Latest / The Epstein Chronicles / Mega Edition: Virginia Roberts Responds To Maxwell's Summary Judgement Request (Part 4-6) (6/7/26)

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Mega Edition: Virginia Roberts Responds To Maxwell's Summary Judgement Request (Part 4-6) (6/7/26) · The Epstein Chronicles

0:00
Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
0:04
In this episode, we're going to continue looking at Virginia
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Roberts response to Khlai Maxwell's motion for a summary Judgment
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number seven, The Black Book. Palm Beach police confiscated an
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extensive list of contacts with their phone numbers from defendant
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and Epstein's residents. Kallaie Maxwell maintained a contact list in
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an approximately one hundred page long hard copy which was
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openly available to other house employees. It consisted primarily of
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telephone numbers, addresses, or email addresses for various personal friends, associates, employees,
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or personal or business connections of Epstein or the defendant.
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Prior to being terminated by defendant, the Palm Beach House
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butler Alfredo Rodriguez printed a copy of this document and
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ultimately provided it to the FBI. This document reflects the
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new or as phone numbers of defendant Epstein, as well
1:03
as staff phone numbers. Additionally, and importantly, there are several
1:07
sections entitled massage alongside a geographical designation with names of
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females and corresponding telephone numbers. These numbers included those of
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underage females with no training in massage therapy including redacted,
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redacted and redacted identified during the criminal investigation of Epstein.
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This document is an authentic reflection of the people who
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are associated with Epstein, defendant and the management of their
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properties and the knowledge each had of the contents of
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the document. Number eight Sex Slave Amazon dot Com book
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receipt Detective Recarry authenticated an Amazon dot Com receipt that
1:48
the Palm Beach Police collected from Jeffrey Epstein's trash. The
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books he ordered are titled one SM one oh one
1:57
A Realistic introduction by Jay Wiseman, Number two slave Craft
2:02
road Maps for Erotic Servitude Principles, Skills and Tools by
2:07
Guy Baldwin. And three Training with Miss Abernathy, a workbook
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for Erotic Slaves and their Owners by Christian Abernathy. As
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shown below, this disturbing two thousand and five purchase corroborates
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Miss Roberts account of being sexually abused and exploited by
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defendant and Epstein, not to mention the dozens of underage
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girls in the Palm Beach police report. Additionally, defendant testified
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that she was not with Jeffrey Epstein in two thousand
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and five. In two thousand and six when he was
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ordering books on how to use sex slaves. However, record
2:43
evidence contradicts that Testimony number nine Thailand folder with defendant's
2:49
phone number. Defendant also was integral in arranging to have
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Virginia go to Thailand. While Epstein had paid for a
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massage therapy session in Thailand, there was a catch. Defendant
3:01
told Virginia she had to meet young girls in Thailand
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and bring her back to the US for Epstein and defendant. Indeed,
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on the travel records and tickets, defendant gave two Virginia
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defendant road on the back the name of the girl
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of Virginia was supposed to meet, and she was also
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instructed to check in frequently with defendant, as it was
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further signified by the words call miss Maxwell nine one
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seven redacted on Virginia's travel documents. In this case, Virginia
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also produced the hard copy records from her hotel stay
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in Thailand paid for by Epstein. See McCauley's declaration at
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exhibit number one, number ten. It is undisputed fact that
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the FBI report and the Churchery emails referenced Miss Roberts
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accounts of sexual activity with Prince Andrew that she made
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in twenty eleven, contrary to the defendant's argument that Miss
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Roberts has never made such claims until twenty fourteen. Based
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on the FBI's interview of Miss Roberts in twenty eleven,
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they wrote a report reflecting Miss roberts claims concerning her
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sexual encounters with Prince Andrew. Additionally, twenty eleven correspondents with
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Sharon Churcher shows that Miss Roberts disclosed her sexual encounters
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with Prince Andrew, but Churcher had to check with the
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publisher's lawyers on how much can be published. From Sharon
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Churcher mail on Sunday to Virginia Roberts, Hi, there been
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up all night writing. Won't have an opinion from our
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lawyer on how much can be published until London wakes up.
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The lawyers wanted internal FBI documents, but I think the
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Justice Department letter is all you have from the Feds. Anyway,
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I can give you a call early afternoon, maybe have
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a late lunch. See McAuley declaration at Exhibit thirty four
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Roberts zero zero three six seven eight. Accordingly, there is
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documentary evidence that refutes defendants meritless argument that Miss Roberts
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did not allege she had sex with Prince Andrew until
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twenty fourteen. To the contrary, two sources, including the FBI,
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show Miss Roberts made these claims in twenty eleven. See
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defendant has not produced no documents whatsoever that tend to
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show that she did not procure underage girls for Jeffrey Epstein.
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Defendant has produced no documents that even tend to show
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that she did not procure underage girls for sex with Epstein,
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and no documents that tend to show that she did
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not participate in the abuse. Indeed, defendant refused to produce
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any documents dated prior to two thousand and nine, which
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includes the two thousand through two thousand and two period
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during which she abused Miss Roberts. Against this backdrop of
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an avalanche of evidence showing the defendant sexually trafficked Miss Roberts.
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Summary judgment on any of the issues advanced by defendant
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is in a place apropriate. While we discuss the particulars
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of the individual claim below, the larger picture is important too.
