- 23:44district court judge in the Southern District
- 23:46of New York is wrestling with whether or not
- 23:49to shut down YouTube or not or to make or order
- 23:52YouTube to pay royalties to compensate content
- 23:56owners, that judge might be led to believe that
- 24:01it's really not such a big deal whether or not
- 24:03the content owners get compensated or not. And
- 24:08that's the accidental alliance in action. One
- 24:12of the contributions of the book is not just
- 24:14to state this as kind of a general idea or a
- 24:18rhetorical observation, but actually to show
- 24:21numerically how influence moves from the academy
- 24:24into the courts. All right. What this slide shows
- 24:32you are specifically the key legal steps in the
- 24:38unraveling of copyright from roughly the mid
- 24:412000s. The first key step is the expansion of
- 24:47fair use. And what I would call the virtual displacement
- 24:53of the four factor test by the single factor.
- 24:59of transformative use. This is often attributed
- 25:07to the court's opinion in the Campbell v. Acob
- 25:10Rose case in 1994. But in fact, what I show in
- 25:15the book is that it's only starting the mid -2000s
- 25:20that courts start to cite to that opinion for
- 25:23the proposition. that fair use should be applied
- 25:26broadly to protect transformative use. If you
- 25:31look at the commentary in the Campbell opinion
- 25:33shortly after it was issued, most commentators,
- 25:37in fact, I would say almost all commentators
- 25:40thought it was a narrow decision just about parity,
- 25:43not really a big deal. And in fact, that was
- 25:45true until about the mid 2000s. What we also
- 25:50see in the fair use case law is that courts don't
- 25:55really honor anymore explicit instructions from
- 26:00the Supreme Court in the Harper and Row precedent
- 26:02in 1985 and also often overlooked in the Campbell
- 26:08decision in 1984. That out of the four factors,
- 26:13the most important factor is whether or not there's
- 26:17been significant harm to the copyright owner.
- 26:21So what you're seeing is as internet usage increases
- 26:26as the information wants to be free school thought
- 26:29exerts influence, courts expand the fair use
- 26:33exemption in a way that it never existed historically
- 26:38under US case law and arguably for which there
- 26:42is no precedent under governing Supreme Court
- 26:46case law. The episode involving the proposed
- 26:52SOPA and PIPA bills in 2011, 2012, which would
- 26:56have expanded indirect liability for platforms
- 27:00for infringing use by users on the platform,
- 27:04was withdrawn very quickly because there was
- 27:08a huge public outcry. and a lobbying campaign
- 27:14by digital platforms. A really great illustration
- 27:17of something we wouldn't contemplate today where
- 27:20the public is siding with the views of the digital
- 27:24platforms to change policy. I mentioned the Viacom,
- 27:30the YouTube decision. This is one of a number
- 27:33of decisions that interpreted the safe harbor
- 27:37from liability for platforms that was contemplated
- 27:43in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for user
- 27:46infringement, right? So if a user is uploading
- 27:49infringing content to YouTube, the DMCA contemplated
- 27:54that YouTube or the parent Google would be liable
- 27:59under certain circumstances, but they did create
- 28:02a safe harbor. What I show in the book is that
- 28:05the courts in Viacom and other decisions interpreted
- 28:09the safe harbor in a way that makes it exceptionally
- 28:14easy for platforms to comply with it by having
- 28:18a notice takedown agent and effectively read
- 28:22out from the statute what seems quite clear from
- 28:27the legislative history that if there was rampant
- 28:30infringement on the site and the platform operator
- 28:34was doing nothing significant to stop it. The
- 28:40legislative history makes it fairly clear that
- 28:43the platform should be liable in that case. The
- 28:46Viacom decision rejected that argument and a
- 28:48number of other prominent appellate decisions
- 28:50rejected it. As I argue in the book, it's difficult
- 28:53to reconcile those decisions with the language
- 28:56of the statute, especially when it's informed
- 28:59by the legislative history. The real culmination
- 29:03of the transformation of copyright by the courts
- 29:07in a way that unilaterally favors the interests
- 29:11of platforms, or what I call sometimes aggregators,
- 29:16over content creators or the Google Books and
- 29:19companion decision known as HathiTrust. Fair
- 29:24use building on this transformation in the case
- 29:28law of that exemption starting in the mid -2000s
- 29:32exonerates what until the advent of AI was I
- 29:38think can fairly clearly be identified as the
- 29:42single largest case of mass copyright infringement
- 29:46through the digitization of millions of in copyright
- 29:49books with no royalty paid to the copyright owner.
