Latest / Prometheus Podcast / In Conversation With Luigi Buttiglione
Transcript
- 0:01SPEAKER_00: Welcome, welcome, everyone.
- 0:03SPEAKER_00: This is Ahan speaking.
- 0:04SPEAKER_00: I'm the founder of Prometheus and your host for today's conversation.
- 0:07SPEAKER_00: Today, I'm joined by Luigi Batlione, founder and CEO of LB Macro.
- 0:12SPEAKER_00: Luigi, it's so great to have you on.
- 0:14SPEAKER_01: My pleasure.
- 0:15SPEAKER_01: Very nice to be with you today.
- 0:18SPEAKER_00: I couldn't think of a better time to have you on and have your expertise.
- 0:23SPEAKER_00: Luigi,
- 0:24SPEAKER_00: I'm sure a lot of people in our institutional audiences will be familiar with you
- 0:28SPEAKER_00: and LB Macro.
- 0:29SPEAKER_00: But for the individual investors and those generally less familiar,
- 0:33SPEAKER_00: maybe you can tell us a little bit about yourself and your firm.
- 0:37SPEAKER_01: Well, I'm an economist.
- 0:39SPEAKER_01: I was born an economist.
- 0:40SPEAKER_01: I lead this company.
- 0:42SPEAKER_01: I've been in this company since...
- 0:45SPEAKER_01: Eight years.
- 0:46SPEAKER_01: I founded it in 2018.
- 0:48SPEAKER_01: Previously,
- 0:49SPEAKER_01: I was at the Bank of Italy,
- 0:51SPEAKER_01: Forecasting Committee of the ECB,
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: Chief Economist of Barclays Capital,
- 0:56SPEAKER_01: and Chief Strategist in a number of leading-edge funds.
- 1:00SPEAKER_01: Last one was for 10 years, Brevin Howard.
- 1:02SPEAKER_01: And again, in 2018, I started, I founded LP Macro.
- 1:09SPEAKER_00: Wonderful, wonderful.
- 1:11SPEAKER_00: Yeah, Luigi brings a breadth of experience today, so I'm really excited.
- 1:15SPEAKER_00: I think it's a particularly timely period to be having this conversation.
- 1:20SPEAKER_00: But before we jump into all the things that are unique to today,
- 1:24SPEAKER_00: one of the things that I hold really dear at Prometheus is the idea that
- 1:28SPEAKER_00: the best information we can provide investors is Well,
- 1:32SPEAKER_00: I leverage a lot of my central bank experience.
- 1:34SPEAKER_00: I was
- 2:00SPEAKER_01: Part and then leading of the forecasting committee of the Bank of Italy and
- 2:06SPEAKER_01: the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.
- 2:08SPEAKER_01: And the approach is still very much the same in the sense
- 2:11SPEAKER_01: that we
- 2:14SPEAKER_01: provide forecasting scenarios which could be useful for us and for clients.
- 2:20SPEAKER_01: Then we can map into asset prices.
- 2:23SPEAKER_01: And this kind of framework was a particularly instrumental approach At
- 2:27SPEAKER_01: the current juncture,
- 2:30SPEAKER_01: since last March when the energy crisis started,
- 2:35SPEAKER_01: we developed some scenarios which we used to forecast inflation,
- 2:42SPEAKER_01: growth and the risks around that.
- 2:45SPEAKER_01: And then to map into central bank forecast and pricing so as to provide our clients
- 2:53SPEAKER_01: with A map so useful to assess whether the market pricing of the next moves
- 3:01SPEAKER_01: by central banks was appropriate or not.
- 3:03SPEAKER_01: For instance,
- 3:04SPEAKER_01: I can tell you at that time at the beginning of the crisis
- 3:08SPEAKER_01: where we were expecting two hikes by the Federal Reserve by year end,
- 3:14SPEAKER_01: at the time when actually the market was forecasting three cuts.
- 3:18SPEAKER_01: And of course, from that kind of forecast, a lot of things
- 3:25SPEAKER_01: And
- 3:28SPEAKER_01: then
- 3:35SPEAKER_01: to provide clients with indications of
- 3:38SPEAKER_01: whether these asset markets are well-priced or not.
- 3:41SPEAKER_01: And of course,
- 3:42SPEAKER_01: if they are not,
- 3:42SPEAKER_01: we try to see and to say in which direction they are not well-priced.
- 3:50SPEAKER_00: Yeah,
- 3:50SPEAKER_00: and I guess something that's always stood out to me when I go through your work is
- 3:56SPEAKER_00: that you have a consistent focus on evaluating the range of probable outcomes rather
- 4:05SPEAKER_00: than solely fixating on like a median expectation.
- 4:08SPEAKER_00: And so while I feel like that's fairly well understood in institutional audiences,
- 4:13SPEAKER_00: it's not truly become like a mainstream approach.
- 4:15SPEAKER_00: Could you kind of talk us through why that approach, its benefits and how you're applying it?
- 4:21SPEAKER_01: Yeah, because what is useful usually for market participants is to try
- 4:26SPEAKER_01: to understand not only the direction of the mode of the forecast,
- 4:31SPEAKER_01: so the most likely event, but also the risks around that.
- 4:36SPEAKER_01: And sometimes the risks are even more important than the mode forecast.
- 4:40SPEAKER_01: Again, for instance,
- 4:41SPEAKER_01: at the beginning of this crisis,
- 4:43SPEAKER_01: we're saying for how markets were pricing future developments in energy,
- 4:49SPEAKER_01: Inflation and central banks' prices,
- 4:53SPEAKER_01: it was clear that they were not pricing well the risks.
- 4:56SPEAKER_01: Of course, no one knows the future.
- 4:59SPEAKER_01: We don't know, we didn't know, we don't know what will be the actual outcome.
- 5:04SPEAKER_01: But what we think we knew was that the market was underpriced in the probability
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: that the crisis had gone for some time and then inflation had gone for some time and
- 5:16SPEAKER_01: then Central bank rates have gone up and so on.
- 5:20SPEAKER_01: And this was really the indication we provide to clients.
- 5:24SPEAKER_01: Again,
- 5:24SPEAKER_01: because the point forecasts sometimes are not particularly relevant compared to
- 5:29SPEAKER_01: the distribution of the risk around a certain point forecast.
- 5:35SPEAKER_01: And this is usually for market participants who don't really trade.
- 5:39SPEAKER_01: Again, this indication usually is more important than the pure mode indication.
- 5:46SPEAKER_00: I'm exposing a little bit of my nerdy side,
- 5:49SPEAKER_00: but we've actually done these tests where if you looked at a 100% accurate forecast
- 5:57SPEAKER_00: with no indication of what market pricing is,
- 6:01SPEAKER_00: you more often than not would lose money trading an asset.
- 6:05SPEAKER_00: But it only begins to work when you start to incorporate some element of pricing.
- 6:09SPEAKER_01: Yeah, yeah.
- 6:10SPEAKER_01: I would say this is why I would say we tend to look at the distribution.
- 6:14SPEAKER_01: Because the world is stochastic.
- 6:16SPEAKER_01: It's uncertain.
- 6:18SPEAKER_01: It's not certain.
- 6:19SPEAKER_01: So I would say this is useful.
- 6:25SPEAKER_01: By the way, not only for market participants, but also for policymakers.
- 6:30SPEAKER_01: This is also leveraging on our experience, myself and my team as policymakers in central banks.
- 6:37SPEAKER_01: This is also how we If I still put myself together with that kind of people, we think.
- 6:45SPEAKER_01: So when you hike or cut interest rates,
- 6:48SPEAKER_01: you want to understand whether this is consistent not only with your mode forecast,
- 6:53SPEAKER_01: but also with the distribution of risks around that forecast.
- 6:57SPEAKER_01: This is crucial, important.
- 6:59SPEAKER_01: Again, because there is uncertainty.
- 7:02SPEAKER_01: Nobody is certain about the future.
- 7:05SPEAKER_00: And so I guess, you know, we've started to drift there already quite naturally.
- 7:09SPEAKER_00: So when you take this framework and you start applying it to today's context,
- 7:15SPEAKER_00: what have been the themes that really stand out to you when you're scanning across
- 7:19SPEAKER_00: the global macroeconomy over the last year or so?
- 7:23SPEAKER_01: Well, before the crisis started,
- 7:27SPEAKER_01: and I'll go into that,
- 7:28SPEAKER_01: the main theme was,
- 7:29SPEAKER_01: which by the way,
- 7:30SPEAKER_01: a theme which is still very present,
- 7:32SPEAKER_01: is that I mean, just to use a more journalistic jargon, U.S. exceptionalism.
- 7:40SPEAKER_01: We think, we thought and we think this is not just a slogan, it's for truth.
- 7:46SPEAKER_01: So the U.S.
