Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Racial Bias in the Jury Room Post Sanchez: New Strategies for the Defense
Transcript
- 0:03Hello, everyone. Welcome to today's program,
- 0:07Racial Bias in the Jury Room Post Sanchez, New
- 0:10Strategies for the Defense. I'm Alla Policastro,
- 0:13Director of Education and Professional Development
- 0:15at Beverly Hills Bar Association. And today it's
- 0:18my pleasure to introduce our speaker, Orly Aroney.
- 0:22Orly is the founder of Aroney Appeals Law Group,
- 0:25where for more than 16 years she has focused
- 0:27exclusively on criminal appeals and post -conviction
- 0:30relief. throughout California, including habeas
- 0:32corpus proceedings, parole hearings, and resentencing
- 0:35matters. Orley is proud of her success in securing
- 0:39the reversal of numerous life sentences under
- 0:41California's criminal justice reforms. Orly is
- 0:45a recognized legal commentator on KTLA and contributor
- 0:48to the Daily Journal. A dedicated educator and
- 0:52advocate, she guest lectures on criminal appeals
- 0:55appellate process, excuse me, and became the
- 0:57first attorney in Marin County Superior Court
- 1:00to obtain a certificate of rehabilitation for
- 1:03a client. We're so excited to hear what she has
- 1:05to share with us today. So I'm now going to turn
- 1:07it over to Orly. Hello everybody and happy Wednesday.
- 1:13I'm actually excited. to have this webinar today
- 1:17with you to share. I don't know if some of you
- 1:18have actually read the Sanchez opinion in the
- 1:21Ninth Circuit, but if you didn't, don't worry.
- 1:24We have a PowerPoint to share with you, and there's
- 1:28a lot of good nuggets for the defense, but also
- 1:31for the prosecution as well and for the legal
- 1:34community to learn more about this. I'm gonna
- 1:37go ahead and share my screen with you. The PowerPoint
- 1:41was passed out to all of you, so you should have
- 1:44it. And I'm going to... Alrighty there. Okay.
- 1:55So I called this a fair trial, cannot survive
- 1:59racial prejudice in the jury room. This is United
- 2:03States v. Sanchez. This was a Ninth Circuit opinion,
- 2:07May 12, 2026. I will keep you entertained because
- 2:11this case was very much entertaining as we go
- 2:13through it. And there was a positive resolution.
- 2:17So stay tuned. So the background of this case,
- 2:22a little bit about the defendant. Andres Sanchez
- 2:25was a man of Mexican descent. He was employed
- 2:28as a tax preparation business, and he was serving
- 2:31Spanish -speaking clients in Idaho. He ended
- 2:35up being convicted in the United States District
- 2:38Court in Idaho on six counts from the preparation
- 2:42of fraudulent tax returns. He had a motion that
- 2:46was denied for a mistrial and a new trial were
- 2:49denied and then he appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
- 2:53So we see there were six counts of fraud. Four
- 2:57jurors heard remarks and they were racial remarks
- 3:01all connected. to Mr. Sanchez. One of the jurors
- 3:05actually did the right thing and reported it
- 3:08before Weideer. Two initially denied hearing
- 3:12them later, so we'll get into that and what the
- 3:15remarks were actually made. And then 13 minutes
- 3:19before the verdict, believe it or not, so close,
- 3:22Juror 5 was removed, who ended up being the problematic
- 3:27juror here. So ultimately, It was reversed on
- 3:31the Ninth Circuit. So we'll get into all of that
- 3:34and what the abuse of discretion was in this
- 3:36case. So the jurors note here, what did juror
- 3:4416 tell the court? This was really pertinent.
- 3:48And I actually took the piece of what was in
- 3:53the opinion because I thought that all of us
- 3:57should read it. I'm sure we would all be shocked
- 3:59by it. So juror 16 said, your honor and members
- 4:04of the prosecution and defense teams, I apologize
- 4:08for not writing this sooner. I have witnessed
- 4:10two separate instances at two separate times
- 4:14by two different jurors, comments derisive and
- 4:18hurtful to the LGBTQ community and to the Spanish
- 4:22community. One of these men, The special men
- 4:26went to the extreme of jumping up at his seat,
- 4:30turned around yelling and flexing about how there
- 4:33is no way he will change his vote because he
- 4:36will get off easy and effing do it again. After
- 4:40this rant directed at me, I said, are you trying
- 4:43to bully me? As this juror finished his rant,
- 4:46the other one jumps up and starts yelling. Yeah,
- 4:50Mexicans hate Americans and they will do anything
- 4:52to get over us. He then went and rolled up his
- 4:56coat and laid down under a table. This was the
- 5:00exact note from juror 16 when he was discussing
- 5:05what happened in deliberations and he came forward
- 5:09to the courts. There were other comments from
- 5:13other jurors suggesting that Mexicans pretended
- 5:16an inability to speak English. there were remarks
- 5:20directly associating Mr. Sanchez to a place of
- 5:24employment with cartel activity because they
- 5:26were saying, oh, you know, Hispanics, cartel
- 5:29activity. And what was really interesting is
- 5:32that the jury had openly discussed that no person
- 5:37of color sat amongst themselves. And the exact
- 5:41quote from juror five was, the Mexicans, all
- 5:49they want to do is screw us anyways. And that's
- 5:51what he said. And when we take a look at this
- 5:54and we hear this as attorneys, we think about.
- 5:59how this even happened. I mean, it sounds like
- 6:01a Jerry Springer show unfolding because it's
- 6:05almost of what didn't happen. It wasn't just
- 6:09one remark, it was several and it was to other
- 6:13communities other than to the Hispanic community
- 6:16and it directly affected Mr. Sanchez because
- 6:20he is of Hispanic descent. So when this issue
- 6:28was brought upon by juror number 16. The district
- 6:34court decided that they're going to call in the
- 6:37jurors and have a discussion to see who heard
- 6:42what. Ultimately, the court had three remedies
- 6:47available to them. There were three different
- 6:49options. in what they were going to do with what
- 6:53juror 16 had told the court that was going on
- 6:56in deliberations. Remember, 13 minutes before
- 6:59the verdict. So number one was declare a mistrial.