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Miss Roberts will prove that trial that Epstein and defendant
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sexually trafficked her. And yet, when Miss Roberts had the
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courage to come forward and expose what defendant had done
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to the world in a court pleading trying to hold
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Epstein accountable, defendant responded by calling her a liar in
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a press release intended for a worldwide publication. Such heinous
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conduct is not a mere opinion, but rather a defamation
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executed deliberately and with actual malice. The jury should hear
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all of the evidence and then render its verdict on
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Miss Roberts's complaint. Part three Legal Standard. Rule fifty six
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that emotion
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for some rejudgment may be granted only when there is
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no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that
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all moving parties is entitled to a judgment as a
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map of law. The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that
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all ambiguities and inferences to be drawn from the underlying
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facts should be resolved in favor of the party opposing
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the motion, and all doubts as to the existence of
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a genuine issue for trial should be resolved against the
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moving party. Swan Brewery Company Limited versus US Trust Company
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of New York, eight thirty two f dot supp seven
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fourteen seven seventeen, sdn Y nineteen ninety three, Sweet Jay
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citing Brady Burst Town of Colchester, eight sixty three, f
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dot two D two five two ten, Second Circuit, nineteen
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eighty eight. In other words, in deciding a motion for
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some rejudgment, the court must construe the evidence in the
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light most favorable to the non moving party, and draw
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all reasonable inferences in the non moving parties favor in
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agent Orange product lab Littig five dot one seven f
8:00
dot three d seventy six eighty seven, Second Circuit, two
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thousand and eight. Stern versus Cosby six forty five F
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dot su pp two d two fifty eight two sixty nine,
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SDNY two thousand and nine. Some rejudgment should be denied
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if the evidence is such that a reasonable jerry could
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return a verdict in favor of the non moving party.
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See net Jets Aviation Incorporated. Versus LHC LLC five thirty
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seven F dot three d one sixty eight, one seventy
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eight and seventy nine, Second Circuit, two thousand and eight,
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Part four. Legal argument. A defendant is liable for the
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publication of the defamatory statement. And damages for its publication.
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Defendant's lead argument is that when she issued a press
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release attacking Miss Roberts to members of the media, she
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somehow was not responsible when the media quickly published her attacks.
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If accepted, this remarkable claim would eviscerate defamation law, as
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it would permit a defamer to send a defamatory statement
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to the media and then stand back and watch immune
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from liability when, as in this case, the defamatory statements
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are published around the world. This absurd position is not
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the law, particularly given that the defendant released the statement
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to the media asking them to police find attached and
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quotable statements on behalf of Glenn Maxwell to make her
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claim seem plausible. Defend incites older cases, some dating back
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as far as nineteen oh six. This presents a distorted
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picture of the case law on these issues, as a
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leading authority on defamation explains. With regard to liability for
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republication by another of statement by defendant, two standards have evolved.
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The older one is that the person making the defamatory
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statements is liable for a republication only if it occurs
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with his or her express or implied authorization of consent
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the more modern formulation as responsibility for all republication that
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can reasonably be anticipated or that is the natural and
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probable consequence of the publication sack on defamation Section two
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dot seven dot two at two DASH one thirteen and
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two DASH one fourteen, fourth edition, twenty sixteen. In this case, however,
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the nuances of the applicable legal standards make little difference,
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because defendants so clearly authorized, indeed desired, and did everything
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possible to obtain publication of her defamatory statements attacking Miss
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Roberts one. Under New York law, defendant is liable for
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the media's publication of her press release. Given the obvious
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purposes of defamation law, New York law unsurprisingly assigns liability
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to individuals for the media's publication of press releases. Indeed,
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New York appellate courts have repeatedly held that an individual
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is liable for media publishing that individual's defamatory press release.
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C Levy versus Smith, eighteen NYS dot three D four
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thirty eight four to thirty nine one thirty two A
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dot d dot three s D nine sixty one, nine
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sixty two and nine sixty three NYAD second Department, twenty fifteen. Generally,
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one who makes a defamatory statement is not responsible for
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its recommunication without his authority or request to another over
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whom he has no control. Here, however, the appellan intended
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and authorized the republication of the allegedly defamatory content of
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the press releases in the news articles National Puerto Rican
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Day Parade Incorporated versus Cost of Publications Incorporated nine fourteen,
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nys DOT two D one twenty one, twenty three, seventy
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nine a dot d Dot three d D five ninety two,
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five ninety five NYAD one Department twenty ten, Affirming the
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refusal to dismiss defamation counts against a defendant who submitted
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an open letter that was published in a newspaper, and
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that the defendant paid to have the open letter published,
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and finding that the defendant authorized the newspaper to recommunicate
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his statements. See also Restatement second of Torts, Section five
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seventy six, nineteen seventy seven. The publication of a libel
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or slander is a legal cause of any special harm
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resulting from its repetition by a third person, if the
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repetition was authorized or intended by the original defamer or
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the repetition was reasonably to be expected. Defendant deliberately sent
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her defamatory statement to major news media publishers for worldwide circulation.
