Latest / The Infographics Show Podcast / How Would the United States Fight a Nuclear War?
Transcript
- 0:10Speaker 1: You know, usually when we talk about a military or
- 0:18Speaker 1: presidential decision, there's this expectation of a very specific, like
- 0:24Speaker 1: Hollywood aesthetic.
- 0:25Speaker 2: Oh. Absolutely. You picture the Oval office.
- 0:27Speaker 1: Right, the Oval office, the resolute desk, and right there,
- 0:31Speaker 1: sitting in the middle of all that polished wood is
- 0:34Speaker 1: a big shiny red button under a glass case.
- 0:37Speaker 2: Yeah, you flip the glass, you press the button.
- 0:40Speaker 1: Boom exactly, the missiles fly. It's a great movie moment.
- 0:43Speaker 2: It's the ultimate cinematic trope. Really. I mean, it's binary,
- 0:47Speaker 2: it's simple, and it immediately communicates absolute power to the audience.
- 0:51Speaker 1: Right, and it's clean in a weird, twisted way. It's
- 0:53Speaker 1: actually comforting. We as human beings, well, we like things
- 0:57Speaker 1: to be visible, to be categorized into a single, understandable
- 1:01Speaker 1: physical action.
- 1:02Speaker 2: You know, you want to know exactly where the danger
- 1:04Speaker 2: is exactly.
- 1:05Speaker 1: But when you strip away the pop culture and actually
- 1:07Speaker 1: step into the real world mechanics of global deterrence and
- 1:10Speaker 1: nuclear command control, that glass case just shatters instantly.
- 1:14Speaker 2: Oh, without a doubt.
- 1:15Speaker 1: We're looking at an operational landscape that is infinitely more complex, terrifying,
- 1:21Speaker 1: and frankly fascinating than anything Hollywood could dream up.
- 1:24Speaker 2: It is the absolute definition of a logistical and philosophical labyrinth.
- 1:29Speaker 2: I mean, you're talking about an architecture designed to end
- 1:32Speaker 2: the world, built entirely with the intention of making sure
- 1:35Speaker 2: it never actually happens.
- 1:36Speaker 1: It's a total paradox, and that paradox is exactly why
- 1:39Speaker 1: we are here. Welcome to Beyond Infographics. I am thrilled
- 1:43Speaker 1: you're joining us today.
- 1:44Speaker 2: It's great to be here.
- 1:45Speaker 1: Our mission on this show is simple. We move past
- 1:48Speaker 1: the surface level stats, you know, the simple pie charts,
- 1:50Speaker 1: the flashy news headlines, to deliver rich personal insights into
- 1:55Speaker 1: the complex mechanics that actually run our world.
- 1:57Speaker 2: The real gears turning behind the curtain right.
- 2:00Speaker 1: And today we are tackling the ultimate existential framework. We're
- 2:05Speaker 1: exploring the realities of nuclear command and control, the intricate
- 2:08Speaker 1: policies of global deterrence, and how the international threat landscape
- 2:12Speaker 1: is rapidly transforming right before our eyes.
- 2:15Speaker 2: The stakes literally could not be higher.
- 2:17Speaker 1: The margin for error here is zero, literally zero, which,
- 2:22Speaker 1: by the way, is exactly why we do this show.
- 2:24Speaker 1: To decode the zero margin global stakes for.
- 2:27Speaker 2: You, the listener, and if you're enjoying the breakdown, hitting
- 2:30Speaker 2: that five star button on your podcast app actually goes
- 2:33Speaker 2: a really long way in helping us keep doing it.
- 2:35Speaker 1: It really does please drop us those five stars. So
- 2:38Speaker 1: to your point about that Hollywood myth of the red button.
- 2:41Speaker 1: To understand how this global strategy works, we actually have
- 2:45Speaker 1: to start with a physical object that initiates.
- 2:47Speaker 2: It, all right, Because it's not a button anchored to
- 2:49Speaker 2: a desk, No.
- 2:50Speaker 1: Not at all. It's a highly mobile, incredibly heavy piece
- 2:54Speaker 1: of luggage, the nuclear football, the famous football.
- 2:57Speaker 2: Precisely officially in military recircles, it's known as the Presidential Emergency.
- 3:02Speaker 1: SATCHEL, which is a much less catching name it really is.
- 3:05Speaker 2: But the concept in my historical research, it really started
- 3:09Speaker 2: to take shape late in the Eisenhower administration. It was
- 3:12Speaker 2: largely driven by a White House naval aid named Edward L.
- 3:15Speaker 2: Beach Junior. Okay, so nineteen fifties exactly, and then it
- 3:20Speaker 2: evolved significantly during John F. Kennedy's era, particularly right around
- 3:24Speaker 2: the time of the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile crisis.
- 3:27Speaker 1: Because before that, the president basically had to be in
- 3:30Speaker 1: a fixed location to order a strike, right like stuck
- 3:32Speaker 1: in a bunker somewhere.
- 3:33Speaker 2: That was the assumption. Yeah, the thought was that the
- 3:36Speaker 2: president would be safely in the White House situation room
- 3:39Speaker 2: or some underground bunker surrounded by generals in huge communication arrays.
- 3:44Speaker 1: But the technology changed.
- 3:46Speaker 2: Right the Cold War realities, specifically the speed of incoming
- 3:49Speaker 2: ballistic missiles made them realize the president might only have
- 3:53Speaker 2: a few minutes to respond.
- 3:55Speaker 1: Wow, just minutes? Yeah, well, traveling or on a golf
- 3:58Speaker 1: course or in a motorcade. They desperately needed a way
- 4:02Speaker 1: to command a massive nuclear response while completely untethered from
- 4:06Speaker 1: a fixed command center.
- 4:07Speaker 2: So it's not a button. It's a mobile communications and
- 4:11Speaker 2: decision making hub exactly. And it is an absolute beast
- 4:14Speaker 2: of a bag. Have you seen pictures of this thing?
- 4:16Speaker 1: I have? It looks exhausting to carry it does if
- 4:19Speaker 1: you read Bill Gully's memoir he was the director of
- 4:22Speaker 1: the White House Military Office back in the day. He
- 4:24Speaker 1: paints this incredibly vivid, almost absurd picture of the football.
- 4:29Speaker 2: What did he say about it?
- 4:30Speaker 1: Well, it's a forty five pound leather bag and it's
- 4:33Speaker 1: usually encased around a sturdy metal zero Haliburton frame to
- 4:37Speaker 1: keep it rigid.
- 4:37Speaker 2: Forty five pounds. Just imagine lugging that everywhere right and inside.
- 4:42Speaker 1: You don't find a keypad counting down with red led
- 4:45Speaker 1: lights like in a James Bond movie.
- 4:46Speaker 2: You find paperwork, Lots and lots of highly classified, incredibly
- 4:51Speaker 2: dense paperwork.
- 4:52Speaker 1: Yeah, gully noted. There are four main components inside. First,
- 4:55Speaker 1: there's the black book. This is a roughly nine x
- 4:58Speaker 1: twelve inch binder about seventy five loose leaf pages printed
- 5:02Speaker 1: in black and red ink.
- 5:03Speaker 2: And that book outlines the retaliatory strike option.
- 5:06Speaker 1: Right, we're talking major attack options, selective attack options, basically
- 5:10Speaker 1: a menu of apocalypse.
- 5:12Speaker 2: A horrifying menu, truly.
- 5:14Speaker 1: Then there's another black book listing classified bunker locations across
- 5:17Speaker 1: the country where the president could be evacuated.
- 5:19Speaker 2: Okay, that makes sense.
- 5:20Speaker 1: Third, a Manila folder with emergency broadcast procedures to address
- 5:25Speaker 1: the nation. And finally, the most critical piece of the
- 5:27Speaker 1: whole puzzle, the biscuit.
- 5:30Speaker 2: Ah, yes, the biscuit.
- 5:33Speaker 1: It sounds so harmless, it.
- 5:35Speaker 2: Does, but it's a three x five inch plastic card
- 5:38Speaker 2: containing the authentication codes. Without the biscuit, the rest of
- 5:41Speaker 2: the football is essentially just a very heavy, terrifying reading assignment.
- 5:46Speaker 1: Right, It's useless without the card. Now I have to
- 5:48Speaker 1: ask you about a rumor I've always heard about the name.
- 5:51Speaker 1: I actually spend some time trying to track down the
- 5:52Speaker 1: origin of this.
- 5:53Speaker 2: Oh about the football nickname?
- 5:55Speaker 1: Yeah, I've always heard that the term came from a
- 5:57Speaker 1: highly classified nuclear attack plan code name dropkick, right right,
- 6:02Speaker 1: because it's famously referenced in the movie Doctor Strange Love.
- 6:05Speaker 1: Is there any historical truth to that? Like, you need
- 6:07Speaker 1: the football for the dropkick?
- 6:09Speaker 2: It's a fantastic pede of lore. I'll give it that,
- 6:11Speaker 2: but the reality is unfortunately much more mundane.
- 6:14Speaker 1: Really, that's a bummer.
- 6:16Speaker 2: Yeah, the term dropkick seems to have originated purely from
- 6:20Speaker 2: the cultural zeitgeist around Doctor Strangelove. The nickname football most
- 6:24Speaker 2: likely came from the early military aids who were tasked
- 6:27Speaker 2: with carrowing.
- 6:28Speaker 1: It. Just guys holding the bag.
