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006 - D-Day at Betio 20 November 1943 - Part 2 · Across the Reef- The Marine Assault of Tarawa

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  Speaker 1: Chapter four, Part two of Across the Reef The Marine
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  Speaker 1: Assault of Tarawa by Joseph H. Alexander. This LibriVox recording
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  Speaker 1: is in the public domain. D Day at Batio twenty
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  Speaker 1: November nineteen forty three, when Shop's LCVP was stopped by
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  Speaker 1: the reef, he transferred to a passing LVT. His party
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  Speaker 1: included Lieutenant Colonel Evan Z. F. Carlson, already a media
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  Speaker 1: legend for his earlier exploits at Macon and Guadalcanal, now
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  Speaker 1: serving as an observer, and Lieutenant Colonel Presley M. Rixey,
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  Speaker 1: commanding first Battalion, tenth Marines, Shoop's artillery detachment. The LVT
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  Speaker 1: made three attempts to land. Each time the enemy fire
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  Speaker 1: was too intense. On the third try, the vehicle was
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  Speaker 1: hit and disabled by plunging fire. Shop sustained a painful
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  Speaker 1: shell fragment wound in his leg, but led his small
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  Speaker 1: party out of the stricken vehicle and into the dubious
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  Speaker 1: shelter of the pier. From this physicians standing waist deep
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  Speaker 1: in water, surrounded by thousands of dead fish and dozens
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  Speaker 1: of floating bodies, Shoot manned his radio, trying desperately to
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  Speaker 1: get organized combat units ashore to sway the balance for
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  Speaker 1: a while. Shupet hopes that the new Sherman tanks would
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  Speaker 1: serve to break the gridlock. The combat debut of the
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  Speaker 1: Marine medium tanks, however, was inauspicious. On D Day. The
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  Speaker 1: tankers were valorous, but the second Marine Division had no
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  Speaker 1: concept of how to employ tanks against fortified positions. When
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  Speaker 1: four Shermans reached Red Beach three late in the morning
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  Speaker 1: on D Day, Major Crow simply waved them forward with
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  Speaker 1: orders to knock out all enemy positions encountered. The tank crews,
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  Speaker 1: buttoned up under fire, were virtually blind without a company
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  Speaker 1: and infantry. They were lost piecemeal, some knocked out by
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  Speaker 1: Japanese seventy five millimeter guns, others damaged by American dive bombers.
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  Speaker 1: Six Shermans tried to land on Red Beach, one each
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  Speaker 1: preceded by a dismounted guide to warn of underwater shell craters.
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  Speaker 1: The guides were shot down every few minutes by Japanese marksmen.
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  Speaker 1: Each time, another volunteer would step forward to continue the movement.
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  Speaker 1: Combat engineers had blown a hole in the sea wall
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  Speaker 1: for the tanks to pass inland, but the way was
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  Speaker 1: now blocked with dead and wounded marines. Rather than run
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  Speaker 1: over his fellow marines, the commander reversed his column and
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  Speaker 1: proceeded around the bird's beak towards a second opening, blasted
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  Speaker 1: in the sea wall. Operating in the turbid waters, now
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  Speaker 1: without guides, four tanks foundered in shell holes. In the
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  Speaker 1: detour inland from the beach, one of the surviving Shermans
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  Speaker 1: engaged a plucky Japanese light tank. The marine tank demolished
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  Speaker 1: its smaller opponent, but not before the doomed Japanese crew
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  Speaker 1: released one final thirty seven millimeters round, a phenomenal shot
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  Speaker 1: right down the barrel of the Sherman. By day's end,
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  Speaker 1: only two of the fourteen Shermans were still operational, Colorado
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  Speaker 1: on Red three and China Gal on Red one. Green
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  Speaker 1: Beach maintenance crews worked through the night to retrieve a
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  Speaker 1: third tank, Cecilia on Green Beach for Major Ryan. Attempts
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  Speaker 1: to get light tanks into the battle fared no better.
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  Speaker 1: Japanese gunners sank all four lcms laden with light tanks
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  Speaker 1: before the boats even reached the reef. Shop also had
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  Speaker 1: reports that the Tank battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander B.