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Because Defendant wanted the public at large to believe Miss
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Roberts was lying about her abuse, Defendant even hired a
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public relations media specialist to ensure the media would publish
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her statement. Her efforts succeeded. Her public relations agent instructed
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dozens of media outlets to publish her quotable defamatory statements,
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and they did. Despite this deliberate campaign to widely publicize
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her defamatory statement, Defendant now claims any responsibility for the
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media publishing her press release. If we understand Defendant's position correctly,
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because she somehow lacked control over what major newspapers and
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other media finally put in their stories, she escapes liability
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for defamation. This nonsensical position would let a defamer send
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a false, defamatory letter to major media, and then, when
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they published the accusation, escape any liability. Such an argument
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is not only an affrontal logic, but is contrary to
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prevailing New York case law cited above. Perhaps even more important,
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in the context of the pending summary judgment motion, it
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would have required defendant to convince the jury that she
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did not authorize or intend for the major media to
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publish her press release. Obviously, the disputed facts on this
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point are legion, and summary judgment is accordingly inappropriate. Even
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the cases defendant sites contradict her argument. She first cites
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Geraci versus Props, in which a defendant sent a letter
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to the Board of Fire Commissioners and years later a
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newspaper published the letter. The court held that the defendant
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was not liable for the belated publication made years later
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without his knowledge or participation Idea three p. Forty. By contrast,
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defendant not only authorized the defamatory statement, but paid money
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to her publicists to convince media outlets to publish it promptly,
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actions taken with both her knowledge and consent. Defendant statements
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was thus not published without her authority or request as
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in Jerachi, but by her express authority already mbuyer express request,
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Defendant's publicist, testimony and documents produced by defendant's publicist unambiguously
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established that the media published her press release with Defendant's
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authority and buyer request. Question when you sent that email
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were you acting pursuant to Miss Maxwell's retention of your services? Answer? Yes,
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I was. Question the subject line does have FW, which
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to me indicates it's a forward. Do you know where
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the rest of this email chain is? Answer? My understanding
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of this is it was a holiday in the UK,
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but mister Barton was not necessarily accessible at some point
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in time, so this had to be sent to him
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originally by Miss Maxwell, and because he was unavailable, she
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forwarded it to me for immediate action. I therefore responded, Okay, Glane,
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I'll go with this. It is my understanding that this
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is the agreed statement. Because the subject of the second
15:57
one is urgent, this is the statement, so I take
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that as an instruction to send it out as a
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positive command. This is the statement. Similarly, another case cited
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by defendant Davis versus Costa Gavrus involved a libel claim
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against a book author who wrote an account of the
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nineteen seventy two military coup in Chile years later. The
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plaintiff attempted to ascribe defamation liability to a third party
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publishing house decision to republish the book in paperback form
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and a third party filmmaker who released a movie based
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on the book. The court held that a party who
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was innocent of all complicity in the publication of a
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libel cannot be held accountable, but that a deliberate decision
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to republish or active participation in implementing the republication resurrects
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the liability five eighty f Dot supp Ten eighty two,
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ten ninety four SDNY, nineteen eighty four. Here, defendant made
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a deliberate decision to publish or press release and actively
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participated in that process. At the very least, the jury
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must make a determination of whether the defendant was innocent
17:06
of all complicity for a libelist statement contained in her
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press release. Finally, defendant sites Caradouman First Newsday Incorporated. Four
17:17
sixteen and dot E dot two d five fifty seven,
17:20
nineteen eighty which held that reporters of a series of
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articles on narcotics trade cannot be held personally liable for
17:27
injuries arising from its subsequent republication in book form, absent
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of showing that they approved or participated in some other
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manner in the activities of the third party republisher ID
17:39
four sixteen and dot E dot two d at five
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point fifty nine and five sixty. Again, the injury could
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reasonably find that defendant both approved of and even participated
17:51
in the media's publication of her press release. Indeed, it
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is hard to understand how any jury could find anything
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else was obviously active in influencing the media to publish
18:03
her defamatory press release. She both approved of and pushed
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for the publication of the press release. Accordingly, she is
18:11
liable for its publication. Therefore, disclaiming responsibility for the media's
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publication of a statement for which she hired a publicist
18:20
for the purpose of influencing the media to publish that
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statement is contrary to both prevailing case law and the
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case is cited by the defendant. All right, folks, we're
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going to wrap up there. In the next episode, we'll
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pick up where we left off with the defendant is
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liable for the media's publication of the defamatory statement. All
18:40
of the information that goes with this episode can be
18:43
found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and welcome
18:47
back to the Epstein Chronicles. This episode, we're going to
18:51
pick up where we left off with Virginia Roberts response
18:56
to the Glain Maxwell attempt to get a summary judge
19:00
in their defamation case. So let's get right back to it.
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Number two. Defendant is liable for the media's publication of
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the defamatory statement. After arguing, contrary to the New York law,
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that she is not liable for the media's publication of
19:16
her own press release, defendant next argues that she is
19:20
not liable for the media's publications of the defamatory statement
19:24
contained within her press release if the media chose to
19:28
make even the tiniest of editorial changes. If we understand
19:32
Defendant's argument correctly, any omission of any language from a
19:35
press release is somehow a selective, partial publication for which
19:40
she escapes liability motion at fourteen. Once again, this claim
19:45
is absurd on its face. It would mean that a
19:47
defamer could send to the media a long attack on
19:50
a victim with one irrelevant sentence, and when the media
19:54
quite predictably cut that sentence, well, they escape liability for
19:58
the attack or over Even on its face, the clan
20:02
presents a jury question of what changes would be in
20:05
context viewed as selective or partial publications, something that only
20:11
a jury could determine after hearing all of the evidence
20:15
in support of this meritless argument defend in Sides Ran
20:18
versus New York Times Company for the proposition that a
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defendant cannot be liable for a publisher's editing and excerpting
20:26
of a statement four thirty nys dot two D two
20:29
seventy one two seventy four seventy five a dot D
20:33
dot two D four seventeen four twenty two n dot
20:37
y dot a dot D nineteen eighty. This argument fails
20:41
for several reasons. First, there is no republication by the media.