- 6:30Speaker 2: Exactly, think about their job. They are on twenty four
- 6:33Speaker 2: hour rotations, constantly handing off this heavy, awkward leather bag
- 6:37Speaker 2: to the next guy, passing it along like a literal football.
- 6:41Speaker 2: Oh wow, And given the Kennedy families famous love for
- 6:44Speaker 2: touch football on the White House lawn, the nickname just
- 6:47Speaker 2: sort of stuck and became part of the vernacular.
- 6:50Speaker 1: Okay, that makes so much more sense than a secret
- 6:52Speaker 1: code name. It's just military guys making a joke about
- 6:55Speaker 1: carrying a.
- 6:55Speaker 2: Bag, precisely.
- 6:57Speaker 1: So let's unpack the mechanics here. Let's say the absolute
- 7:00Speaker 1: worst happens and the President decides to open that black book.
- 7:04Speaker 1: How does this three x five plastic biscuit actually come
- 7:07Speaker 1: into play?
- 7:08Speaker 2: So the biscuit is the key to authentication, which is
- 7:11Speaker 2: a vital distinction from authorization. What's the difference there, Well,
- 7:14Speaker 2: the football doesn't actually transmit a launch signal. It's not
- 7:18Speaker 2: a remote control. If the president gives a launch order,
- 7:20Speaker 2: they have to prove they are in fact the actual
- 7:23Speaker 2: commander in chief.
- 7:24Speaker 1: So they can't just call up and say, hey, it's
- 7:26Speaker 1: me launch the messiles exactly.
- 7:28Speaker 2: So, the military aid opens a secure line of communication
- 7:32Speaker 2: with the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, specifically
- 7:36Speaker 2: the deputy Director of Operations.
- 7:38Speaker 1: Okay, so they're on the phone.
- 7:39Speaker 2: Right, and the military officer on the other end reads
- 7:42Speaker 2: a challenge code, usually two phonetic letters like alpha, bravo.
- 7:47Speaker 1: Oh, like a one time pad cryptographic system.
- 7:49Speaker 2: That's exactly what it is. The President then looks at
- 7:52Speaker 2: the biscuit, which has a list of corresponding codes, finds
- 7:56Speaker 2: alpha Bravo and reads the correct phonetic response to verify
- 8:01Speaker 2: their identity.
- 8:01Speaker 1: So if the challenge is Alpha Brava, the President reads
- 8:04Speaker 1: whatever two letters are printed next to it.
- 8:06Speaker 2: Right, It's an airtight identity verification system.
- 8:09Speaker 1: It's astonishing when you think about it, the literal state
- 8:12Speaker 1: of humanity resting on a three x five piece of
- 8:15Speaker 1: plastic that looks like a novelty credit card.
- 8:18Speaker 2: It is surreal.
- 8:19Speaker 1: And what's even more mind blowing to me looking at
- 8:21Speaker 1: this historical record are the sheer number of times we
- 8:25Speaker 1: have fumbled the football or more specifically, lost the biscuit.
- 8:29Speaker 2: Oh, the stories are terrifying.
- 8:31Speaker 1: The mishaps are incredible.
- 8:32Speaker 2: The human element is always the most unpredictable variable in
- 8:36Speaker 2: any technological system, especially when the stakes are this high.
- 8:39Speaker 1: Absolutely, I mean I was looking into this and Jimmy
- 8:43Speaker 1: Carter allegedly kept the biscuit in his jacket.
- 8:46Speaker 2: Pocket, just loose in his pocket.
- 8:48Speaker 1: Yes, and the story goes that the suit was accidentally
- 8:52Speaker 1: sent to the dry cleaner with the nuclear code still inside.
- 8:55Speaker 2: That is horrifying.
- 8:57Speaker 1: It gets worse. Think about Ronald Reagan to the nineteen
- 9:00Speaker 1: eighty one assassination attempt when he was rushed to the
- 9:02Speaker 1: George Washington University Hospital. The trauma team literally had to
- 9:06Speaker 1: cut his clothes off to save his life.
- 9:08Speaker 2: Right, because he was actively bleeding out.
- 9:10Speaker 1: Exactly in the absolute chaos of the emergency room, the
- 9:13Speaker 1: biscuit fell out of his clothes. It was later found
- 9:15Speaker 1: lying completely unsecured on the hospital floor.
- 9:17Speaker 2: Anyone could have just picked it up.
- 9:19Speaker 1: Yep. And to make matters worse, the Secret Service and
- 9:23Speaker 1: the FBI got into a massive jurisdictional dispute over Reagan's
- 9:27Speaker 1: bloody clothes as evidence.
- 9:29Speaker 2: Wait while the president was in surgery.
- 9:31Speaker 1: Yes, meaning the nuclear codes were essentially caught in the
- 9:35Speaker 1: middle of a domestic law enforcement squabble.
- 9:37Speaker 2: Wow, it just exposes a massive vulnerability in the whole design.
- 9:41Speaker 2: The system assumes a conscious, organized president right.
- 9:46Speaker 1: Furthermore, the military aid carrying the actual forty five pound
- 9:49Speaker 1: football was left behind at the hotel because the presidential
- 9:53Speaker 1: motor cade sped off so fast to get to the hospital.
- 9:56Speaker 2: So the codes were on the floor and the communication
- 9:58Speaker 2: hub was at.
- 9:58Speaker 1: A hotel exactly, and it didn't stop in the eighties.
- 10:02Speaker 1: In nineteen ninety nine, Bill Clinton left a NATO summit
- 10:04Speaker 1: meeting early and walked away completely forgetting his military aid.
- 10:08Speaker 2: He just left him there.
- 10:09Speaker 1: He just left the aid, had to walk back to
- 10:11Speaker 1: the White House carrying the football all by himself through
- 10:13Speaker 1: the streets of Washington, DC.
- 10:15Speaker 2: That is unbelievable.
- 10:16Speaker 1: And then bringing it right up to recent history during
- 10:19Speaker 1: the January sixth Capitol breach, the backup football, which travels
- 10:23Speaker 1: with the vice president, came within one hundred feet of
- 10:26Speaker 1: the rioters as Mike Pence was being evacuated to the
- 10:29Speaker 1: underground loading docks.
- 10:30Speaker 2: Which highlights a fascinating and highly choreographed aspect of the
- 10:34Speaker 2: football the transition of power.
- 10:36Speaker 1: Oh right, because you mentioned the vice president has a
- 10:38Speaker 1: backup Yeah, there are.
- 10:39Speaker 2: Actually three footballs in existence at any given time.
- 10:42Speaker 1: Three. I thought there was just one.
- 10:44Speaker 2: Yep, three. One travels with the president, one with the
- 10:46Speaker 2: Vice President, and a spare is kept completely secure at
- 10:49Speaker 2: the White House.
- 10:50Speaker 1: Okay, And the choreography on inauguration day is just wild.
- 10:54Speaker 1: I was tracing how this works, and it's like a
- 10:56Speaker 1: synchronized ballet of doom.
- 10:58Speaker 2: It is a marvel of operational planning. At exactly noon
- 11:01Speaker 2: on inauguration Day, the outgoing president's authentication codes their specific piscuit.
- 11:07Speaker 2: They instantly deactivate.
- 11:09Speaker 1: So at eleven point five to nine they work, and
- 11:11Speaker 1: at twelve zero zero zero they are garbage.
- 11:14Speaker 2: Exactly simultaneously, the incoming president, who has already received a
- 11:18Speaker 2: comprehensive nuclear briefing in the days prior and has been
- 11:21Speaker 2: issued a brand new biscuit, sees their codes go live.
- 11:25Speaker 1: It's an instant flip.
- 11:27Speaker 2: Right, And we saw a completely unique, unprecedented variation of
- 11:31Speaker 2: this in twenty twenty one when the outgoing president did
- 11:35Speaker 2: not attend the inauguration.
- 11:36Speaker 1: Oh right, I hadn't thought of that. How did that work?
- 11:38Speaker 2: Well? The outgoing president kept his active football with him
- 11:41Speaker 2: down in Florida. Right at eleven point five to nine
- 11:44Speaker 2: point five nine am, those codes went dead. Meanwhile, the
- 11:48Speaker 2: incoming president's spare football in Washington, DC became the active
- 11:52Speaker 2: command hub at exactly noon.
- 11:54Speaker 1: Okay, let's stop and unpack this, because this brings up
- 11:56Speaker 1: a terrifying question. Sure, it sounds like the world's highest
- 11:59Speaker 1: stakes two factor authentication. The president has the password the biscuit,
- 12:03Speaker 1: but the military holds the actual hardware the missiles. Correct,
- 12:07Speaker 1: but does the president really have absolute unchecked power here?
- 12:11Speaker 1: If the military holds the hardware, can they just say no,
- 12:14Speaker 1: this is crazy, we aren't doing this.
- 12:16Speaker 2: That is the pivotal question of this entire architecture. It
- 12:19Speaker 2: moves us from the physical tools of the president directly
- 12:22Speaker 2: into the actual chain of command.
- 12:24Speaker 1: The journey from the bag to the silo.
- 12:27Speaker 2: Exactly how does an order travel from that leather bag
- 12:31Speaker 2: to an underground missile silo? And what are the legal
- 12:34Speaker 2: guard rails?
- 12:36Speaker 1: To answer your question directly, yes, the president has sole
- 12:40Speaker 1: authority to order a launch.
- 12:42Speaker 2: Wait hold on, meaning they don't have to ask Congress
- 12:45Speaker 2: for permission, even though the Constitution gives Congress the power
- 12:48Speaker 2: to declare war.
