Latest / Beyond The Horizon / The DOJ And Their Motion To Dismiss The Epstein Survivors 4th Amended Complaint (Part 4) (11/9/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome to another episode of the
- 0:03Speaker 1: Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're picking back up where
- 0:06Speaker 1: we left off with the DOJ and their motion to
- 0:11Speaker 1: dismiss the lawsuit filed against them by the survivors. I.
- 0:16Speaker 1: There are no mandatory statutes, regulations, or directives that constrain
- 0:21Speaker 1: the FBI's discretion in the conduct at issue. The first
- 0:24Speaker 1: part of Gobert Test here is Satisfied. as plaintiffs do
- 0:28Speaker 1: not identify any specific mandatory statutes, regulations, or directives or
- 0:33Speaker 1: policies that constrain the FBI's discretion on how or whether
- 0:37Speaker 1: it conducted a criminal investigation into Epstein. See FAC 5-9-163-257,
- 0:46Speaker 1: Allegations of the Non-Discretionary Obligations and Duties Related to FBI
- 0:50Speaker 1: Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines, and the 1995 Innocent
- 0:55Speaker 1: Images national initiative. Notably, plaintiffs do not indicate any language
- 1:01Speaker 1: from the IINI that mandates the FBI to act. Similarly,
- 1:06Speaker 1: plaintiffs cite two different MIOGs, but fail to recognize that
- 1:10Speaker 1: such MIOGs are couched in permissive language, and therefore cannot
- 1:14Speaker 1: overcome the DFE. C. Joyner, 1st United States, 5th Circuit, 2020.
- 1:22Speaker 1: Finding that plaintiff failed the first step of Goldberg test,
- 1:25Speaker 1: by failing to identify a non-discretionary duty violated by FBI,
- 1:29Speaker 1: despite referencing Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, Undercover
- 1:36Speaker 1: and Sensitive Operations Unit, Attorney General Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, VI.A.2-1992,
- 1:42Speaker 1: and FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, Barbarary v. United States, Pennsylvania, 2017.
- 1:54Speaker 1: Barbereri also contends that the FBI guidelines prescribe a course
- 1:57Speaker 1: of conduct that FBI agents must follow. Those guidelines, however,
- 2:02Speaker 1: are not mandatory regarding the course of action an agent
- 2:05Speaker 1: must follow in interviewing a witness or building cases. The
- 2:14Speaker 1: relevant FBI Manual of Internal Operating Guidelines states, Handbook and
- 2:17Speaker 1: manual were not mandatory and therefore the FBI agents were
- 2:21Speaker 1: granted discretionary in planning and carrying out the operation that
- 2:24Speaker 1: led to the decedent's demise. Plaintiffs do not identify any
- 2:28Speaker 1: mandatory policy because they cannot. Absent such a mandatory directive,
- 2:33Speaker 1: the FBI maintains full discretion in how to conduct its investigations.
- 2:38Speaker 1: This extends from the inception of an investigation, i.e. whether
- 2:41Speaker 1: a follow-up on a tip from the public, through its middle, i.e.
- 2:45Speaker 1: determining which leads to pursue, and devote investigatory resources all
- 2:49Speaker 1: the way to its conclusion, i.e. arresting a suspect. Further
- 2:54Speaker 1: plaintiff's assertion that discovery is required to determine whether the
- 2:57Speaker 1: FBI violated any other relevant policy or procedure runs contrary
- 3:02Speaker 1: to Rule 8. It's the plaintiff's burden to plead an
- 3:05Speaker 1: exception to the DFE. Cease Alvarez v. U.S., Florida, 2016.
- 3:12Speaker 1: Yet while the court will construe all factual inferences in
- 3:15Speaker 1: plaintiff's favor... In the face of a factual challenge to
- 3:18Speaker 1: subject matter jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to
- 3:21Speaker 1: prove that jurisdiction exists. Thus, plaintiffs must show that the
- 3:26Speaker 1: exception invoked by the government do not apply. CID explaining
- 3:31Speaker 1: that plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the discretionary
- 3:34Speaker 1: function exception did not apply. Stated otherwise, it's plaintiff's burden
- 3:39Speaker 1: to allege facts falling outside the exceptions. courts uniformly agree
- 3:45Speaker 1: that law enforcement must be afforded broad discretion on whether
- 3:48Speaker 1: and how to investigate and follow up on information they
- 3:51Speaker 1: receive from the public. See Thacker v. U.S., Florida, 2006,
- 3:57Speaker 1: dismissing FTCA claim where a plaintiff failed to identify a
- 4:01Speaker 1: specific and binding directive that addresses the investigation of complaints
- 4:06Speaker 1: of perjury or the use of false information by local
- 4:09Speaker 1: law enforcement and prosecutors in state criminal prosecutions and requires
- 4:14Speaker 1: FBI or DOJ employees to investigate such complaints. See Manchatta v. Reardon,
- 4:22Speaker 1: February 1, 2024. Federal law enforcement agency decision to conduct
- 4:27Speaker 1: an investigation in response to reports of criminal activity is
- 4:30Speaker 1: a discretionary function that is not cognizable under the FTCA.
