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Challenge to the FTC's Independence · Bloomberg Law

0:02
Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Grossel from Bloomberg Radio.
0:08
Speaker 2: The Trump administration has been mounting an unprecedented campaign to
0:13
Speaker 2: reign in independent agencies and increase executive authority. To that end,
0:19
Speaker 2: President Trump has fired more than a dozen leaders of
0:22
Speaker 2: independent agencies without cause. What stands out in the long
0:26
Speaker 2: list is Trump firing the two Democratic members of the
0:30
Speaker 2: Federal Trade Commission. Rebecca Kelly. Slaughter is fighting her dismissal
0:35
Speaker 2: in court, arguing that it was illegal.
0:38
Speaker 3: Only one time in history has a president attempted to
0:41
Speaker 3: remove an FTC commissioner over a policy disagreement. It was
0:46
Speaker 3: ninety years ago President Roosevelt tried to remove Commissioner Humphrey,
0:50
Speaker 3: and in the face of the clear language of the statute,
0:53
Speaker 3: the Supreme Court said that was illegal, that the statute
0:57
Speaker 3: is constitutional, and that FTC commissioner and other commissioners of
1:01
Speaker 3: multi member bipartisan agencies cannot be simply removed because the
1:06
Speaker 3: president doesn't agree with them.
1:07
Speaker 2: But the Justice Department has said it's going to ask
1:10
Speaker 2: the Supreme Court to reverse that ninety year old president
1:14
Speaker 2: called Humphrey's executor. Legal experts say they'll be broad ramifications
1:19
Speaker 2: if the President can fire FTC commissioners at will, and
1:24
Speaker 2: the agency is no longer independent. My guest is William Kavasik,
1:28
Speaker 2: former FDC chair and a professor at the George Mason
1:32
Speaker 2: University School of Law. Bill tell us about the president
1:36
Speaker 2: firing Slaughter.
1:37
Speaker 1: Yeah, the President decided that he has the authority to
1:41
Speaker 1: simply fire members of the FTC without any cause, and
1:46
Speaker 1: this contradicts a nineteen thirty five Supreme Court decision called
1:50
Speaker 1: Humphrey's Executor that said that FTC commissioners can be removed
1:55
Speaker 1: only for good cause. The President clearly wanted to remove
1:58
Speaker 1: the two Democrats from the FTC, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and
2:02
Speaker 1: Alvaro Beadoya, and he simply dismissed them. So he decided
2:07
Speaker 1: not just for the FTC, but I think as part
2:09
Speaker 1: of a program for government generally, decided to assert executive
2:13
Speaker 1: authority to control more directly who can serve on these
2:16
Speaker 1: regulatory agencies.
2:18
Speaker 2: Slaughter won her first battle in court. A federal judge
2:21
Speaker 2: reinstated her last month, although that reinstatement has been put
2:26
Speaker 2: on hold pending an appeals court decision. Explain the judge's
2:30
Speaker 2: reasons for reinstating her.
2:32
Speaker 1: Now. She concluded that the president's authority is defined by
2:36
Speaker 1: the nineteen thirty five Supreme Court decision, and the nineteen
2:40
Speaker 1: thirty five Supreme Court decision said that the president can
2:43
Speaker 1: remove Federal Trade Commissioners only for good cost, that the
2:47
Speaker 1: limitation on removal was established in the FTC Statute adopted
2:52
Speaker 1: in nineteen fourteen, and that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
2:57
Speaker 1: that statute limited the circumstances in which the present and
3:00
Speaker 1: it could remove FPC commissioners. Judge Ali Khan and the
3:04
Speaker 1: District Court opinion concluded that those authorities are controlling, that
3:09
Speaker 1: the statute itself makes clear the conditions enrich removal can
3:13
Speaker 1: take place, and the Supreme Court upheld the limitation on
3:17
Speaker 1: executive power, and she said the President contradicted that approach,
3:22
Speaker 1: and until the Supreme Court says otherwise about it's nineteen
3:26
Speaker 1: thirty five decision, that decision is binding on me and commissioners,
3:31
Speaker 1: Slaughter is entitled to be reinstated.