- 7:04That was rejected. The court rejected that motion
- 7:08earlier that morning. Number two was proceed
- 7:13with the 11 jurors and that's ultimately what
- 7:17the court decided on and we'll get into why it
- 7:20made that decision and obviously it was later
- 7:23on reverse on the ninth circuit. The court excused
- 7:28juror number five and essentially sent back the
- 7:3211 remaining jurors without directing them to
- 7:36regard any of the comments made. That was a bit
- 7:40shocking to me, and that was also something that
- 7:43the majority in the Ninth Circuit decision had
- 7:45discussed as well. And the other option was to
- 7:49seat an alternate juror, which the court rejected
- 7:52because they felt that it wouldn't have helped
- 7:58and actually They talked about judicial efficiency,
- 8:02which we'll get into that later on. So they also
- 8:05rejected that as an option as well. So let's
- 8:12go into the court's reasoning of why they chose,
- 8:17why the 11 in this position to proceed on the
- 8:2111 jurors. So on number one, on removing juror
- 8:25five, The court said it made a statement that
- 8:28demonstrate an animus based upon national origin
- 8:31or ethnicity. So his vote should not be made
- 8:34part of the jury's conclusion in this case. With
- 8:39respect to number two, the court said on seeding
- 8:42an alternate, it would mean instructing the entire
- 8:46jury to start the entire process over, which
- 8:50would obviously would not start until next week.
- 8:54And on the third option, on proceeding with 11
- 8:58jurors, the court said it had the discretion
- 9:00to do so. So it was essentially going to allow
- 9:04it to proceed on the 11 jurors instead of the
- 9:0712. And I highlighted the issue about starting
- 9:11the entire process over, because that's important.
- 9:15It tells us about where the court's thinking.
- 9:18It said, the court actually went to say it would
- 9:21not be prudent, fair, or necessary in the interest
- 9:24of justice given that the jury had deliberated
- 9:28for all of yesterday afternoon and into this
- 9:30morning and were ready to return a verdict. So
- 9:34that tells me, and that also told the Ninth Circuit,
- 9:37look, this court was ready to be done with the
- 9:40case. We were so close to the termination of
- 9:44it. And so they thought judicial efficiency.
- 9:48But what ends up happening, that wasn't the case
- 9:50because all of the litigation that happened after
- 9:54the fact, I mean, the resources expended on both
- 9:58sides from the attorney general's office and
- 10:01the defense, it wasn't a judicial economy type
- 10:07of argument. And we'll see that. So we're going
- 10:10to go on to the next. So this was the district
- 10:14court's response. What they did was, when I had
- 10:19started, the first thing that they did was they
- 10:23inquired. So what they did, Jury 16 came in,
- 10:27gave all the information of all the craziness
- 10:30that was happening, and then they started calling
- 10:32all the individual juries back into the courtroom.
- 10:39Ultimately, what they did was they removed Juror
- 10:445 from the panel. And then the case was continued,
- 10:49like we said, it permitted the remaining 11 to
- 10:52deliberate, didn't tell them to discard any of
- 10:56the comments that were made. And then there was
- 10:59the verdict, which accepted the verdict by the
- 11:02panel. And then there was the denial of the mistrial,
- 11:08and they denied the new trial as well. So in
- 11:16this situation, the motion for a new trial, this
- 11:20was Mr. Sanchez's position here. The position
- 11:25was this was a constitutional claim. And Mr.
- 11:29Sanchez said that basically, presence violated
- 11:35his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial
- 11:39jury. And he's saying, look, you know, this juror
- 11:44participated in virtually all of the deliberations
- 11:48minus the 13 minutes. I mean, how could it have
- 11:51not affected all the people that were sitting
- 11:54in the room, especially because there was multiple
- 11:57comments? I mean, jurors were screaming at each
- 12:01other and yelling, you know, this was a reasonable
- 12:06claim that he was making that any defendant should
- 12:10make in this situation. So the question here
- 12:19presented, there were three competing frameworks
- 12:23and why the choice was actually determinative.
- 12:28So what remedy is required when a juror makes
- 12:33explicitly racist statements during deliberations
- 12:38and is removed before a final verdict is returned?
- 12:43So that was the ultimate question of what was
- 12:46asked. So there were three competing frameworks
- 12:49here. The first one is Dyer versus Calderon.
- 12:54And this one treats certain categories of juror
- 12:58bias as structural error, and prejudice is therefore
- 13:03presumed conclusively. Harmless error analysis
- 13:06is foreclosed, so you don't have to even go ahead
- 13:10and follow that analysis, and a reversal is a
- 13:13matter of course. And the Ninth Circuit ultimately
- 13:18declined on those facts, and I'll get into why
- 13:22that was the case. The second one that we have
- 13:27was United States versus Sarkissian. And this
- 13:32asks whether the improper remarks infected the
- 13:36jury's capacity to evaluate the evidence fairly.
- 13:40And the district court ultimately applied this
- 13:43standard and found that they had not. I'll get
- 13:47into that as well. And the Ninth Circuit said,
- 13:50no, this is the incorrect standard. Now, the
- 13:54last and final standard was Remmer v. United
- 13:58States. That was adopted by the majority of the
- 14:01Ninth Circuit. And this is really, I would consider
- 14:06this the happy medium between all of them, because
- 14:10this then establishes a heavy presumption of
- 14:14prejudice, shifting the burden to the government
- 14:16that they would need to prove that the jurist's
- 14:20presence was harmless to the defendant. And like
- 14:24we said, this was ultimately adopted. So when
- 14:32we're talking about the standard of review, we
- 14:37look upon how an abuse of discretion is found.
- 14:41And what we need to look at is the Hickinson
- 14:45two -step. So there was a two -step analysis
- 14:48that goes in determining an abuse of discretion.
