Latest / The Fourcast / Will Israel Iran crisis escalate out of control? - experts explain

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Will Israel Iran crisis escalate out of control? - experts explain · The Fourcast

• 0:00
  It's a moment of opportunity for the Israelis, and they've got
• 0:02
  the president they want in the White House in their corner, so
• 0:06
  they're gonna do as much damage as they can, I think, for as
• 0:09
  long as they can. Iran and Israel are motivated by
• 0:13
  this existential threat that they perceive.
• 0:16
  And so that's what's dangerous. And that there could be a a
• 0:19
  misstep, A miscalculation, and then we're climbing the
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  escalation ladder even faster and furiously in a way that we
• 0:25
  can't now predict. How close do the international
• 0:28
  agencies say Iran had got to being able to deliver a nuclear
• 0:34
  weapon? Worryingly close.
• 0:39
  Hello and welcome to the forecast as simmering tensions
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  between Israel and Iran explode in a barrage of missiles and
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  drones that have killed a number of Iranian nuclear scientists
• 0:49
  and military leaders, including the head of the country's
• 0:52
  powerful Revolutionary Guard. Nuclear enrichment facilities
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  were also targeted. Despite ongoing talks between
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  Iran and the US over its nuclear programme, President Trump said
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  he gave Tehran chance after chance and urged Iran to make a
• 1:07
  deal. Iran retaliated with 100 drones
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  fired into Israel with more promise.
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  But so far, all of them seem to have been shot down.
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  So what is Israel's next move with Prime Minister Netanyahu
• 1:18
  saying strikes could continue for as many days as it takes?
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  To discuss this, I'm joined by our very own Jonathan Rugman and
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  from the defense think tank RUSI, its senior research fellow
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  in Middle East security, Burju Oschelik.
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  Jonathan, first of all, what have they done?
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  How much damage did we think they have done to Iran's
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  infrastructure? Well, Prime Minister Netanyahu
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  of Israel is saying that this operation will take as long as
• 1:43
  it takes. So it's still open-ended, which
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  means that the Israelis themselves have not assessed how
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  much damage has been done. As we speak, more targets are
• 1:53
  being attacked. And I think the Prime Minister
• 1:56
  of Israel views this almost as a once in a lifetime opportunity.
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  He's been talking about doing this for about 15 years.
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  And I remember during the 2012 Olympics in in in the UK,
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  British intelligence officials saying their biggest
• 2:10
  geopolitical warriors far back as then was Israel attacking
• 2:14
  Iran. So now it's happened.
• 2:16
  It's a moment of opportunity for the Israelis because they've had
• 2:19
  this critical report from the nuclear energy watchdog in in
• 2:24
  Vienna and they've got the president they want in the White
• 2:27
  House in their corner. So they're going to do as much
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  damage as they can, I think, for as long as they can.
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  And perhaps the only break on this won't be how Iran responds
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  militarily against Israel because it seems to have been
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  pretty ineffective so far. But the thing might be to watch
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  would be the oil price and what happens in the Gulf and whether
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  this becomes more of a global energy security issue.
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  But you while we wait to see the bomb damage assessment and work
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  out what they've hit and what they haven't hit yet, what what
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  we know they've done is they have taken out some very, very
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  senior figures in the Iranian military, in the Revolutionary
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  Guard. And these are big totemic
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  people. I mean, what's the impact of
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  that? I think the impact is
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  significant and the concern is that there could be more
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  targeted assassinations planned in the coming days or weeks.
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  My sense is that they're they're the planning, the coordination,
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  the intelligence gathering behind this operation has been
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  ongoing for quite some time. And this is not sort of a knee
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  jerk reaction by any means. There's been years in the making
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  and we've already seen in the scale and the geographic reach
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  of the, the targeted operation that began last night, a high
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  level of intelligence penetration, I think in country.