3:33
Speaker 2: It seems like Humphrey's executor is in jeopardy at the
3:37
Speaker 2: Supreme Court. In July, the Court allowed the Trump administration
3:40
Speaker 2: to remove three democratic members of the Consumer Product's Safety
3:45
Speaker 2: Commission that were fired by Trump and then reinstated by
3:48
Speaker 2: a federal judge. And it may the Court rule that
3:51
Speaker 2: the democratic members of the NLRB and Merit Systems Protection
3:55
Speaker 2: Board couldn't return to their jobs because the government was
3:59
Speaker 2: likely to be able to show that the agency's exercised
4:03
Speaker 2: considerable independent power. So does it seem like the Supreme
4:07
Speaker 2: Court is ready to overturn Humphrey's Executor.
4:11
Speaker 1: As you say, June, The Court's given a number of
4:13
Speaker 1: hints that it is ready to revisit Humphrey's executor and
4:17
Speaker 1: to overturn it. The Court has cautioned that every burn
4:21
Speaker 1: in the road that we're not making a final decision
4:23
Speaker 1: on the merit, that that fuller evaluation of the merit
4:27
Speaker 1: of Humphrey and its vitality today remains to take place.
4:31
Speaker 1: So they've said we're not deciding now, but the way
4:34
Speaker 1: in which they've written the decisions that you referred to,
4:37
Speaker 1: even these preliminary rulings where they're not offering a final
4:41
Speaker 1: view about the legitimacy of the challenges at issue, have
4:44
Speaker 1: given hints that at least three members of the Court
4:47
Speaker 1: think that Humphreys must be overturned, maybe two more members
4:51
Speaker 1: of the Court are wavering in their support of Humphreys.
4:55
Speaker 1: I suppose if you were making a wager now about
4:58
Speaker 1: whether Humphrey's will live through the end of twenty twenty six,
5:02
Speaker 1: I suppose the way to bet would be to say no,
5:05
Speaker 1: that it won't. I don't think the possibilities for Humphrey's
5:08
Speaker 1: executors to survive have been extinguished. There's still possibilities that
5:12
Speaker 1: the Court might reflect on the basis for the creation
5:15
Speaker 1: of the limit on removal, might think more completely about
5:19
Speaker 1: existing controls that the President already has over administrative agency discretion,
5:24
Speaker 1: to realize that the choice here is not between having
5:27
Speaker 1: no control and absolute control over appointments and removal. The
5:31
Speaker 1: president already has a number of tools at the president's
5:34
Speaker 1: disposal to influence the way in which the Federal Trade
5:37
Speaker 1: Commission and similar agencies operate. The real issue here is
5:41
Speaker 1: whether that control must be absolute, and the Court might
5:44
Speaker 1: reflect on that in a more elaborate way and come
5:46
Speaker 1: to a different conclusion. But that's a long way of
5:48
Speaker 1: saying that Humphrey's Executor appears to be in peril, and
5:53
Speaker 1: that when the Court does come at some point, perhaps
5:56
Speaker 1: in twenty twenty six, to confront the continuing vitalent of
6:00
Speaker 1: Hunfrees executive, it will probably say that we've decided to
6:04
Speaker 1: change our minds.
6:05
Speaker 2: Bill. Is the FDC right now a fully independent agency?
6:10
Speaker 1: When you look at the design, organization and operation of
6:14
Speaker 1: the agency, I think we discover that the English word
6:18
Speaker 1: independence is badly ill suited to describe the Commission's place
6:22
Speaker 1: in the political landscape. You know, first, the President gets
6:25
Speaker 1: to designate the chair from among existing members of the Commission,
6:30
Speaker 1: and that only takes signing a letter that says you're
6:32
Speaker 1: the chair. That comes with a lot of power, because
6:35
Speaker 1: since nineteen forty nine nineteen fifty, the chair of the
6:39
Speaker 1: so called independent agencies has been the chief operating officer
6:44
Speaker 1: and the chief executive of these agencies and exercises extraordinary
6:49
Speaker 1: authority as part of that reshuffling of government power that
6:53
Speaker 1: took place in the Government Reorganization Act of nineteen forty
6:57
Speaker 1: nine and a reorganization plan that put in place for
7:00
Speaker 1: the FTC in nineteen fifty. So that already gives the
7:03
Speaker 1: president a lot of power. Of course, the White House
7:06
Speaker 1: submits the budget on behalf of the United States to
7:09
Speaker 1: the Congress. The FDC does not do that. Directly, so
7:12
Speaker 1: the FTC's budget requests have to be filtered through the
7:15
Speaker 1: white The White House controls whether FTC officials can go overseas.