- 12:49Speaker 1: Correct, the president does not need to consult Congress at all.
- 12:52Speaker 2: That seems wild.
- 12:53Speaker 1: It is, But this is where the distinction between declaring
- 12:56Speaker 1: a state of war and the president's Article II powers
- 12:59Speaker 1: is mander in chief to repel sudden attacks gets highly concentrated.
- 13:04Speaker 1: They don't even need the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.
- 13:06Speaker 2: The Secretary of Defense can't stop it.
- 13:08Speaker 1: No, the Secretary of Defense is part of the chain
- 13:11Speaker 1: of communication to verify the authenticity of the order, meaning
- 13:15Speaker 1: they confirm the order actually came from the president's biscuit.
- 13:18Speaker 1: But the Secretary cannot legally vedo the decision. That is
- 13:22Speaker 1: a staggering amount of power for one human being. What
- 13:25Speaker 1: if the President is genuinely impaired, drunk, hallucinating, having a
- 13:30Speaker 1: psychological break. We just trust the Secretary of Defense to
- 13:33Speaker 1: gently talk them down, but legally they can't stop them.
- 13:37Speaker 2: It is staggering, and it's vital to present this impartially
- 13:41Speaker 2: because there are two very distinct, highly debated schools of
- 13:44Speaker 2: thought here in my research.
- 13:46Speaker 1: Okay, what's the argument for keeping it this way?
- 13:48Speaker 2: On one side, proponents of the current system argue, this
- 13:51Speaker 2: sole authority is an absolute necessity for rapid.
- 13:54Speaker 1: Response because speed is everything.
- 13:57Speaker 2: Right, if the US is facing a massive incoming stef drike,
- 14:00Speaker 2: say hundreds of warheads screaming over the North Pole, the
- 14:03Speaker 2: system must allow for I launch. Under a tax scenario
- 14:06Speaker 2: where a decision is made and executed in.
- 14:09Speaker 1: Mere minutes, you don't have time for a debate exactly.
- 14:12Speaker 2: Any required consultation with Congress, or even a required legal
- 14:16Speaker 2: consensus among cabinet members would simply take too long. It
- 14:19Speaker 2: would render the deterrent entirely useless.
- 14:21Speaker 1: Okay, I see that logic, and the other side.
- 14:24Speaker 2: On the other side, critics worry deeply about exactly what
- 14:27Speaker 2: you just outlined, the risks of a single individual holding
- 14:31Speaker 2: this power without traditional democratic.
- 14:34Speaker 1: Checks and balances, because it's basically a monarchy in that
- 14:37Speaker 1: one specific instance.
- 14:38Speaker 2: Essentially, yes, they fear it leaves the world profoundly vulnerable
- 14:42Speaker 2: to a rash, miscalculated, or psychologically impaired decision.
- 14:47Speaker 1: But surely the military isn't just a blind machine. I mean,
- 14:50Speaker 1: generals and officers take an oath to the Constitution, not
- 14:53Speaker 1: to a king. They don't just blindly push buttons, do they?
- 14:57Speaker 2: You're exactly right, and that brings us to the Uniform
- 15:00Speaker 2: Code of Military Justice or the UCMJ.
- 15:03Speaker 1: Okay, the military law.
- 15:04Speaker 2: Yes, under the UCMJ, military personnel are required to obey
- 15:07Speaker 2: lawful orders, but crucially, they are also legally required to
- 15:11Speaker 2: refuse unlawful orders.
- 15:13Speaker 1: Okay, so what makes a nuclear strike unlawful?
- 15:15Speaker 2: It falls under the international principles of Justin Bellow, the
- 15:18Speaker 2: Laws of armed conflict. Any military attack must meet certain
- 15:21Speaker 2: strict criteria, primarily proportionality and distinction.
- 15:25Speaker 1: Distinction meaning you have to distinguish between military targets and
- 15:28Speaker 1: innocent civilians, and proportionality meaning you can't use a sledgehammer
- 15:33Speaker 1: to crack a nut. You can't nuke a city because
- 15:36Speaker 1: they shot down a surveillance drone precisely.
- 15:39Speaker 2: And this isn't just a theoretical debate they have in
- 15:41Speaker 2: law school. General John Heighten, when he was commander of
- 15:44Speaker 2: US Strategic Command, famously testified to Congress on this exact issue.
- 15:49Speaker 1: What did he say?
- 15:50Speaker 2: He stated plainly that he would advise the President against
- 15:53Speaker 2: an unlawful nuclear strike order, and if the President pressed
- 15:57Speaker 2: the issue, Heightened testified, he would refuse to execute it.
- 16:00Speaker 1: He would literally say no to the president.
- 16:02Speaker 2: He would, he said, he would opt instead to find
- 16:05Speaker 2: a proportional, legal, conventional alternative to present to the commander
- 16:10Speaker 2: in chief.
- 16:10Speaker 1: Okay, but wait, if the president opens the black book,
- 16:14Speaker 1: those are pre planned options. Didn't you say earlier that
- 16:17Speaker 1: those are basically a menu of apocalypse that the military
- 16:19Speaker 1: already created. Yes, I did so. If the military created them,
- 16:22Speaker 1: aren't they already legal?
- 16:23Speaker 2: That is the catch. The preset war plans currently developed
- 16:27Speaker 2: under what's known as O Plan eighty ten are exhaustively
- 16:30Speaker 2: pre vetted by armies of military lawyers at Stratcom because
- 16:34Speaker 2: they have already been scrubbed for legality. Proportionality and distinction
- 16:38Speaker 2: in various hypothetical scenarios. Any order pulled directly from that
- 16:43Speaker 2: book is presumptively a lawful order.
- 16:46Speaker 1: The assumption is that the lawyers have already given it
- 16:48Speaker 1: the green light years ago exactly, which brings up a
- 16:51Speaker 1: chilling piece of history that perfectly encapsulates this nightmare. It's
- 16:56Speaker 1: the story of Major Herold Herring.
- 16:58Speaker 2: Ah, Yes, Major Herring. It's a profound case study and
- 17:02Speaker 2: the tension of this entire system.
- 17:03Speaker 1: It really is. So it's nineteen seventy five. Major Herring
- 17:07Speaker 1: is an Air Force missileer. He's one of the guys
- 17:09Speaker 1: sitting in the underground bunker behind a multi ton blast door,
- 17:13Speaker 1: just waiting to turn the key.
- 17:14Speaker 2: A tremendous amount of pressure on those officers.
- 17:17Speaker 1: Right, and during his training, he asks a simple, incredibly
- 17:19Speaker 1: logical question. He asks, how can I know that an
- 17:23Speaker 1: order I received to launch my missiles came from a
- 17:25Speaker 1: sane president?
- 17:26Speaker 2: A completely rational, deeply human.
- 17:28Speaker 1: Question, totally rational. He just wanted to know what the
- 17:31Speaker 1: safeguard was. But the military's response, they didn't explain it
- 17:34Speaker 1: to her.
- 17:35Speaker 2: They do.
- 17:35Speaker 1: They discharged him, They fired him just for asking the question.
- 17:39Speaker 1: Because the entire system of deterrence relies on absolute, unquestioning
- 17:43Speaker 1: reliability at the operator level.
- 17:46Speaker 2: The system breaks down if there's hesitation exactly if.
- 17:49Speaker 1: The operators in the silos are debating the president's psychological
- 17:53Speaker 1: state or the geopolitical nuances of the order, the deterrent fails.
- 17:57Speaker 1: The adversary has to know that if the order is given,
- 18:01Speaker 1: the keys will turn without.
- 18:02Speaker 2: Question, exactly right. The system is intentionally designed to remove
- 18:06Speaker 2: hesitation at the silo level. However, there is a mechanical
- 18:10Speaker 2: guard rail in place at that level, known as the
- 18:13Speaker 2: two person rule.
- 18:14Speaker 1: Right the classic movie trope where two people have to
- 18:16Speaker 1: turn their keys at the exact same time. Is that
- 18:18Speaker 1: actually how it works in real life.
- 18:19Speaker 2: It is a very real, highly engineered process. Once the verified,
- 18:24Speaker 2: authenticated order reaches the launch facility, two operators must independently
- 18:29Speaker 2: verify the message format and the cryptographic.
- 18:31Speaker 1: Codes, so they both have to agree the message is
- 18:33Speaker 1: real yes.
- 18:35Speaker 2: Then they must turn their launch keys simultaneously within a
- 18:39Speaker 2: very narrow time window, and the consoles in the launch
- 18:42Speaker 2: control center are physically spaced far enough apart, usually about
- 18:45Speaker 2: twelve feet, that one person cannot physically reach both keys
- 18:49Speaker 2: at the same time.
- 18:50Speaker 1: Oh, that's brilliant. It prevents a single rogue operator from
- 18:53Speaker 1: starting World War III because they had a bad day exactly.
- 18:56Speaker 2: Furthermore, the weapons themselves are safeguarded by permissive action links
- 19:00Speaker 2: or pls.
- 19:01Speaker 1: I've heard the acronym pls before. What exactly is a
- 19:05Speaker 1: pl How does it actually stop a launch?
- 19:07Speaker 2: This is a fascinating piece of Cold War engineering. Back
- 19:11Speaker 2: in the early sixties, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was
- 19:14Speaker 2: completely horrified to discover that US nuclear weapons station in
- 19:18Speaker 2: Europe were essentially guarded by standard issue padlocks.
- 19:21Speaker 1: You're joking.
