Latest / Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God) / 026 - Xxvi That God Is Not The Formal Being Of All Things

Transcript

026 - Xxvi That God Is Not The Formal Being Of All Things · Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: Chapter twenty six of Summa Contragentilees, First Book on God,
• 0:05
  Speaker 1: by Saint Thomas aquinas translated by the Fathers of the
• 0:08
  Speaker 1: English Dominican Province. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
• 0:15
  Speaker 1: Chapter twenty six. That God is not the formal being
• 0:19
  Speaker 1: of all things. From the foregoing we are able to
• 0:23
  Speaker 1: refute the error of some who have asserted that God
• 0:27
  Speaker 1: is nothing else than the formal being of everything, for
• 0:31
  Speaker 1: this being is divided into substantial and accidental being. Now,
• 0:36
  Speaker 1: the divine being is neither the being of a substance
• 0:40
  Speaker 1: nor the being of an accident, as shown above. Therefore,
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: it is impossible for God to be the being whereby
• 0:47
  Speaker 1: everything is formally Again, things are not distinct from one
• 0:53
  Speaker 1: another in that they have being, since in this they
• 0:57
  Speaker 1: all agree. If then things differ from one another, it
• 1:02
  Speaker 1: follows that either being itself is specified by certain differences
• 1:06
  Speaker 1: added there too, so that different things have a specifically
• 1:09
  Speaker 1: different being, or that things differ in that being itself
• 1:13
  Speaker 1: is attached to specifically different natures. But the former of
• 1:18
  Speaker 1: these is impossible, because an addition cannot be attached to
• 1:22
  Speaker 1: being in the same way as a difference is added
• 1:24
  Speaker 1: to a genus. As already stated, It remains therefore that
• 1:30
  Speaker 1: things differ because they have different natures, to which being
• 1:34
  Speaker 1: is attached in different ways. Now, the divine being is
• 1:38
  Speaker 1: not what is attached to another nature, but is the
• 1:42
  Speaker 1: nature itself is shown above. If therefore the divine Being
• 1:47
  Speaker 1: with the formal being of all things, it would follow
• 1:51
  Speaker 1: that all things are simply one. Moreover, the principle is
• 1:57
  Speaker 1: naturally prior to that which flows from it. Now, in
• 2:01
  Speaker 1: certain things, being has something by way of principle, since
• 2:05
  Speaker 1: the form is said to be the principle of being,
• 2:09
  Speaker 1: and unlike manner the agent which gives certain things actual being. Therefore,
• 2:15
  Speaker 1: if the divine Being is the being of each thing,
• 2:19
  Speaker 1: it will follow that God, who is his own being,
• 2:22
  Speaker 1: has a cause, and thus is not per se necessary being,
• 2:28
  Speaker 1: the contrary of which has been shown above. Further, that
• 2:34
  Speaker 1: which is common to many is not something besides those many,
• 2:38
  Speaker 1: except only logically. Thus, animal is not something besides Socrates
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: and Plato and other animals, except as considered by the mind,
• 2:50
  Speaker 1: which apprehends the form of animal as divested of all
• 2:53
  Speaker 1: that specifies and individualizes it. For man is that which
• 2:59
  Speaker 1: is true an animal. Else it would follow that in
• 3:02
  Speaker 1: Socrates and Plato, there are several animals, namely animal in general,
• 3:08
  Speaker 1: man in general, and Plato himself much less. Therefore, being
• 3:13
  Speaker 1: itself in general is something apart from all things that
• 3:16
  Speaker 1: have being, except only as apprehended by the mind. If
• 3:22
  Speaker 1: therefore God is being in general, he will not be
• 3:25
  Speaker 1: an individual thing except only as apprehended in the mind.
• 3:31
  Speaker 1: Now it has been shown above that God is something
• 3:33
  Speaker 1: not merely in the intellect, but in reality. Therefore God
• 3:39
  Speaker 1: is not the common being of all. Again, generation is
• 3:45
  Speaker 1: essentially the way to being, and corruption the way to
• 3:50
  Speaker 1: not being. For the term of generation is the form,
• 3:54
  Speaker 1: and that of corruption privation for no other reason than
• 3:59
  Speaker 1: because the form makes a thing to be, and corruption
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: makes a thing not to be. For supposing a certain
• 4:06
  Speaker 1: form not to give being, that which received that form
• 4:10
  Speaker 1: would not be said to be generated. If then God
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: were the formal being of all things, it would follow
• 4:18
  Speaker 1: that he is the term of generation, which is false,
• 4:22
  Speaker 1: since he is eternal, as we have shown above. Moreover,
• 4:28
  Speaker 1: it would follow that the being of everything as being
• 4:32
  Speaker 1: from eternity. Wherefore there would be neither generation nor corruption.
• 4:38
  Speaker 1: For if there were, you would follow that a thing
• 4:41
  Speaker 1: acquires a new a being already pre existing. Either then
• 4:46
  Speaker 1: it is acquired by something already existing, or else by
• 4:50
  Speaker 1: something no wise pre existing. In the first case, since
• 4:55
  Speaker 1: according to the above supposition, all existing things have the
• 4:58
  Speaker 1: same being, follow that the thing which is said to
• 5:01
  Speaker 1: be generated receives not a new being but a new
• 5:05
  Speaker 1: mode of being, and therefore is not generated but altered. If,
• 5:11
  Speaker 1: on the other hand, the thing nowise existed before, it
• 5:15
  Speaker 1: would follow that it is made out of nothing, and
• 5:18
  Speaker 1: this is contrary to the essence of generation. Consequently, this
• 5:23
  Speaker 1: supposition would wholly do away with generation and corruption, and
• 5:28
  Speaker 1: therefore it is clear that it is impossible. Moreover, the
• 5:34
  Speaker 1: Sacred Doctrine refutes this error by confessing that God is
• 5:39
  Speaker 1: high and elevated according to Isaiah six y one, and
• 5:43
  Speaker 1: that he is over all things according to Romans nine
• 5:47
  Speaker 1: to five. For if He were the being of all,
• 5:52
  Speaker 1: he would be something in all and not above all.