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  So the Iranians will have to get a sense of how this happened
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  from the from the inside. It is humiliating and the, and
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  Tehran will be under immense pressure domestically to to
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  retaliate, to respond effectively.
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  But again, there's very delicate balance there because if they
• 3:58
  push too hard, if they go too far, how much more can Iran
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  take? How much more of an attack can
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  it absorb from from Israel I mean.
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  These are big, significant totemic people for for much of
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  the population in Iran. I mean, you know, when Soleimani
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  was killed, you know, huge outpouring.
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  You go there, there's a big statue and they've done it
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  several times over this time. So so I mean, there's the
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  political impact, but what is the sort of the military impact?
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  I mean, how important are they, those figures, head of the army,
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  the head of a Revolutionary Guard, to actually deciding what
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  Iran does? Well, it limits the strategic
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  decision making capability and the quick turn around that would
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  be required to act decisively in a moment like this.
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  There is the the, the, the prestige, the status, the
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  reputational issue, of course of losing key figures in the IRGC,
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  the military commander and deputies.
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  And we don't know how far Israel will continue to push, whether
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  there it could involve other political leaders.
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  And these are recognizable names on on the streets in Iran.
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  So this fact of the embarrassment, I think will not
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  be lost upon the people. Iranian public opinion is, as we
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  know, very divided. So we have the hardliners to use
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  that expression who will want a strong and decisive response and
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  others who are critical of the regime and may see this as an
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  opportunity, a window perhaps to push for political change
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  domestically. But we're not there yet in my
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  view. I mean, it's tempting to say,
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  OK, so Iran and Israel are at war, but that they're not really
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  at war, are they? Because what Iran has done so
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  far is very limited. Yes, and we found out last year
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  when Israel attacked Iran much less decisively and Iran
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  responded and did very little damage.
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  The drones achieved almost nothing inside and the missiles
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  inside Israel itself. And so the question we have to
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  ask ourselves is, is Iran now a paper tiger?
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  Is it now so weak that it can't really respond militarily in any
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  conventional sense? So what does it do?
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  It might think about asymmetric warfare.
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  It might have sleeper cells in Europe that it could activate,
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  attack Jewish civilian targets or embassies.
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  We just don't know. But the biggest card it has to
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  play is, I think, the energy card.
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  And it, and it, it, if it puts a chokehold on the Gulf, makes the
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  flow of energy to the world's major markets that much more
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  difficult, then we all start to feel it, you know, prices,
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  energy prices go up, inflation goes up.
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  Now, I'm not suggesting they're going to do that.
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  I don't know what they're going to do.
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  And they, they must be thinking about that right now.
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  But, but we don't yet, know, do we, whether Iran is incapable of
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  hitting back with ballistic missiles the way it did before
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  because Israel has taken them out effectively, or whether it
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  just has chosen not to because there's a, there's a calculation
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  here, isn't there? In that Iran, Israel has done
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  this by itself. It hasn't done this with
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  American military power joining in yet, but it obviously wants
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  the Americans to join in and for that to happen, I guess they are
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  hoping that there will be a bigger Iranian military
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  response. Well, that's assuming that
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  Israel is actually in the business of regime change and
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  and it really wants to go all the way.
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  I mean, my suspicion is that, you know, Israeli security
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  officials call this mowing the grass.
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  That's the phrase they use. So they're mowing the grass in
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  Iran. They are making this once in a
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  lifetime opportunity to do as much damage as possible over the
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  next few days, possibly into next week, and we don't know.
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  I don't think that necessarily means that the Israelis want the
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  ayatollahs to fall. And I don't think the Americans
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  want that. I don't think Donald Trump wants
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  that. He wants he wants a deal.
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  But Israeli weapons can't reach all of the Iranian nuclear
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  facilities at the moment, can they?
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  We don't know precisely what they can reach.