20:45
As a matter of law. Defendant issued a defamatory statement
20:49
to the press, and its publication as defendant intended, is
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not a republication under the law as discussed above. Second,
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there was no editing or a paraphrasing, or a time
21:00
taking the quote out of context of the core defamatory
21:03
statement in the press release that Miss Roberts is a liar.
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The obvious lies passage is the heart of the message
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defendant sent to the press that Miss Roberts was lying
21:14
about her past sexual abuse. Even in isolation, defendants quote
21:18
stating that Miss Roberts claims or obvious lies does not
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distort or misrepresent the message defendant intended to convey to
21:26
the public that Miss Roberts was lying about her claims.
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As this Court explained in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss,
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this case involves statements that explicitly claim the sexual assault
21:37
allegations are false. Roberts versus Maxwell, one sixty five f
21:42
Dot su Pp Dot three D one forty seven one
21:46
fifty two SDNY twenty sixteen. Furthermore, the facts at issue
21:51
here make the Rand holding in opposite. In Rand, a
21:55
newspaper paraphrased and sanitized defendant's words. No such changing, sanitizing,
22:01
or paraphrasing occurred in the instant case. The media quoted
22:05
defendant statement accurately. Further the phrase at issue in RAND
22:09
was that certain people screwed another person. The Speaker newspaper
22:13
used the term screwed in reference to our record label's
22:16
dealings with a performing artist. N did not mean screwed
22:19
in a literal sense, but as rhetorical hyperbole, and as
22:24
such is not to be taken literally. By contrast, there
22:28
is no hyperbole in defendance defamatory statement, and it was
22:31
never distorted or paraphrased by any publication known to Miss Roberts.
22:37
A jury could reasonably conclude that defendant statement that Miss
22:40
Roberts's claims of child sex abuse or obvious lies is
22:44
not a rhetorical device nor hyperbole, but a literal and
22:48
particular affirmation that Miss Roberts lied accordingly. There is no
22:53
support in the factual record that the media reporting what
22:57
defendant stated that Miss roberts claims of childchildhood's sexual abuse
23:01
are obvious lies is a distortion of the defendant's message
23:05
or hyperbole. Even a cursory review of the press release
23:09
would lead to that conclusion. Moreover, to the extent that
23:12
there is any dispute that defendant statement had a different
23:16
meaning outside of the context of the remainder of the
23:18
press release, such a determination of meaning and interpretation is
23:23
a question of fact for the jury to decide, and
23:25
is inappropriate for determination upon some rejudgment. B Material issues
23:31
of fact preclude some rejudgment. One the bardon declaration presents
23:36
disputed issues of fact. The primary basis of Defendant's motion
23:40
for some rejudgment is here attorney self serving post talk
23:44
Abbi David, wherein he sets forth his alleged intent with
23:48
regard Defendant's defamatory statement. Miss Roberts disputes Defendant's attorneys alleged
23:54
and unproven intent not to mention Defendant's intent, not only
23:58
because Defendant refuew uses to turn over her attorney's communications,
24:02
but also because questions of intent are questions of fact
24:06
to be determined by a trier of fact. Furthermore, ample
24:10
record evidence contradicts the claimed intent a. The Barden declaration
24:16
is a deceptive backdoor attempt to inject Barden's advice without
24:20
providing discovery of all attorney communications. In her brief, Defendant
24:25
discloses her attorneys alleged legal strategy and alleged legal advice. However,
24:29
she deliberately states that her attorneys intended instead of her
24:33
attorney advised when discussing her attorney's legal strategy and advice,
24:38
using that phrase at least thirty seven times, and using
24:41
phrases such as Barden's beliefs, purposes, goals, and contemplations twenty
24:46
five other times, all the while defending is claim privilege
24:50
as to her communications with Barden. Defendant attempts to convince
24:54
the court that she only granted Gal permission to publish
24:57
the defamatory statements as part of if mister Barden's deliberated
25:01
and carefully crafted MSJA at sixteen Legal Strategy and Advice,
25:06
Yet she still refused to turn over her communications with
25:10
Barden under the auspices of attorney client privilege. Such gamesmanship
25:15
should not be permitted. If the court were to consider
25:18
the Barden declaration, which it shouldn't, it would be on
25:21
a ruling on less than complete record, because, based on
25:24
this declaration, it is necessary that defendant discloses all communications
25:28
with him and possibly others. Miss Roberts doesn't have those communications.
25:33
The court doesn't have those communications. Therefore, defendant is asking
25:37
for some rejudgment on an incomplete record. The court should
25:41
also not consider the Bardon declaration because it will be
25:45
inadmissible as unduly prejudicial. It is a self serving declaration
25:50
by a non deposed witness made without turning over the
25:53
documents that are relevant to the declaration. C e g.
25:57
Rubins versus Mason, three eighty seven Ft three D one
26:01
eight three one eighty five, Second Circuit, two thousand and four.
26:05
We find that the District Court predicated its grant of
26:08
some rejudgment as to liability on an Avid David from
26:12
the arbitrator who presided over the underlying arbitration. The probative
26:16
value of which was substantially outweighed by the danger of
26:20
unfair prejudice. The Avid David therefore should not have been admitted.
26:25
We therefore vacate the grant of some rejudgment to the
26:27
defendant on liability and remand to the District Court b defendant.