- 29:56Those decisions and others you see on this slide
- 29:59and there's many others that tend to all tend
- 30:02in the same direction. reflect a successful advocacy
- 30:08campaign by platforms that have a natural business
- 30:13interest in reducing the cost of acquiring content
- 30:16that is a necessary input for their business.
- 30:21If you look at the Viacombe YouTube decision,
- 30:25the documents obtained in discovery clearly show
- 30:27that the YouTube managers saw to secure as much
- 30:32content, as much high quality content as possible.
- 30:36The business logic is obvious. The more content
- 30:39you have, the higher quality content you have,
- 30:42the more users you have, the more ads you can
- 30:45sell. As you may observe, this is the exact same
- 30:51logic that I illustrated through the Microsoft
- 30:54Netscape example. Microsoft commoditized browser
- 30:59technology, giving it away to users because it
- 31:04enhanced its Windows products, from which it
- 31:07sold at a positive price to device users. Same
- 31:15logic applies here. Google Books commoditizes
- 31:19books. YouTube commoditizes music. They give
- 31:24it away to users. because it attracts paying
- 31:29advertisers. It's the same model. It's a different
- 31:34mechanism because in order for Google Books to
- 31:38work, in order for YouTube to work, you have
- 31:41to take a gamble that the courts will rule in
- 31:46your favor and they will change the law in a
- 31:50way that removes any liability for doing so.
- 31:55Google Books took a gamble in digitizing millions
- 32:00of those books because if it had lost, it would
- 32:02have been liable for billions of dollars in statutory
- 32:05damages. It won that gamble and in the process
- 32:09changed the rules of the game and content markets
- 32:13in a way, again, it favors the interests of platforms
- 32:17over copyright owners. All right, I see that
- 32:23I'm... I need to move forward a little bit. I'm
- 32:28going to go through the developments on the tech
- 32:31side a little bit more quickly, because I want
- 32:35to get to that complex question of whether all
- 32:37of this is a good thing or not, which I haven't
- 32:40expressed any view on so far, just describing
- 32:43what happened. And then we'll have time for questions.
- 32:49All right. So bear with me if you are not a patent
- 32:55aficionado, but trust me that if you found the
- 33:01commoditization strategy interesting on the content
- 33:04side, it should be interesting to see that the
- 33:07very same strategy played out on the tech side.
- 33:12All right. So back in the early 80s, Congress,
- 33:19to simplify, a whole bunch of details, decided
- 33:23it was a good idea to strengthen patent protections.
- 33:28And the reason they thought this was a good idea
- 33:30is that there was a lot of concern at the time
- 33:35that the US was falling behind on innovation
- 33:38and our patent system was too weak. And to do
- 33:42that, Congress enabled research universities
- 33:49to take out patents on discoveries that derived
- 33:54partially or indirectly or directly from federal
- 34:00research funding. This is the basis for today's
- 34:03tech transfer industry. The Congress also established
- 34:09a brand new court of appeals, the Federal Circuit.
- 34:13And the Federal Circuit, in the years after its
- 34:18establishment adopted decisions that in fact
- 34:21strengthen protections for patent owners. And
- 34:26unsurprisingly, when patents became more easily
- 34:31enforceable, innovators took out more patents.
- 34:37Makes sense. This elicited a vigorous critique
- 34:42from academia. In this case, both legal academics
- 34:47and a significant number of economists. And this
- 34:51graph that you're seeing here, which shows the
- 34:55increase in patents granted and applied for per
- 35:01million US residents, academic commentators widely
- 35:08called this a patent crisis. And there were a
- 35:13number of books published in the mid -2000s attacking
- 35:16the courts for strengthening patents, arguing
- 35:20that it would actually slow down innovation by
- 35:25imposing licensing fees, by incentivizing more
- 35:31litigation, by hindering the free flow of ideas.
- 35:37There were a handful of books that defended the
- 35:40reforms. What this graph shows you is that books
- 35:48that favor reversing the reforms, weakening the
- 35:55patent system are cited far more often than the
- 35:59two books at the bottom that defend the patent
- 36:02system. And the most popular book of all, as
- 36:05measured by citations, is the second from the
- 36:11top. which argues for the complete abolition
- 36:14of the patent system. As you can see, we have
- 36:22the same influence mechanism in play. IP skepticism
- 36:27becomes the consensus view in the academy. And
- 36:33if you anticipate, if I'm correct in arguing
- 36:39that this should then have an effect on the decisions
- 36:43of courts and other policymakers, we should start
- 36:46to see the patent system being weakened just
- 36:51as academic commentators are urging. These are
- 36:57other variations on IP skepticism that grew out
- 37:03of the academic literature. I want to draw your
- 37:10attention to just one here. I know this is not
- 37:14of direct interest to some of the audience, but
- 37:16I want to show the exact same mechanism at play.