- 7:47SPEAKER_01: is really probably now more than ever forgetting about the political dimension,
- 7:52SPEAKER_01: Trump, non-Trump, because to some extent it's a distraction.
- 7:56SPEAKER_01: But if you look at productivity trends,
- 7:58SPEAKER_01: the U.S.
- 8:00SPEAKER_01: is on an upward trend way more dynamic than the rest of the world,
- 8:04SPEAKER_01: definitely more dynamic than Europe.
- 8:07SPEAKER_01: And it has been along this trend for, I would say, a good 20 years.
- 8:11SPEAKER_01: And there are no indications that this trend is slowing down, if anything, is accelerating.
- 8:18SPEAKER_01: Not only the surge in U.S.
- 8:20SPEAKER_01: productivity,
- 8:20SPEAKER_01: but also the divergence with the rest of the world and especially with Europe.
- 8:25SPEAKER_01: And this,
- 8:26SPEAKER_01: of course,
- 8:27SPEAKER_01: means a lot,
- 8:28SPEAKER_01: brings a lot of consideration,
- 8:30SPEAKER_01: not only for foreign exchange, which, again,
- 8:32SPEAKER_01: if one sees through the disturbance provided by Trump,
- 8:37SPEAKER_01: tells you that the currency of that country, i.e.
- 8:39SPEAKER_01: the U.S., has to appreciate.
- 8:42SPEAKER_01: For the time being, again,
- 8:43SPEAKER_01: there is no sign that this productivity surge is abating,
- 8:49SPEAKER_01: so this is a signal that the currency of that country has to go up.
- 8:53SPEAKER_01: Another indication is now,
- 8:54SPEAKER_01: to use a more technical jargon,
- 8:57SPEAKER_01: the indication is that the neutral rate,
- 9:00SPEAKER_01: so the rate of interest rates,
- 9:02SPEAKER_01: which equate savings and investments,
- 9:04SPEAKER_01: is growing in that country and is growing to levels which probably are the highest
- 9:10SPEAKER_01: in, if not ever, for a very long time.
- 9:13SPEAKER_01: And these two considerations were not fully priced by the market.
- 9:18SPEAKER_01: Again, as I was telling you,
- 9:20SPEAKER_01: We were expecting,
- 9:21SPEAKER_01: we're forecasting the Federal Reserve to high rates even before
- 9:26SPEAKER_01: the energy crisis occurred because we think and we thought that at that time
- 9:31SPEAKER_01: the market and the Federal Reserve,
- 9:33SPEAKER_01: by the way,
- 9:34SPEAKER_01: itself were not pressing in accurately the fact that the neutral rate was going up
- 9:39SPEAKER_01: so that in the end interest rates would have had to catch up with this level
- 9:44SPEAKER_01: of neutral rates.
- 9:46SPEAKER_01: So this was,
- 9:47SPEAKER_01: I would say,
- 9:49SPEAKER_01: probably the main theme Before the energy crisis occurred,
- 9:53SPEAKER_01: when the war started,
- 9:55SPEAKER_01: then if you want the demand shock in the US,
- 9:59SPEAKER_01: the neutral rate shock in the US was joined by a supply shock in the energy market.
- 10:07SPEAKER_01: And this affected especially Europe.
- 10:10SPEAKER_01: So if you want,
- 10:12SPEAKER_01: when we look at trends in different areas, inflation in Europe is solely focused.
- 10:20SPEAKER_01: If not mainly affected by supply consideration,
- 10:26SPEAKER_01: by the supply of energy, so the energy shock from the Middle East.
- 10:30SPEAKER_01: In the U.S.
- 10:30SPEAKER_01: it's a combination of the supply shock,
- 10:34SPEAKER_01: but also the fact that demand in the U.S. is still high and, if anything, rising.
- 10:41SPEAKER_01: So again,
- 10:41SPEAKER_01: another reason why interest rates in the U.S.
- 10:44SPEAKER_01: should not only be hiked,
- 10:47SPEAKER_01: but also be hiked To higher levels and buy more than you knew.
- 10:51SPEAKER_01: So I would say that these themes are still very much present.
- 10:57SPEAKER_01: Last but not least,
- 10:59SPEAKER_01: in this environment of still growth satisfactorily at one level,
- 11:05SPEAKER_01: and especially in the US,
- 11:07SPEAKER_01: with interest rates which come from below, it's a very good environment for stocks.
- 11:12SPEAKER_01: It's an environment with equities should definitely perform well.
- 11:16SPEAKER_01: These things are This kind of indication can change if and when interest rates,
- 11:23SPEAKER_01: especially in the US, will have rich levels which are, to some extent, restricted.
- 11:28SPEAKER_01: So at or above the level of neutral rate.
- 11:31SPEAKER_01: Now we come from below.
- 11:33SPEAKER_01: So it's still very promising.
- 11:36SPEAKER_01: But if Walsh,
- 11:39SPEAKER_01: the chairman of the Federal Reserve,
- 11:41SPEAKER_01: keeps his word and he wants to control inflation,
- 11:44SPEAKER_01: this means that it would quite likely we'll have to bring The level
- 11:48SPEAKER_01: of interest rates to above neutrality.
- 11:51SPEAKER_01: And if and when that happens, this could change the climate for stock prices.
- 11:58SPEAKER_00: There are lots of threads to pull on there.
- 12:01SPEAKER_00: I think the first place I would like to start is kind
- 12:04SPEAKER_00: of Understanding what drove your expectation of a higher neutral rate in the US,
- 12:12SPEAKER_00: was it a solely tech AI-based phenomena?
- 12:16SPEAKER_00: Is there other things that you saw in the economy that give you the indication
- 12:19SPEAKER_00: that neutral rates are higher?
- 12:21SPEAKER_00: How have you gone about constructing that view
- 12:23SPEAKER_00: of this different neutral rate versus,
- 12:25SPEAKER_00: you know, prior cycles or maybe the last decade?
- 12:29SPEAKER_01: Yeah, I would say it's productivity.
- 12:31SPEAKER_01: Overall productivity,
- 12:33SPEAKER_01: you know, The high rising productivity growth in the US was the main signal.
- 12:38SPEAKER_01: Of course, within productivity, when we break that down, technology plays a king role.
- 12:44SPEAKER_01: Of course,
- 12:45SPEAKER_01: there are sectors,
- 12:46SPEAKER_01: even within the US economy,
- 12:48SPEAKER_01: where productivity growth is either stagnant if not falling.
- 12:52SPEAKER_01: But the overall,
- 12:54SPEAKER_01: the medium,
- 12:57SPEAKER_01: the average growth of the productivity in the US economy Is growing,
- 13:03SPEAKER_01: is actually accelerating also to,
- 13:07SPEAKER_01: because this is what you said, the main driver is technology.
- 13:11SPEAKER_01: And within technology,
- 13:12SPEAKER_01: of course, we know that the main technological shock of the last few years is AI.
- 13:18SPEAKER_01: And this also brings,
- 13:19SPEAKER_01: by the way, the theme of the K economy, because it's a tale of two economies.
- 13:25SPEAKER_01: There is tech and non-tech,
- 13:26SPEAKER_01: and even within tech,
- 13:27SPEAKER_01: there is AI and non-AI,
- 13:31SPEAKER_01: which is a It's a theme, potentially also a problem, also for the U.S. economy.
- 13:38SPEAKER_00: And yeah,
- 13:38SPEAKER_00: I guess,
- 13:39SPEAKER_00: how do you think about,
- 13:40SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 13:41SPEAKER_00: I feel like there has been sort of this relatively rare divergence
- 13:47SPEAKER_00: that you don't see in like a lot of the historical data where...
- 13:51SPEAKER_00: Things that productivity measures,
- 13:53SPEAKER_00: profit measures,
- 13:54SPEAKER_00: all these activity-based business cycle measures are running hard relative to labor,
- 14:01SPEAKER_00: which seems kind of lackluster or labor market growth,
- 14:05SPEAKER_00: which seems rather lackluster in the U.S.
- 14:07SPEAKER_00: How are you thinking about that divergence in context of this neutral rate?
- 14:13SPEAKER_01: Well, I would say there are two sides of the same coin in a sense.
- 14:17SPEAKER_01: The The fact that productivity growth,
- 14:19SPEAKER_01: productivity,
- 14:20SPEAKER_01: which is labor productivity,
- 14:21SPEAKER_01: by the way,
- 14:23SPEAKER_01: is growing so much,
- 14:24SPEAKER_01: it could be one of the reasons why labor demand,
- 14:28SPEAKER_01: I would say,
- 14:28SPEAKER_01: more than lackluster has been lagging behind, because there is less need for labor.
- 14:36SPEAKER_01: Labor input produces a certain output of product.
- 14:42SPEAKER_01: So, to some extent, there is no contradiction between the two.
- 14:46SPEAKER_01: Having said that,
- 14:48SPEAKER_01: labor has also been affected by supply considerations, labor supply considerations.