- 14:52So step one asked Inovo whether the trial court
- 14:56identified the correct legal rule. So if they
- 15:01failed to do so, we must conclude its abuse of
- 15:04discretion. Step two was never reached. Only
- 15:09if the correct rule was identified is it then
- 15:12that the court has to look at whether its application
- 15:17was illogical, implausible, or without support
- 15:22in the record. Okay. And so what it decided on
- 15:28appeal to the Ninth Circuit, because this was
- 15:30on appeal, they said that because the district
- 15:34court chose Sarkissian, which was the incorrect
- 15:37standard over Remmer, the error was complete
- 15:41at step one. And therefore there was no deference
- 15:46was owed to weighing of the record. So we never
- 15:51even had to go there because step one, was that
- 15:54the actual, the framework work that the district
- 15:59court relied upon was incorrect here. And we'll
- 16:03explain why. I'm also gonna get into explaining
- 16:07the different frameworks and what fact patterns
- 16:10those would apply to. So this is framework one.
- 16:20structure error under dire versus Calderon. This
- 16:26is what Sanchez argued. Sanchez argued, I want
- 16:29an automatic reversal. We have people in the
- 16:33jury that were making completely racially biased
- 16:37comments about me, several of them. I just, I
- 16:41want an automatic reversal. And that's what he
- 16:43was arguing was dire. That it presumes prejudice
- 16:48conclusively, and that's it. You don't need to
- 16:51go any further with the harmless error analysis.
- 16:54And it compels the reversal. I understand why
- 16:58he would want that, given that everything that
- 17:00happened in the deliberations. And he's lucky
- 17:03that Juror 16 came forward. And we'll go into
- 17:07what actually, what else happened in the jury
- 17:11room. So what the court held. was that it declined
- 17:16to apply that framework on these facts. This
- 17:21is the Ninth Circuit held this, that the structure
- 17:26error doctrine operates more naturally where
- 17:30a biased juror participates through the return
- 17:33of a completed verdict rather than being removed
- 17:37before. the verdict was finally rendered. Because
- 17:40remember, the verdict was never finally rendered
- 17:43in this case. We still were 13 minutes shy. And
- 17:48so like I said, I think that the REMR was actually
- 17:52the correct framework that was applied here.
- 17:56A note for everybody, we'll get into Judge Bia's
- 17:59dissent. But everybody, the majority and Judge
- 18:03Bia, agreed that Dyer was inapplicable here.
- 18:08and we'll discuss why that was the case. So here
- 18:17we have the ruling below and why the district
- 18:22court found no prejudice. So the jury, the question
- 18:27that the court asked, you know, what they did
- 18:29was jury 16 came in, they started bringing everyone
- 18:33in individually and asking them, you know, in
- 18:36void here, what happened, what did you hear,
- 18:39and so on and so forth. So the question that
- 18:42the court asked was whether jurors' five comments
- 18:46so affected the jury's ability to consider the
- 18:50totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted
- 18:54the verdict. Interestingly enough, most of the
- 19:00jury was unaware, which I don't know if we believe
- 19:05or not believe. We actually will get into that
- 19:08a little bit later in terms of what the Ninth
- 19:11Circuit thought about that, because there was
- 19:14discrepancies amongst the records when certain
- 19:17jurors were asked about what they heard and then
- 19:20came back and said that they heard something
- 19:22else and validated what Juror 16 had said. Most
- 19:29jurors told the court that they were unaware
- 19:32of jurors' five comments and heard nothing else
- 19:36that they took to show bias. And obviously with
- 19:42everything that was discussed, it's almost impossible
- 19:45for someone to say that, right? You have screaming,
- 19:47you have yelling, you have somebody going underneath
- 19:50the table. I mean, jurors are going at it. The
- 19:53deliberation room is not that big. I would bet
- 19:58that everybody pretty much heard what was going
- 20:00on. And we'll talk about why maybe some of them
- 20:03didn't want to come forward at first. But then
- 20:08those who heard it said that there was no effect
- 20:13here. And this is interesting. So each juror
- 20:17who did hear the comments was asked whether they
- 20:20affected their deliberations or verdict. And
- 20:24each answered unambiguously that they didn't.
- 20:28What the Ninth Circuit said in its opinion is
- 20:32that it asked the jurors what it heard, but it
- 20:37never asked about what jurors said about the
- 20:39evidence. And it's interesting because when I
- 20:45was rereading the opinion, When juror five was
- 20:50questioned, and I'm just imagining this as a
- 20:53defense attorney, this is the bad juror that's
- 20:56making all these comments. The court asked juror
- 21:02number five only one question, believe it or
- 21:05not. And that question is whether he had heard
- 21:08or made any comment which might reflect some
- 21:12bias, even if it was made in jest. And juror
- 21:18five responded, no. And that was, I mean, he's
- 21:22clearly not self -reporting of what he said because
- 21:26he's not gonna be, you know, he should be honest
- 21:29to the court as to what happened. But it was
- 21:35very interesting because in my mind as a defense
- 21:38counsel, I thought, okay. let's continue the
- 21:42questioning. And both the prosecutor and the
- 21:46defense here agreed not to ask juror number five,
- 21:50who made all these comments, no more questions.
- 21:54And I still can't figure that one out because
- 21:58I think that if you have identified the racially
- 22:02biased juror and they're denying that they made
- 22:06certain comments, I think that there should be
- 22:09more follow -up questions. You know, well, did
- 22:12you say X? Did you say Z? Did you make these
- 22:15remarks? He pretty much got off the hook quite
- 22:21quickly. So I didn't understand the defense's
- 22:25position for agreeing to stop the questioning
- 22:29at that point. And one of the other things that
- 22:34the Ninth Circuit pointed out was the inquiry
- 22:37didn't fully account for the possibility that
- 22:41a juror may have heard jurors five's bias comments,
- 22:46but subjectively perceived the comments as innocuous.
- 22:50So, you know, a lot of the questioning because
- 22:53in this opinion, it shows you the questions that
- 22:57were asked and how they were answered. And it
- 23:00was more general. and objectively, then subjectively.
- 23:04And that's a problem, because at the end of the
- 23:07day, like we hear, some of them were unaware.