- 37:21There's a well known article published in a prominent
- 37:24journal in 1998. which says that a recent policy
- 37:30development at the time, which had extended patent
- 37:32protection for certain biotechnology inventions,
- 37:38which in fact became the basis for the biotech
- 37:40industry, biopharmaceutical industry, that this
- 37:44was a terrible idea because it would hinder,
- 37:50suppress innovation by entangling scientists
- 37:54and companies in licensing negotiations and litigation.
- 37:59This remains the most widely cited article on
- 38:03this particular hypothesis known as the patent
- 38:06thicket hypothesis. This study published in 1998,
- 38:12this time on your far left -hand side, has also
- 38:17been tested empirically over and over. And in
- 38:25the large majority of studies, when empirical
- 38:33researchers actually go out into the biomedical
- 38:37industry and attempt to see whether more patents
- 38:41in the industry are hindering innovation, are
- 38:44hindering the development of new therapies, they
- 38:49find little or no evidence of any such patent
- 38:54thicket. But as you can see, by the height of
- 38:57the bars, the study, the first study that asserts
- 39:05this as a hypothesis continues to be cited far
- 39:09more often than the empirical studies that find
- 39:12no evidence. As you can see, the bars in some
- 39:15cases are so low for those studies. which are
- 39:19meticulous studies in many cases that take years
- 39:22to produce. They're barely cited. Again, this
- 39:26is a quantitative illustration of a consensus
- 39:29view that patents are a bad idea in the biomedical
- 39:33industry. Those ideas developed in the academy
- 39:39have actual policy impact. In the most important
- 39:46development in 2006, the Supreme Court reversed
- 39:52a century old tradition in US patent law and
- 39:59withdrew from, abrogated the existing presumption
- 40:04that a patent that is shown to be valid in court,
- 40:09shown to be infringed in court, almost automatically
- 40:12results in an injunction. which would seem to
- 40:15make sense if a patent is like a property right.
- 40:19In fact, by 2018, the court ruled that a patent
- 40:25in many cases is not a property right. Exactly
- 40:29the type of idea that was being put forward in
- 40:34the academy. I'll just identify one other key
- 40:38policy development, a statute known as the American
- 40:41Invenstax in 2011, created the most generous
- 40:47mechanism in the world to my knowledge that allows
- 40:51patents to be opposed as being invalid in a special
- 40:57tribunal anytime after issuance. So in year 19
- 41:03of a 20 year patent term, the patent owner could
- 41:06lose its property right. Digital platforms, And
- 41:13other vertically integrated technology companies
- 41:16were among the leading advocates for that statute.
- 41:20And they are among the leading users of the tribunal.
- 41:28Again, this is as in the content side, this is
- 41:31changing the rules of the game in a way that
- 41:34reduces the cost of acquiring your input. Let
- 41:38me explain what this means on the tech side.
- 41:40Let's go back to the smartphone example. If you
- 41:44are a producer of a smartphone device, but you
- 41:50do not internally develop the computing and communications
- 41:54technology that makes it work, you need to license
- 41:57that. Perfectly natural. You want to pay as low
- 42:01a licensing fee as possible and you're going
- 42:03to use your negotiating leverage to do that.
- 42:07But what's happened in the tech markets in a
- 42:10way that's very similar to the content markets
- 42:13is that as property rights over technology has
- 42:19weakened. So for example, when a patent owner
- 42:22can no longer expect to have an injunction, the
- 42:27user of that technology no longer fears losing
- 42:31access to that technology. They may fear damages.
- 42:35But the worst case scenario is a lot better now.
- 42:39And what that does is it shifts bargaining leverage
- 42:42from entities that are producing much of the
- 42:46technology that makes your smartphone work to
- 42:50device makers that implement that technology.
- 42:54And that reduces the licensing fee paid to the
- 42:58entities that stand at the top of the tech supply
- 43:01chain. All right. So to wrap up here before we
- 43:07get to questions, let's ask whether this is a
- 43:12good idea or not. And one idea that I've tried
- 43:21to argue throughout my career is that IP has
- 43:25two functions. And we often just focus on one,
- 43:28the incentive function. That is part of its function.
