Latest / The Plato Library / Theaetetus Section IV
Transcript
- 0:01Speaker 1: Part four of Thettus by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
- 0:07Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by
- 0:12Speaker 1: Jeffrey Edwards. Socrates, Well, and what is the difficulty? Do
- 0:19Speaker 1: we not speak of false opinion and say that one
- 0:22Speaker 1: man holds a false and another a true opinion, as
- 0:26Speaker 1: though there were some natural distinction between them thetatus? We
- 0:30Speaker 1: certainly say so, Socrates. All things and everything are either
- 0:36Speaker 1: known or not known. I leave out of view the
- 0:39Speaker 1: intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting, because they have nothing
- 0:43Speaker 1: to do with our present question Thetatus. There can be
- 0:48Speaker 1: no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these that there is
- 0:51Speaker 1: no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing, Socrates,
- 0:56Speaker 1: that point being now determined. Must we not say that
- 1:00Speaker 1: he who has an opinion must have an opinion about
- 1:03Speaker 1: something which he knows or does not know Thettus? He must, Socrates.
- 1:10Speaker 1: He who knows cannot but know, and he who does
- 1:14Speaker 1: not know cannot know Thetatus? Of course, Socrates. What shall
- 1:20Speaker 1: we say, then, when a man has a false opinion,
- 1:23Speaker 1: does he think that which he knows to be some
- 1:25Speaker 1: other thing which he knows? And knowing both is he,
- 1:29Speaker 1: at the same time ignorant of both Thetitus that Socrates
- 1:34Speaker 1: is impossible, Socrates, But perhaps he thinks of something which
- 1:39Speaker 1: he does not know as some other thing which he
- 1:41Speaker 1: does not know. For example, he knows neither Thetitus nor Socrates,
- 1:47Speaker 1: and yet he fancies that Thetitus is Socrates or Socrates
- 1:52Speaker 1: Thetatus thettus. How can he Socrates? But surely he cannot
- 1:59Speaker 1: suppose what he knows to be what he does not know,
- 2:03Speaker 1: or what he does not know to be what he
- 2:05Speaker 1: knows Thetatus. That would be monstrous, Socrates, Where then is
- 2:13Speaker 1: false opinion? For if all things are either known or unknown,
- 2:17Speaker 1: there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under
- 2:20Speaker 1: this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded thetatus most true, Socrates.
- 2:29Speaker 1: Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere
- 2:31Speaker 1: of knowing or not knowing, into that of being and
- 2:35Speaker 1: not being Thetatus? What do you mean, Socrates? May we
- 2:41Speaker 1: not suspect the simple truth to be that he who
- 2:44Speaker 1: thinks about anything that which is not will necessarily think
- 2:48Speaker 1: what is false. Whatever in other respects may be the
- 2:51Speaker 1: state of his mind. Thetatus that again is not unlikely, Socrates. Socrates, then,
- 2:59Speaker 1: suppose someone to say to us, Thetitas, is it possible
- 3:03Speaker 1: for any man to think that which is not, either
- 3:06Speaker 1: as a self existent substance or as a predicate of
- 3:09Speaker 1: something else? And suppose that we answer, yes, he can
- 3:14Speaker 1: when he thinks what is not true? That will be
- 3:17Speaker 1: our answer Thetitus. Yes, Socrates. But is there any parallel
- 3:23Speaker 1: to this Thettus? What do you mean, Socrates? Can a
- 3:29Speaker 1: man see something and yet see nothing Thetitus? Impossible, Socrates.
- 3:36Speaker 1: But if he sees any one thing, he sees something
- 3:38Speaker 1: that exists. Do you suppose that what is one is
- 3:42Speaker 1: ever to be found among non existing things Thetitus? I
- 3:47Speaker 1: do not, Socrates. He then, who sees some one thing
- 3:51Speaker 1: sees something which is Thetitus? Clearly, Socrates. And he who
- 3:58Speaker 1: hears anything hears some one thing, And here's that which
- 4:02Speaker 1: is Thettus, Yes, Socrates. And he who touches anything touches
- 4:09Speaker 1: something which is one, and therefore is Thetitus. That again
- 4:14Speaker 1: is true, Socrates. And does not he who thinks think
- 4:19Speaker 1: some one thing Thetitus? Certainly, Socrates. And does not he
- 4:25Speaker 1: who thinks some one thing think something which is Thetitus?
- 4:30Speaker 1: I agree? Socrates. Then he who thinks of that which
- 4:35Speaker 1: is not thinks of nothing Thetitus clearly Socrates. And he
- 4:43Speaker 1: who thinks of nothing does not think at all Thetitus
- 4:47Speaker 1: obviously Socrates. Then no one can think that which is not,
- 4:52Speaker 1: either as a self existent substance or as a predicate
- 4:56Speaker 1: of something else. Thetitus clearly not Socrates. Then to think
- 5:02Speaker 1: falsely is different from thinking that which is not. Thettus.
- 5:07Speaker 1: It would seem so Socrates. Then false opinion has no
- 5:12Speaker 1: existence in us, either in the sphere of being or
- 5:15Speaker 1: of knowledge. Thetetus certainly not Socrates. But may not the
- 5:21Speaker 1: following be the description of what we express by this
- 5:24Speaker 1: name thettus what Socrates? May we not suppose that false
- 5:30Speaker 1: opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy. A person
- 5:35Speaker 1: may make an exchange in his mind and say that
- 5:38Speaker 1: one real object is another real object. For thus he
- 5:41Speaker 1: always thinks that which is, But he puts one thing
- 5:45Speaker 1: in place of another, and missing the aim of his thoughts,
- 5:48Speaker 1: he may be truly said to have false opinion. Thetitus.