7:20
Speaker 1: The Executive Branch gives permission to FDC officials to travel
7:25
Speaker 1: abroad for government purposes, So if they don't want the
7:30
Speaker 1: FTC roaming the global landscape speaking on its own, they
7:34
Speaker 1: can stop that right away. The Department of Justice intervenes
7:37
Speaker 1: in a number of instances in the cases of the
7:41
Speaker 1: FTC to oppose the FTC. This is a short list
7:44
Speaker 1: of ways in which the FTC is not independent, and
7:48
Speaker 1: in a broader sense, when we look at Congress, the Congress,
7:51
Speaker 1: of course controls the FTC's budget, and every year the
7:54
Speaker 1: FTC has to go ask for money, I would say
7:57
Speaker 1: that an agency that every year has to ask Congress
8:00
Speaker 1: for an allowance is not very independent, no more independent
8:04
Speaker 1: than a college student is going to their parents at
8:06
Speaker 1: the beginning every school year and saying, top up my allowance.
8:10
Speaker 1: That independence is severely constrained, and maybe a better way
8:13
Speaker 1: to describe the FTC's relationship to the political process is
8:17
Speaker 1: semi autonomous with respect to some functions like adjudication, But
8:22
Speaker 1: independence is a badly inaccurate way to describe its place
8:26
Speaker 1: in the political ecology.
8:28
Speaker 2: Let's talk about what would happen the changes if the
8:32
Speaker 2: FDC loses the independence it now has. It's been said
8:36
Speaker 2: that one casualty would be the in house adjudication system.
8:41
Speaker 1: I think that's right too, and I think the administrative
8:43
Speaker 1: in house adjudication system ultimately topples. For this reason, I
8:48
Speaker 1: think crucial to the legitimacy of any judicial dispute resolution
8:52
Speaker 1: tribunal is some degree of autonomy. This is where the
8:56
Speaker 1: autonomy is most important for legitimacy. Once times a parent
9:00
Speaker 1: that the president can simply fire Federal Trade commissioners because
9:04
Speaker 1: he doesn't like their work, doesn't like their philosophy, I
9:08
Speaker 1: think that system unravels. You can't have courts where the
9:11
Speaker 1: judges are aware that a decision or a specific approach
9:16
Speaker 1: taken in a given case could cause their dismissal, and
9:19
Speaker 1: the FTC commissioners serve as adjudicators when the FTC uses
9:24
Speaker 1: that internal mechanism. So, I think a domino that falls
9:29
Speaker 1: if Humphrey's executor is overturned is the perceived legitimacy and
9:33
Speaker 1: functioning of the administrative adjudication system That disappears.
9:38
Speaker 2: And even now we're seeing motions to dismiss FTC cases,
9:43
Speaker 2: eleging that the FTC structure is unconstitutional because of this
9:49
Speaker 2: weight over Humphreys, I.
9:51
Speaker 1: Think the deeper threat to the FTC's effectiveness is that
9:55
Speaker 1: when it goes to court, it has always had the
9:58
Speaker 1: capacity to tell the court the positions we are taking
10:01
Speaker 1: are the result of our best professional judgment, and as
10:04
Speaker 1: an expert body, we are asking for respect for our
10:08
Speaker 1: judgments because they're based on our accumulated experience, our research
10:13
Speaker 1: in the field of competition and consumer protection, and the
10:16
Speaker 1: expertise that individual members of the Commission bring to the
10:20
Speaker 1: analysis of specific cases. When you put all of those together,
10:24
Speaker 1: you have a key element of professional judgment that might
10:28
Speaker 1: not be always correct, but it deserves respect because it
10:33
Speaker 1: is more likely to be correct than the judgment of
10:37
Speaker 1: individual federal judges, the parties, and the cases. That is
10:41
Speaker 1: that that judgment is worthy of respect. It doesn't mean
10:43
Speaker 1: that the FDC is always going to prevail in court.
10:46
Speaker 1: The moment that courts perceive that you are using your
10:50
Speaker 1: authority not because of your best professional judgment, but because
10:55
Speaker 1: you are simply an extension of the political process and
10:59
Speaker 1: you are serving the specific interests or whims and the
11:03
Speaker 1: chief executive, that element of professional judgment and respect disappear.
11:07
Speaker 1: They're gone. So I think a consequence ipumphrase dies is
11:11
Speaker 1: that the Commission loses the ability to scand before the
11:14
Speaker 1: courts and say you can trust us. And in so
11:17
Speaker 1: many ways, that's what government agencies ask court is trust
11:22
Speaker 1: us because we are the professionals. We're using professional judgment,
11:26
Speaker 1: and that's why you can have confidence in the judgments
11:29
Speaker 1: we're making. You take protection against removal except for a
11:34
Speaker 1: good cause away the basis for asserting that respect disappears,
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Speaker 1: and I think it means that, simply stated, you have
11:43
Speaker 1: a harder time winning your cases when you go to court.
