Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / Iran Nuclear Program Part 3/3: Trump Withdrawal, JCPOA Collapse, Path to War
Transcript
- 0:16By the spring of 2013, the world had tried almost everything.
- 0:21Sanctions had crippled Iran's economy, cyber weapons had
- 0:25destroyed its centrifuges. Assassins had killed its
- 0:28scientists on the streets of Tehran, and Iran had more
- 0:32enriched uranium than at any point in its history.
- 0:35The pressure had not produced surrender.
- 0:38It had produced defiance. And now, quietly, in hotel rooms
- 0:42and government offices far from any camera, something different
- 0:45was being attempted, something that had never been tried
- 0:48before. Not really.
- 0:51The agreement that would become the most consequential arms
- 0:53control deal of the 21st century did not begin with a summit or a
- 0:57handshake. It began with a phone call
- 1:00placed in secret through Omani intermediaries in the early
- 1:04months of 2013. Senior Obama administration
- 1:07officials had made contact with their Iranian counterparts, the
- 1:11channel deliberately hidden from America's closest regional
- 1:14allies, including Israel, including Saudi Arabia, both of
- 1:20whom would have moved immediately to shut it down.
- 1:23The secrecy was not incidental to the process.
- 1:26It was the condition that made the process possible.
- 1:30Hassan Rouhani's election as Iranian president in June of
- 1:33that year changed the geometry in ways that mattered, but not
- 1:37in the way most observers assumed.
- 1:39Rouhani was not a liberal. He harbored no private sympathy
- 1:44for the West. He did not believe the Islamic
- 1:47Republic's confrontational foreign policy had been a
- 1:50mistake on principal grounds. He was a regime insider of long
- 1:54standing, a cleric who had served as Iran's chief nuclear
- 1:57negotiator in the early 2000s and who understood the technical
- 2:01and political dimensions of the program within usual depth.
- 2:04But he had campaigned on a platform that acknowledged, with
- 2:07a directness unusual in Iranian politics, that the economic
- 2:11damage from sanctions was real, that isolation had costs, and
- 2:14that Iran needed a different approach to the outside world.
- 2:18He had won, and that victory gave Ayatollah Khamenei the
- 2:21domestic political cover to authorize what came next.
- 2:25In September 2013, on the margins of the United Nations
- 2:29General Assembly in New York, Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani
- 2:33spoke by telephone. It was the first direct contact
- 2:36between an American and an Iranian head of state since the
- 2:39Islamic Revolution of 1979. 34 years of silence broken by a
- 2:44brief call placed from a motorcade as Rouhani was heading
- 2:47to the airport. The symbolism was not lost on
- 2:50anyone. Neither was the fact that both
- 2:53leaders faced fierce domestic opposition to what they were
- 2:56doing in Washington. Republican lawmakers and pro
- 2:59Israel groups were already mobilizing against any deal.
- 3:03In Tehran, hardliners gathered outside the airport and threw
- 3:07eggs at Rouhani's motorcade as he returned home.
- 3:10Both sides understood what they were risking.
- 3:13They proceeded anyway. The negotiations that followed
- 3:16involved Iran on one side and the group of nations known as
- 3:19the P 5 + 1 on the other, the United States, Britain, France,
- 3:23Russia, China and Germany. The combination was remarkable
- 3:27in itself. Russia and China, whose
- 3:29relationships with the United States were already
- 3:32deteriorating in 2013 and 2014, sat at the same table and worked
- 3:37toward the same agreement. The Iran nuclear file was one of
- 3:40the last areas of genuine great power coordination to survive
- 3:44the collapse of US Russia relations following the
- 3:46annexation of Crimea in 2014. That the talks continued to
- 3:50cross that rupture was itself a measure of how seriously every
- 3:55party regarded the underlying problem.
- 3:57The talks were grinding. Iran's team, led by Foreign
- 4:01Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, was sophisticated and well
- 4:04prepared, operating under a mandate from Khamenei with hard
- 4:08limits Zarif could not cross without losing the supreme
- 4:10leader's backing entirely. The American team, led by
- 4:14Secretary of State John Kerry, faced a domestic political
- 4:17environment deeply hostile to any agreement and a complication
- 4:21that had no precedent in modern diplomatic history.
