Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 021 - Diffusion of Air Assets
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter twenty Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty five
- 0:05Speaker 1: by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:11Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:15Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot oorg. Recording
- 0:22Speaker 1: by Paul Hampton. Chapter twenty Diffusion of Air Assets. General Moore,
- 0:29Speaker 1: the Second Air Division commander, counted General Westmoreland as the
- 0:33Speaker 1: biggest booster of tactical air support in Vietnam, but Westmoreland's
- 0:37Speaker 1: requests for more air resources in mid nineteen sixty four
- 0:41Speaker 1: hued to Army aviation doctrine. He asked for a fourth
- 0:45Speaker 1: C one twenty three squadron sixteen planes to take care
- 0:48Speaker 1: of wholesale delivery supply under the Southeast Asia Military Airlift System,
- 0:53Speaker 1: a second Army CV two Caribou company to handle retail
- 0:57Speaker 1: deliveries within the core areas, to two two new Army
- 1:00Speaker 1: helicopter companies numbering seventy uh one bees, some for command use,
- 1:05Speaker 1: others for gunships, and two additional air mobile platoons with
- 1:10Speaker 1: twenty euh one bees. Among the forty eight hundred personnel
- 1:14Speaker 1: in the package were forty Air Liaison Officer and forward
- 1:18Speaker 1: Air Controller teams. PACAFF understood and agreed to the need
- 1:22Speaker 1: for the C one twenty three squadron in light of
- 1:25Speaker 1: Vietcong's success in attacking surface transportation, but an extra Caribou
- 1:30Speaker 1: company seemed unnecessary if the CV twos already in Vietnam
- 1:34Speaker 1: were put under central control of the airlift system for
- 1:37Speaker 1: common use. General LeMay disliked the more odent position of
- 1:41Speaker 1: complementary needs for armed helicopters and tactical air He objected
- 1:46Speaker 1: strongly to helicopter gunships, despite the Air Force Chief's contention
- 1:50Speaker 1: that strike aircraft gave more firepower. Secretary of Defense McNamara
- 1:55Speaker 1: on August seventh, nineteen sixty four, approved Westmoreland's list of requirements.
- 2:01Speaker 1: Three days later, a Royal Australian Air Force detachment of
- 2:04Speaker 1: six cariboos arrived at Tunsan Nuitt and went under control
- 2:08Speaker 1: of the airlift system, but the new Army Caribou Company,
- 2:11Speaker 1: reaching Vietnam in September, remained outside systematic control. The Air
- 2:16Speaker 1: Force Reserve furnished the fresh squadron of C one twenty three's.
- 2:20Speaker 1: The planes flown to Tanzan Nutt in mid September by
- 2:23Speaker 1: rotating replacement crews. In early October, the nineteenth Air Commando
- 2:28Speaker 1: Squadron Troop Carrier was formed and assigned to the three
- 2:31Speaker 1: fifteenth Troop Carrier Group. In August, the Joint Chiefs of
- 2:36Speaker 1: Staff had forwarded General LeMay's question on the comparative merits
- 2:40Speaker 1: of tactical air and armed helicopters. General Westmoreland MCAVEE commander,
- 2:46Speaker 1: responded and asserted that the latter had numerous advantages over
- 2:50Speaker 1: strike aircraft support. General Moore took exception and argued that
- 2:54Speaker 1: many of the alleged benefits were invalid. Continuing discussions consumed
- 2:59Speaker 1: a lot of staff anders that might better have gone
- 3:01Speaker 1: to the combat situation. Westmoreland did not neglect tactical aviation,
- 3:07Speaker 1: even though he heartily endorsed armed helicopters for the first time.
- 3:11Speaker 1: MACVE critiques of Vietnamese ground operations pointed out missed opportunities
- 3:16Speaker 1: for tactical air support. For example, in Fu Yen Province
- 3:20Speaker 1: on August nineteen, three battalions attacked about five hundred Vietcong
- 3:25Speaker 1: without once calling for strike aircraft. This MACVI commented was
- 3:30Speaker 1: the major fault of the operation. Past counterinsurgency experts had
- 3:35Speaker 1: viewed airstrikes as impeding pacification. Then Leon Gower, an analyst
- 3:40Speaker 1: with the Rand Corporation, interviewed Vietcong prisoners and concluded that
- 3:45Speaker 1: the adverse effects were far less than assumed. He further
- 3:48Speaker 1: found that since the Vietcong were on the lookout for
- 3:51Speaker 1: strike aircraft, they feared even liaison planes. Yet MCVE desired
- 3:57Speaker 1: more helicopters because strike aircraft and liaison plane were too few,
- 4:01Speaker 1: a shortage seen by General Moore as the most important
- 4:04Speaker 1: limiting factor in the USAF effort. Due to training demands,
- 4:08Speaker 1: only eight of the twenty nine A one ease of
- 4:11Speaker 1: the First Air Commando Squadron were on hand for twelve
- 4:14Speaker 1: combat sorties a day. An average of just thirty Vietnamese
- 4:17Speaker 1: A one h's were available for thirty five to forty
- 4:20Speaker 1: five combat sorties. Eight aircraft of the First Air Commando
- 4:24Speaker 1: Squadron crashed, at least two due to enemy ground fire.
- 4:29Speaker 1: These A one e's were shot down on the night
- 4:31Speaker 1: of September twenty three, when silhouetted by flares while making
- 4:35Speaker 1: a low level napalm pass. General Moore had proposed in
- 4:39Speaker 1: August that the Vietnamese be given a fifth and A
- 4:42Speaker 1: sixth A one to eight squadron, and he asked that
- 4:45Speaker 1: the B fifty seven and F one hundred judge at
- 4:48Speaker 1: Biinha and Danag be used within the country. Macvee and
- 4:52Speaker 1: the JCS concurred. When the Joint Chiefs took up in
- 4:55Speaker 1: September the matter of lagging tactical air support, they suggested
- 4:59Speaker 1: using jet but President Johnson was unwilling to do so.
- 5:03Speaker 1: To up USAF sorties, Ambassador Taylor advocated deleting the need
- 5:08Speaker 1: for a bona fide Vietnamese trainee pilot aboard an A
- 5:11Speaker 1: one e during a combat mission. Perhaps, the Joint Chiefs
- 5:14Speaker 1: said USAFA one ees could fly combat while carrying a
- 5:18Speaker 1: Vietnamese observer if a pilot was not on hand. Although
- 5:21Speaker 1: at first entirely negative, Secretary McNamara on September twenty five
- 5:26Speaker 1: agreed to permit A one e combat operations with the
- 5:30Speaker 1: Vietnamese observer or student pilot aboard. The JCS tried again
- 5:35Speaker 1: to allow USAF crews to respond to immediate and emergency
- 5:39Speaker 1: air requests, but Ambassador Taylor still resisted opening the door
- 5:43Speaker 1: to wider use of American crews, and McNamara agreed In October,
- 5:48Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs authorized A one EES to engage in
- 5:51Speaker 1: combat with the Vietnamese pilot or observer aboard. For the
- 5:54Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force, they recommended a fifth A one H
- 5:58Speaker 1: squadron in May nineteen sixty five and a sixth in
- 6:01Speaker 1: October nineteen sixty five. Until then, two USAF A one
- 6:05Speaker 1: EU units were required in the country. During October December
- 6:10Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four, the thirty fourth Tactical Group and the
- 6:14Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force slightly expanded their strike aircraft. Organized under
- 6:18Speaker 1: the thirty fourth Group on October twelve, the USAF six
- 6:21Speaker 1: hundred and second Fighter Commando Squadron began to build in
- 6:25Speaker 1: both personnel and planes. The five twentieth or fourth Vietnamese
- 6:29Speaker 1: Fighter Squadron formed at BiiN High in October, prepared to
- 6:33Speaker 1: move to the new Canto Airfield in December. The thirty
- 6:37Speaker 1: fourth Group flew about fifty A one sorties a day,
- 6:41Speaker 1: seventeen of them available for combat. The planes performed admirably
- 6:45Speaker 1: on strike missions, but proved hard to maintain, chiefly due
- 6:48Speaker 1: to in flight engine failures. The Americans nevertheless kept eighty
- 6:52Speaker 1: percent of the aircraft operational. In contrast, the Vietnamese could
- 6:57Speaker 1: muster only fifty eight percent. For example, the F five
- 7:00Speaker 1: sixteenth Fighter Squadron at Danang had fifteen aircraft, but at
- 7:04Speaker 1: Sordi rate was about six per day. The five twentieth
- 7:08Speaker 1: Fighter Squadron flew a few missions in December, but construction
- 7:11Speaker 1: lagged at Canto later called Bin Twee, and the field
- 7:15Speaker 1: was insecure at night. Beginning December twentieth, the squadron daily
- 7:18Speaker 1: deployed detachment of five A one ahs to Bin Twee.