26:33
Some rejudgment arguments require factual findings regarding Barton's intent, thereby
26:38
precluding some rejudgment. Even were the Court to consider this
26:42
declaration and representations therein which it should not. The declaration
26:47
itself demonstrates that the Court would have to make factual
26:50
findings as to what mister Barton's intent really was. Finding
26:54
about intent are appropriate at the summary judgment stage, as
26:58
this Court and the Second Circuit Court have recognized. This
27:02
Court has explained, if it is necessary to resolve inferences
27:06
regarding intent, summary judgment is not appropriate. Sweet Jay citing
27:11
Patrick versus le Fay seven forty five F Dot two
27:15
D one fifty three one fifty nine, Second Circuit nineteen
27:19
eighty four, Freedman versus Meyers four eighty two F Dot
27:22
two D four thirty five four to thirty nine, Second Circuit,
27:26
nineteen seventy three. See there are factual disputes regarding Bardon's declaration. Finally,
27:33
there are material disputes over the statements in the Bardon
27:36
declaration because they are directly refuted by record evidence. For example,
27:41
the Instant motion and the Bardon declaration describe the press
27:44
release merely as a document expressing his mister Bardon's opinion
27:49
in the form of a legal argument, as a lawyer
27:51
would be as opposed to a press release for dissemination
27:55
by the media to the public. Record evidence refutes this claim.
27:59
As one, the press release was sent to journalist, to
28:02
media publishers or in house counsel. Two, the press release
28:07
instructed the journalists to publish the defamatory statement. Please find
28:11
attached a quotable statement on behalf of Miss Maxwell. Three.
28:15
It was issued by a publicist on defendant's behalf and
28:19
not an attorney, without any reference to attorneys or laws. Indeed,
28:23
Gau testified that Barton was unavailable to approve the statement,
28:27
and for Gau testified that he issued the statement only
28:31
after he understood defendant to have signed off on it.
28:34
In understanding he formed based on defendants positive command to him,
28:39
this is the agreed statement question. When you sent that
28:41
email were you acting pursuing to Miss Maxwell's retention of
28:45
your services? Answer? Yes, I was. Question when you say
28:49
a greed statement, can you tell me more about what
28:51
you mean? Who agreed to the statement? Answer? I need
28:55
to give you some context if I may, about that statement.
28:58
So this is on New Year's Day in France. So
29:01
the email time here is twenty one forty six in
29:04
French time and twenty two forty six. And I was
29:07
getting up early the next morning to drive my family
29:10
back to the south of France to England, which is
29:12
a fourteen hour journey door to door. So on the
29:15
morning of the second of January, bearing in mind that
29:18
Miss Maxwell I think was in New York, then she
29:21
was five hours behind, so there was quite a lot
29:23
of sort of time difference between the various countries here,
29:27
I sent her an email, I believe, saying parsing this,
29:30
forwarding this email to her saying how do you wish
29:33
to proceed? And I was on the telephone. I had
29:36
two telephones in the car. I received an excess thirty
29:39
phone calls from various media outlets on the second of January,
29:43
all asking for information about how Miss Maxwell was looking
29:46
to respond to the latest court filings which were filed
29:49
on the thirtieth of December, as I understand, and by
29:53
clothes towards close of play on the second I received
29:56
an email forwarded by Miss Maxwell containing a draft statement
30:00
which my understanding was the majority of which had been
30:03
drafted by mister Bardon, with a header along the lines
30:06
of this is the agreed on statement at close of
30:10
play on the second So I was I had gone
30:13
under the channel tunnel and I was sitting on the
30:15
other side, and that email, which my understanding was that
30:19
it had been signed off on by the client effectively,
30:22
was then sent out to a number of media, including
30:25
mister Ball and various other UK newspapers. Question, mister Gal,
30:29
when you say end of play and close of play,
30:32
are you referring to sending the email that is exhibit
30:34
to answer? Yes, I am question. The subject line does
30:39
have FW, which to me indicates it's a forward. Do
30:42
you know where the rest of the email chain is? Answer?
30:45
My understanding of this is it was a holiday in
30:48
the UK, but mister Barden was not necessarily accessible at
30:52
some point in time, so this had been sent to
30:54
him originally by Miss Maxwell, and because he was unavailable,
30:58
she forwarded it to me for immediate acts. I therefore responded, Okay, Glain,
31:02
I'll go with this. It is my understanding that this
31:05
is the agreed statement. Because the subject of the second
31:08
one is urgent. This is the statement, so I take
31:11
that as an instruction to send it out as a
31:14
positive command, this is the statement. Accordingly, record evidence shows
31:18
that the press release was intended as press release and
31:21
not as a legal argument. Record evidence also establishes that
31:25
defendants circulated the press release to Bardon and Gal and
31:28
then gave a positive command to Gou to publish it. Additionally,
31:32
there is no indica that the press release is a
31:35
legal opinion. To the contrary, it was issued by and
31:38
specifically attributed to, a woman who has personal knowledge of
31:42
whether Miss roberts claims of sexual abuse are true, and
31:46
she states that Miss Roberts is a liar. At the
31:49
very least, all of these factual issues must be considered
31:52
by a jury. Another example is that defendant states that
31:56
Gal served only as mister Barden's conduit to the media,
32:00
and mister Barden was directing the January tewod through fifteenth
32:03
statement to a discrete number of media representatives. Barden wasn't
32:07
directing anything. He wasn't even in the loop when defendant
32:10
decided to publish the statement, and the documents prove it. Indeed,
32:14
the press release itself states that it is on behalf
32:17
of Miss Maxwell, not Barden. It was the defendant who
32:20
gave the positive command to gou to publish it. These
32:24
are just a couple of examples among many of the
32:26
purported facts asserted Indefendant's motion and Barden's declaration that are
32:31
directly refuted by facts in the record. Finally, neither the
32:35
media nor the general public could have known that the
32:38
statement should be attributed to Barton. His name was nowhere
32:42
in it. Nor is there any reference to Council. Defendant's
32:46
argument that the context is the media knowing Bardon's intent
32:49
or involvement is unsupported by the record. The significant factual
32:53
disputes about Barden alone prevent some rejudgment. All right, folks,
32:57
we're going to wrap up right there, and then in
32:59
the next day episode we'll pick up where we left off.