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  Speaker 1: Swinceski had been killed while waiting ashore. Swinceski, badly wounded,
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  Speaker 1: survived by crawling atop a pile of dead bodies to
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  Speaker 1: keep from drowning until he was finally discovered. On D
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  Speaker 1: plus one. Shop's message to the flagship at ten forty
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  Speaker 1: five reflected his frustrations. Stiff resistance neat half tracks are
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  Speaker 1: tanks no good, But the Regimental Weapons Company half tracks
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  Speaker 1: mounting seventy five millimeters guns fared no better getting ashore
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  Speaker 1: than did any other combat unit that bloody morning. One
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  Speaker 1: was sung in its LCM by long range artillery fire
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  Speaker 1: before it reached the reef. A second ran the entire gauntlet,
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  Speaker 1: but became stuck in the loose sand at the water's edge.
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  Speaker 1: The situation was becoming critical amid the cast along the
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  Speaker 1: exposed beachhead. Individual examples of courage and initiative inspired the
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  Speaker 1: scattered remnants. Staff Sergeant William Bordolin, a combat engineer attached
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  Speaker 1: to LT two to two, provided the first and most
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  Speaker 1: dramatic example on D Day morning, when a Japanese shell
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  Speaker 1: disabled his LVT and killed most of the occupants and
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  Speaker 1: route to the beach. Bordoland rallied the survivors and led
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  Speaker 1: them ashore on Red Beach two, pausing only to prepare
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  Speaker 1: explosive charges. Bordoland personally knocked out two Japanese positions which
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  Speaker 1: had been firing on the assault waves. Attacking a third emplacement,
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  Speaker 1: he was hit by machine gun fire, but declined medical
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  Speaker 1: assistance and continued the attack. Bortoland then dashed back into
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  Speaker 1: the water to rescue a wounded marine, calling for help.
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  Speaker 1: As intense fire opened up from yet another nearby enemy stronghold.
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  Speaker 1: The staff sergeant prepared one last demolition package and charged
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  Speaker 1: the position frontally. Bordoland's luck ran out. He was shot
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  Speaker 1: and killed, later to become the first of four men
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  Speaker 1: of the second Marine Division to be awarded the Medal
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  Speaker 1: of Honor. In another incident, Sergeant Roy W. Johnson attacked
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  Speaker 1: a Japanese tank single handedly, scrambling to the turret, dropping
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  Speaker 1: a grenade inside, then sitting on the hatch until the detonation.
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  Speaker 1: Johnson survived this incident, but he was killed in subsequent
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  Speaker 1: fighting on Batio, one of two hundred seventy Marine Corps
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  Speaker 1: sergeants to be killed or wounded in the seventy six
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  Speaker 1: hour battle on Red beach three, a captain shot through
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  Speaker 1: both arms and legs, sent a message to Major Crow
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  Speaker 1: apologizing for letting you down. Major Ryan recalled a wounded
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  Speaker 1: sergeant I never seen before, limping up to ask me
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  Speaker 1: where he was needed most Pfc Moore, wounded in disarmed
• 6:03
  Speaker 1: from his experiences trying to drive my Delores over the
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  Speaker 1: sea wall, carried fresh ammunition up to machine gun crews
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  Speaker 1: the rest of the day until having to be evacuated
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  Speaker 1: to one of the transports. Other brave individuals retrieved a
• 6:16
  Speaker 1: pair of thirty seven millimeters anti tank guns from a
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  Speaker 1: sunken landing craft, man handled them several hundred yards ashore
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  Speaker 1: under nightmarish enemy fire, and hustled them across the beach
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  Speaker 1: to the sea wall. The timing was critical. Two Japanese
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  Speaker 1: tanks were approaching the beachhead. The marine guns were too
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  Speaker 1: low to fire over the wall. Lift them over, came
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  Speaker 1: the cry from one hundred throats, lift them over. Willing
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  Speaker 1: hands hoisted the nine hundred pound guns atop the wall.