- 5:53Speaker 1: Now you appear to me to have spoken the exact truth.
- 5:56Speaker 1: When a man puts the base in the place of
- 5:58Speaker 1: the noble or the noble in the place of the base.
- 6:02Speaker 1: Then he has truly false opinion. Socrates, I see Thettus
- 6:07Speaker 1: that your fear has disappeared, and that you are beginning
- 6:11Speaker 1: to despise me Thetatus. What makes you say so, Socrates?
- 6:17Speaker 1: You think, if I am not mistaken, that your truly
- 6:20Speaker 1: false is safe from censure, and that I shall never
- 6:24Speaker 1: ask whether there can be a swift which is slow,
- 6:27Speaker 1: or a heavy which is light, or any other self
- 6:30Speaker 1: contradictory thing which works not according to its own nature
- 6:34Speaker 1: but according to that of its opposite. But I will
- 6:37Speaker 1: not insist upon this, for I do not wish needlessly
- 6:40Speaker 1: to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false
- 6:44Speaker 1: opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else Thetatus,
- 6:50Speaker 1: I am, Socrates. It is possible, then, upon your view,
- 6:55Speaker 1: for the mind to conceive of one thing as another,
- 6:58Speaker 1: Thetitus true, Socrates. But must not the mind or thinking
- 7:05Speaker 1: power which misplaces them have a conception either of both
- 7:09Speaker 1: objects or of one of them. Thetitus certainly, Socrates, either
- 7:15Speaker 1: together or in succession. Thettus very good, Socrates. And do
- 7:22Speaker 1: you mean by conceiving the same which I mean? Thetitus?
- 7:27Speaker 1: What is that, Socrates, I mean the conversation which the
- 7:32Speaker 1: soul holds with herself in considering of anything. I speak
- 7:36Speaker 1: of what I scarcely understand. But the soul, when thinking,
- 7:39Speaker 1: appears to me to be just talking, asking questions of
- 7:43Speaker 1: herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she
- 7:48Speaker 1: has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a
- 7:51Speaker 1: sudden impulse, and has at last agreed and does not doubt,
- 7:56Speaker 1: this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to
- 7:59Speaker 1: form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a
- 8:02Speaker 1: word spoken I mean to oneself, and in silence, not
- 8:07Speaker 1: aloud or to another. But think you Thetitus. I agree, Socrates.
- 8:13Speaker 1: Then when anyone thinks of one thing as another, he
- 8:17Speaker 1: is saying to himself that one thing is another Thettus, Yes, Socrates.
- 8:24Speaker 1: But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the
- 8:27Speaker 1: noble is certainly base, or the unjust just, or best
- 8:31Speaker 1: of all? Have you ever attempted to convince yourself that
- 8:34Speaker 1: one thing is another? Nay, not even in sleep, did
- 8:38Speaker 1: you ever venture to say to yourself that add is
- 8:41Speaker 1: even or anything of the kind. Thetitus never, Socrates, And
- 8:48Speaker 1: do you suppose that any other man, either in his
- 8:51Speaker 1: senses or out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade
- 8:54Speaker 1: himself that an ox is a horse, or the two
- 8:57Speaker 1: our one Thetitus certainly not Socrates. But if thinking is
- 9:04Speaker 1: talking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two
- 9:07Speaker 1: objects and apprehending them both in his soul will say
- 9:11Speaker 1: and think that the one is the other of them.
- 9:14Speaker 1: And I must stand that even you, lover of dispute
- 9:17Speaker 1: as you are, had better let the word other alone.
- 9:21Speaker 1: I e. Not insist that one and other are the same.
- 9:26Speaker 1: I mean to say that no one thinks the noble
- 9:28Speaker 1: to be base or anything of the kind. Theatatus. I
- 9:33Speaker 1: will give up the word other, Socrates, And I agree
- 9:36Speaker 1: to what you say, Socrates. If a man has both
- 9:40Speaker 1: of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the
- 9:43Speaker 1: one of them is the other, Thetatus true, Socrates. Neither
- 9:49Speaker 1: if he has one of them only in his mind
- 9:52Speaker 1: and not the other, can he think that one is
- 9:54Speaker 1: the other, Thetitus true. For we should have to suppose
- 9:58Speaker 1: that he apprehends them, which is not in his thoughts
- 10:01Speaker 1: at all, Socrates. Then no one who has either both
- 10:06Speaker 1: or only one of the two objects in his mind
- 10:09Speaker 1: can think that the one is the other. And therefore
- 10:12Speaker 1: he who maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense.
- 10:17Speaker 1: For neither in this any more than in the previous
- 10:20Speaker 1: way can false opinion exist in us Thetitus no, Socrates.
- 10:27Speaker 1: But if Thettus this is not admitted, we shall be
- 10:30Speaker 1: driven into many absurdities. Thetetus, what are they? Socrates? I
- 10:36Speaker 1: will not tell you until I have endeavored to consider
- 10:39Speaker 1: the manner from every point of view, For I should
- 10:41Speaker 1: be ashamed of us if we were driven in our
- 10:43Speaker 1: perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak.