33:03
All of the information that goes with this episode can
33:05
be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
33:09
welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. We're going to pick
33:14
up where we left off with Virginia Roberts response to
33:19
Gallaine Maxwell's attempt to get a summary judgment. See Defendant's
33:25
defamatory statement was not opinion as a matter of law,
33:29
as this Court previously held correctly, Defendant stating that Miss
33:32
Roberts's claims of sexual assault or lies is not an
33:35
expression of opinion. First, statements that Robert's claims against defendant
33:40
are untrue have been shown to be untrue, and our
33:44
obvious lies have a specific and readily understood factual, meaning
33:48
that Roberts is not telling the truth about her history
33:51
of sexual abuse and the defendant's role, and that some
33:54
verifiable investigation has occurred and come to a definitive conclusion
33:59
proving the fact. Second, these statements, as they themselves allege,
34:04
are capable of being proven true or false, and therefore
34:07
constitute actionable fact and not opinion. Third, in their full context,
34:12
while defendant statements have the effect of generally denying plaintiff's story,
34:17
they also clearly constitute fact to the reader. Roberts versus Maxwell,
34:21
one sixty five ft su Pp. Three d one forty seven,
34:26
one fifty two SDNY twenty sixteen. The Court further explained,
34:32
Plaintiff cannot be making claims shown to be untrue that
34:36
our obvious lies without being a liar. Furthermore, to suggest
34:39
individual is not telling the truth about her history of
34:43
having been sexually assaulted as a minor constitutes more than
34:46
a general denial. It alleges something deeply disturbing about the
34:50
character of an individual willing to be publicly dishonest about
34:54
such reprehensible crimes. Defendant statements clearly imply that the denial
35:00
are based on facts separate and contradictory to those that
35:04
plaintiff has alleged. Defendant argues that somehow the context of
35:08
the entire statement tested against the understanding of the average reader,
35:12
should be the press release as a whole, being read
35:15
only by journalists. This is an unreasonable construct because the
35:20
ultimate audience for a press release is the public. Indeed,
35:23
the purpose of a press release is to reach readers. Unsurprisingly,
35:27
Defendant cites no case that holds that journalists might somehow
35:31
believe that statements of fact are opinion while others do not.
35:36
This Court has previously covered this ground when it clearly
35:39
stated sexual assault of a minor is a clear cut issue.
35:43
Either transgression occurred or it did not. Either A. Maxwell
35:47
was involved or she was not. The issue is not
35:50
a matter of opinion, and there cannot be differing understandings
35:53
of the same facts that justify diametrically opposed opinion as
35:58
to whether defendant was involved in plaintiff's abuse as plaintiff
36:02
has claimed. Each plaintiff is telling the truth about her
36:05
story and defendant's involvement, or the defendant is telling the
36:08
truth and she was not involved in the trafficking and
36:11
ultimate abuse of the plaintiff Roberts verse Maxwell, one six
36:16
five f Dot supp At one fifty two SDNY, twenty sixteen.
36:22
The same conclusion applies now. At the motion to this
36:25
Miss stage, defendant had not yet produced the statement she
36:29
issued to the press. The statement is now in evidence,
36:32
so there is no ambiguity as to what defendant released
36:35
to the press. The absurdity of defendant characterizing his statement
36:40
calling Miss Roberts a liar as mere opinion is revealed
36:43
by the fact that the defendant was the one who
36:45
was sexually trafficking and otherwise abusing Miss Roberts. No reasonable
36:50
person in any context would construe that as defendant's mere
36:54
opinion on the subject. Since defendant knew she was abusing
36:57
Miss Roberts. And indeed, this our argument is contradicted by
37:01
the defendant's own deposition testimony question, do you believe that
37:06
Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused minors? Answer? I can only testify
37:11
to what I know. I know that Virginia is a liar,
37:14
and I know what she testified is a lie. So
37:17
I can only testify to what I know to be falsehoods,
37:20
and half those falsehoods are enormous, And so I can
37:23
only categorically deny everything she has said. And that is
37:27
the only thing that I can talk about, because I
37:29
have no knowledge of anything else. See mccauleay declaration at
37:34
Exhibit eleven, Maxwell Deposition, April seventeenth, twenty sixteen. Defendant slightly
37:40
contends in her motion that mister Bardon's arguments in the
37:43
press release constitute pure opinion, attempting to disclaim any involvement
37:49
in making the defamatory statement. However, it is not mister
37:53
Bardon's statement nor his opinion that is that issue here.
37:56
At issue here is defendant statement a statement a t
38:00
bributable to her that she approved, whose publication she commanded,
38:05
and for which he hired a public relations representative to
38:08
disseminate to at least thirty journalists for publication. While mister
38:12
Barton could possibly have had his own opinion as to
38:15
whether or not his client abused Miss Roberts, defendant cannot
38:19
express an opinion on a binary yes or no subject
38:22
where she knows the truth, As this court previously articulated
38:27
statements that Robert's claims against defendant are untrue have been
38:31
shown to be untrue, and our obvious lies have a
38:33
specific and readily understood factual meaning. Roberts versus Maxwell, one
38:38
sixty five f Dot supp Dot three d at one
38:42
fifty two. Again, at the very least, the jury must
38:46
pass on such issues. D the pre litigation privilege does
38:51
not apply to defendant's press release. One defendant fails to
38:55
make a showing that the pre litigation privilege applies. Defendants
38:59
next argument seeks refuge in their pre litigation privilege. If
39:03
we understand the argument correctly, defendant seems to be saying
39:07
that because she was contemplating an unspecified and never filed
39:11
lawsuit involving the British press, she somehow had a green
39:15
light to make whatever defamatory statement she wanted about Miss Roberts.