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  Speaker 1: The gunners coolly loaded, aimed, and fired, knocking out one
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  Speaker 1: tank at close range, chasing off the other. There were
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  Speaker 1: horse cheers. Time correspondent Robert Sharrod was no stranger to combat.
• 7:00
  Speaker 1: The landing on D Day at Batio was one of
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  Speaker 1: the most unnerving experiences in his life. Shirat accompanied marines
• 7:07
  Speaker 1: from the fourth wave of LT two to two, attempting
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  Speaker 1: to wade ashore on Red Beach two. In his words,
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  Speaker 1: no sooner had we hit the water than the Japanese
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  Speaker 1: machine guns really opened up on us. It was painfully
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  Speaker 1: slow waiting in such deep water, and we had seven
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  Speaker 1: hundred yards to walk slowly into that machine gun fire,
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  Speaker 1: looming into larger targets as we rose onto higher ground.
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  Speaker 1: I was scared, as I had never been scared before.
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  Speaker 1: Those who were not hit would always remember how the
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  Speaker 1: machine gun bullets hissed into the water inches to the right,
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  Speaker 1: inches to the left. Colonel Shute, moving slowly towards the
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  Speaker 1: beach along the pier, ordered Major rudds LT three eight
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  Speaker 1: to land on Red Beach, three east of the pier.
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  Speaker 1: By this time in the morning, there were no organized
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  Speaker 1: LVT units left to help transport the Reserve Battalion ashore.
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  Speaker 1: Rudd to approach as closely as he could by landing boats,
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  Speaker 1: then weighed the remaining distance. Rudd received his assault orders
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  Speaker 1: from shoop at eleven oh three. For the next six hours,
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  Speaker 1: the two officers were never more than a mile apart,
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  Speaker 1: yet neither could communicate with the other. Rudd divided his
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  Speaker 1: landing team into seven waves, but once the boats approached
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  Speaker 1: the reef, the distinctions blurred. Japanese anti boat guns zeroed
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  Speaker 1: in on the landing craft with frightful accuracy, often hitting
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  Speaker 1: just as the bow ramp dropped. Survivors reported the distinctive
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  Speaker 1: clang as a shell impacted a split second before the explosion.
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  Speaker 1: It happened a dozen times, recalled staff Sergeant Hatch, watching
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  Speaker 1: from the beach, The boat blown completely out of the
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  Speaker 1: water and smashed and bodies all over the place. Robert Sharad,
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  Speaker 1: reporting from a different vantage point, I watched a Jap
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  Speaker 1: shell hit directly on a landing craft that was bringing
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  Speaker 1: many marines ashore. The explosion was terrific in parts of
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  Speaker 1: the boat flew in all directions. Some Navy coxins, seeing
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  Speaker 1: the slaughter just ahead, stopped their boats seaward of the
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  Speaker 1: reef and ordered the troops off. The Marines, many loaded
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  Speaker 1: with radios or wire or extra ammunition, sank immediately in
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  Speaker 1: the deep water. Most drowned The reward for those troops
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  Speaker 1: whose boats made it intact to the reef was hardly
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  Speaker 1: less sanguinary. A six hundred yard way through withering crossfire,
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  Speaker 1: heavier by far than that endured by the first assault
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  Speaker 1: waves at h hour, The slaughter among the first wave
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  Speaker 1: of companies K and L was terrible. Seventy percent fell
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  Speaker 1: attempting to reach the beach. Seeing this, Shoop and as
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  Speaker 1: party waved frantically to groups of marines in the following
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  Speaker 1: waves to seek protection of the peer. A great number
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  Speaker 1: did this, but so many officers and non commissioned officers
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  Speaker 1: had been hit that the stragglers were shattered and disorganized.
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  Speaker 1: The peer itself was a dubious shelter, receiving intermittent machine
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  Speaker 1: gun and sniper fire from both sides. Shope himself was
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  Speaker 1: struck in nine places, including a spent bullet which came
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  Speaker 1: close to penetrating his bull neck. His runner crouching beside
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  Speaker 1: him was drilled between the eyes by a Japanese sniper.
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  Speaker 1: Captain Carl W. Hoffman, commanding three eighths Weapons Company, had
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  Speaker 1: no better luck getting ashore than the infantry companies ahead.