- 7:22Speaker 1: The pilots were on call for missions until they returned
- 7:25Speaker 1: to being hat just before nightfall. The expansion of the
- 7:28Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force was supported by adequate aircraft delivery and
- 7:32Speaker 1: aircrew training. It suffered from troubles in training maintenance men,
- 7:37Speaker 1: owing in part to shortages of ground support and handling equipment.
- 7:40Speaker 1: The Vietnamese borrowed a few dollies, loading hoists and other
- 7:44Speaker 1: equipment from the thirty fourth Tactical Group. Only main bases
- 7:48Speaker 1: like BiiN Ha owned these items, which hardly helped the
- 7:51Speaker 1: situation at forward bases. On October eighth, at the height
- 7:55Speaker 1: of the Tonkin Gulf Crisis, PACKAFF issued orders in activating
- 7:59Speaker 1: the nineteenth Tactical Air Support Squadron as had earlier been planned.
- 8:04Speaker 1: General Westmoreland expressed surprise to Admiral Sharp and asked to
- 8:08Speaker 1: retain the unit in lieu of giving the one Liaison
- 8:12Speaker 1: planes to the Vietnamese one sixteenth Liaison Squadron as contemplated.
- 8:16Speaker 1: Westmoreland proposed the purchase of U seventeen A aircraft to
- 8:20Speaker 1: equip that unit. On September twenty five, Defense Secretary McNamara approved.
- 8:26Speaker 1: The nineteenth Tactical Air Support Squadron was reactivated at Biinh
- 8:30Speaker 1: on October thirty one. McFee recommended thirty more planes for
- 8:34Speaker 1: it and each of the four Vietnamese Liaison units as well.
- 8:39Speaker 1: The reversal of the earlier phase out decision left the
- 8:42Speaker 1: squadron in limbo until pipeline support could be restored. The
- 8:46Speaker 1: thirty fourth Tactical Group possessed twenty four oh ones and
- 8:50Speaker 1: twelve liaison pilots, three of whom were about to complete
- 8:53Speaker 1: their tours. A detachment of one f's stayed at Biinh
- 8:57Speaker 1: to train newly graduated Vietnamese pilots arrive from Nitrang. Ten
- 9:01Speaker 1: one fs with liaison officers and forward air controllers went
- 9:05Speaker 1: under the Air Support Operations centers. The USAF controller with
- 9:10Speaker 1: a fourteenth Regiment at Trivin was Captain Lloyd E. Lewis.
- 9:14Speaker 1: When he received an one and a Vietnamese observer in September,
- 9:18Speaker 1: he began to fly day long surveillance missions coordinated with
- 9:21Speaker 1: the vin Bin Province commander. The result was an appreciable
- 9:25Speaker 1: decline in Vietcong activity. Friendly ground action became more productive,
- 9:30Speaker 1: as did interdiction, targeting and air strikes. In September, William P.
- 9:36Speaker 1: Graham and AIRN H. Katz of RAND studied the use
- 9:40Speaker 1: of USAF laison officers and forward air controllers on constant
- 9:44Speaker 1: visual reconnaissance and strike control. The two analysts gathered data
- 9:48Speaker 1: for a new concept they called the single Integrated Attack Team.
- 9:52Speaker 1: The idea was presented in Saigon, Hawaii, and Washington in
- 9:56Speaker 1: October and next in a RAND report. The theory favored
- 10:00Speaker 1: small and closely coordinated air and ground strike forces as
- 10:03Speaker 1: the best counterinsurgency weapon. One crews were to carry out
- 10:07Speaker 1: continuous and extensive airborne surveillance and strike control. They would
- 10:11Speaker 1: work with Special Forces ground teams of about eighty men
- 10:14Speaker 1: who were to hold the Viet Cong groups long enough
- 10:17Speaker 1: for strike aircraft to sweep in. Unfortunately, the concept was
- 10:20Speaker 1: better suited to an insurgency in its initial stages than
- 10:24Speaker 1: to the field warfare the Vietcong were starting to wage. Meanwhile,
- 10:29Speaker 1: General Kang had embarked on a general shakeup following the
- 10:32Speaker 1: ABOARDI of coup attempt against him in September. His sweeping
- 10:35Speaker 1: personnel changes in the Joint General Staff and among the
- 10:38Speaker 1: field commanders produced officers unfamiliar with the air request system.
