Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2002] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our gain in net worth during
- 0:062002 was $6.1 billion, which increased the per share book
- 0:11value off both our Class A and Class B stock by 10%.
- 0:15Over the last 38 years that is since present management took
- 0:19over per share book value has grown from $19.00 to $41,727, a
- 0:26rate of 22.2% compounded annually.
- 0:29In all respects, 2002 was a banner year.
- 0:32They'll provide details later, but hey race a summary.
- 0:35Our various non insurance operations performed
- 0:38exceptionally well despite A sluggish economy.
- 0:41A decade ago, Berkshire's annual pre tax earnings from our non
- 0:45insurance businesses was $272 million.
- 0:49Now from our ever expanding collection of manufacturing,
- 0:53retailing, service and finance businesses, we earn that some
- 0:57monthly. Our insurance group increased
- 0:59its float to $41.2 billion, a hefty gain of $5.7 billion.
- 1:05Better yet, the use of these funds in 2002 cost us only 1%.
- 1:11Getting back to low cost float feels good, particularly after
- 1:15our poor results during the three previous years.
- 1:18Berkshires Reinsurance division and GEICO shot the lights out in
- 1:222002 and underwriting discipline was restored at General Rhee.
- 1:26Berkshire acquired some important new businesses with
- 1:29economic characteristics ranging from good to great, run by
- 1:32managers ranging from great to great.
- 1:35Those attributes are two legs of our entrance strategy, the third
- 1:39being a sensible purchase price. Unlike LBO operators and private
- 1:44equity firms, we have no exit strategy.
- 1:46We buy to keep. That's one reason why Berkshire
- 1:49is usually the first and sometimes the only choice for
- 1:52sellers and their managers. Our marketable securities
- 1:56outperformed most indices. For Lou Simpson, who manages
- 2:00equities at GEICO, this was old stuff, but for me it was a
- 2:04welcome change from the last few years, during which my
- 2:07investment record was dismal. The confluence of these
- 2:10favorable factors in 2002 caused our book value gain to outstrip
- 2:15the performance of the S&P 500 by 32.1 percentage points.
- 2:20This result is aberrational. Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice
- 2:25chairman, and my partner and I hope to achieve at most an
- 2:28average annual advantage of a few points in the future.
- 2:32There will be years in which the S&P soundly trounces us.
- 2:36That will in fact almost certainly happened during a
- 2:39strong bull market because the portion of our assets committed
- 2:42to common stocks has significantly declined.
- 2:45This change of course helps our relative performance in down
- 2:49markets such as we had in 2002. I have another caveat to mention
- 2:53about last year's results. If you've been a reader of
- 2:56financial reports in recent years, you've seen a flood of
- 2:59pro forma earnings statements, tabulations in which managers
- 3:03invariably show earnings far in excess of those allowed by their
- 3:07auditors. In these presentations, the CEO
- 3:10tells his owners, don't count this, don't count that, just
- 3:13count what makes earnings fat. Often a forget all this bad
- 3:17stuff message is delivered year after year without management so
- 3:21much as blushing. All figures used in this report
- 3:24apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock
- 3:28that the company had outstanding before 1996.
- 3:32The B shares have an economic interest equal to 130th that of
- 3:37the A. We've yet to see a pro forma
- 3:39presentation disclosing that audited earnings were somewhat
- 3:42high, so let's make a little history.
- 3:44Last year, on a pro forma basis, Berkshire had lower earnings
- 3:48than those we actually reported. That is true because two
- 3:52favorable factors aided our reported figures.
- 3:55First, in 2002 there was no mega catastrophe, which means that
- 3:59Berkshire and other insurers as well earned more from insurance
- 4:03then if losses had been normal. In years when the reverse is
- 4:06true because of a blockbuster hurricane, earthquake or man
- 4:10made disaster, many insurers like to report that they would
- 4:13have earned X except for the unusual event.
- 4:17The implication is that since such mega cats are infrequent,
- 4:20they shouldn't be counted when true earnings are calculated.
- 4:24That is deceptive nonsense. Except for losses will forever
- 4:27be part of the insurance business, and they will forever
- 4:30be paid with shareholders money. Nonetheless, for the purposes of
- 4:34this exercise, we'll take a page from the Industries book for
- 4:38last year when we didn't have any truly major disasters.
- 4:42A downward adjustment is appropriate if you wish to
- 4:45normalize our underwriting result.
- 4:47Secondly, the bond market in 2002 favored certain strategies
- 4:51we employed in our finance and financial products business.
- 4:55Gains from those strategies will certainly diminish within a year
- 4:59or two and may well disappear. Sue, except for a couple of
- 5:03favorable breaks, our pre tax earnings last year would have
- 5:07been about $500 million less than we actually reported.
- 5:10We're happy nevertheless to bank the excess.
- 5:14As Jack Benny once said upon receiving an award, I don't
- 5:18deserve this honor, but then I have arthritis and I don't
- 5:22deserve that either. We continue to be blessed with
- 5:25an extraordinary group of managers, many of whom haven't
- 5:28the slightest financial need to work.
- 5:31They stick around though. In 38 years we've never had a
- 5:34single CEO of a subsidiary elect to leave Berkshire to work
- 5:39elsewhere. Counting Charlie, we now have 6
- 5:41managers over 75 and I hope that in four years that number
- 5:45increases by at least 2. Bob Shaw and I are both 72.
- 5:50Our rationale? It's hard to teach a new dog old
- 5:53tricks. Berkshire's operating CE OS are
- 5:56masters of their crafts and run their businesses as if they were
- 6:00their own. My job is to stay out of their
- 6:02way and allocate whatever excess capital their businesses
- 6:05generate. It's easy work.
- 6:07My managerial model is Eddie Bennett, who was a bat boy in
- 6:111919. At age 19, Eddie began his work
- 6:15with the Chicago White Sox, who that year went to the World
- 6:18Series. The next year, Eddie switched to
- 6:21the Brooklyn Dodgers, and they two won their league title.
- 6:26Our hero, however, smelled trouble changing Burrows.
- 6:29He joined the Yankees in 1921, and they promptly won their
- 6:33first Pennant in history. Now what?
- 6:35He's settled in shrewdly, seeing what was coming.
- 6:38In the next 7 years, the Yankees won five American League titles.
- 6:43What does this have to do with management?
- 6:45It's simple to be a winner. Work with winners.
- 6:47In 1927, for example, Eddie received $700.00 for the 18th
- 6:53World Series. Cher voted him by the legendary
- 6:56Yankee team of Ruth and Garrick. This sum, which Eddie earned by
- 7:00working only four days because New York swept the series, was
- 7:04roughly equal to the full year pay then earned by bat boys who
- 7:07worked with ordinary associates. Eddie understood that how he
- 7:11loved bats was unimportant. What counted instead was hooking
- 7:15up with the cream of those on the playing field.
- 7:18I've learned from Eddie. At Berkshire, I regularly hand
- 7:21bats to many of the heaviest hitters in American business
- 7:25acquisitions. We added some sluggers to our
- 7:27lineup last year. 2 acquisitions pending at year end 2001 were
- 7:32completed. Albeca, which operates under the
- 7:34name Larson Jewel, the US leader in custom made picture frames,
- 7:39and Fruit of the Loom, the producer of about 33.3% of the
- 7:43men's and boys underwear sold in the US and of other apparel as
- 7:47well for both companies, came with outstanding CE OS Steve
- 7:52McKenzie at Albeca and John Holland at Fruit.
- 7:56John, who had retired from Fruit in 1996, rejoined it three years
- 8:00ago and rescued the company from the disastrous path it had gone
- 8:04down after Head left. He's now 70 and I am trying to
- 8:08convince him to make his next retirement coincident with mine,
- 8:11presently scheduled for five years after my death, a date
- 8:14subject however to extension. We initiated and completed two
- 8:19other acquisitions last year that were somewhat below our
- 8:22normal size threshold. In aggregate, however, these
- 8:26businesses earn more than $60 million pre tax annually.
- 8:30Both operate in industries characterized by tough
- 8:34economics, but both also have important competitive strengths
- 8:38that enable them to earn decent returns on capital.
- 8:41The newcomers are a CTBA worldwide leader in equipment
- 8:45for the poultry, hog, egg production and grain industries,
- 8:49and B Garan, a manufacturer of children's apparel whose largest
- 8:54and best known lioness gar animals.
- 8:57These two companies came with the managers responsible for
- 9:00their impressive records, Victoria Mancinelli at CTB and
- 9:04Seymour Lichtenstein at Garan. The largest acquisition we
- 9:08initiated in 2002 was The Pampered Chef, a company with a
- 9:12fascinating history dating back to 1980.
- 9:15Doris Christopher was then a 34 year old suburban Chicago Home
- 9:19economics teacher with a husband, 2 little girls, and
- 9:23absolutely no business background.
- 9:25Wanting, however, to supplement her family's modest income, she
- 9:29turned to thinking about what she knew best, Food preparation.
- 9:33Why not, she wondered, make a business out of marketing
- 9:36kitchenware, focusing on the items she herself had found most
- 9:40useful? To get started, Doris borrowed
- 9:43$3000 against her life insurance policy, all the money ever
- 9:47injected into the company, and went to the Merchandise Mart on
- 9:51a buying expedition. There she picked up a dozen each
- 9:54of this and that, and then went home to set up operations in her
- 9:57basement. Her plan was to conduct in home
- 10:00presentations to small groups of women gathered at the homes of
- 10:04their friends. While driving to her first
- 10:06presentation, though, Doris almost talked herself into
- 10:10returning home, convinced she was doomed to fail.
- 10:13But the women she faced that evening loved her and her
- 10:16products. Purchased $175.00 of goods and
- 10:21TPC was underway. Working with her husband Jay,
- 10:24Doris did $50,000 of business in the first year.
- 10:28Today, only 22 years later, TPC does more than $700 million of
- 10:33business annually. Working through 67,000 Kitchen
- 10:37Consultants. I've been to ATPC Party and it's
- 10:40easy to see why the business is a success.
- 10:43The company's products, in large part proprietary, are well
- 10:47styled and highly useful, and the consultants are
- 10:50knowledgeable and enthusiastic. Everyone has a good time.
- 10:53Hurry to pamperedchef.com on the Internet to find where to attend
- 10:58a party near you. Two years ago, Doors brought in
- 11:01Sheila O'Connell Cooper, now CEO, to share the management
- 11:05load, and in August they met with me in Omaha.