11:45
Speaker 2: Coming up next on the Bloomberg Lan Show, I'll continue
11:48
Speaker 2: this conversation with former FTC chair Bill Kvasik. We'll talk
11:52
Speaker 2: about a bill to consolidate anti trust authority solely in
11:56
Speaker 2: the Justice Department. You're listening to Bloomberg. I'm talking to
12:00
Speaker 2: former FTC chair William Kavasik about the Trump administration's campaign
12:06
Speaker 2: to reign in independent agencies and increase executive power.
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Speaker 4: Bill. Is there any argument that you see for a
12:16
Speaker 4: president having the ability to fire commissioners at will.
12:20
Speaker 1: I guess the best argument would be this. I mean,
12:22
Speaker 1: suppose you're an incoming president and the existing configuration of
12:28
Speaker 1: the commission means that there is nobody from your political
12:31
Speaker 1: party on the board. Imagine a commission of five and
12:34
Speaker 1: you have two vacancies, and the vacancies ordinarily would be
12:38
Speaker 1: your party, but nobody's been confirmed. In that insense, you
12:42
Speaker 1: can make an argument that the president ought to be
12:44
Speaker 1: able to put the president's preferred person on the board,
12:48
Speaker 1: although even there they have to go through Senate confirmation.
12:51
Speaker 1: They'd have to go through Senate confirmation. And if you
12:53
Speaker 1: have a vacancy, you can you can appoint somebody to
12:55
Speaker 1: fill that spot. I guess the other argument one could
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Speaker 1: make is that in d need, these agencies exercise significant discretion.
13:03
Speaker 1: They have considerable powers. The FPC has a broad mandate
13:08
Speaker 1: with a number of policymaking tools to implement it, and
13:12
Speaker 1: those are significant economically important. And if I'm the president,
13:16
Speaker 1: I'm saying I have to have the ability to determine
13:20
Speaker 1: how this large machine of government functions and where it's going. Now, again,
13:24
Speaker 1: as I've said before, I think the president already has
13:27
Speaker 1: a lot of tools to influence that and what you
13:30
Speaker 1: have in the status quo embodied in cases like Humphreys
13:33
Speaker 1: is basically a bargain between the legislature and the President
13:37
Speaker 1: over how oversight functions will be allocated. Some of those
13:41
Speaker 1: functions reside in the White House today already, such as
13:44
Speaker 1: the ability to designate the scare among members of the Commission.
13:47
Speaker 1: Others such as congressional oversight control of the budget, reside
13:51
Speaker 1: in the Congress. One way to put it is that
13:53
Speaker 1: it is shared oversight and accountability that engages the Congress,
13:57
Speaker 1: the President, and indeed the Federal Court. So my view,
14:01
Speaker 1: and this is very much based on my experience that
14:03
Speaker 1: the FTC is a member of the Commission for a
14:06
Speaker 1: year is chair that I was always aware of the
14:09
Speaker 1: capacity of the White House to shape what we were
14:11
Speaker 1: doing in key respects. That is, from the place that
14:14
Speaker 1: we occupied on Pennsylvania Avenue. I was always aware of
14:18
Speaker 1: both ends of the avenue, that both of them had
14:21
Speaker 1: a lot to do to shape the environment in which
14:23
Speaker 1: we worked in. And when I looked out the window
14:26
Speaker 1: at the front of the building, they're also sat the
14:29
Speaker 1: Federal Courthouse for the District of Columbia. So I always
14:34
Speaker 1: knew that we were working in an environment when all
14:36
Speaker 1: three could hold us to account, and I was aware
14:39
Speaker 1: of the history that showed that they certainly would.
14:42
Speaker 2: Slaughter has said there are two lines of pushback, one legal,
14:45
Speaker 2: the other political. Quote.
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Speaker 4: The legal fight we're having in the court, but the
14:49
Speaker 4: political fight is in the court of public opinion. Do
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Speaker 4: you think that the public is aware of what's happening
14:56
Speaker 4: with these agencies?
