Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Beyond Top Gun and Tattoos: Something Old and Something New on Ninth Circuit Principles
Transcript
- 0:03I'm Alla Policastro, Director of Education and
- 0:06Professional Development at Beverly Hills Bar
- 0:08Association. And today I'm delighted to introduce
- 0:11our speaker, Scott Hervey. Scott is a corporate
- 0:15entertainment and intellectual property attorney
- 0:17at Weintraub Tobin, and he brings decades of
- 0:20experience advising clients at the intersection
- 0:23of business, media, and intellectual property
- 0:26law. His practice spans the entertainment, digital
- 0:29media, creator economy, and consumer product
- 0:32sectors, where he helps clients navigate the
- 0:35complexities of building and scaling their businesses
- 0:37in an evolving marketplace. As the founder and
- 0:41host of The Briefing Podcast, Scott shares his
- 0:44insights on cutting -edge issues in IP and media
- 0:47law, helping creators and industry professionals
- 0:50understand and capitalize on the legal and business
- 0:53dynamics shaping today's creator economy. His
- 0:56blend of legal expertise, business insight, and
- 0:59strategic vision has made him a trusted counselor
- 1:02to clients growing their presence and profitability
- 1:05in the digital media and entertainment landscape.
- 1:08We can't wait to to hear what he has to share
- 1:10with us today. So I'm going to turn it over to
- 1:11him now. Thank you all for that warm introduction,
- 1:15and welcome everybody. So we're going to talk
- 1:18about a couple of recent cases at the Ninth Circuit.
- 1:25On first blush, you might look at these cases
- 1:28and think they really aren't, other than just
- 1:30being copyright cases, they're not very similar,
- 1:32but there's some very interesting similarities.
- 1:36So let's go over the agenda, shall we? Oh, put
- 1:40questions in the Q &A, and at the end of the
- 1:44program, if we have some time left, I will get
- 1:48to it. Okay, so today we're talking about kind
- 1:51of these two cases, Seldick versus von Reschenberg,
- 1:55better known as the Miles Davis tattoo case,
- 1:59and then Yone versus Paramount Pictures. better
- 2:03known as the Maverick Top Gun case. We're going
- 2:08to talk about some of the long -term implications
- 2:12from the Sedley case, and we're going to, I don't
- 2:19know, look at our crystal ball or our magic eight
- 2:22ball and... And think about the future of a substantial
- 2:28similarity analysis post intrinsic test, really
- 2:32post the Sedlik case. Uh, but with that, why
- 2:37don't we dive into, um, let's dive in the Sedlik.
- 2:42So Sedlik versus von Drachenberg is a case that
- 2:49began with a tattoo of jazz legends and it ended
- 2:54with two Ninth Circuit judges calling for the
- 2:58death of one of the circuit's most established
- 3:01copyright doctrines. We'll explore why a tattoo
- 3:05that looks nearly identical to a photograph can
- 3:09be found not substantially similar as a matter
- 3:12of law and what this means for the future of
- 3:16the Ninth Circuit's bifurcated infringement test.
- 3:24So the plaintiff, Jeffrey Sudlik is a renowned
- 3:29photographer. As a matter of, just as an aside,
- 3:32um, we did a podcast episode on this case and
- 3:36he called me and we had an opportunity to talk.
- 3:39It was, it was pretty, uh, pretty neat. Anyways,
- 3:42he's a renowned photographer who in 1989 created
- 3:45an iconic portrait of Miles Davis. This photo
- 3:48features Miles Davis in a gesture against a backlit
- 3:54background. Sedlich testified to the meticulous
- 3:58selection and arrangement involving lighting,
- 4:02the precise positioning of his fingers to represent
- 4:04musical notes, and hairstyling. If you look at
- 4:07the photograph, one would think, okay, that's
- 4:09done in like some dark jazz club. But no, this
- 4:15was actually done in the middle of the day at
- 4:17Miles Davis's beach house, outside. So this photo
- 4:24was first published as part of a cover story
- 4:29for the Jazz's Magazine in 1989. The portrait
- 4:33became an iconic representation of Davis and
- 4:37it was featured in Life Magazine's Picture of
- 4:40the Year and it was licensed by Sedlik for use
- 4:43on a wide variety of merch. So the defendant
- 4:49is Katherine von Dershenberg, I'm probably not
- 4:53pronouncing her last name correctly, so apologies,
- 4:55but she's better known as Kat Von D. The celebrity
- 4:59tattoo artist from, I think it's Inked on Discovery.
- 5:06In 2017, she tattooed a photorealistic version
- 5:10of that image onto a client's arm. While she
- 5:14did not charge for this tattoo, she did feature
- 5:19the process and the final result across her social
- 5:21media platforms for the purpose primarily of
- 5:25promoting her tattoo shop. So there was no real
- 5:29dispute that Kat Von D copied the photograph
- 5:33of Miles Davis in creating her tattoo. As part
- 5:36of the process, she traced it on a light box,
- 5:39transferred it to a stencil to her client's arm.
- 5:42and then tattooed that image with the photograph
- 5:46beside her as a reference, as you can see right
- 5:49here on screen. The result was a process which
- 5:53she claimed on social media produces a result,
- 5:56quote, a hundred percent exactly the same, close
- 5:59quote. So Sedlik, of course, sued for infringement
- 6:05in the central district of California. The district
- 6:10court denied cross motions for summary judgment.
- 6:13On Sedlick's motion, the court found a tribal
- 6:18issue of fact or tribal issues of fact surrounding
- 6:22whether the works were substantially similar.