- 10:43Speaker 1: To explain the system's features, a team from the USAF
- 10:46Speaker 1: Air Ground Operations School completed a country wide circuit in
- 10:50Speaker 1: October and November, but all attempts to persuade the Vietnamese
- 10:54Speaker 1: to assign sufficient workers to the request net, to disperse
- 10:58Speaker 1: one a's to forward locations, and to let others besides
- 11:01Speaker 1: Vietnamese air observers marked targets were fruitless. The field commanders
- 11:06Speaker 1: refused to be bypassed in requests for air strikes. Neither
- 11:09Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force nor ground commanders were willing to
- 11:12Speaker 1: assume responsibility under civil law for mistakes that the other
- 11:16Speaker 1: might make in marking targets. Strike pilots refrained from accepting
- 11:20Speaker 1: targets unless a Vietnamese Air Observer designated them, and deploying
- 11:25Speaker 1: one a's to forward and remote airstrips meant danger from guerrillas,
- 11:29Speaker 1: logistics difficulties, and loss of command control. Despite these drawbacks,
- 11:35Speaker 1: Secretary McNamara in November approved a fifth and sixth fighter
- 11:40Speaker 1: Squadron for the Vietnamese Air Force. He authorized building the
- 11:43Speaker 1: Vietnamese Liaison squadrons to thirty aircraft each by deliveries of
- 11:48Speaker 1: sixty eight one a's and U seventeen a's from March
- 11:52Speaker 1: through May nineteen sixty five. He said he would probably
- 11:55Speaker 1: go along with General Westmoreland's request to give the nineteenth
- 11:58Speaker 1: Tactical Air Support squad JUNCHAN thirty oh one fs. However,
- 12:02Speaker 1: he wanted to postpone his decision until the political climate
- 12:06Speaker 1: in Saigon improved. The continuous surveillance concept could not be
- 12:11Speaker 1: properly set in motion during the winter of nineteen sixty
- 12:13Speaker 1: four sixty five due to the dearth of USAF and
- 12:16Speaker 1: Vietnamese aircraft and forward air controllers. By December, the nineteenth
- 12:21Speaker 1: Tactical Air Support Squadron was down to seven airmen and
- 12:25Speaker 1: nine pilots when it received eight single engine pilots who
- 12:28Speaker 1: needed to be checked out in one's. The Vietnamese liaison
- 12:31Speaker 1: squadrons owned only sixty of one hundred and twenty authorized
- 12:35Speaker 1: one a's and U seventeen a's In the two corps,
- 12:39Speaker 1: there were just four oh one controllers on hand. In compensation,
- 12:44Speaker 1: USAF Research and Development had turned out some new weapons
- 12:47Speaker 1: that TAX Special Air Warfare Center had tested. A munition
- 12:51Speaker 1: survey team visiting Vietnam thought that these weapons and new
- 12:55Speaker 1: techniques ought to replace older munitions and methods. Hazards of
- 13:00Speaker 1: Vietcong ground fire to low flying aircraft, particularly those on
- 13:04Speaker 1: napalm runs, demanded a different approach to hamlet defense. Fragmentation
- 13:08Speaker 1: clusters replaced napalm on night flare assisted missions. Fighters delivered
- 13:13Speaker 1: the clusters from a dive to shave the time they
- 13:15Speaker 1: were silhouetted by flarelight. The first Combat Application Group at
- 13:20Speaker 1: Eglin Air Force Base had devised and tested a three
- 13:24Speaker 1: gun side firing installation in a SEA forty seven. The
- 13:27Speaker 1: Air staff called for operational testing of these rapid fire
- 13:31Speaker 1: seven point six to two millimeters gallling guns mini guns,
- 13:35Speaker 1: either affixed to the racks of an A one or
- 13:38Speaker 1: mounted and fired from the side cargo doors of an
- 13:41Speaker 1: orbiting C forty seven. In September mark forty four, Lazy
- 13:45Speaker 1: Dog free falling finned bullets were approved for use in Vietnam.
- 13:50Speaker 1: The Lazy Dog worked well at first, but not in
- 13:52Speaker 1: terrain covered with heavy growth. The fins of the small
- 13:55Speaker 1: projectiles easily bent out of shape when loaded into the
- 13:59Speaker 1: dispensers from which they were dropped. This caused the missiles
- 14:02Speaker 1: to tumble and lose their impact. Moreover, the size and
- 14:05Speaker 1: shape of the pattern of the falling projectiles were erratic. Clearly,
- 14:09Speaker 1: Lazy Dog was no substitute for napalm when enemy and
- 14:13Speaker 1: friendly troops were fairly close to each other. Other new
- 14:16Speaker 1: weapons also proved not entirely reliable. Tests by the First
- 14:21Speaker 1: Combat Application Group verified that it was desirable to modify
- 14:25Speaker 1: the Sea forty seven with lateral firing miniguns. Still, PACKAFF
- 14:29Speaker 1: and TAC were reluctant to employ the mini gun equipped
- 14:32Speaker 1: plane in combat. They deemed it obsolete, vulnerable to ground fire,
- 14:36Speaker 1: and unable to perform as well as strike aircraft. To
- 14:41Speaker 1: General John P. McConnell, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff,
- 14:45Speaker 1: who would succeed General LeMay as chief on February one,
- 14:48Speaker 1: nineteen sixty five, an armed Sea forty seven was a
- 14:51Speaker 1: highly specialized weapon for use solely in areas of light
- 14:55Speaker 1: ground fire. The aircraft could fly long night alert missions
- 14:59Speaker 1: and REACTI fleet to surprise attacks. Circling above small arms range,
- 15:04Speaker 1: it could pin down the enemy until fighters got there.
- 15:07Speaker 1: The armed Sea forty seven would help offset the shortage
- 15:10Speaker 1: of strike aircraft and the inefficiency of night fighter airborne alerts.
- 15:15Speaker 1: Following a November two briefing on the arm Sea forty seven,
- 15:19Speaker 1: General LeMay ordered a combat evaluation that got under way
- 15:23Speaker 1: in early December. A test team led by Major Ronald W.
- 15:27Speaker 1: Terry fitted two Sea forty sevens of the thirty fourth
- 15:30Speaker 1: Tactical Group with miniguns. These aircraft were an instant success
- 15:34Speaker 1: against enemy troops in the open. Using an improvised gun
- 15:37Speaker 1: sight and putting the plane's winged down in a pylon
- 15:40Speaker 1: eight turn, the pilot could direct fire from the three
- 15:43Speaker 1: miniguns mounted in the left hand cargo door. When fired together,
- 15:48Speaker 1: they spewed eighteen thousand rounds permitted into a space about
- 15:52Speaker 1: the size of a football field. An aerial gunner cleared
- 15:55Speaker 1: jams and reloaded the weapons in flight, while the small
- 15:58Speaker 1: caliber bullets were easily deflected in wooded stretches. The AC
- 16:02Speaker 1: forty seven gunships were outstanding for Knight, fort and Hamlet defense.
- 16:07Speaker 1: Awed by the stream of tracers, the Vietcong spoke of
- 16:10Speaker 1: the new ray gun turned upon them. Integrated air reconnaissance
- 16:15Speaker 1: fully responsive to user's need did not develop in nineteen
- 16:18Speaker 1: sixty four, and the absence of a coordinated reconnaissance intelligence
- 16:23Speaker 1: target system was a serious defect. The main stumbling block
- 16:26Speaker 1: was a splintering of air reconnaissance in and out of
- 16:29Speaker 1: the country. Many elements were involved, but the state side
- 16:33Speaker 1: USAF Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center placed most of the blame
- 16:37Speaker 1: on the shortage of keen and influential senior Air Force
- 16:40Speaker 1: officers in Vietnam. By early nineteen sixty four, the reconnaissance
- 16:46Speaker 1: assets of second Air Division had consisted of six able
- 16:49Speaker 1: Mabel R F one oh one s, two experimental infrared
- 16:53Speaker 1: RB fifty sevens, two experimental infrared FB twenty six s,
- 16:58Speaker 1: and two night Photo RB twenty six c's, plus the
- 17:02Speaker 1: thirteenth Reconnaissance Technical Squadron formerly a Photo Processing cell. All
- 17:08Speaker 1: operated under Detachment one thirty third Tactical Group, but supported
- 17:12Speaker 1: the Second Air Division's Director of Intelligence Time and again