- 23:11Some of them said that it had no effect. So it
- 23:15was important to have more of an inquiry. So
- 23:18not only did they not inquire further with Jur
- 23:215, the bad juror, but they really didn't ask
- 23:25enough questions from the other jurors. And maybe
- 23:28it really came down to, we're so close to the
- 23:31verdict, we just want to wrap this case up. But
- 23:34you can't handle a case like that, especially
- 23:37with that much racial biases in the courtroom.
- 23:40It does violate the Sixth Amendment's right to
- 23:43an impartial jury. And whether it means to start
- 23:46all over, then that's the right thing to do.
- 23:50So what the other parts of the Ninth Circuit
- 23:53decision talked about was When they were questioning
- 23:57the jurors, the questions were not the same questions.
- 24:00So there were different variations of it, which
- 24:03I think also presented an issue. Because if you're
- 24:08really trying to get to the bottom of something
- 24:10and you're talking to a bunch of people that
- 24:13heard the same thing, we should ask the same
- 24:16exact question and be consistent here. So the
- 24:19variations were unhelpful. What you know, there
- 24:24was also with with juror number twelve juror
- 24:30number twelve was brought in and basically said
- 24:35that it believed that jurors five statements
- 24:39were just made in Jess and that they weren't,
- 24:44you know, that basically was a joke and would
- 24:47not be taken seriously. This was the comment
- 24:50about the cartel. And that struck me also as
- 24:55shocking because, you know, and the issue then
- 24:59became is once that juror said, well, I took
- 25:02that as ingest and I didn't really take that
- 25:05to mean anything, then the inquiries were, did
- 25:09you feel like this statement was ingest rather
- 25:12than just saying, look, what actually happened?
- 25:16What did you hear? And so. You know, that's a
- 25:21lot of the Ninth Circuit's opinion and analysis
- 25:25that goes into that. And I think this was probably,
- 25:29if you ask me, the most crucial part of this
- 25:35case was the jury inquiry. And we'll get into
- 25:38why it's so important to preserve these issues
- 25:42at that stage, especially if you have something
- 25:46along these facts and you want to ensure that
- 25:49your client's going to have a fair trial. Another
- 25:52point is that I thought was interesting was with
- 25:56respect to juror number 16, who actually was
- 26:01the one that came forward. They never asked juror
- 26:0616 if they were affected by this, which was interesting
- 26:11because I think that if juror 16 was asked that
- 26:14question, they would have probably said yes.
- 26:17I mean, there's no way you can't be affected
- 26:19by all of the statements that were made. So then
- 26:29we go into the next issue here, and we're answering
- 26:34the ruling below. A juror's own assurance cannot
- 26:40carry the burden. So what the finding actually
- 26:44was? So the district court's finding said that
- 26:47the jurors were unaffected merely reflects that
- 26:51the jurors self assessments of prejudice. But
- 26:55the Ninth Circuit said no, good faith is not
- 26:58enough. A jurors good faith belief in his own
- 27:02impartiality is not dispositive. Prejudice may
- 27:07operate substantially without the juror perceiving
- 27:09it at all. So sometimes we don't know what might
- 27:12affect us, right? Subjectively or unconsciously,
- 27:17right? We might hear something, but we don't
- 27:19know what the effect of that is. And I think
- 27:22that what the district court was trying to say
- 27:25was like, look, they said they were unaffected.
- 27:28They were unaffected, so let's move on. But from
- 27:33a psychological standpoint, and it kind of goes
- 27:37into that in this opinion, is that sometimes
- 27:41what we don't know, we just don't know. You know,
- 27:44and I think that that's what happened here as
- 27:46well is that they tried with their good faith
- 27:50belief, but it was nearly impossible at that
- 27:54point. And the record bore this out because at
- 28:00least two jurors heard the bias comments, but
- 28:03did not subjectively perceive them as bias. The
- 28:07assurances were sincere, but they were still
- 28:10wrong. Right. So. We have people here that are
- 28:15essentially saying that it didn't affect them.
- 28:19But ultimately, by studying and looking at the
- 28:23analysis, first you're saying you heard these
- 28:25comments. You're saying it didn't affect you.
- 28:27Some of them said that they heard something or
- 28:30they were in denial of it. And so we saw so much
- 28:34of this on the record that that inconsistency
- 28:39allowed the court to really, the Ninth Circuit
- 28:42to look at that. So the second framework is framework
- 28:49two, distinguishing from Sarkissian. There were
- 28:55three material distinctions. The district court,
- 29:00this was the lower court, asked whether the remarks
- 29:02infected the jury's capacity to evaluate the
- 29:07evidence, and on appeal, concluded that they
- 29:10had not. And Sarkissian was held to be the wrong
- 29:15standard. And we'll go into the material distinctions
- 29:21here. Just a little bit about Sarkissian. This
- 29:26was a case that arose during trial. But before
- 29:33the jury began deliberations, a juror informed
- 29:39the court that she had a problem. So she goes
- 29:42to court, she talks to the court in a meeting
- 29:46with the trial judge, and she basically makes
- 29:49this prejudicial statement against gypsies. And
- 29:55nobody really understood what she was even saying
- 29:58because In Sarkissian, nobody was a gypsy. The
- 30:02defendants were not gypsies in any sort. So when
- 30:05we look at the material distinctions here, in
- 30:09Sarkissian, bias directed at an ethnic group
- 30:13bearing no relation to the defendants. And no
- 30:17jury even understood the reference. Her statement
- 30:22about gypsies came out of nowhere. And it was
- 30:26nonsensical to some extent. Number two, as opposed
- 30:32to jurors five statements that they express a
- 30:36specific animus toward Mexicans, Mr. Sanchez
- 30:40was of Mexican descent, and at least four of
- 30:43the jurors heard, understood, and connected them
- 30:48directly to him. Okay, and the other distinction,
- 30:53distinction number two, a single vague remark
- 30:57too obscure for any juror to comprehend. So again,
- 31:01she made a statement about gypsies that she has
- 31:04a problem with gypsies. Here in Sanchez, there
- 31:09was specific case related statements that four
- 31:14jurors fully grasp and recognize as bearing on
- 31:19Mr. Sanchez's guilt here. Okay. And the last
- 31:24distinction is that the offending juror was excused
- 31:29before deliberations began. This is in the Sarkissian
- 31:32matter. Here, like we discussed, juror five nearly
- 31:38participated in the entire deliberative process.