39:19
To prove such a remarkably claimed, defendant relies on case
39:23
law involving such mundane topics as cease and desist letters
39:27
sent to opposing parties and the like. Obviously, such arguments
39:32
have no application to the press release that defendants sent
39:35
out worldwide attacking Miss roberts veracity. The problems with the
39:39
defendant's argument are legion for starters. There is no record evidence,
39:44
not even defendant's own testimony, suggesting that she was contemplating
39:48
litigation against Miss Roberts, or that her press release was
39:51
related to contemplated litigation against Miss Roberts. Tellingly, the only
39:56
evidence defendant sites of any alleged contemplating litigation is the
40:01
self serving post talk partial waiver of attorney client privilege
40:05
found in the Barden Declaration. As discussed above, the declaration
40:09
fails to establish that there was good faith anticipated in
40:13
litigation between her and Miss Roberts, particularly when evidence in
40:17
the record contradicts such assertions. At the very least, it
40:21
is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.
40:24
In another case in which a defendant attempted to claim
40:27
pre litigation privilege applied to statements made to the press.
40:30
This court denied some rejudgment and held to prevail on
40:34
a qualified privileged defense. Defendant must show that his claim
40:37
of privilege does not raise triable issues of fact that
40:41
would defeat it. Block versus First Blood Associates six ninety
40:45
one f. Dot su Pp. Six point eighty five, six
40:49
ninety nine and seven hundred Sweet Jay sdn Y nineteen
40:52
eighty eight, denying some rejudgment on the pre litigation qualification
40:57
privilege affirmative defense because there was a you an issue
41:00
as to malice an appropriate purpose. Defendant's claim here likewise fails.
41:06
First defendant's testimony makes no mention of any contemplated lawsuit,
41:10
much less any contemplated lawsuit against Miss Roberts. Second defendant
41:15
has offered no witnesses who will testify that she intended
41:19
to bring any lawsuit. Third, she did not, in fact
41:22
bring any such lawsuit. The only evidence is a post
41:25
talk declaration written by her attorney. Finally, it must be remembered,
41:30
as explained that length above, the defendant had sexually trafficked
41:34
defendant and was attempting to continue to conceal her criminal acts.
41:39
Whether her statements had an appropriate purpose, block six ninety one,
41:42
f Dot supp Dot at six ninety nine through seven hundred,
41:47
Sweet Jay, or or rather efforts by a criminal organization
41:50
to silence its victims is obviously contested. Accordingly, obvious issues
41:56
of fact exist as to whether or not defendant contemplated
42:01
distorting reality. Defendant further argues statements pertinent to a good
42:05
faith anticipated litigation made by attorneys or their agents under
42:10
their direction before the commencement of litigation or privileged MSJA
42:14
at thirty three, the record evidence shows that defendant attorneys
42:18
did not make the defamatory statement. Further, defendant's attorneys agents
42:22
did not make the defamatory statement. The defendant did, and
42:26
there was no statement made by anyone before the commencement
42:29
of litigation, because litigation never commenced. Accordingly, the case defendant
42:35
sites where attorneys are making statements or where clients are
42:38
making statements to their attorneys regarding judicial proceedings, including malpractice,
42:44
are wholly in opposite, as detailed below. Similarly, in Black
42:48
versus Green Harbor Homeowners Association Incorporated nineteen A dot d
42:53
dot three D nine sixty two nine sixty three, seven
42:56
ninety eight and do Y dot s dot two d
42:59
seven fifty three, seven fifty four, and two thousand and
43:03
five cited by defendant, the court held a privilege applied
43:07
to a letter sent by a Homeowner's Association board of
43:10
directors to the association's members informing them of the status
43:14
of litigation to which the association was a party, and
43:17
to the association's letter to the state Attorney General, sent
43:21
to discharge its duties to the association. In this case,
43:24
litigation was actually pending, the communication was sent by a
43:28
party to that litigation as part of its duties, and
43:31
the communication itself concerned the litigation. The defendant's press release
43:36
fits none of those descriptions. Unsurprisingly, Defendant cites no case
43:42
in which a court has held that this or any
43:44
qualified privilege extends to internationally disseminated press releases defaming a
43:49
non party to the purported anticipated litigation, regardless of whether
43:54
or not Barden had a hand in drafting the statement.
43:57
Another disputed issue of fact. The jury defendant issued the statement,
44:02
instructed that it be published, and the statement she issued
44:05
was attributed to her and not her attorney or as agents. Accordingly,
44:10
all the case law defendant sites about attorney making a
44:13
statement or a client making a statement to their attorney
44:16
or a malpractice carrier is in opposite two defending his
44:22
foreclothes from using the pre litigation privilege because she acted
44:25
with malice. In any event, because defendant acted with malice,
44:29
she cannot avail herself of the pre litigation privilege. As
44:33
this Court has explained denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, there
44:36
is no qualified privilege under New York law when such
44:40
statements are spoken with malice, knowledge of their falsity, or
44:44
a reckless disregard for the truth. Roberts versus Maxwell, one
44:48
sixty five F. Supp Dot three d at one fifty five.