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  Speaker 1: My landing craft had a direct hit from a Japanese mortar.
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  Speaker 1: We lost six or eight people right there. Hoffman's marines
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  Speaker 1: veered towards the pier, then worked their way ashore. Major Rudd,
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  Speaker 1: frustrated at being unable to contact Shupe, radioed his regimental commander,
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  Speaker 1: Colonel Hall. Third wave landed on beach. Red three were
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  Speaker 1: practically wiped out. Fourth wave landed, but only a few
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  Speaker 1: men got ashore. Hall himself, in a small boat near
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  Speaker 1: the line of departure, was unable to respond. Brigader General
• 11:01
  Speaker 1: Leo D. Dutch, hermally assistant division commander, interceded with the
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  Speaker 1: message stay where you are or retreat out of gun range.
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  Speaker 1: This added to the confusion. As a result, Rudd himself
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  Speaker 1: did not reach the peer until mid afternoon. It was
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  Speaker 1: seventeen thirty before he could lead the remnants of his
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  Speaker 1: men ashore. Some did not straggle in until the following day.
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  Speaker 1: Shoop dispatched what was left of Lt. Three eight in
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  Speaker 1: support of Crows in Battle two eight. Others were used
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  Speaker 1: to help plug the gap between two eight and the
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  Speaker 1: combined troops of two to two and one two. Shupe
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  Speaker 1: finally reached Baesho at noon and established a command post
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  Speaker 1: fifty yards in from the pier along the blind side
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  Speaker 1: of a large Japanese bunker still occupied. The colonel posted
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  Speaker 1: guards to keep the enemy from launching any unwelcome sorties,
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  Speaker 1: but the approaches to the site itself were as exposed
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  Speaker 1: as any other place on the flat island. At least
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  Speaker 1: two dozen messengers were shot while bearing dispatches to and
• 12:01
  Speaker 1: from Shoop. Sharad crawled up to the grim face colonel,
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  Speaker 1: who admitted, we're in a tight spot. We've got to
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  Speaker 1: have more men. Sharad looked out at the exposed waters
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  Speaker 1: on both sides of the pier. Already he could count
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  Speaker 1: fifty disabled LVTs, tanks and boats. The prospects did not
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  Speaker 1: look good. The first order of business upon Shop's reaching
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  Speaker 1: dry ground was to seek updated reports from the landing
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  Speaker 1: team commanders. If anything, tactical communications were worse at noon
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  Speaker 1: than they had been during the morning. Shop still had
• 12:35
  Speaker 1: no contact with any troops ashore on Red Beach one,
• 12:38
  Speaker 1: and now he could no longer raise General Smith on Maryland.
• 12:43
  Speaker 1: A dire message came from LT two to two. We
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  Speaker 1: need help. Situation bad. Later, a messenger arrived from that
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  Speaker 1: unit with this report. All communications out except runners co killed,
• 12:56
  Speaker 1: no word from e company shop found Lieutenant Colonel Jordan
• 13:01
  Speaker 1: ordered him to keep command of two to two and
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  Speaker 1: sought to reinforce him with elements from one to two
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  Speaker 1: and three eight. Shup gave Jordan an hour to organize
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  Speaker 1: and rearm his assorted detachments, then ordered him to attack
• 13:14
  Speaker 1: inland to the airstrip and expand the beachhead. Shup then
• 13:19
  Speaker 1: directed Evans Carlson to hitch a ride out to the
• 13:21
  Speaker 1: Maryland and give General Smith and Admiral Hill a personal
• 13:24
  Speaker 1: report of the situation ashore. Shoupe's strength of character was
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  Speaker 1: beginning to show. You tell the General in the Admiral.
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  Speaker 1: He ordered Carlson that we are going to stick and
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  Speaker 1: fight it out. Carlson departed immediately, but such were the
• 13:40
  Speaker 1: hazards and confusions between the beach and the line of
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  Speaker 1: departure that he did not reach the flagship until eighteen hundred.