14:58
Speaker 1: For the broader public, I have re doubts. I suspect
15:02
Speaker 1: that there are many in the public, for a variety
15:04
Speaker 1: of reasons, who are aware that there's something called the
15:07
Speaker 1: Federal Trade Commission. But if you gave the ordinary American
15:11
Speaker 1: citizen a short quiz, true false questions or multiple choice questions,
15:17
Speaker 1: I don't know how many would answer it in a
15:20
Speaker 1: way that reflected a real understanding of how these agencies
15:23
Speaker 1: function and what they do. So, if we're talking about
15:25
Speaker 1: the US public writ large, I doubt there's a keen
15:30
Speaker 1: awareness of the governance mechanism of the FPC and what
15:34
Speaker 1: removal of commissioners does to that framework. The larger public
15:38
Speaker 1: might be aware of efforts by the President to consolidate
15:44
Speaker 1: power in the White House. They've probably noticed in this
15:47
Speaker 1: barely six months of the second Trump presidency, that the
15:51
Speaker 1: President is doing a number of things to exercise power,
15:54
Speaker 1: imposing tariffs, for example, setting in motion dramatic reductions in
15:58
Speaker 1: force for individual real agencies. And maybe they're aware of
16:03
Speaker 1: the dismissals of heads of different institutions at a high level.
16:07
Speaker 1: They may be aware that the presidents seeking to exert
16:10
Speaker 1: more control over how the government operates. So that awareness
16:14
Speaker 1: I suspect exists, and certainly to the extent of the
16:17
Speaker 1: public she is speaking about, includes the Congress of the
16:20
Speaker 1: United States. I assume that more keenly than the ordinary citizen,
16:24
Speaker 1: they are very aware of the reallocation of power that's
16:28
Speaker 1: taking place in Washington and ought to be concerned about,
16:32
Speaker 1: especially because in the case of the FTC, when Congress
16:35
Speaker 1: created the FTC in nineteen fourteen, their unmistakable view is
16:40
Speaker 1: that the FTC would be accountable through the Congress. First
16:42
Speaker 1: and foremost. Here are debate in the Senate, for example,
16:46
Speaker 1: where members of the Senate asked, as part of the
16:48
Speaker 1: colloquy that takes place in the legislative debates, aren't we
16:52
Speaker 1: giving a lot of fairly open ended power to the
16:54
Speaker 1: federal Trade Commission, shouldn't we specify more carefully what the
16:58
Speaker 1: relevant offenses might be? And the defenders of the FTC
17:02
Speaker 1: Act has ultimately adopted said, you need a flexible, adaptable mandate.
17:06
Speaker 1: That's why we're putting it that way. And if the
17:08
Speaker 1: STC ever misused that mandate, we, the Congress that created it,
17:12
Speaker 1: could abolish it. In the words of one senator, we
17:16
Speaker 1: created it, we could destroy it. So there was no
17:20
Speaker 1: doubt in the minds of Congress that this institution, with
17:23
Speaker 1: its considerable authority, will answer first and foremost to us.
17:27
Speaker 1: So the Congress ought to be keenly aware of the
17:31
Speaker 1: process by which the relevant oversight, responsibility and accountability mechanisms
17:38
Speaker 1: are changing.
17:39
Speaker 2: Can you give us the broader reasons why you think
17:42
Speaker 2: the FTC's independence is critical.
17:46
Speaker 1: The broader, high level reason is that the FTC exercises
17:51
Speaker 1: significant economic policy making functions and as broad regulatory responsibilities.
17:57
Speaker 1: I think in any economy, and certainly in our market economy,
18:01
Speaker 1: the business community, the citizens as a whole have to
18:04
Speaker 1: have confidence that that authority is being used in a
18:07
Speaker 1: principled way, and then when it's used, it reflects truly
18:11
Speaker 1: the exercise of high quality professional judgment from an agency
18:16
Speaker 1: that has special expertise broad experience, and then when it's
18:19
Speaker 1: making those judgments, it's making it on the basis of
18:22
Speaker 1: sound policy analysis. That assumption and confidence vanishes if the
18:28
Speaker 1: head of State can simply designate outcomes or point the
18:31
Speaker 1: agency in a specific direction. I mean, it's the same
18:34
Speaker 1: concern we have about the Federal Reserve Board and monetary policy.