- 14:54SPEAKER_01: So, as you know,
- 14:56SPEAKER_01: especially due to immigration laws,
- 14:58SPEAKER_01: more restrictive,
- 14:59SPEAKER_01: now the supply of labor in the U.S. has been restricted, so it's growing less.
- 15:05SPEAKER_01: I don't want to say it's stagnant,
- 15:06SPEAKER_01: but it's growing much less at a trend along a The trend grows well lower
- 15:15SPEAKER_01: than pre-COVID, for instance, or pre-AI.
- 15:19SPEAKER_01: So there is also that element at play.
- 15:23SPEAKER_00: Right, right, right.
- 15:25SPEAKER_00: And I think it's just, yeah, it's just an interesting microcosm, right?
- 15:28SPEAKER_00: Like to see,
- 15:30SPEAKER_00: you can still have broad-based activity strong,
- 15:32SPEAKER_00: despite like a relatively,
- 15:35SPEAKER_00: like if you just are looking at only the labor picture relative to prior cycles,
- 15:39SPEAKER_00: where it looks a little bit weak.
- 15:42SPEAKER_00: But then we add on kind of this big supply shock coming out of the Iran dynamic, right?
- 15:49SPEAKER_00: And I'm curious as someone,
- 15:52SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 15:53SPEAKER_00: I don't know if your firm engages in any kind of barrel counting in that sense
- 15:57SPEAKER_00: or you're kind of just taking indications at face value and kind of trying to assess
- 16:01SPEAKER_00: the implications.
- 16:02SPEAKER_00: But in a really...
- 16:03SPEAKER_00: A kind of dynamic backdrop for everything that's going on out there.
- 16:08SPEAKER_00: How are you thinking through how the supply shock impacts the economy,
- 16:12SPEAKER_00: impacts inflation further down the road,
- 16:14SPEAKER_00: and how that passes through the asset prices?
- 16:17SPEAKER_01: Well, surely it has a dampening effect of the economy.
- 16:22SPEAKER_01: I would say,
- 16:24SPEAKER_01: like any supply shock in modern times,
- 16:27SPEAKER_01: the transmission to the economy is at least two forms.
- 16:31SPEAKER_01: One is through inflation.
- 16:34SPEAKER_01: And although the U.S.
- 16:38SPEAKER_01: is a producer of energy,
- 16:40SPEAKER_01: so you can think of that as neutral for the overall economy in theory,
- 16:45SPEAKER_01: because there would be producers who benefit and consumers who are damaged.
- 16:50SPEAKER_01: But in the end, for the population, for the majority population are consumers of energy.
- 16:56SPEAKER_01: So for these people, it's not a good thing.
- 16:59SPEAKER_01: And to some extent,
- 17:00SPEAKER_01: I would say for the economy,
- 17:02SPEAKER_01: this is also right for the economy, Also, probably these effects prevails.
- 17:06SPEAKER_01: I mean, of course, for economies like Europe, there are no doubts.
- 17:09SPEAKER_01: It's a negative period.
- 17:11SPEAKER_01: But for oil producer or energy producer, it's less trivial.
- 17:16SPEAKER_01: But then there is another channel.
- 17:17SPEAKER_01: The other channel is interest rates.
- 17:20SPEAKER_01: So with the supply shock,
- 17:23SPEAKER_01: now we know,
- 17:25SPEAKER_01: we have been knowing now for 50 years of economic research and economic theory
- 17:30SPEAKER_01: at central banking that You have to hike interest rates if you want
- 17:36SPEAKER_01: to prevent second-round effects to happen.
- 17:39SPEAKER_01: So this means a long-lasting effect on inflation.
- 17:43SPEAKER_01: So if you want a rise in energy prices as only a one-off effect
- 17:52SPEAKER_01: on inflation,
- 17:53SPEAKER_01: well, you have to make sure that this happens.
- 17:55SPEAKER_01: In order to make this happen, Quite likely, you have to hike interest rates.
- 17:59SPEAKER_01: Quite likely,
- 18:00SPEAKER_01: because the only thing is if the economy is very,
- 18:02SPEAKER_01: very weak at the beginning,
- 18:04SPEAKER_01: when the oil shock hurts, then probably there is no need to hike interest rates.
- 18:11SPEAKER_01: But this is not the case now.
- 18:13SPEAKER_01: The economy,
- 18:14SPEAKER_01: this energy shock,
- 18:15SPEAKER_01: I would say everywhere,
- 18:16SPEAKER_01: especially in the US, it's hitting an economy which is already running hot.
- 18:21SPEAKER_01: So there is no doubt that you have to hike interest rates if you want
- 18:26SPEAKER_01: to prevent Long-lasting effect on inflation.
- 18:29SPEAKER_01: Even more so in the U.S. where the economy started.
- 18:34SPEAKER_01: So the economy started already.
- 18:38SPEAKER_01: The beginning of the shock had already an inflation rate above target.
- 18:43SPEAKER_01: So we know that when the shock hit,
- 18:46SPEAKER_01: core inflation in the U.S. was already above 3%, not even 2%.
- 18:52SPEAKER_01: So again, it's...
- 18:54SPEAKER_01: It's a one-way bet, interest rates, and just to go up.
- 18:58SPEAKER_00: Right, right.
- 18:59SPEAKER_00: And so you got the neutral,
- 19:00SPEAKER_00: plus you got the oil shock, which translates into monetary policy pressures.
- 19:07SPEAKER_00: And I think an interesting avenue to kind of think through is when we had
- 19:12SPEAKER_00: the initial onset of these tensions,
- 19:18SPEAKER_00: You kind of had these two narratives, right?
- 19:20SPEAKER_00: Like that the supply shock in itself is self-correcting because a very dramatic rise
- 19:25SPEAKER_00: in oil prices creates demand destruction in itself.
- 19:28SPEAKER_00: And then on the other side,
- 19:29SPEAKER_00: you have people that are perhaps more inclined to it being
- 19:33SPEAKER_00: a much more gradual process.
- 19:36SPEAKER_00: And so how do you think about that?
- 19:39SPEAKER_00: That balance between an oil shock being inherently inflationary,
- 19:44SPEAKER_00: which it mechanically is,
- 19:45SPEAKER_00: and when it transitions into being this demand destruction kind of force.
- 19:50SPEAKER_01: Well, the demand destruction is there.
- 19:53SPEAKER_01: I mean, there is no doubt.
- 19:54SPEAKER_01: The problem is that to some extent, you as a central banker don't care about that too much.
- 20:01SPEAKER_01: In a sense, this is exactly what you want to happen.
- 20:04SPEAKER_01: The problem is that that kind of demand destruction Usually it's not enough
- 20:08SPEAKER_01: to prevent this second-round effect,
- 20:10SPEAKER_01: so the inflation to become a long-lasting phenomenon rather than a short-round one.
- 20:16SPEAKER_01: So you cannot be moved too much by the fact that when oil prices go up, the economy slows.
- 20:25SPEAKER_01: And by the way,
- 20:26SPEAKER_01: as I said,
- 20:26SPEAKER_01: this is more of a theme in an economy like Europe, which imports by a large energy.
- 20:34SPEAKER_01: Rather than a country like the U.S., which is an oil producer.
- 20:37SPEAKER_01: So in the U.S.,
- 20:39SPEAKER_01: I would say for a number of reasons,
- 20:42SPEAKER_01: definitely we didn't understand why there were these rate cut calls,
- 20:49SPEAKER_01: even after the oil shock heaps the U.S.,
- 20:54SPEAKER_01: which we thought, again,
- 20:55SPEAKER_01: they were not justified neither on the neutral rate,
- 20:59SPEAKER_01: nor on the demand standpoint,
- 21:01SPEAKER_01: from the supply of energy standpoint, Really, we couldn't understand them.
- 21:06SPEAKER_01: And in the end,
- 21:06SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 21:09SPEAKER_01: this is why despite evident political pressure,
- 21:13SPEAKER_01: Chairman Walsh decided it was time to go.
- 21:16SPEAKER_01: I mean, the market was providing already a very clear sign of impatience when after
- 21:23SPEAKER_01: the July meeting,
- 21:27SPEAKER_01: when Walsh was a bit wishy-washy, the curve steepened dramatically.
- 21:32SPEAKER_01: This was a big signal that had the Fed not decided to tighten interest rates,
- 21:38SPEAKER_01: to hike interest rates, the curve would have steepened even more so.
- 21:43SPEAKER_01: And then,
- 21:44SPEAKER_01: actually,
- 21:44SPEAKER_01: if anything,
- 21:45SPEAKER_01: provided a more powerful tightening of financial conditions for the US economy.
- 21:51SPEAKER_01: So to some extent,
- 21:52SPEAKER_01: I'm forcing the argument,
- 21:54SPEAKER_01: but hiking interest rates set at risk variables by the Fed was a
- 22:03SPEAKER_01: An easing of financial conditions.
