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08 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · Logic Library

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Book eight, Chapter one. After these things, it follows that we should
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discuss friendship, for it is a certain virtue, or subsists in conjunction with
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virtue. And besides this, it is most necessary to life. For no
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one would choose to live without friends, though he possessed every other good.
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For the rich, princes and magistrates appear to be especially in want of friends.
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For what advantage is there in a prosperity of this kind if beneficence is
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taken away, which is especially exerted towards friends, and is most praised when
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thus exerted. Or how can prosperity be preserved and saved without friends? For
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by how much the greater, by so much the more insecure it is.
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But in poverty and other misfortunes, friends are considered to be the only refuge
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one. Ship also is useful to youth in preventing them from error, and
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to elderly men by the attention which it pays to their wants and the assistance
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it affords to their deficiency in action arising from the imbecility of age. To
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those likewise in the acme of life, it is useful because it aids them
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in the performance of beautiful actions. Quote when two in concord meet close quote,
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for they are more able through it, both to conceive and act.
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Friendship also appears to be naturally inherent in that which begets towards that which is
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begotten. And this not only in the human race, but likewise in birds,
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in most animals, in those of the same nation, towards each other,
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and especially among men. And hence we praise those that are philanthropic.
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It may also be seen in traveling how accommodating and friendly every man is to
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man. It seems, too, that friendship connects cities together, and legislators
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pay more attention to it than to justice. For concord appears to be something
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similar to friendship. But this legislators are especially desirous of affecting, and they
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principally expel sedition, which is hostile to concord. And when the citizens indeed
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are friends, there is no need of justice. But though they are just,
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they require friendship among just things. Also, that which is especially just
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appears to be of a friendly nature. Nor is friendship alone necessary, but
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it is also a beautiful thing. For we praise those who are lovers of
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friends. And an abundance of friends appears to be one among the number of
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beautiful things. Again, some are of opinion that the same persons are good
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men and friends. There is, however, no small controversy concerning friendship,
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for some consider it to be a certain similitude, and that similar persons are
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friends. Whence also it is said quote like tends to like a jackdaw to
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a jackdaw close quote, et cetera. Others, on the contrary, say
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that all such persons are potters to each other, and they investigate concerning these
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things from a higher and more physical origin. Euripides indeed, saying quote Earth
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when she's dry, rejoices in the rain, and venerable heaven with rain,
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when filled on earth delights to fall close quote, and Heraclitus asserting quote that
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what is adverse is advantageous, that the most beautiful harmony results from things of
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a different nature, and that all things originate from strife close quote. Others,
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however, are of a contrary opinion respecting friendship, and among these is
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Empedocles, for he says, quote that the similar aspires after the similar close
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quote. Such of these doubts, therefore, as are of a physical nature,
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we shall omit, for they are not adapted to the present speculation.
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But we shall direct our attention to such of them as pertain to human affairs,
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and to the manners and passions of men, such as whether there is
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friendship among all men, or it is not possible that depraved men can be
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friends, and whether there is one or many species of friendship. For those
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who are of opinion that there is but one species of it, because it
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receives the more and the less, do not found their opinion on us official
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argument. For things specifically different receive the more and the less. But of
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these we have spoken before Chapter two. These things, however, will perhaps
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become evident when that which is the object of friendly love is known. For
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it seems that not everything is beloved, but that only which is the object
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of love. But this is either what is good or what is delectable,
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or what is useful, that, however, may appear to be useful through
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which some good or pleasure is procured. Hence, the good and the delectable
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will be objects of love. As ends whether therefore, do men love that
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which is simply good or that which is good to them? For these sometimes
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are discordant. A similar inquiry also may be made concerning the delectable. It
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appears, however, that everyone loves that which is good to himself, and
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that good is that which is simply the object of love. But that what
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is good to each person is the object of love to each Each person,
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however, loves not that which is really good to him, but that which
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appears to be so. But this makes no difference, for that which appears
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to be good will be the object of love. Since, however, there
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are three things through which love is produced, viz. The good, the
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delectable, and the useful. In the love of things inanimate, there is
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not said to be friendship, for there is no reciprocal love, nor a
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wish that any good may befall them. For it would be perhaps ridiculous to
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wish that some good might befall wine. But if a man does, he
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wishes that it may be preserved in order that he may have it. But
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it is said to be requisite to wish well to a friend for his own
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sake, And those who entertain this wish for their friends are said to be
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benevolent, though the same wish should not be made by them, for it
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is said that benevolence in reciprocal regard is friendship, to which perhaps it should
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be added if the benevolence is not latent. For many persons are benevolent to
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those whom they never saw in consequence of believing them to be worthy or useful
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men, And those whom they never saw may also be benevolent to them.
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They appear, therefore, indeed, to be benevolent to each other. But
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how can it be said that they are friends when they are ignorant of the
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manner in which they are mutually affected. Hence, it is necessary, in
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order to their being friends, that they should be benevolent to and wish well
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to each other on account of one of the things we have mentioned, viz.
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On account of the good, the delectable, or the useful Chapter three.