- 10:48Speaker 1: But if we find the solution and get away from them,
- 10:51Speaker 1: we may regard them only as the difficulties of others,
- 10:55Speaker 1: and the ridicule will not attach to us. On the
- 10:58Speaker 1: other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we
- 11:01Speaker 1: must be humble and allow the argument to trample us
- 11:04Speaker 1: under foot, as the sea sick passenger is trampled upon
- 11:08Speaker 1: by the sailor, and to do anything to us. Listen, then,
- 11:12Speaker 1: while I tell you how I hope to find a
- 11:14Speaker 1: way out of our difficulty Thetetus, let me hear, Socrates,
- 11:21Speaker 1: I think that we were wrong in denying that a
- 11:23Speaker 1: man could think what he knew to be what he
- 11:26Speaker 1: did not know, and that there is a way in
- 11:29Speaker 1: which such a deception is possible. Thetatus. You mean to say,
- 11:34Speaker 1: as I suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates,
- 11:38Speaker 1: and at a distance see some one who is unknown
- 11:41Speaker 1: to me, and whom I mistake for him, then the
- 11:45Speaker 1: deception will occur, Socrates. But has not that position been
- 11:50Speaker 1: relinquished by us, because involving the absurdity that we should
- 11:54Speaker 1: know and not know the things which we know thetaetus true, Socrates.
- 12:01Speaker 1: Let us make the assertion in another form, which may
- 12:05Speaker 1: or may not have a favorable issue. But as we
- 12:08Speaker 1: are in a great strait, every argument should be turned
- 12:11Speaker 1: over and tested. Tell me then, whether I am right
- 12:14Speaker 1: in saying that you may learn a thing which at
- 12:17Speaker 1: one time you did not know? Thetitis. Certainly you may, Socrates,
- 12:23Speaker 1: and another and another thetitas, yes, Socrates. I would have
- 12:30Speaker 1: you imagined then, that there exists in the mind of
- 12:32Speaker 1: man a block of wax which is of different sizes
- 12:36Speaker 1: in different men, harder, moister, and having more or less
- 12:40Speaker 1: of purity in one than another, and in some of
- 12:44Speaker 1: an intermediate quality. Thettus I see, Socrates. Let us say
- 12:50Speaker 1: that this tablet is a gift of memory, the mother
- 12:53Speaker 1: of the muses, and that when we wish to remember
- 12:57Speaker 1: anything which we have seen, or heard or thought in
- 13:00Speaker 1: our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions
- 13:03Speaker 1: and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them,
- 13:08Speaker 1: as from the seal of a ring. And that we
- 13:11Speaker 1: remember and know what is imprinted as long as the
- 13:14Speaker 1: image lasts. But when the image is effaced or cannot
- 13:18Speaker 1: be taken, then we forget and do not know. Thettus
- 13:24Speaker 1: Very good, Socrates. Now, when a person has this knowledge
- 13:29Speaker 1: and is considering something which he sees or hears, may
- 13:33Speaker 1: not false opinion arise in the following manner thetatus in
- 13:37Speaker 1: what manner, Socrates, when he thinks what he knows sometimes
- 13:42Speaker 1: to be what he knows, and sometimes to be what
- 13:45Speaker 1: he does not know. We were wrong before in denying
- 13:48Speaker 1: the possibility of this thettus. And how would you amend
- 13:53Speaker 1: the former statement, Socrates? I should begin by making a
- 13:57Speaker 1: list of the impossible cases which must be excluded. One.
- 14:02Speaker 1: No one can think one thing to be another when
- 14:05Speaker 1: he does not perceive either of them, but has the
- 14:08Speaker 1: memorial or seal of both of them in his mind.
- 14:12Speaker 1: Nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur
- 14:15Speaker 1: when he only knows one and does not know and
- 14:19Speaker 1: has no impression of the other. Nor can he think
- 14:22Speaker 1: that one thing which he does not know is another
- 14:25Speaker 1: thing which he does not know, or that what he
- 14:29Speaker 1: does not know is what he knows. Nor two, that
- 14:34Speaker 1: one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives,
- 14:38Speaker 1: or that something which he perceives is something which he
- 14:41Speaker 1: does not perceive, or that something which he does not
- 14:45Speaker 1: perceive is something else which he does not perceive, or
- 14:49Speaker 1: that something which he does not perceive is something which
- 14:52Speaker 1: he perceives. Nor again, three can he think that something
- 14:56Speaker 1: which he knows and perceives and of which he has
- 15:00Speaker 1: the impression coinciding with sense, is something else which he
- 15:03Speaker 1: knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression
- 15:07Speaker 1: coinciding with sense. This last case, if possible, is still
- 15:12Speaker 1: more inconceivable than the others. Nor for can he think
- 15:17Speaker 1: that something which he knows and perceives and of which
- 15:20Speaker 1: he has the memorial coinciding with sense, is something else
- 15:24Speaker 1: which he knows. Nor so long as these agree, can
- 15:27Speaker 1: he think that a thing which he knows and perceives
- 15:30Speaker 1: is another thing which he perceives, or that a thing
- 15:33Speaker 1: which he does not know and does not perceive is
- 15:36Speaker 1: the same as another thing which he does not know
- 15:39Speaker 1: and does not perceive. Nor again, can he suppose that
- 15:43Speaker 1: a thing which he does not know and does not
- 15:45Speaker 1: perceive is the same as another thing which he does
- 15:48Speaker 1: not know, or that a thing which he does not
- 15:51Speaker 1: know and does not perceive is another thing which he
- 15:54Speaker 1: does not perceive. All these utterly and absolutely exclude the
- 15:59Speaker 1: possible ability of false opinion. The only cases, if any,
- 16:03Speaker 1: which remain are the following thettus. What are they? If
- 16:08Speaker 1: you tell me, I may perhaps understand you better, But
- 16:11Speaker 1: at present I am unable to follow you, Socrates. A
- 16:16Speaker 1: person may think that some things which he knows, or
- 16:19Speaker 1: which he perceives and does not know, are some other
- 16:22Speaker 1: things which he knows and perceives, or that some things
- 16:26Speaker 1: which he knows and perceives are other things which he
- 16:29Speaker 1: knows and perceives. Thetatus, I understand you less than ever now, Socrates.