- 11:08It took me about 10 seconds to decide that these were two
- 11:11managers with whom I wish to partner, and we promptly made a
- 11:14deal. Berkshire shareholders couldn't
- 11:17be luckier than to be associated with Doris and Sheila.
- 11:20Berkshire also made some important acquisitions last year
- 11:24through Mid American Energy Holdings, MEHCA Company, in
- 11:27which our equity interest is 80.2% because the Public Utility
- 11:32Holding Company Act PUKA limits us to 9.9% voting control.
- 11:37However, we are unable to fully consolidate Max financial
- 11:42statements despite the voting control limitation and the
- 11:45somewhat strange capital structure at MEHC it has
- 11:49engendered. The company is a key part of
- 11:51Berkshire already. It has $18 billion of assets and
- 11:55delivers our largest stream of non insurance earnings.
- 11:59It could well grow to be huge five.
- 12:01Last year MEHC acquired 2 important gas pipelines.
- 12:05The first Kern River extends from southwest Wyoming to
- 12:09Southern California. This line moves about 900
- 12:12million cubic feet of gas a day and is undergoing a $1.2 billion
- 12:17expansion that will double throughput by this fall.
- 12:21At that point, the line will carry enough gas to generate
- 12:24electricity for 10 million homes.
- 12:27The second acquisition, Northern Natural Gas, is a 16,600 mile
- 12:32line extending from the southwest to a wide range of
- 12:35Midwestern locations. This purchase completes a
- 12:38corporate odyssey of particular interest to Omahans.
- 12:42From its beginnings in the 1930s, Northern Natural was one
- 12:45of Omaha's premier businesses, run by CEOs who regularly
- 12:50distinguish themselves as community leaders.
- 12:52Then in July 1985, the company, which in 1980 had been renamed
- 12:58in Turn N, merged with Houston Natural Gas, a business less
- 13:02than half its size. The companies announced that the
- 13:05enlarged operation would be headquartered in Omaha, with
- 13:08Inter N CEO continuing in that job.
- 13:11Within a year, those promises were broken.
- 13:14By then, the former CEO of Houston Natural had taken over
- 13:18the top job at Inter N, the company had been renamed, and
- 13:21the headquarters had been moved to Houston.
- 13:24These switches were orchestrated by the new CEO, Ken Lay, and the
- 13:27name he chose was Enron. Fast forward 15 years to late
- 13:322001. Enron ran into the troubles
- 13:34we've heard so much about and borrowed money from Dynegy,
- 13:38putting up the Northern Natural Pipeline operation as
- 13:41collateral. The two companies quickly had a
- 13:44falling out and the pipeline's ownership moved to Dynegy.
- 13:47That company, in turn, soon encountered severe financial
- 13:51problems of its own. MEHC received a call on Friday,
- 13:55July 26th from Dynegy which was looking for a quick and certain
- 14:00cash sale of the pipeline. Dynegy phoned the right party.
- 14:03On July 29th we signed a contract and shortly thereafter
- 14:08Northern Natural returned home. When 2001 began, Charlie and I
- 14:12had no idea that Berkshire would be moving into the pipeline
- 14:16business, but upon completion of the Kern River expansion, MHC
- 14:20will transport about 8% of all gas used in the US.
- 14:25We continue to look for large energy related assets though in
- 14:28the electric utility field, Puka constrains what we can do.
- 14:32A few years ago and somewhat by accident, MEHC found itself in
- 14:36the residential real estate brokerage business.
- 14:39It is no accident, however, that we have dramatically expanded
- 14:43the operation. Moreover, we are likely to keep
- 14:46on expanding in the future. We call this business Home
- 14:49Services of America in the various communities it serves,
- 14:52though it operates under the names of the businesses it has
- 14:55acquired such as CBS in Omaha, at Dyna Realty Inn Minneapolis
- 15:01and Iowa Realty in Des Moines. In most metropolitan areas in
- 15:04which we operate, we are the clear market leader.
- 15:08Home Services is now the second largest residential brokerage
- 15:12business in the country. On one side or the other or
- 15:15both. We participated in $37 billion
- 15:19of transactions last year, up 100% from 2001.
- 15:23Most of our growth came from three acquisitions we made
- 15:26during 2002, the largest of which was Prudential California
- 15:30Realty. Last year, this company, the
- 15:33leading realtor in a territory consisting of Los Angeles,
- 15:37Orange and San Diego counties, participated in $16 billion of
- 15:42Closings. In a very short period, Ron
- 15:45Peltier, the company's CEO, has increased home services revenues
- 15:49and profits dramatically. Though this business will always
- 15:52be cyclical, it's one we like and in which we continue to have
- 15:56an appetite for sensible acquisitions.
- 15:59Dave Sokol, Mech CEO, and Greg Abel, his key associate, are
- 16:03huge assets for Berkshire. They are deal makers and they
- 16:07are managers. Berkshire stands ready to inject
- 16:10massive amounts of money into MEHC and it will be fun to watch
- 16:14how far Dave and Greg can take the business. 6 The economics of
- 16:18property Casualty insurance Our core business, though we have
- 16:22others of great importance is insurance.
- 16:24To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that
- 16:28you understand how to evaluate an insurance company.
- 16:31The key determinants are one the amount of float that the
- 16:34business generates 2 its cost and three, most critical of all,
- 16:39the long term outlook for both of these factors.
- 16:42To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own.
- 16:45In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are
- 16:49received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes
- 16:53extends over many years. During that time, the insurer
- 16:56invests the money. This pleasant activity typically
- 17:00carries with it a downside, the premiums that an insurer takes
- 17:03and usually do not cover the losses and expenses it
- 17:06eventually must pay. That leaves it running an
- 17:09underwriting loss, which is the cost of float.
- 17:12An insurance business has value if it's cost to float over time
- 17:16is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to
- 17:19obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if
- 17:22it's cost to float is higher than market rates for money.
- 17:25Moreover, the downward trend of interest rates in recent years
- 17:29has transformed underwriting losses that formerly were
- 17:33tolerable into burdens that move insurance businesses deeply into
- 17:37the lemon category. Historically, Berkshire has
- 17:40obtained its float at a very low cost.
- 17:42Indeed, our cost has been less than 0 in many years.
- 17:47That is, we've actually been paid for holding other people's
- 17:50money. In 2001, however, our cost was
- 17:53terrible, coming in at 12.8%, about half of which was
- 17:57attributable to World Trade Center losses back in 1983 to
- 18:0284. We had years that were even
- 18:04worse. There's nothing automatic about
- 18:06cheap float. The table that follows shows at
- 18:09intervals the float generated by the various segments of
- 18:12Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered the business 36
- 18:16years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company,
- 18:19whose traditional lines are included in the segment other
- 18:22primary. For the table, we have
- 18:24calculated our float which we generate in large amounts
- 18:27relative to our premium volume by adding net loss reserves,
- 18:31loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance, assumed
- 18:35and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting insurance
- 18:39related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes
- 18:44and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance got that
- 18:48year end float in dollars millions.
- 18:51Last year our cost of float was 1%.
- 18:54As I mentioned earlier, you should temper your enthusiasm
- 18:57about this favorable result given that no mega catastrophe
- 19:01occurred in 2002. We're certain to get one of
- 19:04these disasters periodically, and when we do, our float cost
- 19:07will spike. 7 our 2002 results were hurt by 1A painful charge
- 19:12at general reefer, losses that should have been recorded as
- 19:16costs in earlier years and to a desirable charge we incur
- 19:20annually for retroactive insurance.
- 19:21See the next section for more about these items.
- 19:25These costs totaled $1.75 billion or about 4.6% of float.
- 19:31Fortunately, our overall underwriting experience on 2002
- 19:34business was excellent, which allowed us even after the
- 19:38charges noted to approach a no cost result.
- 19:41Absent a mega catastrophe, I expect our cost to float in 2003
- 19:46to again be very low, perhaps even less than 0.
- 19:50In the rundown of our insurance operations that follows, you
- 19:53will see why I'm optimistic that over time our underwriting
- 19:57results will both surpass those achieved by the industry and
- 20:01deliver us investable funds at minimal cost insurance
- 20:05operations. If our insurance operations are
- 20:07to generate low cost float over time, they must underwrite with
- 20:12unwavering discipline, be reserved conservatively and C
- 20:16avoid an aggregation of exposures that would allow a
- 20:19supposedly impossible incident to threaten their solvency.
- 20:23All of our major insurance businesses, with 1 exception,
- 20:27have regularly met those tests. The exception is General Ree and
- 20:31there was much to do with that company last year to get it up
- 20:33to snuff. Am delighted to report that
- 20:36under Joe Brandon's leadership and with Yeoman assistance by
- 20:39Tad Montrose, enormous progress has been made on each of the
- 20:43fronts described. When I agreed in 1998 to merge
- 20:47Berkshire with Jen Ree, I thought that company stuck to
- 20:50the three rules I've enumerated. I had studied the operation for
- 20:54decades and had observed underwriting discipline that was
- 20:57consistent in reserving that was conservative at merger time.
- 21:01I detected no slippage in Gen. Res standards.
- 21:05I was dead wrong. Gen. residential culture and
- 21:07practices had substantially changed and unbeknownst to
- 21:11management and to me, the company was grossly mispricing
- 21:14its current business. In addition, Gin Re had
- 21:18accumulated an aggregation of risks that would have been fatal
- 21:21had, say, terrorists detonated several large scale nuclear
- 21:26bombs in an attack on the USA. Disaster of that scope was
- 21:30highly improbable, of course, but it is up to insurers to
- 21:34limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rock
- 21:37solid if the impossible happens. Indeed, had Gin Re remained
- 21:42independent, the World Trade Center attack alone would have
- 21:45threaten the company's existence.
- 21:47When the WTC disaster occurred, it exposed weaknesses in GIN
- 21:51residential operations that I should have detected earlier.
- 21:55But I was lucky. Joe and Tad were on hand,
- 21:58freshly endowed with increased authority and eager to rapidly
- 22:02correct the errors of the past. They knew what to do, and they
- 22:05did it. It takes time for insurance
- 22:07policies to run off. However, in 2002 was well along
- 22:12before we managed to reduce our aggregation of nuclear, chemical
- 22:16and biological risk in CB to a tolerable level.
- 22:19That problem is now behind us. On another front, gin
- 22:23residential underwriting attitude has been dramatically
- 22:26altered. The entire organization now
- 22:29understands that we wish to write only properly priced
- 22:32business, whatever the effect on volume.
- 22:35Joe and Tad judge themselves only by gin residential
- 22:39underwriting profitability. Size simply doesn't count.