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These however, are specifically different from each other, and therefore the loves
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also and the friendships differ. For there are three species of friendship equal in
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number to the objects of friendly love, since in each there is a reciprocal
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love which is not latent. But those who love each other wish well to
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each other so far as they love. Those therefore, who love each other
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on account of utility, do not mutually love for their own sake, but
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so far as they obtain some good from each other. This is also the
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case with those who love on account of pleasure, for they do not love
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those who are versatile because they possess certain qualities, but because they afford them
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pleasure. And those who love on account of utility possess this friendly love on
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account of the good which they derive from it. Those likewise who love on
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account of pleasure love on account of that which is delectable to them. And
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the attachment of these is not personal, but is produced so far as the
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object of their attachment is useful or delectable. These friendships therefore are accidental,
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for the object of their attachment is not beloved so far as he is such
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a person as he is, but so far as he administers to them some
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good or some pleasure. Such friendships therefore are easily dissolved, the objects of
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them not remaining in a similar condition. For if they are no longer delectable
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or useful, they cease to be beloved, and the useful is not permanent,
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but at a different time becomes different. Hence that through which they were
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friends being dissolved. A friendship also is dissolved in consequence of existing for the
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sake of it. A friendship, however, of this kind, appears especially
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to subsist among elderly men, for those who have arrived at this period of
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life do not pursue the delectable, but the useful. Nor is the delectable
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pursued by such young men in the acme of life, as make utility the
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object of their pursuit. But such persons do not very much live together,
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for sometimes they are not pleasing to each other. They do not therefore require
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an association of this kind unless they are useful, for they are delectable to
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each other so far as they hope for some good. Among these friendships,
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also viz. Those of utility, hospitable friendship is ranked. But the friendship
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of young men appears to subsist on account of pleasure, for they live according
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to passion, and especially pursuit that which is delectable to them, and that
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which is present. In consequence of the mutation of age. However, other
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things become delectable, on which account they rapidly become and cease to be friends.
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For their friendship is changed together with that which is delectable. But the
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mutation of such a pleasure is rapid. Young men also are amorous, for
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much of the amatory propensity subsists according to passion and on account of pleasure.
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Hence they love and rapidly cease to love, frequently changing in the same day.
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They wish, however, to spend the day with each other and to
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live together. For thus they obtain what friendship requires. The friendship, however,
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of good men and of those who are similar in virtue, is perfect,
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for they similarly wish well to each other so far as they are good.
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But they are good of themselves. But those who wish well to their
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friends for their sake are especially friends, for they are thus affected towards them
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on their own account i e. Personally, and not from accident. The
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friendship, therefore, of these remains as long as they are good men.
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But virtue is stable, and each of these is simply good and good to
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his friend. For good men are simply good, and are useful to each
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other in a similar manner. Also, they are delectable to each other,
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For good men are simply and mutually delectable, for to each their proper actions
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and such like actions viz. Such as are similarly virtuous are attended with pleasure,
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But the actions of good men are such as these, or resemble them.
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It reasonably follows also that such a friendship is stable, for all such
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things subsist in it, connectedly as ought to be present with friends. For
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all friendship is on account of good or on account of pleasure, either simply
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or to him who loves, and this according to a certain similitude. But
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in this friendship i e. In the friendship founded on virtue, all the
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above mentioned particulars are essentially inherent, since in this all the rest are similar,
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and that which is simply good is also simply delectable. These things,
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however, are especially lovely, and in these the most excellent love and friendship
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principally subsist. But it is likely that such friendships are rare, for persons
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of this description are few. Farther Still, virtuous friendship requires time and custom.
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For according to the proverb, it is not possible for men to know
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each other until they have eaten a peck of salt together. Nor is it
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proper for one person to become intimate with or a friend to another till he
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appears to be amiable to him and worthy of belief. But those who rapidly
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perform towards each other the offices of friendship wish indeed to be friends, but
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are not unless they are amiable and know that they are so. They rapidly
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therefore contract the wish to be friends, but they do not contract friendship.
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Hence, virtuous friendship is perfect according to time, as being lasting, and
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according to other things, and consists from all these. Each friend, likewise
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is in this friendship similar to each which is a thing necessary to friends.
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Chapter four. The friendship, however, which subsists on account of the delectable,
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has a similitude too virtuous friendship. For good men also are delectable to
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each other. This is likewise the case with the friendship which subsists on account
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of utility. For good men are also such i e. Useful to each
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other. But among these, viz. Those who are friends through the delectable.
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Friendships are especially permanent when an equality, as for instance, of pleasure,
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subsists between them, and not only so, but likewise from the same
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thing, as is the case with men of versatile manners, and not as
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between the lover and the beloved person, for these are not delighted with the
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same thing. But the lover is delighted with the sight of the beloved person,
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and he who is beloved is delighted with the attention which is paid him
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by the lover. When the flower of age, however, is no more,
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sometimes the friendship also ends, for to the one the sight of his
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friend is no longer pleasing, and to the other bland attention is no longer
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paid. Many of these, however, continue permanent in their friendship if each
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loves the manners of each from custom in consequence of possessing similar manners. Those,
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however, who do not reciprocally exchange delight in amatory affairs but utility are
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friends in a less degree, and their friendship is less permanent. But the
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friendship of those who are friends on account of utility is dissolved together with advantage,
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for they were not friends of each other, but of the profitable,
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on account of pleasure. Therefore, and on account of utility, it is
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possible for bad men to be friends to each other, and also for worthy
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with bad men, and for those who are neither good nor bad with each
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other, and with the good or the bad. But it is evident that
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the good alone can be friends through or on account of themselves. For bad
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men are not delighted with each other unless each derive some advantage from the other.
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And the friendship of good men alone is unattended with calumny, for it
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is not easy to believe any thing bad of him who has been tried by
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us for a long time. Among these, also there is mutual credibility and
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a confidence that the one will not injure the other, and such other particulars
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as are thought worthy to be ranked in true friendship. In other friendships,
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however, there is nothing to prevent things of this kind from taking place.
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For since men denominate friends those who are connected together on account of utility,
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in the same manner as cities bracket, for to cities, warlike confederacies appear
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to take place for the sake of advantage close bracket. And since those likewise
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are called friends, who like boys, love each other on account of pleasure,
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perhaps indeed it is necessary that we also should call such persons friends,
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and should admit that there are many species of friendship, and we must denominate,
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indeed, the friendship of good men, so far as they are good,
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that which is primarily and properly so called but we must admit that the
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rest are called friendships from similitude, for they are friends so far as there
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is something good and similar among them. Since the delectable is something good to
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the lovers of pleasure. These friendships, however, are not very much conjoined.