- 19:22Speaker 2: Padlocks, just regular padlocks. Anyone with bolt cutters could technically
- 19:26Speaker 2: access the weapon. So they develop pls.
- 19:29Speaker 1: Okay, so what are they?
- 19:30Speaker 2: These are highly advanced cryptographic locks embedded deeply within the
- 19:34Speaker 2: weapons firing system. They physically prevent a nuclear detonation unless
- 19:39Speaker 2: the correct authorization code is inputed, so.
- 19:41Speaker 1: Even if you steal the bomb, you can't blow it
- 19:43Speaker 1: up right.
- 19:44Speaker 2: Modern category fpls use complex split knowledge cryptography, meaning no
- 19:50Speaker 2: single person has the full code, and if you try
- 19:52Speaker 2: to bypass the pl by physically tampering with the warhead,
- 19:56Speaker 2: it will deliberately disable its own firing components, It essentially
- 19:59Speaker 2: brick itself exactly bricks the weapon.
- 20:02Speaker 1: Okay, here's where this gets really interesting and frankly a
- 20:05Speaker 1: bit logically inconsistent to me. How So, we have this
- 20:09Speaker 1: massive technological architecture pls, two person rules, satellites, all designed
- 20:14Speaker 1: to execute an order in maybe ten to fifteen minutes,
- 20:18Speaker 1: very fast, right, But we also have the UCMJA saying
- 20:20Speaker 1: orders must be strictly lawful and proportionate. So isn't there
- 20:24Speaker 1: an inherent, almost impossible conflict between the extreme speed required
- 20:28Speaker 1: to launch under attack and the time needed to deliberately
- 20:31Speaker 1: debate if an order is truly lawful or proportionate.
- 20:33Speaker 2: That is the central paradox of nuclear command and control.
- 20:37Speaker 2: You are asking human beings to make the most consequential, legal, ethical,
- 20:41Speaker 2: and strategic decisions in human history in the time it
- 20:43Speaker 2: takes to brew a pot of coffee. It's insane. So
- 20:47Speaker 2: if the system is primed for this kind of immediate execution,
- 20:51Speaker 2: what is the underlying philosophy that dictates when we would
- 20:54Speaker 2: actually use it. We have the machine, but what is
- 20:57Speaker 2: the strategy driving the machine.
- 20:59Speaker 1: That takes us out of the physical hardware and into
- 21:01Speaker 1: the realm of declaratory policy and strategy. But before we
- 21:05Speaker 1: dive into the strategy that governs the apocalypse, I want
- 21:08Speaker 1: to gently remind you, the listener, that if you are
- 21:10Speaker 1: finding these strategic insects valuable, be sure to drop us
- 21:14Speaker 1: a five star rating.
- 21:15Speaker 2: Yes, please do.
- 21:16Speaker 1: We are pulling back the curtain on things that usually
- 21:18Speaker 1: stay buried in dense white papers, and your support helps
- 21:21Speaker 1: us keep doing that.
- 21:23Speaker 2: Yes, five stars on your app of choice. Okay, so
- 21:26Speaker 2: let's talk strategy. I know administrations frequently review and update
- 21:30Speaker 2: their nuclear policies.
- 21:31Speaker 1: They do. Every recent administration has conducted one. I spend
- 21:34Speaker 1: considerable time analyzing the twenty twenty two Nuclear Posture Review
- 21:38Speaker 1: or the MPR, which the Biden administration released alongside the
- 21:42Speaker 1: National Defense Strategy and the Missile Defense Review.
- 21:44Speaker 2: Okay, so what did you find in there? What's absolutely
- 21:46Speaker 2: fascinating here is the sheer continuity. Despite wildly shifting geopolitical
- 21:52Speaker 2: wins and highly polarized domestic politics, the twenty twenty two
- 21:55Speaker 2: NPR maintains decades of established bipartisan US.
- 22:00Speaker 1: Policy, So they didn't really change the rule book.
- 22:02Speaker 2: Not fundamentally. It clearly emphasizes that the United States would
- 22:06Speaker 2: only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances
- 22:10Speaker 2: to defend the vital interests of the US or its
- 22:13Speaker 2: allies and partners.
- 22:14Speaker 1: But didn't they deeply debate changing the rules on when
- 22:17Speaker 1: we would strike first. I remember a lot of noise
- 22:19Speaker 1: about that leading up to the release of the MPR.
- 22:22Speaker 2: They did. There was significant anticipation in the defense community
- 22:25Speaker 2: around whether the US would adopt a no first use
- 22:28Speaker 2: policy commonly called NFU.
- 22:30Speaker 1: Meaning we promised publicly and officially never to be the
- 22:34Speaker 1: first ones to launch a nuclear weapon in a conflict.
- 22:36Speaker 1: We will only use them in retaliation exactly.
- 22:39Speaker 2: Or Similarly, there was debate over a sole purpose policy,
- 22:42Speaker 2: which would state that the only purpose of our nuclear
- 22:45Speaker 2: arsenal is to deter or respond to a nuclear attack,
- 22:48Speaker 2: explicitly taking other types of attacks off the table.
- 22:50Speaker 1: Like biological weapons.
- 22:52Speaker 2: Right. Ultimately, the twenty twenty two NPR explicitly rejected adopting
- 22:57Speaker 2: both of those policies.
- 22:58Speaker 1: Wow, so we absolutely reserve the right to strike first.
- 23:01Speaker 2: Yes, we do. And again, examining this impartially, you see
- 23:04Speaker 2: a sharp, deeply philosophical divide in the policy world.
- 23:08Speaker 1: Tell me about the two sides.
- 23:09Speaker 2: Well, Disarmament advocates heavily criticize the twenty twenty two NPR
- 23:13Speaker 2: for this decision. They argue that failing to adopt no
- 23:17Speaker 2: first use misses a crucial historical opportunity to de escalate
- 23:21Speaker 2: global tensions.
- 23:22Speaker 1: Because it keeps everyone on itge right.
- 23:24Speaker 2: Their perspective is that keeping a first strike option open
- 23:27Speaker 2: fuels paranoia, encourages adversaries to keep their own weapons on
- 23:31Speaker 2: hair trigger alert, and vastly increases the risk of a
- 23:35Speaker 2: miscalculated nuclear war. They feel it's a step backward from
- 23:38Speaker 2: global arms reduction goals.
- 23:40Speaker 1: Wait, let me play devil's advocate here, because I understand
- 23:42Speaker 1: the disarmament side, but ambiguity sounds like a match near
- 23:45Speaker 1: a powder cake, not a shield.
- 23:47Speaker 2: It can be seen that way.
- 23:48Speaker 1: If China or Rush it doesn't know exactly where our
- 23:50Speaker 1: red line is, aren't they more likely to miscalculate? Why
- 23:53Speaker 1: not just be perfectly clear and say we will only
- 23:55Speaker 1: use these if you use them.
- 23:57Speaker 2: It's a very valid challenge, and it's the core of
- 23:59Speaker 2: the n F you debate, But the deterrence realists look
- 24:02Speaker 2: at it through a completely different lens, specifically the lens
- 24:05Speaker 2: of extended deterrence.
- 24:06Speaker 1: Extended deterrence meaning protecting our friends.
- 24:09Speaker 2: Yes, they commend the NPR for recognizing the harsh, messy
- 24:13Speaker 2: realities of the modern threat environment. Their argument is that
- 24:17Speaker 2: US allies, think of South Korea, Japan, or NATO members
- 24:21Speaker 2: who do not have their own nuclear weapons are highly
- 24:24Speaker 2: vulnerable to devastating non nuclear strategic attack.
- 24:27Speaker 1: Oh, I sink, we're.
- 24:28Speaker 2: Talking about massive conventional invasions, devastating cyber attacks that cripple
- 24:33Speaker 2: a nation's power grid, or the use of engineered biological weapons.
- 24:36Speaker 1: Ah. So if we say we will never use nukes first,
- 24:40Speaker 1: we are basically telling an adversary they can use biological
- 24:43Speaker 1: weapons on an ally and they won't get nuked in return.
- 24:46Speaker 2: Precisely, Therefore, the deterrece realists argue that the deliberate ambiguity
- 24:51Speaker 2: of the US keeping a nuclear first use option on
- 24:54Speaker 2: the table is absolutely necessary. It deters adversaries from launching
- 24:58Speaker 2: catastrophic non nuclear war against our allies.
- 25:01Speaker 1: The fear of the unknown is what restrains the adversary.
- 25:03Speaker 1: It's like, okay, it's like owning a state of the
- 25:06Speaker 1: art security system but refusing to put up a sign
- 25:08Speaker 1: in your yard that says we will only activate this
- 25:11Speaker 1: if you shoot first.
- 25:13Speaker 2: That's a great way to think about it.
- 25:14Speaker 1: By keeping the exact trigger ambiguous, you force the intruder
- 25:18Speaker 1: to second guess every single move they might make, whether
- 25:22Speaker 1: they are breaking in with a gun, a knife, or
- 25:24Speaker 1: just a crowbar. They don't know what will trigger the
- 25:27Speaker 1: ultimate alarm, so they just don't blink in at all.
- 25:29Speaker 2: That's a highly accurate analogy. The ambiguity itself is the
- 25:33Speaker 2: structural pillar of the deterrent.
- 25:35Speaker 1: Okay, so let's walk down the darkest possible path. The
- 25:38Speaker 1: intruder breaks in anyway, the terrence fails, the ambiguity didn't work,
- 25:43Speaker 1: the threshold is crossed, and the president gives the authenticated order.
- 25:46Speaker 2: A terrible scenario.