- 22:07SPEAKER_01: A contractionary easing to some extent.
- 22:09SPEAKER_01: Because having interest rates,
- 22:11SPEAKER_01: short-term rates not going up as they did,
- 22:14SPEAKER_01: the long end would have done the job and it would have been worse.
- 22:20SPEAKER_00: And I guess, you know, that also brings us to the second component, right?
- 22:26SPEAKER_00: Like the way I've often...
- 22:30SPEAKER_00: The short end and long end in the current context is that monetary policy is going
- 22:37SPEAKER_00: to drive most of the short end and then perhaps the difference between the short and
- 22:40SPEAKER_00: the long end is going to be driven by marginal moves by the Treasury.
- 22:45SPEAKER_00: And so I'm kind of thinking,
- 22:47SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 22:47SPEAKER_00: wondering how you've been thinking about this much more active role that the U.S.
- 22:52SPEAKER_00: Treasury seems to have,
- 22:54SPEAKER_00: at least,
- 22:54SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 22:55SPEAKER_00: in terms of policy announcements and trying to kind of influence markets
- 22:58SPEAKER_00: and what you think about the dynamic.
- 23:03SPEAKER_01: Well, I agree with you that the long end is,
- 23:05SPEAKER_01: let's say it's a combination of Expected interest rates,
- 23:11SPEAKER_01: or where inflation also will be, and, say, risk premia.
- 23:16SPEAKER_01: These risk premia are, in turn, correlated with other factors, including public finances.
- 23:24SPEAKER_01: And this is very important.
- 23:25SPEAKER_01: It's a crucial aspect.
- 23:28SPEAKER_01: But I would say that this is what the Fed,
- 23:33SPEAKER_01: the Treasury Secretary,
- 23:36SPEAKER_01: in particular,
- 23:36SPEAKER_01: has done In the last few months, frankly, it was not particularly useful.
- 23:43SPEAKER_01: These attempts of fisting the curve were a little bit,
- 23:48SPEAKER_01: I would say,
- 23:48SPEAKER_01: I don't want to use,
- 23:49SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 23:50SPEAKER_01: I want to be too dismissive,
- 23:52SPEAKER_01: but at least they
- 23:53SPEAKER_00: were not going in
- 23:53SPEAKER_00: the right direction.
- 23:54SPEAKER_01: The right direction,
- 23:55SPEAKER_01: as you said,
- 23:56SPEAKER_01: is if you want to tackle that part of the yield curve,
- 24:02SPEAKER_01: you have to tackle it the right way,
- 24:03SPEAKER_01: at least by contracting the Fiscal spending, fiscal policy.
- 24:08SPEAKER_01: That is effective.
- 24:11SPEAKER_01: If they're going to do that, that would be very beneficial.
- 24:13SPEAKER_01: Of course, it's not the only variable which affects long-term rates.
- 24:19SPEAKER_01: Sometimes there is a tendency in the press to see that dynamics as
- 24:23SPEAKER_01: the sole determinant of long-term interest rates, which is not.
- 24:28SPEAKER_01: But of course, it's an important one.
- 24:31SPEAKER_01: But this is what the market wants to hear from Secretary Besant if they want
- 24:39SPEAKER_01: to reduce the premium or long-term U.S. interest rates.
- 24:44SPEAKER_01: That would be very effective.
- 24:46SPEAKER_01: So far, the comments in that direction are a bit mixed.
- 24:51SPEAKER_01: Yesterday, there was something in this direction, which is appropriate.
- 24:55SPEAKER_01: But this is the right way, the right avenue.
- 24:59SPEAKER_01: We see the curve.
- 25:01SPEAKER_01: Not that effective.
- 25:03SPEAKER_00: And so, you know,
- 25:05SPEAKER_00: I think at the onset,
- 25:07SPEAKER_00: we definitely talked about how point forecasts are not necessarily helpful, right?
- 25:13SPEAKER_00: But also, I think a question that's increasingly on my mind.
- 25:17SPEAKER_00: So at the,
- 25:20SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 25:20SPEAKER_00: around March,
- 25:21SPEAKER_00: we started to also kind of gain conviction that We're going into a meaningful
- 25:27SPEAKER_00: and material hiking cycle.
- 25:28SPEAKER_00: And the question I think that's mostly on my mind is how far does the Fed need
- 25:34SPEAKER_00: to actually go to get the job done?
- 25:37SPEAKER_00: And how does that look relative to what's already priced in?
- 25:42SPEAKER_00: And I wonder if that's been on your mind and what you're thinking about that.
- 25:48SPEAKER_01: Well, definitely I would say the way we look at things initially, again,
- 25:51SPEAKER_01: before the shock,
- 25:53SPEAKER_01: The energy shock,
- 25:54SPEAKER_01: as you correctly said,
- 25:55SPEAKER_01: there are some demand or neutral rate considerations plus the supply shock.
- 26:00SPEAKER_01: So before the supply shock, our call was the Fed would like twice by your end.
- 26:07SPEAKER_01: September and December and September has already occurred.
- 26:10SPEAKER_01: We think in December also it will occur.
- 26:15SPEAKER_01: Now there is also the supply shock curve.
- 26:18SPEAKER_01: So I would say
- 26:21SPEAKER_01: And there is another factor which is important, which we didn't know at that time.
- 26:26SPEAKER_01: There is a policy shift at the Fed.
- 26:30SPEAKER_01: So for the same level of inflation,
- 26:32SPEAKER_01: the Fed,
- 26:32SPEAKER_01: the new chairman,
- 26:35SPEAKER_01: basically thinks interest rates are to be higher because he wants
- 26:39SPEAKER_01: to bring inflation back to target, which before was quite unclear.
- 26:44SPEAKER_01: I mean,
- 26:45SPEAKER_01: Warsaw is definitely a point in saying that inflation has overshot the target
- 26:49SPEAKER_01: for five years.
- 26:51SPEAKER_01: That's a fact.
- 26:52SPEAKER_01: So the truth is that under Chairman Powell, I mean, inflation was not brought to that.
- 26:58SPEAKER_01: So policy was too expansionary.
- 27:01SPEAKER_01: Again, to use other words, the policy rate was below the neutral rate.
- 27:08SPEAKER_01: So now, in order to take these things into account,
- 27:11SPEAKER_01: so the policy shift and the supply shock,
- 27:15SPEAKER_01: we think that interest rates are to go higher relative to what we thought before by
- 27:19SPEAKER_01: at least another 100 degrees.
- 27:21SPEAKER_01: So from now, we say another five hikes.
- 27:26SPEAKER_01: So what we saw in September,
- 27:28SPEAKER_01: from our standpoint, is the beginning, not the end of the tightening cycle.
- 27:35SPEAKER_01: What can end it before or at lower levels than we say?
- 27:41SPEAKER_01: Well, it could be a financial event.
- 27:45SPEAKER_01: It could be some financial markets giving up.
- 27:49SPEAKER_01: So equity markets, these kind of things, possible.
- 27:53SPEAKER_01: If you want,
- 27:54SPEAKER_01: you can even say that the view we have is that the Fed has to hike rates until
- 28:02SPEAKER_01: the economy slows.
- 28:05SPEAKER_01: So whatever the level is.
- 28:07SPEAKER_01: If you are wrong and the economy slows meaningfully after, say, two hikes, it will be two hikes.
- 28:13SPEAKER_01: It could be six, it could be seven.
- 28:16SPEAKER_01: So there is,
- 28:17SPEAKER_01: of course,
- 28:18SPEAKER_01: And now going back to your point about our scenarios,
- 28:23SPEAKER_01: let's say that this is the expected, our expectation.
- 28:29SPEAKER_01: The mode could be more or less consistent with similar to the expected,
- 28:35SPEAKER_01: our expectation,
- 28:37SPEAKER_01: but risk could, to some extent, skew to the upside and under the downside.
- 28:42SPEAKER_00: And I think that's very interesting to me because one of the things
- 28:46SPEAKER_00: that we do is we try to construct these systematic strategies with look
- 28:50SPEAKER_00: at these sorts of dynamics.
- 28:51SPEAKER_00: And when you look at most prior hiking cycles,
- 28:54SPEAKER_00: you basically have this kind of mean of about eight to nine policy moves.
- 29:02SPEAKER_00: You very rarely have a policy cycle because...
- 29:07SPEAKER_00: And you're in a much better place to obviously tell me this,
- 29:10SPEAKER_00: but monetary policymakers need enough evidence to accumulate,
- 29:16SPEAKER_00: to begin to make their moves.
- 29:18SPEAKER_00: And arguably, we waited far too long in the United States before making our moves here.
- 29:23SPEAKER_01: I agree.
- 29:24SPEAKER_01: I totally agree with you.