- 4:24The Prime Minister of a foreign country flew to Washington to
- 4:27address a joint session of Congress and explicitly urge
- 4:30American legislators to reject the deal being negotiated by a
- 4:34sitting president. Benjamin Netanyahu did exactly
- 4:37that in March 2015. It was an extraordinary breach
- 4:42of diplomatic protocol. A foreign head of government
- 4:45standing in the Chamber of a Co Equal branch of the American
- 4:47government, publicly campaigning against the foreign policy of
- 4:51the President of the United States.
- 4:53It did not stop the negotiations, but it poisoned
- 4:57the atmosphere around the agreement.
- 4:58Before the ink was dry. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of
- 5:02Action was announced on July 14th, 2015 in Vienna.
- 5:07More than 100 pages of technical annexes, schedules and
- 5:10verification protocols. What actually did, stripped of
- 5:14the political noise, was this. Iran agreed to reduce its
- 5:18stockpile of enriched uranium by 98%, from roughly 10,000
- 5:23kilograms to 300. It cut its operating centrifuges
- 5:26from approximately 19,000 to just over 6000, with the most
- 5:30advanced models taken out of service rather than destroyed.
- 5:34It redesigned its heavy water reactor at Iraq so it could no
- 5:37longer produce weapons grade plutonium.
- 5:40It accepted significantly more intrusive IAA inspections under
- 5:44the Additional Protocol, and it agreed to a set of early warning
- 5:47mechanisms designed to detect violations before they reached
- 5:50the critical threshold. In exchange, the United States
- 5:54and European Union lifted the core sanctions, strangling
- 5:57Iran's economy. 10s of billions of dollars in frozen assets were
- 6:01released. Iran's oil exports, cut by more
- 6:05than half under sanctions, were allowed to flow again.
- 6:08The country was returned to the international financial system.
- 6:12For a moment, it seemed like something had actually worked.
- 6:16The agreement had a time limit. Most of its core restrictions on
- 6:20enrichment were set to expire between 10 and 15 years after
- 6:24the deal came into force. Its critics labeled these the
- 6:27sunset clauses. After those dates, Iran would be
- 6:31free to enrich uranium without the JCPOA limits found only by
- 6:35the permanent but weaker prohibitions of the Nuclear Non
- 6:38Proliferation Treaty itself. The debate about whether the
- 6:41JCPOA was a good agreement was never really a debate about the
- 6:45facts. The facts were not seriously
- 6:47contested. Iran's nuclear program was
- 6:51genuinely constrained under the deal.
- 6:53IAEA inspectors confirmed repeatedly and consistently that
- 6:58Iran was meeting its technical obligations.
- 7:00The pathway to a weapon have been lengthened.
- 7:03The immediate crisis had been managed.
- 7:06The debate was about something else entirely.
- 7:09About what happened when the clock ran out.
- 7:12About whether a deal that delayed Iran's capability was
- 7:15meaningfully different from one that eliminated it.
- 7:17About whether the sanctions relief was funding Iranian
- 7:20behavior across the region in ways that made the broader
- 7:23security picture worse, even as the specific nuclear threat was
- 7:27temporarily reduced. About whether an agreement that
- 7:29left Iran's nuclear infrastructure intact,
- 7:32recognized its right to enrich uranium and treated it as a
- 7:35legitimate counterparty in international diplomacy was
- 7:38itself a strategic error, regardless of its technical
- 7:41provisions. These were not trivial
- 7:43objections. The sunset clauses were real.
- 7:47The regional behavior question was real.
- 7:49The gap between a constrained program and a dismantled 1 was
- 7:53real. But the critics of the deal
- 7:55rarely answer the harder question underneath their
- 7:58criticisms. Compared to what?
- 8:00The alternative being offered was not a better agreement.
- 8:03It was pressure. More sanctions, more isolation,
- 8:07more time. And the previous decade had
- 8:09demonstrated in precise and measurable terms what pressure
- 8:13without a diplomatic outlet produced.
- 8:15It produced more centrifuges, more enriched uranium, a more
- 8:20advanced program. The argument against the deal
- 8:24was, at its core, an argument that the status quo before the
- 8:27deal had been sustainable. The evidence suggested it had
- 8:31not been. Netanyahu called it a historic
- 8:34mistake. The Gulf states watched with
- 8:36deep unease as their regional rival was economically and
- 8:39diplomatically rehabilitated. Republican opposition in
- 8:43Congress refused to submit it to the Senate as a formal treaty,
- 8:46which would have required a 2/3 ratification vote.