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Nor do the same persons become friends on account of the useful and the
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delectable. For things which are from accident are not very much united, but
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friendship being distributed into these species. Bad men indeed will be friends on account
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of pleasure or advantage through which they are similar. But good men will be
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friends on their own account, for they are friends so far as they are
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good. These therefore are simply friends, but those from accident and from being
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assimilated to these Chapter five. As however, in the virtues, some men
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are so to be good according to habit, but others according to energy.
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Thus also it is in friendship, for those friends who live together are delighted
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with and impart good to each other. But those who are asleep or are
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separated by places do not indeed energize. And yet they are so disposed as
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to be able to energize in such a way as friendship requires. For places
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do not dissolve friendship simply, but only the energy of it. If,
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however, the absence is long, it seems to produce an oblivion of friendship.
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Whence it is said that taciturnity dissolves many friendships. But neither elderly nor
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austeremen appear to be adapted to friendship, for in them there is but little
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of pleasure. No one, however, can constantly associate with one who is
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sorrowful or with one who is not pleasant, for nature appears especially to avoid
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the painful, and to aspire after the pleasing. But those who admit the
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company of each other and yet do not live together rather resemble benevolent persons than
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friends, since nothing is so much the province of friends as living together.
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For those who are in want aspire after advantage. Those also, who are
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blessed constantly associate with each other, for it is not in the smallest degree
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fit that these should lead a solitary life. But it is not possible for
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men to live together whose company is not delightful, and who are not pleased
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with the same things which fellowship appears to possess. The friendship, therefore,
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of good men is eminently friendship, as we have frequently observed, for that
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which is simply good or delectable appears to be lovely and eligible, but to
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every one that is lovely and eligible, which is to him a thing of
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this kind. A good man, however, is lovely and eligible to a
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good man through both these. Dilection, however, is similar to passion,
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but friendship to habit, For dilection is no less exerted towards inanimate things.
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But reciprocal love exists in conjunction with deliberate choice, And deliberate choice is from
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habit. We likewise wish well to those whom we love for their own sake,
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not according to passion, but according to habit. And those who love
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a friend loves that which is good to themselves. For a good man becoming
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a friend becomes a good to him to whom he is a friend. Each
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therefore loves that which is good to himself, and they mutually impart to each
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other. That which is equal both in wishing well and affording delight, for
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equality is said to be friendship. But these things are specially present with the
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friendship of good men. Chapter six. Friendship, however, subsists in a
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less degree among austere and elderly men in proportion, as they are more morose
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and less delighted with associations, for these appear to be especially friendly and effective
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of friendship. Hence, young men rapidly become friends, but not elderly men,
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for they do not become friends to those with whom they are not delighted.
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In a similar manner, neither do the austere become rapidly friends. But
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men of this description are indeed benevolent to each other, for they wish well
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and afford assistance to the wants of each other. They are, not,
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however, very much friends, because they do not constantly associate nor are delighted
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with each other, which things appear to be especially of a friendly nature.
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But it is not possible to be a friend to many according to perfect friendship,
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as neither is it possible to love many at one and the same time,
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for this resembles excess, and a thing of this kind is naturally adapted
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to take place towards one person. Moreover, it is not easy for many
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persons to please the same person very much at one and the same time,
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Nor perhaps would it be a good thing if it were easy. Experience and
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custom likewise are necessary to a perfect friendship, which are very difficult things.
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But it is possible to please many persons on account of utility and delight,
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for there are many of this description viz. Who are thus to be pleased,
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and a little experience is sufficient for this purpose. Of these two,
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however, the friendship which subsists through the delectable is more similar to true friendship,
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when the same things are affected by both persons, and they are delighted
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with each other or with the same things, as is the case in the
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friendship of young men. For there is more of the liberal in these friendships.
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But the friendship which subsists on account of utility is the friendship of merchants,
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and of those who are occupied in sordid and illiberal pursuits, and those
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who are blessed indeed, viz. Who are as happy as the condition of
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human nature will permit, are not in want of anything useful or delectable,
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because they already possess everything of this kind. For they wish to live with
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certain persons, and they endure what is painful, but for a short time,
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since no one could endure it continually, not even good itself if it
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were attended with molestation. Hence they search for friends who can procure them delight.
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It is, however, perhaps necessary to search for good men who are
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such i e. Who are delectable, and who are also such to their
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friends, for thus those things will be present with them which ought to be
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present with friends. But men in authority and appear to use their friends by
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making a distinction between them, for some are useful and others delectable to them.
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The same things, however, are not very much affected by both these,
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for neither do they search for those who are delectable in conjunction with virtue,
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nor for those who are useful for worthy purposes. But aspiring after pleasure,
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they search for men of versatile manners, and for those who are skillful
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in accomplishing what they are ordered to do. But these qualifications are not very
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much found in the same person. We have, however, already observed that
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the worthy man is at the same time pleasing and useful. But such a
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one will not be the friend of the man who surpasses others in power and
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authority unless he also surpasses others in virtue. But if he does not,
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he who surpasses will not equalize. According to the analogous men of this description,
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however, are rare. The above mentioned friendships, therefore, are an
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equality, for either the same things are affected by both, and they mutually
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wish the same things, or they exchange one thing for another, as for
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instance, pleasure for utility. But that these are friendships in a less degree,
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and that they are less permanent, has been already observed by us.
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They appear, however, through a similitude and dissimilitude of the same thing,
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to be and not to be friendships. For from their similitude to the friendship,
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which is according to virtue, they appear to be friendships, since the
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one of these has the delectable, but the other the useful. But both
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these are inherent in virtuous friendship. They differ, however, in this that
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virtuous friendship is free from calumny and is stable. But these are rapidly changed,
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and they also differ in many other things. And from this dissimilitude to
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the friendship, which is according to virtue, they do not appear to be
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friendships. Chapter seven. There is, however, another species of friendship which
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subsists according to transcendency. Such is that between a father and his son,
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and in short, between a more elderly and a younger man, between a
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husband and his wife, and between every governor and him who is governed.