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  Speaker 1: Matters of critical resupply then captured Shupe's attention. Beyond the pier,
• 13:52
  Speaker 1: he could see nearly one hundred small craft circling aimlessly. These,
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  Speaker 1: he knew, carried assorted supplies from the transports and cargo ships,
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  Speaker 1: unloading as rapidly as they could in compliance with Admiral
• 14:04
  Speaker 1: Nimitz's stricture to get the hell in, then get the
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  Speaker 1: hell out. The indiscriminate unloading was hindering prosecution of the
• 14:13
  Speaker 1: fight ashore. Shup had no idea which boat held which supplies.
• 14:18
  Speaker 1: He sent word to the primary control officer to send
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  Speaker 1: only the most critical supplies to the pier head ammunition, water, blood,
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  Speaker 1: plasma stretchers, LVT fuel, more radios. Then conferred with Lieutenant
• 14:33
  Speaker 1: Colonel Rixey while naval gunfire support. Since the landing had
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  Speaker 1: been magnificent, it was time for the Marines to bring
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  Speaker 1: their own artillery ashore. The original plan to land the
• 14:44
  Speaker 1: first Battalion, tenth Marines on Red one was no longer
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  Speaker 1: practical shop and Rixey agreed to try a landing on
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  Speaker 1: the left flank of Red two, close to the pier.
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  Speaker 1: Rixy's guns were seventy five millimeters pack howitzers boated in LCVP.
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  Speaker 1: The expeditionary guns could be broken down for manhandling. Rixey,
• 15:06
  Speaker 1: having seen from close at hand, what happened when Lt.
• 15:09
  Speaker 1: Three eight tried to wade ashore from the reef. When
• 15:12
  Speaker 1: after the last remaining LVTs there were enough operational vehicles
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  Speaker 1: for just two sections of Batteries A and B. In
• 15:22
  Speaker 1: the confusion of transfer line operations, three sections of Battery
• 15:26
  Speaker 1: C followed the LVT shoreward in their open boats. Luck
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: was with the artillery men. The LVTs landed their guns
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  Speaker 1: intact by late afternoon, when the trailing boats hung up
• 15:38
  Speaker 1: on the reef, The intrepid marines humped the heavy components
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  Speaker 1: through the bullet swept waters to the pier and eventually
• 15:45
  Speaker 1: ashore at twilight. There would be close in fire support
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  Speaker 1: available at daybreak. Julian Smith knew little of these events,
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  Speaker 1: and he continued striving to piece together the tactical situation ashore.
• 15:59
  Speaker 1: From op's reports from staff officers aloft in the floatplanes,
• 16:03
  Speaker 1: he concluded that the situation in the early afternoon was desperate.
• 16:08
  Speaker 1: Although elements of five infantry battalions were ashore, their toe
• 16:12
  Speaker 1: hold was at best precarious. As Smith later recalled, the
• 16:17
  Speaker 1: gap between Red one and Red two had not been closed,
• 16:20
  Speaker 1: and the left flank on Red three was by no
• 16:23
  Speaker 1: means secure. Smith assumed that Shupe was still alive and functioning,
• 16:28
  Speaker 1: but he could ill afford to gamble. For the next
• 16:32
  Speaker 1: several hours, the commanding general did his best to influence
• 16:35
  Speaker 1: the action ashore from the flagship. Smith's first step was
• 16:40
  Speaker 1: the most critical. At thirteen thirty one, he sent a
• 16:44
  Speaker 1: radio message to General Holland Smith, reporting situation in doubt
• 16:48
  Speaker 1: and requesting release of the six Marines to division control.