- 8:50The Obama administration, anticipating this, structured it
- 8:53as an executive agreement instead.
- 8:55A future president could withdraw from it without
- 8:58congressional approval. That decision, pragmatic at the
- 9:01time, would prove fateful in ways nobody fully admitted they
- 9:05were anticipating. Donald Trump had campaigned
- 9:08explicitly on tearing up the JCPOA, calling it the worst deal
- 9:12ever negotiated. His objections were political
- 9:15and strategic rather than narrowly technical.
- 9:18The deal had given Iran too much, asked too little, left the
- 9:22missile program and regional proxies untouched, and the
- 9:25sunset clauses meant it was a delay, not a solution.
- 9:29Many of his advisors had held these views for years, long
- 9:32before Trump arrived on the scene.
- 9:34On May 8th, 2018, Trump withdrew the United States from the
- 9:38JCPOA. He signed the order from the
- 9:40White House Diplomatic Reception Room and reimpose the sanctions
- 9:44that have been lifted under the deal.
- 9:46The European signatories, Britain, France and Germany
- 9:50announced they would try to keep the agreement alive without
- 9:52American participation. Iran said it would stay within
- 9:56the deals limits while the Europeans worked to preserve the
- 9:59economic benefits that made the agreement worth honoring.
- 10:02That effort collapsed within a year.
- 10:05The secondary sanctions the United States reimposed were
- 10:07powerful enough that European companies and banks, forced to
- 10:11choose between access to the American market and continue
- 10:14trade with Iran, chose the American market.
- 10:16Almost without exception, the economic gains Iran had been
- 10:20promised evaporated. Iran's government found itself
- 10:23in a position its own public found impossible to accept.
- 10:27It had surrendered significant nuclear capabilities in exchange
- 10:30for benefits that had simply ceased to exist.
- 10:33It had made a deal, the other side had walked away, and it had
- 10:37nothing to show for its concessions.
- 10:40Iran's response was methodical. Beginning in 2019, it announced
- 10:45a series of measured steps away from the JCPOA limits, each one
- 10:49calibrated to increase pressure without provoking an immediate
- 10:52military response. It exceeded the 300 kilogram
- 10:56limit on enriched uranium. It brought back advanced
- 10:59centrifuge models the deal had prohibited.
- 11:02It raised its enrichment levels first to 4.5%, then passed 20%
- 11:08and eventually to 60 percent. 60% enrichment has no credible
- 11:12civilian justification. Weapons grade is 90%.
- 11:17The distance between the two have become, by any serious
- 11:21measure, short. Then came January 2020.
- 11:25The killing of Kaisam Soleimani near Baghdad airport, ordered by
- 11:28Trump and carried out by an American drone strike, shattered
- 11:32whatever remained of the diplomatic framework.
- 11:34Soleimani was the commander of the IRGCS Quds Force, the most
- 11:38powerful military figure in Iran after Khamenei himself, and the
- 11:42architect of Iran's entire regional strategy across Iraq,
- 11:46Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. His death was a shock of a kind.
- 11:50The Iranian system had never experienced A demonstration that
- 11:53the United States would eliminate Iran's most senior
- 11:56military commander in a third country without warning.
- 11:59Iran responded with missiles against American bases in Iraq.
- 12:04Both sides stepped back from edge.
- 12:06A kind of paralysis took hold. Neither country wanted the war
- 12:10that had briefly seemed imminent, but neither was
- 12:13willing to take the steps genuine re engagement required.
- 12:16The space for diplomacy did not merely narrow it effectively
- 12:21ceased to exist. By 2021, when the Biden
- 12:24administration came to office with stated intention of
- 12:27returning to the JCPOA, Iran's nuclear program occupied A
- 12:31fundamentally different position than when Trump had walked away.
- 12:34The enriched uranium stockpile had grown from 300 kilograms to
- 12:38thousandths. Centrifuge capacity had expanded
- 12:42significantly. The knowledge base had deepened.
- 12:45The original deal was no longer sufficient to produce the same
- 12:48constraints because Iran had advanced well past the baseline
- 12:52the agreement had been designed to hold.