- 4:36Speaker 1: Any other result would seriously handicap the FBI and other
- 4:40Speaker 1: federal law enforcement agencies in carrying out the important duties
- 4:43Speaker 1: assigned to them by Congress. The FBI employees who received
- 4:47Speaker 1: tips from the public were not required to take mandatory
- 4:51Speaker 1: or specific steps in their assessment of those tips. FBI
- 4:56Speaker 1: personnel retained discretion to determine whether a tip indicates a
- 5:00Speaker 1: credible threat that's appropriate for FBI involvement. The decisions of
- 5:05Speaker 1: how to analyze and assess the information gathered and whether
- 5:08Speaker 1: to forward the tips to a field office with discretion,
- 5:13Speaker 1: without which the FBI could not perform its investigative and
- 5:17Speaker 1: law enforcement functions. Beyond the decision on how or whether
- 5:21Speaker 1: to follow up on tips are a myriad of subsequent
- 5:24Speaker 1: investigatory decisions that FBI agents in the relevant field offices
- 5:29Speaker 1: would have made, each of which also demand the exercise
- 5:32Speaker 1: of discretion throughout. FBI agents like detectives and police officers
- 5:37Speaker 1: must evaluate whether the information requires immediate action, deferred action,
- 5:42Speaker 1: or no action at all. The FBI field office would
- 5:45Speaker 1: have determined for itself whether any specific fact revealed a
- 5:49Speaker 1: credible threat that was appropriate for FBI involvement and whether
- 5:53Speaker 1: to take any action. If FBI agents had decided to act,
- 5:57Speaker 1: they would have the discretion to decide how to act,
- 6:02Speaker 1: including the ultimate law enforcement decision regarding what steps to
- 6:05Speaker 1: take to prevent potential criminal conduct. In exercising that discretion,
- 6:10Speaker 1: Considerations such as feasibility of interviewing the complainant or the
- 6:14Speaker 1: subject of the complaint, how to identify and locate the subject,
- 6:18Speaker 1: the use and availability of potential witnesses, the value of
- 6:23Speaker 1: any documentary evidence, whether the evidence was consistent or contradictory,
- 6:28Speaker 1: and whether to refer the matter for possible prosecution inevitably
- 6:32Speaker 1: comes into play. And even if the FBI had failed
- 6:35Speaker 1: to take some prelim action, such as ignoring a tip,
- 6:39Speaker 1: in 1996 or 2005, the FBI ultimately would have still
- 6:43Speaker 1: had discretion in all remaining steps of its investigatory decision
- 6:48Speaker 1: tree to federal law enforcement officers' decision on whether and
- 6:53Speaker 1: how to conduct criminal investigations or grounded in public policy.
- 6:57Speaker 1: If no mandatory directive controls the governmental conduct at issue,
- 7:01Speaker 1: the second part of the discretionary function analysis requires the
- 7:04Speaker 1: court to determine whether the discretion involved in the governmental
- 7:08Speaker 1: act is the kind that the discretionary function was designed
- 7:11Speaker 1: to shield. Gobert, 499. The FBI's discretionary decisions on how
- 7:17Speaker 1: to conduct a criminal investigation are grounded in public policy
- 7:21Speaker 1: and thus protected from hindsight review. See Kelly v. United States,
- 7:25Speaker 1: 1st Circuit, 91. Finding that the decision whether or not
- 7:28Speaker 1: to investigate was at the core of law enforcement activity
- 7:32Speaker 1: and involved the type of decision-making that Section 2680A was
- 7:35Speaker 1: designed to protect. holding that the decision to allocate limited
- 7:42Speaker 1: governmental resources to investigate a reported crime is a discretionary function,
- 7:46Speaker 1: and noting that the federal government's decision concerning enforcement of
- 7:50Speaker 1: its criminal statutes comprise a part of its pursuit of
- 7:54Speaker 1: national policy. When the FBI analyzes which matters to undertake,
- 7:58Speaker 1: it engages in a complex balancing act between the allocation
- 8:02Speaker 1: of limited investigatory resources, the gravity of the alleged offenses,
- 8:06Speaker 1: and the credibility of the allegations. among many other considerations. Indeed,
- 8:11Speaker 1: the FBI is not required to investigate every field complaint. Here,
- 8:16Speaker 1: how the FBI received information from the public, how it
- 8:19Speaker 1: evaluated the information received, and how it responded to the
- 8:22Speaker 1: information via allocating resources and personnel were grounded in public policy.
