Latest / Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge / Episode 67 - Perceive Process Perform - Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge

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Episode 67 - Perceive Process Perform - Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge · Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge

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  Perceive process perform three P. The perceived process performed three P model for ad
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  M offers a simple, practical and systematic approach that can be used during all
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  phases of flight. To use it, the pilot will perceive the given set
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  of circumstances for a flight process by evaluating their impact on flight safety, perform
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  by implementing the best course of action. In the first step, the goal
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  is to develop situational awareness by perceiving hazards, which are present events, objects,
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  or circumstances that could contribute to an undesired future event. In this step,
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  the pilot will systematically identify and list hazards associated with all aspects of the
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  flight pilot, aircraft environment, and external pressures. It is important to consider
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  how individual hazards might combine. Consider, for example, the hazard that arises
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  when a new instrument of pilot with no experience in actual instrument conditions wants to
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  make a cross country flight to an airport with low ceilings in order to attend
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  an important business meeting. In the second step, the goal is to process
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  this information to determine whether the identifying hazards constitute risk, which is defined as
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  the future impact of a hazard that is not controlled or eliminated. The degree
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  of risk posed by a given hazard can be measured in terms of exposure,
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  number of people or resources affected, severity, extent of possible loss, and
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  probability the likelihood that a hazard will cause a loss. If the hazard is
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  low ceilings, for example, the level of risk depends on a number of
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  other factors, such as pilot training and experience, aircraft equipment and fuel capacity,
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  and others. In a third step, the goal is to perform by
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  taking action to eliminate hazards or mitigate risk, and then continuously evaluate the outcome
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  of this action. With the example of low ceilings at destination, for instance,
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  the pilot can perform good adm by selecting a suitable alternate, knowing where
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  to find good weather, and carrying sufficient fuel to reach it. This course
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  of action would mitigate the risk. The pilot also has the option to eliminate
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  it entirely by waiting for better weather. Once the pilot has completed the three
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  p decision process and selected a course of action, the process begins anew because
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  now the set of circumstances brought about by the course of action requires analysis.
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  The decision making process is a continuous loop of perceiving, processing, and performing.
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  With practice and consistent use, running through the three P cycle can become
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  a habit that is as smooth, continuous, and automatic as a well honed
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  instrument scan. This basic set of practical risk management tools can be used to
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  improve risk management. The three P model has been expanded to include the care
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  and Team models, which offers pilots another way to assess and reduce risks associated
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  with flying. Perceive process, perform with care and team. Most flight training
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  activities take place in the time critical timeframe for risk management. Figure seventeen DASH
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  eight and seventeen DASH nine combine the six steps of risk management into an easy
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  to remember three P model from practical risk management Perceive process, Perform with the
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  care and Team models. Pilots can help perceive hazards by using the PAVED checklist
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  of pilot, aircraft, environment and external pressures. They can process hazards by
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  using the care checklist of consequences, alternatives, reality, external factors. Finally,
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  pilots can perform risk management by using the team choice list of transfer,
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  eliminate, accept, or mitigate. These concepts are relatively new in the general
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  aviation training world, but have been shown to be extraordinarily useful in lowering accident
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  rates in the world of air carriers forming good safety habits. While a three
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  P model is similar to other methods, there are two good reasons to use
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  the three P model. First, the three P model gives pilots a structured,
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  efficient, and systematic way to identify hazards, assess risk, and implement
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  effective risk controls. Second, practicing risk management needs to be as automatic and
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  general aviation flying as basic aircraft control as is true for other flying skills.
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  Risk management thinking habits are best developed through repetition and consistent adherence to specific procedures.
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  The ODA loop Colonel John Boyd, United States Air Forces Retired, coined
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  the term and developed the concept of the OODA loop Observation, Orientation, decision
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  action. The ideas, words and phrases contained in Boyd's briefings have penetrated not
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  only the United States military services, but the business community and worldwide academia.
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  The ODA loop is now used as a standard description of decision making cycles.
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  The loop is an interlaced decision model which provides immediate feedback through the decision making
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  process. For SRM purposes, an abbreviated version of the concept referred to Figure
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  seventeen ten provides an easily understood tool for the pilot. The first node of
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  the loop, observe reflects the need for situational awareness. A pilot must be
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  aware of those things around him or her that may impact the flight. Continuous
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  monitoring of aircraft controls, whether, etc. Provides a constant reference point by
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  which the pilot knows his or her starting point on the loop, which permits
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  the ability to immediately move to the next step orient The second node of the
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  loop focuses the pilot's attention on one or more discrepancies in the flight. For
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  example, there is a low oil pressure reading. The pilot is aware of
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  this deviation and considers available options in view of potential hazards to continued flight.