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But these friendships also differ from each other. For there is not the same
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friendship between parents and children as there is between governors and the governed, nor
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between a father and a son, as between a son and his father,
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nor between a husband and wife, as between a wife and husband. For
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the virtue and also the work of each of these are different, and the
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things are different on account of which they love. Their loves. Therefore and
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their friendships are different. Hence, neither are the same things affected by each
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towards each, nor is it fit they should be required. But when children
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indeed bestow on their parents those things which offspring ought to bestow on those by
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whom they were begotten, and parents bestow on their children those things which it
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is proper to bestow on their offspring, then the friendship between such as these
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will be stable and worthy. It is, however, necessary, in all
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the friendships which subsist according to transcendency, that the love should be analogous,
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as for instance, that the better character should be beloved in a greater degree
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than he loves, and that this should also be the case with the more
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useful character, and in a similar manner with each of the rest. For
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when love exists according to Dessert, then in a certain respect, equality is
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produced, which appears to be the peculiarity of friendship. The equal, however,
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does not appear to subsist similarly in just things and in friendship. For
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in just things, indeed, the equality which is according to Dessert ranks in
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the first place, but that which is according to quantity in the second place.
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But in friendship the equality which is according to quantity ranks in the first
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place, and that which is according to Dessert in the second place. This,
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however, becomes evident if there is a great interval of virtue, or
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vice, or affluence, or of some other things, For then they are
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no longer friends, nor do they think themselves qualified to be so. But
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this is most apparent in the gods, for they most abundantly transcend in everything
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that is good. It is also evident in kings, for those who are
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much inferior to them do not think themselves worthy to be their friends. Nor
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do those who are of no worth aspire to be friends of the best or
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the wisest of men. In such as these, therefore, there is no
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accurate definition as long as they are the friends of some one. For many
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things being taken away, the friendship may yet remain. But if they are
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separated by a great interval from each other, as is the case with man
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and divinity, friendship no longer remains. Whence, also it is doubted whether
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friends would wish for their friends the greatest of goods, such for instance,
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as for them to be gods. For in this case they would no longer
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be friends to them. Neither therefore would they be a good to them.
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For friends are a good to each other. Hence, if it is well
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said that a friend wishes well to his friend for his sake, it is
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requisite that he should remain such as he is. But he wishes the greatest
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good may befall him, still remaining a man. And perhaps he does not
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wish that every good may befall him, for every one especially wishes to obtain
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good himself. Chapter eight. The multitude, however, appear from ambition,
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to be more desirous of being beloved than of loving. Hence the multitude love
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flatterers, For a flatterer is a friend who is surpassed by him whom he
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flatters or pretends to be so, and also professes to love in a greater
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degree than he is beloved. But to be beloved appears to be proximate to
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the being honored after which the multitude aspire. It seems, however, that
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they do not choose honor on its own account, but from accident. For
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the multitude are delighted when they are honored by those in power, through the
31:45
hope of the benefits they may thence derive, For they fancy they shall obtain
31:51
from them that of which they are in want. They are delighted therefore with
31:56
honor as an indication that they shall be benefited. But those who aspire after
32:01
honor from worthy and intelligent men desire to confirm their own opinion of themselves.
32:07
They rejoice therefore that they are worthy persons, believing in the judgment of those
32:13
who say that they are worthy. But they are delighted to be beloved per
32:17
se. Hence, it would seem that this is a better thing than to
32:22
be honored, and that friendship is a thing eligible of itself. Friendship,
32:27
however, seems to consist more in loving than in being beloved, of which
32:31
this is an indication. Let mothers rejoice in loving their children. For some
32:37
mothers give their children to be privately educated by others and love them, knowing
32:42
them to be their own offspring, but are not anxious to be beloved in
32:46
return, if both cannot be effected. But it appears to them to be
32:51
sufficient if they see their children doing well, and they love their offspring,
32:57
though the offspring are unable to pay that attention to their mother, which is
33:00
fit because they are ignorant of her. Since therefore, friendship consists rather in
33:06
loving than in being beloved, and we praise those who are lovers of friends.