18:38
Speaker 1: Notice how the markets lose their minds when it appears
18:42
Speaker 1: as though the Fed might lose that insallation from direct
18:45
Speaker 1: political influence over the monetary system. I can't quite assert
18:48
Speaker 1: that the FTC occupies the same position in the minds
18:53
Speaker 1: of business leaders and others about its role in the economy,
18:57
Speaker 1: but I think it is nonetheless and important pillar of
19:01
Speaker 1: the regulatory mechanism in the US. If you take away
19:05
Speaker 1: some measure of autonomy, especially in the decision to prosecute,
19:09
Speaker 1: the decision to impose sanctions, the decision to do things
19:13
Speaker 1: that in a broad sense hurt, you take away that
19:16
Speaker 1: presumption of good professional judgment and autonomy with respect to
19:20
Speaker 1: those functions. I think it underminds confidence in the regulatory
19:23
Speaker 1: process itself, and at a higher level, for our entire
19:27
Speaker 1: political economy. And our stature in the world. For the
19:30
Speaker 1: last thirty plus years, we have been telling the world
19:33
Speaker 1: that these key economic regulatory functions must have some element
19:38
Speaker 1: of protection with respect to these fundamental decisions about prosecuting cases,
19:43
Speaker 1: initiating rules, that there has to be an accountability regime.
19:46
Speaker 1: But you can't have political leadership telling the agency to
19:50
Speaker 1: punish enemies, reward friends, and otherwise simply be party to
19:54
Speaker 1: a negotiation between top political leadership and individual business interests.
19:59
Speaker 1: So once you do that, confidence in the entire system
20:02
Speaker 1: of governments tends to erode. And if the Humphries executive
20:06
Speaker 1: protections against removal except for good cause disappear, that's a
20:11
Speaker 1: step in the direction of diminishing that confidence and legitimacy
20:15
Speaker 1: for the regulatory process.
20:17
Speaker 2: I want to get.
20:17
Speaker 4: Your input on the bill to consolidate federal antitrust authority
20:23
Speaker 4: solely within the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, so that would
20:27
Speaker 4: lead the FTC as a consumer protection agency. What's your
20:33
Speaker 4: take on that.
20:34
Speaker 1: I think it's a bad time to do that. I
20:36
Speaker 1: think the question of whether you want two federal agencies
20:40
Speaker 1: to occupy in many ways the same policy domain is
20:44
Speaker 1: a very useful and important issue. That's worthy of debate.
20:48
Speaker 1: I would hope that that debate would involve a more
20:52
Speaker 1: nuanced than careful consideration of what the FTC has brought
20:56
Speaker 1: to the mix. I mentioned the FTC because the assumption
20:59
Speaker 1: always is, as you say, all that authority will be
21:02
Speaker 1: given to the Department of Justice. The main reason I
21:04
Speaker 1: think it's a bad tub to do this is that
21:06
Speaker 1: in the area of all things digital and information systems platforms,
21:11
Speaker 1: there is a growing global awareness that the solution to
21:15
Speaker 1: problems observed in that area and the disciplines that have
21:19
Speaker 1: to be brought to bear to come up with good
21:21
Speaker 1: policy foundations include competition law, antitrust, consumer protection law, and
21:27
Speaker 1: privacy data protection law. There is one agency in the
21:31
Speaker 1: world that has all three of those mandates under its
21:34
Speaker 1: umbrella in its portfolio. That's a Federal Trade Commission, which
21:38
Speaker 1: also has distinctive information gathering powers and report writing powers,
21:43
Speaker 1: has a collection of policy making tools that can bring
21:47
Speaker 1: all of these policy domains to bear on specific issues.
21:51
Speaker 1: I think in a time when we are seeing that
21:54
Speaker 1: policy making involving information systems digital AI involve an intersection
22:01
Speaker 1: of these different policy areas, I think that's exactly the
22:04
Speaker 1: wrong time to divest the FPC of its Competition Policy mandate,
22:09
Speaker 1: also because I think the Competition Policy Mandate has brought
22:14
Speaker 1: useful discipline and direction to the consumer protection program. And
22:18
Speaker 1: if you sever the competition mandate from the Consumer Protection mandate,
22:23
Speaker 1: I think the consumer Protection Mandate and the Data Protection
22:26
Speaker 1: Mandate they both suffer.
22:28
Speaker 2: It's always great to have you on Bill, Thanks so much.
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Speaker 2: That's former FTC Chair William Kavasik, a professor at George
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Speaker 2: Mason University School of Law. And that's it for this
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Speaker 2: edition of The Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always
22:41
Speaker 2: get the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law Podcast.
22:44
Speaker 2: You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at
22:47
Speaker 2: www dot Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast Slash Law, and
22:53
Speaker 2: remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight
22:56
Speaker 2: at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm Jim Grosso and
22:59
Speaker 2: your listen listening to Bloomberg.
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Speaker 4: Hmm