- 29:25SPEAKER_01: So once this means that,
- 29:28SPEAKER_01: and this is also why,
- 29:29SPEAKER_01: once you start,
- 29:30SPEAKER_01: especially when you start late, well, you cannot think that you will stop tomorrow.
- 29:36SPEAKER_01: I mean, that would be a bit ridiculous.
- 29:39SPEAKER_01: And I am sure this is not in the mind of Chairman Walsh.
- 29:44SPEAKER_01: So you have to put together a meaningful amount of tightening.
- 29:49SPEAKER_01: So this is why...
- 29:51SPEAKER_01: We think that in the end,
- 29:53SPEAKER_01: if what we said,
- 29:55SPEAKER_01: what I told you is correct,
- 29:56SPEAKER_01: this would mean six hikes relative to the situation pre-September.
- 30:04SPEAKER_01: It could be more.
- 30:06SPEAKER_01: The reason why it could be less than the usual eight that you mentioned is
- 30:11SPEAKER_01: because probably the starting level is already,
- 30:14SPEAKER_01: we are not really super easy in territory.
- 30:17SPEAKER_01: It's somewhat,
- 30:18SPEAKER_01: you can think of this What is happening now at the Fed is an unfinished business
- 30:25SPEAKER_01: to some extent.
- 30:26SPEAKER_01: Because basically under the previous chairman,
- 30:33SPEAKER_01: Chairman Powell, the Fed hiked but then started to cut too soon.
- 30:38SPEAKER_01: So in the end they didn't go through the whole cycle.
- 30:44SPEAKER_01: So a hiking cycle big enough to bring inflation down to 2%.
- 30:49SPEAKER_01: So this is an unfinished business.
- 30:51SPEAKER_01: This is why,
- 30:51SPEAKER_01: if you want,
- 30:52SPEAKER_01: I can try to reconcile the six hikes overall,
- 30:56SPEAKER_01: we think, with the average of eight that you mentioned.
- 31:02SPEAKER_01: And by the way,
- 31:02SPEAKER_01: I'm sympathetic also with the eight in the sense that,
- 31:07SPEAKER_01: as I said,
- 31:08SPEAKER_01: when we assess the risks around these six,
- 31:12SPEAKER_01: risks are to the upside, not to the downside.
- 31:15SPEAKER_01: And this is more, it is in the market, by the way.
- 31:19SPEAKER_01: Now things way less than this.
- 31:22SPEAKER_00: Yeah, yeah.
- 31:23SPEAKER_00: And I think I really like this idea of you need to hike until the economy tells you otherwise.
- 31:32SPEAKER_00: And an interesting question, I think, Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- 31:37SPEAKER_00: I agree totally with what you said.
- 32:02SPEAKER_01: I would say the equity market,
- 32:04SPEAKER_01: especially now,
- 32:05SPEAKER_01: way more so than 30 or 40 years ago,
- 32:08SPEAKER_01: is part of the retransmission mechanism, on the upside and the downside.
- 32:14SPEAKER_01: And of course, it's probably more difficult to fine-tune either way, in both ways.
- 32:21SPEAKER_01: So it's possible that when,
- 32:25SPEAKER_01: in terms of the economy, okay,
- 32:27SPEAKER_01: rates will be hiked until it slows,
- 32:29SPEAKER_01: the economy really slows,
- 32:30SPEAKER_01: meaningful,
- 32:30SPEAKER_01: which is, again,
- 32:31SPEAKER_01: that would be Nothing dramatic because this is what you have to do if you want
- 32:37SPEAKER_01: to bring inflation down.
- 32:39SPEAKER_01: The thing is that in a market which is very spoiled by the deep strategies,
- 32:46SPEAKER_01: this may mean that all of a sudden equities go down 30%.
- 32:50SPEAKER_01: This is very possible.
- 32:52SPEAKER_01: These kind of fluctuations are now quote-unquote normal.
- 32:57SPEAKER_01: Should we see a normal 30% down?
- 33:00SPEAKER_01: In 2000, it's not 30% down now.
- 33:05SPEAKER_01: So I would not be shocked at all if equities go down this way.
- 33:10SPEAKER_01: Of course,
- 33:11SPEAKER_01: this is a problem because the fine-tuning of the economy
- 33:14SPEAKER_01: when you have volatility induced by the equity market becomes more difficult.
- 33:22SPEAKER_00: And so what I wonder with that equity piece, right, is how much...
- 33:27SPEAKER_00: At least from the way that I've seen it,
- 33:29SPEAKER_00: and you can tell me if you think I'm wrong,
- 33:31SPEAKER_00: it seems like a lot of my friends have this saying that there are bonds in
- 33:38SPEAKER_00: the stocks.
- 33:39SPEAKER_00: And so when you have discount rates rise dramatically, that's an inherent pressure on equities.
- 33:47SPEAKER_00: But at the same time,
- 33:48SPEAKER_00: it has seemed that growth expectations
- 33:50SPEAKER_00: the United States have been completely impervious to these rising interest rates.
- 33:58SPEAKER_00: And so how do you think about the balance between those two things?
- 34:02SPEAKER_00: When does the rate effects begin to bleed into equities?
- 34:06SPEAKER_01: Well, as I said before, to some extent we don't know, but we know at some stage, yes.
- 34:14SPEAKER_01: So you hike,
- 34:16SPEAKER_01: Under basis points, nothing happens.
- 34:18SPEAKER_01: Then you hike 200, nothing happens.
- 34:21SPEAKER_01: Then you hike 300, something happens.
- 34:24SPEAKER_01: So the hard part of the strategies is that you have to keep on going until it happens.
- 34:32SPEAKER_01: So, of course,
- 34:33SPEAKER_01: I would be very resistant to the notion that there is nothing that this growth rate
- 34:39SPEAKER_01: or this increase.
- 34:40SPEAKER_01: It will go on forever,
- 34:41SPEAKER_01: and inflation will stay there forever,
- 34:43SPEAKER_01: and the equity price,
- 34:44SPEAKER_01: the equity market will go on, will keep on hiking, keep on going
- 34:48SPEAKER_00: up forever.
- 34:49SPEAKER_01: This is not true.
- 34:52SPEAKER_01: And again, I will stress also the policy shift at the fact.
- 34:55SPEAKER_01: That's important.
- 34:56SPEAKER_01: Basically,
- 34:58SPEAKER_01: if Walsh, I mean,
- 34:59SPEAKER_01: unless he's subjugated by political pressure,
- 35:02SPEAKER_01: he's telling us, I want to finish the job.
- 35:05SPEAKER_01: And if he finishes the job...
- 35:08SPEAKER_01: I mean, they will be healthy.
- 35:09SPEAKER_01: Don't get it wrong.
- 35:10SPEAKER_01: This is not a policy mistake by any means.
- 35:14SPEAKER_01: If equity prices went up only because there was a bubble,
- 35:18SPEAKER_01: if you want,
- 35:19SPEAKER_01: and you need rest rates so they were too low, well, they have to go down.
- 35:23SPEAKER_01: And again, there is no drama in there.
- 35:26SPEAKER_01: It could sound dramatic,
- 35:27SPEAKER_01: of course,
- 35:28SPEAKER_01: if you bought on day one and on day two equities go down 30%, that's a problem.
- 35:35SPEAKER_00: Of course, you are not happy about that.
- 35:38SPEAKER_01: But hopefully it won't happen in one day,
- 35:40SPEAKER_01: and hopefully there will be also a lot of people who will still have memories of
- 35:45SPEAKER_01: the fact that minus 30,
- 35:47SPEAKER_01: but after they made plus 100 in the previous three years, it's still okay.
- 35:53SPEAKER_01: And then it won't be the end of humanity.
- 35:57SPEAKER_01: We will still be around now.
- 36:02SPEAKER_00: So we've talked a lot about my favorite markets,
- 36:05SPEAKER_00: which are U.S. markets, but of course you cover global markets very deeply as well.
- 36:10SPEAKER_00: So what I'd like to do is I'd kind of like to take us on this journey in
- 36:15SPEAKER_00: a similar sort of way where you framed up the U.S.
- 36:18SPEAKER_00: context prior to the oil shock and how policymakers responded post the oil shock.
- 36:23SPEAKER_00: So, you know, we can talk about the ECB, we can talk about the BOJ, wherever you'd like to go.
- 36:28SPEAKER_00: But yeah, let's talk about that a little bit more.
- 36:31SPEAKER_01: Absolutely.
- 36:32SPEAKER_01: Well, actually,
- 36:33SPEAKER_01: it's good that you ask this because I would say I have a good slogan concerning how
- 36:38SPEAKER_01: the Europe and the ECB were before the Middle East crisis hit.
- 36:44SPEAKER_01: We thought that the ECB, the European Central Bank, was in a kind of super neutral situation.
- 36:51SPEAKER_01: Super neutral means that there was no output gap.
- 36:55SPEAKER_01: So basically, activity, supply and demand were about in balance.