33:10
To love appears to be the virtue of friends. Hence, those in
33:15
whom this exists, according to Dessert, are stable friends. And the friendship
33:21
of such as these is stable. But thus also those who are unequal may
33:27
especially become friends, for thus they will be equalized. Equality, however,
33:32
and similitude are friendship, and especially the similitude of those who resemble each other
33:38
in virtue, For being of themselves stable, they are also stable towards each
33:44
other, and neither require anything depraved, nor are subservient to anything of this
33:50
kind. But as I may say they prohibit what is base, for it
33:54
is the province of good men neither to air themselves, nor permit their friends
34:00
to be subservient to erroneous conduct. But depraved men have no stability, for
34:07
they do not remain similar to themselves, but are only friends for a short
34:10
time, being delighted with the depravity of each other. Useful, however,
34:16
and pleasing men remain friends for a longer time, for they continue friends as
34:22
long as they impart to each other pleasure and advantage. But the friendship which
34:27
subsists on account of utility appears to be composed from contraries, such as the
34:31
friendship of the poor with the rich man, and of the unlearned with the
34:36
learned man. For he who is in want of anything aspiring to the position
34:42
of it, recompenses with something else, him from whom he obtains what he
34:47
wants. Hither also may be referred the lover and the beloved, the beautiful
34:52
and the deformed. Hence, lovers sometimes appear to be ridiculous when they think
34:59
they ought to be believe as much as they love, If therefore they are
35:02
similarly amiable. Perhaps it is fit they should thus think, But it is
35:08
ridiculous if they possess nothing of this kind. Perhaps also, neither does one
35:15
contrary desire another essentially, but only from accident. But the appetite is directed
35:22
to the medium, for this is good. Thus, for instance, it
35:25
is good to a dry thing not to become moist but to arrive at the
35:30
medium between dryness and moisture. And in a similar manner to a hot thing,
35:36
and to other substances. These things, however, must be omitted,
35:40
for they are more foreign than is proper. Chapter nine. It seems,
35:47
however, as we said in the beginning, that both friendship and justice are
35:52
conversant with and exist in the same things. For in all society there appears
35:59
to be a certain justice and friendship. Men therefore call their fellow sailors and
36:06
fellow soldiers friends, and in a similar manner, those who associate with them
36:12
in other employments. But such as is the extent of their associations, such
36:19
also is the extent of their friendship, For such likewise is the extent of
36:24
justice. The proverb too rightly says that all things are common among friends,
36:30
for friendship consists in communion among brothers, However, and associates, all things
36:37
are common, but among others they are limited to certain bounds, and to
36:43
some indeed more so, but to others less. For with respect of friendship,
36:49
also some are friendships integrator, and others in a less degree. Just
36:53
things also differ, For there is not the same justice between parents and children
37:00
as between brothers towards each other, nor as between associates and fellow citizens,
37:06
and the like takes place in other friendships. Injuries, therefore, are different
37:12
towards each of these, and they receive an increase by how much the more
37:15
the persons injured are friends. Thus, for instance, it is a more
37:20
dire thing to defraud an associate of money than a fellow citizen, and not
37:25
to assist a brother than to refuse assistance to a stranger, and to strike
37:30
a father then to strike any other person. But the just is naturally adapted
37:37
to be increased at one and the same time with friendship, as subsisting in
37:42
the same things, and being equally extended. All communions or societies, however,
37:47
resemble the parts of the political or civil communion. Four men journey together
37:53
with a view to a certain advantage, and in order to procure something which
37:59
pertains too human life. Political communion also appears to exist for the sake of
38:04
advantage, to have been established with a view to this from the beginning,
38:07
and to continue so. For the attention of legislators is directed to this,
38:14
and they say that what is advantageous in common is just other communions therefore partially
38:21
aspire after utility. Thus sailors aspire after the utility pertaining to navigation, or
38:28
to the acquisition of wealth or something of the like kind. But soldiers aspire
38:32
after the utility pertaining to war, whether riches are the object of their desire,
38:37
or victory or the capture of cities. The like also takes place among
38:43
tribes and the populace. Some communions, however, appear to have been formed
38:47
on account of pleasure, such as the communion from the celebration of festivals,
38:52
or from societies instituted to promote good fellowship. For these subsist for the sake
38:59
of sacrifice and association. But all these appear to be subject to political communion.
39:06
For political communion does not aspire after present advantage, but to that which
39:10
pertains to the whole of life, performing sacrifices, and for this purpose forming
39:16
assemblies, bestowing honours on the gods, and affording a cessation from labour in
39:22
conjunction with pleasure. Four ancient sacrifices and assemblies appear to have been instituted after
39:30
collecting the fruits of the earth as first fruits. All communions therefore appear to
39:36
be parts of the political communion. But such like friendships follow such like communions.
39:43
Chapter ten. There are, however, three species of a polity,
39:49
and as many deviations from them, which are, as it were, the
39:52
corruptions of these polities. But the polities, indeed are a kingdom and aristocracy,
40:00
and the third is derived from the distribution of honors through the medium of
40:05
wealth, which, as it seems, may be appropriately called a timocracy.
40:10
Most men, however, are accustomed to call it simply a polity. But
40:15
of these, a kingdom is the best, and a timocracy is the worst.
40:20
The deviation, also from a kingdom, is indeed a tyranny, for
40:25
both are monarchies. They differ, however, very much from each other.
40:30
For the tyrant indeed looks to his own advantage, but the king to the
40:35
advantage of those whom he governs. For he is not a king who is
40:38
not sufficient to himself, and who does not surpass his subjects in every kind
40:44
of good. But a man of this description is in want of nothing.
40:49
Hence his attention will not be directed to what is advantageous to himself, but
40:54
to the benefit of those whom he governs. For he who is not a
40:59
person of this description will be a certain elected king. A tyrant, however,
41:05
is the contrary to a king properly so called, for he pursues his
41:09
own good, And from this it is more evident that he is the worst
41:14
of rulers, for that which is contrary to the best is the worst.
41:19
But the transition from a kingdom is into a tyranny. For a tyranny is
41:23
the depravity of a monarchy, and a depraved king becomes a tyrant. The
41:29
transition from an aristocracy is into an oldigarchy through the vice of the governors,
41:36
who distribute civil offices in a manner contrary to dessert, bestow upon themselves all
41:42
or the greater part of everything that is good, and always appoint the same
41:45
person's magistrates, paying more attention to wealth than to anything else. Those therefore
41:52
that govern are few and are depraved instead of being the most worthy men.
41:58
But the transition from a democracy is into a democracy, since these polities border
42:04
on each other. For in a democracy also the multitude have dominion, and
42:09
all those that are rich are equal. A democracy, however, is in
42:15
the smallest degree depraved, for it deviates but little from the form of a
42:20
polity, i e. From a democracy. After this manner, therefore,
42:24
polities are especially changed, for thus they are changed the least and the most
42:30
easily. The resemblances, however, and as it were, paradigms of them,
42:36
may be derived from families. For the communion or society between a father
42:42
and his children has the form of a kingdom, for a father pays attention
42:46
to his children for their own sake. Hence also Homer calls Jupiter father,
42:52
for the intention of a kingdom is to be a paternal government. But among
42:58
the Persians, the government of a fother is tyrannical, for they use their
43:01
children as slaves. The government, likewise of a master towards his servants is
43:07
tyrannical, for in this government that alone which is advantageous to the master is
43:13
performed. This therefore appears to be right. But the Persian government is erroneous.