- 25:48Speaker 1: What exactly are we aiming at when those silo doors open?
- 25:51Speaker 1: What is the philosophy behind the crosshairs?
- 25:53Speaker 2: The evolution of targeting theory is a dark, macabre, but
- 25:57Speaker 2: absolutely essential subject to understand. Historically, during the early to
- 26:01Speaker 2: mid Cold War, the prevailing theory was something called counter value.
- 26:09Speaker 1: Counter value that sounds very clinical and sanitized, what does
- 26:13Speaker 1: it actually mean? In reality?
- 26:15Speaker 2: It means targeting what the adversary values most in terms
- 26:18Speaker 2: of population and industry. So cities in brutally plain terms, Yes,
- 26:24Speaker 2: it means targeting cities and civilian populations. It was the
- 26:28Speaker 2: fundamental concept of assured massive retaliation.
- 26:32Speaker 1: Like mutually assured destruction.
- 26:34Speaker 2: Exactly. The strategic logic was that the threat of losing
- 26:37Speaker 2: your major population centers, your cultural hubs, your workforce, that
- 26:42Speaker 2: was the ultimate undeniable deterrent.
- 26:44Speaker 1: Because no one wants their country turned into ash.
- 26:47Speaker 2: Right. However, counter value targeting is largely considered obsolete and
- 26:50Speaker 2: lacking credibility.
- 26:51Speaker 1: Today because it's a massive war crime.
- 26:53Speaker 2: Exactly. Under modern international humanitarian law, intentionally targeting civilian populations
- 27:00Speaker 2: violates the core principle of distinction we.
- 27:01Speaker 1: Talked about earlier, right just in Bello.
- 27:04Speaker 2: Furthermore, there is a globally recognized nuclear taboo that has
- 27:07Speaker 2: solidified over the decades since nineteen forty five. Threatening to
- 27:11Speaker 2: vaporize millions of innocent civilians is not only legally fraught,
- 27:14Speaker 2: but politically and morally abhorrent.
- 27:17Speaker 1: The rest of the world would completely turn against you.
- 27:19Speaker 2: They would, And from a pure strategic standpoint, if an
- 27:23Speaker 2: adversary believes the US President would be too morally constrained
- 27:26Speaker 2: to actually carry out in order to destroy a city,
- 27:30Speaker 2: then the threat isn't credible.
- 27:31Speaker 1: And if the threat is incredible, it's not a deterrent.
- 27:34Speaker 2: Exactly, you've lost the psychological edge.
- 27:36Speaker 1: So if we aren't aiming at cities, we move to
- 27:39Speaker 1: the alternative, which I've heard called counterforce.
- 27:42Speaker 2: Yes, counterforce targeting shifts the crosshairs away from civilian populations
- 27:47Speaker 2: and directly onto the adversary's military and nuclear assets.
- 27:52Speaker 1: So you shoot at their guns, not their people.
- 27:54Speaker 2: Right, You target their missile silos, their commanding control bunkers,
- 27:57Speaker 2: their submarine pens, their bomber bases. The goal is to
- 28:01Speaker 2: destroy their ability to wage war against you.
- 28:04Speaker 1: That sounds significantly more ethical, relatively speaking, but from an
- 28:08Speaker 1: engineering perspective, it also sounds infinitely harder to pull off.
- 28:12Speaker 2: It is exponentially harder. It requires immense, highly precise technological capability.
- 28:17Speaker 1: Because you have to be perfectly accurate.
- 28:19Speaker 2: Exactly, you aren't just dropping a massive gravity bomb on
- 28:22Speaker 2: a sprawling city where being off by a mile doesn't
- 28:25Speaker 2: really matter. You are trying to hit a reinforced concrete
- 28:28Speaker 2: silo no bigger than a house from half a world away,
- 28:32Speaker 2: flying through the atmosphere at mock twenty. Furthermore, adversaries know
- 28:36Speaker 2: this is our strategy. So they adapt. They build what
- 28:40Speaker 2: the military calls hard and deeply buried targets or hdbts.
- 28:45Speaker 1: What are we talking about there, We.
- 28:47Speaker 2: Are talking about command bunkers tunneled hundreds of feet deep
- 28:50Speaker 2: inside solid granite mountains.
- 28:52Speaker 1: You can't just blow those up with a standard air.
- 28:54Speaker 2: Burd No, you can't. Destroying those targets requires specialized high
- 28:58Speaker 2: yield earth penetrating weapons, weapons designed to crash through the
- 29:02Speaker 2: rock and detonate underground to create a localized seismic shockwave.
- 29:06Speaker 1: Like an artificial earthquake, to crush the bunker. Exactly.
- 29:09Speaker 2: But even straight counter force has evolved into something much
- 29:12Speaker 2: more nuanced now, right, It's not just about hitting every
- 29:15Speaker 2: single tank and silo anymore.
- 29:16Speaker 1: Yeah, I've heard they have a new approach they do.
- 29:19Speaker 2: The modern sophisticated approach is often referred to as tailored targeting.
- 29:23Speaker 1: Tailored targeting like a bespoke suit of destruction.
- 29:27Speaker 2: That's well, that's one way to put it. It is
- 29:29Speaker 2: a highly refined, deeply psychological concept. Instead of a one
- 29:33Speaker 2: size fits all retaliation of hitting cities or hitting silos,
- 29:36Speaker 2: tailored targeting focuses on holding at risk what that specific adversaries,
- 29:41Speaker 2: leadership values most So.
- 29:43Speaker 1: You literally have to get inside the minds of their
- 29:46Speaker 1: leadership exactly.
- 29:47Speaker 2: It requires a profound, granular intelligence understanding of a specific
- 29:52Speaker 2: adversaries decision making process, and their power structure.
- 29:56Speaker 1: Give me an example of how that works.
- 29:58Speaker 2: You have to ask what does an authority tarian dictator
- 30:00Speaker 2: value more than anything else. Is it their elite military guard,
- 30:05Speaker 2: is it their personal fortified command bunkers. Is it the
- 30:08Speaker 2: specific industrial base that funds their regime's internal security apparatus.
- 30:13Speaker 1: So you don't care about their regular army. You hit
- 30:16Speaker 1: what keeps them in power.
- 30:17Speaker 2: You tailor the target package to threaten the specific pillars
- 30:21Speaker 2: that keep that specific leadership in power. It's highly customized.
- 30:24Speaker 1: Okay, but I have a major issue with this theory.
- 30:26Speaker 1: Let's say you figure out what the dictator values, but
- 30:29Speaker 1: if that adversary deliberately hides their most valued military assets
- 30:34Speaker 1: beneath civilian populations, which we know happens constantly in modern
- 30:37Speaker 1: asymmetrical warfare, doesn't tailor targeting just become counter value by proxy.
- 30:43Speaker 2: It's a very dark gray area.
- 30:45Speaker 1: How do you separate the two When an elite command
- 30:48Speaker 1: bunker is deliberately built beneath a civilian hospital, or right
- 30:52Speaker 1: in the middle of a dense urban center in a
- 30:54Speaker 1: capital city.
- 30:55Speaker 2: You've just hit on one of the most agonizing, unsolvable
- 30:58Speaker 2: complexities of my mind, conflict. If an adversary deliberately uses
- 31:02Speaker 2: human shields, the legal and ethical calculus becomes incredibly.
- 31:06Speaker 1: Fraud So what does the military do.
- 31:08Speaker 2: The military still attempts to adhere to proportionality. They weigh
- 31:12Speaker 2: the direct military advantage of destroying the bunker against the
- 31:14Speaker 2: anticipated civilian collateral damage.
- 31:17Speaker 1: But with a nuke, that math is terrible.
- 31:19Speaker 2: It is the brutal reality of a nuclear detonation, even
- 31:21Speaker 2: a low yield one, means the collateral damage from blast waves,
- 31:25Speaker 2: thermal radiation, and fallout would be catastrophic. In those scenarios,
- 31:29Speaker 2: the pristine theoretical line between counter force and counter value
- 31:32Speaker 2: blurs heavily in practice.
- 31:34Speaker 1: And these targeting theories, as complex and fraud as they are,
- 31:39Speaker 1: they don't exist in a vacuum. They aren't just academic exercises.
- 31:43Speaker 1: The real world is shifting under our feet right now, dramatically,
- 31:47Speaker 1: so looking at the geopolitical data, it's clear we are
- 31:50Speaker 1: currently undergoing the most dramatic shift in nuclear dynamics since
- 31:54Speaker 1: the early days of the Cold War.
- 31:55Speaker 2: We are entering completely uncharted strategic territory. For decades, the
- 32:01Speaker 2: global nuclear architecture was essentially a bipolar.
- 32:04Speaker 1: Stand off US and Russia.
- 32:05Speaker 2: Right, it was a giant, terrifying seesaw between the United
- 32:08Speaker 2: States and the Soviet Union and later Russia, two players
- 32:12Speaker 2: balancing each other out.
- 32:13Speaker 1: But now we have a massive third player. We have
- 32:16Speaker 1: to talk about China.
- 32:17Speaker 2: We must. The expansion of China's nuclear arsenal is quite
- 32:20Speaker 2: frankly staggering. It is a fundamental alteration of the global
- 32:24Speaker 2: balance of power.
- 32:25Speaker 1: I was looking at the recent projections and they are breathtaking. Historically,
- 32:28Speaker 1: China maintained what they called a minimum.
- 32:30Speaker 2: Turn right, a very small force.