- 22:42Finally, we are making every effort to get our reserving
- 22:45right. If we fail at that, we can't
- 22:48know our true costs and any insurer that has no idea what
- 22:52its costs or is heading for big trouble. 8 At year end 2001,
- 22:57General Ree attempted to reserve adequately for all losses that
- 23:01had occurred prior to that date and we're not yet paid.
- 23:04But we failed badly. Therefore, the company's 2002
- 23:08underwriting results we're penalized by an additional $1.31
- 23:12billion that we recorded to correct the estimation mistakes
- 23:16of earlier years. When I review the reserving
- 23:19errors that have been uncovered at General Rhee, a line from a
- 23:22country song seems apt. I wish I didn't know now what I
- 23:26didn't know then. I can promise you that our top
- 23:28priority going forward is to avoid inadequate reserving, but
- 23:32I can't guarantee success. The natural tendency of most
- 23:36casualty insurance managers is to under reserve and they must
- 23:40have a particular mindset which, it may surprise you, has nothing
- 23:44to do with actuarial expertise if they are to overcome this
- 23:47devastating bias. Additionally, a reinsurer faces
- 23:51far more difficulties in reserving properly than does a
- 23:54primary insurer. Nevertheless, at Berkshire we
- 23:58have generally been successful in our reserving and we are
- 24:01determined to be at General Rhee as well.
- 24:03In summary, I believe General Rhee is now well positioned to
- 24:07deliver huge amounts of no cost float to Berkshire and that it's
- 24:11sink the ship catastrophe risk has been eliminated.
- 24:14The company still possesses the important competitive strengths
- 24:18that I've outlined in the past, and it gained another highly
- 24:21significant advantage last year when each of its three largest
- 24:25worldwide competitors, previously rated AAA was demoted
- 24:29by at least one rating agency. Among the giants, General Rhee,
- 24:34rated AAA across the board, is now in a class by itself.
- 24:38In respect to financial strength, no attribute is more
- 24:41important. Recently, in contrast, one of
- 24:44the world's largest reinsurers, a company regularly recommended
- 24:48to primary insurers by leading brokers, has all but ceased
- 24:52paying claims, including those both valid and due.
- 24:55This company owes many billions of dollars to hundreds of
- 24:58primary insurers who now face massive write offs.
- 25:02Cheap reinsurance is a fool's bargain.
- 25:05When an insurer lays out money today in exchange for a
- 25:08reinsurer's promise to pay a decade or two later, it's
- 25:11dangerous and possibly life threatening for the insurer to
- 25:15deal with any but the strongest reinsurer around.
- 25:18Berkshire shareholders owe Joe and Tad a huge thank you for
- 25:22their accomplishments in 2002. They worked harder during the
- 25:26year than I would wish for anyone and it is paying off at
- 25:29GEICO. Everything went so well in 2002
- 25:32that we should pinch ourselves. Growth was substantial, profits
- 25:36were outstanding, policy holder retention was up and sales
- 25:40productivity jumped significantly.
- 25:42These trends continue in early 2003.
- 25:46Thank Tony nicely for all of this.
- 25:48As anyone who knows him will attest, Tony has been in love
- 25:51with GEICO for 41 years, ever since he went to work for the
- 25:54company at 18, and his results reflect this passion.
- 25:58He is proud of the money we save policy holders, about $1 billion
- 26:02annually versus what other insurers on average would have
- 26:05charged them. He is proud of the service we
- 26:08provide these policy holders. In a key industry survey, GEICO
- 26:12was recently ranked above all major competitors.
- 26:16He is proud of his 19162 associates who last year were
- 26:20awarded profit sharing payments equal to 19% of their base
- 26:24salary because of the splendid results they achieved.
- 26:27And he is proud of the growing profits he delivers to Berkshire
- 26:31shareholders. GEICO took in $2.9 billion in
- 26:34premiums when Berkshire acquired full ownership in 1996.
- 26:39Last year, its volume was $6.9 billion, with plenty of growth
- 26:44to come. Particularly promising is the
- 26:47company's Internet operation, whose new business grew by 75%
- 26:52last year. Check us out at geico.com or
- 26:55call 800-847-7536. In most states, shareholders get
- 27:01a special 8% discount pay raise. One footnote to Geico's 2002
- 27:06earnings that underscores the need for insurers to do business
- 27:10with only the strongest of reinsurers.
- 27:12In 1981 to 1983, the managers then running GEICO decided to
- 27:17try their hand at writing commercial umbrella and product
- 27:21liability insurance. The risks seemed modest.
- 27:24The company took in only $3,051,000 from this line and
- 27:29used almost all of it, $2,979,000 to buy reinsurance.
- 27:35In order to limit its losses, GEICO was left with a paltry
- 27:39$72,000 as compensation for the minor portion of the risk that
- 27:43it retained, but this small bite of the apple was more than
- 27:47enough to make the experience memorable.
- 27:49Geico's losses from this venture now total of breathtaking $94.1
- 27:54million, or about 130,000% of the net premium it received.
- 27:59Of the total loss, uncollectible receivables from Deadbeat
- 28:03reinsurer's account for no less than $90.3 million, including
- 28:08$19 million charged in 2002. So much for cheap reinsurance.
- 28:13Ajit Jain's reinsurance division was the major reason our float
- 28:17cost us so little last year. If we ever put a photo in a
- 28:21Berkshire annual report, it will be of Ajit in color.
- 28:25Ajit's operation has amassed $13.4 billion of float, more
- 28:29than all but a handful of insurers have ever built up.
- 28:33He accomplished this from a standing start in 1986 and even
- 28:37now has a workforce numbering only 20.
- 28:40And most important, he has produced underwriting profits.
- 28:44His profits are particularly remarkable if you factor in some
- 28:47accounting arcana that I am about to lay on you.
- 28:50So prepare to eat your spinach. Or, alternatively, if debits and
- 28:54credits aren't your thing, skip the next two paragraphs.
- 28:58Ajit's 2002 underwriting profit of $534 million came after his
- 29:04operation recognized a charge of $428.00 million attributable to
- 29:09retroactive insurance he has written over the years.
- 29:12In this line of business, we assume from another insurer the
- 29:15obligation to pay up to a specified amount for losses they
- 29:19have already incurred, often for events that took place decades
- 29:22earlier but that are yet to be paid.
- 29:24For example, because a worker heard in 1980 will receive
- 29:28monthly payments for life. In these arrangements, an
- 29:31insurer pays us a large upfront premium, but one that is less
- 29:36than the losses we expect to pay.
- 29:38We willingly accept this differential because our
- 29:40payments are capped and B we get to use the money until loss
- 29:44payments are actually made, with these often stretching out over
- 29:47a decade or more. About 80% of the $6.6 billion in
- 29:51asbestos and environmental loss reserves that we carry arises
- 29:56from contracts whose costs consequently can't skyrocket.
- 30:00When we write a retroactive policy, we immediately record
- 30:04both the premium and a reserve for the expected losses.
- 30:08The difference between the two is entered as an asset entitled
- 30:11Deferred Charges Reinsurance assumed.
- 30:14This is no small item at your end.
- 30:17For all retroactive policies, it was $3.4 billion.
- 30:21We then amortized this asset downward by charges to income
- 30:26over the expected life of each policy.
- 30:28These charges, $440 million in 2002, including charges at GIN
- 30:34recreate an underwriting loss, but one that is intentional and
- 30:38desirable. And even after this drag on
- 30:41reported results, Ajit achieved a large underwriting gain last
- 30:45year. We want to emphasize however
- 30:48that we assume risks and Ajit's operation that are huge, far
- 30:51larger than those retained by any other insurer in the world.
- 30:55Therefore, a single event could cause a major swing in Ajit's
- 30:59results in any given quarter or year.
- 31:02That bothers us not at all, as long as we are paid
- 31:04appropriately. We love taking on short term
- 31:07volatility that others wish to shed.
- 31:10At Berkshire, we would rather earn a lumpy 15% overtime than a
- 31:14smooth 12%. If you see Ajit at our annual
- 31:17meeting, bow deeply. Berkshire's smaller insurers had
- 31:21an outstanding year. Their aggregate float grew by
- 31:2438%, and they realized an underwriting profit of $32
- 31:28million, or 4.5% of premiums. Collectively, these operations
- 31:34would make one of the finest insurance companies in the
- 31:36country. Included in these figures,
- 31:39however, were terrible results in our California workers
- 31:42compensation operation there. We have work to do there too.
- 31:47Our reserving severely missed the mark.
- 31:50Until we figure out how to get this business right, we will
- 31:53keep it small for the fabulous year they had in 2002.
- 31:57We thank Rod Eldred, John Kaiser, Tom Nernie, Don Tall and
- 32:01Don Werster. They added a lot of value to
- 32:04your Berkshire investment. Sources of reported earnings The
- 32:08table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's
- 32:10reported earnings. You will notice that purchase
- 32:13accounting adjustments dropped sharply in 2002.
- 32:17The reason being that GAAP rules changed then no longer requiring
- 32:21the amortization of goodwill. This change increases our
- 32:25reported earnings but has no effect on our economic earnings.
- 32:29Berkshire purchased 1273 million dollars of Mid American junior
- 32:34debt, bringing our total holdings up these 11%
- 32:38obligations to 1728 million dollars and also invested
- 32:43$402,000,000 in a common equivalent stock.
- 32:47We now own on a fully diluted basis, 80.2% of Mid Americans
- 32:51equity. Mid Americans financial
- 32:54statements are presented in detail on page 37.
- 32:58Last year I told you of the problems at Dexter that led to a
- 33:00huge loss in our shoe business. Thanks to Frank Rooney and Jim
- 33:05Isler of HH Brown, the Dexter operation has been turned around
- 33:09despite the cost of unwinding our problems there.
- 33:13We earned $24 million in shoes last year, an upward swing of
- 33:17$70 million from 2001. Randy Watson and Justin also
- 33:22contributed to this improvement, increasing margins significantly
- 33:26while trimming invested capital. Shoes are a tough business, but
- 33:30we have terrific managers and believe that in the future we
- 33:34will earn reasonable returns on the capital we employ in this
- 33:37operation. 11 in a SOSO year for home furnishing and jewelry
- 33:42retailers, our operations did well.
- 33:45Among our 8 retailing operations, the best performer
- 33:48was Homemakers in Des Moines. There, the talented Merchman
- 33:52family achieved outstanding gains in both sales and profits.
- 33:56Nebraska Furniture Mart will open a new Blockbuster store in
- 34:00metropolitan Kansas City in August.