43:20
For of things that are different, the governments also are different. But
43:23
the government of man and wife appears to be aristocratic, for the man governs
43:30
according to dessert and in those things in which it is proper for the man
43:34
to govern, but he permits his wife to rule over such things as are
43:37
adapted to be governed by a woman. If the man, however, has
43:43
dominion in all things, the government is changed into an oligarchy, for he
43:47
does this contrary to dessert, and not so far as he is the better
43:52
character. But it sometimes happens that women, in consequence of being heiresses,
43:58
governed even in things pertaining to men. The government therefore, in this case
44:04
is not according to virtue, but is through wealth and power, in the
44:07
same manner as in oligarchies. And the government of brothers resembles a democracy,
44:14
for they are equal, except so far as they differ in their ages.
44:17
Hence, if there is a great difference in their ages, the friendship is
44:22
no longer fraternal. But a democratic government is especially to be seen in those
44:28
families which are without a master, for here all govern equally. In those
44:32
families, also, where he who governs is a man of a weak understanding,
44:37
everyone has the power of acting as he pleases. Chapter eleven, in
44:44
each of the polities. However, friendship appears to have the same extent as
44:49
justice, and the friendship indeed between a king and his subjects consists in transcendency
44:55
of beneficence, for he benefits his subject since being a good man, he
45:01
is attentive to their interest, like a shepherd, in order that they may
45:06
do well. Whence, also Homer calls Agamemnon the shepherd of the people.
45:12
Such, likewise is paternal friendship, but it differs in the magnitude of the
45:17
benefits which it confers. For the father is the cause of the existence of
45:22
his child, which appears to be a thing of the greatest consequence, and
45:27
also procures him nutriment and education. The same things likewise are attributed to progenitors,
45:34
for a father is naturally adapted to rule over his children, and progenitors
45:39
over the offspring of their children, and kings over their subjects. But these
45:45
friendships consist in transcendency, on which account also parents are honoured. The just
45:52
therefore in these is not the same, but subsists according to Dessert. For
45:57
thus also the friendship subsists. There is likewise the same friendship between a husband
46:02
and a wife as in an aristocracy, for it subsists according to virtue,
46:08
and a more ample good is attributed to the better character, and that which
46:13
is adapted and appropriate is attributed to each. For thus also justice is affected.
46:20
But the friendship of brothers resembles that of associates, for they are equal
46:24
and of the same age. And persons of this description apply themselves, for
46:30
the most part, to the same disciplines, and are similar in their manners.
46:34
The friendship, therefore, which exists in a democracy, resembles this,
46:38
For in this government it is requisite that the citizens should be equal and worthy
46:44
persons. Hence they alternately and equally govern. Such therefore is the friendship of
46:50
brothers. In corrupt polities, however, as the justices, but small,
46:54
so likewise is the friendship, And it exists in the smallest degree in the
46:59
worst polity. For in a tyranny there is either no friendship or very little,
47:05
since among those with whom there is nothing common. Between the governor and
47:08
the governed, there is not any friendship, for neither is there any justice.
47:14
But the friendship between them resembles that which is between an artist and his
47:19
instrument, between the soul and the body, and between a master and his
47:22
servant, for these indeed are benefited by those that use them. There is
47:28
not, however, any friendship with nor justice towards things inanimate, as neither
47:32
is there towards a horse or an ox, or towards a slave, so
47:37
far as he is a slave, since there is nothing common between these.
47:42
For a slave is an animated instrument, but an instrument is an inanimate slave.
47:47
So far therefore as he is a slave, there is no friendship between
47:52
him and his master. But there may be so far as he is a
47:55
man. For it appears that there is a certain justice due from every man
48:00
towards every man who is able to partake of law and compact. And therefore
48:07
there may also be a friendship between any one man and another, so far
48:10
as each is a man. In tyrannical governments, however, there is but
48:15
little friendship and justice, But there is very much of each in democracies,
48:21
for among those that are equal, many things are common. Chapter twelve.
48:29
All friendship, therefore, as we have before observed, consists in communion,
48:34
but it may be divided into that which subsists between kindred and that which subsists
48:38
between associates. But political friendships the friendships of those of the same tribe,
48:45
of those who sail together, and such like, are more similar to the
48:49
friendships of associates, for they appear to exist, as it were, from
48:53
compact. Among these, also hospitable friendships may be ranked. The friendship,
49:00
likewise, of kindred, appears to be multiform, and the whole of it
49:05
depends from paternal friendship. For parents love their children as being something of themselves,
49:12
but children love their parents as being something proceeding from them. Parents,
49:16
however, have a greater knowledge of their offspring, so as to know more
49:21
accurately that they are their offspring, than the offspring know that they proceeded from
49:25
their parents. And that from which a thing is generated has a greater familiarity
49:31
and alliance with the thing produced than the thing produced has with its maker.
49:37
For that which originates from a thing is the property of that from which it
49:43
originates, as a tooth or a hair or anything else, is the property
49:49
of its possessor. But that from which a thing originates is not the property
49:52
of any one of the things which originate from it, or is so in
49:57
a less degree. The love also of parents to their children is superior to
50:02
that of children to their parents by length of time. For parents love their
50:07
children as soon as they are born, but children their parents in process of
50:12
time when they begin to understand or perceive that they are their parents. From
50:17
these things, likewise, it is evident on what account mothers love their children
50:22
more than fathers love them. Parents indeed therefore love their children as themselves,
50:28
for those that proceed from them are as it were, their other selves by
50:32
being separated from them. But children love their parents as proceeding from them.