- 16:35Speaker 1: Hear me once more than I, knowing Theodorus and remembering
- 16:40Speaker 1: in my own mind what sort of person he is,
- 16:43Speaker 1: and also what sort of person. Thetatus is at one
- 16:46Speaker 1: time see them, and at another time do not see them.
- 16:51Speaker 1: And sometimes I touch them, and at another time not.
- 16:55Speaker 1: Or at one time I may hear them or perceive
- 16:59Speaker 1: them in some other way, and at another time not
- 17:02Speaker 1: perceive them. But still I remember them and know them
- 17:06Speaker 1: in my own mind. Thettus very true, Socrates. Then, first
- 17:13Speaker 1: of all, I want you to understand that a man
- 17:16Speaker 1: may or may not perceive sensibly that which he knows
- 17:20Speaker 1: thettus true, Socrates, and that which he does not know
- 17:26Speaker 1: will sometimes not be perceived by him, and sometimes will
- 17:30Speaker 1: be perceived and only perceived thetatus. That is also true, Socrates.
- 17:37Speaker 1: See whether you can follow me better. Now Socrates can
- 17:40Speaker 1: recognize Theodorus and Thetatus, but he sees neither of them,
- 17:45Speaker 1: nor does he perceive them in any other way. He cannot, then,
- 17:49Speaker 1: by any possibility, imagine in his own mind that thettus
- 17:53Speaker 1: is theodoras am I not right? Thettus? You are quite right, Socrates.
- 18:01Speaker 1: Then that was the first case of which I spoke,
- 18:04Speaker 1: thettus yes, Socrates. The second case was that I, knowing
- 18:10Speaker 1: one of you and not knowing the other and perceiving
- 18:14Speaker 1: neither can never think him whom I know to be
- 18:18Speaker 1: him whom I do not know, Thetitus true Socrates. In
- 18:24Speaker 1: the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you,
- 18:29Speaker 1: I cannot think that one of you whom I do
- 18:32Speaker 1: not know, is the other whom I do not know.
- 18:35Speaker 1: I need not again go over the catalog of excluded
- 18:38Speaker 1: cases in which I cannot form a false opinion about
- 18:41Speaker 1: you and Theodorus, either when I know both, or when
- 18:45Speaker 1: I am in ignorance of both, or when I know
- 18:49Speaker 1: one and not the other, and the same of perceiving.
- 18:53Speaker 1: Do you understand me Thetitus, I do, Socrates. The only
- 18:59Speaker 1: possible of erroneous opinion is when knowing you and Theodorus,
- 19:05Speaker 1: and having on the wax and block the impression of
- 19:08Speaker 1: both of you given as by a seal, but seeing
- 19:11Speaker 1: you imperfectly and at a distance. I try to assign
- 19:15Speaker 1: the right impression of memory to the right visual impression,
- 19:19Speaker 1: and to fit this into its own print. If I succeed,
- 19:23Speaker 1: recognition will take place. But if I fail and transpose them,
- 19:28Speaker 1: putting the foot into the wrong shoe, that is to say,
- 19:31Speaker 1: putting the vision of either of you on to the
- 19:34Speaker 1: wrong impression, or if my mind, like the sight in
- 19:37Speaker 1: a mirror, which is transferred from right to left air
- 19:42Speaker 1: by reason of some similar affection. Then heterodoxy and false
- 19:47Speaker 1: opinion ensues. Thetatus. Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature
- 19:53Speaker 1: of opinion with wonderful exactness, Socrates. Or again, when I
- 19:58Speaker 1: know both of you, and perceive as well as no
- 20:01Speaker 1: one of you, but not the other, and my knowledge
- 20:04Speaker 1: of him does not accord with perception. That was the
- 20:08Speaker 1: case put by me just now, which he did not
- 20:10Speaker 1: understand Thetitus. No I did not, Socrates. I meant to
- 20:17Speaker 1: say that when a person knows and perceives one of you,
- 20:21Speaker 1: and his knowledge coincides with his perception, he will never
- 20:24Speaker 1: think him to be some other person whom he knows
- 20:27Speaker 1: and perceives, and the knowledge of whom coincides with his perception.
- 20:32Speaker 1: For that also was a case supposed Thetitus true, Socrates.
- 20:39Speaker 1: But there was an omission of the further case, in which,
- 20:43Speaker 1: as we now see, false opinion may arise when knowing
- 20:47Speaker 1: both in seeing, or having some other sensible perception of both,
- 20:51Speaker 1: I fail in holding the seal over against the corresponding sensation.