- 32:32Speaker 1: They kept a relatively small number of weapons, just enough
- 32:36Speaker 1: to ensure they could retaliate if they were attacked. But
- 32:39Speaker 1: recent satellite imagery and intelligence reveals a rapid, unprecedented nuclear
- 32:45Speaker 1: build up.
- 32:45Speaker 2: They are moving incredibly fast.
- 32:47Speaker 1: They are building massive new silo fields in the western deserts,
- 32:51Speaker 1: expanding their ballistic missile submarine fleets, and developing advanced bomber capabilities.
- 32:57Speaker 1: They are sprinting to achieve a full, highly capable, survivable nuclear.
- 33:02Speaker 2: Triad and then numbers are shocking, right.
- 33:05Speaker 1: The projection suggest they will possess at least one thousand
- 33:08Speaker 1: deliverable nuclear warheads by the end of this decade, or
- 33:11Speaker 1: certainly into the twenty thirties.
- 33:13Speaker 2: It is a breath taking breakout. Meanwhile, Russia remains what
- 33:16Speaker 2: the defense community calls the pacing threat.
- 33:18Speaker 1: Right. They aren't just fading into the background because China
- 33:20Speaker 1: is building.
- 33:21Speaker 2: Up, not at all. Russia continues to possess the most
- 33:24Speaker 2: diverse and capable nuclear arsenal on the planet, heavily modernized.
- 33:28Speaker 1: Over the last decade, and their doctrine is very aggressive
- 33:30Speaker 1: right now.
- 33:31Speaker 2: Yes, what's particularly concerning about Russia's current posture is their
- 33:35Speaker 2: deep integration of nuclear rhetoric into their conventional operations. We've
- 33:39Speaker 2: seen this starkly in Ukraine.
- 33:41Speaker 1: The constant threats exactly.
- 33:43Speaker 2: Russian leadership uses veiled and sometimes explicit nuclear threats as
- 33:48Speaker 2: a strategic shield. They rattle the nuclear saber to deter
- 33:52Speaker 2: Western intervention and limit NATO support while they conduct a
- 33:55Speaker 2: conventional war. It's an aggressive strategy of escalate to disc late.
- 34:00Speaker 1: So we have an aggressively expanding China building a triad
- 34:04Speaker 1: from scratch and a highly capable rhetorically aggressive Russia leveraging
- 34:09Speaker 1: their arsenal for conventional games, which creates.
- 34:11Speaker 2: The ultimate strategic nightmare, the two peer dilemma.
- 34:15Speaker 1: The two peer dilemma.
- 34:16Speaker 2: Right, if we connect this to the bigger picture, for
- 34:18Speaker 2: the first time in its history, US nuclear strategy must
- 34:21Speaker 2: account for two major, fully capable, nuclear armed peers simultaneously.
- 34:26Speaker 1: That completely breaks the old Cold War math, doesn't it
- 34:29Speaker 1: seesaw doesn't work with three people.
- 34:31Speaker 2: It strains the underlying logic of deterrence to its absolute limits.
- 34:35Speaker 2: Critics of the twenty twenty two MPR argue that the
- 34:38Speaker 2: review takes a somewhat business as usual approach to this new.
- 34:42Speaker 1: Reality, meaning they aren't adapting fast enough.
- 34:45Speaker 2: That's a criticism. They argue it fails to adequately detail
- 34:48Speaker 2: a concrete force structure solution, meaning exactly how many weapons, submarines,
- 34:54Speaker 2: and bombers we actually need to deter a simultaneous two peer.
- 34:57Speaker 1: Threat, because what happens if they team up?
- 35:00Speaker 2: Exactly what happens if Russia and China were to actively
- 35:03Speaker 2: cooperate or coordinate in a global crisis. How do we
- 35:06Speaker 2: divide our deterrence?
- 35:07Speaker 1: And we have to remember the sheer destructive power we
- 35:10Speaker 1: were talking about here, Because warhead is a sterile word.
- 35:14Speaker 1: It sounds like a piece of machinery.
- 35:15Speaker 2: It obscures what it actually does.
- 35:17Speaker 1: Right. The yield reality of these weapons makes the World
- 35:19Speaker 1: War two bombs look incredibly small, almost primitive. It's easy
- 35:23Speaker 1: to lose perspective, but these figures just stop you in
- 35:26Speaker 1: your tracks.
- 35:27Speaker 2: The leap in technology is terrifying.
- 35:29Speaker 1: It is The bomb dropped on Hiroshima, which devastated an
- 35:33Speaker 1: entire city, flattened infrastructure for miles, and changed the course
- 35:36Speaker 1: of human history, had a yield of about sixteen kilotons.
- 35:40Speaker 2: Sixteen kilotons.
- 35:41Speaker 1: Today, a modern US submarine launched ballistic missile like the
- 35:44Speaker 1: Trident the second can carry multiple independent warheads. Just one
- 35:48Speaker 1: of those warheads, like the W seventy six, yields around
- 35:52Speaker 1: one hundred kilotons.
- 35:53Speaker 2: Almost seven times the size of Hiroshima, and.
- 35:55Speaker 1: The land based ICBMs in the silos, or the heavier
- 35:58Speaker 1: submarine warheads like the Double eight those can yield upwards
- 36:02Speaker 1: of four hundred and seventy five kilotons.
- 36:04Speaker 2: It's hard to even picture that.
- 36:05Speaker 1: One single warhead is roughly thirty times more powerful than
- 36:08Speaker 1: the weapon that destroyed Eroshima. And one missile can carry
- 36:12Speaker 1: several of them.
- 36:12Speaker 2: It is an almost incomprehensible level of destructive energy, capable
- 36:16Speaker 2: of vaporizing steel and concrete, instantly multiplied by thousands of
- 36:20Speaker 2: warheads across the globe.
- 36:22Speaker 1: So what does this all mean for the two peer dilemma?
- 36:25Speaker 1: If we are facing two massive peers who might cooperate
- 36:28Speaker 1: and we have these massive yields, do we have to
- 36:30Speaker 1: match their combined numbers weapon for weapon?
- 36:33Speaker 2: That is the debate.
- 36:34Speaker 1: This seems like a vital question. If Russia has fifteen
- 36:37Speaker 1: hundred deployed warheads and China builds up to one thousand,
- 36:41Speaker 1: does the US need twenty five hundred to maintain deterrence
- 36:44Speaker 1: or does the logic of deterrence have a ceiling?
- 36:47Speaker 2: What do you mean by a ceiling?
- 36:48Speaker 1: Well, at a certain point, doesn't the ability to destroy
- 36:51Speaker 1: an adversary five times over deter them just as well
- 36:55Speaker 1: as the ability to destroy them ten times over?
- 36:57Speaker 2: That is the multi trillion dollar question, the absolute center
- 37:01Speaker 2: of current strategic debates. Some analysts argue, exactly what you
- 37:05Speaker 2: just proposed, deterrence has a ceiling.
- 37:07Speaker 1: So we don't need to match them, right, They argue.
- 37:09Speaker 2: For sufficiency, once you possess a secure, survivable second strike
- 37:14Speaker 2: capability that can inflict unacceptable civilization ending damage on both
- 37:18Speaker 2: Russia and China. Building more weapons is strategically redundant.
- 37:22Speaker 1: It's just wasting money at that point.
- 37:24Speaker 2: That's their argument. You don't need mathematical parity in numbers
- 37:27Speaker 2: to deter an adversary. You just need the undeniable capacity
- 37:31Speaker 2: to ruin their country, which.
- 37:33Speaker 1: Makes logical sense. Why build more if the world has
- 37:35Speaker 1: already ended? But I assume there's fierce pushback against that.
- 37:39Speaker 2: There is massive pushback. The other camp argues that numbers
- 37:43Speaker 2: do matter profoundly, especially for extended deterrence and allied assurance.
- 37:48Speaker 1: Going back to our allies again.
- 37:50Speaker 2: Always, if our allies in Asia or Europe see that
- 37:53Speaker 2: the US is vastly outnumbered by a combined Sino Russian force,
- 37:57Speaker 2: they might lose faith in the credibility of the U
- 37:59Speaker 2: s U nuclear umbrella.
- 38:01Speaker 1: And if they lose faith, they build their own nukes.
- 38:03Speaker 2: Exactly, they might seek to develop their own nuclear weapons
- 38:06Speaker 2: to protect themselves, leading to massive, destabilizing global proliferation.
- 38:11Speaker 1: Which is everyone's worst nightmare right.
- 38:13Speaker 2: Furthermore, if your strategy relies on counterforce targeting, meaning you
- 38:17Speaker 2: have to hit their military assets. You inherently need a
- 38:20Speaker 2: sufficient number of warheads to cover all of their rapidly
- 38:23Speaker 2: expanding targets.
- 38:24Speaker 1: Oh, because every new silo they build is a new
- 38:26Speaker 1: target you have to hit.
- 38:27Speaker 2: Exactly, if China builds three hundred new silos, you need
- 38:31Speaker 2: three hundred new warheads to hold them at risk.
- 38:33Speaker 1: It's a terrifying numbers game, a relentless mathematical treadmill, and
- 38:38Speaker 1: with more players, more targets, and infinitely more destructive power
- 38:42Speaker 1: on the board, the margin for air is essentially vanished
- 38:45Speaker 1: to zero.
- 38:45Speaker 2: Which brings us back to the systems managing all of this.