- 17:17Speaker 1: Colonel Harvey E. Henderson, Second Air Division's deputy commander, had
- 17:22Speaker 1: suggested that all these resources be brought into a tactical
- 17:25Speaker 1: reconnaissance squadron. To do so, however, would have exceeded the
- 17:29Speaker 1: Air Force's authorized unit force levels. Mirroring the talk of
- 17:34Speaker 1: phasing out the American forces from Vietnam, planners programmed a
- 17:38Speaker 1: decline in US reconnaissance. Furthermore, the Vietnamese seven to sixteenth
- 17:42Speaker 1: Composite Reconnaissance Squadron, with three RC forty sevens and eighteen
- 17:47Speaker 1: RT twenty eights, together with photoprocessing cells in the core
- 17:51Speaker 1: tactical zones, was becoming operational. Except for problems in camera installation,
- 17:57Speaker 1: this squadron was making solid progress. As the seven sixteenth
- 18:01Speaker 1: reached its projected goal in early nineteen sixty four of
- 18:05Speaker 1: three hundred and seventy four sorties a month, the able
- 18:08Speaker 1: Mabel RF one oh one s were to depart, along
- 18:11Speaker 1: with six Army Mohawk armed photo reconnaissance planes. Unforeseen events
- 18:17Speaker 1: buffeted the projections. The U two aircraft from bienh flew
- 18:21Speaker 1: very high altitude photo missions over Southeast Asia. Film from
- 18:25Speaker 1: these flights swamped the thirteenth Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, which had
- 18:30Speaker 1: to call upon other pack app SACK and Navy facilities
- 18:33Speaker 1: in the Philippines in Japan. Unfortunately, the U two photography
- 18:37Speaker 1: needed for national strategic planning had slight value for tactical users. Moreover,
- 18:42Speaker 1: the wing stress weakness of the B twenty six led
- 18:45Speaker 1: to the removal of the RB twenty sixes from Vietnam
- 18:48Speaker 1: at the close of March nineteen sixty four, diminishing night
- 18:51Speaker 1: photo coverage. At the same time, the Vietnamese reconnaissance program
- 18:55Speaker 1: ran into technical snags. The improved RC forty seven infrared
- 19:00Speaker 1: photo systems were operational in April and could locate the
- 19:03Speaker 1: enemy by heat source imagery, but McVie intelligence could not
- 19:06Speaker 1: use this information because procedures had not been worked out
- 19:10Speaker 1: to exploit the infrared photography. Two things were to alter
- 19:14Speaker 1: sharply the whole reconnaissance program. The US decision in May
- 19:18Speaker 1: to begin air reconnaissance over Laos and Secretary of McNamara's
- 19:22Speaker 1: orders to retrain Vietnamese RT twenty eight pilots for a
- 19:26Speaker 1: fourth A one H squadron. Six more usaf RF one
- 19:29Speaker 1: OH once arrived to augment the six able Mabel aircraft
- 19:33Speaker 1: all RT twenty eights were removed from the Vietnamese seven
- 19:36Speaker 1: to sixteenth Squadron and three RC forty sevens were assigned
- 19:40Speaker 1: to the Vietnamese forty third Transport Group. After a few
- 19:43Speaker 1: transport missions, the RC forty sevens were restored to photo
- 19:47Speaker 1: duty in the three and four Core. In midyear, the
- 19:52Speaker 1: RF one oh one s commenced flying out of tonson
- 19:54Speaker 1: Nyuitt over Laos, yet authorized occasional night photography and infrared
- 19:58Speaker 1: reconnaissance were out of the question. The two RC forty
- 20:01Speaker 1: sevens for this work had no self contained navigation systems,
- 20:05Speaker 1: chiefly terrain clearance, radar and mountains, and uncertain weather made
- 20:09Speaker 1: the flights too hazardous. The Air Force set up delivery
- 20:12Speaker 1: of two more RC forty sevens with Doppler navigation and
- 20:15Speaker 1: in flight readout infrared sensors. These planes could not be
- 20:19Speaker 1: modified and in place until December nineteen sixty four. General
- 20:24Speaker 1: Harris Pack aff commander, pressed for low level reconnaissance to
- 20:27Speaker 1: secure more detailed coverage for tactical air operations. Admiral Sharp
- 20:32Speaker 1: had no hope of obtaining blanket approval for these flights
- 20:36Speaker 1: due to their danger to low flying planes. Sink Pack
- 20:39Speaker 1: needed to justify each mission to officials in Washington on
- 20:42Speaker 1: a case by case basis. As the photo reconnaissance workload
- 20:48Speaker 1: grew in South Vietnam, PACAFF sent six more RF one
- 20:51Speaker 1: o ons to tans On Nutt. Another six RF one
- 20:54Speaker 1: oh once that had been dispatched to Kadena in the
- 20:56Speaker 1: wake of the talk and golf crisis also assisted the VA.
- 21:00Speaker 1: Setnamese RC forty sevens continued their coverage into three and
- 21:03Speaker 1: four cores two Vietnamese aircrews being permanently assigned to reconnaissance.
- 21:08Speaker 1: Requests for photography forwarded straight to air support operation centers
- 21:12Speaker 1: markedly increased. Since photo reconnaissance could not capture rapidly shifting
- 21:17Speaker 1: guerrilla operations, interest in other air reconnaissance techniques quickened. Airborne
- 21:22Speaker 1: radio direction finding held promise, and the Army's third Radio
- 21:26Speaker 1: Research Unit operated three assorted aircraft. These planes furnished important
- 21:31Speaker 1: intelligence of the Vietcong order of battle, but they could
- 21:34Speaker 1: not make precise enough fixes of enemy transmitters to permit
- 21:38Speaker 1: air targeting. In the United States, the Air Force tested
- 21:42Speaker 1: a SEA forty seven, later an EC forty seven, that
- 21:46Speaker 1: could plot the location of a ten watt radio transmitter
- 21:49Speaker 1: within one degree at a range of twenty five nautical miles.
- 21:53Speaker 1: In January nineteen sixty four, Packaff requested seven SEA forty
- 21:57Speaker 1: sevens fitted with more sensitive and accurate radio direction finders. However,
- 22:01Speaker 1: the Air Force delayed approval until the experimental plane could
- 22:05Speaker 1: be tested in Vietnam. Conducted during February June nineteen sixty four,
- 22:10Speaker 1: the tests showed the tactical advantage of equipment that gave
- 22:13Speaker 1: lines of position to an enemy transmitter regardless of the
- 22:16Speaker 1: aircraft's heading. The plane could fly past a transmitter without
- 22:20Speaker 1: revealing interest in it, whereas army gear required a series
- 22:23Speaker 1: of head bearings on the transmitter. Yet, as the testing
- 22:27Speaker 1: bore out, the C forty seven direction finder was not
- 22:29Speaker 1: sufficiently sensitive to plot the very low power short range
- 22:33Speaker 1: radios used by the insurgents. A better way to pinpoint
- 22:37Speaker 1: enemy actions seemed to be infrared reconnaissance sensors. In mid
- 22:41Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four, while two USAF RB fifty sevens waited
- 22:46Speaker 1: for tactical work, macve requested two Army infrared equipped OV
- 22:50Speaker 1: one seas to help carry out visual and photographic night surveillance.
- 22:55Speaker 1: General Moore asked why the mohawks were needed when the
- 22:57Speaker 1: RB fifty sevens were there MACV. He was surprised that
- 23:00Speaker 1: a infrared capability was already on hand, but proceeded to
- 23:04Speaker 1: justify a requirement for four OV one c's. These were
- 23:08Speaker 1: to feature side looking airborne radar in infrared sensors that
- 23:11Speaker 1: could be read out in flight. The two RB fifty
- 23:14Speaker 1: sevens had older infrared sets, requiring film to be developed
- 23:18Speaker 1: and interpreted on the ground. After the mission in December,
- 23:22Speaker 1: the Air Force provided two extra RB fifty sevens with
- 23:25Speaker 1: in flight infrared redoubt. The older RB fifty sevens were
- 23:28Speaker 1: retrofitted with newer equipment and returned to service. Word of
- 23:33Speaker 1: the Mohawks authorized to MACVE reached General LeMay. He wanted
- 23:37Speaker 1: them put under the operational control of the second Air
- 23:39Speaker 1: Division as part of a joint Counterinsurgency Reconnaissance task Force.