- 34:02With 450,000 square feet of retail space, it could well
- 34:06produce the second largest volume of any furniture store in
- 34:10the country. The Omaha operation being the
- 34:12national champion. I hope Berkshire shareholders in
- 34:16the Kansas City area will come out for the opening and keep
- 34:19coming. Our home and construction
- 34:21related businesses, Acme Brick, Benjamin Moore Paint, Johns
- 34:25Manville, Mytech and Shaw delivered $941 million of pre
- 34:30tax earnings last year. Of particular significance with
- 34:34Shaw's gain from $292 million in 2001 to $424,000,000.
- 34:40Bob Shaw and Julian Saul are terrific operators.
- 34:44Carpet prices increased only 1% last year, but Shaw's
- 34:48productivity gains and excellent expense control delivered
- 34:51significantly improved margins. We cherish cost consciousness at
- 34:55Berkshire. Our model is the widow who went
- 34:58to the local newspaper to place an obituary notice told there
- 35:02was a $0.25 a word charge she requested Fred Brown died.
- 35:08She was then informed there was a seven word minimum.
- 35:10OK, the bereaved woman replied, make it Fred Brown died.
- 35:14Golf clubs for sale Earnings from flight services increased
- 35:18last year, but only because we realized a special pre tax gain
- 35:22of $60 million from the sale of our 50% interest in flight
- 35:27safety Boeing. Without this gain, earnings from
- 35:29our training business would have fallen slightly in concert with
- 35:33the slowdown in business aviation activity.
- 35:36Flight safety training continues to be the gold standard for the
- 35:39industry and we expect growth in the years to come.
- 35:42At Net Jets, our fractional ownership operation, we are the
- 35:46runaway leader of the four company field.
- 35:49FAA records indicate that our industry share in 2002 was 75%,
- 35:54meaning that clients purchased or leased planes from us that
- 35:58were valued at triple those recorded by our three
- 36:00competitors. Combined.
- 36:02Last year, our fleet flew 132.7 million nautical miles, taking
- 36:08clients to 130 countries. Our pre eminence is directly
- 36:12attributable to Rich Santouli, Net Jet's CEO.
- 36:16He invented the business in 1986 and ever since has exhibited an
- 36:20unbending devotion to the highest levels of service,
- 36:24safety and security. Rich, Charlie and I insist on
- 36:28planes and personnel worthy of carrying our own families
- 36:32because they regularly do. Though net jets revenues set a
- 36:35record in 2002, the company again lost money.
- 36:39A small profit in the US was more than offset by losses in
- 36:42Europe. Overall, the fractional
- 36:44ownership industry lost significant sums last year, and
- 36:48that is almost certain to be the outcome in 2003 as well.
- 36:52The bald fact is that airplanes are costly to operate.
- 36:56Over time, this economic reality should work to our advantage,
- 37:00given that for a great many companies, private aircraft are
- 37:03an essential business tool. And for most of these companies,
- 37:07net jets makes compelling sense as either a primary or
- 37:10supplementary supplier of the aircraft they need.
- 37:13Many businesses could save millions of dollars annually by
- 37:16flying with us. Indeed, the yearly savings at
- 37:20some large companies could exceed $10 million.
- 37:23Equally important, these companies would actually
- 37:26increase their operational capabilities by using USA.
- 37:30Fractional ownership of a single net jets plane allows a client
- 37:34to have several planes in the air simultaneously.
- 37:37Additionally, through the interchange arrangement we make
- 37:40available, an owner of an interest in one plane can fly
- 37:44any of 12 other models using whatever plane makes most sense
- 37:48for a mission. One of my sister's owns a
- 37:50fraction of a Falcon 2000, which she uses for trips to Hawaii,
- 37:55but exhibiting the Buffett gene, she interchanges to a more
- 37:58economical citation. Excel for short trips in the US.
- 38:02The roster of Net Jets users confirms the advantages we offer
- 38:06major businesses. Take General Electric for
- 38:09example. It has a large fleet of its own,
- 38:12but also has an unsurpassed knowledge of how to utilize
- 38:15aircraft effectively and economically, and it is our
- 38:18largest customer. Our finance and financial
- 38:21products line covers a variety of operations, among them
- 38:25certain activities in high grade fixed income securities that
- 38:28proved highly profitable in 2002.
- 38:31Earnings in this arena will probably continue for a while,
- 38:35but are certain to decrease and perhaps disappear in time. 12th,
- 38:39This category also includes a highly satisfactory but rapidly
- 38:43diminishing income stream from our Arcadia investment in Finova
- 38:47described in last year's report. Our partner, Leucadia National
- 38:52Corp has managed this operation with great skill, willingly
- 38:56doing far more than its share of the heavy lifting.
- 38:59I like this division of Labor and hope to join with Leucadia
- 39:02in future transactions. On the minus side, the finance
- 39:06line also includes the operations of General RE
- 39:09Securities, A derivatives and trading business.
- 39:12This entity lost $173 million pre tax last year, a result that
- 39:18in part is a belated acknowledgement of faulty,
- 39:21albeit standard, accounting it used in earlier periods.
- 39:25Derivatives in fact deserve an extensive look, both in respect
- 39:29to the accounting their users employ and to the problems they
- 39:32may pose for both individual companies in our economy.
- 39:36Derivatives. Charlie and I are of one mind in
- 39:39how we feel about derivatives and the trading activities that
- 39:42go with them. We view them as time bombs, both
- 39:46for the parties that deal in them in the economic system.
- 39:49Having delivered that thought, which we'll get back to, let me
- 39:52retreat to explaining derivatives, though the
- 39:55explanation must be general because the word covers an
- 39:58extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts.
- 40:02Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands
- 40:05at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one
- 40:09or more reference items such as interest rates, stock prices, or
- 40:13currency values. If for example you are either
- 40:16long or short in S&P 500 futures contract, you are a party to a
- 40:21very simple derivatives. Transaction with your gain or
- 40:25loss derived from movements in the index.
- 40:28Derivatives contracts are off varying duration, running
- 40:31sometimes to 20 or more years, and their value is often tied to
- 40:35several variables. Unless derivatives contracts are
- 40:38collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also
- 40:42depends on that credit worthiness of the counterparties
- 40:45to them. In the meantime, though, before
- 40:48a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits
- 40:51and loss is often huge an amount in their current earnings
- 40:55statements without so much as a penny changing hands.
- 40:58The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the
- 41:01imagination of man, or sometimes, so it seems, Mad Men.
- 41:06At Enron, for example, new Sprint and broadband
- 41:09derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future, were
- 41:13put on the books. Or say you want to write a
- 41:16contract speculating on the number of twins to be born in
- 41:19Nebraska in 2020. No problem.
- 41:22At a price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty.
- 41:26When we purchased Jen Ree, it came with General Ree
- 41:28Securities, A derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn't want,
- 41:32judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to
- 41:35sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it.
- 41:39But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than
- 41:42done. It will be a great many years
- 41:45before we are totally out of this operation, though we reduce
- 41:48our exposure daily. In fact, the reinsurance sent
- 41:52derivatives businesses are similar.
- 41:54Like hell. Both are easy to enter and
- 41:57almost impossible to exit. In either industry, once you
- 42:01write a contract which may require a large payment decades
- 42:04later, you are usually stuck with it.
- 42:06True, there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with
- 42:09others, but most strategies of that kind leave you with
- 42:13residual liability. Another commonality of
- 42:16reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate reported
- 42:19earnings that are often wildly overstated.
- 42:22That's true because today's earnings are in a significant
- 42:25way, based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed
- 42:29for many years. Errors will usually be honest,
- 42:32reflecting only the human tendency to take an optimistic
- 42:36view of once commitments. But the parties to derivatives
- 42:40also have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them.
- 42:44Those who trade derivatives are usually paid in whole or part on
- 42:47earnings calculated by mark to market accounting.
- 42:50But often there is no real market think about our contract
- 42:54involving twins and mark to model is utilized.
- 42:57This substitution can bring on large scale mischief.
- 43:01As a general rule, contracts involving multiple reference
- 43:04items and distant settlement dates increase the opportunities
- 43:08for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions.
- 43:11In the twin scenario, for example, the two parties to the
- 43:14contract might well use differing models, allowing both
- 43:18to show substantial profits for many years.
- 43:21In extreme cases, mark to model degenerates into what I would
- 43:25call mark to myth. Of course, both internal and
- 43:28outside auditors review the numbers, but that's no easy job.
- 43:32For example, General RE Securities at year end after 10
- 43:36months of winding down its operation had 1438413 contracts
- 43:41outstanding involving 672 counterparties around the world.
- 43:46Each contract had a plus or minus value derived from one or
- 43:51more reference items, including some of mind boggling
- 43:54complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that,
- 43:57expert auditors could easily and honestly have widely varying
- 44:01opinions. The valuation problem is far
- 44:04from academic. In recent years, some huge scale
- 44:07frauds and near frauds have been facilitated by derivatives
- 44:10trades in the energy and electric utility sectors.
- 44:14For example, companies used derivatives and trading
- 44:17activities to report great earnings until the roof fell in
- 44:21when they actually tried to convert the derivatives related
- 44:24receivables on their balance sheets into cash.
- 44:27Mark to market then turned out to be truly mark to myth.
- 44:31I can assure you that the marking errors in the
- 44:33derivatives business have not been symmetrical.
- 44:35Almost invariably they have favored either the trader who
- 44:38was eyeing a multi $1,000,000 bonus, or the CEO who wanted to
- 44:43report impressive earnings, or both.
- 44:45The bonuses were paid and the CEO profited from his options.
- 44:49Only much later did shareholders learn that the reported earnings
- 44:53were a sham. Another problem about
- 44:55derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that a
- 44:58corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons.
- 45:02This pylon effect occurs because many derivatives contracts
- 45:05require that a companies suffering a credit downgrade
- 45:08immediately supply collateral to counterparties.
- 45:12Imagine then, that a company is downgraded because of general
- 45:16adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in
- 45:19with their requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous
- 45:23demand for cash collateral on the company.
- 45:25The need to meet this demand can then throw the company into a
- 45:29liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still more
- 45:33downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can
- 45:36lead to a corporate meltdown. Derivatives also create a Daisy
- 45:40chain risk that is akin to the risk run by insurers or
- 45:44reinsurers that lay off much of their business with others.
- 45:47In both cases, huge receivables from many counterparties tend to
- 45:51build up over time. At Gen.