- 37:01SPEAKER_01: Inflation was a 2,
- 37:02SPEAKER_01: which is the ECB target,
- 37:06SPEAKER_01: and the policy rate was a 2, which was considered as the neutral rate.
- 37:12SPEAKER_01: So everything was a kind of nirvana.
- 37:15SPEAKER_01: This is why President Lagarde,
- 37:18SPEAKER_01: ECB President Lagarde, used to say we are in a good spot, in a good position.
- 37:25SPEAKER_01: They were in a good position.
- 37:27SPEAKER_01: But then the general shock hit, and so it was very clear cut what had to happen.
- 37:33SPEAKER_01: Because again, if, let's say like
- 37:38SPEAKER_01: the UK, the cyclical situation was different.
- 37:40SPEAKER_01: So there were below what was considered, there was a positive output gap.
- 37:49SPEAKER_01: So the activity was below, demand was below supply.
- 37:53SPEAKER_01: And rates were in restricted territory.
- 37:56SPEAKER_01: I mean, I'm talking about the UK, of neutral.
- 37:59SPEAKER_01: Then there was, when the oil shock hit, there was a reason why they could have been waiting.
- 38:06SPEAKER_01: And the Bank of England has been waiting since then.
- 38:10SPEAKER_01: But for the ACB, there was none of the above.
- 38:13SPEAKER_01: Again, no output gap.
- 38:16SPEAKER_01: Rates are neutral.
- 38:18SPEAKER_01: Inflation at target.
- 38:20SPEAKER_01: So they had to hike.
- 38:21SPEAKER_01: Which is actually...
- 38:22SPEAKER_01: This is why the ECB was actually the first one to move together with the Bank
- 38:26SPEAKER_01: of Japan, which has also some additional problems, but let's focus on the ECB first.
- 38:32SPEAKER_01: So definitely before the Fed,
- 38:34SPEAKER_01: definitely before the Bank of England, and they have to still keep on going.
- 38:41SPEAKER_01: But again, here,
- 38:42SPEAKER_01: the The situation is somewhat less vicious from an inflation standpoint in the U.S.
- 38:50SPEAKER_01: The reason being that there is just an energy supply side consideration and not
- 38:58SPEAKER_01: the other demand or productivity neutral rate considerations like in the U.S.
- 39:04SPEAKER_01: So also the ECB has to keep on going.
- 39:07SPEAKER_00: But, again, less and for longer, quite
- 39:12SPEAKER_01: likely, than the U.S.
- 39:13SPEAKER_01: I would say especially not for longer, not as much for longer.
- 39:19SPEAKER_00: Would you say that the risks for the ECB are more skewed towards,
- 39:24SPEAKER_00: that they're more sensitive to the hikes creating
- 39:30SPEAKER_00: a downwards economic spiral relative to the U.S.
- 39:33SPEAKER_00: where you're more of a risk of underdoing it or not hiking enough?
- 39:39SPEAKER_01: Well, I would say so, yes.
- 39:40SPEAKER_01: I would agree with this because,
- 39:43SPEAKER_01: again, the underlying growth situation in Europe is softer than the U.S.
- 39:48SPEAKER_01: It's not bad because,
- 39:52SPEAKER_01: if anything,
- 39:53SPEAKER_01: also the European economy has been more resilient than expected in
- 39:57SPEAKER_01: the last few months, even after the crisis.
- 40:00SPEAKER_01: But, of course, the cushion in this economy is way smaller than it is in the U.S.
- 40:07SPEAKER_01: So it's easier when you grow at 1% or 1.5% to fall into stagnation,
- 40:12SPEAKER_01: if not recession, than when you grow at 3%.
- 40:18SPEAKER_01: And also because,
- 40:20SPEAKER_01: which is the same,
- 40:21SPEAKER_01: basically saying the same story, there is no demand shock in Europe.
- 40:29SPEAKER_01: There is no positivity shock, positive positivity shock in Europe.
- 40:34SPEAKER_01: So...
- 40:36SPEAKER_01: They have to be careful,
- 40:37SPEAKER_01: more careful in the U.S.
- 40:39SPEAKER_01: And this is why probably all in all,
- 40:41SPEAKER_01: still the end point of the cycle will be definitely way lower than in the U.S.
- 40:47SPEAKER_01: and probably rates will be at a peak or way less than in the U.S.
- 40:54SPEAKER_00: And I guess another added complication in Europe is
- 40:59SPEAKER_00: that you have very varying fiscal dynamics, right?
- 41:03SPEAKER_00: And that impacts different sovereigns in different ways.
- 41:05SPEAKER_00: So what are you making of the variation in the fiscal landscape in the EU?
- 41:12SPEAKER_01: It's a dangerous situation.
- 41:13SPEAKER_01: There is the potential for a third sovereign crisis, right?
- 41:22SPEAKER_01: After 2011 and 2012,
- 41:24SPEAKER_01: which was where the epicenter was Greece,
- 41:26SPEAKER_01: but then it contaminated other peripheral countries, including Italy.
- 41:32SPEAKER_01: And the second one was with COVID,
- 41:34SPEAKER_01: which again was mainly in the periphery, and Italy was very affected by that.
- 41:39SPEAKER_01: There is a potential for a third episode,
- 41:43SPEAKER_01: potentially more vicious because now it's not a peripheral episode.
- 41:47SPEAKER_01: And so potentially,
- 41:48SPEAKER_01: yes, it's true that France is too big to fail, but it's also too big to rescue.
- 41:56SPEAKER_01: So the potential is there.
- 42:10SPEAKER_01: The problem is that Italy still is very vulnerable.
- 42:13SPEAKER_01: So the third economist,
- 42:14SPEAKER_01: if the second economist of the Eurozone is under attack,
- 42:18SPEAKER_01: the third one is very vulnerable.
- 42:21SPEAKER_01: And if you look at France,
- 42:25SPEAKER_01: it's very clear that fiscal policy there has not been stabilized at all.
- 42:30SPEAKER_01: So they were not able to bring the deficit nowhere near the famous 3% threshold,
- 42:37SPEAKER_01: which, by the way, is still already high.
- 42:39SPEAKER_01: Or a high-tech country.
- 42:42SPEAKER_01: So the situation is very unstable.
- 42:46SPEAKER_00: Apart from words,
- 42:50SPEAKER_01: the political constituents,
- 42:51SPEAKER_01: even within the French population, for fiscal consolidation, seem to be very slim.
- 42:59SPEAKER_01: So it's like if, contrary to, say, even to Italy, in France, the time has not come yet.
- 43:06SPEAKER_01: Yes.
- 43:07SPEAKER_01: For the reckoning that fiscal virtue is good.
- 43:16SPEAKER_00: And this is a problem.
- 43:18SPEAKER_01: So the risk definitely matches there again.
- 43:20SPEAKER_01: The epicenter is the second economist of the area.
- 43:25SPEAKER_01: The third one is very vulnerable.
- 43:27SPEAKER_01: It's a pretty poisoning mix.
- 43:29SPEAKER_01: And markets are awakening to this risk in a situation where,
- 43:34SPEAKER_01: of course,
- 43:34SPEAKER_01: the triggers are The fact that there is an energy crisis to some extent and yields,
- 43:42SPEAKER_01: global yields are going up.
- 43:43SPEAKER_01: So if you are in trouble already with your public finances,
- 43:47SPEAKER_01: then there is a combo effect of energy and yields both moving to the upside.
- 43:55SPEAKER_01: That's a problem.
- 43:57SPEAKER_00: And it seems, at least from popular coverage, that the markets have really woken up to that.
- 44:04SPEAKER_00: The media coverage of the old burn spread is probably at its highest level.
- 44:08SPEAKER_00: It's been in like three decades.
- 44:11SPEAKER_00: And so do you think that the fiscal situation or
- 44:15SPEAKER_00: the fiscal dynamics are fairly represented in current pricing?
- 44:20SPEAKER_00: Or do you see things that may not be currently reflected?
- 44:24SPEAKER_01: I think it's difficult to think that this
- 44:26SPEAKER_00: is over.
- 44:29SPEAKER_01: We are at levels of the spread, which again, you're right.
- 44:32SPEAKER_01: I mean, they are the highest in quite some times,
- 44:36SPEAKER_01: except for France, but actually only since 2025 for Italy.
- 44:40SPEAKER_01: So it's not so far away, the previous peak.
- 44:47SPEAKER_01: So I think there is still room to go.
- 44:50SPEAKER_01: And also because the safety net at this stage Definitely less powerful than the way before.
- 44:59SPEAKER_01: In power,
- 45:00SPEAKER_01: we have either in power or about to be in power or also very influential,
- 45:06SPEAKER_01: we have more nationalist parties rather than, say, globalist parties.