- 31:43And that distinction was long recognized as dispositive.
- 31:49And here, we could tell that by having juror
- 31:54number five who had all these so strong opinions
- 31:58and was clearly racist, it had an effect through
- 32:05the deliberations. And I think that the prejudice
- 32:08definitely permeated the verdict in this case.
- 32:17So now we're looking at framework three, which
- 32:22was Remmer reaches the jury room. And this was
- 32:27the, I believe, the standard, obviously, that
- 32:30the Ninth Circuit chose to apply. And I see that
- 32:35it actually is the framework that properly fits
- 32:38our set of facts here. So as we discussed, it's
- 32:43a heavy presumption of prejudice that arises
- 32:46upon that a jury harbored racial bias and made
- 32:50racially biased statements during the liberation,
- 32:54even where that juror is excused before the court
- 32:58accepts a verdict. And one thing that the Ninth
- 33:02Circuit said is, This was a quote that I have
- 33:05on my PowerPoint. The source of the constitutionality
- 33:08infirmity is the corruption of the deliberative
- 33:12process itself, not merely the channel through
- 33:15which that corruption entered. So we have historically
- 33:22confined. Remer had been limited to external
- 33:28jury tampering and improper outside contacts.
- 33:34There's no principle distinction here. So they're
- 33:37basically saying that the racial animus originating
- 33:39within the jury room poses an equivalent, if
- 33:43not greater, threat to the Sixth Amendment. No
- 33:47principled basis exists for treating the internal
- 33:51animus and external contact differently, basically
- 33:55with everything that occurred in the courtroom.
- 33:58And the burden shifts. So now the government
- 34:02has to prove that that jurors fives presence
- 34:06was harmless to the defendant. Just a little
- 34:10bit about Remmer. In Remmer, the defendant found
- 34:15for the first time, this was post verdict, that
- 34:18an unknown person had approached the jury foreman
- 34:22and told him that he can gain a profit by essentially
- 34:28acquitting the defendant. So the defendant ends
- 34:32up filing a motion for new trial. It gets denied
- 34:36without a hearing. And basically, the Court of
- 34:41Appeals also held that the district court had
- 34:44not abused its discretion. It actually ends up
- 34:47going, Remmer is a United States Supreme Court
- 34:50case here. And it held that in any criminal case,
- 34:55any private communication, contact, tampering
- 34:58directly or indirectly, it's deemed presumptually
- 35:04prejudicial and it needs to be made known if
- 35:08not made in pursuance of known rules of the courts
- 35:11and the instructions and directions of the court
- 35:13made during the trial. Obviously the presumption
- 35:18is not conclusive because like we said that the
- 35:21burden then will shift to the government to establish
- 35:25that that contact was harmless to the defendant
- 35:30in this case. And that's how we obtain the remer
- 35:36presumption of the burden shifting in this case.
- 35:40So the practical consequence is now the defendant
- 35:44no longer bears the burden of proving that the
- 35:48remaining jurors were actually affected. Now
- 35:50the government has to prove that they were not.
- 35:55Okay, so how the standard operates. We're gonna
- 36:00look at the burden shift step by step. So what
- 36:06you want to do is you have a showing. So racial
- 36:13bias is shown to have touched deliberations.
- 36:16There's no way. that we don't see that here,
- 36:21right? I mean, we have four different comments
- 36:24targeting the Hispanic community. There was even
- 36:27comments about LGBTQT. I mean, there's so much
- 36:31that went on into this case. Now, presumption,
- 36:36the prejudice is presumed as a matter of constitutional
- 36:39law. And the burden shifts. The government must
- 36:45prove the jury's presence was harmless. And here,
- 36:52there's the failure. So the government never
- 36:56was able to prove that because the ambiguity
- 37:00in the record is resolved against the government.
- 37:05Because the government... bore the burden of
- 37:07dispelling the presumption, and it failed to
- 37:10do so. And this is when we get into all the inconsistencies
- 37:14that happened. I heard it. I didn't hear it.
- 37:17Now I heard it. Yes, I heard that it was biased,
- 37:20but it didn't affect me. So it really goes into
- 37:26that analysis of trying to understand what went
- 37:31in during the deliberation room. So the application,
- 37:40why did the government, why were they not able
- 37:44to successfully rebut the presumption here? Well,
- 37:49for number one, it was neither subtle nor ambiguous
- 37:53on any sort of term. The statements targeted
- 37:58Mexicans and immigrants by name. Number two,
- 38:03it was tied exactly to the defendant. explicitly
- 38:07link Mr. Sanchez to cartel activity, the most
- 38:12inflammatory associations possible in a federal
- 38:17criminal case, because federal cases typically
- 38:20deal with gang -related cartel activity. So it
- 38:25really was inflammatory. There's no other way
- 38:28to perceive it otherwise. It was made during
- 38:33deliberations. So it wasn't in passing conversation,
- 38:38but within the most important, I mean, the deliberation
- 38:41process is the most important process of itself,
- 38:45because these people in the room are gonna be
- 38:49deciding your life, whether or not you're gonna
- 38:51go to prison or you're not. In this case, Mr.
- 38:56Sanchez was facing, I believe up to three years.
- 39:00for each criminal conviction count, because he
- 39:03had six of the fraudulent tax returns. And ultimately,
- 39:09at the end, he was sentenced to a year. But in
- 39:15any event, a year in prison is a year in prison.
- 39:20And here, We want to ensure that our jurors are
- 39:24making the most, you know, the best decision.
- 39:28They're impartial, they're able to think clearly,
- 39:30and they're not going to be swayed by anyone's
- 39:34comments here. And number four, we see that it
- 39:39was heard by multiple jurors. And if you take
- 39:43a look at the opinion yourself, it's very lengthy.