- 43:31We need profits to be there. for people to invest
- 43:35in creative properties and new technology. But
- 43:38something that's often missed is that we also
- 43:41need IP rights to make deals, to make markets.
- 43:45And by making deals and making markets, IP rights
- 43:51often make it easier for the smaller firm, for
- 43:55the smaller entity to enter the market. And let
- 44:01me illustrate this through an example that some
- 44:03of you may be familiar with, but maybe not familiar
- 44:06with all the details. And I promise this is from
- 44:09entertainment, not tech. Back in 1996, a company
- 44:15called Marvel Comics that you might've heard
- 44:18about was in economic distress on the verge of
- 44:23bankruptcy. In 2009, that same company now known
- 44:29as Marvel Studios, is sold to Disney for four
- 44:33and a quarter billion. So how is it that in less
- 44:38than 15 years they could go from zero to four
- 44:41and a quarter billion? And this almost entirely
- 44:45rests on the IP system. What happened back in
- 44:4996 is that Marvel Comics, not doing too well
- 44:54because comics weren't so cool anymore, decided
- 44:58to try and save the company by licensing out
- 45:01some of the characters to major movie studios.
- 45:07And they had two big hits, Incredible Hulk and
- 45:10Iron Man. Marvel then thought that they could
- 45:16make even more money, which was true, if they
- 45:19had their own studio. But to do that, they needed
- 45:23about $500 million. through an entity that does
- 45:30not exist today in the same form, Merrill Lynch,
- 45:33they were able to secure that money guaranteed
- 45:38by a third party. But why was IP so critical
- 45:41here? Not only because IP obviously protects
- 45:44the Marvel characters, but because in an innovative
- 45:51financing transaction, IP was used as the collateral
- 45:55for the Merrill Lynch loan. Why do I like this
- 46:00example? Because much of the critique of IP is
- 46:05that it's a tax. It's a tax on consumers. It's
- 46:08a tax on other creators. It reduces value. It
- 46:13takes away value. That's not what happened here.
- 46:17It created four and a quarter billion dollars
- 46:20in value that otherwise would never have emerged.
- 46:25Not only that, it enabled a new entrant into
- 46:29the studio market, incentivizing both innovation
- 46:34and making the market more competitive. In fact,
- 46:39if we look at the development of the digital
- 46:44content markets since the bad days of the early
- 46:502010s, where I showed you the music industry
- 46:53was struggling, We now know today the music industry
- 46:56is doing great, right? Private equity funds are
- 47:00buying. IP portfolios in the tens of millions
- 47:08of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars.
- 47:13So something must have changed. Now I haven't
- 47:16told you copyright laws change, it hasn't. So
- 47:19does that mean my whole thesis is wrong? The
- 47:22markets don't really need IP? Not at all. If
- 47:27we look at digital content markets that have
- 47:29adapted to the weak IP environment, what they
- 47:33have done, as I show in the book, is that they
- 47:36have filled in that IP deficit, that IP shortfall,
- 47:41through a combination of contract and technology.
- 47:45So starting with the Apple iTunes service, music
- 47:52recovered, by offering both a reasonable price
- 47:56point by using technology to control access.
- 47:59That's a type of property right. We see the same
- 48:02thing in e -books and we see the same thing in
- 48:09video streaming. Wherever we look in digital
- 48:12content marks, they recover when property rights
- 48:15are restored to some extent. And that suggests
- 48:19that the academic critique that Information markets,
- 48:25content markets can do fine without IP. It's
- 48:28not true at all. And there's an exception that
- 48:32proves the rule here. If we look at the news
- 48:34industry, they're not thriving. They're not thriving
- 48:39because the free ad -based model didn't work.
- 48:43And ironically, they rely today in many cases
- 48:48on philanthropy. And who are among the biggest
- 48:51philanthropists of the news industry? Google
- 48:54and Facebook. What does that suggest? It suggests
- 48:58that when IP rights are weakened excessively,
- 49:04it's great at the beginning. You get all the
- 49:06existing content for free. But then either your
- 49:10content pipeline will run dry or you'll have
- 49:14a lot of QCAD videos. You'll have low value content.
- 49:18That no offense to Katzmann. And that's the ultimate
- 49:23message of the book. I can go into greater detail,
- 49:26but I want to leave room for questions. The third
- 49:30and more complex question the book argues is
- 49:34that we have created an IP system that is skewed.