- 6:25And the court focused on certain differences
- 6:27between Sedlick's photo and the tattoo, namely
- 6:31the light and the shading on Davis's face, the
- 6:35hairline and the background. As for Von D's motion
- 6:40for summary judgment on fair use, the court too
- 6:43found questions for the jury. So as you know,
- 6:46there are four key factors that the court looked
- 6:48at when deciding whether or not a use qualifies
- 6:52as fair use. The first is the purpose and character
- 6:56of the use, including whether it's commercial
- 6:59and whether that use is transformative. as established
- 7:03by the Supreme Court in the case of Campbell
- 7:05versus Acuff -Rose music. Transformativeness
- 7:08occurs when a new work adds something new with
- 7:11a further purpose or a different character, altering
- 7:14the first with a new expression or new meaning.
- 7:21The court's hearing of this motion was before
- 7:25Warhol. But the Warhol decision now requires
- 7:29courts to ask, as part of this first factor,
- 7:32whether and to what extent the use at issue has
- 7:36a purpose or character that is different from
- 7:38the original, and whether that supports a justification
- 7:42for copying. So now the first fair use factor
- 7:45will analyze whether the purpose of the use of
- 7:48the second work is different enough from the
- 7:50first to reasonably justify a copying. So the
- 7:55second and third factor, the nature of the copyrighted
- 8:00work and the amount and substantiality of the
- 8:04portion used. In this case, the Sedley case,
- 8:07the court found that these factors weighed against
- 8:11fair use. Lastly, the effect of the use on the
- 8:15potential market for the original work. Okay,
- 8:18the court found no evidence that the tattoo is
- 8:22a substitute for the primary market for Sedlik's
- 8:25photo, but the court did find a tribal issue
- 8:28with regard to whether there's a market for future
- 8:30uses of the image as a tattoo. All right, so
- 8:36after these cross motions for summary judgment
- 8:38were denied, the case went to a jury in January
- 8:42of 2024. The jury's verdict was a surprise to
- 8:54many. The jury found that the tattoo and the
- 9:00five related works were not substantially similar
- 9:04to the photograph. For the four process images,
- 9:08social media posts where the original photograph
- 9:10was actually visible in the background, the jury
- 9:12found that they were similar but excused the
- 9:14use under the fair use doctrine. Okay. So to
- 9:21understand how the jury reached this result,
- 9:25we must look at how the Ninth Circuit's unique
- 9:28two -part test for substantial similarity. It's
- 9:31the extrinsic intrinsic test. So the extrinsic
- 9:38test, this is the part that's reserved for the
- 9:42court. It's an objective. analytic dissection
- 9:46of the works, and here the court will filter
- 9:48out unprotectable elements like ideas and facts
- 9:53and scenes of fare, and it will then compare
- 9:56only the protectable expressions of the allegedly
- 10:01infringed work with the allegedly infringing
- 10:04work. This stage allows for expert testimony.
- 10:10If the court does not deal with the case at that
- 10:18time, usually it's on a motion for summary judgment,
- 10:23so thereby finding a tribal issue of material
- 10:27fact as to whether or not there is a substantial
- 10:30similarity, and the case goes to the jury, then
- 10:33the jury will employ the intrinsic test. So this
- 10:39test is an entirely subjective test, and it asks,
- 10:44whether an ordinary reasonable observer would
- 10:47define the total concept and feel of the two
- 10:51works to be substantially similar. This test
- 10:55for similarity of expression is from the standpoint
- 10:59of an ordinary reasonable observer with no expert
- 11:04assistant, assistance. So there's no expert assistance
- 11:08here to tell the jury what what elements are
- 11:14protectable under copyright law and what elements
- 11:16are not. This stage is reserved exclusively for
- 11:18the trier of fact or the jury. Okay. So this
- 11:23brings us to Sedlik's appeal. So on appeal, appeal
- 11:30of the jury verdict, Sedlik tried to argue that
- 11:33no reasonable juror could find that the works
- 11:38were not substantially similar to the photograph.
- 11:41That was the only argument that was available
- 11:43to Sedlik on appeal, that the jury's verdict
- 11:46was contrary to the only reasonable conclusion
- 11:50permitted by the evidence for both the intrinsic
- 11:54and the extrinsic test, since both tests are
- 11:58required for substantial similarity. The Ninth
- 12:03Circuit issued a per curiam. opinion, affirming
- 12:07the judgment, the court's reasoning, highlighting
- 12:10a major hurdle for copyright appellants. So the
- 12:15panel held that because the jury found no similarity
- 12:19under the intrinsic test, they didn't even need
- 12:24to reach the extrinsic test because the extrinsic
- 12:29test is a essentially a gut check by laypeople,
- 12:35the court ruled that it could not second guess
- 12:37the jury's subjective interpretation. Effectively,
- 12:42once a jury finds no intrinsic similarity, the
- 12:46verdict becomes virtually unreviewable on appeal
- 12:49and the court openly acknowledged that the intrinsic
- 12:57test is uniquely suited to the jury and therefore
- 13:01nearly immune from appellate review. So this
- 13:06is why Judge Wardlaw's concurrence is so important.
- 13:10In her concurrence, Judge Wardlaw said that the
- 13:16intrinsic test divorced from analysis of protectable
- 13:20elements is legally incoherent. Judge Wardlaw
- 13:25and Judge Johnstone's concurrence, they basically
- 13:28say that the intrinsic test So Judge Wardlaw's
- 13:38concurrence to call for reform. While the court
- 13:43followed precedent, Judge Wardlaw, joined by
- 13:47Judge Johnstone, wrote really blistering concurrences.
- 13:54Judge Wardlaw, argued that the intrinsic test
- 13:58is fundamentally flawed and should be disregarded.