• 16:53
  Speaker 1: In the meantime, having ordered his last remaining landing team,
• 16:57
  Speaker 1: Hayes's one to eight to the line of departure, Smith
• 17:00
  Speaker 1: began reconstituting an emergency division reserve comprised of bits and
• 17:04
  Speaker 1: pieces of the artillery, engineer and service troop units. General
• 17:10
  Speaker 1: Smith that thirteen forty three ordered General Hermale to proceed
• 17:14
  Speaker 1: to the end of the pier, assess the situation, and
• 17:16
  Speaker 1: report back. Hermally and his small staff promptly debarked from
• 17:22
  Speaker 1: Monrovia APA thirty one and headed towards the Smoking Island,
• 17:27
  Speaker 1: but the trip took four hours. In the meantime, General
• 17:31
  Speaker 1: Smith intercepted a fourteen fifty eight message from Major Schettle,
• 17:35
  Speaker 1: still afloat seaward of the reef CP located on back
• 17:39
  Speaker 1: of Red Beach one situation as before, have lost contact
• 17:43
  Speaker 1: with assault elements. Smith answered, in no uncertain terms, direct
• 17:48
  Speaker 1: you land at any cost, regain control of your battalion
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: and continue the attack. Shettle complied, reaching the beach around sunset,
• 17:58
  Speaker 1: it would be well into the next day before where
• 18:00
  Speaker 1: he could work his way west and consolidate his scattered remnants.
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: At fifteen twenty five, Julian Smith received Holland Smith's authorization
• 18:09
  Speaker 1: to take control of the six Marines. This was good news.
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: Smith now had four battalion landing teams, including one to
• 18:17
  Speaker 1: eight available. The question then became where to feed them
• 18:21
  Speaker 1: into the fight without getting them chewed to pieces like
• 18:24
  Speaker 1: Redd's experience and trying to land three eight. At this point,
• 18:28
  Speaker 1: Julian Smith's communications failed him again. At seventeen forty, he
• 18:33
  Speaker 1: received a faint message that Hermiley had finally reached the
• 18:36
  Speaker 1: pier and was under fire. Ten minutes later, Smith ordered
• 18:40
  Speaker 1: Hermiley to take command of all forces ashore. To his
• 18:44
  Speaker 1: subsequent chagrin, Hermally never received this word, nor did Smith
• 18:49
  Speaker 1: know his message fail to get through. Hermally stayed at
• 18:52
  Speaker 1: the pier, sending runners to Shup, who unceremoniously told him
• 18:56
  Speaker 1: to get the hell out from under that peer and trying,
• 18:59
  Speaker 1: with with partial success, to unscrew the two way movement
• 19:02
  Speaker 1: of casualties out to sea and supplies to shore. Throughout
• 19:07
  Speaker 1: the long day, Colonel Hall and his regimental staff had
• 19:10
  Speaker 1: languished in their LCVPs adjacent to Hayes's LT One eight
• 19:14
  Speaker 1: at the line of departure, cramped, wet, hungry, tired, and
• 19:18
  Speaker 1: a large number seasick. In late afternoon, Smith abruptly ordered
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: Hall to land his remaining units on a new beach
• 19:26
  Speaker 1: on the northeast tip of the island at seventeen forty
• 19:29
  Speaker 1: five and work west towards Shoop's ragged lines. This was
• 19:34
  Speaker 1: a tremendous risk. Smith's overriding concern that evening was a
• 19:39
  Speaker 1: Japanese counterattack from the eastern tail of the island against
• 19:42
  Speaker 1: his left flank Crow and Rudd. Once he had been
• 19:46
  Speaker 1: given the six Marines, Smith admitted he was willing to
• 19:50
  Speaker 1: sacrifice a battalion landing team if it meant saving the
• 19:53
  Speaker 1: landing force from being overrun during darkness. Fortunately, as it
• 19:58
  Speaker 1: turned out, Hall never received this message from Smith. Later
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: in the afternoon, a floatplane reported to Smith that a
• 20:06
  Speaker 1: unit was crossing the line of departure and heading for
• 20:09
  Speaker 1: the left flank of Red Beach two. Smith and Etson
• 20:13
  Speaker 1: assumed it was haul In Hays going in on the
• 20:16
  Speaker 1: wrong beach. The fog of war. The movement reported was
• 20:20
  Speaker 1: the beginning of Rixey's artillery men moving ashore. The Eighth
• 20:24
  Speaker 1: Marine spent the night in its boats waiting for orders.
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: Smith did not discover this fact until early the next morning.
• 20:31
  Speaker 1: On Batio, Shope was pleased to receive at fourteen fifteen
• 20:35
  Speaker 1: an unexpected report from Major Ryan that several hundred marines
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: and a pair of tanks had penetrated five hundred yards
• 20:42
  Speaker 1: beyond Red Beach one on the western end of the island.