- 39:48I think it's 77 pages, but you'll see that there
- 39:53was several jurors there and the contamination
- 39:56extended beyond any single juror exposure here.
- 40:01This wasn't like the Sarkissian, oh, I don't
- 40:04like gypsies. I mean, you really had intense
- 40:08racial bias remarks targeting Mr. Sanchez here.
- 40:14And again, thankfully to juror 16 that had raised
- 40:19that, you know, because some people wouldn't
- 40:21come forward with that. So together with these
- 40:25compounding factors, it rendered almost impossible
- 40:28to conclude the remaining deliberations were
- 40:32untainted following jurors five removal. So removing
- 40:36him. wasn't going to help here. And the Ninth
- 40:42Circuit made a point to go through all of these
- 40:44factors. So one of the things that the Ninth
- 40:51Circuit highlighted was Pina Rodriguez and the
- 40:55reporting gap. And I couldn't agree with it more.
- 40:59The stigma attendant to racial bias renders jurors
- 41:05reluctance to come forward. That's Pina versus
- 41:07Colorado. And the record substantiated precisely
- 41:13that concern, supporting the inference that the
- 41:16court received an incomplete account of the deliberations.
- 41:21So when we think about this, imagine you're a
- 41:24juror. I've never been a juror myself. I always
- 41:27wish I was a juror, because I would love to be
- 41:28part of deliberations and see what happens. But
- 41:32they're each called in. They're now under the
- 41:37limelight of interrogation, essentially. And
- 41:40nobody wants to be in that position. First of
- 41:42all, most jurors don't even want to be a juror.
- 41:46But when they are, now they're being questioned
- 41:49about what they heard, what they didn't hear.
- 41:53It's an interrogation process. And I think that
- 41:57Pina Rodriguez alludes to the fact that jurors
- 42:01kind of have this ability or need to appease
- 42:05the court. They don't want to tell the court,
- 42:07yeah, I heard that bias comment, and that really
- 42:11affected me. And it's interesting that we do
- 42:15have case law that discusses that, because I
- 42:17think that we need more of that, because it's
- 42:20true. Based on what happened, we have four jurors
- 42:27that acknowledge jurors' five remarks. One had
- 42:32reported them prior to the voyeur. Why only one
- 42:36when there's four? right? I mean, we jurors have
- 42:40a duty to come forward when they hear, you know,
- 42:43especially these kinds of statements, you know,
- 42:48to initially denied hearing any bias comment,
- 42:51and then they reverse the course. And they each
- 42:55express the view that what they witnessed did
- 42:58not constitute prejudice. Again, I think that
- 43:02there's a source of appeasing here that happened.
- 43:06And they wanted to show up and say, yes, no matter
- 43:10what judge, court, we can go forth with this.
- 43:16And so like I mentioned before, juror 15, when
- 43:21she was questioned, believed that the cartel
- 43:25comment was just in jest. not made seriously,
- 43:30they really played down what these really charged
- 43:36racially biased statements were said and how
- 43:39they were made, almost not protecting juror five
- 43:43in the comments. But again, I think it was a
- 43:46level of, I want to appease the court right now
- 43:50and I don't want to admit how it really had affected
- 43:53me on that level. and it was interesting because
- 43:57at one point when one of the jurors were brought
- 44:00in they talked about because there was a comment
- 44:03of you know I'm not racist you're racist you
- 44:07know and so jurors were kind of going at it in
- 44:10the jury deliberation room and that conversation
- 44:13also came out and so the court was now focused
- 44:17on jurors telling each other they're not racist,
- 44:21rather than what juror five said, which was the
- 44:25worst thing that you can tell somebody. So again,
- 44:30I think that because the record was so inconsistent,
- 44:36the lack thereof of reporting for people heard
- 44:39this, but only one reported that says a lot about
- 44:44what happened in the courtroom here. So we talk
- 44:51about this room. This room was already compromised.
- 44:55There is nothing you can do about it. Taking
- 44:58juror number five was not going to fix the issue.
- 45:03The conditions were inconsistent with evidence
- 45:07-based deliberation. You have yelling and heated
- 45:11confrontations, accusation of racism amongst
- 45:15jurors themselves, profanity used during deliberations,
- 45:22a juror physically rising from his seat to declare
- 45:25that he would not change his vote. I mean, again,
- 45:29what more can possibly go wrong in this case?
- 45:33And, you know, for me, I was shocked that with
- 45:35all this that happened, it didn't just stop there.
- 45:38And the mistrial should have been declared and
- 45:41it should have been granted. I mean, allowing
- 45:44these jurors to go through this entire process,
- 45:48and then obviously having this then later reversed
- 45:51by the Ninth Circuit just didn't make sense.
- 45:54Again, even though it was 13 minutes and Jurify
- 45:59participated in a substantial majority of deliberations
- 46:03before the verdict, it doesn't matter even if
- 46:05it was one minute or two minutes. You know, you
- 46:09cannot cure this defect by taking one bad egg
- 46:13after there were so much that went on and there
- 46:17were honestly the jurors themselves were fighting
- 46:21amongst each other. So, you know, I think that
- 46:26the court definitely the Ninth Circuit made the
- 46:28right decision in applying the Remmer standard
- 46:31and finding that the government could not meet
- 46:35its presumption of burden here. So, Here we have
- 46:44the partial dissent. We have Judge Villa would
- 46:49have affirmed. He concurred with the structure
- 46:53error doctrine articulated in Dyer versus Calderon
- 46:56being inapplicable and inappropriate. He dissented
- 47:02from the majority's reversal and he identified
- 47:05three distinct errors. Number one, he said the
- 47:10majority set aside the standard established in
- 47:13Sarkissian, and he felt that Sarkissian was the
- 47:18proper authority here. Number two, Judge Villa
- 47:22believed that the majority improperly extended
- 47:27Remmer because it was to a case involving no
- 47:30external jury contact where the bias jury was
- 47:33discharged mid deliberation before any verdict
- 47:37was returned. And number three, and he feels
- 47:42that this fashioned an unmetable standard. So
- 47:45he's saying that the rebuttable standard for
- 47:47the government now is going to be so high that
- 47:51no evidentiary showing could satisfy. I mean,
- 47:56I disagree in this case because there are cases
- 48:01that you know, where, for example, you don't
- 48:04you only have one comment made or you have, you
- 48:07know, I think in this scenario with these set
- 48:10of facts with the amount of comments that were
- 48:14made, the government should meet that burden,
- 48:17you know, and they should be held to that standard.