- 20:56Speaker 1: Like a bad archer, I miss and fall wide of
- 20:58Speaker 1: the mark. In this is called falsehood Thetitus. Yes, it
- 21:04Speaker 1: is rightly so, called Socrates. When therefore, perception is present
- 21:09Speaker 1: to one of the seals or impressions, but not to
- 21:12Speaker 1: the other, and the mind fits the seal of the
- 21:15Speaker 1: absent perception on the one which is present. In any
- 21:19Speaker 1: case of this sort, the mind is deceived. In a word,
- 21:23Speaker 1: if our view is sound, there can be no error
- 21:26Speaker 1: or deception about things which a man does not know
- 21:29Speaker 1: and has never perceived, but only in things which are
- 21:32Speaker 1: known and perceived. In these alone, opinion turns and twists about,
- 21:38Speaker 1: and becomes alternately true and false. True when the seals
- 21:42Speaker 1: and impressions of sense meet straight, and opposite false when
- 21:46Speaker 1: they go awry and are crooked. Thetitas, And is not
- 21:51Speaker 1: that Socrates nobly said Socrates nobly, yes, But wait a
- 21:57Speaker 1: little and hear the explanation, and then you will say
- 22:01Speaker 1: so with more reason. For to think truly is noble,
- 22:04Speaker 1: and to be deceived is base. Thetitas undoubtedly, Socrates. And
- 22:12Speaker 1: the origin of truth and error is as follows. When
- 22:16Speaker 1: the wax in the soul of anyone is deep and
- 22:18Speaker 1: abundant and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which
- 22:24Speaker 1: pass through the senses and sink into the heart of
- 22:27Speaker 1: the soul, as Homer says, in a parable meaning to
- 22:30Speaker 1: indicate the likeness of the soul to wax cad cados, These,
- 22:36Speaker 1: I say, being pure and clear, and having a sufficient
- 22:41Speaker 1: depth of wax, are also lasting. And minds such as
- 22:45Speaker 1: these easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable
- 22:50Speaker 1: to confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty
- 22:54Speaker 1: of room, and having clear impressions of things as we
- 22:58Speaker 1: term them, quickly distribute them into their proper places on
- 23:01Speaker 1: the block. And such men are called wise. Do you
- 23:05Speaker 1: agree thetitis entirely, Socrates? But when the heart of anyone
- 23:12Speaker 1: is shaggy, a quality which the all wise poet commends,
- 23:17Speaker 1: or muddy, and of impure wax, or very soft or
- 23:21Speaker 1: very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind.
- 23:25Speaker 1: The soft are good at learning, but apt to forget
- 23:29Speaker 1: in the heart. Or the reverse, the shaggy and rugged
- 23:32Speaker 1: and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth
- 23:36Speaker 1: or dung in their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as
- 23:41Speaker 1: also the heart, for there is no depth in them.
- 23:44Speaker 1: In the soft tomb are indistinct, for their impressions are
- 23:48Speaker 1: easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when
- 23:52Speaker 1: they are all jostled together in a little soul which
- 23:55Speaker 1: has no room. These are the natures which have false opinions,
- 24:00Speaker 1: for when they see or hear or think of anything,
- 24:04Speaker 1: they are slow in assigning the right objects to the
- 24:06Speaker 1: right impressions. In their stupidity, they confuse them, and are
- 24:11Speaker 1: apt to see and hear and think amiss. And such
- 24:15Speaker 1: men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of
- 24:17Speaker 1: objects and ignorant. Thettus. No man Socrates can say anything
- 24:24Speaker 1: truer than that Socrates. Then now we may admit the
- 24:28Speaker 1: existence of false opinion in us thettus certainly, Socrates, and
- 24:35Speaker 1: of true opinion also Thettus, yes, Socrates. We have at
- 24:41Speaker 1: length satisfactorily proven that beyond a doubt, there are these
- 24:46Speaker 1: two sorts of opinion. Thetitus undoubtedly Socrates, alas theatatus. What
- 24:53Speaker 1: a tiresome creature is a man who is fond of talking? Thetitus?
- 24:58Speaker 1: What makes you say so, Socrates? Because I am disheartened
- 25:03Speaker 1: at my own stupidity and tiresome garrulity. For what other
- 25:07Speaker 1: term will describe the habit of a man who is
- 25:10Speaker 1: always arguing on all signs of a question, whose dulness
- 25:14Speaker 1: cannot be convinced, and who will never leave off Thetetus.