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: This was by far the most successful progress of the day,
• 20:49
  Speaker 1: and the news was doubly welcome because Shupe, fearing the worst,
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: had assumed Shettle's companies and the other strays who had
• 20:57
  Speaker 1: veered in that direction had been wiped out. Shop, however,
• 21:01
  Speaker 1: was unable to convey the news to Smith. Ryan's composite
• 21:05
  Speaker 1: troops had indeed been successful on the western end, learning
• 21:09
  Speaker 1: quickly how best to operate with the medium tanks, the
• 21:12
  Speaker 1: Marines carved out a substantial beachhead, overrunning many Japanese turrets
• 21:17
  Speaker 1: and pill boxes, but aside from the tanks, Ryan's men
• 21:21
  Speaker 1: had nothing but infantry weapons. Critically, they had no flamethrowers
• 21:26
  Speaker 1: or demolitions. Ryan had learned from earlier experience in the
• 21:30
  Speaker 1: Solomons that positions reduced only with grenades could come alive again.
• 21:36
  Speaker 1: By late afternoon, he decided to pull back his thin
• 21:39
  Speaker 1: lines and consolidate. I was convinced that without flamethrowers or
• 21:44
  Speaker 1: explosives to clean them out, we had to pull back
• 21:47
  Speaker 1: to a perimeter that could be defended against counter attack
• 21:49
  Speaker 1: by Japanese troops still hidden in the bunkers. The fundamental
• 21:54
  Speaker 1: choice faced by most other marines on Beaeshow that day
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: was whether to stay put along the beach or crawl
• 21:59
  Speaker 1: over the sea wall and carry the fight inland. For
• 22:03
  Speaker 1: much of the day, the fire coming across the top
• 22:06
  Speaker 1: of those coconut logs was so intense it seemed a
• 22:09
  Speaker 1: man could lift his hand and get it shot off laid.
• 22:13
  Speaker 1: On D Day, there were many too demoralized to advance.
• 22:17
  Speaker 1: When Major Rathven mc cy Tompkins, bearing messages from General
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: Hermally to Colonel Shup first, arrived on Red Beach two
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: at the foot of the pier at dusk on D Day,
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: he was appalled at the sight of so many stragglers
• 22:31
  Speaker 1: Tompkins wondered why the Japanese didn't use mortars. On the
• 22:34
  Speaker 1: first night, people were lying on the beach so thick
• 22:38
  Speaker 1: you couldn't walk. Conditions were congested on Red Beach one
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: as well, but there was a difference. Major Crow was
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: everywhere as cool as ice box. Let us there were
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: no stragglers. Crow constantly fed small groups of marines into
• 22:53
  Speaker 1: the lines to reinforce his precarious hold on the left flank.
• 22:58
  Speaker 1: Captain Hoffman of three to eight was not not displeased
• 23:00
  Speaker 1: to find his units suddenly integrated within Crow's two eight,
• 23:05
  Speaker 1: and Crow certainly needed help. As darkness began to fall.
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: There we were, Hoffman recalled toes in the water. Casualties everywhere,
• 23:13
  Speaker 1: dead wounded all around us. But finally a few marines
• 23:16
  Speaker 1: started inching forward. A yard here, a yard there. It
• 23:21
  Speaker 1: was enough. Hoffman was soon able to see well enough
• 23:24
  Speaker 1: to call in naval gunfire support. Fifty yards ahead. His
• 23:28
  Speaker 1: marines dug in for the night, west of Crow's lines,
• 23:32
  Speaker 1: and just inland from Shoop's command post. Captain William T.
• 23:35
  Speaker 1: Bray's Company B one two settled in for the expected
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: counter attacks. The company had been scattered in Kyle's bloody landing.