- 45:12SPEAKER_01: And contrary to 2012,
- 45:15SPEAKER_01: when the crisis ended, we have to remember, with drug is whatever it takes, or 2020,
- 45:23SPEAKER_01: Inflation is not too low.
- 45:25SPEAKER_01: At that time, in the end, it was the whatever it takes meant QE, quantitative easing.
- 45:31SPEAKER_01: Now quantitative easing is unthinkable at the time when interest rates are going up.
- 45:36SPEAKER_01: So the only mechanism in place from a monetary standpoint is
- 45:41SPEAKER_01: the so-called transmission protection mechanism by the ACP instrument,
- 45:50SPEAKER_01: the TPI, so-called TPI.
- 45:52SPEAKER_01: But this cannot be activated at these levels.
- 45:56SPEAKER_01: And it has to be clear that the country is compliant with fiscal rules,
- 46:00SPEAKER_01: so it's not an easy task.
- 46:03SPEAKER_01: Because at the moment,
- 46:04SPEAKER_01: there is a conflict between sorting out the crisis,
- 46:09SPEAKER_01: this potential sovereign crisis, and sorting out the inflation problem.
- 46:16SPEAKER_01: While in the previous two crises, the two were going in the same direction.
- 46:20SPEAKER_01: If you put in place QE,
- 46:22SPEAKER_01: You would have helped sorting out the sovereign crisis and you would have helped
- 46:29SPEAKER_01: to sort out the inflation problem.
- 46:32SPEAKER_01: Now the choice is much more dilemmatic,
- 46:35SPEAKER_01: which means that the safety net or the parachutes are less effective than before.
- 46:39SPEAKER_01: It can be activated at a higher level of spreads compared to before.
- 46:45SPEAKER_00: And so continuing our tour of global fixed income markets that continue
- 46:50SPEAKER_00: to face challenges,
- 46:52SPEAKER_00: perhaps we can start talking a little bit from that same framework
- 46:55SPEAKER_00: of initial conditions and that policy response about the BOJ?
- 47:00SPEAKER_01: Sure.
- 47:00SPEAKER_01: Well, it's quote unquote, it's an easier task they are behind.
- 47:06SPEAKER_01: And, you know,
- 47:07SPEAKER_01: unfortunately,
- 47:07SPEAKER_01: when you,
- 47:08SPEAKER_01: there is an old rule,
- 47:10SPEAKER_01: which is usually economics is not like physics because There are no hard rules.
- 47:16SPEAKER_01: There are soft rules.
- 47:17SPEAKER_01: But there is one rule which is close to a hard rule.
- 47:21SPEAKER_01: It is the later the higher.
- 47:23SPEAKER_01: So the later you start hiking rates, the higher you have to go.
- 47:27SPEAKER_01: Had they started really tightening policy meaningfully two years ago,
- 47:34SPEAKER_01: maybe we could have thought that they could have stopped at 2%.
- 47:40SPEAKER_01: Now this is too long.
- 47:41SPEAKER_01: So they have to keep on going.
- 47:43SPEAKER_01: Probably the Towards 3%, and the slower they go, the higher that we go.
- 47:50SPEAKER_01: And so even there, risks, again,
- 47:53SPEAKER_01: talking about the scenarios,
- 47:55SPEAKER_01: approach that we discussed at length before,
- 48:00SPEAKER_01: when we look at market pricing,
- 48:03SPEAKER_01: these POJ rates are probably still also underpriced going forward.
- 48:09SPEAKER_01: So they will have to hike and they will have to hike more than expected by markets.
- 48:14SPEAKER_01: They have started to quicken the pace of their hiking.
- 48:18SPEAKER_01: But, you know, they come from very slow pace.
- 48:21SPEAKER_00: So there is still a route to go.
- 48:24SPEAKER_00: And so the way is it's up.
- 48:28SPEAKER_00: And I think a lot of that slowness is also,
- 48:31SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 48:32SPEAKER_00: it's still very fresh in the memories of Japanese people,
- 48:35SPEAKER_00: you know, having this kind of secular stagnation dynamic.
- 48:38SPEAKER_00: And so do you feel that some of that slowness is justified in
- 48:44SPEAKER_00: that they're essentially allowing conditions to somewhat normalize?
- 48:49SPEAKER_01: Definitely the roots of the slowness are in the deflation,
- 48:56SPEAKER_01: which plagued the country for decades.
- 48:59SPEAKER_01: Probably they've gone too much.
- 49:02SPEAKER_01: They're now overshot to the other side.
- 49:04SPEAKER_01: Probably it's human, but I would say still you pay a price for this.
- 49:09SPEAKER_01: In the end,
- 49:10SPEAKER_01: the roots of the bubble,
- 49:12SPEAKER_01: the Japanese bubble,
- 49:13SPEAKER_01: which was at the root of the Japanese deflation,
- 49:15SPEAKER_01: was overexpansionary monetary policy.
- 49:19SPEAKER_01: In the 80s.
- 49:21SPEAKER_01: So now the risk to do the same thing all over again.
- 49:25SPEAKER_01: So that's definitely a risk that they are running.
- 49:31SPEAKER_01: There is also a political dimension.
- 49:34SPEAKER_01: The new government,
- 49:36SPEAKER_01: when they came to power,
- 49:39SPEAKER_01: they thought that the best way
- 49:42SPEAKER_01: was to also to gain support,
- 49:45SPEAKER_01: which is also probably What they thought when they won the election was to deflate
- 49:50SPEAKER_01: the economy by putting pressure on the BOJ not to hike rates,
- 49:57SPEAKER_01: putting in place an expansionary fiscal policy and propelling a further devaluation
- 50:04SPEAKER_01: of the yen.
- 50:06SPEAKER_01: Then the result of that was inflation.
- 50:08SPEAKER_01: Then the Middle East crisis hit.
- 50:12SPEAKER_01: Together with these wrong policies, inflation went up.
- 50:16SPEAKER_01: And then they realized that their popularity was collapsing.
- 50:20SPEAKER_01: Because in these,
- 50:21SPEAKER_01: so what, key economies all over the place, all over the globe, inflation is bad.
- 50:28SPEAKER_01: Inflation is the worst thing because it hits the majority of the population.
- 50:35SPEAKER_01: The majority of the population which is not invested in stocks,
- 50:39SPEAKER_01: which lives on wages, for them inflation is bad.
- 50:43SPEAKER_01: So when they saw the popularity collapsing,
- 50:46SPEAKER_01: they basically gave green light to the BOJ,
- 50:51SPEAKER_01: to the Bank of Japan to run
- 50:53SPEAKER_01: more appropriate monetary policy, which is what we see.
- 50:57SPEAKER_01: The thing is that it's late.
- 50:59SPEAKER_00: Right, right.
- 51:01SPEAKER_00: And I think an interesting thing,
- 51:03SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 51:03SPEAKER_00: having discussed these varying reactions of central banks to what's essentially
- 51:08SPEAKER_00: an oil shock with varying initial conditions, is that it has created these...
- 51:17SPEAKER_00: These idiosyncratic or rather, let's say, uncorrelated to Bond moves, FX moves.
- 51:26SPEAKER_00: And so I think the FX dynamics are very, very interesting this year.
- 51:31SPEAKER_00: And so I'm just curious about your broad take about FX from any of these perspectives.
- 51:38SPEAKER_00: Are there any particular pairs that are particularly interesting to you at this time?
- 51:41SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
- 51:44SPEAKER_01: Well, I would say if I look at,
- 51:47SPEAKER_01: of course,
- 51:47SPEAKER_01: there have been a lot of fluctuations in these years,
- 51:51SPEAKER_01: part related to,
- 51:52SPEAKER_01: quote-unquote,
- 51:52SPEAKER_01: wrong policy,
- 51:54SPEAKER_01: talking about Bank of Japan,
- 51:56SPEAKER_01: part related about,
- 51:59SPEAKER_01: let's say,
- 51:59SPEAKER_01: wrong politics,
- 52:01SPEAKER_01: talking about the U.S., Trump,
- 52:03SPEAKER_01: who just scared markets with no reason to invade Greenland and so on,
- 52:08SPEAKER_01: all this kind of tab.
- 52:11SPEAKER_01: But when we look at the macro, A macro force, which in the end we think will win.
- 52:18SPEAKER_01: I would say the indications are that the dollar has to appreciate
- 52:25SPEAKER_01: against the euro.
- 52:26SPEAKER_01: The yen has probably to appreciate against everyone.
- 52:31SPEAKER_01: And euro probably has to depreciate against everyone.
- 52:34SPEAKER_01: So if you want a rank in the next,
- 52:38SPEAKER_01: let's say,
- 52:38SPEAKER_01: if I have to think about currency three years from today,
- 52:43SPEAKER_01: I would put yen first among the three major currencies.
- 52:47SPEAKER_01: Yen first, dollar second, euro third.
- 52:52SPEAKER_01: Seeing through the rest is kind of noise, again created by non-economic or macroeconomic forces.