• 5:57
  Speaker 1: Those who erred thus are condemned by the same sentence
• 6:01
  Speaker 1: as idolators who gave the incommunicable name, that is, of God,
• 6:07
  Speaker 1: to wood and stones, as stated in Wisdom fourteen twenty one.
• 6:13
  Speaker 1: For if God is the being of all, it would
• 6:16
  Speaker 1: be no truer to say a stone is a being,
• 6:20
  Speaker 1: than to say a stone is God. Now there are
• 6:25
  Speaker 1: four things which apparently fostered this error. The first was
• 6:30
  Speaker 1: a wrong understanding of certain authorities, For they found Dionysius
• 6:35
  Speaker 1: saying in the Celestial Hierarchy, Book four, the being of
• 6:39
  Speaker 1: all is the super essential Godhead. And from this they
• 6:44
  Speaker 1: wished to conclude that God is the formal being of
• 6:47
  Speaker 1: all things, not perceiving that this meaning is irreconcilable with
• 6:52
  Speaker 1: the words. For if the Godhead were the formal being
• 6:56
  Speaker 1: of all, it would not be above all, but in
• 6:59
  Speaker 1: the midst of all, in fact, something of all. Wherefore,
• 7:04
  Speaker 1: when he said that the Godhead is above all, he
• 7:09
  Speaker 1: declares it to be by its nature distinct from all
• 7:12
  Speaker 1: and placed above all. And by saying that the Godhead
• 7:16
  Speaker 1: is the being of all, he declares that all things
• 7:20
  Speaker 1: derive from God a likeness to the divine Being. Moreover,
• 7:26
  Speaker 1: he elsewhere expressly proscribes their wrong interpretation on the divine
• 7:32
  Speaker 1: names two, where he declares that there can be no
• 7:36
  Speaker 1: contact with God, nor mingling of him with other things,
• 7:40
  Speaker 1: as of point with line or of the shape of
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: the seal on wax. The second cause of this error
• 7:48
  Speaker 1: was defective reason. For since that which is common is
• 7:52
  Speaker 1: specified or individualized by addition, they deemed the divine being,
• 7:58
  Speaker 1: to which nothing is at added, not to be some
• 8:02
  Speaker 1: proper being, but the common being of all, not perceiving
• 8:06
  Speaker 1: that the common or universal cannot be without some addition,
• 8:10
  Speaker 1: though it be considered apart from any addition. For animal
• 8:16
  Speaker 1: cannot be apart from the difference of rational or irrational,
• 8:22
  Speaker 1: although we think of it apart from these differences. Moreover,
• 8:26
  Speaker 1: although we think of the universal without an addition, we
• 8:30
  Speaker 1: do not think of it apart from its receptivity of addition.
• 8:35
  Speaker 1: For if no difference could be added to animal, it
• 8:38
  Speaker 1: would not be a genus, and the same applies to
• 8:41
  Speaker 1: all other names of things. Now, the divine being is
• 8:45
  Speaker 1: without addition, not only in thought but also in reality.
• 8:50
  Speaker 1: And not only is it without addition, but also without
• 8:54
  Speaker 1: receptivity of addition. Wherefore, from the very fact that it
• 8:59
  Speaker 1: neither received nor can receive addition, we should conclude rather
• 9:03
  Speaker 1: that God is not common but proper being, since his
• 9:07
  Speaker 1: being is distinct from all others for the very reason
• 9:11
  Speaker 1: that nothing can be added to it. Hence, the commentator
• 9:15
  Speaker 1: says in des causis that the first cause, by reason
• 9:20
  Speaker 1: of the very purity of its goodness, is distinct from others,
• 9:23
  Speaker 1: and so to speak, individualized. The third cause of this
• 9:29
  Speaker 1: error is the consideration of the divine simplicity, For since
• 9:33
  Speaker 1: God is the extreme of simplicity, they thought that if
• 9:38
  Speaker 1: we make an analysis of all that is in us,
• 9:41
  Speaker 1: the last thing being the most simple, must be God,
• 9:45
  Speaker 1: for we cannot proceed indefinitely in the composition of the
• 9:49
  Speaker 1: things that are in us. In this again, their reason
• 9:53
  Speaker 1: was lacking, that they failed to observe that what is
• 9:57
  Speaker 1: most simple in us is not so much a complete
• 10:00
  Speaker 1: thing as some part of a thing, whereas simplicity is
• 10:04
  Speaker 1: ascribed to God as to a perfect, subsistent being. The
• 10:10
  Speaker 1: fourth thing that might lead them into this error is
• 10:13
  Speaker 1: the expression whereby we say that God is in all things.
• 10:18
  Speaker 1: For they fail to perceive that He is in things,
• 10:22
  Speaker 1: not as part thereof, but as the cause of things,
• 10:26
  Speaker 1: which is no wise wanting to its effect. For we
• 10:30
  Speaker 1: do not say that the form is in the body
• 10:32
  Speaker 1: in the same sense as we say that the sailor
• 10:35
  Speaker 1: is in the boat. End of Chapter twenty six, read
• 10:42
  Speaker 1: by Michael Shane, Craig, Lambert Elsie