- 49:41It works well for platform based business models
- 49:44where you give away one thing to sell something
- 49:47else. But when that one thing you're giving away
- 49:51has been produced by others and they're not compensated
- 49:54for it, they will exit the market. They will
- 49:58not be able to attract capital. And in the long
- 50:02term, while we all like free stuff in the short
- 50:05term, in the long term, that's not good for the
- 50:08US creator economy. It's not good for the US
- 50:11innovation economy in the long term. All right.
- 50:14So it looks like we have about A little less
- 50:18than 10 minutes, so I'm going to stop the share
- 50:22and go to questions. All right, so I'm just going
- 50:32to take these in order. Is Judge Alzop's recent
- 50:37transformer fair use favoring anthropic correct
- 50:41in your view? Well, it's a new decision and I'd
- 50:49like to read it in more detail, but you wouldn't
- 50:51be surprised to learn that I'm concerned about
- 50:58whether that decision is going down the path
- 51:02of Viacomd YouTube. It's continuing to preserve
- 51:12in place a copyright system that systematically
- 51:18favors the interests of content implementers,
- 51:22content aggregators over content creators. And
- 51:29one other thing I'd like to add on this, which
- 51:32was later in the slide deck, but we can talk
- 51:34about without slides, is that it's often asserted,
- 51:39and I understand this view, the concern. It's
- 51:42a reasonable concern. that if we enforce content
- 51:47overly rigorously or enforce copyright overly
- 51:51rigorously in the AI ecosystem, it's gonna slow
- 51:55down the market, it's gonna kill the market because
- 51:59the model and the app developers won't be able
- 52:02to develop their training sets. This is exactly
- 52:07the argument that was made at the birth of the
- 52:10internet or the civilian internet. And the reason
- 52:15I'm skeptical of this argument is that if we
- 52:20look at the history of US creative markets and
- 52:27technology markets, when those markets are what
- 52:32I call IP intensive, there's a lot of IP rights,
- 52:35they're enforced rigorously. In fact, we have
- 52:38few long -standing examples. I'm in fact not
- 52:41aware of any. where that situation causes the
- 52:46market to seize up over any significant period.
- 52:50Instead, what we see is that markets are really
- 52:54good at coming up with licensing structures,
- 52:57cross licensing structures, and the tech side
- 53:00pooling structures that both deliver revenues
- 53:05to entities that are responsible for innovating,
- 53:08creating content, and allow free flow of content
- 53:12to those who implement. So I'm not going to make
- 53:16a specific view on that particular decision,
- 53:18but I am concerned about the direction of the
- 53:21decision. OK, next one. Is there any hope for
- 53:25content owners? And in the case that there isn't,
- 53:29to make a living from content, what hope do we
- 53:31have that we had when copyright was enforced?
- 53:34OK. So I'm a little bit more optimistic on this
- 53:38and the question may have been asked before the
- 53:41very end because in digital content markets we
- 53:46have seen that markets have been able to kind
- 53:52of pivot in a low copyright environment through
- 53:57technology. Now some markets do it better than
- 54:01others. I think the market would be better off
- 54:03if they were in a more robust copyright environment.
- 54:07And again, I look, I want to focus again on not
- 54:11all, not all content markets have been able to
- 54:15adapt. And that's the news industry. They have
- 54:19not yet been able to come up with a viable business
- 54:22model that is independently economically sustainable.
- 54:28The ones that continue to exist are in the most,
- 54:33in very specialized information markets where
- 54:37the subscription model works, or they rely on
- 54:39patronage, corporate patronage or philanthropic
- 54:43patronage. But that's got to be an inferior model
- 54:47in terms of editorial independence than an independently
- 54:51economically sustainable model. In the AI ecosystem,
- 54:55the news industry is again, at the greatest risk
- 55:00because even though click -throughs revenues
- 55:06are reportedly modest in the search engine ecosystem,
- 55:12when you're using chat GPT, so far, as far as
- 55:16we know, users generally have very little incentive
- 55:20to ever go back to the original source, which
- 55:24means that there's going to be almost no revenue
- 55:27flowing to the original content producers in
- 55:32the AI ecosystem. And again, that fuels my concern
- 55:36about the recent decision. There's a question
- 55:45about Marvel owning the content it sold to Disney.
- 55:48I have to confess, I'm not sufficiently familiar.