- 53:02SPEAKER_00: And so something that I spend a lot of time thinking about is kind of this idea
- 53:08SPEAKER_00: of macro regimes, right?
- 53:09SPEAKER_00: Like you're in a current state of the world where,
- 53:11SPEAKER_00: you know, certain trends persist within that kind of state.
- 53:16SPEAKER_00: We've talked about the US, you know, perhaps running too hard.
- 53:20SPEAKER_00: The Eurozone having its challenges and the variation in fiscal situation there.
- 53:27SPEAKER_00: And we've talked about the BOJ kind of being behind.
- 53:31SPEAKER_00: When you look ahead,
- 53:35SPEAKER_00: what are kind of the guideposts you're looking to to understand whether we're going
- 53:39SPEAKER_00: to stay kind of in this global backdrop where global yields are under pressure?
- 53:44SPEAKER_00: And what do you think will tell us if we're going to remain in that regime or move out of it?
- 53:51SPEAKER_01: Well, for the time being,
- 53:53SPEAKER_01: in this kind of environment,
- 53:57SPEAKER_01: as you said, I mean,
- 53:58SPEAKER_01: all the conditions are that For bond yields to stay under pressure because
- 54:05SPEAKER_01: the rate cycle has to some extent just begun.
- 54:12SPEAKER_01: Of course, I want to think when it will end, but we have just begun with it.
- 54:19SPEAKER_01: So I want to
- 54:22SPEAKER_01: For me, I mean, it will be very important to see when the U.S. economy really slows.
- 54:30SPEAKER_01: In a fashion going together in line with what you said before,
- 54:33SPEAKER_01: in a fashion which is consistent with a substantial drop in equities.
- 54:39SPEAKER_01: Equities are highly leveraged on the economy, so they have to go down.
- 54:44SPEAKER_01: If you don't see in tandem the economy and equities going down meaningfully,
- 54:52SPEAKER_01: Inflation will not go down,
- 54:53SPEAKER_01: and in fact, whatever they say, they won't be able to stop.
- 54:57SPEAKER_01: Unless they accept the fact that inflation,
- 55:00SPEAKER_01: they are not able to bring inflation down on targets,
- 55:04SPEAKER_01: or the target is even more credible.
- 55:05SPEAKER_01: But this is even worse for long-term yields.
- 55:09SPEAKER_01: So I think probably, I think the growth rate of the U.S. economy is a key factor.
- 55:18SPEAKER_01: It will be very difficult to generate a Very, very soft landing.
- 55:22SPEAKER_01: I'm not saying that there has to be a recession,
- 55:25SPEAKER_01: but probably for the equity market,
- 55:26SPEAKER_01: even a meaningful slowdown will be enough for a substantial correction.
- 55:31SPEAKER_01: But these things have to happen.
- 55:33SPEAKER_01: This is, to some extent, froth, which has to be taken out.
- 55:39SPEAKER_01: I mean, froth, of course, I'm not saying that the U.S. economy is frothed.
- 55:43SPEAKER_01: It's for real.
- 55:44SPEAKER_01: Relativity is going up.
- 55:45SPEAKER_01: But because inflation is 302,
- 55:47SPEAKER_01: this means that there is part Of the extra growth or part of this extra increase
- 55:54SPEAKER_01: in equity markets, which is froth.
- 55:59SPEAKER_01: This has to go away.
- 56:01SPEAKER_01: Unfortunately, it's never so easy to fine tune these things.
- 56:05SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 56:07SPEAKER_00: And I guess that that is always the challenge, right?
- 56:10SPEAKER_00: Like the central banking tools are unfortunately very blunt and to achieve,
- 56:16SPEAKER_00: you know, Yeah, although this could have been possible for the previous fact.
- 56:19SPEAKER_00: Again, that was an unfinished business.
- 56:35SPEAKER_01: Yeah, I'm definitely going to steal the unfinished business.
- 56:38SPEAKER_01: Exactly.
- 56:39SPEAKER_01: So this is the notion of the unfinished.
- 56:42SPEAKER_01: Probably for the previous Fed,
- 56:44SPEAKER_01: let's say for the Powell's Fed,
- 56:46SPEAKER_01: it would have been easier to achieve a softer landing consistent with inflation
- 56:53SPEAKER_01: at target than it will be for this one.
- 56:55SPEAKER_01: Of course, we should see.
- 56:56SPEAKER_01: Again, as you said,
- 56:58SPEAKER_01: they have to be blunt and it's very, very difficult to fine tune to perfection.
- 57:03SPEAKER_01: So Powell said,
- 57:05SPEAKER_01: almost want to convey the message that if I'm tuned to perfection,
- 57:09SPEAKER_01: that was not true.
- 57:10SPEAKER_01: Because, again, inflation was not the two.
- 57:12SPEAKER_01: Unless I missed something, core inflation was three or more.
- 57:19SPEAKER_01: So, not really.
- 57:23SPEAKER_00: Luigi, as we begin to wind down,
- 57:26SPEAKER_00: are there any themes that you feel that we haven't covered
- 57:29SPEAKER_00: that you think investors really need to kind of have top of their minds?
- 57:33SPEAKER_01: I think really we cover quite a lot.
- 57:35SPEAKER_01: I would say the main thing that I would say,
- 57:39SPEAKER_01: maybe not for today,
- 57:40SPEAKER_01: maybe not for tomorrow,
- 57:41SPEAKER_01: for the day after,
- 57:41SPEAKER_01: is I think really they have to think about twice when they look at
- 57:49SPEAKER_01: the equity market.
- 57:51SPEAKER_01: They're thinking that this can go on forever.
- 57:54SPEAKER_01: We have seen a lot of this situation,
- 57:56SPEAKER_01: a lot of these episodes when people were thinking that this would have gone
- 58:01SPEAKER_01: on forever.
- 58:02SPEAKER_01: They didn't end up well.
- 58:05SPEAKER_01: And, you know, we are still human beings.
- 58:09SPEAKER_01: So this is something that has to be considered.
- 58:15SPEAKER_01: AI is there.
- 58:16SPEAKER_01: It's for real.
- 58:17SPEAKER_01: It's not a bubble.
- 58:18SPEAKER_01: But the fact that there is no bubble around doesn't mean that equity is there to go up forever.
- 58:27SPEAKER_01: I would say I would advise for caution because Those who will have the hot potato
- 58:33SPEAKER_01: in their hands on the last day won't be very pleased.
- 58:39SPEAKER_00: I sense the topic for our next discussion.
- 58:42SPEAKER_01: Yes, exactly.
- 58:43SPEAKER_01: We have fun.
- 58:45SPEAKER_00: Luigi, you've been so generous with your time.
- 58:48SPEAKER_00: Thank you so much for coming on and having this chat.
- 58:50SPEAKER_00: Before we sign off, where can people go to learn more about you and your firm?
- 58:56SPEAKER_01: Oh, thank you.
- 58:56SPEAKER_01: For me, it was a pleasure.
- 58:58SPEAKER_01: And of course, for whoever is...
- 59:02SPEAKER_01: We'll be delighted to have them as clients or to take a look at our app,
- 59:08SPEAKER_01: the LB Macro app,
- 59:09SPEAKER_01: which is downloadable and they can look at it also on Substack, where we are now.
- 59:17SPEAKER_01: There they can find, I think, a lot of our views.
- 59:22SPEAKER_01: They will see that we have two products,
- 59:24SPEAKER_01: one for more institutional investors,
- 59:27SPEAKER_01: we call the premium product,
- 59:29SPEAKER_01: another one for a Say for a wider audience,
- 59:33SPEAKER_01: I don't want to say retail, for a wider audience, which is called Emporium.
- 59:37SPEAKER_01: Of course, the cost is different.
- 59:40SPEAKER_01: The first one is also more customized through one-on-one meetings.
- 59:44SPEAKER_01: The other one is mainly through the app.
- 59:47SPEAKER_01: But of course, we'd be delighted if they want to take a look.
- 59:51SPEAKER_01: There is usually, especially on the Emporium, there is a trial period of a month.
- 59:55SPEAKER_01: So they're welcome to join and download the app.
- 59:59SPEAKER_00: Yeah, listeners, I highly recommend checking that out.
- 1:00:01SPEAKER_00: I've been reading the stuff for just about the entire year now, and it's fantastic.
- 1:00:06SPEAKER_00: So highly recommend checking out.
- 1:00:08SPEAKER_00: Luigi, thanks again.
- 1:00:10SPEAKER_01: Thank you very much, everybody.
- 1:00:11SPEAKER_01: And thank you for this time.
- 1:00:15SPEAKER_01: It was really a pleasure to answer your questions.
- 1:00:17SPEAKER_01: Take care.
- 1:00:18SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
- 1:00:19SPEAKER_01: You too.
- 1:00:19SPEAKER_01: Goodbye.