- 14:04The intrinsic test, it's a holistic comparison
- 14:08that focuses on whether the works are substantially
- 14:13similar in total concept and the feel of the
- 14:17works. And then with no more guidance, The jury
- 14:21is left to consider this holistic comparison
- 14:24of the total concept and feel of the two works.
- 14:28She noted that in this case, this test allowed
- 14:33a jury to ignore a quote, a hundred percent exactly
- 14:38the same, close quote, reproduction because of
- 14:42a quote, empty standard, close quote. Her primary
- 14:46legal critique is that the total concept and
- 14:51feel standard actually contradicts section 102B
- 14:56of the Copyright Act, which expressly states
- 14:59that copyright does not protect concepts. By
- 15:04inviting judges to find infringement, sorry,
- 15:07by inviting juries to find infringement based
- 15:10on concept and feel risks collapsing the idea
- 15:16-expression distinction entirely. Judge Johnstone
- 15:22reminds us where this phrase, total concept and
- 15:27feel came from. It came from a 1970 case of Roth
- 15:33greeting cards versus United Card Company. And
- 15:36that phrase was used to refer to the protectable
- 15:40selection and arrangement of otherwise unprotectable
- 15:43elements. Over time, other courts have expanded
- 15:47this phrase This phrase that related to the concept
- 15:51of separating the protectable from the unprotectable
- 15:55to a standalone infringement test that does not
- 15:58have anything to do with separating the protectable
- 16:00from the unprotectable. I mean, it's just ironic.
- 16:04By 1990, the total concept and feel test became
- 16:10the intrinsic test. Basically, the jury's opportunity
- 16:14to say, I know it when I see it. Okay, so we
- 16:24have two concurring opinions that call for the
- 16:27end of this test. So what might a new test look
- 16:33like? Let's start with the second circuit, which
- 16:38has a more discerning ordinary observer test
- 16:42here. And in this test, the works, the examination
- 16:48of the work includes In determining substantial
- 16:53similarity in the Second Circuit, the district
- 16:55will filter out the unprotectable similarities,
- 16:59review whether there are any similarities that
- 17:03remain in light of the overall concept and feel,
- 17:07and dismiss on that basis as a matter of law
- 17:11if the two works are not substantially similar.
- 17:13So here, every aspect of substantial similarity,
- 17:17including the subjective question of whether
- 17:20or not there is a shared concept and feel, that
- 17:24can be determined by a court. Now, the 10th Circuit
- 17:27has a test. They use the abstraction filtration
- 17:33comparison test. This is a model that's often
- 17:36reserved for software cases, but it's applied
- 17:39broadly in the 10th Circuit. This test involves
- 17:42three steps. First step is the abstraction, which
- 17:46is breaking down the work into ideas and expression.
- 17:49The filtering, which is the removing of unprotectable
- 17:53elements like ideas or public domain material.
- 17:56And then the comparison. Assessing if the remaining
- 18:01protectable elements are substantially similar
- 18:03to the defendant's work, requiring then the unprotectable
- 18:09material to be filtered out. before judging the
- 18:13overall similarity of the protectable expression.
- 18:23Judge Wardlaw suggests focusing the test on the
- 18:30filtration of protectable and unprotectable elements
- 18:33and remove any inquiry into a work's total concept
- 18:39and feel. So despite all these different tests
- 18:43and the different tests suggested by Judge Wardlaw,
- 18:49most of the circuits follow kind of the same
- 18:53general format. They separate the unprotectable
- 18:56from the protectable elements and compare only
- 19:00the protectable elements. The Ninth Circuit seems
- 19:03to be the only outlier here where the Ninth Circuit
- 19:08has this expert intensive extrinsic analysis
- 19:17that's left only to the judges, and then this
- 19:21subjective intrinsic analysis that's left entirely
- 19:26to the juries. We're going to have to see what
- 19:30the courts actually do here, and we'll have to
- 19:33see if the Ninth Circuit essentially takes on
- 19:38this invitation to adopt a new form of analysis
- 19:43of substantial similarity. Next, we're going
- 19:53to talk about UNE versus Paramount pictures.
- 19:58I like to say today we're heading into the danger
- 20:01zone, not the cockpit of an F 14, but the equally
- 20:05turbulent waters of the extrinsic test for substantial
- 20:10similarity. So this case, uh, Paramount versus
- 20:15Yoni, it isn't just a, about a billion dollar
- 20:18blockbuster. It's really a deep analysis. in
- 20:22how courts filter out facts from fiction and
- 20:26how the Ninth Circuit treats the selection and
- 20:29arrangement of unprotectable elements. So let's
- 20:33break down how Paramount secured a summary judgment
- 20:35victory that effectively cleared Top Gun Maverick
- 20:39for takeoff. So here's the origin story. It begins
- 20:44in 1983 when Ehud Yone published Top Guns in
- 20:50California Magazine. The article was an inside
- 20:53look at the real Navy fighter weapons school
- 20:57Top Gun based out of Miramar, California. The
- 21:00article begins with a vivid description of two
- 21:04Top Gun F -14 Tomcat aviators, Yogi and Possum,
- 21:08on a hop, a simulated dogfight training against
- 21:12Top Gun instructors. And then the article continues
- 21:15with a deep dive into what makes Yogi and Possum
- 21:18and other fighter pilots tick. The article takes
- 21:22a look at the Top Gun training regimen, what
- 21:25life on base is like, and the history of Top
- 21:28Gun itself. When the article was published, it
- 21:32was optioned by Paramount. And in the credits
- 21:37for Top Gun, Yone is credited on the original
- 21:41movie as the writer of the magazine article.