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  I mean, the, the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon last year
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  suggested that they now have the kind of military technology that
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  they didn't have a decade ago, which could penetrate, you know,
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  bunker busting bombs, get deep underground in the way that they
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  assassinated Sheikh Nasrallah, the, the, the leader of
• 8:08
  Hezbollah. Now, the, the, the, the, the
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  danger for Israel, I suppose, is that this mowing the grass
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  operation doesn't achieve very much.
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  And I think that's why they will make it as prolonged as they can
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  to achieve as many targets as they can until President Trump
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  says enough is enough. So how, how close do the
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  international agency say Iran had got to being able to deliver
• 8:36
  a nuclear weapon? Worryingly close.
• 8:39
  I think the statement earlier this week was the, was the
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  harshest condemnation of of Iran in in in 20 years and.
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  We should have known this was coming because Israel was sort
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  of tweeting away those those reports furiously very much.
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  So As for. What they?
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  Were gonna do it, wasn't it? Wasn't a surprise, I think for
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  close watchers, I think the timing of the attacks raise some
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  questions because the the nuclear talks between the US and
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  Iran of selected by Oman, of course, have been ongoing.
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  The next round was due to take place this this weekend.
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  So the timing is perhaps surprising.
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  But again, we've been hearing for months now, if not years
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  that from the from Israel that this is a strategic window of
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  opportunity. It's an unmissable historic
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  moment. And I think President Trump
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  resisted the temptation to go along with this.
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  There is a sense at the moment that he could still be hoping
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  that this creates A leverage to bring Iran back to the table.
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  And they're really leaning it hard into this hard power
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  basically to to decimate Iranian the the military commands
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  potentially into humiliate the regime in front of the public.
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  When you say very close, I mean what do you mean?
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  I mean, you mean weeks? It's been hotly debated, hasn't
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  it? It's, it's weeks, months up to a
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  year, but it's close. And Prime Minister Netanyahu's
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  statements even as as recent as last night said that Iran could
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  be a year away from from from building the bomb.
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  I think from the Iranian perspective, being seen as a
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  nuclear threshold state, it's a it's a source of deterrence and
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  they wanted desperately to be able to hold on to that.
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  But how close they actually got we, we don't know.
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  We don't have enough visibility on it.
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  But the concern now is that with Iran potentially walking away
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  from the the non proliferation treaty, the NPT, there will be
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  less access by the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor,
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  to verify what Iran is doing, particularly the threat of
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  undisclosed sites, hidden sites across Iran, uranium enrichment
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  sites. We will have less insights now
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  potentially into what Iran is actually up to.
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  And this creates this lack of visibility, creates a new layer
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  of complexity going going forward.
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  So it very much is, I think, an issue of mowing the lawn.
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  And we have said that if Israel attacks Iranian nuclear
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  facilities, it will likely be unable to take dismantle the
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  program out completely, that this will require ongoing
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  persistent strikes over time. And what is the level of
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  commitment that the US is willing to to provide to that?
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  That is a big question now. And.
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  And, and the gamble that you have with the, you know, with
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  the, with hitting them every couple of years is that you, you
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  don't, as you say, really know how far along they are.
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  You don't know what their new sites deep underground are
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  achieving. And they could be a lot closer
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  to it than anybody thinks. And that's, that's the fear.
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  That's a great fear. So will this now this
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  embarrassment, this, this the attack on their reputation
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  regionally as well, will this now spur Iran on to accelerate
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  its program for a bomb? That's that's the question.
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  But at the same time, from the Israeli security perspective,
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  the point of view is we're not only trying to dismantle their
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  ability to become a nuclear state, but we're also taking out
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  their ability to retaliate, to hit us back hard.
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  Even this morning there were news stories about attacks on
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  Iranian air bases, ballistic missile sites, for example.
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  So it's not only the nuclear facilities that have been
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  targeted, but it's a political military leadership and also the
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  ballistic missile program. It's the ability of Iran to hit
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  back hard that that Israel is now targeting as well.
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  I. Mean they they may also have
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  targeted the them effectively politically because if the
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  Iranian leadership has been humiliated, key leaders have
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  been taken out, how close are they to igniting a home grown
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  rebellion and defiance of the regime?