- 48:21And central to the dissent here, when individually
- 48:25questioned every remaining juror affirmatively
- 48:28represented that jurors five statements had not
- 48:31affected their assessment of the evidence or
- 48:34their ability to deliberate impartially. And
- 48:38he felt that the prejudice finding rested on
- 48:41speculation rather than record evidence. I disagree
- 48:45with this view. There's no speculation here because
- 48:48you have all these people saying that they heard
- 48:50it. but only one reported it. Two then said that
- 48:53they did hear it or they didn't hear it at first
- 48:57and then came forward and said that they did.
- 48:59There's no speculation on the record and I actually
- 49:02think that the Ninth Circuit did a good job in
- 49:04its opinion in pulling out the questioning and
- 49:08the inconsistencies so that we can all see that.
- 49:15So what trial courts must internalize? that removal
- 49:20of a biased juror is not ordinarily an adequate
- 49:26remedy. Maybe in some instances they were, but
- 49:31not in this case. Sanchez did not hold that every
- 49:36instance of juror bias requires automatic reversal.
- 49:40It held that the government failed to rebut the
- 49:43strong presumption of prejudice arising from
- 49:46the biased jurors participation and deliberation.
- 49:49So although Sanchez said, no court, I want you
- 49:52to apply dire. I want an automatic reversal.
- 49:55I don't want you to have to look at the record,
- 49:57right? Ninth circuit said, no, we are going to
- 50:00look at the record, but you know, prejudice is
- 50:03now presumed government. You need to meet your
- 50:06burden. And that's why I think it really was
- 50:08the happy medium here between an automatic reversal
- 50:11and they really took their time in the record
- 50:14here. And the court said. The Ninth Circuit said
- 50:19deliberations are collective. Those statements
- 50:22do not leave the deliberation room with the offending
- 50:25juror. The harm is the corruption of the process.
- 50:29And you cannot undo. And remember here, the district
- 50:32court never even told the 11 jurors proceeding,
- 50:37start anew, don't pay attention to that. I mean,
- 50:40there was no sanitization of an instruction here.
- 50:44It was just like. deliberate and let's be done.
- 50:48Again, efficiency is not a variable. The Sixth
- 50:51Amendment does not bend to the demands of calendar
- 50:55management or judicial economy. I understand
- 50:58the court said, look, the jurors deliberated
- 51:02for a full day, you know, and we're almost to
- 51:04the end of it, but it's not enough. It's not
- 51:07at the expense. of a defendant who has the right
- 51:11to an impartial jury, according to the Sixth
- 51:14Amendment here. Inaction is self -defeating.
- 51:19So here, Sanchez consumed years of appellate
- 51:21litigation that a timely mistrial would have
- 51:25foreclosed entirely. I believe that that would
- 51:29have been the appropriate remedy here because
- 51:33now we're looking at all of the appellate litigation,
- 51:36like we said, on both sides. It's not just the
- 51:39defense. Now, when you file an appeal, it's the
- 51:42attorney general handling it. They essentially
- 51:47need to go through the entire record itself and
- 51:49file their own brief. So on a point of judicial
- 51:53efficiency, that was not the case here. So the
- 51:58dispositive question is not whether Juror 5 was
- 52:01excused, but whether the jurors who remain could
- 52:04return an untainted verdict. And clearly, they
- 52:08couldn't. This case actually gave me a little
- 52:16bit of overlay with the penal code of Section
- 52:20745, the Racial Justice Act. Obviously, this
- 52:23is a beast of its own. The RJA was enacted in
- 52:302020. The Racial Justice Act prohibits the state
- 52:35from seeking or obtaining a conviction or imposing
- 52:39a sentence based on race, ethnicity, or national
- 52:42origin. There's four categories of behavior that
- 52:47violate the act. A judge, attorney, police officer,
- 52:51or expert witness showed bias toward the defendant
- 52:54because of race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- 52:58Racially coded statements against the defendant
- 53:01set at trial. So this can be, you know, now the
- 53:06racial justice act. is still being developed
- 53:09in terms of what it actually means, what are
- 53:11racially coded statements, where does it apply
- 53:14to. Number three, the prosecution sought more
- 53:19severe charges than in other similarly situated
- 53:23cases in that county. and the court imposed a
- 53:27more severe sentence than in other similar situated
- 53:32cases in that county as well. So what we're talking
- 53:35about is minorities versus non. So now we're
- 53:40seeing articles and case law that certain minorities
- 53:44were hit with the three strikes a lot more severely
- 53:47or stacking charges or. stacking the commitment
- 53:53offenses, you know, one offense really turns
- 53:55into three. So that's what we're talking about
- 53:58severely charges based on race, you know, because
- 54:00we are seeing that there are articles that have
- 54:04been published that show that unfortunately minorities
- 54:08were facing more of those types of violations.
- 54:12Again, racial justice act, it's on its own. Maybe
- 54:15we'll do a webinar on that as well. Okay, so
- 54:20Assembly Bill 1071, Findings and Clarifications.
- 54:26That was affected in 2026 and it was sort of
- 54:29an add -on on the RJA. It clarified, it didn't
- 54:34really change anything. Again, it told us to
- 54:37look at meaningful implementations with the legislative
- 54:41intent here. For example, for counsel and discovery,
- 54:47the threshold to secure counsel is extremely
- 54:50low now, and it's a minimal pleading requirement,
- 54:54not a prima facie showing. So before, you know,
- 54:57it was a little bit tougher for indigent defendants
- 55:00to have access to state appointed attorney, but
- 55:05now they're saying, no, you know, we should provide
- 55:08that to you with this low pleading requirement.