- 8:28Speaker 1: The second part of the Gobert test is also met
- 8:31Speaker 1: here because decisions of whether to investigate an individual are
- 8:35Speaker 1: at the core of law enforcement activity. that the discretionary
- 8:38Speaker 1: function exception was designed to safeguard. After all, the ability
- 8:43Speaker 1: of an investigator to choose the way in which an
- 8:46Speaker 1: investigation will proceed is undoubtedly grounded in consideration of public policy.
- 8:53Speaker 1: See Sabo v. U.S., 9th Circuit, 1996. Investigations clearly require
- 8:59Speaker 1: investigative officers to consider relevant political and social circumstances in
- 9:04Speaker 1: making decisions about the nature and scope of a criminal investigation. Moreover,
- 9:09Speaker 1: to the extent plaintiffs seek to predicate liability on the
- 9:12Speaker 1: assumption that had the FBI followed up on the tips,
- 9:16Speaker 1: then the FBI would have prevented Epstein from acting, such
- 9:19Speaker 1: a claim falls within the discretionary function exception because it
- 9:23Speaker 1: challenges policy-based decisions on whether and how to enforce statutes
- 9:27Speaker 1: authorizing the FBI to investigate potential crimes. In sum, the
- 9:34Speaker 1: second prong of Gobert applies. Because both prongs of the
- 9:37Speaker 1: discretionary function exception are met here, the United States has
- 9:41Speaker 1: not waived its sovereign immunity over plaintiff's negligence claim, warranting
- 9:45Speaker 1: its dismissal. C. Prosecutorial decisions are protected by discretionary function exception.
- 9:52Speaker 1: An additional flaw in the conclusory allegations of the FAC
- 9:56Speaker 1: is its premise that an FBI investigation would have taken
- 9:58Speaker 1: Epstein off the streets. and prevented further harm. In addition
- 10:02Speaker 1: to ignoring, an intensive FBI investigation did take place. The
- 10:06Speaker 1: causation premise overlooks that only a prosecutor's decision to file
- 10:11Speaker 1: charges can potentially get a criminal off the streets, a
- 10:14Speaker 1: decision which is inherently discretionary. An even more clearly established
- 10:20Speaker 1: discretionary function of the government is the decision whether or
- 10:24Speaker 1: not to prosecute. Broadly defined, the term prosecutorial discretion refers
- 10:28Speaker 1: to the soup-to-nuts entirety of a prosecutor's power to choose
- 10:32Speaker 1: from the options available in a criminal case, such as
- 10:36Speaker 1: filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea bargaining, and recommending a
- 10:41Speaker 1: sentence to the court. The 11th Circuit has already examined
- 10:45Speaker 1: the conduct of the Department of Justice related to the
- 10:48Speaker 1: 2007 non-prosecution agreement with Epstein relied upon by the FAC.
- 10:54Speaker 1: While the 11th Circuit was strongly critical of the actions
- 10:57Speaker 1: of the Department of Justice in its decision not to
- 10:59Speaker 1: prosecute Epstein, it found that judicial review of a prosecutor's
- 11:03Speaker 1: decision whether to prosecute is the very quintessence of an
- 11:08Speaker 1: impairment of prosecutorial discretion. The court decided that the conduct
- 11:13Speaker 1: of the government was within prosecutorial discretion and therefore the
- 11:16Speaker 1: case could not move forward. Plaintiff's premise of causation runs
- 11:21Speaker 1: directly into the constitutionality vested discretion within the U.S. Attorney's
- 11:25Speaker 1: Office whether to charge criminal conduct or not. 3. The
- 11:30Speaker 1: discretionary function exception is properly before the court at the
- 11:35Speaker 1: motion to dismiss stage. While the defendant recognizes that this
- 11:38Speaker 1: court previously held that the assertion of the DFE was premature,
- 11:43Speaker 1: the defendant requests court conduct further review based on the
- 11:46Speaker 1: specific facts alleged in the FAC under the scrutiny of
- 11:50Speaker 1: relevant case law. First, in their briefing defending the third
- 11:54Speaker 1: amended complaint, plaintiffs relied on Douglas v. U.S. for contention
- 11:59Speaker 1: that the DFE should not be applied at the motion
- 12:01Speaker 1: to dismiss stage. However, Douglas involved facts much different than
- 12:05Speaker 1: those in this case. For example, the government's DFE challenge
- 12:09Speaker 1: in Douglas was based on a factual question such as
- 12:13Speaker 1: whether plaintiff's pay grade was correct, who can set that grade,
- 12:17Speaker 1: and the court found the record showed the BOP regulation
- 12:19Speaker 1: related to plaintiff's pay allowed no discretion. The plaintiff in
- 12:23Speaker 1: Douglas at the MTD stage was able to point to
- 12:26Speaker 1: a specific non-discretionary regulation that defeated the discretionary function exception.
