Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Hijacked country registries mint real Google certificates: the trust chain nobody audits
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Thursday, the eighth of October.
- 0:06Hijacked country registries mint real Google certificates: the trust chain nobody audits.
- 0:13Last week, attackers took over the registries behind three country-code domains.
- 0:20That's.gh for Ghana,.sl for Sierra Leone and.
- 0:26as for American Samoa. According to the Chrome team's account, published on 6 October, they then used that con
- 0:35trol to obtain genuine H T T P S certificates for Google domains and other organisations.
- 0:42Google says its own systems were not breached.
- 0:45The weakness sat a level below the website, in the address book that the whole certificate system quietly tru
- 0:52sts.
- 0:58Before a certificate authority issues a certificate, it checks that the applicant controls the domain.
- 1:06Usually that check reads the domain's D N S records.
- 1:10That's the public directory that says where a name lives.
- 1:13Imagine a notary asked to certify that a stranger owns a house.
- 1:18The notary rings the number listed in the town hall directory.
- 1:22If someone has rewritten the directory, the notary calls the burglar, hears the right answers and stamps the
- 1:29paperwork.
- 1:36ated validation checks. The certificates were real, and the browser padlock would have appeared.
- 1:42The certificate authorities followed their rules.
- 1:46The input they trusted had been poisoned.
- 1:48And also.
- 1:52Every certificate that Chrome trusts by default must be disclosed in public Certificate Transparency logs.
- 1:59Analysis of those logs is how the unauthorised certificates were found.
- 2:04Chrome then blocked them through CRLSets, its emergency revocation list.
- 2:10Google also contacted the issuing authorities to arrange formal revocation, so protection extends beyond Chro
- 2:18me.
- 2:21It said it cannot guarantee that its analysis found every affected domain.
- 2:25And it said Chrome's interventions do not reliably protect people using other browsers.
- 2:31And finally.
- 2:35Certificate issuance rested on a single chain: registry, then D N S, then proof of control.
- 2:42Compromise one link and the checks downstream pass honestly.
- 2:47Two controls from Google's guidance fit that gap, and neither is expensive.
- 2:52First, watch Certificate Transparency for every domain you own.
- 2:57Include the defensive registrations, the overseas ones and the forgotten ones.
- 3:02Someone must read the alerts.
- 3:04Second, publish restrictive C A A records bound to your own A C M E account.
- 3:10Google is honest that C A A cannot stop issuance during an active D N S hijack.
- 3:16Its value is afterwards. It stops attackers reusing validation once you regain control.
- 3:22The structural fix is slower.
- 3:25Google says it is working through the Chrome Root Program on shorter certificate lifetimes and less reuse of
- 3:32domain validation. That shrinks the window in which a moment of stolen D N S control stays useful.
- 3:39For UK organisations, the reporting names no UK registry.
- 3:44The question is dependency.
- 3:47Many firms hold names under foreign country codes for brand protection or overseas trading, and many supplier
- 3:54s run services on them. Your control over your own identity online includes the registries and D N S hosts you
- 4:02never chose and rarely audit.
- 4:04Here are two questions for this week's risk meeting.
- 4:07One. Which registries and D N S providers sit beneath our domains, including those held for defensive reason
- 4:15s?
- 4:22Opinion, not advice: a padlock proves a check was passed, not that it was sound.
- 4:28That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:33Thanks for listening.