- 55:11And the 1071 also reasserts the low threshold.
- 55:17So we talked about coded or dehumanizing language,
- 55:21racial slurs, gratuitous references. And the
- 55:27RJA here is. meant to correct subtle racism.
- 55:31When courts recognize only the most egregious
- 55:34or historic manifestations of them, they allow
- 55:37the present day racism to go uncorrected. So
- 55:42this clarification of AB 1071 has been great
- 55:48for the defense. Again, the law is evolving every
- 55:52day in terms of finding how that falls into play.
- 55:57with that. So the RJA in courts there was two
- 56:04recent applications that I wanted to talk to
- 56:08you guys about and share. The first one was People
- 56:12v. Stubblefield. So I'm sure some of you had
- 56:15followed this. This was in a rape trial of a
- 56:18formal NFL player. The prosecutor argued in closing
- 56:22that police did not search the home because the
- 56:25defendant was a famous black man and implied
- 56:28a search would be bad publicity. So by using
- 56:32that word and that terminology and referring
- 56:35to him as a famous black man, the court held
- 56:40that that was discriminatory language under subsection
- 56:44A2 and that the conviction wasn't obtained in
- 56:49violation of the RJA. That conviction and sentence
- 56:52was later vacated. I know we're getting close
- 56:55to end, so I'll try to wrap it up for you guys.
- 57:00And then we have people v. Bankston. Hence my
- 57:04little tiger there up there. So this was a case
- 57:08about where the DA commented and made comparisons
- 57:13to the defendant to a Bengal tiger, and with
- 57:18references to the defendant as a thug. And it
- 57:22constituted an implicit appeal to racial bias
- 57:25and violation of the RJA. As a result, the death
- 57:31judgment was reversed based on this prejudicial
- 57:34violation. Interestingly enough, the defendant
- 57:38had raised other RJAs about gangs and whatnot,
- 57:44but that's not what raised to the level of the
- 57:49RJ violation in this case. It was a Bengal tiger.
- 57:55So the post -conviction application, RJA is not
- 57:59limited to prospective relief. So nowadays, and
- 58:02I handle a lot of these cases, is that you're
- 58:04dealing with 20 years ago, we're looking at a
- 58:09record, we're seeing certain things that were
- 58:11said, racially coded language, or sometimes it's
- 58:16even the disparity in the statistical evidence
- 58:20that you'll see. The more consequential lesson
- 58:24is that obviously the misconduct in Sanchez was
- 58:28over repeated and directed at the defendant by
- 58:31name. And it's the clearest case, right? That
- 58:35we have a racial biasism here. And sometimes
- 58:38racial biasism is not that explicit. Like I said,
- 58:41it could be done in other subtle words. Again,
- 58:45I'm shocked that this case had to go all the
- 58:48way to the ninth circuit for us to for him to
- 58:53actually have it remanded. And, you know, the
- 58:57motion for new trial was ended up granted. And
- 59:01so it did have a positive resolution for Sanchez.
- 59:04So I'm happy that he went all the way through
- 59:07the Ninth Circuit and it solidified the framework
- 59:11that we need to use. So for defense attorneys,
- 59:14you know, when we have cases like this, this
- 59:16is another one that we can use, you know, so
- 59:19we want to use Remmer again. Racial discrimination
- 59:24can also be in overcharging a defendant based
- 59:28on race and patterns. And what you would use
- 59:31for that is statistics. OK, so your takeaway
- 59:37for practitioners, what to preserve and what
- 59:40to argue. You always want to build the record
- 59:43on who heard what. Very important, because that's
- 59:46what it turned. in for Sanchez. The number of
- 59:50jurors, what did they hear, what did they understand,
- 59:53and connected the remarks to the defendant. Always
- 59:57ask good follow -up questions. I think the follow
- 1:00:00-up questions should have been key here, and
- 1:00:03they weren't. Are you Remmer, not Sarkissian,
- 1:00:08where animus arises inside of the jury room and
- 1:00:12the juror participated in deliberations? Circassian
- 1:00:15is the incorrect frame. We want to argue Remmer.
- 1:00:19Press the timing. So a juror's sustained presence
- 1:00:22throughout deliberation is itself evidence that
- 1:00:26prejudice pre -mediated the verdict. Number four,
- 1:00:31anticipate jury equivocation. Pino Rodriguez,
- 1:00:34it tells us, it says, there's a reason why jurors
- 1:00:38under report. We see that. They want to appease
- 1:00:41the court and so incomplete accounts cut against
- 1:00:45the government here. Number five, objective efficiency
- 1:00:49rationale. So calendar management, judicial economy,
- 1:00:5313 minutes left, it doesn't matter. That has
- 1:00:57no place in the constitutional framework of having
- 1:01:01an impartial jury, especially in criminal cases.
- 1:01:06Preserve the RJA claim. Section 745 also reaches
- 1:01:11post -conviction proceedings, including habeas,
- 1:01:14and like we said, that the prima facie is deliberately
- 1:01:18low. And that concludes our webinar, that the
- 1:01:26Sixth Amendment does not discount for its protections
- 1:01:30for trials that are nearly complete. you know,
- 1:01:33it was a pleasure hosting you guys. I'm going
- 1:01:37to allow for a few minutes of questioning. Let
- 1:01:42me just... Alrighty, looks like we currently
- 1:01:49don't have questions. I know that we're at time.
- 1:01:53Orly, do you have any other comments that you'd
- 1:01:54like to let our audience know? No, this was a
- 1:01:59pleasure. If any of you have any questions, my
- 1:02:02information is, you know, you have the power
- 1:02:04points. So you can go ahead and reach out to
- 1:02:08me and I'll be happy to assist. This concludes
- 1:02:12today's presentation. Thank you again, Orly,
- 1:02:14for an excellent and interesting presentation
- 1:02:16today. And thank you so much to our audience
- 1:02:18for joining us. Have a great day, everybody.
- 1:02:21Thank you. Bye -bye.