- 25:19Speaker 1: But what puts you out of heart? Socrates? I am
- 25:23Speaker 1: not only out of heart, but in positive despair, for
- 25:27Speaker 1: I do not know what to answer if anyone were
- 25:30Speaker 1: to ask me, Oh, Socrates, have you indeed discovered that
- 25:34Speaker 1: false opinion arises neither in the comparison of perceptions with
- 25:37Speaker 1: one another, nor yet in thought, but in the union
- 25:41Speaker 1: of thought and perception. Yes, I shall say, with the
- 25:45Speaker 1: complaisance of one who thinks that he has made a
- 25:48Speaker 1: noble discovery Thetetus. I see no reason why we should
- 25:53Speaker 1: be ashamed of our demonstration, Socrates. Socrates, he will say,
- 25:58Speaker 1: you mean to argue that the man whom we only
- 26:01Speaker 1: think of and do not see, cannot be confused with
- 26:04Speaker 1: the horse which we do not see or touch, but
- 26:07Speaker 1: only think of and do not perceive. That I believe
- 26:10Speaker 1: to be my meaning, I shall reply Thetitus, quite right, Socrates. Well,
- 26:17Speaker 1: then he will say, according to that argument, the number eleven,
- 26:22Speaker 1: which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve,
- 26:24Speaker 1: which is only thought, how would you answer him? Thetitas,
- 26:29Speaker 1: I should say that a mistake may very likely arise
- 26:32Speaker 1: between the eleven or twelve which are seen or handled,
- 26:36Speaker 1: but that no similar mistake can arise between the eleven
- 26:39Speaker 1: and twelve which are in the mind. Socrates, Well, but
- 26:44Speaker 1: do you think that no one ever put before his
- 26:46Speaker 1: own mind five and seven. I do not mean five
- 26:49Speaker 1: or seven men or horses, but five or seven in
- 26:53Speaker 1: the abstract, which, as we see, are recorded on the
- 26:56Speaker 1: waxen block, and in which false opinions is held to
- 27:00Speaker 1: be impossible. Did no man ever ask himself how many
- 27:04Speaker 1: these numbers make when added together, and answer that they
- 27:08Speaker 1: are eleven, while another thinks that they are twelve? Or
- 27:12Speaker 1: would all agree in thinking in saying that they are twelve?
- 27:16Speaker 1: Thetitus certainly not many would think that they are eleven.
- 27:21Speaker 1: And in the higher numbers the chance of error is
- 27:23Speaker 1: greater still, For I assume you to be speaking of
- 27:26Speaker 1: numbers in general, Socrates exactly, And I want you to
- 27:31Speaker 1: consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in
- 27:34Speaker 1: the waxen block are supposed to be eleven. Thetitas, Yes,
- 27:40Speaker 1: that seems to be the case. Socrates. Then do we
- 27:45Speaker 1: not come back to the old difficulty, For he who
- 27:48Speaker 1: makes such a mistake does think one thing which he
- 27:51Speaker 1: knows to be another thing which he knows. But this,
- 27:55Speaker 1: as we sand, was impossible, and afforded an irresistible proof
- 27:59Speaker 1: of the non existence of false opinion, because otherwise the
- 28:03Speaker 1: same person would inevitably know and not know the same
- 28:07Speaker 1: thing at the same time. Thettus most true, Socrates. Then
- 28:14Speaker 1: false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought
- 28:18Speaker 1: and sense, for in that case we could not have
- 28:21Speaker 1: been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought. And thus we
- 28:25Speaker 1: are obliged to say either that false opinion does not exist,
- 28:29Speaker 1: or that a man may not know that which he knows.
- 28:33Speaker 1: Which alternative do you prefer? Thettus? It is hard to determine, Socrates, Socrates,
- 28:40Speaker 1: and yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But
- 28:44Speaker 1: as we are at our wits end, suppose that we
- 28:47Speaker 1: do a shameless thing, thetatus? What is it? Socrates? Let
- 28:53Speaker 1: us attempt to explain the verb to know thetatus? And
- 28:57Speaker 1: why should that be shameless? Socrates? You seem not to
- 29:02Speaker 1: be aware that the whole of our discussion, from the
- 29:04Speaker 1: very beginning, has been a search after knowledge of which
- 29:08Speaker 1: we are assumed not to know the nature Thetitus n
- 29:13Speaker 1: But I am well aware, Socrates, and is it not
- 29:17Speaker 1: shameless when we do not know what knowledge is to
- 29:20Speaker 1: be explaining the verb to know the truth is status
- 29:25Speaker 1: that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands
- 29:29Speaker 1: of times have we repeated the words we know and
- 29:33Speaker 1: do not know, and we have or have not science
- 29:37Speaker 1: or knowledge, as if we could understand what we are
- 29:40Speaker 1: saying to one another. So long as we remain ignorant
- 29:43Speaker 1: about knowledge, And at this moment we are using the
- 29:47Speaker 1: words we understand, we are ignorant, as though we could
- 29:52Speaker 1: still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science Thetitus.
- 29:57Speaker 1: But if you avoid these expression, Socrates, how will you
- 30:00Speaker 1: ever argue at all? Socrates? I could not, being the
- 30:05Speaker 1: man I am. The case would be different if I
- 30:08Speaker 1: were a true hero of dialectic And oh that such
- 30:12Speaker 1: an one were present, for he would have told us
- 30:16Speaker 1: to avoid the use of these terms. At the same
- 30:18Speaker 1: time he would not have spared in you and me
- 30:21Speaker 1: the faults which I have noted. But seeing that we
- 30:25Speaker 1: are no great wits, shall I venture to say what
- 30:27Speaker 1: knowing is? For I think that the attempt may be
- 30:30Speaker 1: worth making Thetatus then by all means venture, and no
- 30:36Speaker 1: one shall find fault with you for using the forbidden terms. Socrates,
- 30:42Speaker 1: you have heard the common explanation of the verb to
- 30:45Speaker 1: know Thetaetus. I think so, but I do not remember
- 30:49Speaker 1: it at the moment, Socrates. They explain the word to
- 30:54Speaker 1: know as meaning to have knowledge thetatus true, Socrates, I
- 31:01Speaker 1: should like to make a slight change and see to
- 31:04Speaker 1: possess knowledge Thetitus. How did the two expressions differ, Socrates?