- 45:53Re Securities, we still have $6.5 billion of receivables,
- 45:57though we've been in a liquidation mode for nearly a
- 46:00year. A participant may see himself as
- 46:03prudent, believing his large credit exposures to be
- 46:06diversified and therefore not dangerous under certain
- 46:09circumstances, though an exogenous event that causes the
- 46:13receivable from company A to go bad will also affect those from
- 46:17companies B through Z. History teaches us that a crisis
- 46:21often causes problems to correlate in a manner undreamed
- 46:25of and more tranquil times. In banking, the recognition of a
- 46:29linkage problem was one of the reasons for the formation of the
- 46:32Federal Reserve System before the Fed was established.
- 46:36The failure of weak banks would sometimes put sudden and
- 46:39unanticipated liquidity demands on previously strong banks,
- 46:43causing them to fail in turn. The Fed now insulates the strong
- 46:48from the troubles of the weak, but there is no central bank
- 46:51assigned to the job of preventing the dominoes toppling
- 46:54in insurance or derivatives. In these industries, firms that
- 46:58are fundamentally solid can become troubled simply because
- 47:02of the travails of other firms further down the chain.
- 47:05When a chain reaction threat exists within an industry, it
- 47:08pays to minimize links of any kind.
- 47:11That's how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it's
- 47:14one reason we are exiting derivatives.
- 47:17Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic
- 47:20problems and that participants who can't bear certain risks are
- 47:23able to transfer them to stronger hands.
- 47:26These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the
- 47:29economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual
- 47:33participants. And on a micro level, what they
- 47:37say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I
- 47:40sometimes engage in large scale derivatives transactions in
- 47:43order to facilitate certain investment strategies.
- 47:47Charlie and I believe however that the macro picture is
- 47:50dangerous and getting more so large amounts of risk,
- 47:54particularly credit risk have become concentrated in the hands
- 47:58of relatively few derivatives dealers who in addition trade
- 48:02extensively with one other. The troubles of one could
- 48:05quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers
- 48:08are owed huge amounts by non dealer counterparties.
- 48:11Some of these counterparties, as I've mentioned, are LinkedIn
- 48:15ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a
- 48:19problem because of a single event, such as the implosion of
- 48:22the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value
- 48:26of merchant power projects. Linkage, when it suddenly
- 48:29surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.
- 48:33Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives heavy activities
- 48:38of a single hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, caused
- 48:42the Federal Reserve anxieties so severe that it hastily
- 48:46orchestrated a rescue effort. In later congressional
- 48:49testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that had they not
- 48:52intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCMA firm, unknown to
- 48:57the general public and employing only a few 114 people, could
- 49:02well have posed a serious threat to the stability of American
- 49:05markets. In other words, the Fed acted
- 49:08because its leaders were fearful of what might have happened to
- 49:11other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled.
- 49:15And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the
- 49:18fixed income market for weeks, was far from a worst case
- 49:22scenario. One of the derivatives
- 49:24instruments that LTCM used was total return swaps, contracts
- 49:28that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including
- 49:33stocks. For example, party A to a
- 49:35contract. Usually, a bank puts up all of
- 49:39the money for the purchase of a stock, while party B, without
- 49:42putting up any capital, agrees that at a future date it will
- 49:46receive any gain or pay any loss that the bank realizes.
- 49:50Total return swaps of this type make a joke of margin
- 49:53requirements. Beyond that, other types of
- 49:56derivatives severely curtail the ability of regulators to curb
- 50:00leverage and generally get their arms around that risk.
- 50:03Profiles of banks, insurers, and other financial institutions.
- 50:08Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter
- 50:12major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms
- 50:15that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts.
- 50:19When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes
- 50:22detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the
- 50:25only thing we understand is that we don't understand how much
- 50:28risk the institution is running. The derivatives genie is now
- 50:33well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost
- 50:36certainly multiply in variety and number until some event
- 50:40makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous there
- 50:44has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses
- 50:47in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of
- 50:51derivatives to diminish dramatically.
- 50:53Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues
- 50:57to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments
- 51:00have so far found no effective way to control or even monitor
- 51:05the risks posed by these contracts.
- 51:07Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of
- 51:10financial strength for the sake of our owners, creditors,
- 51:14policyholders and employees. We try to be alert to any sort
- 51:18of mega catastrophe risk and that posture may make us unduly
- 51:22apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long
- 51:25term derivatives contracts in the massive amount of
- 51:28uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside.
- 51:32In our view, however, derivatives are financial
- 51:35weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that while now
- 51:38latent are potentially lethal investments.
- 51:42Below we show our common stock investments, those that had a
- 51:46market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2002 are
- 51:51itemized. We continue to do little
- 51:53inequities. Charlie and I are increasingly
- 51:55comfortable with our holdings in Berkshire's major investees
- 51:59because most of them have increased their earnings while
- 52:01their valuations have decreased. But we are not inclined to add
- 52:05to them. Though these enterprises have
- 52:07good prospects, we don't yet believe their shares are
- 52:10undervalued. In our view, the same conclusion
- 52:13fits stocks generally. Despite 3 years of falling
- 52:16prices, which have significantly improved the attractiveness of
- 52:20common stocks, we still find very few that even mildly 15
- 52:26interest us. That dismal fact is testimony to
- 52:29the insanity of valuations reached during the Great Bubble.
- 52:33Unfortunately, the hangover may prove to be proportional to the
- 52:36bench. The aversion to equities that
- 52:39Charlie and I exhibit today is far from congenital.
- 52:42We love owning common stocks if they can be purchased at
- 52:45attractive prices. In my 61 years of investing, 50
- 52:49or so years have offered that kind of opportunity.
- 52:52There will be years like that again.
- 52:54Unless however, we see a very high probability of at least 10%
- 52:59pre tax returns, which translate to 6 to 7% after corporate tax,
- 53:04we will sit on the sidelines with short term money returning
- 53:08less than 1% after tax. Sitting it out is no fun, but
- 53:12occasionally successful investing requires inactivity.
- 53:16Last year we were, however, able to make sensible investments in
- 53:20a few junk bonds and loans. Overall, our commitments in this
- 53:24sector sex dupled, reaching $8.3 billion by year end.
- 53:29Investing in junk bonds and investing in stocks are alike in
- 53:32certain ways. Both activities require us to
- 53:36make a price value calculation and also to scan hundreds of
- 53:39securities to find the very few that have attractive reward risk
- 53:43ratios. But there are important
- 53:45differences between the two disciplines as well.
- 53:48In stocks, we expect every commitment to work out well
- 53:52because we concentrate on conservatively financed
- 53:54businesses with strong competitive strengths run by
- 53:58able and honest people. If we buy into these companies,
- 54:01it's sensible. Prices losses should be rare
- 54:04indeed. During the 38 years we have run
- 54:07the company's affairs, gains from the equities we manage at
- 54:10Berkshire, that is excluding those managed at General Rhee
- 54:14and GEICO, have exceeded losses by a ratio of about 100 to 1.
- 54:18Purchasing junk bonds, we are dealing with enterprises that
- 54:22are far more marginal. These businesses are usually
- 54:25overloaded with debt and often operate in industries
- 54:28characterized by low returns on capital.
- 54:31Additionally, the quality of management is sometimes
- 54:34questionable. Management may even have
- 54:36interests that are directly counter to those of debt
- 54:39holders. Therefore, we expect that we
- 54:41will have occasional large losses and junk issues.
- 54:45So far, however, we have done reasonably well in this field.
- 54:49Corporate governance, both the ability and fidelity of managers
- 54:53have long needed monitoring. Indeed, nearly 2000 years ago,
- 54:58Jesus Christ addressed this subject, speaking Luke 16 verse
- 55:022 approvingly of a certain rich man who told his manager, give
- 55:06an account of thy stewardship, for thou mayest no longer be
- 55:10steward. Accountability and stewardship
- 55:12withered in the last decade, becoming qualities deemed of
- 55:16little importance by those caught up in the great bubble.
- 55:19As stock prices went up, the behavioral norms of managers
- 55:23went down by the late 90s. As a result, CE OS who traveled
- 55:27the High Road did not encounter heavy traffic.
- 55:30Most CE OS, it should be noted, are men and women you would be
- 55:34happy to have as trustees for your children's assets or his
- 55:38next door neighbors. Too many of these people,
- 55:40however, have in recent years behaved badly at the office,
- 55:45fudging numbers and drawing obscene pay for mediocre
- 55:48business achievements. These otherwise decent people
- 55:51simply followed the career path of Mae.
- 55:53WI was Snow White, but I drifted.
- 55:56In theory, corporate boards should have prevented this
- 55:59deterioration of conduct. I last wrote about the
- 56:03responsibilities of directors in the 1993 Annual Report.
- 56:07We will send you a copy of this discussion on request, or you
- 56:11may read it on the Internet in the Corporate Governance section
- 56:13of the 1993 letter. There I said that directors
- 56:17should behave as if there was a single absentee owner whose long
- 56:21term interest they should try to further.
- 56:23In all proper ways. This means that directors must
- 56:26get rid of a manager who is mediocre or worse, no matter how
- 56:30likable he may be. Directors must react, as did the
- 56:34chorus girl bride of an 85 year old multimillionaire when he
- 56:38asked whether she would love him if he lost his money.
- 56:41Of course the young beauty replied, I would miss you, but I
- 56:45would still love you. In the 1993 annual report I also
- 56:49said directors had another job if able, but greedy managers
- 56:53over reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders
- 56:56pockets. Directors must slap their hands.
- 56:59Since I wrote that, overreaching has become common, but few hands
- 57:04have been slapped. Why have intelligent and decent
- 57:06directors failed so miserably? The answer lies not in
- 57:10inadequate laws. It's always been clear that
- 57:12directors are obligated to represent the interests of
- 57:15shareholders, but rather in what I'd called boardroom atmosphere
- 57:1916. It's almost impossible, for
- 57:22example, in a boardroom populated by well mannered
- 57:25people, to raise the question of whether the CEO should be
- 57:29replaced. It's equally awkward to question
- 57:32a proposed acquisition that has been endorsed by the CEO,
- 57:35particularly when his inside staff and outside advisors are
- 57:39present and unanimously support his decision.
- 57:42They wouldn't be in the room if they didn't.