50:37
Brothers, however, love each other in consequence of being born from the same
50:43
parents, For sameness with their parents causes them to be the same with each
50:47
other. Hence it is said that they have the same blood, the same
50:52
root, and such like expressions. They are, therefore, in a certain
50:55
respect one and the same in separate bodies. The being educated together also,
51:02
and equality of age greatly contribute to friendship, for according to the proverb quote
51:08
equal delights in equal age close quote, and those who are accustomed to the
51:15
same things are associates. Hence, also fraternal friendship is assimilated to the friendship
51:21
of associates cousins. Likewise, and the remaining kindred become conjoined from the friendship
51:28
of brothers in consequence of mediately originating from the same persons. Some, however,
51:35
become more united in friendship, and others less in consequence of the source
51:39
of their race being nearer or more remote. But the friendship of children towards
51:45
their parents and of men towards the gods is as towards that which is good
51:51
and transcendent. For parents and the gods confer the greatest benefits, for they
51:57
are the causes of existence and of being nor and when they are of a
52:01
proper age of being educated. A friendship, also of this kind, possesses
52:07
the delectable and the useful in a greater degree than the friendship of strangers,
52:12
because their life is in a greater degree more common. Those things, however,
52:16
are to be found in fraternal friendship, which exist in the friendship of
52:21
associates, and in a greater degree in those that are worthy, and in
52:25
short, in those that are similar in proportion as they are more familiar and
52:30
love each other from their birth, and in proportion as those who are born
52:37
from the same parents, who are nourished together and similarly educated, are more
52:40
similar in their manners in this friendship. Likewise, the proof which is obtained
52:45
from time, is most abundant and most firm, and things pertaining to friendship
52:52
subsist analogously in the remaining gradations of kindred. But the friendship between man and
52:59
wife appears to be according to nature. For man is more a connubial than
53:02
a political animal, and this by how much more a family is prior to
53:08
and more necessary than a city. And the procreation of offspring is more common
53:13
to all animals in other animals. Therefore, the communion proceeds thus far i
53:19
e. As far as to the procreation of offspring. But men and women
53:24
not only cohabit for the sake of begetting children, but also with a view
53:29
to the necessaries and conveniences of life. For their employments are immediately divided,
53:35
and those of the husband are different from those of the wife. Hence they
53:37
assist each other, referring their own private possessions to the common good of the
53:43
family. On account of these things, therefore, both the useful and the
53:46
delectable appear to be contained in this friendship. It will also exist on account
53:52
of virtue if the husband and wife are worthy characters, for there is a
53:57
virtue pertaining to each, and they will choice in a thing of this kind.
54:01
Children, however, appear to be a bond, and hence those marriages
54:06
that are without children are more swiftly dissolved, For children are a common good
54:10
to both husband and wife, and that which is common connects to inquire also
54:16
how a husband ought to live with his wife. And in short, one
54:20
friend with another appears to be nothing else than to inquire how justice subsists between
54:24
them, For it does not appear that there is the same justice between one
54:30
friend and another, nor between one stranger, one associate, and one disciple
54:35
with another. Chapter thirteen. Since therefore there are three kinds of friendship,
54:40
as was observed in the beginning, and according to each some are friends inequality,
54:46
but others according to transcendency. For similarly, good men are friends,
54:52
and between worthy men who are not equally worthy, the more may be the
54:55
friend of the less worthy. And in a similar manner with respect to friendships,
55:01
which subsist on account of delight and on account of utility, they may
55:07
be equal or unequal, and different in the advantages with which they are attended.
55:14
This being the case, it is requisite that those friends who are equal
55:17
should be equalized in loving and other things. Pertaining to friendship, but that
55:22
those who are unequal should render to themselves that which is analogous in transcendencies.
55:29
Accusations, however, in complaints, reasonably take place in that friendship alone or
55:35
principally, which is founded in utility. For those who are friends on account
55:40
of virtue are readily disposed to benefit each other, for this is the peculiarity
55:46
of virtue and friendship. But with those who contend with each other in kindness,
55:52
there are no accusations nor contests. For no one is indignant with him
55:57
who loves and benefits him. But if he is grateful, he will recompence
56:01
him by benefiting him in return. He, however, who transcends in the
56:07
benefits which he confers, obtaining that which he desires, will not accuse his
56:10
friend, for each aspires after good. Nor do accusations and complaints very much
56:16
take place in the friendships which are founded in pleasure, for at one and
56:22
the same time both obtain the objects of their desire if they rejoice to live
56:27
together. He, however, will appear to be ridiculous who accuses him by
56:31
whom he is not delighted. Whain it is not possible to spend his time
56:36
with him. But the friendship which is founded in utility is full of accusations
56:40
and complaints. For since they make use of each other with a view to
56:45
advantage, they are always in want of more, and fancy they have less
56:49
than is proper, and blame their friends because they do not obtain as much
56:52
as they are in want of, though they deserve to obtain it. But
56:57
those who benefit are not able to supply a small as those who are benefited
57:00
require. It appears, however, that as the justice twofold, for one
57:05
kind is unwritten but the other is legal. Thus, also with respect to
57:08
the friendship which is founded in utility, one kind indeed is ethical, but
57:15
the other is legal. Accusations therefore, then, especially take place when compacts
57:21
are formed and dissolved, not with a view to the same friendship as that
57:25
by which they are united. But the legal friendship founded in utility is that
57:30
which subsists by compacts, one kind indeed being entirely venal from hand to hand
57:37
viz. Such as takes place in buying and selling. But another kind is
57:43
more liberal, in which one thing is to be given for another at a
57:46
stated time, But from compact in this friendship. However, that which is
57:52
owing is manifest and is not ambiguous, but a friendly delay is permitted to
57:58
take place. Hence, with some of these there are no judicial processes.
58:02
But they think it is requisite to love those who form compacts from the obligation
58:08
of fidelity. But the ethical friendship does not consist in compacts. But what
58:15
it gives, it gives as to a friend. And this is also the
58:20
case with whatever is imparted by the one to the other. He, however,
58:24
who gives, thinks it fit that he should receive in return an equivalent
58:30
or more than an equivalent, as if he had not given but lent.