- 31:10Speaker 1: Perhaps there may be no difference, But still I should
- 31:13Speaker 1: like you to hear my view, that you may help
- 31:16Speaker 1: me to test it Thetitus. I will if I can, Socrates.
- 31:22Speaker 1: I should distinguish having from possessing. For example, a man
- 31:26Speaker 1: may buy and keep under his control a garment which
- 31:29Speaker 1: he does not wear, and then we should say not
- 31:32Speaker 1: that he has, but that he possesses the garment Thetitus.
- 31:37Speaker 1: It would be the correct expression, Socrates. Well, may not
- 31:41Speaker 1: a man possess and yet not have knowledge in the
- 31:45Speaker 1: sense of which I am speaking, as you may suppose
- 31:48Speaker 1: a man to have caught wild birds, doves or any
- 31:52Speaker 1: other birds, and to be keeping them in an aviary,
- 31:55Speaker 1: which he has constructed at home. We might say of
- 31:58Speaker 1: him in one sense that he always has them, because
- 32:02Speaker 1: he possesses them, might we not Thetitas, Yes, Socrates. And
- 32:09Speaker 1: yet in another sense he has none of them. But
- 32:12Speaker 1: they are in his power, and he has got them
- 32:14Speaker 1: under his hand in an enclosure of his own, and
- 32:18Speaker 1: can take and have them whenever he likes. He can
- 32:21Speaker 1: catch any which he likes, and let the bird go again,
- 32:25Speaker 1: and he may do so as often as he pleases.
- 32:29Speaker 1: Thetitus true, Socrates. Once more, then, as in what preceded,
- 32:35Speaker 1: we made a sort of wax and figment in the mind.
- 32:38Speaker 1: So let us now suppose that in the mind of
- 32:41Speaker 1: each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds,
- 32:45Speaker 1: some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small groups,
- 32:50Speaker 1: others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere. Thetitus. Let us imagine
- 32:56Speaker 1: such an aviary, and what is to follow. We may
- 33:01Speaker 1: suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that
- 33:04Speaker 1: when we were children this receptacle was empty. Whenever a
- 33:08Speaker 1: man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind
- 33:12Speaker 1: of knowledge, he may be said to have learned or
- 33:14Speaker 1: discovered the thing which is the subject of the knowledge,
- 33:18Speaker 1: and this is to know thetitis granted Socrates. And further,
- 33:25Speaker 1: when anyone wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences,
- 33:29Speaker 1: and having taken to hold it, and again to let
- 33:33Speaker 1: them go, how will he express himself? Will he describe
- 33:36Speaker 1: the catching of them and the original possession in the
- 33:40Speaker 1: same words? I will make my meaning clearer by an example,
- 33:44Speaker 1: you admit that there is an art of arithmetic, thetitis.
- 33:48Speaker 1: To be sure, Socrates conceive this under the form of
- 33:53Speaker 1: a hunt after the science of odd and even in
- 33:56Speaker 1: general thetitis I follow Socrates, having the use of the art.
- 34:02Speaker 1: The arithmetician, if I am not mistaken, has the conceptions
- 34:06Speaker 1: of number under his hand, and can transmit them to another. Thettus, yes, Socrates,
- 34:15Speaker 1: And when transmitting them he may be sent to teach them,
- 34:18Speaker 1: and when receiving to learn them, and when having them
- 34:22Speaker 1: in possession in the aforesaid aviary, he may be said
- 34:25Speaker 1: to know them thetitas exactly, Socrates. Attend to what follows.
- 34:32Speaker 1: Must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he
- 34:36Speaker 1: has the science of all numbers in his mind thetitas true, Socrates,
- 34:43Speaker 1: and he can reckon abstract numbers in his hand, or
- 34:46Speaker 1: things about him which are numerable Thetitus. Of course, he can, Socrates,
- 34:53Speaker 1: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such
- 34:56Speaker 1: and such a number amounts to Thetitus. Very true, true, Socrates.
- 35:02Speaker 1: And so he appears to be searching into something which
- 35:05Speaker 1: he knows, as if he did not know it. For
- 35:08Speaker 1: we have already admitted that he knows all numbers. You
- 35:11Speaker 1: have heard these perplexing questions raised thetatus I have, Socrates.
- 35:18Speaker 1: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and
- 35:20Speaker 1: see that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds.
- 35:24Speaker 1: One kind is prior to possession and for the sake
- 35:27Speaker 1: of possession, and the other for the sake of taking
- 35:30Speaker 1: and holding in the hands that which is possessed already.
- 35:34Speaker 1: And thus, when a man has learned and known something
- 35:37Speaker 1: long ago, he may resume and get hold of the
- 35:40Speaker 1: knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at
- 35:44Speaker 1: hand in his mind, Thetatus True, Socrates. That was my
- 35:51Speaker 1: reason for asking how we ought to speak. When an
- 35:54Speaker 1: arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading, shall
- 35:59Speaker 1: we see that although he knows, he comes back to
- 36:02Speaker 1: himself to learn what he already knows theatatus, It would
- 36:06Speaker 1: be two absurd Socrates. Socrates, shall we say then that
- 36:11Speaker 1: he is going to read or number what he does
- 36:14Speaker 1: not know, although we have admitted that he knows all
- 36:16Speaker 1: letters and all numbers Satatus, That again would be an absurdity. Socrates.
- 36:24Speaker 1: Then shall we say that about names we care nothing.