- 21:46So there are certainly elements. in the article
- 21:49that made it into the original movie, Top Gun,
- 21:53the fact that students practice against instructors,
- 21:56the fact that small replica jets on sticks were,
- 22:00at that time, actually used in training, the
- 22:03tight relationship between the pilot and his
- 22:06radar intercept officer, the kind of high octane
- 22:12testosterone -fueled personalities of these aviators,
- 22:17They just jump off the page. The article even
- 22:20covers an incident where yogi and possum stationed
- 22:24on a carrier in the Indian ocean are dispatched
- 22:27to intercept a Russian plane. Not a fighter as
- 22:31depicted in the movie, but a cargo plane, not
- 22:34really as, you know, exciting as fighter jets,
- 22:38but nonetheless, and then escorting that Aaron
- 22:41plane away the. F -14 is so close that the aviators
- 22:47see the Russian pilots snapping photos of them.
- 22:51There is even a picture of that in the article
- 22:53of two Blue Angels F -14s in back -to -back maneuvers.
- 23:00So following Ehud Yone's death, his heirs exercised
- 23:05their right to terminate the 1983 grant under
- 23:08Section 203A3 effective in 2020 when Top Gun
- 23:12Maverick When Top Gun Maverick was released in
- 23:172022, the Yone sued, alleging that the sequel
- 23:21produced without a new license allegedly infringed
- 23:24the copyright in the original article. So just
- 23:28a little quick word about section 203. So text
- 23:31section 203 of the Copyright Act permits authors,
- 23:35or if the author is not alive, their surviving
- 23:39spouses or children or grandchildren, and others
- 23:43to terminate grants of copyright assignments
- 23:47and licenses that were made on or after January
- 23:501, 1978 when certain conditions have been met.
- 23:57the effective date of termination, all rights
- 24:00in the works that were covered by the terminated
- 24:04grant revert to the author. However, any derivative
- 24:06works prepared under the authority of the grant
- 24:09before its termination may continue to be utilized
- 24:12under the terms of the grant after its termination.
- 24:16But this privilege does not extend to the preparation.
- 24:21after the termination of any other derivative
- 24:24works based on the copyrighted work covered by
- 24:28the terminated grant. Okay, so the Yones, if
- 24:33you followed this case, you know that the Yones
- 24:36took the first sortie in the copyright fight
- 24:39with Paramount. At the district court, Paramount
- 24:43filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the works
- 24:46were not substantially similar because the Yone
- 24:50article is a work of unprotectable fact. In order
- 24:59to state a claim for infringement, a plaintiff
- 25:02must show substantial similarity between the
- 25:05work's protected elements. Determining Whether
- 25:08works are substantially similar, as we know,
- 25:11involves a two -part analysis consisting of the
- 25:14extrinsic and the intrinsic test. The extrinsic
- 25:17test assesses the objective similarities of the
- 25:20two works, focusing only on protectable elements
- 25:23of the plaintiff's expression. In its motion
- 25:27to dismiss, Paramount argued that in applying
- 25:30the extrinsic test and by filtering out the elements
- 25:33that are not protectable under copyright law,
- 25:36so that's facts, ideas, sounds of fair, which
- 25:39include situations and incidents that flow naturally
- 25:43from a basic plot premise, and stock elements,
- 25:47the two works, Maverick and the article, are
- 25:50not substantially similar. In its motion to dismiss,
- 25:54Paramount argued that all elements that are alleged
- 25:56to be similar, the history and operations of
- 26:00Top Gun Academy, the fact that pilots pull off
- 26:03risky aerial maneuvers, that the maneuvers, that
- 26:07the manner of combat training and tactical discussions
- 26:10that the pilots have, the description and depiction
- 26:14of the fighter jets, including their exorbitant
- 26:16cost, pilots doing pushups, Pilots' use of call
- 26:21signs, nicknames, and the description of camaraderie
- 26:25among the pilots, including bar excursions and
- 26:28games, are reported in the article as factual.
- 26:33So Yoni's counsel were ready for Paramont and
- 26:37had their own evasive maneuvers ready to go.
- 26:40In reading the district court's denial of Paramont's
- 26:43motion to dismiss, the key argument which resonated
- 26:46with the court was essentially that it would
- 26:49be contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent to dismiss
- 26:51Yone's case at such an early stage. Because the
- 26:56analytical dissection required to separate protectable
- 27:00from non -protectable elements, which also generally
- 27:04involves expert testimony, and therefore the
- 27:08determination of substantial similarity between
- 27:10protected elements of works which are usually
- 27:15extremely close issues of fact, the Ninth Circuit
- 27:19generally just favors dismissals on grounds of
- 27:22substantial similarity at the Rule 12b6 stage.
- 27:26That was their hook and the court bought it.
- 27:31So in opposition to Paramount's motion to dismiss,
- 27:35the Yones argued that, but for Ehud Yones' literary
- 27:40efforts and his story's evocation, evocative
- 27:45prose and narrative, the Top Gun sequel would
- 27:49not exist. The Yones argued that if Paramount
- 27:54was only interested in the facts about Miramar
- 27:57Naval Air Station, it would have drawn inspiration
- 28:00from the Senate report Paramount equated Yones
- 28:05Article II. The Yones argued that it was the
- 28:09expressive imagery engaging action, engaging
- 28:14character traits, and themes contained within
- 28:17the original article, that were the reasons why
- 28:20Paramount optioned the article in the first place.
- 28:24The Iones point to a list of more than 70 alleged
- 28:28substantial similarities between the original
- 28:35article and the sequel, and that was enough for
- 28:38the district court. The court found that there
- 28:42were enough similarities between the article
- 28:44and Top Gun Maverick for reasonable minds to
- 28:46differ on the issue of substantial similarity,
- 28:49including the filtering out of unprotectable
- 28:51elements and additional development of the factual
- 28:54record would shed light on the issues pertinent
- 28:57to the court's analysis under the extrinsic test.