• 23:44
  Speaker 1: At midday, Bray reported to Kyle that he had men
• 23:48
  Speaker 1: from twelve to fourteen different units in his company, including
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: several sailors who swam ashore from sinking boats. The men
• 23:56
  Speaker 1: were well armed and no longer strangers to each other,
• 23:59
  Speaker 1: and Kyle was reared. Altogether, some five thousand marines that
• 24:04
  Speaker 1: stormed the beaches of Batio on D Day, fifteen hundred
• 24:07
  Speaker 1: of these were dead, wounded, or missing. By nightfall. The
• 24:12
  Speaker 1: survivors held less than a quarter of a square mile
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: of sand and coral. Shupe later described the location of
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: his beachhead lines the night of D Day as a
• 24:21
  Speaker 1: stock market graph. His marines went to ground in the
• 24:26
  Speaker 1: best fighting positions they could secure, whether in shell holes,
• 24:29
  Speaker 1: inland or along the splintered sea wall. Despite the crazy
• 24:34
  Speaker 1: quilt defensive positions and scrambled units, the marine's fire discipline
• 24:38
  Speaker 1: was superb. The troops seemed to share a certain grim confidence.
• 24:43
  Speaker 1: They had faced the worst in getting ashore. They were
• 24:46
  Speaker 1: quietly ready for any sudden Bonzai charges in the dark offshore.
• 24:51
  Speaker 1: The level of confidence diminished. General Julian Smith on Maryland
• 24:55
  Speaker 1: was gravely concerned. This was the crisis of the battle.
• 24:59
  Speaker 1: He recalled three fourths of the island was in the
• 25:02
  Speaker 1: enemy's hands, and even allowing for his losses, he should
• 25:05
  Speaker 1: have had as many troops left as we had ashore.
• 25:09
  Speaker 1: A concerted Japanese counterattack Smith believed would have driven most
• 25:13
  Speaker 1: of his forces into the sea. Smith and Hill reported
• 25:17
  Speaker 1: up the chain of command to Turner, Spruance, and Nimits
• 25:20
  Speaker 1: issue remains in doubt. Spruance's staff began drafting plans for
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: emergency evacuation of the landing force. The expected Japanese counter
• 25:30
  Speaker 1: attack did not materialize. The principal dividend of all the
• 25:34
  Speaker 1: bombardment turned out to be the destruction of Admiral Shibasaki's
• 25:38
  Speaker 1: wire communications. The Japanese commander could not muster his men
• 25:43
  Speaker 1: to take the offensive. A few individuals infiltrated through the
• 25:47
  Speaker 1: marine lines to swim out to disabled tanks and LVTs
• 25:50
  Speaker 1: in the lagoon, where they waited for the morning. Otherwise
• 25:54
  Speaker 1: all was quiet. The main struggle throughout the night of
• 25:57
  Speaker 1: D Day was the attempt by Shop and Hermali to
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: advise Julian Smith of the best place to land the
• 26:03
  Speaker 1: reserves on D plus one. Smith was amazed to learn
• 26:07
  Speaker 1: at zero two hundred that Hall and Hayes were in
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: fact not ashore, but still afloat at the line of departure,
• 26:13
  Speaker 1: awaiting orders. Again, he ordered combat Teammate Minus to land
• 26:19
  Speaker 1: on the eastern tip of the island, this time at
• 26:22
  Speaker 1: zero nine hundred on Deep plus one. Hermalley finally caught
• 26:26
  Speaker 1: a boat to one of the destroyers in the lagoon
• 26:28
  Speaker 1: to relay ship's request to the commanding General to land
• 26:31
  Speaker 1: reinforcements on Red Beach two. Smith altered Hall's orders accordingly,
• 26:37
  Speaker 1: but he ordered Hermany back to the flagship, miffed at
• 26:40
  Speaker 1: his assistant for not getting ashore and taking command, but
• 26:44
  Speaker 1: Hermley had done Smith a good service in relaying the
• 26:47
  Speaker 1: advice from Shop. As much as the eighth Marines were
• 26:51
  Speaker 1: going to bleed in the morning's assault, a landing on
• 26:53
  Speaker 1: the eastern end of the island would have been an
• 26:55
  Speaker 1: unmitigated catastrophe. Reconnaissance after the battle discover hover those beaches
• 27:01
  Speaker 1: to be the most intensely mined on the island. End
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: of Chapter four read by Aaron Bennett