44:52
Citing Block six ninety one F Dot supp Dot at
44:57
six ninety nine, Sweet j sdn Y nineteen eight, there
45:01
is ample record evidence that defendant acted with malice in
45:04
issuing the press release, thereby making the litigation privilege inapplicable
45:09
see Block six ninety one FT supp At seven hundred. Here,
45:14
sufficient evidence has been adduced to support the inference that
45:18
defendant acted with malice and may not therefore claim a
45:21
qualified privilege under New York law. A genuine issue as
45:26
to malice an appropriate purpose has properly been raised, and
45:30
is sufficient to preclude some rejudgment. For example, Miss Schuberg
45:34
testified that defendant recruited her for sex with Epstein, thus
45:38
corroborating Miss roberts own account of defendant's involvement in abusing
45:42
her with Epstein. For another example, Jeffrey Epstein's pilot testified
45:47
that defendant flew with Miss Roberts on at least twenty
45:51
three flights, thus corroborating Miss roberts claims against the defendant.
45:55
Ce mccaulay's declaration at Exhibit fifteen Robert's deposition at thirty
46:01
four three through ten. For another example, Tony Figueroa testified
46:05
that defendant asked him for assistance in recruiting girls for Epstein,
46:10
more testimony that corroborates Miss Roberts's claims against the defendant.
46:14
And again, just to interject, this is why we went
46:17
through that Virginia Roberts deposition. All of these court documents
46:21
dove tell into each other, and when you put them
46:23
all together, you begin to see the true scope of
46:26
what Jeffrey Epstein was up to. Defendant statements that Miss
46:30
Roberts was lying, and her claims of sexual abuse where
46:33
obvious lies were not pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation,
46:37
but instead they were made for inappropriate purpose, i e.
46:41
To bully, harass, intimidate, and ultimately silence Miss Roberts. As
46:45
the record of evidence shows, defendant knew the statements were
46:48
false because defendant engaged in and facilitated the sexual abuse
46:53
of this minor child. Therefore, they were made for the
46:56
inappropriate purpose of bullying, harassment, and intimidation. See Front versus Khalil,
47:02
twenty four and Y Dot three d Dot seven thirteen
47:05
seven twenty twenty fifteen. Simply put, defendant sexually trafficked Miss
47:10
Roberts and then tried to silence Miss Roberts to keep
47:13
her crime secret, circumstances that prevent her from using privileges
47:18
designed to shield legitimate legal disputes from court interference. New
47:22
York case law fully confirms that pre litigation qualified privileges
47:27
do not apply to this case. Historically, statements made in
47:31
the course of litigation were entitled to privilege from defamation's claims,
47:35
so that those discharging a public function may speak freely
47:38
to zealously represent their clients without fear of reprisal or
47:43
financial hazard. Court of Appeals case somewhat extended this privilege
47:47
by holding that statements made by attorneys prior to the
47:51
commencement of the litigation are protected by a qualified privilege
47:55
if those statements are pertinent to a good faith anticipation
47:58
litigation id d At seven eighteen. Although it is well
48:02
settled that statements made in the court of litigation are
48:05
entitled to absolute privilege, the Court is not directly addressed
48:08
whether statements made by an attorney on behalf of his
48:12
or her client in connection with prospective litigation are privileged.
48:16
To advance the goals of encouraging communication prior to the
48:19
commencement of litigation, we hold that statements made prior to
48:23
the commencement of an anticipated litigation are privileged, and that
48:27
the privilege is lost when a defendant proofs that statements
48:30
were not pertinent to a good faith anticipation litigation. The
48:34
Court of Appeals reason for allowing this qualified privilege could
48:38
not be more clearer. When litigation is anticipated, attorneys and
48:42
parties should be free to communicate. In order to reduce
48:45
or avoid the need to actually commence litigation. Attorneys often
48:50
send cease and desist letters to avoid litigation. Applying privilege
48:54
to such preliminary communication encourages potential defendants to negotiate with
48:58
potential plaintiffs in order to prevent costly and time consuming
49:03
judicial intervention idea at seven, nineteen and twenty. Under this rationale,
49:08
the Khalil Court found that an attorney letters to the
49:10
potential defendant were privileged because they were sent in an
49:14
attempt to avoid litigation by requesting, among other things, that
49:18
Khalil returned the alleged stolen propriety information and cease and
49:22
desist in his use of that information. Here, quite unlike Khalil,
49:27
the defendant statements were one made by a non attorney
49:30
defendant through GAO two concerning a non party to an
49:34
alleged anticipated litigation, three knowingly false statements, and four contained
49:39
in a press release directed at and disseminated to the
49:42
public at large. The defendant statements cannot be considered pertinent
49:46
to a good faith anticipated litigation, such that the qualified
49:50
privilege should apply. Finally, though it strains credulity to even
49:55
entertain the prospect, if defendant could make even colorable showings
49:59
on these basic g issues, it would remain an issue
50:01
effact for the jury to determine whether or not defendants
50:05
press release calling Miss Roberts sex abuse claims obvious lies.
50:09
Was any type of cease and desist statement or a
50:11
statement that acted to reduce or avoid or resolve any
50:15
anticipated litigation? Summary judgment is obviously inappropriate here as well.
50:21
All right, folks, we're going to wrap up right there,
50:23
and in the next episode we'll pick up where we
50:25
left off. All of the information that goes with this
50:28
episode can be found in the description box.