- 57:44Finally, when the compensation committee, armed as always with
- 57:48support from a high paid consultant, reports on a mega
- 57:52grand of options to the CEO, it would be like belching at the
- 57:55dinner table for a director to suggest that the committee
- 57:58reconsider these social difficulties, argue for outside
- 58:02directors regularly meeting without the CEO or reform that
- 58:05is being instituted. And that I enthusiastically
- 58:08endorse. I doubt, however, that most of
- 58:11the other new governance rules and recommendations will provide
- 58:15benefits commensurate with the monetary and other costs they
- 58:18impose. The current cry is for
- 58:21independent directors. It is certainly true that it is
- 58:24desirable to have directors who think and speak independently,
- 58:28but they must also be business savvy, interested and
- 58:31shareholder oriented. In my 1993 commentary, those are
- 58:36the three qualities I described as essential.
- 58:39Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public company
- 58:42boards, excluding Berkshire's. In half interacted with perhaps
- 58:46250 directors. Most of them were independent,
- 58:49as defined by today's rules, but the great majority of these
- 58:53directors lacked at least one of the three qualities I value.
- 58:57As a result, their contribution to shareholder well-being was
- 59:00minimal at best and too often negative.
- 59:04These people, descendant intelligent though they were,
- 59:07simply did not know enough about business and or care enough
- 59:10about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions or
- 59:14egregious compensation. My own behavior, I must ruefully
- 59:18add, frequently fell short as well.
- 59:20Too often I was silent when management made proposals that I
- 59:23judge to be counter to the interests of shareholders.
- 59:27In those cases, collegiality trumped independence.
- 59:30So that we may further see the failings of independence, let's
- 59:33look at a 62 year case study covering thousands of companies.
- 59:38Since 1940, federal law has mandated that a large proportion
- 59:42of the directors of investment companies, most of these mutual
- 59:45funds, be independent. The requirement was originally
- 59:4840% and now it is 50%. In any case, the typical fund
- 59:53has long operated with a majority of directors who
- 59:56qualify as independent. These directors and the entire
- 1:00:00board have many perfunctory duties.
- 1:00:03But in actuality, have only two important responsibilities,
- 1:00:07obtaining the best possible investment manager and
- 1:00:10negotiating with that manager for the lowest possible fee.
- 1:00:13When you are seeking investment help yourself, those two goals
- 1:00:17are the only ones that count, and directors acting for other
- 1:00:20investors should have exactly the same priorities.
- 1:00:23Yet when it comes to independent directors pursuing either goal,
- 1:00:27their record has been absolutely pathetic.
- 1:00:30Many thousands of investment company boards meet annually to
- 1:00:34carry out the vital job of selecting who will manage the
- 1:00:37savings of the millions of owners they represent.
- 1:00:40Year after year the directors of Fund A, Select Manager A, Fund
- 1:00:44B, Directors Select Manager B, etcetera.
- 1:00:47In a zombie like process that makes a mockery of stewardship.
- 1:00:51Very occasionally a board will revolt, but for the most part a
- 1:00:55monkey will type how does Shakespeare play before an
- 1:00:58independent mutual fund director will suggest that is fun, look
- 1:01:02at other managers even if the incumbent manager has
- 1:01:05persistently delivered substandard performance when
- 1:01:08they are handling their own money.
- 1:01:10Of course directors will look to alternative advisors, but it
- 1:01:14never enters there minds to do so when they are acting as
- 1:01:17fiduciaries for others. The hypocrisy permeating the
- 1:01:21system is vividly exposed when a fund management company, call it
- 1:01:25A, is sold for a huge sum to Manager B.
- 1:01:28Now the independent directors experience, encounter,
- 1:01:31revelation and decide that Manager B is the best that can
- 1:01:34be found even though B was available and ignored in
- 1:01:38previous years. Not so.
- 1:01:39Incidentally, B also could formerly have been hired at a
- 1:01:42far lower rate than it's possible now that it has bought
- 1:01:46Manager A. That's because B has laid out a
- 1:01:48fortune to acquire. A&B must now recoup that cost
- 1:01:52through fees paid by the A shareholders who were delivered
- 1:01:55as part of the deal. For a terrific discussion of the
- 1:01:58mutual fund business, read John Boble's Common Sense on Mutual
- 1:02:02Funds. A few years ago, my daughter was
- 1:02:04asked to become a director of a family of funds managed by a
- 1:02:08major institution. The fees she would have received
- 1:02:11as a director were very substantial enough to have
- 1:02:14increased her annual income by about 50% of boost she will tell
- 1:02:19you she could use. Legally.
- 1:02:21She would have been an independent director, but did
- 1:02:24the fund manager who approached her think there was any chance
- 1:02:27that she would think independently as to what advisor
- 1:02:30the fund should employ? Of course not.
- 1:02:32I am 17 proud to say that she showed real independence by
- 1:02:37turning down the offer. The fund, however, had no
- 1:02:41trouble filling the slot and surprised the fund has not
- 1:02:44changed managers. Investment company directors
- 1:02:47have failed as well in negotiating management fees.
- 1:02:50Just ask, Compensation committees of many American
- 1:02:53companies have failed to hold the compensation of their CE OS
- 1:02:57to sensible levels. If you or I were empowered, I
- 1:03:01can assure you that we could easily negotiate materially
- 1:03:04lower management fees with the incumbent managers of most
- 1:03:07mutual funds. And believe me, if directors
- 1:03:11were promised a portion of any fee savings, they realized the
- 1:03:15skies would be filled with falling fees.
- 1:03:17Under the current system though, reductions mean nothing to
- 1:03:21independent directors while meaning everything to managers.
- 1:03:25So guess who wins? Having the right money manager,
- 1:03:28of course, is far more important to a fund than reducing the
- 1:03:32managers fee. Both tasks are nonetheless the
- 1:03:35job of directors, and in stepping up to these all
- 1:03:38important responsibilities, 10s of thousands of independent
- 1:03:42directors over more than six decades have failed miserably.
- 1:03:46They've succeeded, however, in taking care of themselves.
- 1:03:50Their fees from serving on multiple boards of a single
- 1:03:53family of funds often run well into 6 figures.
- 1:03:57When the manager cares deeply and the directors don't, What's
- 1:04:00needed is a powerful countervailing force.
- 1:04:03And that's the missing element in today's corporate governance.
- 1:04:06Getting rid of mediocre CEOs and eliminating overreaching by the
- 1:04:11able ones requires action by owners, big owners.
- 1:04:14The logistics aren't that tough. The ownership of stock has grown
- 1:04:18increasingly concentrated in recent decades, and today it
- 1:04:22would be easy for institutional managers to exert their will on
- 1:04:26problem situations. 20 or even fewer of the largest
- 1:04:30institutions acting together could effectively reform
- 1:04:34corporate governance at a given company simply by withholding
- 1:04:38their votes for directors who are tolerating odious behavior.
- 1:04:41In my view, this kind of concerted action is the only way
- 1:04:45that corporate stewardship can be meaningfully improved.
- 1:04:48Unfortunately, certain major investing institutions have
- 1:04:52glass house problems in arguing for better governance elsewhere.
- 1:04:56They would shudder, for example, at the thought of their own
- 1:04:59performance and fees being closely inspected by their own
- 1:05:03boards. But Jack Bogle of Vanguard fame,
- 1:05:06Chris Davis of Davis Advisors and Bill Miller of Leg Mason are
- 1:05:10now offering leadership in getting CE OS to treat their
- 1:05:13owners properly. Pension funds, as well as other
- 1:05:16fiduciaries, will reap better investment returns in the future
- 1:05:20if they support these men. The acid test for reform will be
- 1:05:24CEO compensation managers will cheerfully agree to board
- 1:05:28diversity, attest to SEC filings and adopt meaningless proposals
- 1:05:33relating to process. What many will fight, however,
- 1:05:36is a hard look at their own pay and perks.
- 1:05:39In recent years, compensation committees too often have been
- 1:05:42tail wagging puppy dogs, meekly following recommendations by
- 1:05:45consultants, a breed not known for allegiance to the faceless
- 1:05:49shareholders who pay their fees. If you can't tell whose side
- 1:05:53someone is on, they are not on yours.
- 1:05:55True, each committee is required by the SEC to state its
- 1:05:59reasoning about pay in the proxy, but the words are usually
- 1:06:03boilerplate, written by the company's lawyers or its human
- 1:06:06relations department. This costly charade should
- 1:06:09cease. Directors should not serve on
- 1:06:11compensation committees unless they are themselves capable of
- 1:06:15negotiating on behalf of owners. They should explain both how
- 1:06:18they think about pay and how they measure performance dealing
- 1:06:22with shareholders money. Moreover, they should behave as
- 1:06:26they would were at their own. In the 1890s, Samuel Gompers
- 1:06:30described the goal of organized labor as more.
- 1:06:33In the 1990s, America's CE OS adopted his battle cry.
- 1:06:37The upshot is that CE OS have often amassed riches while
- 1:06:40they're shareholders have experienced financial disasters.
- 1:06:44Directors should stop such piracy.
- 1:06:46There's nothing wrong with paying well for truly
- 1:06:49exceptional business performance.
- 1:06:51But for anything short of that, it's time for directors to shout
- 1:06:54less. It would be a travesty if the
- 1:06:57bloated pay of recent years became a baseline for future
- 1:07:01compensation. Compensation Committee should go
- 1:07:04back to the drawing boards. Rules that have been proposed
- 1:07:07and that are almost certain to go into effect will require
- 1:07:10changes in Berkshire's board obliging us to add directors who
- 1:07:14meet the codified requirements for independence 18.
- 1:07:17Doing so, we will add a test that we believe is important but
- 1:07:21far from determinative in fostering independence.
- 1:07:25We will select directors who have huge and true ownership
- 1:07:28interests, that is, stock that they owe their family, have
- 1:07:31purchased, not been given by Berkshire or received via
- 1:07:34options, expecting those interests to influence their
- 1:07:38actions to a degree that dwarfs other considerations such as
- 1:07:41prestige and board fees. That gets to an often overlooked
- 1:07:45point about directors compensation, which at public
- 1:07:48companies averages perhaps $50,000 annually.
- 1:07:52It baffles me how the many directors who look to these
- 1:07:55dollars for perhaps 20% or more of their annual income can be
- 1:07:59considered independent when Ron Olson, for example, who is on
- 1:08:03our board, may be deemed not independent because he receives
- 1:08:07a tiny percentage of his very large income from Berkshire
- 1:08:10legal fees. As the investment company saga
- 1:08:13suggests, a director who's moderate income is heavily
- 1:08:16dependent on directors fees and who hopes mightily to be invited
- 1:08:20to join other boards in order to earn more fees is highly
- 1:08:24unlikely to offend ACEO or fellow directors who in a major
- 1:08:28way will determine his reputation in corporate circles.