- 29:02Well, even though Yoni took the first sortie,
- 29:06Paramount was eventually able to splash the Yonez
- 29:10lawsuit at the district court. In Paramount's
- 29:13motion for summary judgment, the court said that
- 29:17any similarities between the article and the
- 29:20sequel were either due to, were essentially due
- 29:25to the inclusion of unprotectable facts, general
- 29:29plot ideas, or Sons Affair. The fact that both
- 29:33the article and the sequel contain top gun instructors
- 29:37and graduate fighter pilots is not actionable
- 29:40since these are factual elements and not protected
- 29:43by copyright. The fact that the article and the
- 29:46sequel are similar because they depict or describe
- 29:50fighter pilots landing on an aircraft character,
- 29:53being shot down while flying and carousing at
- 29:57a bar is a showing of familiar stock scenes or
- 30:02sans -affaire. The court also found significant
- 30:06portions of the article and the movie dissimilar.
- 30:09The themes and moods of the two works are dissimilar,
- 30:13as is the dialogue and the selection and arrangement
- 30:16of elements, including the arrangement of the
- 30:19unprotectable elements. Additionally, the court
- 30:25noted that the dialogue in the article is unprotectable
- 30:29in any event, since it is all historical fact.
- 30:33In summing up the court's objective comparison
- 30:36of the work's respective plots, sequences of
- 30:40events, pacing, themes, mood, dialogue. and characters,
- 30:45the court found that they are not substantially
- 30:48similar. And while the article and the sequel
- 30:50have some similarities, those similarities are
- 30:56based on unprotected elements. For example, a
- 31:01general mood that flows naturally from unprotectable
- 31:05basic plot premise is not entitled to protection.
- 31:09And the Ninth Circuit has said, in Corbello versus
- 31:12Valley, which is known as the Jersey Boys case,
- 31:17that a character based on a historical figure
- 31:19is not protected for copyright purposes. So the
- 31:24court did take into account the expert testimony
- 31:26of both parties. But it found that the plaintiff's
- 31:30expert testimony was unhelpful and inadmissible
- 31:33because that expert failed to filter out the
- 31:37elements of the article in the sequel that were
- 31:38not protected by copyright law. All right. So
- 31:41the Yones appealed the laws to the Ninth Circuit.
- 31:48The Ninth Circuit. OK. The Ninth Circuit framed
- 31:56the case succinctly, explaining that while the
- 32:01article and the film do share some similarities
- 32:05because they both depict real Navy fighter pilot
- 32:08training programs, that alone is not enough.
- 32:12As the court put it, copyright plaintiffs must
- 32:15show more than an allegedly infringing work's
- 32:20general similarity to their own. they must show
- 32:23what is similar to their original expression.
- 32:28The crux of the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of
- 32:32Paramount's win at the district court lies in
- 32:37the extrinsic test. So as I've said now, this
- 32:42will be the third time, this is the objective
- 32:44analytical side of the inquiry where courts filter
- 32:48out unprotectable elements and then compare only
- 32:52the protectable expression that remains. And
- 32:56as you may know, for non -fiction works, copyright
- 33:01protection is deemed to be thin. So this court
- 33:05performed really a methodical filtering of the
- 33:10elements that Leone's claimed supported a finding
- 33:16of substantial similarity. So the first is plot
- 33:20and sequencing. So the article is a nonlinear
- 33:26account of a flight school. The movie is a traditional
- 33:33free act, functional narrative. The court emphasized
- 33:38that Maverick includes major plot elements that
- 33:42simply don't exist in the article, things like
- 33:45the uranium enrichment mission. the maverick
- 33:49rooster conflict, a romantic subplot, and the
- 33:54extended combat finale. So even though both works
- 33:59involve elite fighter pilots and training, the
- 34:02court said those similarities are factual and
- 34:06inevitable when you are depicting a real military
- 34:10program, not protected expression. Characters
- 34:17and settings. The characters in the article were
- 34:21real people and real people are not protectable
- 34:25under copyright law. The court found that general
- 34:29traits like being competitive or a man's man
- 34:34are too abstract for protection. And frankly,
- 34:38those traits are exactly what you'd expect in
- 34:41any depiction of a fighter pilot. You can't copyright
- 34:46that. Similarly, The plaintiff pointed out that
- 34:50both works take place in San Diego at the Naval
- 34:54Air Station in Miramar. Just like real people
- 34:58on which characters are based or maybe based,
- 35:02these are real locations tied to a real program.
- 35:06The court treated that as a factual reality that's
- 35:09not protectable. It's not creative expression.
- 35:14Dialogue. The court actually questioned whether
- 35:18any of the article's dialogue was protectable
- 35:21at all since it was presented as factual reporting
- 35:25of what real pilots said and factual reporting.
- 35:30The facts are not protectable by copyright. Even
- 35:35assuming some dialogue could be protected, the
- 35:38court found that none of it appears in Maverick
- 35:41except for the phrase fight on, which is real
- 35:45world aviation jargon. So there was no meaningful
- 35:49overlap in dialogue, protected or otherwise.
- 35:54Uh, the court dealt next with the, with themes,
- 35:58mood and pace. So the plaintiffs identified themes
- 36:02like redemption, sacrifice, brotherhood, and
- 36:07the dangers of aviation that were all expressed
- 36:11in both the article and in Maverick. However,
- 36:14the court rejected all of these as classic examples
- 36:18of unprotectable ideas. Themes at that level
- 36:23of generality, they simply aren't copyrightable.