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  And how? How feasible is that?
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  Well, Benjamin Netanyahu in his speech this morning sort of said
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  my war is not with the Iranian people.
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  And, and, you know, hopefully, I mean, he, he'd be more or less
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  said, you know, one day we hope that you, you overthrow your
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  leaders. I mean, he came pretty close to
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  saying that. I think it's, well, we've just
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  found out in Syria, haven't we, We, how unpredictable these
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  things are, how movements can spring up within a matter of
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  days. I think it's too early to say
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  how close that moment is. I mean, the revolution is long
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  in the tooth. It's been there since 1979, the
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  Islamic Revolution. And it's there's an enormous
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  amount of economic hardship in Iran.
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  And still a huge amount of suppression.
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  And. Of of all dissent.
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  And a huge amount of suppression.
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  So, but you know, what's the other way of looking at it is,
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  you know, what is going to unite Iranians might be actually what
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  Israel does in a way that internal dissent, you know, is a
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  is a different kettle of fish, if you see what I mean.
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  So I think, I think we just don't know.
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  How, how does Iran position itself in terms of why it wants
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  a nuclear weapon? I mean, Israel has always been
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  very, very clear that they view it as an existential threat
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  because they firmly believe Iran wants to wipe Israel off the
• 14:00
  map. Now you go to Iran and they say,
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  well, no, we don't, we don't, you know, quite the opposite.
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  We don't want to destroy Iran. We Israel.
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  We want Israel to be a genuine democracy and to represent all
• 14:10
  the people of the of of of the. Place well, it's a risk of a big
• 14:14
  over generalisation. I think there is something quite
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  similar between the Israeli and Iranian psyches and that they
• 14:19
  both have a a sense of great fear of being being annihilated.
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  I mean, it's it, it and both of them think that.
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  So I, I don't think it's. And I think therefore the
• 14:32
  Iranian nuclear program springs from something that is as much
• 14:36
  Iranian as anything else to do with with Israel.
• 14:40
  It's been interesting to see the Saudis condemning these Israeli
• 14:44
  attacks because there's no love lost between the Saudis and the
• 14:48
  Iranians. But nevertheless, I mean, the
• 14:50
  Saudis are quite capable of speaking out of both sides of
• 14:52
  the mouth. They'll be, they'll be pleased
• 14:53
  that the Iranian nuclear program has been set back as a potential
• 14:56
  threat to Saudi Arabia. But at the same time, it's an
• 14:59
  enormous, the front to, you know, peace and stability in the
• 15:02
  region. I mean, just on that, what?
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  Because, I mean, you're a big Saudi watcher.
• 15:05
  I mean, Saudi's been very, very close to the United States.
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  But it seems, as you say, to have improved its relationship
• 15:11
  with Iran recently to the point to which it is a, you know, it
• 15:15
  is condemning these Israeli strikes despite Saudi Arabia and
• 15:20
  Israel having quite a long history in recent years of
• 15:23
  trying to improve their relationship.
• 15:25
  What's going on? I mean this is 3 dimensional
• 15:26
  chairs. Yeah, I think, I think the war
• 15:28
  in Gaza has has completely scuppered any attempt at
• 15:31
  reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and and and Iran, Saudi
• 15:35
  Arabia, Israel, Saudi Arabia still doesn't recognize Israel.
• 15:37
  Normalization with Israel is still a very long way off.
• 15:41
  And actually what's happened with Iran may even make that an
• 15:45
  even longer process. And so in terms of Trump looking
• 15:49
  around the globe and thinking about the deals that he can
• 15:52
  strike, you know, Ukraine not going well, Gaza not going well
• 15:57
  now, you know, a, a, a nuclear disarmament deal with Iran
• 16:02
  arguably not going well either. I mean, the big question is
• 16:04
  will, will the Iranians do what Trump wants and fall into line
• 16:08
  and, and actually say we are, you know, effectively say we are
• 16:12
  now such a paper tiger. We, we are now so powerless that
• 16:15
  we will do what you want just to stop a, a, a much wider
• 16:19
  conflict. But there's an enormous pressure
• 16:21
  from inside the country to do the opposite and to strike back.