- 38:49Speaker 1: Right, which makes me wonder about the actual mechanics of
- 38:51Speaker 1: starting this process. How do we actually know an attack
- 38:55Speaker 1: is coming in the first place, And more importantly, how
- 38:58Speaker 1: do we prevent a false alarm like a slock of
- 39:00Speaker 1: geese on a radar screen or a computer glitch in
- 39:03Speaker 1: a server from ending the world.
- 39:05Speaker 2: That brings us to the technological frontier of early warning
- 39:09Speaker 2: and command infrastructure.
- 39:10Speaker 1: Right because the president can't make a decision, they can't
- 39:13Speaker 1: open the black book if they don't have perfectly accurate instantaneous.
- 39:17Speaker 2: Data exactly, the US relies on an incredibly complex layered
- 39:21Speaker 2: infrastructure of warning to ensure that data is accurate. A
- 39:25Speaker 2: critical first line component of this is the space based
- 39:28Speaker 2: Infrared system or.
- 39:30Speaker 1: SBIs space based infrared system. What does that look like?
- 39:33Speaker 2: These are highly advanced satellites sitting in geosynchronous orbit, equipped
- 39:37Speaker 2: with phenomenally sensitive infrared sensors.
- 39:39Speaker 1: So they are looking for heat.
- 39:41Speaker 2: Yes, they are designed to detect the intense heat signatures
- 39:44Speaker 2: the literal launch plumes of rocket motors. The moment a
- 39:47Speaker 2: ballistic missile leaves the launch pad anywhere on the surface.
- 39:50Speaker 1: Of the Earth, like a giant thermal camera in.
- 39:52Speaker 2: Space, exactly against the cold background of space, a massive
- 39:57Speaker 2: ICBM booster rocket lights up like a beacon, so.
- 40:01Speaker 1: The satellite see the heat flare. And then what happens?
- 40:04Speaker 2: That data is instantly relayed down to ground stations and
- 40:07Speaker 2: central command centers, primarily.
- 40:08Speaker 1: NORAD, the guys inside the mountain.
- 40:10Speaker 2: Rightch Iron Mountain, though operations have expanded. But here's the
- 40:14Speaker 2: critical vulnerability. What if a ground command center is destroyed
- 40:18Speaker 2: in a preemptive first strike, or what if the communication
- 40:22Speaker 2: lines are severed by a massive cyber attack or an
- 40:24Speaker 2: electromagnetic pulse.
- 40:25Speaker 1: Then the president is blind.
- 40:27Speaker 2: Which is unacceptable. The system has to have impenetrable redundancies,
- 40:32Speaker 2: and one of the most fascinating redundancies in the entire
- 40:35Speaker 2: US arsenal is.
- 40:36Speaker 1: Tecomo to como. That stands for take charge and move
- 40:40Speaker 1: out right. I always thought that sounded like something out
- 40:42Speaker 1: of an action movie.
- 40:42Speaker 2: It really does, but it's a very real, incredibly demanding mission.
- 40:46Speaker 2: TACAMO refers to a fleet of highly specialized airborne command
- 40:50Speaker 2: post aircraft, specifically the E six B Mercury, which is
- 40:54Speaker 2: essentially a heavily modified Boeing seven oh seven, just a.
- 40:58Speaker 1: Big commercial airliner modified of the apocalypse basically.
- 41:01Speaker 2: And these planes are constantly in the air or on
- 41:04Speaker 2: alert two hundred and forty seven three hundred and sixty
- 41:07Speaker 2: five days a year.
- 41:08Speaker 1: What makes them so special? Why not just use a
- 41:10Speaker 1: normal radio to talk to the subs.
- 41:12Speaker 2: Because normal radio waves don't travel well through water at all,
- 41:16Speaker 2: and the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad is
- 41:18Speaker 2: the submarine fleet hiding deep in the oceans.
- 41:21Speaker 1: You could just call them on a cell phone.
- 41:22Speaker 2: No, if ground communications fail, Tacomo aircraft have a specific mission.
- 41:28Speaker 2: They use trailing wire antennas to communicate securely with submerged
- 41:32Speaker 2: ballistic missile submarines and land based silos.
- 41:35Speaker 1: Ensuring the president can always transmit a launch shorder even
- 41:38Speaker 1: in the midst of a nuclear war.
- 41:39Speaker 2: Exactly now.
- 41:40Speaker 1: I read about these trailing wires, and the physics of
- 41:42Speaker 1: it is wild. They literally unspool a wire out the
- 41:45Speaker 1: back of the plane that is miles long.
- 41:47Speaker 2: Right, Yes, the primary wire is over five miles long,
- 41:50Speaker 2: five miles. They use very low frequency or VLF radio waves.
- 41:55Speaker 2: VLF waves have massive wavelengths, meaning they can bounce between
- 41:58Speaker 2: the ionosphere and the Earth's surface to travel.
- 42:01Speaker 1: Globally, and they can go under water.
- 42:03Speaker 2: Crucially, yes, they can pierce the surface of the ocean
- 42:06Speaker 2: to reach submarines without the subs having to surface and
- 42:08Speaker 2: expose themselves. But to transmit VLF effectively, the antenna has
- 42:13Speaker 2: to be perfectly vertical.
- 42:15Speaker 1: Wait, how do you keep a five mile wire vertical
- 42:18Speaker 1: behind an airplane flying at hundreds of miles an hour?
- 42:20Speaker 1: Wouldn't it just trail behind it like a tail?
- 42:22Speaker 2: Yes, normally it would. So the pilots have to perform
- 42:26Speaker 2: a continuous, incredibly steep tight banking maneuver, basically flying in
- 42:31Speaker 2: a continuous tight circle at near stall speed that sounds dangerous.
- 42:35Speaker 2: It is physically exhausting. They do this so that gravity
- 42:38Speaker 2: pulls the five mile wire straight down toward the ocean,
- 42:41Speaker 2: keeping it vertical, and they do this for hours on end.
- 42:44Speaker 2: It is an incredible technological and physical safety net, it is, but.
- 42:49Speaker 1: The factor that scares me the most in all of
- 42:51Speaker 1: my reading on this is time. We have this incredible tech,
- 42:54Speaker 1: satellites and five mile wires, but the human element is
- 42:58Speaker 1: squeezed into an impossibly tiny window, the thirty minute window.
- 43:01Speaker 2: The physical timeline is utterly unforgiving. Oh so well, if
- 43:05Speaker 2: a land based intercontinental ballistic missile and ICBM is launched
- 43:10Speaker 2: from deep within Russia toward the United States, its flight
- 43:14Speaker 2: time on a ballistic trajectory over the North Pole is
- 43:17Speaker 2: roughly thirty minutes.
- 43:19Speaker 1: Thirty minutes. That's a sitcom episode, that's a daily commute.
- 43:23Speaker 2: It's nothing, And that's not thirty minutes for the president
- 43:26Speaker 2: to sit and ponder their legacy.
- 43:28Speaker 1: Right, because detection takes time exactly.
- 43:31Speaker 2: The first few minutes of that window are consumed by
- 43:33Speaker 2: the SBR satellites detecting the launch bloom. The next several
- 43:37Speaker 2: minutes involve the military validating that the launch is.
- 43:40Speaker 1: Real, making sure it's not a glitch.
- 43:42Speaker 2: Right, They have to correlate the infrared data with ground
- 43:45Speaker 2: based early warning radars, assess its trajectory, and confirm it
- 43:49Speaker 2: is a definite threat to the homeland.
- 43:50Speaker 1: So how much time does the president actually get?
- 43:52Speaker 2: By the time the president is located, briefed on the
- 43:55Speaker 2: incoming threat, and presented with the football, they might have
- 43:58Speaker 2: less than ten or fifteen minut to review the dense
- 44:01Speaker 2: black book, select a retaliatory option, authenticate their identity with
- 44:05Speaker 2: the biscuit, and have the military transmit the order.
- 44:08Speaker 1: It's just staggering in human pressure. You're asking one person
- 44:13Speaker 1: to end the world before their coffee gets cold.
- 44:15Speaker 2: It is an incredible burden.
- 44:17Speaker 1: But wait, didn't you mention earlier that the twenty twenty
- 44:19Speaker 1: two NPR says we don't have to make that decision
- 44:21Speaker 1: in fifteen minutes. How is that possible if the missiles
- 44:24Speaker 1: are going to hit.
- 44:24Speaker 2: In thirty This is perhaps the most crucial stabilizing factor
- 44:27Speaker 2: in all of US policy. The NPR assures that US
- 44:30Speaker 2: nuclear forces, specifically those submarines hidden in the oceans and
- 44:34Speaker 2: the disperse bombers, are survivable enough to ride out an
- 44:38Speaker 2: initial strike.
- 44:40Speaker 1: Ah, So even if our land based silos are completely
- 44:43Speaker 1: wiped out, the subs are still out there, hiding in
- 44:45Speaker 1: the dark, ready to strike back.
- 44:47Speaker 2: Exactly because the US knows it has an assured second
- 44:50Speaker 2: strike capability that will definitively survive a massive surprise attack,
- 44:54Speaker 2: the President is not legally or strategically forced into a panicked,
- 44:58Speaker 2: use it or lose it scenario, so they don't have
- 45:00Speaker 2: to guess. They do not have to launch on warning
- 45:03Speaker 2: based purely on early radar data. If they want to,
- 45:06Speaker 2: they can wait for absolute, undeniable confirmation of a nuclear
- 45:09Speaker 2: detonation on US soil before retaliating.
- 45:12Speaker 1: This drastically reduces the catastrophic risk of starting a global
- 45:16Speaker 1: nuclear war over a radar glitch, a rogue satellite sensor,
- 45:20Speaker 1: or a system error.