- 1:08:31If regulators believe that significant money taints
- 1:08:35independence, and it certainly can, they have overlooked a
- 1:08:38massive class of possible offenders at Berkshire.
- 1:08:42Wanting our fees to be meaningless to our directors, we
- 1:08:45pay them only a pittance. Additionally, not wanting to
- 1:08:48insulate our directors from any corporate disaster we might
- 1:08:51have, we don't provide them with officers and directors,
- 1:08:55liability insurance and unorthodoxy.
- 1:08:57That, not so incidentally, has saved our shareholders many
- 1:09:01millions of dollars over the years.
- 1:09:04Basically we want the behavior of our directors to be driven by
- 1:09:08the effect their decisions will have on their families net
- 1:09:10worth, not by their compensation.
- 1:09:13That's the equation for Charlie and me as managers and we think
- 1:09:17it's the right one for Berkshire directors as well.
- 1:09:20To find new directors we will look through our shareholders
- 1:09:23list for people who directly or in there family have had large
- 1:09:27Berkshire holdings in the millions of dollars for a long
- 1:09:29time. Individuals making that cut
- 1:09:32should automatically meet two of our tests, namely that they'd be
- 1:09:35interested in Berkshire and shareholder oriented.
- 1:09:39In our third test, we will look for business savvy, A competence
- 1:09:43that is far from commonplace. Finally, we will continue to
- 1:09:47have members of the Buffett family on the board.
- 1:09:49They are not there to run the business after I die, nor will
- 1:09:53they then receive compensation of any kind.
- 1:09:56Their purpose is to ensure for both our shareholders and
- 1:09:59managers that Berkshire's special culture will be nurtured
- 1:10:02when him succeeded by other CEOs.
- 1:10:05Any change we make in the composition of our board will
- 1:10:07not alter the way Charlie and I run Berkshire.
- 1:10:11We will continue to emphasize substance over form in our work
- 1:10:15and waste as little time as possible during board meetings
- 1:10:18and show and tell and perfunctory activities.
- 1:10:21The most important job of our board is likely to be the
- 1:10:24selection of successors to Charlie and me and that is a
- 1:10:27matter upon which it will focus. The board we have had up to now
- 1:10:32has overseen A shareholder oriented business consistently
- 1:10:35run in accord with the economic principles set forth on pages 68
- 1:10:40to 74, which I urge all new shareholders to read.
- 1:10:44Our goal is to obtain new directors who are equally
- 1:10:47devoted to those principles. The audit committee.
- 1:10:50Audit committees can audit. Only a company's outside auditor
- 1:10:53can determine whether the earnings that a management
- 1:10:56purports to have made or suspect reforms that ignore this reality
- 1:11:00and that instead focus on the structure and charter of the
- 1:11:03audit committee will accomplish little.
- 1:11:06As we've discussed, far too many managers have fudged their
- 1:11:09company's numbers in recent years using both accounting and
- 1:11:13operational techniques that are typically legal but that
- 1:11:15nevertheless materially mislead investors.
- 1:11:19Frequently, auditors knew about these deceptions.
- 1:11:22Too often, however, they remained silent.
- 1:11:26The key job of the audit committee is simply to get the
- 1:11:28auditors to divulge what they know.
- 1:11:30To do this job, the committee must make sure that the auditors
- 1:11:34worry more about misleading its members then about offending
- 1:11:37management. In recent years, auditors have
- 1:11:39not felt that way. They have instead generally
- 1:11:43viewed the CEO, rather than the shareholders or directors, as
- 1:11:47their client. That is Benet natural result of
- 1:11:50day-to-day working relationships and also of the auditors
- 1:11:53understanding that no matter what the book says, the CEO and
- 1:11:57CFO pay their fees and determine whether they are retained for
- 1:12:01both auditing and other work. The rules that have been
- 1:12:04recently instituted won't materially change this reality.
- 1:12:08What will break 19 this cozy relationship is audit committees
- 1:12:12unequivocally putting auditors on the spot, making them
- 1:12:15understand they will become liable for major monetary
- 1:12:19penalties if they don't come forth with what they know or
- 1:12:22suspect. In my opinion, audit committees
- 1:12:25can accomplish this goal by asking 4 questions of auditors,
- 1:12:28the answers to which should be recorded and reported to
- 1:12:31shareholders. These questions are one If the
- 1:12:35auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the company's
- 1:12:38financial statements, would they have in any way been prepared
- 1:12:42differently from the manner selected by management?
- 1:12:45This question should cover both material and non material
- 1:12:48differences. If the auditor would have done
- 1:12:51something differently, both management's argument and the
- 1:12:54auditor's response should be disclosed.
- 1:12:56The audit committee should then evaluate the facts. 2 If the
- 1:13:00auditor were an investor, would he have received, in plain
- 1:13:03English, the information essential to his understanding
- 1:13:06the company's financial performance during the reporting
- 1:13:09period? 3 Is the company following the
- 1:13:12same internal audit procedure that would be followed if the
- 1:13:15auditor himself or CEO? If not, what are the differences
- 1:13:19and why? 4 Is the auditor aware of any
- 1:13:22actions, either accounting or operational, that have had the
- 1:13:25purpose and effect of moving revenues or expenses from one
- 1:13:29reporting period to another? If the audit committee asks
- 1:13:32these questions, it's composition, the focus of most
- 1:13:35reforms is of minor importance. In addition, the procedure will
- 1:13:40save time and expense. When auditors are put on the
- 1:13:43spot, they will do their duty. If they are not put on the spot,
- 1:13:47well, we have seen the results of that.
- 1:13:49The questions we have enumerated should be asked at least a week
- 1:13:53before an earnings report is released to the public.
- 1:13:56That timing will allow differences between the auditors
- 1:13:59and management to be aired with the committee and resolved.
- 1:14:03If the timing is tighter. If an earnings release is
- 1:14:05imminent when they auditors and committee interact, the
- 1:14:08committee will feel pressure to rubber stamp the prepared
- 1:14:11figures. Haste is the enemy of accuracy.
- 1:14:15My thinking, in fact, is that the SE CS recent shortening of
- 1:14:19reporting deadlines will hurt the quality of information that
- 1:14:23shareholders receive. Charlie and I believe that rule
- 1:14:26is a mistake and should be rescinded.
- 1:14:29The primary advantage of our four questions is that they will
- 1:14:32act as a prophylactic. Once the auditors know that the
- 1:14:35audit committee will require them to affirmatively endorse
- 1:14:39rather than merely acquiesce to management's actions.
- 1:14:43They will resist mis doings early in the process, well
- 1:14:46before specious figures become embedded in the company's books.
- 1:14:50Fear of the plaintiffs bar will see to that.
- 1:14:53The Chicago Tribune ran a four part series on Arthur Andersen
- 1:14:56last September that did a great job of illuminating how
- 1:15:00accounting standards and audit quality have eroded in recent
- 1:15:03years. A few decades ago and Arthur
- 1:15:06Andersen audit opinion was the gold standard of the profession
- 1:15:10within the firm, an elite professional standards group,
- 1:15:13PSG insisted on honest reporting no matter what pressures were
- 1:15:17applied by the client. Sticking to these principles,
- 1:15:20the PSG took a stand in 1992 that the cost of stock options
- 1:15:25should be recorded as the expense it clearly was.
- 1:15:28The PS GS position was reversed, however, by the rainmaking
- 1:15:32partners of Anderson, who knew what their clients wanted higher
- 1:15:36reported earnings no matter what the reality.
- 1:15:38Many CE OS also fought expensing because they knew that the
- 1:15:42obscene mega grants of options they craved would be slashed if
- 1:15:46the true cost of these had to be recorded.
- 1:15:48Soon after the Anderson reversal, the Independent
- 1:15:51Accounting Standards Board, FESB, voted 7 to 04 expensing
- 1:15:56options. Predictably, the major auditing
- 1:15:59firms and an army of CE OS stormed Washington too pressure
- 1:16:03the Senate. What better institution to
- 1:16:05decide accounting questions into castrating the FASB?
- 1:16:08The voices of the protesters were amplified by their large
- 1:16:12political contributions, usually made with corporate money
- 1:16:16belonging to the very owners about to be bamboozled.
- 1:16:19It was not a site for a civics class.
- 1:16:21To its shame, the Senate voted 88 to 9 against expensing.
- 1:16:25Several prominent senators even called for the demise of the
- 1:16:29FASB if it didn't abandoned its position.
- 1:16:32So much for independence. Arthur Levitt Junior, then
- 1:16:36chairman of the SEC and generally A vigilant champion of
- 1:16:40shareholders, has since described his reluctant 20
- 1:16:43bowing to congressional and corporate pressures as the act
- 1:16:47of his chairmanship that he most regrets.
- 1:16:49The details of this sordid affair are related in Levitt's
- 1:16:53excellent book Take on the Street.
- 1:16:55With the Senate in its pocket and the SEC outgunned, corporate
- 1:16:59American knew that it was now boss when it came to accounting.
- 1:17:03With that, a new era of anything goes.
- 1:17:05Earnings reports, blessed and in some cases encouraged by big
- 1:17:10name auditors, was launched. The licentious behavior that
- 1:17:13followed quickly became an air pump for the great bubble.
- 1:17:16After being threatened by the Senate, FASB backed off its
- 1:17:20original position and adopted an honor system approach, declaring
- 1:17:24expensing to be preferable but also allowing companies to
- 1:17:27ignore the cost if they wished. The disheartening result of the
- 1:17:32500 companies in the S&P for 98 adopted the method deemed less
- 1:17:38desirable, which of course let them report higher earnings
- 1:17:41compensation. Hungry CE OS love this outcome.
- 1:17:45Let FASB have the honor. They had the system.
- 1:17:48In our 1992 annual report discussing the unseemly and
- 1:17:52self-serving behavior of so many CEOs, I said the business elite
- 1:17:57risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to
- 1:18:00society about which it may have much of value to say when it
- 1:18:04advocates the incredible on issues of significance to
- 1:18:07itself, that loss of credibility has occurred.
- 1:18:11The job of CEOs is now to regain America's trust, and for the
- 1:18:15countries sake, it's important that they do so.
- 1:18:18They will not succeed in this endeavor, however, by way of
- 1:18:22fatuous ads, meaningless policy statements, or structural
- 1:18:25changes of boards and committees.
- 1:18:28Instead, CEOs must embrace stewardship as a way of life and
- 1:18:32treat their owners as partners, not patsies.