• 16:24
  What do you make of that? Well, just on the point about
• 16:27
  Saudi Iran normalization, which has been underway for for some
• 16:30
  time, this matters a great deal. And it's also a natural barrier
• 16:35
  or serves as a restraint on Iranian retaliation that would
• 16:39
  involve Gulf energy installations or the OR the
• 16:42
  Strait of Hormuz, for example. Saudi and other Gulf countries
• 16:46
  are firmly opposed to being dragged into this direct
• 16:49
  military confrontation between Iran and Israel.
• 16:52
  So this matters a great deal. If Iran were to go there, I
• 16:56
  think it would be a matter of last resort that they are so
• 16:59
  cornered that there are no alternatives because to blow up
• 17:02
  the energy infrastructure in the Gulf would be to destroy the
• 17:05
  relationship with Saudi Arabia. At a time when Israel is viewed
• 17:09
  to be extremely diplomatically isolated in the region and is
• 17:13
  acting on its own, it's been described by by many in the
• 17:16
  region as as now a rogue state. What's really fascinating is
• 17:19
  that both Iran and Israel are motivated by this existential
• 17:23
  threat that they perceive. And so that's what's dangerous
• 17:27
  and that there could be a misstep, A miscalculation, and
• 17:31
  and then we're climbing the escalation ladder even even
• 17:34
  faster and furiously in a way that we can't now predict.
• 17:38
  But in terms of Iran Gulf normalization, this means that
• 17:43
  Iran's options are limited, are more limited than they would
• 17:46
  have been a few years ago because there will be backlash
• 17:49
  against the Iranian regime if they were to attack, if they
• 17:53
  were to damage energy, energy infrastructure and and the price
• 17:58
  of oil would would escalate. It hasn't yet.
• 18:00
  Thus far, energy prices have not spiked.
• 18:04
  They did, but then they then they retreated.
• 18:06
  So I think this is the initial reaction.
• 18:07
  Now markets are waiting to see what will happen over the next
• 18:10
  few days and just how bad the scenario can can can develop.
• 18:15
  Now, as Jonathan says, I mean, Netanyahu has been wanting to do
• 18:18
  this for years and years and years, and other Israeli leaders
• 18:21
  have as well. But there are lots of domestic
• 18:24
  political reasons and actually diplomatic reasons why Netanyahu
• 18:29
  would want to do this right now, aren't there?
• 18:31
  Yes, certainly. What's interesting is that both
• 18:35
  Israel and Iran face stiff domestic resistance and and
• 18:39
  opposition. From Netanyahu's point of view,
• 18:41
  this is a long standing almost, I won't say fixation, but it's
• 18:46
  certainly seen as an issue of national interest that is deeply
• 18:50
  connected to Netanyahu's own political ambitions, but also
• 18:53
  exceeds them in a way as well. Taking out nuclear, Iran's
• 18:57
  nuclear ambitions is a long standing Israeli desire, the way
• 19:01
  that they define their national interests.
• 19:04
  In terms of timing, of course there's the the 60 day deadline
• 19:08
  that Trump had set that passed this week.
• 19:12
  And I think from the Israeli perspective, they are now
• 19:14
  defending that timeline and it has passed.
• 19:16
  And so this is now a call to action that is seen as as being
• 19:20
  justifiable. But it's very unclear as to
• 19:23
  whether this will push the Iranians back to the negotiating
• 19:26
  table. But, but I mean, Netanyahu knows
• 19:28
  that both his internal critics and his external critics will
• 19:31
  tend to see the Iran issue and the Gaza issue, around which
• 19:36
  he's drawing huge amounts of criticism, is very, very
• 19:39
  different. And and while he's he's under
• 19:42
  fire from former prime ministers, political opposition,
• 19:45
  his his own population who wanted to settle that war
• 19:48
  quickly, and he's under pressure from Britain and France and
• 19:51
  Canada over Gaza. This is an issue around which
• 19:57
  all of those critics suddenly go, oh, OK, fine.