- 36:28Speaker 1: Anyone may twist and turn the words knowing and learning
- 36:33Speaker 1: in any way which he likes. But since we have
- 36:36Speaker 1: determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having
- 36:39Speaker 1: or using it, we do assert that a man cannot
- 36:42Speaker 1: possess that which he possesses. And therefore, in no case
- 36:47Speaker 1: can a man not know that which he knows. But
- 36:50Speaker 1: he may get a false opinion about it, for he
- 36:53Speaker 1: may have the knowledge not of this particular thing, but
- 36:57Speaker 1: of some other. When the various numbers inform of knowledge
- 37:00Speaker 1: are flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture
- 37:04Speaker 1: a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store,
- 37:07Speaker 1: he takes the wrong one by mistake. That is to say,
- 37:10Speaker 1: when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold
- 37:13Speaker 1: of the ring dove, which he had in his mind
- 37:15Speaker 1: when he wanted the pigeon. Paetetus, a very rational explanation, Socrates.
- 37:23Speaker 1: But when he catches the one which he wants, then
- 37:25Speaker 1: he is not deceived and has an opinion of what is.
- 37:29Speaker 1: And thus false and true opinion may exist, and the
- 37:33Speaker 1: difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that
- 37:38Speaker 1: you agree with me, do you not, sat Aetus? Yes, Socrates.
- 37:44Speaker 1: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a
- 37:46Speaker 1: man's not knowing what he knows, for we are not
- 37:49Speaker 1: driven to the inference that he does not possess what
- 37:52Speaker 1: he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And
- 37:56Speaker 1: yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in
- 38:00Speaker 1: at the window Thetitus? What is it? Socrates? How can
- 38:05Speaker 1: the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion? Thetitus?
- 38:11Speaker 1: What do you mean, Socrates? In the first place, how
- 38:15Speaker 1: can a man who has the knowledge of anything be
- 38:18Speaker 1: ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance,
- 38:22Speaker 1: but by reason of his own knowledge? And again, is
- 38:25Speaker 1: it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another
- 38:28Speaker 1: thing to be this and this to be another thing, that,
- 38:32Speaker 1: having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should
- 38:36Speaker 1: still know nothing and be ignorant of all things. You
- 38:40Speaker 1: might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know,
- 38:43Speaker 1: and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make
- 38:46Speaker 1: him ignorant. Thetitus. Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong
- 38:51Speaker 1: in making only forms of knowledge our birds, whereas there
- 38:54Speaker 1: ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying
- 38:57Speaker 1: about together in the mind. And then he who sought
- 39:01Speaker 1: to take one of them might sometimes catch a form
- 39:03Speaker 1: of knowledge, in sometimes a form of ignorance, and thus
- 39:07Speaker 1: he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a
- 39:10Speaker 1: true one from knowledge about the same thing, Socrates, I
- 39:15Speaker 1: cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg
- 39:19Speaker 1: you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say. Then,
- 39:23Speaker 1: according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a
- 39:26Speaker 1: false opinion. Am I right? Theaetetus, Yes, Socrates. He will
- 39:33Speaker 1: certainly not think that he has a false opinion, Thetitus,
- 39:37Speaker 1: of course, not Socrates. He will think that his opinion
- 39:41Speaker 1: is true, and he will fancy that he knows the
- 39:44Speaker 1: things about which he has been deceived Thetetus. Certainly, Socrates.
- 39:51Speaker 1: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and
- 39:54Speaker 1: not ignorance. Thetitus clearly Socrates. And thus, after going a
- 40:01Speaker 1: long way round, we are once more face to face
- 40:05Speaker 1: with original difficulty. The hero of Dialectic will retort upon us, Oh,
- 40:11Speaker 1: my excellent friends, he will say, laughing. If a man
- 40:14Speaker 1: knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge,
- 40:18Speaker 1: can he think that one of them which he knows
- 40:20Speaker 1: is the other which he knows? Or if he knows
- 40:23Speaker 1: neither of them, can he think that the one which
- 40:26Speaker 1: he knows not is another which he knows not. Or
- 40:29Speaker 1: if he knows one and not the other, can he
- 40:32Speaker 1: think the one which he knows to be the one
- 40:34Speaker 1: which he does not know, or the one which he
- 40:37Speaker 1: does not know to be the one which he knows?
- 40:40Speaker 1: Or will you tell me that there are other forms
- 40:43Speaker 1: of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and
- 40:46Speaker 1: which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven
- 40:50Speaker 1: on wax and blocks, according to your foolish images, and
- 40:54Speaker 1: which he may be said to know while he possesses them,
- 40:57Speaker 1: even though he have them not at hand in his mind.
- 41:00Speaker 1: And thus, in a perpetual circle you will be compelled
- 41:03Speaker 1: to go round and round, and you will make no progress.
- 41:08Speaker 1: What are we to say in reply? Thettus Thetitus. Indeed, Socrates,
- 41:13Speaker 1: I do not know what we are to say. Socrates,
- 41:17Speaker 1: are not his reproaches just? And does not the argument
- 41:20Speaker 1: truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false
- 41:23Speaker 1: opinion until we know what knowledge is that must be
- 41:27Speaker 1: first ascertained. Then the nature of false opinion Thetitus. I
- 41:33Speaker 1: cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we
- 41:36Speaker 1: have yet gone. And of Part four of Thetitus Recording
- 41:43Speaker 1: in memory of Mitchell Edwards