- 36:28The court essentially said that allowing protection
- 36:31here would give one author ownership over concepts
- 36:35that belong in the public domain. The plaintiffs
- 36:39made similar arguments about mood. moods shared
- 36:43between both the article and maverick nostalgia
- 36:46romanticism and intensity but the court explained
- 36:51that mood alone isn't in it isn't independently
- 36:56protectable and any shared mood between the article
- 37:00and the motion picture flow naturally from the
- 37:05subject matter of fighter aviation so in other
- 37:08words you make a movie about fighter pilots is
- 37:12going to feel intense and nostalgic. That doesn't
- 37:16make it infringing. Finally, there was pace.
- 37:21The plaintiffs argued that both works alternate
- 37:24between intense fight sequences and quieter moments
- 37:28on the ground. The court rejected that too, explaining
- 37:31that this pacing reflects how... real fighter
- 37:36pilot training actually works, that it's dictated
- 37:39by the subject matter, not by original creative
- 37:43choices. I mean, also, could you imagine a scenario
- 37:47where the pace of a movie like Top Gun Maverick
- 37:52was a particular element, so you had to choose
- 37:54between either being all intense or all quiet
- 37:59and nostalgic? Lastly, the court dealt with scenes
- 38:04of fear, elements like jocks carousing at a bar,
- 38:09or the presence of a brass bell. Those were all
- 38:13deemed to be stocked scenes that naturally flow
- 38:16from the settings of naval aviation. And frankly,
- 38:20those traits are what you'd expect in any depiction
- 38:22of fighter pilots, and you can't copyright that.
- 38:26So once these unprotectable elements are removed,
- 38:30the court found that there was very little left
- 38:32to compare. The court said as follows, we observe
- 38:38a problem that pervades the Yone's arguments.
- 38:42Although the article contains much original protected
- 38:45expression, most notably its vivid phrasing and
- 38:49innovative structure, none of that expression
- 38:51appears in Maverick. Yone's The Yone plaintiffs
- 38:56identify similarities between the article and
- 38:59the film only by describing both works at such
- 39:03a high level of abstraction that the similarities
- 39:07do not involve protected expression. Their claim
- 39:10of substantial similarity fails because what
- 39:14is protected is not similar and what is similar
- 39:17is not protected. So after filtering out the
- 39:21unpredictable elements, what's left, the actual
- 39:24expressive choices Yone made in writing his article,
- 39:28simply are not reflected in Top Gun Maverick.
- 39:32The panel was very clear that this case fails
- 39:37the extrinsic test. The court said because Maverick
- 39:41does not share substantial amount of the original
- 39:45expression of top guns the article, we affirm
- 39:49the district court's grant of summary judgment
- 39:51for Paramount. One argument the heirs pushed
- 39:56hard was that even if the individual elements
- 39:59weren't protected, their selection and arrangement
- 40:01The selection and arrangement of those elements
- 40:03were, but the Ninth Circuit wasn't persuaded
- 40:06by that argument. Either the court explained
- 40:09that the alleged similarities weren't arranged
- 40:12in a sufficiently original or unique way in the
- 40:15article to warrant protection, and in any event,
- 40:18maverick doesn't replicate that structure. One
- 40:21of the things the Ninth Circuit did very methodically,
- 40:24as I said, is they walked through each category
- 40:26of allegedly similar protected expression. And
- 40:31they found no substantial similarity. So this
- 40:35case, it really isn't a sweeping new doctrine
- 40:38or a major expansion of fair use or copyright
- 40:43defense. Actually, they never got the fair use.
- 40:46To me, it just is a very methodical application
- 40:49of the extrinsic test. And I think litigators
- 40:52should take note of. Just how methodical the
- 40:56court was and try to replicate that in any motions
- 41:00to dismiss The court didn't need to reach fair
- 41:04use and it didn't need to reach termination rights
- 41:06in detail It reserved it resolved the case on
- 41:09the cleanest possible ground. No substantial
- 41:12similarity as a matter of law Here's two interesting
- 41:18interesting points that don't that don't really
- 41:22go to the court's determination of no substantial
- 41:26similarity. The first has to do with the expert
- 41:31testimony. The district court included the plaintiff's
- 41:35literary expert, Harry Bean, because he refused
- 41:39to filter out unprotectable facts in his analysis.
- 41:42The Ninth Circuit held that this was not the
- 41:47district court's refusal to take into account
- 41:52the plaintiff's expert, was not an abuse of discretion.
- 41:57The other interesting element was the contract
- 41:59claim. The Yones argued that Paramount breached
- 42:05the 1983 agreement by not crediting Ehud Yone
- 42:08in Maverick. The district court found two conditions
- 42:13for crediting Yone in a movie produced by Paramount.
- 42:19And these are the conditions. One, that the movie
- 42:21was One, produced under the agreement, so the
- 42:25agreement between Yone and Paramount, and two,
- 42:30that the movie was substantially based upon or
- 42:35adapted from the article. Because Maverick was
- 42:39not produced under the agreement, the court concluded
- 42:43that Paramount was not required to credit Yone.
- 42:47The court... The Ninth Circuit agreed holding
- 42:50that the word and means and, and since the movie
- 42:54didn't infringe, it wasn't produced here under.
- 42:58And so no credit was required. Okay. So obviously
- 43:11these cases are different. factually. But there
- 43:16are some similarities and let's take a take a
- 43:19brief look at them. So the outcome. So both of
- 43:22these cases resulted in wins for the defendant
- 43:25with the Ninth Circuit affirming that the allegedly
- 43:29infringing works did not infringe upon the original
- 43:33copyrighted work. Both were Both were defendant
- 43:39wins at different parts of the trial, obviously,
- 43:42and both defendants won on different elements
- 43:49of the analysis of the extrinsic and intrinsic
- 43:53test. Both cases utilize the two -part extrinsic
- 44:00and intrinsic test, but Sedlik focused heavily
- 44:03on the jury's finding of no intrinsic similarity.