• 19:59
  You gotta well. Up to a point, Chris, I mean,
• 20:01
  it's interesting that Benny Gantz, 1 of Netanyahu main
• 20:04
  rivals has come out with full support for Netanyahu.
• 20:07
  So you're right. There's, you know, this, this is
• 20:09
  a, if it's an existential threat that we're talking about.
• 20:12
  Existential threats tend to bring people together, don't
• 20:15
  they? But on the international front,
• 20:17
  it's an interesting one for the UK because last year British
• 20:22
  jets were involved in protecting Israel from Iranian attacks.
• 20:26
  Are they going to get involved this time?
• 20:28
  Well, they've said no. They've they've, they've
• 20:30
  explicitly said that they weren't involved in defending
• 20:32
  Israel. Haven't they?
• 20:33
  Not so far. But, you know, we don't know
• 20:35
  whether there's going to be an intensification of, of the
• 20:37
  attacks that perhaps the Iranians didn't launch last last
• 20:40
  year or in fact, whether the Iranians have shown that they
• 20:42
  don't have very much the damage that they can do.
• 20:45
  And I think it will be quite possible for the for the Brits
• 20:48
  to sit this one out in the sense that I mean, these the Israelis
• 20:50
  have already proved what, what they can do ostensibly on their
• 20:55
  own. No doubt there was some U.S.
• 20:56
  intelligence involved, certainly US more than US awareness,
• 21:01
  because every time Israel does anything in the Middle East, the
• 21:03
  Americans have to be informed for the safety of U.S. troops,
• 21:07
  US aircraft carriers and so on. So arguably this the point of
• 21:15
  sort of maximum pressure from the Brits over the Gaza issue.
• 21:18
  Yes, it's possible the Brits get sucked into defending Israel
• 21:22
  from Iran. Well, we've already seen Macron
• 21:24
  sort of flipping the script. You know, he's been hugely
• 21:26
  critical of Israel over Gaza, but he comes around on side when
• 21:31
  it comes to Iran. Yes, and, and, and, you know,
• 21:34
  Netanyahu is often several steps ahead of everybody else in in, I
• 21:38
  think thinking through how these things are going to play out.
• 21:40
  What, what does this tell us about the relationship with
• 21:41
  America as well? I mean, what, what we've seen in
• 21:44
  reality is American president after American president unable
• 21:47
  to really tell Netanyahu what to do.
• 21:51
  Is that what's happened here again?
• 21:53
  Well, the issue is that, you know, over the past few weeks,
• 21:56
  we've been hearing a lot about there being this divide between
• 21:58
  Netanyahu and Trump, that they had fallen out, that Trump
• 22:01
  wasn't pleased with the way in which Netanyahu was handling
• 22:03
  Gaza, that there was a lack of a ceasefire on the ground, that
• 22:07
  the situation was deteriorating rapidly and, and, and, and Trump
• 22:10
  wanted to end it because, I mean.
• 22:12
  Trump said openly this week he didn't want Israel to hit Iran.
• 22:15
  That's right. But at the same time, Trump is
• 22:19
  is also restrained in that he has his own base is divided into
• 22:24
  the MAGA camp, right. And in terms of the
• 22:27
  isolationists and those who are more hawkish with respect to
• 22:31
  Iran policy. And so there will be those who
• 22:34
  not publicly but discreetly are in favour of humiliating Iran in
• 22:39
  this way of dismantling or at least eroding its nuclear
• 22:42
  program significantly and buying time.