- 12:54The Vienna talks that followed produced months of painstaking
- 12:58negotiation and no agreement. The two sides came close on
- 13:01multiple occasions. Draft text circulated.
- 13:05Key compromises were discussed. There were moments when the
- 13:09people in those rooms genuinely believed they were close to
- 13:12something that could hold. But the gaps that remained were
- 13:15not technical. They reflected A structural
- 13:18problem that neither side could resolve.
- 13:20Iran wanted guarantees that a future American administration
- 13:24could not simply walk away. Again, the United States was not
- 13:27in a position to offer guarantees its own domestic
- 13:30political system could not reliably deliver.
- 13:33The negotiators understood each other's constraints.
- 13:37They could not overcome them. There is something worth sitting
- 13:40with in that impasse. The original JCPOA had required
- 13:44both sides to accept political risk at home in exchange for a
- 13:47genuine reduction in the shared danger abroad.
- 13:50That willingness to absorb domestic cost for a collective
- 13:53benefit have been real in 2015. By 2021, it was gone.
- 13:59The Trump withdrawal had not merely ended an agreement, it
- 14:03had consumed the political conditions that made agreement
- 14:06possible in the first place. Trust of a particular and
- 14:09fragile kind. The belief that an agreement
- 14:12would survive the next election cycle, had been broken.
- 14:15It could not simply be reconstructed at a negotiating
- 14:18table. The window that had opened in
- 14:212013, through which Rouhani and Obama had managed to construct
- 14:25an imperfect but genuine agreement, was now closed.
- 14:28The architecture that had taken 2 years to build had taken less
- 14:32than 1 presidential term to dismantle.
- 14:35What remained on both sides were positions that had hardened into
- 14:38something close to irreversibility, and the world
- 14:41on the other side of that closed window was measurably more
- 14:44dangerous than the one that had existed when the window opened.
- 14:47By 2025, Iran was assessed by multiple intelligence agencies
- 14:52to be within weeks of weapons grade enrichment capability if
- 14:55it chose to take the final step. The infrastructure was in place.
- 14:59The technical knowledge was established.
- 15:02The enriched material existed in quantity sufficient for multiple
- 15:06weapons. Iran had not crossed the
- 15:08threshold, but it was standing at the door, and every month it
- 15:12stood there, the argument for military action grew louder in
- 15:15the capitals of the country's most threatened by what lay on
- 15:18the other side. There is one dimension of this
- 15:21story that deserves attention before it reaches its
- 15:23conclusion, because it shaped the final years of the crisis in
- 15:27ways that are easy to overlook. When Trump withdrew from the
- 15:30JCPOA and announced maximum pressure, the architects of the
- 15:34policy argued that sufficient economic pain would either bring
- 15:37the Iranian government to the table on American terms or cause
- 15:41Iranians to rise against their rulers.
- 15:43Neither outcome occurred. The economy contracted sharply.
- 15:48The currency collapsed to historic lows.
- 15:50Ordinary Iranians suffered in ways that were concrete and
- 15:54serious. The regime did not fall.
- 15:57The government did not capitulate.
- 15:59What happened instead was that Iran accelerated its nuclear
- 16:02program, deepened its relationships with Russia and
- 16:05China as alternative economic partners, and concluded, with
- 16:09considerable justification, that the United States could not be
- 16:12trusted as a negotiating partner regardless of what any agreement
- 16:15said on paper. The maximum pressure policy had
- 16:18a secondary consequence its architects had not fully
- 16:21anticipated. By demonstrating that the United
- 16:24States would walk away from a signed international agreement
- 16:27when a new administration preferred different terms, it
- 16:30made every future American diplomatic commitment less
- 16:33credible. Not just with Iran.
- 16:36With every state watching how Washington treated its own
- 16:39signature, the withdrawal from the JCPOA became, in certain
- 16:43circles, a case study in the risks of concluding agreements
- 16:46with a country whose commitments could be reversed by a single
- 16:49election. That erosion had costs far
- 16:52beyond Iran reaching into conversations about nuclear
- 16:55restraint in other parts of the world where American assurances
- 16:58were supposed to provide the deterrent.