- 23:44Speaker 1: General Moore hoped to get authority to coordinate all infrared
- 23:47Speaker 1: reconnaissance from MACV, but General Westmoreland favored a quite different
- 23:51Speaker 1: control arrangement. In mid nineteen sixty four, USAF air liaison
- 23:56Speaker 1: officers and forward air controllers easily obsor served Vietcong activity.
- 24:02Speaker 1: Their liaison planes flew over enemy held areas during the
- 24:05Speaker 1: day and even more at night when the guerrillas kindled
- 24:09Speaker 1: fires to cook their food. The infrared sensor aircraft had
- 24:12Speaker 1: the mission of collecting heat radiating intelligence. Experimental night flights
- 24:17Speaker 1: of the RB fifty sevens produced infrared photos with hotspots. These,
- 24:22Speaker 1: when correlated with ground intelligence, confirmed the positions of Viet
- 24:26Speaker 1: Cong camps in zones C and D. The infrared section
- 24:30Speaker 1: of the thirteenth Reconnaissance Technical Squadron processed the results of
- 24:34Speaker 1: each night's infrared mission from October nineteen sixty four on
- 24:38Speaker 1: enemy locations. Usually, the coordinates of the cooking fire sites
- 24:42Speaker 1: were phoned at once to the Core Tactical Operations Center
- 24:45Speaker 1: after collation with other intelligence. Infrared material was useful for
- 24:50Speaker 1: artillery and air strikes. While the RB fifty sevens were
- 24:54Speaker 1: in test. During July twenty nine infrared targets were requested
- 24:58Speaker 1: and twenty one were completed, with one more RB fifty
- 25:02Speaker 1: seven in use. In December, there were two hundred and
- 25:04Speaker 1: sixty one requests for infrared and two hundred and twenty
- 25:07Speaker 1: eight executed. Most infrared coverage was in the three corps
- 25:10Speaker 1: to exploit both visual and infrared sightings. The Second Air
- 25:14Speaker 1: Division proposed target centers for the other core. These centers
- 25:18Speaker 1: were to funnel information and needs to the Air Operations Center,
- 25:22Speaker 1: which would coordinate strike aircraft. On December twenty, nineteen sixty four, however,
- 25:27Speaker 1: macv formed the Central Target Analysis and Research Center at
- 25:31Speaker 1: Tanzan Nuitt as a unit of macv J two intelligence.
- 25:35Speaker 1: Its main mission was to coordinate Army and Air Force
- 25:38Speaker 1: infrared reconnaissance. The center set up units at the core headquarters,
- 25:42Speaker 1: and they were responsive to macv J two flights by
- 25:45Speaker 1: RB fifty seven's and OV one c's proved invaluable. By
- 25:49Speaker 1: January nineteen sixty five, the new setup was absorbing the
- 25:53Speaker 1: entire infrared capability in Vietnam. In February, there were so
- 25:57Speaker 1: many requests for RF one oh one coverage that the
- 25:59Speaker 1: three thirteenth Reconnaissance Technical Squadron was again unable to handle
- 26:04Speaker 1: the processing load. Chiefly through correlation of infrared sensor indications
- 26:08Speaker 1: with other intelligence, the center identified two hundred and fifty
- 26:12Speaker 1: possible enemy targets in two months. Included were Vietcong battalion
- 26:16Speaker 1: camps in fup Thai Province that would eventually be struck
- 26:19Speaker 1: by B fifty seven jet bombers. Although the Air Force
- 26:23Speaker 1: supported the MACV program to improve intelligence. The system removed
- 26:27Speaker 1: control of infrared sorties and much of the RF one
- 26:30Speaker 1: oh one effort from the Air Operations Center. MACV enjoyed
- 26:34Speaker 1: several intelligence sources that by law could not be disclosed
- 26:37Speaker 1: to Vietnamese agencies. Consequently, the Vietnamese delayed and in some
- 26:41Speaker 1: cases refused to allow strikes against targets so generated the
- 26:45Speaker 1: Central Target Analysis and Research Center worked at cross purposes
- 26:49Speaker 1: with the Second Air Division's desire to develop close relations
- 26:52Speaker 1: with province chiefs for intelligence and quick air targeting. Had
- 26:57Speaker 1: the MACV system been staffed with more USAF targeting, interpretation
- 27:01Speaker 1: and reconnaissance officers, they might have produced more air strikes.
- 27:05Speaker 1: But General Westmoreland regarded all air operations as support for
- 27:09Speaker 1: ground troops and of necessity responsive to ground commanders. He
- 27:13Speaker 1: even included interdiction a normal USAF responsibility. Hence, the MacFee
- 27:18Speaker 1: J two had the principal say on how air reconnaissance
- 27:21Speaker 1: and surveillance resources were to be used. This left the
- 27:25Speaker 1: Second Air Division's commander, working through the Air Operations Center
- 27:29Speaker 1: with only nominal operational control over reconnaissance forces. These like
- 27:34Speaker 1: the aircraft flying closed support and interdiction in South Vietnam
- 27:38Speaker 1: became chiefly geared to ground needs so to the airlift.
- 27:43Speaker 1: Although General le May preferred to have C one three
- 27:46Speaker 1: assault transports used in tactical operations rather than as logistics carriers.
- 27:52Speaker 1: The insecure rail and roadnet imposed great stress on air
- 27:56Speaker 1: At times, US commanders joked that the Vietnamese Army recfs
- 28:00Speaker 1: fused to travel on the ground and to keep roads
- 28:02Speaker 1: and rails open because the Air Force moved everything for them.
- 28:06Speaker 1: The adding of air escort for trains and convoys did
- 28:09Speaker 1: little to restrain requests for air movements. The three fifteenth
- 28:14Speaker 1: Troop Carrier Group at townshend Nuitt operated the Southeast Asia
- 28:17Speaker 1: Airlift System. Its Transport Control office in the Air Operations
- 28:21Speaker 1: Center managed common use airlift in South Vietnam and Thailand.
- 28:25Speaker 1: Assigned to the three fifteenth Air Division at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan,
- 28:29Speaker 1: the group came under MACV operational control exercised by the
- 28:33Speaker 1: second Air Division. American and Vietnamese forces projected monthly airlift
- 28:38Speaker 1: requirements and sent them to the Joint Airlift Allocation Board
- 28:42Speaker 1: in MACV J four Logistics. The board in fact consisted
- 28:46Speaker 1: of one officer in the jfour Movements Branch. He screened
- 28:50Speaker 1: and processed the requests SAT priorities, and with the Joint
- 28:53Speaker 1: General Staff, levied the requirements on the airlift units by
- 28:57Speaker 1: monthly incrementsifteen eighth Group Commander also served as Director of
- 29:02Speaker 1: Air Transportation for the Southeast Asia Airlift System. In theory,
- 29:06Speaker 1: he could call upon the forty eight USAFC one twenty
- 29:10Speaker 1: threes of his three squadrons, three Sea forty sevens of
- 29:13Speaker 1: the first Air Commando Squadron, two of sixteen US Army
- 29:17Speaker 1: CV two B Caribou transports, several Vietnamese Sea forty sevens,
- 29:21Speaker 1: and two Bristol Type one seventy transports of the Royal
- 29:24Speaker 1: New Zealand Air Force operating in Thailand. Actually, three C
- 29:28Speaker 1: one twenty threes and three Air Commando Sea forty sevens
- 29:31Speaker 1: were kept on station at Nitrang to support US Army
- 29:34Speaker 1: special forces at remote spots. A fire brigade of three
- 29:38Speaker 1: C one twenty threes at Tansan Nuitt and one at
- 29:40Speaker 1: Danang stood alert, ready to respond on fifteen minute notice
- 29:44Speaker 1: to the need for paratroot drop or equivalent emergency. Besides,
- 29:48Speaker 1: two C one twenty threes were regularly allocated for service
- 29:51Speaker 1: in Thailand, and the Vietnamese C forty sevens were usually
- 29:55Speaker 1: flying other missions. Colonel David T. Fleming, commander of the
- 29:59Speaker 1: three fifths e teenth Troop Carrier Group, depicted the airlift
- 30:02Speaker 1: system as a hodgepodge of badly tacked together elements saturated
- 30:06Speaker 1: with requirements. The sole officer on the Joint Airlift Allocation
- 30:10Speaker 1: Board could not possibly screen requests for validity. Cargo that
- 30:14Speaker 1: should have gone by surface transportation was airlifted, and cargo
- 30:17Speaker 1: for airlift was often late or absent at air terminals.