• 22:45
  A weaker Iran is dangerous because it's it's more
• 22:49
  unpredictable. But also could it open the door
• 22:53
  for negotiations? I think it's too soon to tell.
• 22:56
  We don't have any idea of what an off ramp would look like for
• 23:01
  any type of face saving measure for Iran to walk back from this.
• 23:06
  The argument could be made that the regime is is doing it in
• 23:09
  favor in for the sake of avoiding all out regional
• 23:12
  escalation. But at the same time the
• 23:14
  pressure to act domestically. On the US side though, I think
• 23:18
  again very divided, much like the domestic, the constituencies
• 23:22
  in in Israel and Iran, the US base is also divided as to where
• 23:26
  they stand on, on Israel and Iran.
• 23:31
  Yeah. I mean, I think the Iranians are
• 23:35
  really in a corner now because they've got to be seen to be
• 23:38
  doing something. But what?
• 23:41
  And do they really want to escalate the situation into an
• 23:45
  attack on Israel, which is so successful?
• 23:48
  If it is successful, that brings America in to a wider conflict.
• 23:52
  And so we're still in the situation we've been in for
• 23:54
  really quite a long time, I think, which is that nobody
• 23:56
  really wants a wider war. Israel wants to reduce Iran's
• 24:03
  nuclear capability to a point where it will take years and
• 24:06
  years and years for it to be restored.
• 24:08
  And it seems to be saying go hang to diplomacy, go hang to
• 24:11
  monitoring facilities, which has been going on for years.
• 24:14
  And and you know, we're going to do this militarily.
• 24:17
  And the risk for in all of this is is a miscalculation that that
• 24:22
  we know we have AUS president who says he doesn't want wars.
• 24:25
  He's there to stop wars, but nevertheless, he acts in such an
• 24:29
  unpredictable way. And so suddenly he flips and he
• 24:32
  said one minute and he says, you know, he doesn't want war with,
• 24:34
  with Iran. And the next minute he says,
• 24:36
  well, kind of the Iranians had this coming.
• 24:38
  We tried to negotiate and be prepared for even tougher
• 24:42
  attacks to come in the in the days ahead.
• 24:44
  So in the same way that on tariffs, he changed his mind,
• 24:48
  he, he prevaricated, he, he tried to negotiate.
• 24:52
  He could switch again within a matter of days.
• 24:55
  He could say, you know, say to the Israelis, it really is time
• 24:59
  for this to stop. And I think, however bad the
• 25:01
  relationship between Netanyahu and Trump is, I think Netanyahu
• 25:05
  really believes that Trump is the best American president
• 25:08
  Israel has ever had and would probably do what he was told in
• 25:12
  the final analysis. In in the build up to military
• 25:14
  action last year, it was all about how Iran had become the
• 25:17
  regional power and was able to cause trouble on multiple
• 25:21
  fronts, whether it was Yemen, Syria, Gaza, what, what's the
• 25:27
  reality of the power of, of Iran now?
• 25:30
  I mean, has it been massively degraded in terms of what it can
• 25:32
  achieve? You know, there are still
• 25:34
  missiles being fired by the Houthis regularly as Israel, and
• 25:38
  they get shot down after the sky.
• 25:39
  So can they actually do any damage?
• 25:42
  Well, it's the paper tiger argument, but the question is,
• 25:45
  have we overestimated Iran's military capabilities over time,
• 25:49
  or has the Israeli assault been so effective that they have been
• 25:53
  downgraded significantly? I think what Iran has done quite
• 25:55
  problematically is use the the territory of neighboring Arab
• 25:59
  states as launching pads of attacks against against Israel
• 26:02
  in those countries, those domestic populations that have
• 26:05
  suffered as a result because of Iran's use of its forward
• 26:09
  deterrence policy. And it's leaning into these
• 26:12
  armed non state actors that has significantly been eroded over
• 26:16
  the course of the war, since the start of the war in Gaza.
• 26:18
  And without that, in the absence of it, where does that leave
• 26:22
  Iranian capabilities is, is the question.