- 12:32Speaker 1: The plaintiffs here cannot do the same. Rather, they point
- 12:35Speaker 1: to MIOGs and DIOGs, which have been held to be
- 12:39Speaker 1: couched with permissive language and therefore discretionary. Further, the government
- 12:46Speaker 1: here is not making a DFE challenge based on factual contentions,
- 12:50Speaker 1: but one of law. The court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
- 12:53Speaker 1: claims because plaintiffs have pointed to no mandatory policy of
- 12:58Speaker 1: the government requiring the FBI to investigate or the DOJ
- 13:01Speaker 1: to prosecute. The court pointed to Judge... Demetriolis' decision in
- 13:06Speaker 1: Marjory Stoneman Douglas in finding that consideration of the DFE
- 13:10Speaker 1: at the MTD stage for the TAC was premature. However,
- 13:15Speaker 1: the government points out that the denial of the DFE
- 13:18Speaker 1: argument at the MTD stage in Marjory Stoneman Douglas was
- 13:22Speaker 1: a sanction on the government. Finally, to the extent the
- 13:26Speaker 1: court noted that all but one of the cases cited
- 13:29Speaker 1: by the government in its MTD, the TAC, were decided pre-Douglas.
- 13:34Speaker 1: The government provides further support for its contention that dismissal
- 13:38Speaker 1: based on DFE at the MTD stage is appropriate. 3.
- 13:42Speaker 1: Several plaintiffs failed to present a sum certain as required
- 13:45Speaker 1: by the FCTA. A claim shall be deemed to have
- 13:49Speaker 1: been presented when a federal agency receives from a claimant
- 13:52Speaker 1: an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of
- 13:57Speaker 1: an incident accompanied by a claim for money damages in
- 14:00Speaker 1: a sum certain. Where the sum certain is omitted, the
- 14:03Speaker 1: administrative claim fails to meet the statutory prerequisite to maintaining
- 14:07Speaker 1: a suit against the government and leaves the district court
- 14:10Speaker 1: without jurisdiction to hear the case. Here, three of the
- 14:13Speaker 1: Jane Doe plaintiffs, Jane Doe 13, 21, and 29, failed
- 14:17Speaker 1: to assert a sum certain on the administrative claim forms.
- 14:21Speaker 1: See Declaration of Deborah A. Edwards, attached as Exhibit 1.
- 14:27Speaker 1: Without a sum certain, these plaintiffs failed to present a
- 14:29Speaker 1: valid administrative claim. and they must be dismissed from the
- 14:33Speaker 1: action for failing to properly exhaust administrative remedies. Conclusion. The
- 14:38Speaker 1: defendant respectfully requests that the court dismiss this case in
- 14:41Speaker 1: its entirety without further leave to amend, as further amendment
- 14:45Speaker 1: would be futile. Plaintiffs have continuously failed to meet the
- 14:48Speaker 1: pleading requirements of Rule 8, failed to properly assert subject
- 14:52Speaker 1: matter jurisdiction, and failed to state a claim upon which
- 14:55Speaker 1: relief can be granted. As such, a dismissal is warranted.
- 14:59Speaker 1: Request for hearings. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1b, defendant respectfully
- 15:04Speaker 1: requests a hearing on its motion to dismiss. The defendant
- 15:09Speaker 1: believes the hearing would help clarify the issues and give
- 15:11Speaker 1: the court the opportunity to ask any questions necessary for
- 15:15Speaker 1: resolution of the defendant's motion. The defendant anticipates one hour
- 15:20Speaker 1: would be needed for such a hearing. This document was
- 15:24Speaker 1: signed by Kelsey Romero and it was dated June 4th, 2026.
- 15:31Speaker 1: All the information that goes with this episode can be
- 15:33Speaker 1: found in the description box.