- 44:07while Yone focused on the lack of extrinsic similarity.
- 44:13Both decisions emphasize filtering out unprotectable
- 44:16elements before determining similarity. I think
- 44:20the Sedlik case shows a risk that I think, well,
- 44:28pundits say both plaintiffs and defendants, but
- 44:30I think it's more defendants face. where ruling
- 44:35of non -infringement is not reached at the summary
- 44:38judgment phase, and where there are numerous
- 44:43shared unprotectable elements. I'm not saying
- 44:50that a jury would have found Maverick to be an
- 44:52infringing work had the case gone to a jury.
- 44:57I think the result would likely have been the
- 44:59same as at the district court. Like given the,
- 45:07given the difference in the total work, the motion
- 45:11picture versus the article, you had difference
- 45:14in the storylines and also the medium of expression.
- 45:20I think the jury had it, had Yoni versus Paramount
- 45:23gone to a jury and the jury would likely have
- 45:25found the total concept and feel of the article
- 45:29and of both works not to be, um, not to be substantially
- 45:36similar or not to be similar enough to justify
- 45:38finding of substantial similarity. So Sedlec
- 45:43may be remembered as the case that broke the
- 45:46Ninth Circuit's substantial similarity doctrine.
- 45:50If the intrinsic test is eventually abolished,
- 45:53it will represent a massive shift towards a more
- 45:59objective legally grounded standard for infringement.
- 46:04But for now, the ordinary observer's gut check
- 46:08remains the ultimate and often unreviewable deciding
- 46:14factor where a jury is left to decide substantial
- 46:17similarity. I think Yone reinforces several core
- 46:22principles of intellectual property law specific
- 46:26to the entertainment industry. Nonfiction receives
- 46:32a narrower scope of protection. So studios can
- 46:35draw inspiration from real world events and journalistic
- 46:40reporting and real people as long as they do
- 46:44not copy the author's specific expressive choices.
- 46:50And then selection and arrangement is not a catchall.
- 46:55The court in UNA rejected the argument that specific
- 46:58sequences of facts were protected, noting that
- 47:02the. The film Top Gun Maverick did not replicate
- 47:07the article's unique structure. Uh. So a couple
- 47:17of emerging themes and where it looks like we're
- 47:19going to have about 10 minutes for questions.
- 47:22So hopefully you've loaded up that Q &A. Some
- 47:26emerging themes. Obviously, the first one's pretty
- 47:30obvious. The intrinsic test is under fire. The
- 47:34total concept and feel standard actually contradicts
- 47:38section 102B of the Copyright Act, which expressly
- 47:42states that copyright does not protect concepts
- 47:44and fosters a result where unprotectable elements
- 47:48are clearly being considered. Also, it's ironic
- 47:52that this phrase had its origin from the separation
- 48:00of protectable and unprotectable elements, and
- 48:03now it's totally dismissed and divorced from
- 48:07that. It's seemingly certain that a new method
- 48:12for determining substantial similarities is going
- 48:15to emerge. It's curious what the factors will
- 48:21be. Second, the importance of judicial determination
- 48:28while our current test still stands. I think
- 48:34Ione underscores the importance of judicial determination
- 48:37of non -infringement prior to trial, where the
- 48:43allegedly infringing work incorporates unprotectable
- 48:48elements, and one might say where it incorporates
- 48:50a substantial amount of unprotectable elements.
- 48:54It seems obvious to say, but focus on extrinsic
- 48:59comparison and protectable elements and seek
- 49:03judicial determination of non -infringement if
- 49:05you're the defendant. Obviously, if you're the
- 49:08plaintiff, the goal, is to get past the extrinsic
- 49:13comparison and allow the jury to consider the
- 49:16mix of protectable and unprotectable elements
- 49:19as part of the total concept and feel. Once the
- 49:24jury has adjudicated substantial similarity,
- 49:28it's next to impossible to unwind. All right,
- 49:35let me jump to our questions in the Q &A. and
- 49:39see if I can give you some answers. Oh, Jay,
- 49:43you're my best friend. You've asked a lot of
- 49:46questions. That's great. Okay. Did the plaintiff
- 49:50and top gun make an affirmative claim for breach
- 49:54of contract? such as the Coming to America case
- 49:58that Paramount lost. That case interpreted based
- 50:03upon pretty broadly and looks into account the
- 50:07development nexus of the plaintiffs and the defendants'
- 50:10projects, which would have been even clearer
- 50:14here. If so, what was the result? I guess Jay
- 50:17probably wrote that after. or before we talked
- 50:22a little bit about the contract claim. So I'm
- 50:24gonna go to your next question. The court's analysis
- 50:29suggests Paramount didn't need rights in the
- 50:34article to do the first film either, correct?
- 50:38So why do you think Paramount optioned the article
- 50:40for the title, something else? Jay, that's a
- 50:42great question. And you have to ask yourself,
- 50:50Why do studios option life rights agreements
- 50:56for public figures when the story that they want
- 51:03to tell is in the public domain? I think there's
- 51:06a lot of reasons. One, maybe access to research
- 51:10material that didn't appear in the article. I
- 51:14mean, the article was presented as uh, as fact.
- 51:21And the article presented depictions of real
- 51:26life people. As we know, the Copyright Act does
- 51:30not protect real persons, nor, um, does the Copyright
- 51:37Act protect facts. It only protects the creative
- 51:40expression of those facts. Now, maybe Paramount
- 51:46determined that The original top gun movie and
- 51:50top guns, the article, um, had enough similarities
- 51:56of protectable elements to warrant an option.