- 30:21Speaker 1: Communications for keeping track of transport flights were unreliable. Aircraft
- 30:25Speaker 1: frequently left bases empty or partially loaded. The Great Demands
- 30:30Speaker 1: constantly pushed the C one twenty threes above their program
- 30:34Speaker 1: sixty hours of flying time a month per aircraft. They
- 30:37Speaker 1: were wearing out. Stressed by landings and takeoffs on rough fields.
- 30:40Speaker 1: By May nineteen sixty four, skin wrinkles appeared on the
- 30:43Speaker 1: top sides of two planes. Further inspection at Tonsan Nuitt
- 30:47Speaker 1: disclosed visible damage on all thirty seven C one twenty
- 30:51Speaker 1: threes that had been in Vietnam for nearly three years
- 30:54Speaker 1: eleven required extensive repairs. Those at Dinang in the theater
- 30:58Speaker 1: for a year had minor damage. Airlift further declined when
- 31:02Speaker 1: C one twenty three S went to Thailand in July
- 31:04Speaker 1: to join the two on station there. That same month,
- 31:07Speaker 1: two U S Army Cariboos were lost in crashes. The
- 31:12Speaker 1: debut in August of six CV two B Cariboos of
- 31:15Speaker 1: the Royal Australian Air Force helped redress the balance. They
- 31:19Speaker 1: contributed six hundred tons of short range airlift a month,
- 31:22Speaker 1: proving that all the cariboos could be scheduled and used
- 31:25Speaker 1: within the centralized system. The system did well, despite its shortcomings.
- 31:30Speaker 1: Over the first half of nineteen sixty four. The C
- 31:33Speaker 1: one twenty three S bore the bulk of the airlift load.
- 31:36Speaker 1: They air dropped twelve hundred and seventy tons of supplies,
- 31:39Speaker 1: moved twelve hundred and fifty two paratroopers and one hundred
- 31:41Speaker 1: and fifteen tons of material in assault missions, and flew
- 31:44Speaker 1: two hundred and thirty nine night flare sorties, dispensing flares
- 31:48Speaker 1: one hundred and nineteen times. The Air Commando C forty
- 31:52Speaker 1: SEVENS air dropped four hundred and five tons of cargo
- 31:55Speaker 1: and flew thirteen hundred and thirty eight air landed resupply missions,
- 31:59Speaker 1: two thousand, eight ten passengers and one thousand, two hundred
- 32:02Speaker 1: and forty six tons of supplies. As a rule, the
- 32:05Speaker 1: two US Army Cariboos made short hauls. They flew seven thousand,
- 32:09Speaker 1: nine hundred and thirty nine air land a sorties four thousand,
- 32:12Speaker 1: seven hundred and thirty one passengers in three thousand, three
- 32:15Speaker 1: hundred and twenty two tons of cargo. The three USAFC
- 32:19Speaker 1: one twenty threes and the three Air Commando C forty
- 32:22Speaker 1: sevens at Natrangue delivered about fifteen hundred tons a month
- 32:25Speaker 1: throughout nineteen sixty four to the scattered fortified outposts at
- 32:29Speaker 1: remote sites held by Army special Forces. Cargo loads varied
- 32:34Speaker 1: from neatly packed bundles to belky and unweldy rolls of
- 32:37Speaker 1: concertina wire, sandbags, and steel stakes, frequently a mixture of all.
- 32:43Speaker 1: Landing strips at the forward locations were roughed and drop
- 32:46Speaker 1: zones hard to find, especially in marginal weather. Enemy ground
- 32:50Speaker 1: fire made low altitude approaches dangerous. During nineteen sixty four,
- 32:54Speaker 1: more C one twenty threes were hit by ground fire
- 32:57Speaker 1: than any other type of fixed wing aircraft Colonel Victor N. Curtis,
- 33:01Speaker 1: USAF air liaison officer at Natrang, spoke of the C
- 33:05Speaker 1: forty seven and C one twenty three crews as some
- 33:08Speaker 1: of the most professional and dedicated people he had ever known.
- 33:11Speaker 1: The Special Forces likewise appreciated the air supply they lent
- 33:15Speaker 1: ahead in rigging an slash PRC ten radios aboard the
- 33:18Speaker 1: transports per communications with the camps, but the aircraft commanders
- 33:22Speaker 1: commonly relied on smoke signals to direct landing and drops.
- 33:26Speaker 1: The crews manhandled their air dropped cargo in a manner
- 33:29Speaker 1: reminiscent of World War II. Through the autumn of nineteen
- 33:33Speaker 1: sixty four, the C one twenty threes and C forty
- 33:36Speaker 1: seven supporting the Special Forces ran serious risks. A C
- 33:40Speaker 1: one twenty three on October twenty four tried to resupply
- 33:42Speaker 1: an outpost in western Quang Duk Province, but could not
- 33:46Speaker 1: make radio contact. The plane wandered over the Cambodian border
- 33:49Speaker 1: and was shot down with the loss of all A crewmen.
- 33:52Speaker 1: In December, half of the three hundred and tenth Troop
- 33:55Speaker 1: Carrier Squadron and seven of AT C one twenty three's
- 33:58Speaker 1: went in n Trang to replace the C forty sevens
- 34:01Speaker 1: which were withdrawn. The seven C one twenty threes, an
- 34:04Speaker 1: Australian CV two and three Army CV twos supported the
- 34:08Speaker 1: Special Forces. The forty two hundred new US field advisors
- 34:13Speaker 1: that General Westmoreland had asked for in June and July
- 34:16Speaker 1: would need an average of twelve hundred tons of airlift
- 34:19Speaker 1: each month. Colonel Fleming therefore requested a C one twenty
- 34:22Speaker 1: three squadron to bring his total to four. Until that
- 34:26Speaker 1: unit arrived, PACKAPF committed eleven C one thirties from the
- 34:30Speaker 1: three fifteenth Air Division to the airlift in South Vietnam.