- 17:00The intelligence picture in 2024 and 2025 was, against this
- 17:05backdrop, genuinely alarming. Iran had not merely advanced its
- 17:09enrichment program, it had hardened its facilities,
- 17:13dispersed its activities across a wider range of sites,
- 17:16developed longer range ballistic missiles capable of reaching
- 17:19targets across the region and beyond, and deepened its
- 17:22integration with Russia's defense industry in ways that
- 17:24complicated any assessment of what military action would
- 17:27actually accomplish. The program that had been
- 17:30manageable, if barely, in 2015 had become something
- 17:34considerably more formidable A decade later, And the diplomatic
- 17:38infrastructure that might have offered an alternative to
- 17:40military confrontation have been dismantled piece by piece across
- 17:45those same years. The people making decisions in
- 17:48Washington and Jerusalem in early 2026 were not operating in
- 17:51a vacuum. They were operating in the full
- 17:54weight of this history, the decades of failure to produce a
- 17:57durable resolution, the closing of every diplomatic window that
- 18:00had briefly opened, the steady accumulation of Iranian
- 18:04capability against a backdrop of diminishing options.
- 18:07Whether the military action they chose will prove to have been
- 18:10the right decision, whether it achieves its stated objectives,
- 18:13whether it produces a more stable outcome than the one it
- 18:16replaced. Those are questions that history
- 18:18will take years to answer. But the decision was not made in
- 18:22ignorance of the past. It was made in full awareness of
- 18:25it by people who had concluded that 70 years of failed
- 18:28management had finally reached its limit.
- 18:30This was the world that produced Operation Epic Fury.
- 18:34Not a world in which Iran had suddenly and unexpectedly become
- 18:37dangerous, but a world in which a crisis that had been building
- 18:41across 7 decades, managed imperfectly, resolved
- 18:44temporarily and then allowed to deteriorate had reached the
- 18:47point where the actors involved concluded that the status quo
- 18:50could no longer hold. The diplomatic tools have been
- 18:53exhausted. The covert tools had bought time
- 18:56without resolution. The economic tools had inflicted
- 18:59pain without changing the fundamental calculation.
- 19:03What remained was the military option that every serious
- 19:06analyst had described for years as the last resort that could
- 19:09delay the problem but not solve it.
- 19:12The facilities being struck in Operation Epic Fury, the
- 19:15underground halls at Natan's, the heavy water plant at Iraq,
- 19:18the enrichment sites whose names have been spoken in Security
- 19:21Council chambers and intelligence briefings and
- 19:23diplomatic cables for more than two decades were not abstract
- 19:27targets. They were the physical
- 19:28embodiment of seven decades of ambition, fear, defiance and
- 19:33strategic calculation. The places where all of that
- 19:36history have been made concrete and steel and uranium and
- 19:39spinning centrifuges. Whether destroying them resolves
- 19:43the crisis or delays it or transforms it into something
- 19:46different and potentially worse, is a question that military
- 19:50power alone cannot answer. The knowledge does not disappear
- 19:54when the buildings fall. The motivations that drove the
- 19:57program do not vanish under bombardment.
- 20:00The strategic calculations that sustained it through sanctions
- 20:03and sabotage and international isolation are not erased by air
- 20:06strikes. The history of Iran's nuclear
- 20:09program is, at its core, the history of a problem that
- 20:12resisted every solution attempted against it.
- 20:15Diplomacy constrained it temporarily.
- 20:18Pressure hardened it. Force may set it back.
- 20:22But the program began because Iran decided, in the Crucible of
- 20:25war and isolation and perceived vulnerability, that it needed a
- 20:29capability. The world was determined to deny
- 20:31it. The people who built it did not
- 20:34act out of recklessness. They acted because they had
- 20:37concluded from their own history that the alternative was worse.
- 20:41That does not make the program less dangerous.
- 20:44It is not make the deception that built it more acceptable.
- 20:48It does not make the threat it poses to regional and global
- 20:51security less real. But it means that understanding
- 20:54what comes next, whatever form that takes, requires
- 20:57understanding what came before. And what came before is long and
- 21:01complicated and human in every sense of that word.
- 21:05This is epic fury. the US Iran War Podcast, the three-part
- 21:10history of Iran's nuclear program is now complete.
- 21:13The atoms that were offered in peace are now at the center of a
- 21:16war. Long after the last bomb falls,
- 21:19the question of what to do about them will still be waiting for
- 21:22an answer.