• 26:25
  And that we will I think have an answer to in the coming hours,
• 26:28
  in the coming days, contingent on how Iran responds.
• 26:32
  We've, we've heard a lot about tracking Iran's ballistic
• 26:36
  missile program, its armed drone program, but will it be able to
• 26:40
  use these to high effect? Or is the ongoing assault that
• 26:44
  the Israelis are now conducting to limit the retaliatory strike
• 26:48
  capability? Will that mean that Iran is is
• 26:51
  now cornered? There's already talk in regional
• 26:54
  media in Turkey and in many Arab countries, you know, questioning
• 26:58
  how it was that Iran wasn't able to respond last night to deter
• 27:02
  these attacks. Where is the intelligence
• 27:04
  failure coming from? So there's some serious internal
• 27:07
  questioning going on as well. Or we can expect to see that
• 27:10
  and. What an amazing night for
• 27:12
  Mossad. I mean, I mean, we've had years
• 27:14
  of assassination attempts on and successful attempts on
• 27:18
  Revolutionary Guard commanders, nuclear scientists.
• 27:21
  But this, this, I mean, this the last 24 hours.
• 27:24
  And, you know, we thought the walkie-talkie attack on, on
• 27:26
  Hezbollah members in Lebanon was, was of a different league.
• 27:29
  But to take out, to use a crude phrase, at least six nuclear
• 27:35
  scientists, the head of the army, the head of the
• 27:38
  Revolutionary Guard, I mean, every man who takes on that job
• 27:41
  is, is a dead man walking. I mean, because, you know, the
• 27:44
  Iranians have, the Israelis have shown that they are so capable
• 27:47
  now of penetrating, you know, the, the upper echelons of the
• 27:51
  Iranian elite. Yes, I mean it's a striking
• 27:53
  contrast with the massive failure incompetence around Gaza
• 27:59
  on October the 7th and the threat right on their doorstep
• 28:02
  by comparison to the one in in Tehran.
• 28:05
  Just finally, I mean, because the other thing I think, you
• 28:07
  know, people will be worried about watching this is if you're
• 28:12
  right and Iran's military capability is significantly
• 28:15
  degraded, it may well turn to asymmetric warfare supporting
• 28:21
  terrorism. What do we know about their sort
• 28:25
  of ongoing ability to do that? Well, obviously there have been
• 28:30
  various cases in the UK of Iranian journalists targeted,
• 28:34
  followed, threatened. I think the Iranians have had
• 28:39
  sleeper cells in Europe for a long time.
• 28:42
  They've in the past shown the ability to attack museums or
• 28:46
  attack Jewish tourists. But I think the risk for them is
• 28:51
  that asymmetric warfare, if it's waged by Iran, will reap more
• 28:58
  symmetric warfare from the Americans themselves.
• 29:00
  I think that's that's the risk for them.
• 29:02
  My guess is they don't want to go there.
• 29:05
  You know, there there are various soft targets, museums
• 29:08
  across Europe, embassies perhaps What?
• 29:13
  We just have to hope that doesn't happen.
• 29:15
  I would add to that the possibility of an Iranian LED
• 29:19
  cyberattack on critical national infrastructure in Europe, in the
• 29:22
  United States, depending on Tehran's strategic calculus as
• 29:26
  to whether to target West, the West or to keep it more limited
• 29:30
  to Israel. So cyberattacks, potential
• 29:32
  states supported terrorism. And also I think we need to keep
• 29:36
  in mind that the the Houthi threats in in Yemen and the Red
• 29:39
  Sea in terms of maritime security is, is very much live.
• 29:43
  And could that then draw in the US and the UK and allies and
• 29:48
  defending the Red Sea and that strategic checkpoints there?
• 29:52
  I think that is something to watch as well.
• 29:55
  Thank you both very much indeed. That's it for this episode of
• 29:57
  The Forecast. Until next time, bye bye.