- 34:34Speaker 1: These planes worked off the backlog of air cargo at
- 34:37Speaker 1: the major terminals. The Gulf of Tonkin crisis in August
- 34:40Speaker 1: had triggered a hurried deployment of USAF units into South
- 34:44Speaker 1: Vietnam and Thailand. The three fifteenth Division, aided by three
- 34:49Speaker 1: tax C one thirty squadrons of the Composite Air Strike Force,
- 34:53Speaker 1: handled these movements. The division's Detachment three at Clark Air
- 34:57Speaker 1: Base functioned as the movement controls. Set in nineteen sixty two,
- 35:02Speaker 1: Ranch hand C one twenty three's had flown a series
- 35:05Speaker 1: of defoliation missions in South Vietnam Sea Chapter ten. The
- 35:10Speaker 1: results led the Joint Chiefs to conclude in April nineteen
- 35:13Speaker 1: sixty three that aerial spraying of herbicides had military value
- 35:17Speaker 1: to kill the foliage concealing the enemy and to destroy
- 35:21Speaker 1: his crops. The Kennedy administration granted joint authority to the
- 35:24Speaker 1: US Ambassador and McFee to order defoliation spraying, but it
- 35:29Speaker 1: cleared no U. S crews in aircraft for spray missions
- 35:33Speaker 1: against Vietcong crops. Specific approval for each crop destruction target
- 35:37Speaker 1: had to come from Washington. The chemicals worked best in
- 35:41Speaker 1: the wet season, when the vegetation was actively growing. Ranch
- 35:45Speaker 1: Hand therefore waited until June and July nineteen sixty three
- 35:48Speaker 1: before clearing growth from the Saigon to die Lap power
- 35:52Speaker 1: line and canals in the Kaumau Peninsula. This and other
- 35:55Speaker 1: spraying over the year improved the view and reduced cover
- 35:59Speaker 1: for hostile style ambush operations. There were eighty seven square
- 36:03Speaker 1: kilometers to foliated through nineteen sixty three, compared to twenty
- 36:07Speaker 1: in nineteen sixty two. In January nineteen sixty four, the U. S.
- 36:12Speaker 1: Army Division Advisors were allowed to make wider use of
- 36:14Speaker 1: aerial spray around depots, airfields and outposts. They could also
- 36:19Speaker 1: approve hand spray operations against enemy crops. Warnings had to
- 36:23Speaker 1: go out to the civilian population before spraying. In consequence,
- 36:27Speaker 1: the ranch Hand C one twenty three's flying at one
- 36:30Speaker 1: hundred and fifty feet were exposed to enemy ground fire.
- 36:33Speaker 1: In nineteen sixty two and nineteen sixty three, the average
- 36:36Speaker 1: number of hits on each spray plane per mission was
- 36:39Speaker 1: four small arms bullets. The risk rose in nineteen sixty
- 36:43Speaker 1: four as spray flights treated areas totally dominated by the
- 36:46Speaker 1: Viet com On April thirty, a ranch Hand aircraft ran
- 36:50Speaker 1: into fifty caliber fire that wounded the copilot and tore
- 36:53Speaker 1: forty holes in the plane. Fighters regularly escorted spray missions
- 36:57Speaker 1: and struck the areas from which the C one A
- 37:00Speaker 1: three's took ground fire. The ranch Hand C one twenty
- 37:03Speaker 1: threes staged to Dnang in May and June nineteen sixty four.
- 37:08Speaker 1: They set about spraying the elephant grass and other vegetation
- 37:10Speaker 1: that sheltered the enemy along the roads in the Aeshao
- 37:13Speaker 1: a Louis Valley and other areas near the Laotian border.
- 37:17Speaker 1: Completed quickly before the viet Cong could fully react. These
- 37:21Speaker 1: flights sustained just four hits in the course of twenty
- 37:24Speaker 1: six sorties on five spray missions in three quarts. During
- 37:28Speaker 1: May C one twenty threes were struck fifteen times by
- 37:31Speaker 1: ground fire. On two occasions. Macvie suspended operations where heavy
- 37:36Speaker 1: firing persisted. Ranch Hand functioned on temporary duty until July
- 37:42Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four, supported by the Tactical Air Command. Then,
- 37:46Speaker 1: the three Spray C one twenty threes and their specialized
- 37:49Speaker 1: crews became Detachment one of the three fifteenth Troop Carrier
- 37:53Speaker 1: Group permanently assigned to Paka. Though Vietnamese helicopters and ground
- 37:57Speaker 1: troops had sprayed crops in nineteen sixty two and nineteen
- 38:00Speaker 1: sixty three, no American aircraft or personnel had been permitted
- 38:04Speaker 1: to take part in crop destruction prior to nineteen sixty four.
- 38:08Speaker 1: On July twenty ninth, nineteen sixty four, Ambassador Taylor received
- 38:12Speaker 1: the authority to approve crop destruction operations without first referring
- 38:16Speaker 1: them to Washington. In May, VNAF helicopters had resumed crop destruction,
- 38:22Speaker 1: but were unable to spray crops in certain areas. Taylor
- 38:25Speaker 1: therefore directed Ranchhand to spray some crop targets beginning on
- 38:28Speaker 1: October thirty. The ranch Hand planes had to operate under
- 38:31Speaker 1: the farm gate concept when spraying crops. That is, they
- 38:35Speaker 1: carried temporary South Vietnamese markings and were under the ostensible
- 38:39Speaker 1: control of a South Vietnamese aircraft commander who was also
- 38:42Speaker 1: on board. To cut exposure to ground fire, the three
- 38:45Speaker 1: ranch Hand aircraft in August were given modified spray systems.
- 38:49Speaker 1: Now they could dispense herbicides at the rate of three
- 38:51Speaker 1: gallons per acre, doubled the old rate, and finish a
- 38:54Speaker 1: mission in a single pass. Their first nineteen crop spring
- 38:58Speaker 1: sorties lasted ten days in October, directed against rice, corn manioc, bananas,
- 39:03Speaker 1: and pineapples near War Zone D. While fighters escorted all flights,
- 39:08Speaker 1: enemy ground fire scored forty hits on the C one
- 39:11Speaker 1: twenty threes. In November and December, ranch Hands sprayed enemy
- 39:15Speaker 1: rice near War Zone D. An intelligence source quoted the
- 39:19Speaker 1: Viet Kong Fup Tang Provincial Committee as reporting that the
- 39:23Speaker 1: destroyed rice would have fed their troops in the area
- 39:26Speaker 1: for two years. During these flights, ground fire shot out
- 39:30Speaker 1: an engine on a C one twenty three, and the
- 39:33Speaker 1: plane barely made it back to be inh A fourth
- 39:36Speaker 1: C one twenty three was added in December. By the
- 39:40Speaker 1: end of the year, the detachment had flown seventy two
- 39:42Speaker 1: survey flights and three hundred and sixty three spray sorties,
- 39:47Speaker 1: defoliated three hundred and fifty three square kilometers of vegetation
- 39:51Speaker 1: and destroyed seven than six hundred and twenty acres of
- 39:54Speaker 1: Vietcong crops. This contrasted with the seven hundred and fifty
- 39:57Speaker 1: acres of crops sprayed by the Vietnamese and Nia eighteen
- 40:00Speaker 1: sixty two and the one hundred and ninety seven acres
- 40:03Speaker 1: in nineteen sixty three. Concern of Washington officials over strengthening
- 40:08Speaker 1: the Kang government focused fresh attention on psychological operations during
- 40:12Speaker 1: the spring of nineteen sixty four. Psychological warfare had been
- 40:16Speaker 1: conducted since nineteen sixty one, but with uneven results. In
- 40:20Speaker 1: November nineteen sixty one, farm Gate had first used four
- 40:24Speaker 1: SC forty sevens for leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. The
- 40:29Speaker 1: SC forty seven, however, was not well suited to remote
- 40:32Speaker 1: area work. Farmgate wanted a plane that could land at
- 40:36Speaker 1: a forward site, pick up local officials or Vietcong defectors,
- 40:41Speaker 1: and let them speak from the air to people who
- 40:43Speaker 1: would recognize their voices. To do this, the L twenty
- 40:46Speaker 1: eight Helio Supercourier later designated U ten, seemed ideal. The aircraft,
- 40:53Speaker 1: specially configured for the CIA, featured short takeoff and landing
- 40:57Speaker 1: and other admirable characteristics. Farmgate requested eight L twenty eights
- 41:03Speaker 1: an authority to create a psychological Warfare branch of three
- 41:06Speaker 1: qualified officers and two technicians to forge a sophisticated psychological
- 41:11Speaker 1: warfare effort. These efforts were abruptly dampened. On February eleventh,
- 41:17Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, a low flying SC forty seven dropping
- 41:20Speaker 1: leaflets near Da Lat crashed and killed eight Americans and
- 41:24Speaker 1: one Vietnamese. Embarrassed by the loss of so many Americans
- 41:28Speaker 1: on a flight that was supposed to train Vietnamese, Secretary
- 41:31Speaker 1: McNamara ordered leaflet and speaker missions turned over to the Vietnamese.