58:34
But if he does not receive the retribution which he expected from the contract,
58:38
he accuses his friend. And this happens because all or most men wish to
58:45
obtain things which are truly beautiful, but deliberately choose what is advantageous. But
58:51
it is beautiful to benefit, not with a view to be benefited in return,
58:55
and it is advantageous to be benefited. He, therefore, or who
59:00
is able, ought to make a retribution equivalent to the benefit he has received
59:05
and willingly, for a friend must not return kindness unwillingly. If Therefore he
59:10
has erred from the first and has been benefited by an improper person, for
59:16
he was not benefited by a friend, nor by one who did this for
59:21
his sake. If this be the case, retribution must be made as if
59:25
he had been benefited by compact. Hence, he who has been benefited by
59:30
such a one ought to promise that he will make a retribution if he can,
59:35
But if he cannot, he who conferred the benefit ought not to think
59:38
it fit that he should be recompensed, So that, if possible, retribution
59:44
is to be made in the beginning. However, it is requisite when a
59:47
benefit is offered to consider by whom it is offered, and with what view
59:52
swas either to accept or refuse it. But it may be doubted whether retribution
59:59
is to be measured by the advantage of him who receives it, or by
1:00:02
the beneficence of him who made it. For those who receive it say in
1:00:07
extenuation that they receive such things from benefactors as are of little use to them,
1:00:13
and which they might have received from others. But on the contrary,
1:00:17
the benefactors say that they bestow the greatest things which it was in their power
1:00:22
to give and which could not be obtained from others, and that they conferred
1:00:27
them in dangerous circumstances or such like necessities. Since therefore this friendship subsists on
1:00:35
account of utility, the measure of it is the advantage of him who is
1:00:39
benefited, For he is the person who is in want, and his friend
1:00:44
assists him in order that he may receive an equal benefit in return. The
1:00:49
assistance therefore afforded by him who is benefited will be as great as that which
1:00:54
he received, and as much or even more, must be given by him
1:00:58
in return, for it is more beautiful and becoming. But in those friendships
1:01:04
which are founded in virtue, there are no accusations, and the deliberate choice
1:01:08
of him who benefits resembles a measure. For the authority of virtue and manners
1:01:15
consists in deliberate choice Chapter fourteen. Dissensions, however, take place in those
1:01:22
friendships which subsist according to transcendency. For each thinks it fit that he should
1:01:28
have more than the other. But when this takes place, the friendship is
1:01:31
dissolved. For the better character of the two thinks it is proper that he
1:01:37
should have more than the other. For more ought to be distributed to a
1:01:40
good man. This is also the case with him who is the more useful
1:01:45
person of the two. For they say it is not fit that he who
1:01:49
is useless should have an equal portion with him who is useful, since ministrant
1:01:54
offices will take place, and not friendship, unless what is done from friendship
1:02:00
is according to the dessert of the deeds. For they are of opinion that,
1:02:06
as in pecuniary negotiations, those who employ a greater sum of money receive
1:02:09
more profit. Thus also it ought to be in friendship. The contrary,
1:02:15
however, is the opinion of him who is indigent and who is the worst
1:02:20
character. For these thinks that it is the province of a good friend to
1:02:22
assist those that are in want. For what advantage, say they, is
1:02:28
there in being the friend of a worthy or powerful man, if no benefit
1:02:31
is to be derived from him. It seems, however, that each thinks
1:02:36
rightly, and that it is requisite to distribute more to each from friendship,
1:02:40
yet not of the same thing, but more of honor indeed to him who
1:02:45
transcends, but more of gain to him who is indigent. For honor,
1:02:49
indeed, is the reward of virtue, and beneficence, but gain is the
1:02:53
auxiliary of indigence. This also appears to be the case in polities, for
1:02:59
he is not honored who is the cause of no good to the community,
1:03:04
Since that which is common is given to him who benefits the community, but
1:03:07
honor is something common. For it is not possible for a man at one
1:03:12
and the same time to be enriched and honored by the community, since no
1:03:16
one endures to have less in all things. Hence to him who is inferior
1:03:21
in wealth, honor is given, but money to him who is to be
1:03:24
bribed by gifts. For distribution, according to Dessert, equalizes and preserves friendship,
1:03:31
as we have before observed in this manner. Therefore, it is requisite
1:03:37
to act towards those who are unequal, And he who is benefited, either
1:03:42
in wealth or in virtue, should remunerate him by whom he is benefited with
1:03:46
honor, thus recompensing him as far as he is able. For friendship requires
1:03:52
that which is possible, and not that which is according to Dessert, For
1:03:57
a recompense, according to Dessert is not possible in all things, as in
1:04:01
honors conferred on the gods and parents, since no one can bestow these according
1:04:08
to Dessert. But he who pays homage to them to the utmost of his
1:04:12
power appears to be a worthy man. Hence, though it would seem not
1:04:16
to be lawful for a son to abandon his father, yet it is lawful
1:04:19
for a father to abandon his son for a return ought to be made by
1:04:25
him who is a debtor. But a son can do nothing worthy of the
1:04:29
benefits he has received from his father, so that he will always be his
1:04:32
debtor. Those, however, to whom others are indebted, have the power
1:04:36
of abandoning their debtors, and therefore a father has this power. At the
1:04:43
same time, however, no father perhaps will abandon his son unless the son
1:04:46
is transcendently depraved. For exclusive of natural friendship, it is human not to
1:04:53
refuse giving assistance when it is wanted. But if the son is depraved,
1:04:58
he is either to be avoided by his father, or his father must not
1:05:01
be anxious to assist him. A depraved son, however, sometimes hates his
1:05:06
father, or at least does not very much endeavor to assist him, For
1:05:11
the multitude wished to be benefited, but they avoid acting beneficently as a useless
1:05:17
thing. In thus much concerning these particulars, end of Book eight,