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  The pilot then moves to the third node decide, in which he or she
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  makes a positive determination about a specific effect. That decision is made based on
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  experience and knowledge of potential results and to take that particular action will produce the
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  desired result. The pilot then acts on that decision, making a physical input
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  to cause the aircraft to react in the desired fashion. Once the loop has
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  been completed, the pilot is once again in the observed position. The assessment
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  of the resulting action is added to the previously perceived aspects of the flight to
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  further define the flight's progress. The advantage of the OODA loop model is that
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  it may be cumulative, as well as having the potential of allowing for multiple
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  progressions to occur at any given point in the flight. The decide model,
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  using the acronym d ec ide the six step process decide model is another continuous
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  loop process that provides the pilot with a logical way of making decisions. Refer
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  to Figure seventeen DASH eleven. Decide means to detect, estimate, choose a
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  course of action, identify solutions, do the necessary actions, and evaluate the
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  effects of the actions. First, consider a recent accident involving a Piper Apache
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  PA twenty three. The aircraft was substantially damaged during impact with terrain at a
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  local airport in Alabama. The certificated Airline Transport Pilot ATP received minor injuries and
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  the certificated private pilot was not injured. The private pilot was receiving a check
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  ride from the ATP, who was also a designated examiner for a commercial pilot
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  certificate with a multi engine rating. After performing air work at altitude, they
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  returned to the airport and the private pilot performed a single engine approach to a
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  full stop landing. He then taxied back for takeoff, performed a short field
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  takeoff, and then joined the traffic pattern to return for another landing. During
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  the approach for the second landing, the ATP simulated a right engine failure by
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  reducing power on the right engine to zero thrust. This caused the aircraft to
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  yaw right. The procedure to identify the failed engine is a two step process.
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  First, bring power to maximum controllable on both engines. Because the left
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  engine is the only engine delivering thrust, the yaw increases to the right,
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  which necessitates application of additional left rudder. The failed engine is the sign that
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  requires no rudder pressure in this case the right engine. Second, having identified
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  the failed right engine, the procedure is to feather the right engine and a
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  just power to maintain descent angle to a landing. However, in this case,
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  the pilot feathered the left engine because he assumed the engine failure was a
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  left engine failure. During twin engine training. The left engine out is emphasized
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  more than the right engine because the left engine on most light twins is the
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  critical engine. This is due to multi engine airplanes being subject to p factor
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  as our single engine airplanes. The descending propeller blade of each engine will produce
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  greater thrust than the ascending blade when the airplane is operated under power and at
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  positive angles of attack. The descending propeller blade of the right engine is also
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  a greater distance from the center of gravity and therefore has a longer moment arm
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  than the descending propeller blade of the left engine. As a result, failure
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  of the left engine will result in the most asymmetrical thrust adverse yol because the
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  right engine will be providing the remaining thrust. Many twins are designed with a
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  counter rotating right engine. With this design, the degree of asymmetrical thrust is
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  the same with either engine inoperative. Neither engine is more critical than the other.
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  Since the pilot never executed the first step of identifying which engine failed,
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  he feathered the left engine and set the right engine at zero thrust. This
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  essentially restricted the aircraft to a controlled glide. Upon realizing that he was not
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  going to make the runway, the pilot increased power to both engines, causing
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  an enormous yaw to the left. The left propeller was feathered, whereupon the
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  aircraft started to turn left. In desperation, the instructor closed both rottles and
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  the aircraft hit the ground and was substantially damaged. This case is interesting because
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  it highlights two particular issues. First, taking action without forethought can be just
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  as dangerous as taking no action at all. In this case, the pilot's
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  actions were incorrect, yet there was sufficient time to take the necessary steps to
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  analyze the simulated emergency. The second and more subtle issue is the decisions made
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  under pressure are sometimes executed based on limited experience, and the actions taken may
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  be incorrect, incomplete, or insufficient to handle the situation. Detect the problem.
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  Problem detection is the first step in the decision making process. It begins
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  with recognizing a change occurred or an expected change did not occur. A problem
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  is perceived first by the senses, and then it is distinguished through insight and
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  experience. These same abilities, as well as an objective analysis of all available
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  information, are used to determine the nature and severity of the problem. One
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  critical error made during the decision making process is incorrectly detecting the problem. In
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  the example above, the change that occurred was a yaw estimate the need to
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  react. In the inng and out example, the aircraft yawed right, the
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  pilot was on final approach, and the problem warranted a prompt solution. In
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  many cases, overreaction and fixation excludes a safe outcome. For example, what
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  if the cabin door of a Mooney sub opened in flight while the aircraft climbed
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  through fifteen hundred feet on a clear, sunny day. The sudden opening would
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  be alarming, but the perceived hazard the open door presents is quickly and effectively
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  assessed as minor. In fact, the door's opening would not impact save flight
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  and could almost be disregarded. Most likely, a pilot would return to the
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  airport to secure the door after landing. The pilot flying on a clear day,
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  faced with this minor problem, may rank the open door as a low
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  risk. What about the pilot on an IFR climb out in IMC conditions with
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  light intermittent turbulence in rain, who is receiving an ammended clearance from air Traffic
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  Control ATC The open cabin door now becomes a higher risk factor. The problem
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  is not changed, but the perception of risk a pilot assigns it changes.
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  Because of the multitude of ongoing tasks and the environment. Experience, discipline,
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  awareness, and knowledge will influence how a pilot ranks a problem choose a course
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  of action. After the problem has been identified and its impact estimated, the
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  pilot must determine the desirable outcome and choose a course of action. In the
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  case of the multi engine pilot, given the simulated failed engine, the desired
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  objective is to safely land the airplane. Identify solutions. The pilot formulates a
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  plan that will take him or her to the objective. Sometimes there may be
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  only one course of action available. In the case of the engine failure already
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  at five hundred feet or below, the pilot solves the problem by identifying one
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  or more solutions that lead to a successful outcome. It is important for the
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  pilot not to become fixated on the process to the exclusion of making a decision
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  due the necessary actions. Once pathways to resolution are identified, the pilot selects
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  the most suitable one for the situation. The multi engine pilot given a simulated
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  failed engine must now safely land the aircraft, evaluate the effect of the action.
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  Finally, after implementing a solution, evaluate the decision to see if it
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  was correct. If the action taken does not provide the desired results, the
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  process may have to be repeated. End of Part four of Chapter seventeen.