- 41:36Speaker 1: The Joint Chiefs directed that US aircraft refrained from such
- 41:39Speaker 1: operations except in unusual circumstances. In June nineteen sixty two,
- 41:45Speaker 1: the Vietnamese equipped a C forty seven with speakers for
- 41:48Speaker 1: airborne broadcasts. The Air Staff and PACAFF wanted farm Gate
- 41:53Speaker 1: to train Vietnamese Air Force personnel for psychological warfare, but
- 41:57Speaker 1: by April nineteen sixty three, the Second Air Divis Director
- 42:00Speaker 1: of Operations, Colonel Winston P. Anderson, judged the Vietnamese to
- 42:04Speaker 1: have little recognition of its importance. From June nineteen sixty
- 42:08Speaker 1: two through January nineteen sixty three, the Vietnamese speaker equipped
- 42:12Speaker 1: Sea forty seven had made a total of twenty two flights,
- 42:15Speaker 1: fourteen loud speaker and eight psychological warfare now and then
- 42:20Speaker 1: the standard Sea forty seven's dispense leaflets and the l
- 42:23Speaker 1: nineteens of the Liaison Squadrons participated in a small program
- 42:27Speaker 1: of civic action, troop information and enemy leaflet dissemination. In
- 42:32Speaker 1: September nineteen sixty two, farm Gate received two of four
- 42:36Speaker 1: authorized U ten Helio supercouriers, one being rigged with speakers.
- 42:41Speaker 1: Between December fourteenth, nineteen sixty two and May thirteen, nineteen
- 42:45Speaker 1: sixty three, farm Gate made a number of flights in
- 42:48Speaker 1: the U ten to evaluate as a psychological warfare aircraft,
- 42:52Speaker 1: and in May mister McNamara approved the use of American
- 42:56Speaker 1: planes to supplement Vietnamese psychological operations, provided minimum US personnel
- 43:01Speaker 1: were aboard. The mission was then divided between the Vietnamese
- 43:05Speaker 1: Air Force and the Second Air Division, with neither of
- 43:08Speaker 1: them given authority to coordinate the overall psychological warfare program.
- 43:13Speaker 1: The Second Air Division favored the Helio Supercourier, while the
- 43:17Speaker 1: C forty seven carrid a navigator and was better for
- 43:20Speaker 1: night flights. The U ten was more maneuverable, not as noisy,
- 43:24Speaker 1: and less susceptible to ground fire since it was smaller.
- 43:28Speaker 1: The weight of the U ten's laminated fiberglass armour diminished
- 43:32Speaker 1: aircraft performance but protected the crew against light caliber fire.
- 43:37Speaker 1: After speakers and other equipment were installed in two more
- 43:40Speaker 1: U tens, the Second Air Division had three planes for
- 43:43Speaker 1: speaker and leaflet missions. The air flights stepped up after
- 43:47Speaker 1: May nineteen sixty three. By October twenty two, Second Air
- 43:52Speaker 1: Division aircraft had flown three hundred and eighty six psychological
- 43:56Speaker 1: warfare sorties in the spring of nineteen sixty Aerial psychological
- 44:01Speaker 1: operations were often the sole swift means of communication between
- 44:05Speaker 1: the government and remote rural peoples since part of President
- 44:09Speaker 1: Kang's weakness stemmed from loss of contact with the hinterland.
- 44:12Speaker 1: It was proposed to expand the training of Vietnamese in
- 44:15Speaker 1: psychological operations. While visiting Saigon, Carl T Rowan, director of
- 44:20Speaker 1: the US Information Agency, was impressed with the potential of
- 44:24Speaker 1: these activities. He supported the proposal to enlarge them, which
- 44:28Speaker 1: President Johnson approved on April twenty eight. To support the
- 44:31Speaker 1: Vietnamese armed forces in political warfare, the Vietnamese Air Force
- 44:35Speaker 1: set up a General Political Warfare Directorate with headquarters at
- 44:39Speaker 1: Tansan Nuitt and officers at each wing. Ten single engine
- 44:43Speaker 1: utility aircraft, six U six a's and four U seventeen
- 44:47Speaker 1: a's were delivered to the Vietnamese Air Force for modification
- 44:51Speaker 1: to psychological warfare duty. Also over the summer of nineteen
- 44:55Speaker 1: sixty four, the second Air Division worked with the United
- 44:58Speaker 1: States Army Support Commands to test a public address system.
- 45:02Speaker 1: It consisted of eight one hundred and twenty five watt
- 45:05Speaker 1: speakers installed in the Vietnamese H thirty four helicopter. Messages
- 45:09Speaker 1: could be heard on the ground as a chopper fluid
- 45:11Speaker 1: a fairly save altitude of three thousand feet, but the
- 45:14Speaker 1: rotor blades distorted the sound the second Air Division abandoned
- 45:18Speaker 1: the project, while the army continued to maintain seven UH
- 45:21Speaker 1: one B copters fitted with a public address system. American
- 45:26Speaker 1: and Vietnamese aircraft in August nineteen sixty four reached a
- 45:29Speaker 1: new high of one hundred and thirty two psychological warfare sorties.
- 45:33Speaker 1: The Vietnamese were nevertheless more concerned with internal personnel services
- 45:37Speaker 1: to the soldiers and airmen caught up in the conversion
- 45:40Speaker 1: to fighter aircraft. The Vietnamese paid scant attention to psychological warfare.
- 45:44Speaker 1: Four U seventeens were used in and around Sigon, yet
- 45:48Speaker 1: only one U six was modified due to the complications
- 45:51Speaker 1: in installing speakers. The U ten section of the first
- 45:55Speaker 1: Air Commando Squadron was authorized four aircraft and six pilots.
- 45:59Speaker 1: Accident claimed one plane in September, and the absence of
- 46:03Speaker 1: a planned flow of replacement pilots proved even more serious.
- 46:07Speaker 1: In November, the U ten section was down to two
- 46:09Speaker 1: pilots each averaging more than one hundred flying hours during
- 46:13Speaker 1: the month. Psychological warfare sorties by USAF and Vietnamese aircraft
- 46:19Speaker 1: totaled one hundred and six in September, one hundred and
- 46:22Speaker 1: nine in October sixty nine, in November, and one hundred
- 46:26Speaker 1: and two in December nineteen sixty four. Although four USAF
- 46:30Speaker 1: replacement pilots finally joined the U ten section, the impression
- 46:34Speaker 1: was current that we are piddling with psychological operations and
- 46:37Speaker 1: not getting anywhere. That impression also applied to the broader
- 46:42Speaker 1: canvas of events in Vietnam. This is the end of
- 46:47Speaker 1: chapter twenty. This has been read by Paul Hampton.