- 45:21Speaker 2: It's a massive pressure relief valve.
- 45:23Speaker 1: Okay, that is a massive relief. But as technology advances,
- 45:27Speaker 1: that thirty minute window isn't getting any longer. In fact,
- 45:30Speaker 1: it's shrinking rapidly.
- 45:31Speaker 2: You're referring to the new delivery systems.
- 45:33Speaker 1: Right. I was looking into the development of hypersonic weapons.
- 45:36Speaker 1: These vehicles don't fly in a predictable, high arcing ballistic
- 45:40Speaker 1: trajectory over the pole.
- 45:41Speaker 2: Do they No, they don't. They fly at lower atmospheric trajectories.
- 45:44Speaker 1: And they maneuver unpredictably at speeds exceeding mock five. They
- 45:48Speaker 1: can evade traditional early warning radars until they are incredibly
- 45:52Speaker 1: close to their targets.
- 45:53Speaker 2: Which is terrifying for command and control.
- 45:55Speaker 1: It completely compresses that decision window from thirty minutes down
- 46:00Speaker 1: to maybe fifteen or even ten minutes from detection to impact, and.
- 46:03Speaker 2: That extreme compression of time creates intense psychological and operational
- 46:08Speaker 2: pressure on decision makers. When time is compressed, the risk
- 46:11Speaker 2: of miscalculation skyrockets.
- 46:14Speaker 1: And it's not just the delivery systems getting faster, it's
- 46:17Speaker 1: the entire information landscape getting murkier. We are fully living
- 46:21Speaker 1: in the era of artificial intelligence.
- 46:23Speaker 2: Now AI factor is huge.
- 46:25Speaker 1: We have AI generated deep fakes that look and sound
- 46:28Speaker 1: completely indistinguishable from reality. What happens in an escalating geopolitical
- 46:33Speaker 1: crisis if a deep fake video circulates on social media
- 46:37Speaker 1: showing a foreign leader declaring a preemptive nuclear launch, or.
- 46:41Speaker 2: Worse, what if AI is integrated into our own early
- 46:44Speaker 2: warning systems to speed up detection and data fusion. But
- 46:47Speaker 2: the AI hallucinates a threat that isn't there.
- 46:50Speaker 1: Exactly a machine hallucinating the end of the world.
- 46:52Speaker 2: This raises an incredibly important existential question about the future
- 46:56Speaker 2: of command and control. How do we integrate twenty first
- 46:59Speaker 2: century software with twentieth century apocalyptic hardware.
- 47:03Speaker 1: It sounds like a disaster waiting to happen.
- 47:05Speaker 2: However, I want to provide a vital piece of insight
- 47:07Speaker 2: from current policy that should offer some reassurance against that
- 47:10Speaker 2: specific nightmare scenario.
- 47:12Speaker 1: Please do, because a deep fake starting World War three
- 47:15Speaker 1: keeps me up at night.
- 47:16Speaker 2: While AI is heavily and necessarily used for data integration,
- 47:20Speaker 2: analyzing vast amounts of intelligence and processing early warning sensor
- 47:24Speaker 2: data much faster than a human could.
- 47:26Speaker 1: Right, the computers have to crunch the numbers.
- 47:28Speaker 2: US policy draws a very hard, non negotiable line. The
- 47:33Speaker 2: US strictly requires a human in the loop for any
- 47:36Speaker 2: nuclear employment decision.
- 47:38Speaker 1: So an AI cannot legally or physically turn the key,
- 47:41Speaker 1: no matter how fast it thinks. No.
- 47:43Speaker 2: The US has publicly committed and is actively pushing for
- 47:46Speaker 2: international agreements with other nuclear arm states to do the
- 47:49Speaker 2: exact same, to never hand the final launch authority over
- 47:53Speaker 2: to an autonomous system or an artificial intelligence network that
- 47:56Speaker 2: is huge. A human being with all our inherent flaws,
- 48:00Speaker 2: but also our profound capacity for moral reasoning, context and intuition,
- 48:05Speaker 2: must always make the final conscious decision to use nuclear weapons.
- 48:08Speaker 1: That is somewhat comforting. It's the ultimate policy firewall against
- 48:12Speaker 1: a literal terminator style scenario where the machine deicized humanity
- 48:15Speaker 1: is a threat to itself.
- 48:16Speaker 2: It's the last line of defense.
- 48:18Speaker 1: And listen, if you the listener, are as fascinated by
- 48:21Speaker 1: how this cutting edge technology intersects with the very survival
- 48:24Speaker 1: of our globe, please take a moment to rate the
- 48:26Speaker 1: show five stars. They do. It helps us bring these massive,
- 48:29Speaker 1: world altering concepts right to your headphones.
- 48:32Speaker 2: It is a profound intersection of technology, psychology, law, and policy.
- 48:37Speaker 1: We really appreciate the support it really is. And as
- 48:39Speaker 1: we wrap up this exploration, I find myself just reflecting
- 48:42Speaker 1: on the sheer, undeniable gravity of everything we've discussed today.
- 48:46Speaker 2: It's heavy material.
- 48:47Speaker 1: We started with the simple cinematic image of a red
- 48:50Speaker 1: button on a desk, and we uncovered a reality that
- 48:54Speaker 1: is vastly more complex and demanding. We are talking about
- 48:57Speaker 1: a forty five pound leather bag carried by a shadow
- 49:00Speaker 1: like military aid through hotel lobbies and emergency rooms.
- 49:04Speaker 2: We covered a lot of ground.
- 49:05Speaker 1: We really did. We're talking about the legal intricacies of
- 49:08Speaker 1: the UCMJ, the incredible moral responsibility placed on the shoulders
- 49:12Speaker 1: of underground silo operators like Major Herring, and a sprawling
- 49:16Speaker 1: multipolar geopolitical chess match involving thousands of megatons of destructive power.
- 49:22Speaker 2: It is a vast, complex and terrifying machine built right
- 49:26Speaker 2: on the edge of human capability.
- 49:28Speaker 1: But the core takeaway, the fundamental reason this entire architecture exists,
- 49:32Speaker 1: from the pay all cryptography to the trailing wires of
- 49:36Speaker 1: the Essex B Mercury, is the concept of deterrence.
- 49:40Speaker 2: De Terrence is everything.
- 49:41Speaker 1: The ultimate goal of building these weapons, writing these dense
- 49:45Speaker 1: posture reviews, and practicing these transitions of power is ensuring
- 49:49Speaker 1: that the system works so perfectly and so credibly that
- 49:53Speaker 1: it never actually has to be used.
- 49:54Speaker 2: The machine exists solely to prevent its own operation.
- 49:57Speaker 1: That's a beautiful way to say it.
- 49:59Speaker 2: That is dense, paradoxical hope of nuclear deterrence. But I
- 50:03Speaker 2: want to leave you with a final, perhaps chilling concept
- 50:06Speaker 2: to ponder as we step away from this topic.
- 50:08Speaker 1: Okay, let's hear it.
- 50:09Speaker 2: We talked about the nuclear taboo earlier, the global norm
- 50:12Speaker 2: against using these weapons.
- 50:14Speaker 1: Right.
- 50:14Speaker 2: That taboo has held unbroken since nineteen forty five, But
- 50:17Speaker 2: we have to recognize that it has been largely sustained
- 50:20Speaker 2: by the visceral, deeply human fear of total annihilation.
- 50:23Speaker 1: Because the people in charge remember how scary.
- 50:25Speaker 2: It was exactly it was built and maintained by generations
- 50:29Speaker 2: of leaders who lived through the acute anxieties of the
- 50:32Speaker 2: Cold War, leaders who understood in their bones the reality
- 50:37Speaker 2: of the weapons they controlled because they actually watched atmospheric
- 50:41Speaker 2: tests light.
- 50:42Speaker 1: Up the sky they saw with their own eyes.
- 50:44Speaker 2: But today we are handing this terrifying, perfected architecture over
- 50:49Speaker 2: to a completely new generation of leaders.
- 50:52Speaker 1: Leaders who have only read about it in history books.
- 50:54Speaker 2: Right, we are operating in a multipolar world with an
- 50:57Speaker 2: expanding China and a volatile Russia, managing hypersonic speeds and
- 51:01Speaker 2: eventually integrating these systems with lightning fast artificial intelligence data processing.
- 51:07Speaker 1: World is just moving so much faster.
- 51:08Speaker 2: Now, so we have to ask ourselves, will the taboo
- 51:11Speaker 2: hold against the friction of this modern multipolar, high speed world.
- 51:16Speaker 2: Or are we relying on a twentieth century fear to
- 51:18Speaker 2: protect us from twenty first century weapons?
- 51:21Speaker 1: Wow, that brings us right back to the beginning. We
- 51:23Speaker 1: don't have a clean, binary red button under a glass case.
- 51:26Speaker 1: We have a murky, fast moving, high stakes reality, and
- 51:29Speaker 1: that glass case is looking more fragile every single day.
- 51:32Speaker 2: It certainly is.
- 51:33Speaker 1: Thank you for joining us for this edition of Beyond Infographics.
- 51:37Speaker 1: We hope we've given you a lot to think about
- 51:39Speaker 1: and a deeper understanding of the invisible structures that keep
- 51:42Speaker 1: the world turning.
- 51:44Speaker 2: Thanks for listening.
- 51:45Speaker 1: Remember to rate us five stars, subscribe, and above all,
- 51:49Speaker 1: stay curious. We'll see you next time.