- 55:53With the details of the history of ownership
- 55:56of those characters, I'd love to learn more offline,
- 56:00but I'm not sufficiently familiar to address
- 56:05that. What are your thoughts on lawsuits brought
- 56:09forth by major record companies, get AI music
- 56:12companies such as Suno and Udio? Again, similar
- 56:19thoughts here. I think the history of content
- 56:25markets show that content markets are good at
- 56:28coming up with licensing solutions that work
- 56:31for all stakeholders. And in order for that to
- 56:37happen, and in fact, in the AI ecosystem, there
- 56:40are already startups that are developing these
- 56:43types of licensing solutions. Licensing solutions
- 56:49create a wide range of price points. They enable
- 56:54markets to develop. They enable access to technology
- 56:59for the app and model developers. And they still
- 57:02deliver revenues to the music creators. So we
- 57:05don't have to have concern that music creation
- 57:09would fall entirely or the high value music creation
- 57:13would fall. And so, again, that's the same concern.
- 57:18And one thing I should point out There's another
- 57:20question on the anthropic decision. Just point
- 57:23out two things there. There's currently about
- 57:26a little bit more than 40 litigations in progress,
- 57:30depending on how you count them, in the AI space
- 57:33about copyright. The anthropic, the ALSIP decision
- 57:37is the most recent one, so obviously it gets
- 57:39the most headlines. Some in the audience may
- 57:42be familiar with the Thompson Reuters Ross Intelligence
- 57:46decision, where the court rejected the Fair Use
- 57:48defense. And I should also bring to the audience's
- 57:52attention, and I think I may have to end here,
- 57:56the key decision by the US Supreme Court in the
- 57:59Warhol estate case, where the court specifically
- 58:06admonished the lower courts for overly expanding
- 58:09the fair use exemption in a way that could be
- 58:14inconsistent with the architecture and the intent
- 58:17behind the copyright statute as a whole. And
- 58:19I'll just leave the audience with that thought
- 58:21because lower courts that pay attention to that
- 58:25decision should detect that there seems to be
- 58:29a pendulum shift of some magnitude in the court's
- 58:34appreciation for the importance of copyright.
- 58:37And so the way the law plays out in AI may turn
- 58:41out to be different than the way it played out
- 58:44at the dawn of the internet. It was great speaking
- 58:47to you today. Great. Thank you so much for your
- 58:51questions, and I'm happy to take comments directly
- 58:54at my USC email address. If I've elicited your
- 58:58interest enough in the book, it's of course available
- 59:03on Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and from the publisher
- 59:08directly, Oxford University Press. Thank you
- 59:11so much. On behalf of the bar, I want to thank
- 59:15you, Professor Barnett. It was an excellent presentation.
- 59:18I think I saw a note that some of the book is
- 59:21the result of maybe 15 years or more of research.
- 59:25And you clearly drive it home in a nice quantitative
- 59:29way by demonstrating with the amicus briefs what
- 59:33is in fact happening before the courts. And it's
- 59:36by no accident. And you can't dispute it. It's
- 59:40black and white. It's a fascinating subject.
- 59:43I think we're gonna have to have you back. The
- 59:45dynamic between performer and the platform. We're
- 59:48seeing play out time and again. I think there's
- 59:51a, recently in the last few years, we had a well
- 59:53-known comedian who decided to streamline, to
- 59:56bypass the platforms. But I think, you know,
- 1:00:00not to extend the past. I know you've been talking,
- 1:00:03but I think that kind of proves your point, maybe.
- 1:00:06You know, that this is someone of such means.
- 1:00:09that they could do it, but they had the means
- 1:00:14to do it. John and Jane Doe, they don't necessarily
- 1:00:19have that type of backing. But it's such a fascinating
- 1:00:24subject. And I know the members of the bar appreciate
- 1:00:28it. And I did get one question, which, not to
- 1:00:31put you on the spot, my understanding is you
- 1:00:33also do consultant and expert services. IP area
- 1:00:38as well or? Yes, absolutely. Okay, so we will
- 1:00:43absolutely have to have you back. We can talk
- 1:00:45about that and then as it was noted in the chat,
- 1:00:49your book is available or you had just said your
- 1:00:51book is available both in electronic form and
- 1:00:54the old school hard copy and an excellent read.
- 1:00:58So thank you very much for appearing again on
- 1:01:01behalf of The Bar. We really appreciate it. Thanks
- 1:01:04so much. Thanks for attending everyone. You may
- 1:01:08be eligible for CLE credit in your state. Visit
- 1:01:11bhba .org slash podcasts for more information