- 52:00Maybe Paramount option, the article or the article,
- 52:04because they didn't want another studio to option
- 52:09the article. Maybe they didn't want to deal with
- 52:12a potential copyright infringement claim, which
- 52:15I think is most of the reason why. studios, option,
- 52:20works that may not be protectable or enter into
- 52:24life rights agreements with persons when they
- 52:29don't have to. It's just to avoid the hassle
- 52:32and expense of a later claim. As we know, lawyers
- 52:38are expensive and the cost of an option might
- 52:42be less than the cost to defend the claim. Certainly
- 52:47probably was the case here with Maverick. They
- 52:52might have done it just for the name as well.
- 52:58Even though it's questionable, one, whether Top
- 53:03Gun itself, that phrase or the words Top Gun
- 53:07is protectable by copyright, and also questionable
- 53:10whether or not The word copyright is protectable
- 53:14as a trademark, since it is the title of a single
- 53:19artistic work. And under the Lanham Act, titles
- 53:25of single artistic works are not protectable
- 53:30as trademarks. I don't know that I agree with
- 53:33that, but that is the trademark law. Let's see.
- 53:40Jay's got another question. As a drafting tip,
- 53:44after the Top Gun case, should a provision be
- 53:46drafted if the seller of rights in a non -fiction
- 53:49material wants to be entitled to payment for
- 53:52sequels and other subsequent productions? I mean,
- 53:56generally you have in rights agreements, there
- 54:00generally is negotiated either passive payments
- 54:03or some type of other... payment related to a
- 54:10sequel or a prequel or some type of subsequent
- 54:13production. It then will focus on whether or
- 54:25not that work would qualify as a subsequent production.
- 54:30Generally, when you're talking about sequels
- 54:32or prequels, there's a they're defined in the
- 54:40Writers Guild of America. Actually, we did a
- 54:42really interesting podcast on the Pitt lawsuit
- 54:46where we analyzed the freeze language as it relates
- 54:54to sequels and prequels, and we have some discussion
- 54:57about that. Um, and it relates to this subject
- 55:02matter as well. So anybody who's interested in
- 55:05that, I encourage you to look for that podcast
- 55:07episode and, and take a listen. Cause I think
- 55:10it'll provide some clarity here on some drafting
- 55:14suggestions. Uh, and, um, whether or not one
- 55:20should align their definition of. Sequels and
- 55:24prequels to the WGA definition or to. derivative
- 55:31works as that term is defined in the Copyright
- 55:33Act. Gene. Gene asks, where do I find the podcast
- 55:40as in where is it available? I did not see it
- 55:44when I scanned the QR code. Oh, I'll have to
- 55:46tell our marketing department. Go to your favorite.
- 55:51podcast platform, whether that's Apple podcast
- 55:54or Spotify, and look for the briefing by Weintraub
- 55:59Tobin. And you should find it. You should find
- 56:03it there. OK, Jonathan. Oh, OK, here's some insight.
- 56:15As it happens, you and I were both staff writers
- 56:17at California magazine. previously known as New
- 56:20West and a sister publication of the New York
- 56:23Magazine. At the time, his story was published
- 56:25in Option. It was standard practice at both magazines
- 56:29to actively look for movie deals, and the two
- 56:31studios were willing to make deals with modest
- 56:33prices for risk avoidance. Thanks, Jonathan.
- 56:36Yeah, that's kind of exactly what I said. I will
- 56:40note now, we do... as a outside lawyer for a
- 56:46number of studios, we do see a lot of deal making
- 56:49between studios and, um, uh, magazines, uh, companies
- 56:58that, um, like, you know, magazines or newspapers
- 57:03or what have you, like Conde Nast, Bloomberg,
- 57:06et cetera. Okay. Um, I have another question.
- 57:15Even if copyright law doesn't protect life story
- 57:19rights, might another doctrine, but then the
- 57:24option a studio would want to buy would be from
- 57:28the real person, not the journalist. So right,
- 57:30you're talking about the whole issue of right
- 57:34of publicity and the protectability of an individual's
- 57:40persona. We actually have a couple of podcasts
- 57:44on that subject as well, because that comes up
- 57:47quite a bit. The whole issue of whether or not
- 57:54an individual's persona is infringed by the depiction
- 58:00of a particular character in a movie or a motion
- 58:04picture. A lot of times it can come up in the
- 58:07context of a defamation lawsuit. Trying to think
- 58:12of some of the podcasts that we have that talk
- 58:14about that I Think if you just I'm I know that
- 58:19we have at least four or five episodes where
- 58:21we've addressed that episode where you dress
- 58:22that topic I just can't Come it's just not coming
- 58:26to the top of mind any of the episodes Right
- 58:28now, but I would just suggest looking through
- 58:30our titles. It would be pretty obvious Gene this
- 58:36does make me think of the Havilland versus FX.
- 58:39Yeah, that's I love that case. That case gives
- 58:45producers quite a bit of latitude in the depiction
- 58:48of real life people and the need not to obtain
- 58:56life story rights. I'm going to close with Jay's
- 59:04last question. Do you think the intrinsic test
- 59:07will ever be fully... disregarded, what would
- 59:10it take for that to happen? I'm going to answer
- 59:12that question with a please subscribe to my podcast
- 59:17and we'll let you know exactly what happens.
- 59:22I see that our time is up. I hope you've enjoyed
- 59:25this podcast. I've certainly enjoyed giving it.
- 59:30Thank you to the Beverly Hills Bar Association
- 59:32for allowing me to to do this today. and I hope
- 59:39to see you all as subscribers to the briefing.