- 1:18:35It's time for CEOs to walk the walk. 3 Suggestions for
- 1:18:39investors First, beware of companies displaying weak
- 1:18:42accounting. If a company still does not
- 1:18:45expense options or if its pension assumptions are
- 1:18:48fanciful, watch out. When management's take the low
- 1:18:51road and aspects that are visible, it is likely they are
- 1:18:54following a similar path behind the scenes.
- 1:18:58There is seldom just one cockroach in the kitchen.
- 1:19:00Trumpeting EBITDA, earnings before interest, taxes,
- 1:19:04depreciation and amortization is a particularly pernicious
- 1:19:08practice. Doing so implies that
- 1:19:10depreciation is not truly an expense, given that it is a non
- 1:19:14cash charge. That's nonsense.
- 1:19:17In truth, depreciation is a particularly unattractive
- 1:19:20expense because the cash outlay it represents is paid upfront,
- 1:19:25before the asset acquired has delivered any benefits to the
- 1:19:28business. Imagine if you will, that at the
- 1:19:31beginning of this year a company paid all of its employees for
- 1:19:35the next 10 years of their service in the way they would
- 1:19:38lay out cash for a fixed asset to be useful for 10 years.
- 1:19:41In the following nine years, compensation would be a non cash
- 1:19:46expense or reduction of a prepaid compensation asset
- 1:19:49established this year. Would anyone care to argue that
- 1:19:52the recording of the expense in years two through 10 would be
- 1:19:56simply a bookkeeping formality? Second, unintelligible footnotes
- 1:20:00usually indicate untrustworthy management.
- 1:20:03If you can't understand a footnote or other managerial
- 1:20:06explanation, it's usually because the CEO doesn't want you
- 1:20:09to. Enron's descriptions of certain
- 1:20:12transactions still baffle me. Finally, be suspicious of
- 1:20:16companies that trumpet earnings projections and growth
- 1:20:19expectations. Businesses seldom operate in a
- 1:20:22tranquil, no surprise environment and earnings simply
- 1:20:25don't advance. Smoothly accept, of course, in
- 1:20:29the offering books of investment bankers, Charlie and I not only
- 1:20:32don't know today what our businesses will earn next year,
- 1:20:35we don't even know what they will earn next quarter.
- 1:20:38We are suspicious of those CEOs who regularly claim they do know
- 1:20:42the future, and we become downright incredulous if they
- 1:20:45consistently reach their declared targets.
- 1:20:48Managers that always promised to make the numbers will at some
- 1:20:51point be tempted to make up the numbers.
- 1:20:54Shareholder Designated contributions About 97.3% of all
- 1:20:59eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 2002 shareholder
- 1:21:03Designated Contributions program with contributions totaling
- 1:21:07$16.5 million. Cumulatively, over the 22 years
- 1:21:12of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $197
- 1:21:16million pursuant to the instructions of our
- 1:21:20shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving
- 1:21:22is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic
- 1:21:26patterns that prevailed before they were acquired, except that
- 1:21:29they're former 21 owners themselves take on the
- 1:21:32responsibility for their personal charities.
- 1:21:35In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $24
- 1:21:39million in 2002, including in kind donations of $4,000,000.
- 1:21:45To participate in future programs, you must own Class A
- 1:21:48shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner,
- 1:21:51not the nominee name of a broker, bank, or depository.
- 1:21:55Shares not so registered on August 31, 2003 will be
- 1:22:00ineligible for the 2003 program. When you get the contributions
- 1:22:04form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put
- 1:22:08aside or forgotten. Designations received after the
- 1:22:11due date will not be honored. The Annual Meeting This year's
- 1:22:16annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3rd and once again
- 1:22:20we will be at the Civic Auditorium.
- 1:22:22The doors will open at 7:00 AM, the movie will begin at 8:30,
- 1:22:27and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30.
- 1:22:30There will be a short break at noon for food.
- 1:22:32Sandwiches will be available at the Civics concession stands.
- 1:22:36That interlude aside, Charlie and I will answer questions
- 1:22:39until 3:30. Give us your best shot.
- 1:22:42An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with
- 1:22:45this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will
- 1:22:49need for admission to the meeting and other events.
- 1:22:52As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again
- 1:22:56signed up American Express 800-799-6634 to give you special
- 1:23:02help. They do a terrific job for us
- 1:23:05each year and I thank them for it.
- 1:23:07In our usual fashion, we will run vans from the larger hotels
- 1:23:10to the meeting. Afterwards the vans we'll make
- 1:23:14trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart,
- 1:23:17Borsheims and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find
- 1:23:21a car useful. Our exhibit area for Berkshire
- 1:23:24goods and services will be bigger and better than ever this
- 1:23:27year, so be prepared to spend. I think you will particularly
- 1:23:31enjoy visiting the Pampered Chef display where you may run into
- 1:23:35Doris and Sheila. GEICO will have a booth staffed
- 1:23:38by a number of its top counselors from around the
- 1:23:41country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance
- 1:23:44quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be
- 1:23:47able to give you a special shareholder discount, usually
- 1:23:508%. This special offer is permitted
- 1:23:53by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate.
- 1:23:57Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out
- 1:24:00whether we can save you money. On Saturday at the Omaha
- 1:24:03Airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from net jets
- 1:24:07available for your inspection. Just ask a representative at the
- 1:24:11Civic about viewing any of these planes.
- 1:24:13If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items
- 1:24:16during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them
- 1:24:20home. Furthermore, if you buy a
- 1:24:22fraction of a plane, they'll personally see that you get a
- 1:24:25three pack of briefs from Fruit of the Loom at Nebraska
- 1:24:28Furniture Mart, located on a 77 acre site on 72nd St. between
- 1:24:33Dodge and Pacific. We will again be having
- 1:24:36Berkshire weekend pricing, which means we will be offering our
- 1:24:39shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to
- 1:24:43employees. We initiated this special
- 1:24:45pricing at NFM 6 years ago and sales during the weekend grew
- 1:24:49from $5.3 million in 1997 to $14.2 million in 2002.
- 1:24:56To get the discount, you must make your purchases during the
- 1:24:59Thursday, May 1st through Monday, May 5th period and also
- 1:25:03present your meeting credential. The period Special pricing will
- 1:25:07even apply to the products of several prestigious
- 1:25:10manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against
- 1:25:13discounting, but that in the spirit of our Shareholder
- 1:25:16weekend, have made an exception for you.
- 1:25:19We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10:00 AM to
- 1:25:239:00 PM on weekdays and 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on Sundays.
- 1:25:28On Saturday this year from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM, we are having a
- 1:25:32special affair for shareholders only.
- 1:25:34They'll be there eating hot dogs and drinking Coke.
- 1:25:38Borcheim's, the largest jewelry store in the country except for
- 1:25:41Tiffany's Manhattan store, Well have two shareholder only
- 1:25:44events. The first will be a cocktail
- 1:25:46reception from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM on Friday, May 2nd.
- 1:25:51The 2nd, the main Gala, will be from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM on
- 1:25:55Sunday, May 4th. Ask Charlie to autograph your
- 1:25:58sales ticket. Shareholder prices will be
- 1:26:01available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid
- 1:26:04the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and
- 1:26:07Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a 22
- 1:26:12shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open
- 1:26:15until 6:00 PM. Borsheims operates on a gross
- 1:26:18margin that is fully 20 percentage points below that of
- 1:26:21its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save.
- 1:26:25Or at least that's what my wife and daughter tell me.
- 1:26:28In the mall outside of Borsheims, we will have some of
- 1:26:31the world's top bridge experts available to play with our
- 1:26:34shareholders. On Sunday afternoon, we expect
- 1:26:37Bob Hammond, Sharon Osberg, Fred Gittleman and Sherri Weinstock
- 1:26:41to host tables. Patrick Wolf, twice US Chess
- 1:26:44champion, will also be in the mall taking on all comers
- 1:26:48blindfolded. Last year, Patrick played six
- 1:26:51games simultaneously with his blindfold securely in place and
- 1:26:55for the first time suffered a loss.
- 1:26:57He won the other five games, however, he's been training
- 1:27:01overtime ever since and is planning to start a new streak
- 1:27:04this year. Additionally, Bill Roberti, one
- 1:27:07of only two players who have twice won the Backgammon World
- 1:27:11Championship, will be on hand to test your skill at that game.
- 1:27:14Finally, we will have a newcomer, Peter Morris, the
- 1:27:18winner of the World Scrabble Championship in 1991.
- 1:27:21Peter will play on five boards simultaneously.
- 1:27:25No blindfold for him, however, and will also allow his
- 1:27:28challengers to consult a Scrabble dictionary.
- 1:27:31We are also going to test your vocal cords at the mall.
- 1:27:34My friend out early of Philadelphia will be at the
- 1:27:37piano to play any song in any key.
- 1:27:40Susie and I will lead the singing.
- 1:27:42She's good. Gorret's, My Favorite
- 1:27:44Steakhouse, will again be open exclusively for Berkshire
- 1:27:47shareholders on Sunday, May 4th and we'll be serving from 4:00
- 1:27:52PM until 10:00 PM. Please remember that to come to
- 1:27:55Gorret's on Sunday, you must have a reservation.
- 1:27:58To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st, but not before.
- 1:28:06If Sunday is sold out, try gourds on one of the other
- 1:28:09evenings you will be in town. Show your sophistication by
- 1:28:13ordering a rare T-bone with a double order of hash Browns.
- 1:28:17There won't be a ball game this year.
- 1:28:18After my fastball was clocked at 5 mph last year, I decided to
- 1:28:23hang up my spikes, so we'll see you on Saturday night at NFM
- 1:28:26instead. Next year, our meeting will be
- 1:28:29held at Omaha's new Convention Center.
- 1:28:31This switch and locations will allow us to hold the event on
- 1:28:35either Saturday or Monday, whichever the majority of you
- 1:28:38prefer, using the enclosed special ballot.
- 1:28:41Please vote for your preference, but only if you are likely to
- 1:28:44attend in the future. We will make the Saturday Monday
- 1:28:47decision based upon a count of shareholders, not shares.
- 1:28:51That is, a Class B shareholder owning one share will have a
- 1:28:55vote equal to that of a Class A shareholder owning many shares.
- 1:28:59If the vote is close, we will go with the preference of out of
- 1:29:02towners. Again, please vote only if there
- 1:29:05is a reasonable chance that you will be attending some meetings
- 1:29:08in the future. Warren E Buffett, February 21st,
- 1:29:122003, Chairman of the Board.